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An Analysis of Self-Management
Author(s): Carolyn Hughes and John W. Lloyd
Source: Journal of Behavioral Education, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 405-425
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41819757
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Journal
of
Behavioral Education
,
Vol.
3,
No.
4, 1993, pp.
405-425
An
Analysis
of
Self-Management
Carolyn Hughes, Ph.D.,1,3
and
John
W.
Lloyd,
Ph.D.2
Accepted: April
30,
1993 Action Editor:
Nirbhay
N.
Singh
We discuss
topics
related to a theoretical
analysis of self-management, including
theories
of self-management, self-reinforcement
and
self-management,
antecedent
stimuli
for self-management, teaching of self-management
behaviors,
and
applications of self-management.
Our
analysis
indicates that
self-management's
roots in behavioral
explanations of phenomena
are
solid,
but that there are
important
issues
yet
to be examined in
developing
a
thorough understanding
of self-management.
We
argue
that
self-management
behaviors almost
certainly
must be examined in relation to the contexts in which
they
occur and the
consequences
that
they produce.
KEY WORDS:
self-management;
self-control; self-regulation;
reinforcement;
problem-solving.
Human situations associated with self-control or
self-management
typically
involve
behaving
in a
way
that causes one or the other of two
competing consequences
to occur
(Catania,
1984; Rachlin, 1978; Skinner,
1953).
Often,
for
simplicity, people say
that an individual chooses between
two behaviors
having
different
consequences.
For
example, spending
one's
entire
weekly paycheck may
make
inexpensive
items such as
magazines
or
cassette
tapes
available
immediately,
but
may prevent
the later
purchase
of a more
expensive commodity
such as a new car
(Catania, 1984).
Simi-
larly,
the immediate effects of
watching
television rather than
studying may
increase the future likelihood of television
viewing,
but the
delayed
effects
(e.g., poor grades) may
be aversive.
1
Assistant
Professor, Department
of
Special
Education,
Vanderbilt
University,
Nashville,
Tennessee.
2Professor, Curry
School of
Education, University
of
Virginia,
Charlottesville,
Virginia.
Correspondence
should be directed to
Carolyn Hughes, Department
of
Special
Education,
Vanderbilt
University,
Box
328, Peabody College,
Nashville,
TN 37203.
405
1 05 3-08 19/93/1 200-0405 $07.00/0 1993 Human Sciences Press, Inc.
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406
Hughes
and
Lloyd
Such situations
present challenging
dilemmas to an individual because
the effects of the two alternative
responses
occur at different times
(Rachlin,
1978).
In
contrast,
if
opportunities (e.g.,
a limitless
supply
of
funds)
to
buy
a car or
purchase
a video
player
occurred at the same
time,
self-control
would not be an issue. One
simply
would choose a
purchase
based
upon
personal preference (i.e.,
a
high-probability behavior).
The dilemma occurs
because a
high-probability activity
for an individual such as
spending
one's
money provides
immediate
reinforcement,
whereas the effect of not
saving
funds
(e.g.,
not
enough money
is accumulated to
buy
a
car)
is
experienced
only
after a
delay (Bandura, 1969).
Good
grades (and possible
related
events such as honor
rolls,
scholarships,
or
recognition) may
not be an ef-
fective reinforcer for
studying
because,
as an
outcome,
grade averages may
be
"to delayed,
too
improbable,
or too
small,
and of
only
cumulative
sig-
nificance"
(Malott,
1984,
p. 200).
We
typically
describe an individual's de-
cision to
study (a low-probability behavior)
rather than watch television
(a
high-probability behavior)
as an instance of self-control or
self-management.
Studying may
be
immediately
aversive; however,
studying may provide
ac-
cess to the
long-term
benefits of
good grades
and associated events. Kazdin
(1978)
and
Brigham (1978)
contended that self-control occurs when an in-
dividual
responds
in a manner counter to
obtaining
an
immediately
rein-
forcing consequence.
Self-control
may
be the
performance
of a
response
that
appears
to act
against
the immediate
contingencies.
In this
paper
we discuss theoretical issues related to the
concept
of
self-management. Topics
discussed include:
(a)
theories of
self-management,
including operant
and
cognitive explanations, (b)
the role of self-reinforcement
in the
self-management paradigm, (c)
the discriminative stimulus for self-
management
behavior,
(d) teaching self-management, (e) contemporary ap-
plications
of
self-management,
and
(f)
recommendations for future research.
WHAT IS SELF-MANAGEMENT?
Despite
minor
distinctions,
responses typically
classified under the
rubric of
self-management
include self-control
(cf.
Kazdin, 1978; Skinner,
1953), self-regulation (cf.
Kanfer,
1971),
and self-determination
(cf.
Skinner,
1953).
Two theoretical
explanations
of
self-management
as a
process
domi-
nate the literature:
(a)
the
operant explanation, including
basic
investiga-
tions of self-control and theories of
problem solving (cf. Brigham,
1978;
Catania, 1984; Kazdin, 1978; Rachlin, 1978; Skinner,
1953)
and the
(b)
cognitive interpretation (cf.
Bandura, 1969;
Goldfried &
Merbaum, 1973;
Kanfer, 1971; Mahoney
&
Thoresen,
1974).
In this section we discuss the
literature related to these two
major
theories.
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Self-Management
407
Operant
View of
Self-Management
Skinner
(1953) may
have been the first theorist to
propose
an
operant
view of the
self-management paradigm (Jones,
Nelson,
&
Kazdin,
1977).
Skinner theorized that individuals control their behavior as
they
would con-
trol the behavior of
anyone
else:
through manipulation
of the variables of
which their own behavior is a function. For
example,
to avoid
smoking,
an
individual could make the
response
less
probable by altering functionally-
related variables
(e.g., by
not
buying cigarettes).
Skinner continued that
any
behavior that succeeds in
decreasing
the
probability
of the
response
automatically
would be
negatively
reinforced
by decreasing
aversive stimu-
lation associated with the
response (e.g.,
shortness of breath or fear of heart
failure).
Skinner's
paradigm
involves two
separate responses:
the
controlling
response ,
the behavior that affects variables
(e.g., turning
off the
television)
in such a
way
as to
change
the
probability
of the controlled
response ,
the
behavior to be increased or decreased
(e.g., studying).
An individual's be-
havior
ultimately
is accounted for
by
variables external to the
individual,
but these external events
typically
are mediated
by
events accessible to the
individual alone
(e.g.,
the
"urge"
to
smoke).
Kazdin
(1978) suggested
that
individuals are in the best
position
to observe their own behavior and that
in the case of
private
events
(e.g., thoughts)
are the
only
ones that can
detect their occurrence and administer
consequences
for their control.
Basic
Investigations of Self-Control
Basic studies with both animals and humans
support
Skinner's con-
ceptualization
of self-control
(Catania, 1984; Rachlin,
1978).
Behavior iden-
tified as commitment
responses
have been observed both in
pigeons (cf.
Fantino, 1966;
Rachlin &
Green,
1972)
and humans
(cf.
Millar &
Navarick,
1984;
Ragotzy, Blakely,
&
Poling, 1988). Specifically, pigeon
and human
subjects
have been observed to make
responses
that increase the chances
of
obtaining
a
large delayed
reinforcer
(e.g., edible) by making
an imme-
diate,
smaller reinforcer unavailable.
(This
commitment
response parallels
Skinner's
controlling response).
In
contrast,
responses
that result in
accessing
the
smaller,
more im-
mediate reinforcer instead of the
larger, delayed
reinforcer are classified
as
impulsive responses.
Because
pigeons typically
behave more
impulsively
than human
subjects (Rachlin
&
Green, 1972;
Ragotzy
et
al.,
1988),
Catania
(1984)
and
Mawhinney (1982) speculated
that human instances of self-control
involve verbal behavior
(cf. Bem,
1967).
For
example,
Rachlin
(1978) suggested
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408
Hughes
and
Lloyd
that a student
may sign (i.e.,
commit
to)
a written contract
stating
a re-
sponse
cost
(e.g.,
loss of
privileges
or
money)
for not
studying.
The contract
is
signed (a
form of verbal
behavior)
when the student's
perceived
value
of
studying
is
high (e.g.,
when the
possibility
of
obtaining
a
scholarship
is
contingent
on
maintaining good grades).
The verbal commitment
(the
con-
tract)
decreases the student's choice due to the
impending response
cost
during
those times when the value of
studying may
wane
(e.g.,
when there
are
competing reinforcers).
Theories
of
Problem
Solving
The
problem-solving process
described
by
Skinner
(1953)
and Catania
(1984) exemplifies
the
operant
view of
self-management.
Skinner
suggested
that a
problem
situation is one in which "a
response
exists in
strength
which
cannot be emitted"
(1953, p. 246).
The
strength
of the
response typically
is
demonstrated when the
response
occurs as soon as the
opportunity
is avail-
able. For
example,
a locked door in a house is a
problem
if behavior re-
quiring
the door to be
open
is
strong
and a
key
or other means of
opening
the door is not available. The
strength
of the
response
is inferred from the
occurrence of behavior that
previously opened
the door
(e.g., "jimmying"
the lock with a
knife)
or the behavior that occurs as soon as the door is
opened (e.g., dashing
inside the
house).
The solution to the
problem
is
simply
a
response
that alters the situation so that the
strong response
can
be emitted
(e.g., finding
the
key
or
calling
a
locksmith). Similarly,
Catania
(1984) suggested
that the discriminative features of a situation define the
problem,
and the solution to the
problem
serves as the reinforcer.
Skinner
(1953)
reminded us that:
"Simply emitting
a.
solution, however,
is not
solving
a
problem.
. . .
Problem-solving
may
be defined as
any
behavior which, through
the
manipulation of
variables
(emphasis added),
makes the
appearance
of a solution more
probable.
. . .
[However],
the
appearance
of a solution does not
guarantee
that
problem-solving
has taken
place.
An accidental
change
in the environment often
brings
about a
similar result
-
[for example],
the
key may
be found
[by chance]" (p. 247-248).
The
process by
which an individual solves a
problem
is similar to the
explanation
of how one
manages
one's own behavior:
through
the
manipulation of
variables
of
which the
response
is a
function.
In the case of
self-management,
one controls variables
(i.e.,
an ex-
ample
of Skinner's
controlling response)
to
change
the
probability
of a con-
trolled
response.
For
example, people
count to ten to
prevent making
abusive comments or enter a
library
carrel to increase
studying.
When solv-
ing
a
problem,
one
manipulates
stimuli
(i.e.,
modifies the
environment)
to
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Self-Management
409
make a solution more
probable (e.g., by converting
a verbal
problem
into
a mathematical
equation
or
looking up
a word in a
dictionary) (Catania,
1984).
Skinner
(1953) argued
that
solving
a
problem
does not mean emit-
ting
a
response
that
proves
to be a
solution, but, rather,
manipulating
stim-
uli that control the
problem-solving response.
For
example,
"We increase the chances of a solution when we look a
problem
over
carefully,
when we
get
all the
facts,
or when we
point up
relevant stimuli
by stating
a
problem
in its clearest terms. A further
step
is to
arrange
or
rearrange
stimuli"
(Skinner,
1953,
p. 249).
To
illustrate,
if the
problem
is to isolate the cause of a
airplane
crash,
one
may classify
relevant variables
according
to common characteristics
(e.g.,
weather conditions or
physical
state of the
crew)
to
identify
factors
functionally
related to the crash. In an
operant
view,
in both the
self-management
and the
problem-solving processes,
one
responds (i.e.,
manipulates variables)
in
ways
that
change
the
probability
of a future
response (i.e.,
either a controlled
response
or a
problem-solving response).
Cognitive
View of
Self-Management
Skinner, Rachlin,
and others who base
self-management
on
operant
principles typically
focus their
analyses
on individuals'
controlling
and con-
comitant controlled
responses.
In
contrast,
the
cognitive explanation
of self-
management suggests
the occurrence of two
steps: (a)
first,
the assessment
of and decision to control one's behavior followed
by (b)
the actual self-
controlling response (Brigham, 1978). Emphasis
is
placed upon
the first
step
which is assumed to
begin
when individuals evaluate their own behav-
ior and
subsequently
decide to
change
that behavior
(cf.
Bandura, 1969;
Goldfried &
Merbaum, 1973; Kanfer, 1971;
Mahoney
&
Thoresen, 1974;
Premack,
1970).
For
example,
Premack
(1970) argued
that individuals' ob-
servations of deficiencies in their own
performance
and their
resulting
de-
cision to address these deficiencies are the critical
components
of
self-management.
Other writers
(Bandura,
1971; Kanfer, 1971;
Mahoney
&
Thoresen,
1974)
concurred that
self-management
is a
process
that
begins
with
monitoring
and
evaluating
one's behavior followed
by reinforcing
im-
provements
in one's
performance.
For
example,
a student
may
infer from
a
survey
of her
recently deteriorating grades
that her
study
behavior is in-
effective,
prompting
her to
modify
her
performance
which is reinforced ul-
timately by improved
test scores.
Similarly, Mahoney
and Thoresen
(1974)
claimed that self-awareness or
sensitivity
to one's actions is a
requisite
to
self-management.
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410
Hughes
and
Lloyd
According
to the
cognitive
view of
self-management,
discrimination
of one's behavior is followed
by
a decision to control or
change
one's
per-
formance to achieve a self-determined outcome. Kanfer
(1971)
claimed that
this decision resulted from individuals' observation of a
discrepancy
be-
tween their behavior and their self-established standard of
performance.
Similarly,
Bandura
(1969) argued
that the:
"selection
of well-defined objectives
... is an essential
aspect
of
any
self-directed
program
of
change.
The
goals
that individuals choose for themselves must be
specified sufficiently
... to
provide adequate guidance
for the actions that must
be taken
daily
to attain desired outcomes"
(p. 255).
Goldfried and Merbaum
(1973)
concurred that
self-management "represents
a
personal
decision arrived at
through
conscious deliberation for the
purpose
of
integrating
action which is
designed
to achieve certain desired
outcomes or
goals
as determined
by
the individual himself'
(p. 12).
These
authors
acknowledged
that their
viewpoint
as well as those of Bandura and
Kanfer stresses:
"the
importance
of
mediating
variables in
dealing
with the
process
of self-control.
All of these
[cognitive] conceptions
lean
heavily
on the
importance
of
thought
and
language
in
delaying impulsive
action,
and for
introducing
a
competing cognitive
alternative into the
self-regulatory sequence" (p. 12).
Differences and Similarities Between
Operant
and
Cognitive
Perspectives
on
Self-Management
Rachlin
(1978)
and other
operant
researchers also referred to
delay-
ing impulsive responses
within the context of basic
investigations
of self-
control. These
researchers, however,
focused on the individual's con-
trolling
or commitment
response
in which variables are
manipulated
to
make an
impulsive response
less
probable.
In
contrast,
the
cognitive
viewpoint
stressed the mediation of variables
through thought processes
in order to
delay impulsive
action. To
illustrate,
Kanfer
(1971) argued
that "at the
psychological
level,
some
verbal,
perceptual
or
physiological
feedback for activation of the
self-regulation sequence
is needed as a
trigger" (p. 43).
Although
there are differences between the
operant
and
cognitive
perspectives
on
self-management, they
share characteristics.
Indeed,
both
views arose from a behavioral
perspective,
not from a
psychoanalytic
or
other
non-empirical
tradition. Furthermore,
according
to both
views,
self-
management
is not a trait. Whereas
people
on the street
might
refer to
concepts
such as will
power
or other
psychological qualities,
neither the
cognitive
nor the
operant
views of
self-management require
recourse to
personality
attributes. Another
similarity
is that
according
to both
views,
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Self-Management
4X1
individuals can
acquire greater facility
in
exercising self-management.
In a
later
section,
we discuss some
examples
of
applications
of
self-management
and how it can be
taught.
Before
turning
to that
topic,
however,
we examine
the events that surround
self-management
of
behavior,
asking
what causes
and
supports self-management.
WHY DO PEOPLE MANAGE THEIR OWN BEHAVIOR?
Because both human and infrahuman
subjects
have been observed to
manage
their own behavior
(i.e.,
to avoid immediate
consequences
in favor
of
delayed reinforcement),
an
analysis
of the
self-management paradigm
should consider environmental events that
prompt
and maintain that
behavior. The issue is
particularly intriguing
when we consider that the
individual has the
opportunity
to obtain reinforcement at
any
time,
but
behaves in a manner that does not result in the
immediately
available
reinforcer
(Kazdin,
1978; Skinner, 1953;
Thoreson &
Mahoney, 1974).
To
describe
why
individuals
manage
their own behavior in this
way,
we discuss
perspectives
on the antecedents and
consequences
of
self-management,
respectively.
What
Prompts Self-Management?
Because television
watching
or
doodling
at one's desk or
remaining
quiet
on a controversial
topic
at a
meeting may provide
more immediate
reinforcement for an individual than
paying
bills or
solving algebraic equa-
tions or
publicly presenting
an
opposing
view,
the
question
remains
why
anyone
would ever
engage
in a behavior that
provides delayed
rather than
immediate benefits. If we observed a
young
man who was
guffawing loudly
while
watching
television
suddenly get up,
turn off the
television,
sit down
at his
desk,
and
begin figuring
his income tax in
mid-January,
we
may
be
curious to know what
prompted
his
change
in behavior. An
interpretation
of the
young
man's actions is
complex
because of the influence of
multiple
schedules of reinforcement. For
example,
the television show
may provide
immediate
positive reinforcement
because of its
relaxing
and
entertaining
ef-
fects. At the same
time,
the
young
man
may
be
nagged by
the
thought
that his income tax isn't finished and he knows that
early filing typically
results in
early
refunds.
He, therefore,
may
receive
(a)
immediate
negative
reinforcement by avoiding nagging thoughts
as he
begins
his income
tax,
(b) delayed positive reinforcement
for
early filing
when he receives an
early
return,
and
(c) delayed negative reinforcement by preventing
the aversive
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412
Hughes
and
Lloyd
consequences
of not
filing (e.g.,
a
fine).
To be
sure,
the benefits of these
contingencies
must be
strong enough
to overcome the aversive conse-
quences
that are familiar to most
people
who
complete
tax forms.
Competing Contingencies
This scenario
provides
bases for
speculation
about
why
an individual
may
act in a
way
that leads to access to
immediate,
prepotent consequences
(i.e., why
he exerts
self-control). According
to our
scenario, however,
the
young
man could reinforce himself at
any
time
(i.e.,
he could turn the tele-
vision back on without
finishing
his income
tax).
The fact that he does not
requires
an
explanation.
One
explanation
concerns the relative
strength
of
competing
contin-
gencies.
For
example,
Herrnstein
(1970) suggested
that at
any given
time
an individual
may
choose to behave in
any
of several
ways,
each associated
with a
unique contingency.
The
proportion
or
strength
of
any
one of the
several behaviors to the total behavior available to the individual matches
the ratio between the
contingency
for that behavior and the total behavior.
Therefore,
if several
contingencies
are in effect at a
given
time
(e.g.,
the
young
man in our
example
could either watch television or do his
taxes,
each of which has
multiple consequences),
the
proportion
of the individ-
ual's
responses corresponds
to the relative
strength
of the
contingency.
The
consequences
associated with
completing
his income tax
may
have
been more
powerful
to the
young
man than those associated with televi-
sion
viewing.
Further
analysis
would lead us to
question
what influences the relative
strength
of
competing contingencies.
Several
explanations appear plausible,
including (a)
an individual's reinforcement
histoiy (Ferster
&
Skinner,
1957; Kanfer, 1971; Rachlin,
1978), (b) rule-governed
behavior
(Catania,
1984; Malott,
1984), (c)
the
perceived
value or
probability
of occurrence
of a
potential
reinforcer
(Brigham,
1978; Rotter,
1954), (d)
discrimination
of one's own
performance (Mahoney
&
Thoresen,
1974), (e)
an individual's
motivation to obtain a
particular
reinforcer
(Brigham, 1978),
and
(f)
the
operating
environmental context
(Nelson
&
Hayes,
1981; Rachlin, 1978).
Cues
We now have an
explanation
for the
young
man's behavior: He turns
off the television and works on his taxes because of the relative
strength
of
competing contingencies
that influence his behavior. The
probability
of
an
early
refund of his
taxes,
the avoidance of
penalties
such as a
fine,
and
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Self-Management
413
other
consequences
are more
powerful
influences than the
enjoyment
he
currently
is
experiencing watching
television. We still do not
know,
how-
ever,
what
prompts
him to turn off the television
suddenly
and
begin
work-
ing
on the aversive tax forms.
Several theories have been
proposed regarding
the discriminative
stimulus for
self-managing
behavior.
Although
the ultimate incentive to
manage
one's own behavior
may
be accounted for
by referring
to environ-
mental variables
(Skinner, 1953),
events that
prompt self-management typi-
cally
are
presumed
to be accessible to the individual alone. For
example,
Rachlin
(1978)
and Catania
(1984)
described an individual's commitment
response. According
to this
perspective, during
a
period
in which the value
of a
particular response (e.g., exercising)
is
high,
an individual makes a
commitment
(typically
considered a verbal
response)
to
perform
the desired
behavior with a
particular frequency.
The commitment decreases the indi-
vidual's choice and
prompts
the
performance
of the behavior when com-
peting contingencies
are
prepotent (e.g.,
when one would rather watch TV
than
complete
tax forms or rather
stay
in bed than
get up early
and
run).
Nelson and
Hayes (1981)
extended this
analysis, suggesting
that the entire
controlling response (self-management behavior) may
serve as a
prompt
for
delayed consequences.
Premack
(1970),
Kanfer
(1971),
Kanfer and
Karoly (1972),
and
Brigham
(1983)
referred to an individual's
attending
to his or her own behavior or
private
events as the stimulus for
self-management
to occur. Kanfer
suggested
that:
"this
self-monitoring system may go
into effect
only
under those conditions in which
the normal chains of behavior are not run off
smoothly
or when other external or
internal events
provide
cues for which no
highly
trained
response
is available'*
(p. 41).
That
is,
the individual assesses his or her behavior
and,
in
finding
it
unsatisfactory,
makes a decision to
change
that
performance.
Self-
monitoring,
therefore,
is viewed as the stimulus for
self-management;
however,
the
process
is influenced
by
feedback from environmental events.
What Reinforces
Self-Management?
Let's return to observe the
young
man
doing
his income tax. The tele-
vision is still off and he sits
working
at his desk which is covered with
forms,
receipts, legal tablets,
writing
utensils,
and a calculator. We've
speculated
on
why
he went to work on his
taxes,
but what
keeps
him
working
for
hours?
Explanations
related to the maintenance of
self-management
be-
havior
typically
involve either self-reinforcement or external reinforcement.
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414
Hughes
and
Lloyd
Self-Reinforcement
Self-reinforcement often has been
proposed
as the
consequence
that
maintains
self-management
behavior
(Bandura,
1974; Kazdin, 1978;
Thoresen
&
Mahoney, 1974).
Bandura noted that
self-management
behavior
may
be
hard to maintain because it is
supported by delayed
reinforcement which
conflicts with
immediate,
competing contingencies.
Individuals, therefore,
often are
taught
to
provide
their own reinforcement for
self-managing
until
natural
consequences
are
operational.
For
example,
the
young
man whom
we observed
completing
his income tax
may
reward himself
by eating
a
pizza
after he has
completed
two hours of work. We assume that
eating
the
pizza
reinforces
completing
the income tax return if
time-spent-working
increases for the
young
man in the future
(Bandura,
1969, 1974; Kanfer,
1971; Kazdin,
1978).
This
explanation
of the self-reinforcement of
self-management
behav-
ior
appears
both
logical
and
parsimonious.
However,
its
verity
has been
questioned by
several
investigators.
Skinner
(1953) proposed
that:
"The ultimate
question
is whether the
consequence
has
any strengthening
effect
upon
the behavior which
precedes
it. Is the individual more
likely
to do a similar
piece
of work in the future? It would not be
surprising
if he were
not, although
we must
agree
that he has
arranged
a
sequence
of events in which certain behavior
has been followed
by
a
reinforcing
event"
(p. 238).
To return to the income tax
scenario,
does
eating
a
pizza
increase future
sessions
working
on his income tax for the
young
man?
Conversely,
would
future work sessions be maintained if income tax refunds were withdrawn
or if
penalties
were no
longer
levied for failure to file returns?
Rachlin
(1978)
and Catania
(1984) argued
that self-administered re-
inforcement is not what maintains
self-management
behavior.
Instead,
the
operant
involved is a commitment
response.
In our
example,
Rachlin and
Catania would
arge
that the
young
man has made a commitment to eat
a
pizza only
if he has worked on his income tax for two hours because
completing
his return has become
important
for other reasons
(e.g.,
a
po-
tential
refund).
Whatever
originally brought
the
young
man to make the
commitment to reinforce his own
working
in the first
place probably by
itself would make
completing
the income tax in the future more
likely
(Catania, 1984).
Perhaps
self-reinforcement
operates
more as a mediator than a rein-
forcer of behavior.
Eating
the
pizza might
have increased
working
on the
income tax because of its stimulus
properties
rather than its
reinforcing
properties (Rachlin, 1978).
Rachlin
argued
that:
"This
hypothesis
could be tested
by substituting
neutral but
strong
stimuli for
self-reinforcers. For instance,
a student who rewards himself
by eating
a
peanut
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Self-Management
415
after each 10 min of
studying ought
to
study
as well
if,
instead of
eating it,
he
simply
transfers the
peanut
from one dish to another as a
way
of
counting
10 min
study periods" (p. 253).
Self-reinforcement
may simply
serve as feedback that
says
"I did it" to the
individual in the same
way
that a feedback click informs a
pigeon
that it
has
just pecked
a
key. Similarly,
Baer
(1984)
referred to marker stimuli
such as tokens in a container or numbers on a wrist counter whose
"Function is to serve as mediators of the
long-term
outcomes that cannot
readily
be made direct and immediate outcomes of the behavior
changes
that are
being
programmed.
. . .
They
are direct and immediate
consequences
of a
necessary
initial
performance; they
mark the correct
completion
of that initial
performance
and set the occasion for a
subsequent performance
that now can lead to the
reinforcers or avoid the
punishers
in those
rearranged contingencies
that the
self-controlling person
is
attempting
to use"
(p. 212).
External
Reinforcement
Is self-reinforcement sufficient to maintain a
self-controlling response?
Bandura
(1974),
Kanfer
(1971),
Kanfer and
Karoly (1972),
and Thoresen
and
Mahoney (1974) proposed
that much of human behavior is maintained
in the absence of immediate environmental
support
or feedback. Jones et al.
(1977) argued
that
although
theorists
acknowledge
the role of the environment
in the
self-management paradigm,
"self-reinforcement
investigations strongly
imply
that the
self-delivery
of
consequences
is
responsible
for behavior
change
rather than
specific
external
contingencies operating
in the
experiment"
(p. 151).
Bandura conceded that
self-reinforcing responses
are
partly
sustained
by periodic
external
reinforcement,
but he claimed that the
process
is
relatively
independent
of environmental influence.
Other
investigators place
more
weight
on the role of the environment
(Brigham,
1978; Kazdin, 1978; Skinner, 1953).
Kazdin
argued
that research
suggests
that
self-management contingencies depend upon
environmental
surroundings
to maintain their
support
and
"although
theoretical
concepts
of self-control
vary
in the role accorded external
contingencies,
it is
generally agreed
that
[the]
environment is crucial in the execution of self-
control in
therapeutic applications" (p. 335).
Skinner contended that indi-
viduals control their own behavior
by manipulating
variables of which their
behavior is a
function,
but that
ultimately
control must be accounted for
with variables
lying
outside individuals themselves. Skinner concluded that:
"A mere
survey
of the
techniques
of self-control does not
explain why
the individual
puts
them into effect. This
shortcoming
is all too
apparent
when we undertake to
engender
self-control. . . . We make
controlling
behavior more
probable by
arranging special contingencies
of reinforcement. . . . Some of these additional
consequences
are
supplied by
nature,
but in
general they
are
arranged by
the
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416
Hughes
and
Lloyd
community.
... It
appears,
therefore,
that
society
is
responsible
for the
larger part
of the behavior of self-control"
(p. 240).
One
way
to
conceptualize
environmental influences on
self-managed
behaviors is to consider the
concept
of
trapping. According
to the idea of
trapping (Baer
&
Wolf,
1970),
it is
possible
that the levels of a
given
behavior are not
high (or low) enough
to come into contact with reinforce-
ment
contingencies.
For
example,
children
may
not read at a fast
enough
rate to meet a criterion.
However,
when an individual
-
perhaps
because
she exercises a
self-management technique
-
begins
to
respond
at
higher
levels,
she comes into contact with reinforcement
contingencies;
at the
same
time,
her behavior
may
be
trapped
at a
higher
level because it also
comes into contact with other
naturally occurring contingencies
such as
understanding
what she
read,
keeping peers
from
chiding
her for
reading
without
inflection,
or other
positive
or
negative
reinforcers.
Thus,
the self-
management technique provides
a means to
gain
access to
naturally
occur-
ring
reinforcers.
Another
way
to
conceptualize
environmental influences on self-
management
is to consider
self-management
as a behavior itself. That
is,
if
self-management
or
controlling responses
are a functional
response
class,
then as a
group they
are
likely
to be influenced
by consequences. Perhaps
the environment
differentially provides
more and
stronger positive
conse-
quences
for behaviors that
bring people
in contact with
longer-term
con-
tingencies.
In this
way,
we can reconsider
self-management
behaviors as
less discrete and more similar to an
operant;
as a
group, self-management
behaviors
operate
on the environment to
bring
the behavior into contact
with more
powerful
reinforcers.
Both of the alternatives we discussed in the
previous paragraphs
also
correspond
to an alternative
conceptualization
of the
relationship
between
self-managed
behavior and the environment.
According
to this
view,
people may
exhibit self-control not
just
because such behavior re-
sults in
greater
reinforcement,
but because it obtains reinforcement more
effectively.
Furthermore,
there
may
be some reinforcement value in how
one's behavior affects one's
world;
as Skinner
noted,
"The human
organ-
ism is reinforced
simply by being
effective"
(Evans,
1968,
p. 62).
Thus,
one
potential
reinforcer for
self-management
is that the
controlling
be-
haviors of an individual
exercising
self-control are reinforced not so much
by
their
specific
effects on the
environment,
but that
they
have effects.
Given the idea of
multiple
schedules
operating
at
essentially
the same
time on
behavior,
perhaps self-managing
behavior
produces multiple
changes
in the environment that
are,
in
sum, reinforcing.
For
example,
perhaps exercising
what we are
calling self-management
reduces the value
of
certain,
short-term
negative consequences
as well as
making
certain
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Self-Management
417
longer-term consequences
more accessible. We
suggested
this in the ex-
ample
of the
person preparing
tax returns: As a
consequence
of
turning
off the television and
completing
tax
forms,
he
may
have
(a)
reduced the
"nagging"
associated with not
having completed
his
taxes,
(b)
made his
return arrive
earlier,
(c) provided
himself with a means for
soliciting
so-
cial reinforcement from his associates
("Wow!
You've done it
already?
I'm
dreading it."),
and
(e) operated
on his environment in other
ways,
as well as
simply causing effects
or
changes
in his environment.
Perhaps
all
of these
consequences may
have been
reinforcing,
more
reinforcing
than
those associated with
watching
television.
Perhaps
the individual has
learned that his behavior has effects on the environment in these sorts
of
ways,
that
self-management
behavior has
simply acquired
the effects
that are characteristic of
secondary
reinforcers.
The view of the environment as the ultimate source of behavioral con-
trol
may
seem to limit one's
personal responsibility
with
respect
to behavior
management,
a
point
consistent with radical behaviorism
(Skinner, 1971).
A focus on the environmental influences on
self-management processes,
however,
has the benefit of
making
these
processes
more amenable to edu-
cational influences
-
we can
manipulate
environmental variables. In the
next
section,
we turn to
discussing strategies
for
teaching self-management.
HOW TO TEACH SELF-MANAGEMENT
According
to the
paradigm
we have advocated in this
paper,
self-
management
refers to instances in which the individual
forgoes
immediate
reinforcement in favor of
highly
valued,
long-term
benefits. The
process
appears simple enough
for
anyone
to
follow,
yet
there is
ample
evidence
that
many people may
not
practice
efficient
self-management
skills. For
example,
individuals
engage
in excessive
consummatory
behavior
despite
harmful effects such as
obesity,
heart
disease, alcoholism, listlessness,
and
general
ill health. Or
they engage
in
inappropriate
social interactions
regardless
of loss of friends or business
colleagues. Conversely, people
fail
to
speak up
when it comes time for annual
pay
raises
despite
dissatisfaction
with their current
salary,
or
they may
fail to
study
torts well
enough
to
pass
a bar exam for a law
degree.
Communities
pollute
streams and
drinking
water
despite
threats to health and loss of wildlife and nations
engage
in warfare and fail to
negotiate
settlements in the face of loss of
life and natural resources.
Assuming
that these cases
represent examples
of
long-term
benefits that are sacrificed for short-term
rewards,
it would
appear
that the need to learn
self-management
skills is
pervasive.
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418
Hughes
and
Lloyd
Rachlin
(1978) suggested
that environmental events that can
generate
self-management by shifting
the locus of behavioral control from short- to
long-term
events have not been examined
systematically.
Since
investigators
have
analyzed
the variables of which behavior is a
function, however,
it
should be
possible
to teach individuals to
manipulate
variables that influence
their own behavior
(cf.
Skinner,
1953).
Rachlin
(1978)
and Baer
(1984) sug-
gested
that it is
possible
to make
people
more aware of the
contingencies
that are in effect in their lives
by increasing
the
saliency
of the antecedents
and
consequences
of environmental events.
Through
the use of direct in-
structional
principles
such as
prompting, modeling, practice,
and corrective
feedback,
people
have been
taught
to observe instances of their undesired
behavior and the environmental events
affecting
their behavior. The use of
recording
devices
may help
to make these events and their
consequences
more salient to the individual.
Additionally,
an individual's behavior
initially
may
be
brought
into
conformity
with
long-term consequences by employing
techniques
such as
(a)
commitment
strategies (e.g., arranging
to have a
wake-up
call in order to arrive at an
appointment
on
time) (Rachlin, 1978),
(b)
rules and verbal behavior
(e.g., raising
one's hand before
speaking
in
class to avoid loss of
privileges) (Catania,
1984; Malott,
1984),
or
(c)
stimulus
control
(e.g., eating only
when
sitting
at a table to avoid
snacking
between
meals) (Kazdin,
1978; Skinner,
1953).
Goldiamond
(1965), Mahoney
and Thoresen
(1974),
and
Brigham
(1978) proposed
that
through
direct instruction individuals can be
taught
to
analyze
their environments to
identify
functional variables that influence
their behavior. The next
step,
therefore,
is to teach
people
to
modify
the
variables that control the behavior
they
wish to
charge.
Skinner
(1953)
and
Brigham (1978) suggested
that because
any
of the variables of which the
target
behavior is a function
may
be
manipulated, many self-management
procedures
are available and one
may
be chosen that is
appropriate
for a
particular
environmental context. The next section discusses effective
ap-
plications
of
self-management strategies.
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS OF
SELF-MANAGEMENT
As we
developed
in an earlier
section,
self-management
establishes a
relationship
between
controlling
and controlled
responses (Skinner, 1953).
This contrast
aligns
with a distinction between
techniques (or self-management
behaviors)
and the
problem
behaviors that those
techniques
have been used
to
change.
In this
section,
we examine that distinction with reference to
interventions.
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Self-Management
419
Controlling Responses
People may manage
their own behavior in
myriad ways.
For
example,
when one is
writing
while
sitting
next to an
open
window on a
pleasant
afternoon,
she
may manage
her behavior of
looking
out the window rather
than
looking
at what she is
writing by altering
her environment
(e.g., closing
curtains or
turning
her back to the
window). Similarly,
a
person may
act
in a
way
that is
incompatible
with
acting
in another
way,
as
exemplified
in
the
song,
"Whistle a
Happy
Tune."
Skinner discussed
techniques
of
self-management.
He
catalogued
and
gave examples including (a) physical
restraint and
physical
aid,
(b) changing
the
stimulus,
(c) depriving
and
satiating, (d) manipulating
emotional condi-
tions,
(e) using
aversive
stimulation,
(f) drugs, (g) operant conditioning, (h)
punishment,
and
(i) "doing something
else"
(see
Skinner, 1953,
pp. 231-240).
Kazdin
(1984) provided
a
slightly
different
catalog.
He included
(a)
stimulus
control,
(b) self-monitoring, (c)
self-reinforcement and
self-punishment,
and
(d)
alternate
response training.
Models
proposed by
others
(e.g.,
Bandura &
Perloff,
1967:
Glynn,
Thomas,
&
Shee, 1973; Kanfer,
1970)
included
(a)
self-
assessment,
(b)
self-evaluation,
(c) self-recording,
and
(d)
self-reinforcement.
The last
examples
have a more substantial theoretical basis: the behaviors
described
by
Kazdin
(1978)
and Skinner
(1953) comprise
more of an un-
structured collection. But these lists are not
exhaustive;
other
techniques
that have been tested under the
general
rubric of
self-management
include
goal-setting
and self-instruction.
As is
apparent,
there are
many
different
ways
to
classify self-management
techniques.
A
thorough
examination of these taxonomies would reveal both
similarities and differences
among categories
of
techniques.
But,
at
present,
we do not think that there is a
comprehensive, unifying
means of
classifying
these
techniques.
Controlled
Responses
An exhaustive list of the different behaviors that have been
changed
using any
of these various
techniques
would be
tedious,
in
part
because
self-management procedures
have been used to address
many responses
generally
outside of the realm of education. These
response range
from
ceasing smoking (Abueg,
Colletti,
&
Kopel,
1985; McConnell,
Biglan,
&
Severson, 1984;
Singh
&
Leung, 1988)
to
losing weight (e.g.,
Horton, 1981;
Israel, Silverman,
&
Solotar,
1987),
and from
reducing depression (e.g.,
Singer, Irvin,
&
Hawkins, 1988; Stark,
Reynolds,
&
Kaslow,
1987)
to man-
aging
diabetes
(Wing, Epstein,
Nowalk,
&
Scott,
1988).
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420 Hughes
and
Lloyd
Examples
of controlled
responses
within education are
abundant,
also. Some studies have examined the effects of
controlling responses
on
social behavior in
schools;
for
example,
Martella, Leonard,
Marchand-
Martella,
and
Agran (1993)
used
self-monitoring
to reduce a student's
negative
statements. Other controlled
responses
have been
academic;
for
example,
Laird and Winton
(1993)
examined the effects of different self-
evaluation
procedures
on students' mistakes on mathematics
problems.
Still
other studies have examined effects on combinations of controlled
responses;
for
example, Maag,
Reid,
and
DiGangi (1993)
used
self-recording
to ad-
dress these controlled
responses: (a) attending
to math work
sheets,
(b)
answering
math
problems,
and
(c) answering
those
problems correctly.
Controlled
responses may vary
in
complexity,
too;
whereas
attending
is a
relatively simple response, answering questions correctly
is more
complex
(i.e.,
it
requires multiple separate responses).
The controlled educational
responses
do not have to be limited to
school
settings,
however.
Rusch, McKee, Chadsey-Rusch,
and
Renzaglia
(1988)
used self-instruction to address a
conceptually simple response,
seek-
ing
assistance,
in a
job setting. Similarly, Lagomarcino
and Rusch
(1989)
used self-instruction
techniques
to increase the
relatively complex
work
responses performed by
a
person
with
profound
retardation in a
community
work
setting.
This brief set of
examples
illustrates that diverse
self-management
techniques
have been
applied
in diverse
settings
with diverse
responses
by
members of diverse
groups. Apparently, techniques, settings, responses,
and
group membership
do not
impose
obvious limitations on the useful-
ness of
self-management.
Rather,
they primarily
test the
capability
of the
people
who are
teaching self-management:
Can we determine how to
teach
pretty
much
anyone
how to
manage
her own behavior under
given
circumstances?
Because of the extent of the literature on
self-control,
readers who
are new to it and are interested in
examining
studies of
self-management
should read research reviews as a first
step.
Both earlier reviews
(e.g.,
Kazdin, 1984;
McLaughlin, 1976)
and more recent works
addressing par-
ticular
topics
in
self-management (e.g., Hughes,
1991;
Mace &
Kratochwill,
1988) provide
informative introductions.
CONCLUSION
Despite
the extensive literature on
self-management, including
both
theoretical and
applied papers,
there is much about
self-management
that
is unknown. Our discussion has hinted at some areas of
potentially
fruitful
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Self-Management
421
research. In this
section,
we
suggest
a few areas as illustrations of the
range
of
topics
that
may
be studied.
Although
we have an
abiding
interest in the
study
of
procedures
for
teaching self-management
behaviors,
in these com-
ments we focus on issues relevant to
understanding
the
phenomenon
self-
management.

We think it would be
particularly
valuable to examine the
consequences
of
self-management.
For
example,
we wonder whether
the idea of
trapping (Baer
&
Wolf,
1970)
is
operating
in self-
management.
Does
managing
one's own behavior
permit
access to
other environmental reinforcers?

We wonder about whether various
self-management
behaviors or
techniques might
form a
response
class. Does
exercising
various
self-management
behaviors
produce
a
higher probability
of
using
those behaviors in other
settings?

We think that the
question
of
why self-management techniques
work remains unanswered.
Although
there are substantial data that
bear on the
question,
we would like to know what are the
key
ingredients
in
self-management
and how do
they
interact with
other variables to enhance or inhibit effects.

Similarly,
we wonder how successful educators
may
be in
teaching
the use of
self-management techniques
to
change
an individual's
behavior when the individual herself does not want to
change
it.
For
example,
teachers
may
want students to work harder to
improve
their
grades, employers may
desire
employees
to decrease
absences,
or
parents may
wish that their children more
consistently completed
their household chores.
Self-management techniques may
be
appropriate
in each
case; however,
if an individual does not want
to
change
a
targeted
behavior,
will
self-management
be effective
in
promoting
behavior
change?
We believe that in such a
case,
individuals need to learn what
contingencies
are
operating
in their
environments. This
learning
is facilitated
by making
the
consequences
of one's actions more salient. For
example,
students could be
instructed that the results of continued
poor grades
will be academic
probation
and eventual dismissal from school. Smokers could be
shown
x-rays
of
lungs
that have been
damaged by
the effects of
long-term
smoke inhalation. It
may
be that reluctance to
change
a behavior that is
potentially damaging
to an individual is due in
part
to a failure of the individual to associate
delayed
aversive
consequences
with an immediate
response.
A
prerequisite
for
teaching self-management may
be to cause the individual to attend
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422
Hughes
and
Lloyd
to
potential consequences by making
these
consequences
more
salient.
Empirical testing
of this
hypothesis
in addition to
investigation
of the most effective methods for
increasing
the
saliency
of
delayed consequences
under various conditions should
be conducted.

We think that the wealth of
techniques
considered under the rubric
of
self-management
is both a benefit and a
liability. Although
it
indicates that there are
many
different
possible techniques
(controlling behaviors)
that we can
teach,
we fear this wealth also
indicates a lack of
conceptual clarity.
How are
self-monitoring
and
self-recording
the same and different? To what extent is
goal-setting
implicit
in self-evaluation? We need a
rigorous
examination and
classification of these
procedures.
Such an examination should also
propel
us toward a more
complete understanding
of the
phenomenon
we call
self-management.

We also
expect
that there is much to be
gained by studying
self-
management
behaviors in a broader context.
Self-management
behavior occurs within a context in which some antecedent and
consequent
events influence it. We have too little
understanding
of how the various factors in the environment
promote
or inhibit
self-management
and how
self-management,
itself,
affects those
environmental variables. To
gain greater understanding
of the
interactions between
self-management
and the environments
within which it
occurs,
we
probably
must
adopt
an ecobehavioral
approach
to
studying
these
phenomena (e.g.,
Greenwood, Carta,
Arreaga-Mayer,
&
Rager, 1991).

We think that some of the
problems
and issues we have identified
are the result of
having
no
fully specified
and
extensively
tested
theory
of
self-management. Although cognitive
views of self-
management
have offered
working
models of self-control
(e.g.,
Kanfer &
Karoly, 1972),
there are difficulties with them.
Likewise,
it is not clear that more
operant
models are sufficient
(Nelson
&
Hayes, 1981).
But,
we doubt that we shall be able to resolve
many
of the more difficult issues in
self-management (e.g.,
what's needed
to make it
work?)
until we have a
well-developed
model to
critique,
test,
and revise.
Despite
these
questions
about
self-management,
we think that the
area has much to offer education.
Self-management techniques appear
to
appeal
to teachers and other
educators;
to be
applicable
in diverse
settings,
with diverse
populations,
and to diverse controlled
responses;
and to be
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Self-Management
423
robust.
Likewise,
they
have
advantages
for individuals because
they
offer
a
potential
means of
changing
behaviors
important (and
therefore
socially
valid)
to individuals themselves.
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