Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No.

1 (March 2009) 75

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Intelligence in Public Literature
Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chi nese Secret Servi ce
Frederi c Wakeman, Jr. Berkel ey: Uni versi ty of Cal i forni a Press, 2003, 650 pp. Photos, i ndex.
Reviewed by Bob Bergin
Spymaster i s a ri ch, but very compl ex book, di ffi cul t to read i n pl aces, but
rewardi ng for the reader wi l l i ng to struggl e through the di ffi cul t parts. I t tel l s
the story of Dai Li , an extraordi nary secret pol i ceman, and of the i mmense espi -
onage apparatus he bui l t. More i mportantl y, i n detai l i ng Ameri can i nvol vement
wi th Dai Li , the story offers a l esson, rel evant today, i n the nature of i ntel l i gence
rel ati onshi ps between al l i es, how wrong they can go, and how the OSS deftl y
handl ed a rel ati onshi p gone bad.
Dai Li was Chi ang Kai -sheks spymaster duri ng Worl d War I I , the cl aws and
teeth of the Chi nese Nati onal i st l eader and the Chi nese Hi mml er to the Bri t-
i sh. As chi ef of the Bureau of I nvesti gati on and Stati sti cs of the Mi l i tary Affai rs
Commi ssi on or J untong, he contr ol l ed tens of thousands of spi es i n Chi na and i n
every country that had a Chi nese communi ty. Offi ci al sources cl ai m that Dai Li
had 100,000 agents i n the fi el d by 1945. Ther e were 50,000 r egul ar agents r un-
ni ng assets, amounti ng to about 500,000 spi es and i nfor mers, maki ng the Jun-
tong the worl ds l argest espi onage organi zati on at the ti me. Ai med pri mari l y at
Chi angs pol i ti cal enemi es and the communi sts, the Juntong carri ed out al l
ki nds of espi onage and i ntel l i gence work.
Dai Li was a natural for the job: hi s was the cl assi c ri se from obscuri ty to great
power through cunni ng, i ntel l i gence, and devi ousness. He was born i n 1897 i n
the hi l l s of Zheji ang Provi nce, where even as a teenager he was seen as a natu-
ral l eader, but al so as a troubl e maker addi cted to sex and gambl i ng. Caught
cheati ng at cards, he ran off to joi n the army, and then desertedbut not before
he connected wi th the Green Gang, the notori ous gangsters who control l ed the
Shanghai under wor l d. I t was a l i nk that woul d ser ve hi m wel l i n ti mes to come.
I n 1921, whi l e l i vi ng off the l and i n Shanghai , he met Chi ang Kai -shek and r an
errands for hi m. I n 1926, possi bl y wi th Green Gang hel p, he managed to get
admi tted to the Whampoa Mi l i tary Academy, where Chi ang was the chancel l or.
To i ngrati ate hi msel f wi th Chi ang, who wanted to use hi m as a batman, he
reported on the i deol ogi cal puri ty of hi s fel l ow cadets. The ones he i denti fi ed as
communi sts were el i mi nated i n a pur ge at Whampoa i n 1927.
Book Review: Spymaster
76 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 2009)
Whampoa and i ts al umni were the base on whi ch Chi angs power was bui l t. Hi s
l oyal i sts moved i n a swi rl of associ ati ons, secret soci eti es, and front organi za-
ti ons. At the core was the most secret Lixingshe (the Soci ety for Vi gorous Prac-
ti ce) and the front organi zati on i t control l ed, the Fuxingshe, or Rennai sance
Soci ety. Permeati ng the mi x was Chi angs personal espi onage apparatus of secret
i ntel l i gence organi zati ons that he l et fi ght among themsel ves for funds and
authori ty.
I n 1928, Chi ang establ i shed a 10-man i ntel l i gence uni t cal l ed the Li ai son Group
and put Dai Li i n charge. Later cal l ed the embryo of al l subsequent party and
state mi l i tary i ntel l i gence organi zati ons, the group had to compete wi th many
others. To strengthen hi s hand, Dai Li formed the League of Ten, Wampoa grad-
uates he put on hi s pri vate payrol l who became the core of hi s personal secret
servi ce.
I n 1932, when Chi ang needed i ntel l i gence that others wer e unabl e to provi de, he
di rected Dai Li to turn hi s League of Ten i nto a formal Speci al Servi ces Depart-
ment. The Ten became more than a hundr ed, and Dai Li s r i se began. Dai Li
became Chi angs pri mary sour ce for pol i ti cal i ntel l i gence, and, i n 1938, Chi ang
establ i shed the new i ndependent securi ty agency that was the Juntong. Dai Li
was made i ts chi ef.
Before the outbreak of war wi th Japan, Dai s acti vi ti es centered on Shanghai ,
where he suborned the pol i ce and drew on the ski l l s of hi s associ ates i n the Green
Gang. Ki dnappi ng and torture became tool s to gather i ntel l i gence and root out
Chi angs enemi es and the communi sts. Traffi cki ng i n narcoti cs and other contra-
band was the means to suppl ement budgets as Dai Li s acti vi ti es and power grew.
Dai Li was the onl y man al l owed armed i nto Chi angs presence. He became the
most feared man i n Chi na; mothers i nvoked hi s name to make thei r chi l dren
behave.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Ameri cans started streami ng i nto
Chi na, some wi th bi g i deas for wi nni ng the war and access to the funds to do i t.
Dai had never taken wel l to forei gners and avoi ded deal i ng wi th them. Then he
met a US Navy offi cer open to hi s i deas. Commander Mi l ton E. Mi l es, known to
hi story as Mary Mi l es, was the nearest thi ng the US Navy had to a Chi na expert.
A graduate of the Naval Academy, he had spent fi ve years wi th the Asi ati c fl eet. I n
earl y 1942, Chi ef of Naval Operati ons Admi ral Ki ng sent hi m to Chi na to estab-
l i sh weather stati ons and to heckl e the Japanese.
Dai Li took Mi l es on a tri p i nto occupi ed Chi na and i mpressed hi m wi th how eas-
i l y the Juntong coul d operate behi nd Japanese l i nes. Before the tri p was over, Dai
proposed the cr eati on of a 50,000 str ong Chi nese guerri l l a army under Si no-
Ameri can control . Wi thout consul ti ng Washi ngton, Mi l es agreed, and the two
started worki ng on the creati on of what became the Si no-Ameri can Cooperati ve
Organi zati on (SACO) to carry out espi onage, speci al operati ons, and si gnal s
i ntel l i gence. The Chi nese woul d provi de the manpower; the Uni ted States the
rest. Dai Li woul d be the SACO di rector, Mi l es hi s deputy.
Washi ngtons approval of the SACO agreement requi red that Mi l es be appoi nted
chi ef of OSS acti vi ti es i n Chi na. OSS chi ef Wi l d Bi l l Donovan resi sted the i dea,
Book Review: Spymaster
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 2009) 77
but because OSS needed a Chi nese base for i ts Asi a operati ons, he agreed to an
unhappy al l i ance wi th Mi l es and Dai Li . The OSS was admi tted to Chi na as
subordi nate partners of General Dai Li s i ntel l i gence servi ce. Personnel from
OSS and the US Navy started arri vi ng at Dai Li s base, Happy Val l ey, outsi de
Chunki ng to i nstruct Dai s peopl e i n everythi ng from guerri l l a warfare to cri mi -
nal i nvesti gati on, even an FBI school to trai n Dai Li s secret pol i ce.
There were probl ems from the start. Dai s secret pol i ce were di rected agai nst
Chi angs i nternal enemi es rather than the Japanese. There was the matter of
torture: Happy Val l ey, whi ch had a sani ti zed mess hal l and western toi l ets for
the Ameri cans, al so had a gri m pri son about whi ch unpl easant stori es were
tol d. There was Mi l es, who i nsi sted that nothi ng be kept secret from the Chi -
nese; they woul d work di rectl y wi th the Ameri cans and everythi ng woul d be
shared. There was Dai Li , whose hand was seen i n thwarted OSS operati ons.
Free Thai agents bei ng i nfi l trated i nto Thai l and were del ayed and several ki l l ed.
Dai Li had hi s own pl ans. He woul d i nvade Thai l and wi th a force of 10,000 Chi -
nese guerri l l as di sgui sed as Thai on 10,000 Ti betan poni es.
The si tuati on was further compl i cated by Al l i ed suspi ci ons that Dai was tr ad-
i ng secrets wi th Japanese i ntel l i gence. I n October 1943, Donovan was ordered
to gather i ntel l i gence i n Chi nas communi st-control l ed areas. Donovan tol d
Roosevel t, We cannot do our job as an Ameri can i ntel l i gence servi ce unl ess we
operate as an enti rel y i ndependent one, i ndependent of the Chi nese and our
other al l i es. The presi dent agreed.
Donovan vi si ted Chi na i n l ate 1943. Over a di nner i n Dai Li s resi dence, Dono-
van tol d the spymaster that OSS woul d work uni l ateral l y i nsi de Chi na. Dai
responded that he woul d execute any OSS agent found operati ng outsi de the
SACO agreement. Donovan sl ammed hi s fi st on the tabl e and shouted, For
every one of our agents you ki l l , we wi l l ki l l one of your general s! The next
day Donovan met wi th Chi ang Kai -shek, who spoke of Chi nese soverei gnty,
and asked that OSS act accordi ngl y.
Leavi ng Mi l es to work wi th Dai Li s operati ons, Donovan ci rcumvented them
both and secretl y set up a separate cl andesti ne OSS i ntel l i gence col l ecti on
mechani sm. The seni or US offi cer i n the Chi na-Burma-I ndi a Theater, General
Joseph Sti l wel l , was no hel p, but i n the 14th Ai r Force commander, General
Cl ai re Chennaul t, Donovan found an al l y. Chennaul t had served as Chi angs
avi ati on advi ser si nce 1937. He had no use for Dai Li and had tur ned down an
earl y offer to work together. But as the war expanded, Chennaul ts bombers
needed more i ntel l i gence than the Chi nese coul d provi de. He created hi s own
network of Ameri can operati ves who worked behi nd Japanese l i nes.
Chennaul t agreed to work wi th Donovan. The resul t was the 5329th Ai r and
Ground Forces Resources and Techni cal Staff (AGFRTS), or Ag-farts, as i t
was popul arl y cal l ed. OSS woul d run operati ons i nsi de Japanese terri tory
usi ng the 14th Ai r Force as cover from the Chi nese. Donovan l ater wrote:
AGFRTS succeeded where SACO had fai l ed, and i ts resul ts were al most
i mmedi atel y apparent. OSS agents behi nd the l i nes gathered i ntel l i gence on
Japanese shi ppi ng and rai l traffi c and other targets, i nterrogated pri soners,
trai ned guerri l l as, someti mes engaged i n guerri l l a warfare, and di d a host of
other thi ngs i mportant to the war effort.
Book Review: Spymaster
78 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 2009)
By contrast, no i ntel l i gence or operati ons of any consequence have come out of
SACO, Donovan reported to Roosevel t i n November 1944. The judgment i s
shared by Wakeman and other hi stori ans. I t was Dai Li and hi s cl andesti ne
empi re that benefi ted. Dai Li emerged from the war at the pi nnacl e of hi s power.
But as the postwar reposi ti oni ng began, he became convi nced that Chi ang
i ntended to abol i sh the Juntong. I n the spri ng of 1946, rumors of Dai Li s reti re-
ment were ri fe. On 17 March 1946, an ai rcraft carryi ng Dai Li crashed i nto the
hi l l s outsi de Nanji ng. Dai Li was dead, but many refused to bel i eve i t. Some
bl amed the cr ash on communi st sabotage, other s on a bomb pl anted by OSS. The
most common r umor was that Dai Li had faked hi s own death.
But Dai Li was dead, and i t was bad weather that di d i t, not the OSS. He was
bur i ed on a hi l l si de outsi de Nanji ng, not far from Sun Yat-sens mausol eum. I n
1949, hi s remai ns were destroyed by the communi sts. A hero to some, a demon to
others, Dai Li wi th hi s geni us for organi zati on had created the l argest spyi ng
machi ne of i ts ti me, but revi ews of i ts effecti veness are mi xed. I ts success was
greatest agai nst Chi angs i nternal enemi es and di ssi dents of hi s r egi me, l ess so
agai nst the Japanese and thei r col l aborators, where i ntel l i gence col l ecti on was
subor di nated to the l ucrati ve trade between the Chi nese and Japanese under the
gui se of i nfi l trati ng each other. Wi th the Juntongs mai n target, the Chi nese
Communi st Party, there appears to have been onl y l i mi ted success, but here
Wakeman and other hi stori ans necessari l y depend on i nformati on that comes
mai nl y from former Dai Li agents re-educated by the communi sts.
Whi l e the current uti l i ty of the l essons of i ntel l i gence cooperati on are rel ati vel y
cl eari ntel l i gence partners al most al ways gi ve precedence to sel f-i nterest; sover-
ei gnty i s l i kel y to trump better sense; and mi smatches i n cul tural norms strai n,
i f not make i mpossi bl e, good rel ati onshi psother el ements of Wakemans meti cu-
l ous schol arshi p are worth noti ng for what they mi ght say about Chi nas present
i ntel l i gence apparatus and about the way i n whi ch such organi zati ons mi ght
for m i n per i ods of nati onal str ess.
Fi rst, Wakemans research reveal s the bewi l deri ng array of organi zati ons and
personal connecti ons that eventual l y grew i nto an i nternal securi ty apparatus.
Organi zati onal sproutssoci eti es, uni ons, cl ubs, cl i ques, etc.l arge and smal l ,
came and went i n the chaoti c envi ronment of newl y republ i can Chi na. Many
thought themsel ves desti ned for bi g thi ngs but were gone or ai ml ess soon after
they were created. Amazi ngl y, Wakeman seemed to have found them al l i n the
mi nutest detai l i t i s the feature of thi s book that makes i t such di ffi cul t read-
i ng at ti mes. Hi s effort, however, speaks to the energy, dynami sm, and potenti al
for mani pul ati on of Chi nese i ntel l ectual s i n the 1930s and 1940s who wer e l ook-
i ng i n al most every concei vabl e di recti on for ways to combat the Japanese (or
other enemi es) and to bri ng the nati on i nto modern ti mes. Thi s chaoti c scene
eventual l y coal esced i n 1949, but Wakemans effor t i s a power ful r emi nder of the
compl exi ty of the underl yi ng coal i ti on and the chal l enges that compl exi ty pre-
sents i n understandi ng Chi na and the responses of i ts peopl e i n di ffi cul t ti mes,
and i n knowi ng wi th whom to deal i n such eras of change i n Chi na or anywhere.