Baris Arslan Senior Safety Consultant Oilconx Risk Solutions (ORS)
www.ors-no.com 1 30.10.2012 This presentation is about 2 How to maintain HIPPS?
How to demonstrate the reliability of HIPPS in operation?
Human Reliability & HIPPS Maintenance
www.ors-no.com 3 The beginning of wisdom is to call things with their right names
HIPPS protects downstream equipment against overpressure coming from upstream.
Instrument based systems for secondary protection or HIPPS?
Why is HIPPS so special?
www.ors-no.com Source: lsa.org HIPPS or not 4 In most cases, it is developed as a result of a deviation from traditional process design
Upon failure, it may cause major accidents with catastrophic safety, environmental and commercial consequences
Typically very high integrity and fault tolerance requirements
Critical response times for the entire system (could be 2-3 seconds)
www.ors-no.com HIPPS is a special case; because: 3 www.ors-no.com 1ask-based ArchlLecLure-based SLandard-based Shared componenLs lndependenL componenLs lndependenL / comblned sysLem 1opsldes (*) LxporL plpellnes Subsea 8educe demand raLe on rellef LllmlnaLe a parLlcular scenarlo from deslgn basls CLhers... Al deslgned asseLs lLC 61308 lLC 61308 / -001 /CLl070 Classification of HIPPS different generations 6 Procedures for analyzing maintenance performance for: Systematic faults & recurring faults Assessing demand rates (if higher than design basis or not) Diagnosis / repair / revalidation
Ensuring that functional safety is maintained during operation and maintenance Availability of skills and resources for maintenance
www.ors-no.com Chronological documentation of repair and maintenance Results of tests Documentation of the time Documentation of modifications
High safety integrity systems with particularly severe consequences not share common maintenance procedures
IEC:61508 2010ensuring functional safety during operational phase 7 OLF 070 gives detailed guidance about SIS (indirectly HIPPS) maintenance focusing on: SIS Maintenance Scope Use of vendor documents Functional testing requirements Integral / partial tests Maintenance reporting Compensating measures upon overrides and failures Reporting of demands / anomalies
P-001 contains Requirements about testing frequency Valve leakage testing frequency System regularity aspect Reference is made to IEC standards
API 521, Annex E.5 gives some guidance about HIPPS testing. Highlighted issues are: Considering site resources when establishing testing frequency Potential for introducing faults and spurious shutdowns due to human error
API 17O Subsea HIPPS The proof test intervals are to be documented in the maintenance procedures Experience data to include failure data source based on the number of performed tests of the SIF together with how many of these resulted in a failure
www.ors-no.com OLF/NORSOK views on HIPPS maintenance 8 PM Procedure for each HIPPS Linked to design basis documents (such as SRS)
Maintained database for information such as demands, failures etc.
Well-designed infrastructure to accomodate information flow (maintenance reports, failure codes, damage codes, automatic notifications etc.)
Well established procedures to analyse failure data
Verification and validation activities (see assurance on next slide)
Competent (and available) personnel to make decisions in due time
www.ors-no.com Key requirements for HIPPS maintenance appear to be uaLa valldaLlon M or CorrecLlve MalnLenance System responsible is notified Origin of data is controlled (document traceable) Equipment type (manufacturer, year etc. checked) Operating conditions are verified Failure code and long text is checked (i.e. in compliance with corporate guideline/EN 14224) Offshore personnel is consulted for data validation Cnshore verlflcaLlon Test period Acceptance criteria for verification Pass/fail statement for the verificaton Revisions on design basis documents Competence requirements Verification of functional test on component basis M rocedure L8 SysLem uaLabase SLage 1 SLage 2 Two Stage Offshore Failure Data Validation for HIPPS 20 years How does reliability change? ueslgn 8asls uevelop rellablllLy model (Alternative: Existing model upon validation) ueflne accepLance crlLerla (Datasheets/QRA/Corporate/Performance Standards) CollecL fleld daLa Assess fallure daLa 8evalldaLe (How? see failure reporting) (Evaluate failure types) (Evaluate failure inter-arrival times) (Carry out trend analysis of field failure data) ModlflcaLlon 8esLore operaLlon (Degraded system) Monitoring Reliability Performance 90% confidence interval has been applied for OREDA based studies
70% confidence interval for IEC-based appraoch
Only useful lifetime has been included due to Offshore site-acceptance test Onshore factory acceptance test Assumption: Sub-components are replaced before the wear- out period (e.g. lifetime replacements)
Useful lifetime and confidence interval 12 Field data is vital for the credibility of Periodic Reliability Monitoring
Standardized data format is necessary to adress failure cause and failure consequence
Data needs to be collected for all HIPPS components, e.g. input devices, control units and final elements
Why is it difficult to collect data? It requires: Resources (positive & negative reporting) Competence and motivation Sophisticated ERP systems
www.ors-no.com System responsible Offshore supervisor Offshore technician Vendors Reliability specialist Surveyors/ Authorities Data collection is the key 13 www.ors-no.com luncLlonal Check rocedure ls followed ln case of fallure, noLlflcaLlon ls creaLed ln Lhe company L8 by Lechnlclans unlque fallure codes are used AddlLlonal damage LexL ls lncluded CperaLlonal mode ls ad[usLed as per S8S and M procedure Always shuLdown uegraded CperaLlon Always roducLlon Cnshore lnvesLlgaLlons sLarL All posslble PlS sub-componenL fallures musL be well known 1echnlclans musL be Lralned Lo recognlze all fallure Lypes lnLerfaclng sysLems and assoclaLed fallures musL be assessed ln deLall PlS 1ralnlng package for Lechnlclans musL adress: racLlcal use of S8S use of revenLlve MalnLenance (M) procedure wlLh S8S use of fallure codes ln L8 sysLems oLenLlal human errors
In case of HIPPS failures (offshore) and training package 14 Different strategies based on HIPPS classification (see Slide 4) For 1st generation HIPPS, focus on dangerous undetected failures and For 3rd generation HIPPS, classification of both safe and dangeorus failures
Failure database is updated based on failure classifications
www.ors-no.com Code Input Final Logic AIR X DOP X ELP X X ELU X X ERO X X FTC X FTF X X HIO X HUE X X X INL X LOO X PLU X X SER X X X SPO X X X STD X
lallure codes for PlS ~ SA/Ln14224 Classification of failure codes for different generations HIPPS 13 PERIODIC CHECKS
Keep it simple
Use existing reliability model (if any) for a particular HIPPS (clear benefits if the model is not software dependent, e.g. excel based or similar)
Apply simple but recognized methods to evaluate the effect of failure inter-arrival times, distributions, sampling etc.
Determine a final failure rate to update the model
Is the HIPPS performance acceptable? Where is the acceptance criteria?
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
Again, different acceptance criteria based on HIPPS classifications (Slide 4) Some examples:
Fully risk-based approach Risk-based approach with minimum requirements API-based judgments (equal to or better than x concept)
Remember: Two-stage assurance model to verify acceptance criteria periodically
www.ors-no.com Periodic Verifications Classical human error producing conditions apply widely to full-automatic HIPPS operation and maintenance Based on our experience, typically observed human errors on HIPPS relate to red marked items in the North Sea: Poor feedback (reporting) Physical capabilities exceeded No independent check after testing Unclear allocation of function and responsibility An incentive to use more dangerous methods A poor or hostile working environment Task pacing caused by intervention of others Operator inexperienced Little or no independent checking or testing of output High level emonotional stress Disruption of normal work sleep cycles Unfamilarity with the situation which occurs (infrequent or new situation) A need to unlearn a technique and apply one which requires application of another philosophy HIPPS Human Error Producing Conditions 17 Human reliability is a huge concern for HIPPS operation and maintenance
Numerous incidents have been observed at different companies where HIPPS valves and/or transmitters have been disabled
Generally speaking, limited focus on quantification of human reliability for maintenance of HIPPS in the oil and gas business
Limited failure reporting regarding human failures during maintenance
Human reliability must be considered as an integral part of overall reliability for HIPPS
www.ors-no.com Puman 8ellablllLy Pardware 8ellablllLy SofLware 8ellablllLy Cverall PlS rellablllLy Human reliability & HIPPS maintenance 8equlred Achleved Periodic Reliability Assessments (PRA) reveal the weakest components in critical loops 19 Failure of HIPPS may lead to major accidents with catastrophic consequences
Maintenance & Operation longest lifecycle we need reliable HIPPS all the way thru
A customized approach is needed for different types of HIPPS, Operating Company and Operating Unit
HIPPS maintenance if done as advised by IEC is a complex job requiring strict collaboration and interaction at all levels. It requires highly competent, motivated people and enhanced data management tools
Collection and analysis of data are very important. Credibility of simply everything is at the stake if we dont collect correct field data from offshore oil platforms
Human failures remain as a big concern. Human reliability must be adressed as a part of overall HIPPS reliaibility
No quick-fix for HIPPS maintenance
www.ors-no.com Conclusion Baris Arslan Senior Safety Consultant baa@ors-no.com +46 735391827
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