This article examines the tensions between the Gran Colombian republican constitution of 1821 and Simo'n Boli 'var's fear of a mulatto takeover. It focuses on Cartagena in the 1820s, where the mulato general Jose' Padilla challenged the socio-racial hierarchy. The article uses the protagonists' correspondence, manifestos, criminal investigations, consular reports and censuses.
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Helg 2003_Simón Bolívar and the Spectre of Pardocracia
This article examines the tensions between the Gran Colombian republican constitution of 1821 and Simo'n Boli 'var's fear of a mulatto takeover. It focuses on Cartagena in the 1820s, where the mulato general Jose' Padilla challenged the socio-racial hierarchy. The article uses the protagonists' correspondence, manifestos, criminal investigations, consular reports and censuses.
This article examines the tensions between the Gran Colombian republican constitution of 1821 and Simo'n Boli 'var's fear of a mulatto takeover. It focuses on Cartagena in the 1820s, where the mulato general Jose' Padilla challenged the socio-racial hierarchy. The article uses the protagonists' correspondence, manifestos, criminal investigations, consular reports and censuses.
Post-Independence Cartagena ALINE HELG Abstract. This article examines the tensions between the Gran Colombian repub- lican constitution of 1821 and Simon Bol vars fear of a mulatto takeover. It focuses on Cartagena in the 1820s, where the mulatto general Jose Padilla challenged the socio-racial hierarchy and accepted notions of equality of the city, heading a three- day coup in 1828 against Bol vars attempt to impose a new authoritarian con- stitution. Padilla failed to rally the mostly African-derived population of Cartagena behind the republican views of Francisco de Paula Santander and was promptly executed. Using the protagonists correspondence, manifestos, criminal investi- gations, consular reports and censuses, the article analyses the factors in the citys demography, political leadership and culture, and in the composition of its military forces, that explain Padillas failure. It highlights the role played by race and by Bol vars views of mulattos in the process. From 1810 to 1831 New Granada experienced extraordinary changes as it evolved from a colonial caste society ruled by a distant Spanish monarch to a multiracial republic of free and equal citizens, rst in the union of Gran Colombia and later as an independent nation. The 1820s, in particular, was a decade during which the military leaders who had just defeated Spain confronted elected legislators often themselves former military men over the new nations form of government and its citizens rights and duties. In broad terms, from 1826 the civilians supported the establishment of a con- stitutional republic embodied by the man of letters and vice-president of Gran Colombia, Gen. Francisco de Paula Santander, against the attempts Aline Helg is an Associate Professor in the Department of History at the University of Texas at Austin. The following abbreviations have been used: AHNC (Archivo Historico Nacional de Colombia, Bogota), RE (Seccion Republica), AR (Archivo Historico Restrepo), GM (Fondo Guerra y Marina), HI (Fondo Historia) ; BNC (Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia, Bogota), SM (Sala Manuscritos) ; MAE-Paris (Ministe`re des Aaires Etrange`res, Paris), CCC (Correspondance Consulaire, Colombie, Carthage`ne) ; NA (National Archives of the United States, Washington, D.C.), DCC (Dispatches from the United States Consuls in Cartagena, Colombia, 18221906 [Microcopy]) ; PRO (Public Record Oce, London), FO (Foreign Oce Papers). J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 35, 447471 f 2003 Cambridge University Press 447 DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X03006849 Printed in the United Kingdom by the Liberator and president, Gen. Simon Bol var, and several military leaders to keep Gran Colombia together by imposing authoritarian regimes on Venezuela, New Granada and Ecuador under Bol vars centralised super- vision. By the end of 1830 Bol var had died and Gran Colombia had sep- arated into the three nations. In New Granada the supporters of Santander triumphed over the bolivaristas by mid-1831 and proceeded to restore a re- publican government, but the fact that they achieved their victory on the battleelds rather than at the polls instituted a bipartisan political system (Liberals versus Conservatives) in which it was often military triumph that secured political change. By focusing on the scarcely studied relationship between Bol var, San- tander, the pardo (mulatto) General Jose Padilla, and their respective con- stituencies in the predominantly Afro-Caribbean port city of Cartagena, this article analyses how the socio-racial structures of the colonial past, the spectre of the Haitian Revolution, and contradictory visions of the future shaped these leaders trajectories in the early republic. 1 Whereas fear of people of African descent and the need to keep the lower classes in check dominated Bol vars thinking, the urge for controlling the military, regardless of race, guided Santander. Padilla, who routinely experienced the racism of Cartagenas aristocrats, oscillated between the old scare tactic of mobilising his pardo class and a modern discourse of democracy and equality. In a political culture based on clientelism, in which many white elites under- stood references to blackness and its mixtures as threats of another Haiti, such ambivalence limited Padillas regional leadership. Moreover, unable to choose between military discipline and political beliefs, Padilla cultivated the dual patronage of Bol var and Santander even after the two leaders had clashed and Bol vars authoritarianism began to clearly contradict his own socio-racial interests. When in early 1828 Padilla eventually chose Santander and launched a coup in favour of the latters constitutionalist views, the 1 For brief mentions of Padilla in Bol vars trajectory, see I. Lievano Aguirre, Bol var (1950; reprint, Caracas, 1988), p. 501; G. Masur, Simon Bol var (2nd ed., Albuquerque, 1968), p. 447; John Lynch, Bol var and the Caudillos, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 63, no. 1 (1983), pp. 301; D. Bushnell, The Last Dictatorship: Betrayal or Consummation?, ibid., p. 78. The most complete military biography of Padilla is J. C. Torres Almeyda, El Almirante Jose Padilla (epopeya y martirio) (1983; reprint, Bogota, 1990). See also E. Uribe White, Padilla: homenaje de la armada colombiana al he roe de la batalla del lago de Maracaibo (Bogota, 1973) ; E. Otero DCosta, Vida del Almirante Jose Padilla (17781828 ) (1921; reprint, Bogota, 1973). For a novelised narrative, see J. Zapata Olivella, Piar, Petion y Padilla: tres mulatos de la revolucion (Barranquilla, 1986), pp. 31106. For an innovative discussion of the events in Cartagena in 1828, see J. Conde Calderon, Provincias, ciudadan a y clase en el Caribe colombiano, 18211855, unpubl. thesis, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Programa de Doctorado Las mascaras del poder en el imaginario latinoamericano, Seville, 2001), pp. 1037. 448 Aline Helg santanderistas gave him little support. Bol var could easily accuse him of in- itiating a race war and have him executed. In 1821 Gran Colombia achieved independence from Spain, and the Congress of Cucuta adopted the new nations rst constitution. As other republican constitutions in the 1820s, this document stressed its protection of Colombians liberty, security, property, and equality. It established a system of indirect representation that limited surage to adult men with real property or independent trade, but in practice unqualied military men were allowed to vote until 1827. 2 Simultaneously, all references to the colonial racial categories other than Indians and slaves disappeared from laws, cen- suses, and legal documents. 3 This reected not only the principles of equality promoted by the French Revolution but also the fact that the armies that liberated Gran Colombias territories were racially integrated and made up principally of men of mixed African and Indian ancestry. Although con- gressmen and military leaders tacitly accepted the abolition of the colonial racial privileges as a natural outcome of independence, a few elite native whites worried that constitutional racial equality and the example of the Haitian Revolution could inspire mulattos and blacks into taking power in the regions where they were in the majority, notably Venezuela and New Granadas Magdalena department. Gran Colombias uneasy relations with Haiti added to the governments preoccupation. In 1816, after Spain temporarily reconquered the region, Simon Bol var had welcomed Haitian money, arms and ammunitions to revive the struggle for independence, in return for the abolition of slavery in the territories he would liberate. However, he only partially fullled his promise, as the 1821 manumission law did not free the slaves, but only the children of slave mothers born after 1821. 4 In 1823, unfounded rumours spread that Haiti attempted to destabilise Venezuela and the Magdalena de- partment and that pardos conspired to exterminate whites. The following year the independent government in Bogota refused to establish diplomatic relations with Haiti, on the pretext that it might dissuade the European nations from recognising Gran Colombia. 5 Moreover, Haiti was the only 2 D. Uribe Vargas (ed.), Las Constituciones de Colombia, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1977), pp. 71213; D. Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia (Newark, 1954), pp. 1314. 3 For a British praise of the measure, see F. Hall, Colombia, Its Present State, in Respect of Climate, Soil, Productions, Population, Government, Commerce, Revenue, Manufactures, Arts, Litera- ture, Manners, Education and Inducements to Emigration (London, 1825), p. 14. 4 Ley, 21 Oct. 1821, in Republica de Colombia, Sala de Negocios Generales del Consejo de Estado, Codicacion nacional de todas las leyes de Colombia desde el ano de 1821, hecha conforme a la ley 13 de 1912 (Bogota, 192433), vol. 1, pp. 1417. 5 Consejo extraordinario de gobierno del jueves 8 de julio de 1824, in Acuerdos del consejo de gobierno de la republica de Colombia, 18211824 (1892; reprint, Bogota, 1988), pp. 2356. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 449 American nation neither President Bol var nor Vice-President Santander invited to the Inter-American Congress held in Panama in mid-1826. 6 No leader was more concerned with mulatto power than Simon Bol var. Bol vars apprehension dated back to his rst-hand experience of the racial violence of the troops of pardos as well as manumitted and fugitive slaves under the royalist Jose Tomas Boves against the Venezuelan white creoles in 1814, during the rst phase of the anticolonial struggle, often referred to as a race war. 7 The following year, in two open letters aimed from Jamaica at British readers and seeking European support for the cause of Spanish American independence, Bol var reected on the future of multiracial America. Only through threat and violence, he explained, had Venezuelas people of colour taken arms against the white creoles, but now that Spain had restored its domination on the colony, the same freedmen and slaves had joined the white creoles in their struggle for independence. Yet, Bol var expressed his condence that in Venezuela, as in all indepen- dent Spanish America, the white race, despite being a demographic minority, possessed intellectual capacities that gives it a relative equality with the majority made up of Indians, blacks and the racially mixed. 8 Moreover, he already foresaw the union of New Granada and Venezuela in a nation called Colombia, under a British-inspired political system halfway between dema- gogic anarchies and monocratic tyrannies, similar to the semi-monarchical republic he would propose in 1826. 9 Despite these arguments, in 1815 Bol var failed to obtain British help. Only poor and ostracised independent Haiti, which he visited in 1816 and where President Alexandre Petion ex- emplied mulatto military and political leadership, responded to his request 6 D. Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berkeley, 1993), p. 58. 7 See, for example, Simon Bol var to [ Jefe de las Fuerzas de Tierra de S. M. B.], 17 June 1814, in S. Bol var, Obras completas, V. Lecuna (ed.) (La Habana, 1947), vol. 1, pp. 979. 8 El Americano [Bol var] to Senor redactor o editor de la Gaceta Real de Jamaica, Kingston, [ ?] Sep. 1815, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 1, pp. 17881. Although many historians have analysed this letter and the Letter from Jamaica, few have taken into account that their addressees were British and that one of their main goals was to show that Central and South Americans longed for peace but, as their North American pre- decessors, they could not win the war against their colonial oppressors without the help of other European powers (see, for example, Ernesto Archiga Cordoba, Una nueva propuesta de discusion en torno a la Carta de Jamaica, Cuadernos Americanos, vol. 58, Nueva epoca [ JulyAug. 1996], pp. 2745). 9 Bol var, Contestacion de un americano meridional a un caballero de esta isla [Carta de Jamaica], 6 Sep. 1815, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 1, pp. 15974. On Colombia, Bol var wrote: Its government could imitate the English government ; with the dierence that instead of a king, there will be an elective executive power, at the most for life, but never hereditary, if one wants a republic; a hereditary legislative house or senate, which will mediate between the popular waves and the governments thunderbolts during the pol- itical storms, and a legislative body, of free election, without other restrictions than those of the lower house of England (p. 171). 450 Aline Helg for material support. 10 Petions help did not appease Bol vars racial con- cerns. He realised that only with the full support of the lower classes, which in Venezuela and in large regions of New Granada were made up of people of African descent, could the independence envisaged by members of the native white elite be achieved. At the same time, however, both the Haitian Revolution and his experience in Venezuela made him doubt the nal mo- tives of the pardos and freedmen ghting under the banner of independence; he believed that for many of them race was more important than the nation. This doubt, added to Bol vars desire for absolute leadership, could be deadly for those who stood in his way. As early as 1817, Bol var had the upper-class pardo Manuel Piar executed for challenging his supremacy and allegedly mobilising blacks against whites, but he used rapid military advancement to tame his two other challengers, the aristocrat Santiago Marino and the lower-class but white llanero Jose Antonio Paez. 11 From March 1821 to August 1826 Bol var was in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, but he continued to express his concerns about what he called pardocracia (the rule of the pardos) to his correspondents in Venezuela and New Granada. One of the principal objects of his concern was Cartagena, capital of Magdalena department, where Jose Padilla, the popular pardo general, was committed to making racial equality a practical reality not only in law, but also in the public and private sphere. Born to a lower-class family in Riohacha in 1778, Jose Padilla had acquired a broad experience as a sailor on the Caribbean Sea and while spending three years in a penitentiary in England following his capture at the battle of Trafalgar. In November 1811, after his return to Caribbean New Granada, he joined Cartagenas radical movement. Comprised of the popular classes of predominantly African descent led by the elite creoles Gabriel and German Gutierrez de Pineres, this movement forced the proclamation of the prov- inces independence on the more reformist and aristocratic faction in power. From 1812 to 1814, as the radicals controlled Cartagena, Padilla par- ticipated in the war against the royalists, supporting Bol var against the reformist commander of the regional troops. When in early 1815 the reform- ists regained power in Cartagena, Padilla continued to follow Bol vars leadership, which led to his imprisonment by the Venezuelan aristocrat, Gen. Mariano Montilla, then among Bol vars foes. After Spains reconquest, Padilla took refuge in Haiti. He joined Bol vars expedition from Les Cayes and fought in Venezuela, reportedly witnessing the execution of the pardo 10 P. M. McKinley, Pre-Revolutionary Caracas : Politics, Economy, and Society, 17771811 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 1714. 11 Bol var, A los pueblos de Venezuela, 5 Aug. 1817, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 2, pp. 11016; J. E. Rodr guez O., The Independence of Spanish America (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 1878. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 451 Piar. He became a hero in Cartagena for his decisive role in liberating it from Spain in 1821. In the next two years, together with the newly committed Montilla, Padilla brought independence to Gran Colombias Caribbean Coast, including Santa Marta. His military career culminated at Maracaibo Bay in 1823, when he won the naval battle against Spain that sealed the independence of Venezuela. As a result, Padilla gained broad popularity in Caribbean New Granada. However, in a decision due partly to the fear of pardocracia, the government promoted Montilla, not Padilla, to the position of commander-in-chief of the department of Magdalena, despite the formers previous opposition to Bol var. The personal rivalry between the two men dating back to Padillas imprisonment in 1815 increased, and was exacer- bated by race and class dierences. 12 Montilla suspected pardos and radical patriots of stirring up the issue of race and repeatedly asked Vice-President Santander to remove Padilla from Cartagena for purportedly threatening public order. 13 Simultaneously, the citys white aristocracy did not miss an opportunity to humiliate Padilla, notably by neglecting to invite him to private balls. They alleged that his separation from his legal wife and cohabitation with a mulatto woman ex- cluded him from the category of respectable paterfamilias. To aggravate matters, in 1824 the government in Bogota rewarded Padilla for his triumph at Maracaibo only with a promotion to general and an annual pension of 3,000 pesos. Not fooled, Padilla bitterly compared the high position other military men had obtained as reward for their services with his own rec- ompense, which he qualied as the pay of a mercenary. As an ocer, he wanted to conclude his career with honour, not with a pension. 14 In the end, he was appointed to commander of the navy in Cartagena, a position below his expectations and in which he was doomed to clash with Montilla. In November 1824, in response to defamation by an anonymous paterfamilias, General Padilla issued an incendiary broadside, To the Respectable Public of Cartagena, in which he denounced [the white aristocrats] who each day shamelessly increase their attacks and under- mine the holy edice of the peoples freedom and equality in order to build on its ruins the foundation of ambition and replace the republican ways with their old 12 Uribe White, Padilla, pp. 65133, 194278, 306; Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, pp. 2568, 31924. For vivid descriptions of Padillas popularity in Cartagena, see Uribe White, Padilla, pp. 1812; and among the population of the Magdalena River, see C. A. Gossel- man, Viaje por Colombia, 1825 y 1826, trans. Ann Christien Pereira (Bogota, 1987), pp. 98100. The full name of Padilla was Jose Prudencio Padilla, but he signed his correspondence Jose Padilla. He is sometimes referred to as a zambo rather than a pardo. 13 Montilla to Santander, 10 and 30 April 1822, 20 Aug. 1822, 20 Feb. 1823, in M. Montilla, General de division Mariano Montilla: homenaje en el bicentenario de su nacimiento, 17821982 (Caracas, 1982), vol. 2, pp. 9223, 927, 943, 969. 14 Padilla to Santander, 30 Aug. 1824, in Uribe White, Padilla, pp. 3013. 452 Aline Helg privileges and the exclusive domination of a small and miserable portion of families over the great majority of the peoples. Furthermore, he warned that the sword that I brandished against the king of Spain, this sword with which I gave days of glory to the fatherland, this same sword will support me against anyone who tries to lower my class and degrade my person. 15 This declaration oers a rare insight into Padillas vision of equality. To him, if the republic had banned privileges of birth and race, only service to the fatherland should matter in the new social hierarchy. And because of his outstanding military achievements, he deserved his superior rank and the respect due to it, regardless of his lower-class origin and pardo race. However, even if he considered himself superior to his fellow citizens, in his view he was not only an individual of republican merits but also part of a colonial socio-racial category the pardo class. Any aront to him was an aront to all pardos and, by extension, to the republic they had helped to build more than had the white elite. With this argument, Padilla openly deed the socio-racial hierarchy inherited from Spanish colonialism and threatened to rally the entire pardo class, regardless of economic or military standing, behind him. Padillas vision of equality clashed with the position of the cartagenero aristocrats surrounding Montilla, who perceived further demands by pardos, such as equal advancement with whites and equality in private relations, as proofs of arrogance and violations of the private sphere. Padilla was also out of line with many free men of African descent who accepted the ocial egalitarian discourse. By using the colonial racial category of pardos to make democratic claims, he could fairly have been criticised for being a man of the past who clung to the Spanish caste system. Moreover, by announcing that he would use his sword to defend the equal rights and full integration of his pardo class at all levels, Padilla formulated the very scenario that, since the late 1790s, colonial and early independent authorities had predicted would transform Caribbean New Granada into another Haiti. In other words, when Padilla began to use race as a mobilising idea, his detractors could easily raise the spectre of the Haitian Revolution and accuse him of preparing a race war. Indeed, the legal equality contained in the constitution and the scarecrow of pardocracia prohibited people of African descent in general from making demands as pardos. Padillas broadside sent shock waves as far away as Santander in Bogota and Bol var, still at war in Peru, prompting an exchange of letters in 1825 15 General Jose Padilla, Al respectable publico de Cartagena, 15 Nov. 1824, in AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI, caja 88, vol. 170, fols. 12526. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 453 between the two white generals about the threat of pardocracia. Bol var saw Padillas protest as representative of the disposition that [ Padilla] has toward the government and the system _ I think that this aair very much deserves the attention of the government, not to thrash but to take measures that spare in the future the horrible disasters that Padilla himself foresees. Legal equality is not enough for the spirit the people have, as they want absolute equality, in the public and the domestic areas alike; and next they will want pardocracia, which is their natural and unique propensity, in order to then exterminate the privileged class. 16 Bol var did not dene the measures he estimated to be necessary then but he expressed his conviction that equality and by extension, the power of prominent pardos should have limits, otherwise people of African descent would dominate and massacre whites. Far less critical of Padilla, Santander responded to Bol var : I dont know how the germ of pardocracia could be destroyed. Nothing pleases [the pardos] and everything annoys them. They want everything exclusively; and I must be fair with Padilla, who until now is among those who least spread scandal . 17 Nevertheless, Padillas declaration of November 1824 failed to mobilise Cartagenas free population of colour. Moreover, it did not diminish his popularity among the enfranchised citizens who in February 1825 elected him a senator of the republic for the department of Magdalena. In August, as a member of Cartagenas electoral council, Padilla took part in Gran Co- lombias presidential election. Like almost all electors in the nation, he re-elected Bol var to the presidency. But unlike most of Magdalenas electors, who voted for the native cartagenero, Finance Secretary Jose Mar a Castillo y Rada, Padilla also cast his vote for Santander, and so helped to secure the vice-presidents more contested re-election. 18 As a result, Santander and Bol var expressed to each other their renewed condence in the pardo leader. Santander wrote to Bol var that Padilla was one of the most enthusiastic friends of the government, who idolises me but you above all . 19 Bol var did not hesitate to characterise Padilla as the most important man of Colombia and added, I like him very much for his record of service and his adhesion to me. May God keep him in this feeling. 20 However, Bol vars optimism was shortlived. In January 1826, Gen. Jose Antonio Paez used troops to enforce enlistment in the militia among the male inhabitants of Caracas. A majority in Gran Colombias senate promptly 16 Bol var to Santander, 7 April 1825, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 1, p. 1076. 17 Santander to Bol var, 21 July 1825, in F. de Paula Santander, Cartas SantanderBol var (Bogota, 1990), vol. 5, p. 16. 18 Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 155; Bushnell, Santander Regime, pp. 31921. 19 Santander to Bol var, 6 Oct. and 6 Nov. 1825, in ibid., pp. 60, 1012. 20 Bol var to Santander, 27 Oct. 1825, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 1, p. 1222. 454 Aline Helg voted to summon Paez to stand trial in Bogota, which Padilla and some others opposed. In April, Paez deed Santanders government and launched a massive rebellion in Venezuela. From Peru, Bol var began to fear that Padilla would emulate him in Cartagena and became convinced that in Venezuela and Caribbean New Granada the root of the problem was that pardocracia was gaining ground. 21 Increasingly, race, conated with class, dominated Bol vars social thinking. He lamented the abominable com- posite of these hunting tigers who came to America to spill her blood and breed with the victims before slaughtering them, to later mix the bastard fruits of these unions with the fruits of the slaves uprooted from Africa. With such physical mixes, with such moral elements, one could not establish laws and principles, but only prepare the beautiful ideal of Haiti , he as- serted. However, it was impossible to return to the order Spain had main- tained for so long or to build a new order through more laws, and it was dangerous to entrust it only to the army. We will have Guinea and more Guinea; and I am not joking, those who will escape with their white faces will be very lucky. 22 The Liberator also had growing doubts about the success of a republican government in Gran Colombia and the civil administration of Santander. In his view, only strong military leaders caudillos could prevent the end of Gran Colombia and the rise of new Haitis. But this presented him with an irreconcilable dilemma, as he believed that the African-descended lower class would only obey a leader born into their own class, but he refused to put any mulatto or black in high positions of power, for fear of pardocracia. 23 Thus, to the surprise of many, he perceived Paez as Venezuelas lesser evil : although he was a rough lower-class llanero, he was white, popular, and supported by a portion of the aristocracy. However, Bol var could not nd an adequate leader for Caribbean New Granada: Montilla was from the white elite but without a massive following; Padilla, a lower-class pardo with broad popularity who agitated for racial equality. As Bol var wrote to San- tander, Both seem very devoted to me: the rst one cannot [do] anything; the second can [do] everything. 24 As a result, Bol var began to profess that only by adopting the semi-monarchical constitution he had designed for Bolivia, would Gran Colombia and Peru cure themselves from all the ills typical of the young, multiracial and mostly illiterate Spanish-American nations. Bol vars pan-Andean constitutional project consisted of a feder- ation of authoritarian republics placed under the supreme authority of 21 Bol var to Antonio Jose Sucre, 12 May 1826, and Bol var to Santander, 7 June 1826, in ibid., pp. 1323, 1365. 22 Bol var to Santander, 8 July 1826, in ibid., pp. 13901. 23 Bol var to Santander, 7, 13, and 23 June 1826, in ibid., pp. 1365, 1371, 1379. 24 Bol var to Santander, 7 May 1826, in ibid., p. 1322. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 455 a president for life (himself) who was to choose his successor, as sketched from Jamaica in 1815. The project guaranteed equality and banned all privi- leges as well as slavery, but limited surage to those who were literate, paid taxes, and had an occupation. 25 It violated the 1821 constitution, which authorised no revision before 1831. Bol var sent from Lima the caraqueno Antonio Leocadio Guzman, well known for his role in Paezs rebellion and his anti-Santander feelings, with the mission of rallying the military and civic leaders of several cities behind his project of semi-monarchical constitution. 26 Not surprisingly, Guzman carried two letters of instructions from Bol var to Cartagena: one for Padilla, the other for Montilla. In eect, as Bol var increasingly suspected Padilla of promoting pardocracia and being in sympathy with Paez, he began to consider Montilla, for whom he previously had little esteem, as his most dependable ally in the region. 27 Despite the profound enmity between Montilla and Padilla, both facili- tated the task of Guzman when he arrived in Cartagena in September 1826. Within a couple of days, the town council and male heads of families had been pressured into signing the resolution against the legal government of Santander concocted by Guzman, who proudly reported to Bol var the citys complete adherence to his dictatorship. 28 However, the correspondence of several cartageneros to Santander illustrates the deep divisions within the native elite. It also shows the limits of Padillas popularity and how the fear of being accused of promoting pardocracia restricted him. In Padillas own words, the letter from Bol var left him no choice but to listen to the ideas and to trust the Liberator. 29 He told Santander: If I had not taken this step, maybe Montilla would have been the cause of the spilling of many torrents of blood, because should he have sought to launch [a rebellion] like Paez in Caracas, I would not have allowed it, and you can see how the action 25 Bol var to Santander, 27 Dec. 1825 and 13 June 1826, in ibid., pp. 12524, 1371; Bol var to Sucre, 12 May 1826, in ibid., pp. 13234; Lievano, Bol var, p. 462. See also note 9. 26 Bol var to Rafael Urdaneta, Cristobal Mendoza, Francisco Javier Yanes, Jose Padilla, Mariano Montilla, Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, Juan Paz del Castillo, and Pedro Briceno Mendez, 68 Aug. 1826, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 1, pp. 140815. See also Bol var to Paez, 4 Aug. 1826, in ibid., pp. 14068. On Antonio Leocadio Guzman and his appreci- ation of Bol vars constitutional project, see Jaime Duarte French, Poder y pol tica: Colombia, 18101827 (Bogota, 1980), pp. 46872, 4805. 27 See Montillas correspondence with Bol var, in Montilla, General de division, vol. 1, pp. 21749, 56577; Padilla to Santander, 20 Aug. 1826, and Padilla to Paez, 29 July 1826, in Archivo Santander, ed. Ernesto Restrepo Tirado (Bogota, 191332), vol. 15, pp. 12529. 28 Antonio L. Guzman to Bol var, 1 Oct. 1826, in D. F. OLeary, Memorias del General OLeary publicadas por su hijo, Simon B. OLeary, por orden del gobierno de Venezuela y bajo los auspicios de su presidente, general Guzman Blanco (Caracas, 18741914), vol. 2, pp. 35455. 29 Padilla to Santander, 2 Oct. 1826, in Archivo Santander, vol. 15, pp. 22932. 456 Aline Helg would have gone. 30 Yet, the ideas contained in the public act Padilla supported in September 1826 sharply contradicted his 1824 broadside. The act made no references to equality and democracy but stressed the central role of Bol var as the father of the Fatherland. Implicitly reassuming the position of king of Spain, Bol var was the common centre that united all interests, neutralised all oppositions, and irradiated all virtues. To be national was to follow him. 31 In September 1826 Bol var left Peru and arrived in Bogota two months later to assume the special powers reserved by the constitution to the presi- dent in case of a national crisis. He promulgated extended legislation to rell the treasury and reduce the public service and the armed forces. Most unpopular among these measures was his decision to restore the colonial alcabala (sale tax) and head tax, which he xed at three pesos on every male over the age of fourteen, regardless of status. Discontent grew, and violence broke out in Venezuela, prompting Bol vars departure to negotiate with General Paez. In many regions, federalism was on the rise, and rumours of secession multiplied. 32 In Andean New Granada, many cities mobilised against Bol vars constitutional project and issued acts supporting Vice- President Santander and the 1821 constitution. In Bogota, the conict be- tween Bol vars supporters and those of Santander escalated. Thus, Cartagenas unconditional support for the Liberator was increas- ingly at odds with most of New Granada. The citys bolivarista publications and polemics turned more and more aggressive against Santander and his factious followers. 33 Despite the vigilance of Montilla, there too pro- Santander sentiments were gaining ground among some ocers and cartageneros. In March 1827, the British consul, a rm advocate of Bol var, worried about some intrigues to seduce the 4,000 undernourished and un- paid troops garrisoned in the city to favour views which are called consti- tutional . 34 Nevertheless, Cartagenas unity behind the Liberator lasted through most of 1827. When in July Bol var stopped in Cartagena on his way back from Venezuela, the Army and the population welcomed him warmly. 30 Cited in Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 189. 31 Acta de la municipalidad de Cartagena, 29 Sep. 1826, in Efeme rides y anales del estado de Bol var [ed. Manuel Ezequiel Corrales], (Bogota, 1889), vol. 2, pp. 3368. See also Fiestas nacionales en diciembre de 1826, Gaceta de Cartagena de Colombia, 31 Dec. 1826, in ibid., pp. 3434; La Lanza Llanera (Cartagena), 1826 (n.d.), AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI, caja 88, vol. 170, fols. 14142. 32 J. M. Macpherson to Henry Clay, 24 March 1827, NA, DCC, roll 1; Bushnell, Santander Regime, pp. 33843. 33 For examples of anti-Santander publications in Cartagena, see AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI, caja 88, vol. 170, fols. 14459. 34 Edward Watts to George Canning, 27 March 1827, and Watts to John Bidwell, 29 March 1827, in PRO, FO 1845. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 457 Bol var boasted to Paez: I have met a very enthusiastic people [and] two excellent friends in Generals Montilla and Padilla. 35 The navy, despite Bol vars attempts to reduce it, hosted a sumptuous banquet for him at Padillas cramped home. 36 Ceding to the bolivarista pressure, in August 1827 the national congress, controlled by the santanderistas, agreed to hold a convention in Ocana on 2 March 1828 to revise the 1821 constitution. The election of the delegates to the convention was set for November, but the congress, in order to weaken the bolivaristas, decided strictly to enforce the surage requirements imposed by the 1821 constitution, disenfranchising soldiers and lower-ranking ocers in active service who until then had been discreetly allowed to vote. As a result, the election produced a minority of delegates in favour of Bol var, prompting rumours that he would launch a coup detat. 37 By late 1827 support for democratic institutions became vocal even in Cartagena. Generals Padilla and Montilla resumed their dispute, despite the Liberators call for order. 38 The bolivaristas showed increasing nervousness, particularly after Montilla, their candidate to the convention, failed to be elected. By early February 1828, for Padilla, the salvation of the Fatherland had ceased to depend on Bol var and his authoritarian constitution. To Santanders great satisfaction, Padilla now backed the santanderista delegates to the convention who would defend a freedom guaranteed by a popular representative system. 39 In response, the pro-Bol var sectors led by Montilla had the military chiefs and many ocers in the ground units issue an Ex- posicion to the convention in Ocana that blamed the misery and shrinking prerogatives of the army on the civilian government of Santander and backed Bol vars strong power. 40 Some ocers who refused to sign the document were threatened with transfer to remote posts. Padilla stood up for them and, as the commander of the navy, prohibited the ocers under his authority to sign the manifesto. On 29 February 1828 the two parties clashed in a tavern; the defenders of the civil government called the champions of Bol var servile, and the latter called the advocates of Santander factious. Padilla oered to defend those who had refused to sign with his sword if necessary. 35 Bol var to Paez, 11 July 1827, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 2, p. 141. 36 For a description of the banquet at Padillas home, see Aurora de Colombia (Cartagena), 2 Aug. 1827. On Bol vars policy toward the Navy in 182627, see Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, pp. 1613, 1802, 188. 37 Ley, 29 Aug. 1827, in Colombia, Codicacion nacional, vol. 3, p. 307; P. Moreno de Angel, Santander : Biograf a (Bogota, 1989), pp. 393408; Bushnell, Santander Regime, pp. 26970. 38 Bol var to Montilla, 6 Nov. 1827, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 2, p. 194. 39 Padilla to Santander, 9 Feb. 1828, in Archivo Santander, vol. 17, pp. 2456; Santander to Juan Madiedo, 10 and 17 March 1828, in ibid., pp. 260, 286. 40 Exposicion dirigida a la Gran Convencion por la division del Magdalena, 25 Feb. 1828, AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI, caja 88, vol. 170, fols. 16167. 458 Aline Helg Cartagenas acting commander-in-chief, Jose Montes, found the situation explosive enough to ask for intervention from Montilla, who was in his hacienda in Turbaco, fteen miles from Cartagena, but whom Bol var had authorised to assume unlimited power whenever necessary. Instead, Montilla chose to let the conict grow. 41 By late February, when Bol var had taken the rst steps of his dictatorship, suspicions among santanderistas that he would cancel the convention had escalated. 42 On 2 March 1828 Padilla rallied some ocers of African descent and told them that he was leading the people to protect their freedom and the convention because if the crown [i.e., Bol vars constitution] was to be- come reality, they would kick us for being pardos. 43 Padilla also attempted to mobilise a lower-ranking pardo ocer by asking him whether he could not see that he had not advanced with so many years of service and that tomorrow they would put above him any little white candidate as ocer, as it was happening. 44 Rumours began to spread that Padilla was arming a large number of individuals in Getseman , Cartagenas predominantly black and mulatto suburb. On 5 March some ocers in the pro-Bol var artillery shouted Death to General Santander ! Padilla devised with Montes a way to stop the crisis. Montes resigned, and a commission nominated Juan Antonio Gutierrez as the commander-in-chief. The acting intendant of Magdalena, Vicente Ucros, remained in his post. Simultaneously, still from Turbaco, Montilla assumed the extraordinary faculties given to him by Bol var to restore the public tranquillity threatened by a spirit of faction. 45 In order to precipitate the downfall of Padilla, Montilla ordered all the mili- tary units to pull out of Cartagena at 2:00 a.m. on 6 March and to transfer to Turbaco. By so doing, he lured Padilla into taking charge with the intent of accusing him of launching a coup and promoting the long-awaited race war in the Caribbean Coast. 46 41 Montilla to secretario de estado del despacho del interior, 7 March 1828, in Efeme rides [ed. Corrales], vol. 2, pp. 35961; Padilla to director de la comision de la Gran Convencion, 12 March 1828, in Gaceta de Colombia (Bogota), no. 342, 1 May 1828, facsimile edition (Bogota, 1973). 42 Decretos del Libertador (Caracas, 1961), vol. 3, pp. 2732. 43 Proceso por los tumultos de Cartagena levantado por el general Mariano Mon- tilla _ contra el general Padilla y los ociales que se negaron a rmar la representacion militar contra la convencion de Ocana, 12 March 1828, in Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 331. 44 Proceso por los tumultos, p. 334. 45 Montilla to secretario de estado, in Efeme rides [ed. Corrales], vol. 2, pp. 3612. See also Padilla to director de la comision, 12 March 1828; Apelacion a la razon (Bogota, 1828), in Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 348; Jose Montes to Montilla, n.d., in Montilla, General de division, vol. 1, pp. 38890. 46 La Cotorra (Cartagena), 23 April 1828; Apelacion a la razon, pp. 34551; Manifestacion que Manuel Perez de Recuero hace a sus conciudadanos, Cartagena, 20 July 1831, BNC, SP, no. 573; Otero, Vida del Almirante, pp. 918; Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 209. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 459 As expected by Montilla, Padilla immediately mobilised the navy and the soldiers who were left in the city and assigned them to key guard posts. Allegedly responding to popular pressure, he then assumed the military command of the department, a decision he knew was illegal but he thought necessary to bring the besieging general [Montilla] to reason. 47 According to Cartagenas municipal council and the British consul, Padilla acted only to secure the citys tranquillity, and there were no thefts or disorders on 6 March and the following days. 48 On 6 March all cartagenero men were called to a meeting in which the issues of liberty and equality were at the forefront. Padilla declared that Montillas goal was to destroy the 1821 constitution and to dissolve the Ocana con- vention, and he committed himself to defend the peoples freedom with his sword. 49 However, he said nothing in favour of slave emancipation or the Haitian Revolution. As recognised by a pro-Bol var newspaper, Padilla never accepted various propositions of plundering, contributions, and ex- termination made to him. 50 In fact, according to all the declarants in the investigation opened by Montilla a few days later, the most vocal activist and Padillas guide was Ignacio Munoz, a radical white lawyer who had played a leading role during the province of Cartagenas First Independence (181015). 51 Munoz told the assembled men that he wished for the death of Montilla because the latter wanted to subjugate the rest of the Colombian population by tyranny, principally by the Bolivian Charter; that the latter would be of no advantage for the second class [the pardos], because they were the ones who had fought on the battleelds to suppress the tyranny; that Munoz harangued General Padilla that in no way should he yield but carry on the ght until the ultimatum. One witness declared that Munoz had asked the militiamen whether they did not recognise [Padilla] as general commander and intendant, whether they wanted to be slave or free. 52 Not a single declarant stated that Padilla had mobilised the population of colour against the whites. But two whites testied that on 6 March the pardo Captain Damian Berr o had told them that Jose Ignacio Ibarra, a stranger _ of African colour, stirred up the racial question, even saying that one should 47 Padilla to director de la comision, 12 March 1828. 48 Apelacion a la razon, p. 350. See also Watts to Earl of Dudley, 7 March 1828, PRO, FO 1857, 11318; El Calamar (Cartagena), 13 March 1828, in AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI, caja 77, vol. 5. 49 Proceso por los tumultos, pp. 329, 333, 334. 50 El Amanuense, 16 March 1828. 51 On Cartagenas First Independence, see A. Munera, El fracaso de la nacion. Region, clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano (17171810) (Bogota, 1998) ; A. Helg, The Limits of Equality: Free People of Color and Slaves during the First Independence of Cartagena, Colombia (181015) , Slavery and Abolition, vol. 20, no. 2 (1999), pp. 130. 52 Proceso por los tumultos, pp. 333, 337, 338. 460 Aline Helg give the signal to behead the whites. However, when Berr o gave his deposition, he said that Ibarra had only expressed his fear of a war against whites, which would force him to escape for being at risk as a foreigner. 53 On 7 March the municipal council of Cartagena refused to declare Padilla Magdalenas new intendant. It was decided to send two emissaries to nego- tiate a settlement with Montilla: the santanderista Munoz and the bolivarista Juan de Francisco Mart n, a rich merchant of Spanish descent who had been a royalist during the First Independence and in 1824 had humiliated Padilla. 54 The mission, however, was to no avail. Montilla restated that he had assumed extraordinary powers and began to redirect the troops to Cartagena. 55 The next day, tensions in the city reportedly escalated to the point that some men of African descent were talking about killing whites. 56 Simultaneously, Padilla realised that his supporters had abandoned him. He returned the military command of Cartagena to Jose Antonio Pineres and left with Munoz and a few others for Mompox, on the Magdalena River. 57 In a letter to the US consul, Padilla declared that he had left Cartagena in order to prevent the spilling of blood that Montilla would have prompted if he had attacked him. 58 When the troops under Montilla re-entered Cartagena, the supporters of Padilla oered no resistance. Several ed; others were arrested and imprisoned. 59 As soon as he reached Mompox, Padilla wrote to Bol var, blaming Car- tagenas events on Montilla. 60 In the same breath, however, he denounced Montillas misuse of power to the president of the convention in Ocana, oering to help defend the convention against any attack by bolivaristas. 61 Padilla also sent an insulting letter to Montilla that instructed him to leave Cartagena in peace and return to his native Venezuela. 62 Nevertheless, once he arrived in Ocana Padilla only obtained passive support from the pro- Santander delegates. He also failed to get practical advice from those who backed Bol var. Quite disillusioned, he returned to Mompox, but the tight security ordered in the city by Montilla forced him to continue to Cartagena, where he arrived on 1 April 1828. He was immediately arrested, accused of planning a race war in the city, and imprisoned in Bogota. There he was 53 Ibid., pp. 32730. 54 Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, pp. 1458. 55 El Amanuense o Rejistro pol tico y militar (Cartagena), 16 March 1828, in NA, DCC, roll 1. 56 Proceso por los tumultos, pp. 331, 333. 57 Padilla to director de la comision, 12 March 1828; Vicente Ucros, Al publico, Cartagena, 19 May 1832, BNC, SS, Sala 1, no. 12881, pieza 32. 58 Padilla to consul de los Estados Unidos de la America del Norte, 9 March 1828, in NA, DCC, roll 1. 59 Otero, Vida del Almirante, pp. 978. 60 Padillas 12 March 1828 letter to Bol var is partly cited in Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, pp. 21415. See also J. Posada Gutierrez, Memorias historico-pol ticas (Bogota, 1929), vol. 1, p. 128. 61 Padilla to director de la comision, 12 March 1828. 62 Padilla to Montilla, 13 March 1828, in Montilla, General de division, vol. 1, pp. 3945. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 461 fatally entangled in a santanderista conspiracy against Bol var. On 25 Sep- tember 1828, the night of the attempted murder of the Liberator, con- spirators entered Padillas jail, killed his guard, gave him the latters sword, and ran away with him. After turning himself in, Padilla was swiftly tried and sentenced to death, with thirteen other defendants, for a conspiracy he did not plan and a murder he did not commit. The next day, on 2 October, a deant General Padilla was publicly stripped of his rank and shot, and his body displayed hanging from the gallows. The presumed leader of the con- spiracy, the white creole Santander, was reprieved and exiled. 63 The tragic conclusion of the life of Jose Padilla illustrates again the double standard that guided the Liberator. From 1826 to 1828 Bol var pardoned and nego- tiated with the white llanero Jose Antonio Paez, despite the fact that the latter headed a full-edged rebellion of Venezuela against the legal government in Bogota, but he executed the pardo Padilla for a three-day bloodless coup in Cartagena. Still, Padillas fate also raises important questions. The most immediate one is about the leading role played by Ignacio Munoz, of dubious pro- Santander credentials, in the radicalisation of Padillas brief coup and ensuing downfall, which has puzzled witnesses of the events, contemporaries and historians alike. 1828 was not the rst time that Munoz had distinguished himself as a popular leader. During the First Independence of Cartagena, he had mobilised on several occasions large numbers of Cartagenas free men of colour behind the radical Gutierrez de Pineres brothers. After the Spanish reconquest in 1815 he took refuge in Les Cayes, Haiti, from where he par- ticipated with Padilla in an expedition to re-liberate Venezuela. He was a skilful manipulator of crowds, whom he harangued like a preacher . 64 That he seized the opportunity to act again in 1828 behind or perhaps against Padilla is not surprising. Less understandable is the fact that Padilla ac- cepted Munozs support, when the two men had a long history of petty denunciation and physical aggression against each other, which Montilla had used to denigrate Padilla. Simultaneously, Padilla had repeatedly asked San- tander to remove Munoz, this very evil man, from Cartagena. 65 As late as February 1827 Padilla had warned Santander that Munoz was in jail for having attempted to incite Cartagenas troops to rebel against himself and 63 E. Ortega Ricaurte (ed.), Documentos sobre el proceso de la conspiracion del 25 de Septiembre de 1828 (Bogota, 1942), pp. 1315, 249. See also J. M. Cordovez Moure, Reminiscencias de Santafe de Bogota, ed. Elisa Mujica (Madrid, 1957), pp. 7323, 741. 64 Proceso por los tumultos, p. 337; D. Bossa Herazo, La vida novelesca e infortunada del doctor Ignacio Munoz , palad n de la libertad (Cartagena, 1961), p. 9. 65 Padilla to Santander, 10 May 1825, in Archivo Santander, vol. 11, pp. 3556; Montilla to Santander, 20 Sep. 1825, in Montilla, General de division, vol. 2, pp. 99192; Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, pp. 14950. 462 Aline Helg Montilla but that he probably would not be properly punished. 66 In March 1828, Munoz not only radicalised and racialised Padillas movement in Cartagena, he also represented him at the meeting with Montilla, where, according to a pro-Bol var newspaper, he sold out Padilla. 67 Furthermore, although eeing with Padilla, when Munoz was caught in June 1828 he made a sworn declaration that provided the principal piece of evidence against Padilla until the latters entanglement in the attempted murder of Bol var. He accused Padilla of being the leader, together with several delegates to the convention, of a broad armed conspiracy to prevent the adoption of the Bolivian constitution and to separate New Granada from Gran Colombia. Padillas intention upon leaving Ocana, Munoz claimed, was to stir up rst Mompox then Getseman and the navy in Cartagena, but he failed to nd backing. 68 Indeed, a more fundamental question is why the popular Padilla failed to mobilise Cartagena in early March 1828. Why was the disliked General Montilla able to restore his control over the city and to arrest Padilla there? According to the British consul, Padilla plotted to overthrow all the sup- porters of Bol var in Magdalena, conding in the strength of his own party among the people of colour, los Pardos as he terms them. But they deserted him. 69 Other sources conrm that as early as 7 March Padilla ac- cused of apathy the people he could not move, and of treason the ocers who misleadingly had oered him the cooperation of their units. 70 As a close associate wrote to Bol var after meeting with Padilla in Ocana, Re- garding Cartagena, I will say that Your Excellency has formed a very exag- gerated idea of the event. Padillas steps in this city and the behaviour he observed with me show, without any doubt, that he has no party at all. 71 In fact, only a close examination of Cartagenas society and economy in the 1820s allows for an understanding of the isolation of Padilla in 1828. In the late 1820s, Cartagena still suered from the eects of the wars of inde- pendence and the deadly siege imposed by the Spanish general Pablo Morillo in 1815, which left the city partly destroyed with the loss of about one- third of its inhabitants. 72 According to the census of 1835, Cartagenas total 66 Padilla to Santander, 25 Feb. 1827, in Archivo Santander, vol. 16, pp. 2456. 67 La Cotorra, 23 April 1828. For a later conrmation of this accusation, see Ucros, Al publico, BNC, SS, Sala 1, no. 12881, pieza 32. 68 Urdaneta to Montilla, 28 July 1828, in Archivo Santander, vol. 17, p. 374; Declaracion del senor doctor Ignacio Munoz, 7 June 1828, in OLeary, Memorias del General OLeary, vol. 26, pp. 2923. 69 Watts to Earl of Dudley, 8 March 1828, PRO, FO 1857, 11819. 70 El Amanuense, 16 March 1828. 71 Daniel OLeary to Bol var, 5 April 1828, in Cordovez, Reminiscencias de Santafe , p. 693. 72 Reminiscencias del sitio de Cartagena, hechas por el esclarecido ciudadano Lino de Pombo, 8 April 1862, in [M. E. Corrales, ed.], Documentos para la historia de la provincia Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 463 population reached only 11,929, in contrast to an estimated 17,600 in 1809. 73 For many residents in 1828 the memory of the horrors of the 1815 siege and Spanish reconquest still served as a deterrent to any risky movement. Cartagena also had lost the privileged military status and budget it enjoyed during Spanish colonialism. The port citys monopoly of the foreign trade of Colombia came to an end with independence. All attempts by cartagenero authorities and merchants to restore Cartagenas predominant trade rights were hampered by their inability to repair the canal that linked it to the Magdalena River, New Granadas main waterway. As a result, few boats anchored in Cartagena, and trade was low. 74 No doubt, Cartagena continued to be the most important city in the Caribbean Coast, and therefore became the capital of the department of Magdalena. However, due to the lack of good communications, it remained quite isolated from its departments vast terri- tory and from Bogota. Nevertheless, Cartagena retained some of its colonial characteristics. As in the eighteenth century, it was mostly inhabited by people of African descent. In 1825 the rst impression of the Swedish traveller Carl August Gosselman at landing on the esplanade between the citys entrance and Getseman was that of a multicolour human anthill. The major part were blacks, ac- companied by other colours forming a sample of tones that went from the African black, passing by the American yellow-brown, and ending in the European white. 75 Whites still held most positions of economic and political power, but Spaniards had been replaced by British, North Americans, French and other foreigners in trade, and several Venezuelans served in the administration. 76 As before independence complex, networks of patronage and kinship linked individuals across class and race. Another lasting colonial characteristic was the high ratio of females among Cartagenas popular classes of African descent (according to the 1835 census, the city counted an average of 154.4 women over sixteen years of age for every 100.0 men, due to female overrepresentation in the most popular neighbourhoods). As other de Cartagena de Indias, hoy estado soberano de Bol var en la Union colombiana (Bogota, 1883), vol. 2, pp. 16774. 73 F. Gomez, Los censos en Colombia antes de 1905, in M. Urrutia and M. Arrubla (eds.), Compendio de estad sticas historicas de Colombia (Bogota, 1970), p. 20, table 3. Historians prefer to use the 1835 census rather than the rst postcolonial census of 1825, which seriously undercounted the population (ibid., pp. 1314, 18). 74 Manuel Rodr guez Becerra and Jorge Restrepo Restrepo, Los empresarios extranjeros de Barranquilla, 18201900, in Gustavo Bell Lemus (ed.), El Caribe colombiano: Seleccion de textos historicos (Barranquilla, 1988), pp. 1423. 75 Gosselman, Viaje por Colombia, p. 33. 76 G. Colmenares, El transito a sociedades campesinas de dos sociedades esclavistas en la Nueva Granada, Cartagena y Popayan, 17801850, Huellas (Barranquilla), vol. 29 (1990), p. 23. 464 Aline Helg cities in the Americas, Cartagena oered women greater security, autonomy, and economic opportunity in domestic service and the markets than did small towns and villages. Although by 1835 slavery had declined to 5.0 per cent of the citys total population (in contrast to 15.7 per cent in 1777), the wealthy barrio of La Catedral showed the highest ratio of urban slavery in Caribbean New Granada, with still one inhabitant out of ten being a slave, a majority of them female. 77 In brief, if General Padilla lived among a population of predominantly African descent, this population was also largely female, thus disenfran- chised. No source mentions the presence of women in the events of FebruaryMarch 1828, probably because women had little to do with the issues that mobilised the rival parties, such as military pay, benets, and surage, the Ocana convention, and the dispute between Bol var and San- tander. This is not to say that women were not active in Cartagena. On the contrary, aside from those working in domestic service, many women sold goods in the streets and the markets, did laundry, ran inns, taverns and small shops, and drove goods between the city and its surroundings. They often were single heads of household. Thus, quite likely women would have participated in a movement of broader appeal, such as a protest against Bol vars recent reestablishment of colonial taxes, which aected most of them. Surely, such a movement would also have rallied more men among the citys jewellers, tailors, shoemakers, those who worked in construction and small industries, as well as sailors, stevedores, porters, muleteers, sher- men and daylabourers. 78 Yet, the focus of the dispute on military and political matters made Padillas appeal most relevant to soldiers and ocers, reputedly loyal to Montilla and whose number shrank after the latter with- drew most of them from the city. 79 Moreover, the troops stationed in Cartagena generally comprised black, zambo (of mixed indigenous and African ancestry), mulatto and Indian peasants and labourers who had been dragged away from their homes and had little interest in the disputes of the citys leadership. With the exception of a mutiny for food and clothes in the artillery, swiftly repressed by Montilla in 1823, according to a British ocer, the troops in Cartagena showed patient endurance _ under their many privations. 80 As already mentioned, 77 AHNC, RE, Censos, Censo de 1835. For example, J. Kinsbruner, Not of Pure Blood: The Free People of Color and Racial Prejudice in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico (Durham, 1996), pp. 8284. 78 G. Mollien, Voyage dans la re publique de Colombia, en 1823 (Paris, 1824), vol. 1, p. 16; Macpherson to Clay, 24 March 1827, NA, DCC, roll 1. 79 Ibid., 30 March 1827. 80 Watts to Bidwell, 3 Feb. 1827, in PRO, FO 1845, 69. On the 1823 mutiny, see Watts to Col. P. Campbell, 19 April 1825, PRO, FO 1353. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 465 in early 1827 Ignacio Munoz failed to instigate them to rebel against Padilla and Montilla. Later that year Montilla encountered little opposition when he had the ocers of all the citys military corps issue manifestoes supporting Bol var against the faction of Bogota embodied by Santander. 81 Not sur- prisingly, in February 1828, few resisted his demand that they sign the anti- Santander Exposicion to the convention in Ocana, which protested the forced conscription without pay, the exclusion of soldiers from surage, and the lengthening of the military career through the creation of new intermediate ranks, all issues stressing the inequality between citizens duties and rights. 82 In March the troops went along when Montilla pulled them out of Cartagena in the middle of the night only to return them two days later. Like the ground troops, most men in the navy left in Cartagena in early March 1828 had been brutally enlisted. As noted by the US consul when he observed the manning of ships in 1826, people resented the navy for bring- ing men from the most distant parts, tied or handcued together, because with little or no pay, seamen are out of question. 83 Moreover, the navys practice of forcing Cartagenas artisans to abandon their shops and perform unpaid work on ships alienated many, as exemplied by the carpenter Jose Francisco Escudero. Since 1822, the navy had enlisted Escudero by bodily force and mistreated him repeatedly. In the words of his protest to the intendant, he was ready to full his duties as a citizen, but I will not consent that, because they need my skills, they want to _ reduce me to a Slavery more unbearable than the one the Government is trying to extinguish in the territory of the Republic. Although the intendant defended Escudero, in 1824 Padilla ordered his arrest for disobedience and his allocation to a warship, where he still served one year later. 84 Such experiences were un- likely to prompt men in the navy to stand up and risk their lives in the defence of their commander, Padilla, who until 1827 had sided with Montilla and supported Bol vars authoritarianism. In addition, in 1828 Cartagena lacked the powerful native leadership it had in 1810, when a reformist elite of creole hacendados, merchants, lawyers and priests had organised the free population of colour against Spains rule. Many had died during the war or been executed by Spain in 1816. Now the most outstanding members of the elite born in the region tended to pur- sue their careers in Bogota, such as Jose Mar a Castillo y Rada, who was nance secretary. Whites still held the highest positions of power, but some of 81 Manifestos publicos de los ociales de los cuerpos militares de Cartagena en favor de Bol var, 1618 June 1827, in PRO, FO 1845. 82 Exposicion dirigida a la Gran Convencion, 25 Feb. 1828. 83 Macpherson to Clay, 6 May 1826, NA, DCC, roll 1. 84 Jose Francisco Escudero to intendente del Magdalena, 11 Sep. 1823, and Padilla to intendente, 20 March 1825, in AHNC, RE, GM, tomo 373, fols. 3069, 347. 466 Aline Helg them, such as Montilla, were Venezuelan. Others, such as Juan de Francisco Mart n, had a royalist past. The native survivors of the First Independence of some signicance, such as Ignacio Munoz and the rich merchant Manuel Marcelino Nunez, were unable to oer a viable project for the de- partment of Magdalena and to undermine the domination of Montilla. As for Padilla, despite Bol vars assertion that he was the most important man of Colombia, he could not transcend the limits imposed upon him by his race and class. Because he had often boasted of his pardo identity and his determination to defend his pardo class, he had exposed himself to ac- cusations of pardocracia and of envisaging a revolution on the Haitian model in the Caribbean region. As a result, in a political culture that banned references to blackness and its mixtures (but not whiteness), Padilla had excluded himself from the possibility of becoming a regional caudillo. Unlike the uneducated but white Paez, whose boldness and resolution had gained the support of Bol var against Santander and had progressively united Venezuelans regardless of race and class against New Granadans, Padilla simultaneously alienated the local aristocracy and courted the national hierarchy. 85 Moreover, by attempting to reconcile Bol var and Santander after Bol var initiated his campaign for a semi-monarchical constitution, Padilla distanced himself from the native leaders, such as Nunez, who backed Santander. 86 Some even accused him of having absolutely sold out to the faction [of Bol var] and of using seduction and intimidation to silence the lower classes into obedience. 87 When in February 1828 Padilla eventually abandoned his attempts to reunite Bol var and Santander and stood up in defence of the latter, no doubt many cartageneros still remembered his role in the celebration of Bol vars visit eight months earlier and did not take him seriously. More importantly, the pro-Santander delegates in Ocana acknowledged Padillas oer to defend the convention but did little to save him. Clearly, though popular in Caribbean New Granada, Padilla lacked national stature and political constancy, which explains the cartageneros reluctance to follow him. All these factors strengthened the bolivaristas condence that the elimin- ation of Padilla would not ignite a protest. Indeed, when in April 1828 his sister, Magdalena Padilla, asked fteen political and religious notables in 85 On Paezs leadership, see A. Gomez Picon, Paez: Fundador del estado venezolano (Bogota, 1978), pp. 182298; V. Hebrard, Pueblos y actores municipales en la estructuracion de la region venezolana, 18211830, Anuario de Historia Regional y de las Fronteras (Bucaramanga) vol. 5 (2000), pp. 99149. 86 Padilla to Santander, 18 March, 2 April, and 18 Aug. 1827, in Archivo Santander, vol. 16, pp. 299, 32223, vol. 17, p. 154. 87 Bonifacio Rodr guez to Santander, 31 March and 16 April 1827, in ibid., vol. 16, pp. 319, 333. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 467 Cartagena to declare that he had not disturbed the public order in March, all declined. 88 Similarly, the broadside she issued then to refute the horrible accusations with which they attempt to vilify the glorious prowess of my brother, the general of division Jose Padilla, failed to mobilise cartageneros. 89 In addition, the dynamics of race, class and power in the city had changed since 181011, when the reformist elite had empowered and armed militia- men of African descent because it knew that it could only secure indepen- dence from Spain by building an alliance with the free population of colour. By the 1820s a conservative elite under Montilla dominated Cartagena and sought to keep the lower class of colour in check, not to organise them. Evidently, race still overlapped with class. As observed by a French diplomat, the young men in the upper class tried to nd a government job or studied law, and the mechanical professions were left to the foreigners and the men of colour. 90 Yet racial boundaries were loosening. Among the pro- gressive elite opposed to Montilla, a few white men were married to mulatas. 91 More generally, given the gender imbalance in Cartagenas population, sev- eral women of African descent were involved in relationships with white men, which tended to blur racial identity, especially for their children. Among the lower classes, the introduction of legal equality, the end of racial divisions in the armed forces and of the mention of race in state (but not church) records had led people to refer to themselves more as citizens or el pueblo than as los pardos , los negros or los zambos . Whereas race con- tinued to be meaningful and inuential to individuals, it was less so collec- tively. Thus, when in March 1828 Ignacio Munoz attempted to revive the rhetoric of 1811 and 1815 and to mobilise the lower classes of colour on racial grounds, he had limited success. Furthermore, in 1828 people were unlikely to defend Padilla against Montilla because Cartagena was not a city where political confrontation of- ten turned violent. In October 1829, exactly one year after the public ex- ecution of Padilla, the US consul in Cartagena disagreed with his European colleagues who still favoured Bol vars authoritarian constitution on the grounds that Colombians needed a strong executive to prevent rebellions. To the consul, neither a government of the wealthy nor a president for life were necessary: All the insurrections that have disturbed the country within 88 Contiene quince cartas dirigidas por mi hermana a sujetos respetables y su contestacion, AHNC, RE, HI, tomo 1, fols. 375411. 89 Magdalena Padilla, A la impostura y la intriga. La justicia y la verdad, AHNC, RE, AR, Documentos varios de Cartagena, rollo 5, fondo 1, vol. 9, fol. 339. 90 Aversenc, Etat commercial, industriel, politique et moral de la province de Carthage`ne, 27 Sep. 1837, MAE-Paris, CCC, no. 1, fol. 236. 91 Notably Jose Mar a del Real, Vicente Ucros and Ignacio Munoz were married to pardas (Montilla to Santander, 20 Feb. 1823, in Montilla, General de division, vol. 2, p. 969). 468 Aline Helg the last two years have been attempts of well informed members of the community; and in no one instance are the low and ignorant classes to be blamed, he claimed. 92 In making this comment, the consul certainly had in mind the events of March 1828, when Cartagenas blacks, mulattos and zambos did not support Padilla against the unpopular Montilla. Yet this lack of involvement did not signify that people were indierent to the form of government that ruled them, as the consul believed. 93 In 1828 the lower classes did not back the Venezuelan aristocrat Montilla either. They simply did not take part in a dangerous confrontation that was unlikely to yield much for them. In reality, cartageneros tended to prefer non-violent political confrontation. One French observer noted, beyond the customary remarks on Caribbean peoples alleged idleness, that family bonds, social cohesion, and charity characterised Cartagenas inhabitants: In their sharpest quarrels, they _ never lack a certain dignity, this being in all classes of society, even the lowest. Literate people tended to express dierences of opinion or protest in the form of handwritten pasquinades and printed broadsheets directed against a specic person. This generated responses and counterresponses, as exemplied by the exchange between Padilla and the aristocratic pater- familias in 1824, but, as the same Frenchman reported, consequently the people of the country _ only ght with quills. 94 Although few among the population could read, the content of posters and newspapers reached the illiterate in the streets, the workplaces, and the taverns through dis- cussions and improvised speeches. Yet, if erce verbal disputes could arise, such as the one that opposed Padilla to the supporters of Bol var in February 1828, they seldom or never led to manslaughter or lynching. By all accounts no violence was committed during Jose Padillas takeover on 6 and 7 March 1828. Finally, in March 1828 Padilla was unable to nd support outside Cartagena, despite strong opposition to Montilla in several towns. In fact, Padillas takeover had been so brief that Montilla could rapidly step up re- pression and prevent similar movements elsewhere. Although Mompoxs santanderistas welcomed Padilla with enthusiasm when he stopped there on his way to Ocana, when he returned, Montilla had given discretional powers to the military to prevent any sedition or pardo movement in the city. Mompoxs militiamen were disarmed and replaced with more reliable forces from Cartagena; those suspected of sympathy with Padilla were detained. 92 Macpherson to Clay, 4 Oct. 1829, NA, DCC, roll 1. 93 Ibid., 6 May 1826; Adolphe Barrot to ministre, 4 May 1832, MAE-Paris, CCC, no. 1, fols. 1516. 94 Aversenc, Etat commercial, 27 Sep. 1837, MAE-Paris, CCC, no. 1, fols. 23435. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 469 Padilla was thus forced to leave immediately for Cartagena, where he was arrested upon his arrival and rapidly transferred to Bogota. 95 With the execution of Padilla in October 1828, Bol var had denitively exorcised his fear of pardocracia in Cartagena and Caribbean New Granada. Yet he quickly realised that his racial bias would weigh on his legacy. As he wrote to Paez one month after Padillas death: Things have reached a point that keeps me wrestling with myself, with my ideas and with my glory _ I already repent for the death of Piar, of Padilla and the others who have died for the same cause; in the future there will be no justice to punish the most atrocious murderer, because [ by saving] the life of Santander [ I have par- doned] the most scandalous impunities _ What torments me even more is the just clamour with which those of the class of Piar and Padilla will complain. They will say with more than enough justice that I have only been weak in favour of this infamous white [Santander], who did not have the record of service of those famous [ pardo] servants of the fatherland. This exasperates me, so that I dont know what to do with myself. 96 However, Bol var did not need to worry about being accused of racism for the execution of Padilla. In 1831, after the Liberators death from illness and the victory of Santanders supporters in New Granadas rst post- independence civil war, one of the rst acts of the constitutional convention that met in Bogota under santanderista control was the rehabilitation of the memory of Gen. Jose Padilla, but the delegates carefully avoided to mention the role of the fear of pardocracia in his execution. They also approved a new constitution similar to that of 1821 but did nothing to actively promote racial equality and to end slavery. 97 As the santanderistas, under the new name of Liberals, rapidly dominated the Caribbean region in the spring of 1831, Cartagena remained the only stronghold of the bolivaristas. The lower classes of African descent did not mobilise against their rulers, and the city fell to the Liberals only after a one- month siege. The Liberals, some of them pardo, took leading positions and banished Gen. Mariano Montilla and his associates. The Liberal press ourished, celebrating freedom and the restored rights of the people. One notice entitled To the Manes of Padilla, signed by six thousand cartageneros , demanded revenge for his blood and, somewhat forgetful of his loneliness in 1828, asserted that the people idolise him. 98 Moreover, in a symbolic 95 Pedro Rodr guez to Adlercreutz, 21 March 1828, in C. Parra-Perez (ed.), La cartera del coronel conde de Adlercreutz: documentos ine ditos relativos a la historia de Venezuela y de la Gran Colombia (Paris, 1928), pp. 403; P. Salzedo del Villar, Apuntaciones historiales de Mompox. Edicion conmemorativa de los 450 anos de Mompox (1939; reprint, Cartagena, 1987), p. 191. 96 Bol var to Paez, 16 Nov. 1828, in Bol var, Obras completas, vol. 2, pp. 5058. 97 Moreno de Angel, Santander, pp. 5479, 56770. 98 Correo Semanal (Cartagena), 24 June 1831. See also other issues of Correo Semanal ; Cartagenero Liberal (Cartagena), JuneAug. 1831; He rcules (Cartagena). 470 Aline Helg reversal, in October 1831 Padilla received grandiose obsequies in Cartagenas cathedral. 99 However, as revengeful as they were, the citys Liberals, regard- less of colour, followed the steps of their peer at the national level and did not raise the issue of racial equality. They too believed that the elimination of colonial racial privileges and the legal equality of the free rmly established with independence suced. No doubt, although never mentioned, the fate of Padilla reminded pardos, regardless of class, that to mobilise behind a racial identity was ineective and dangerous. Indeed, Cartagenas First Indepen- dence had resulted from the cross-class and cross-racial alliances that linked the white elite to the popular classes of colour without challenging the socio- racial hierarchy. At the local level, these alliances continued in the movements attached to Bol var and Santander in 182631 and in the two-party system Colombia adopted in the 1840s. 100 Long after, Conservative and Liberal leaders continued to be able to channel lower-class people of African descent under their respective banner, neutralising the latters autonomous socio- racial challenge. Although Simon Bol vars fear that Gran Colombia would disintegrate did come true in 1830, when Venezuela, New Granada and Ecuador became separate nations, pardocracia never seriously threatened the region. Initially conceived in the context of racial violence of the rst phase of Venezuelas struggle for independence, Bol vars views regarding people of African de- scent were rooted in the colonial past and the spectre of the Haitian revol- ution. He was in advance of many of his contemporaries when he opposed the existence of slavery in republican nations, but his semi-monarchical project of constitution and his reluctance to see pardos in government pos- itions showed his inability to transform the racial equalisation required by the war against Spain into full republican equality. 99 Rejistro Ocial (Cartagena), 13 Oct. 1831. 100 O. Fals Borda, El Presidente Nieto, vol. 2 of Historia doble de la Costa (Bogota, 1981), pp. 65B, 70B72B. Simon Bol var and the Spectre of Pardocracia 471
Mexico, Aztec, Spanish and Republican: A Historical, Geographical, Political and Social Account of Mexico From the Period of the Invasion until 19th Century