Epistemic Modality in Greek:

Towards a Constructional and Typological Approach

Accepting language as in some way a result of cognitive processes, understanding
any language necessarily involves accounting for the ways in which these processes are
instantiated in that language. The present study represents a tentative and initiatory
explanation to lay the groundwork for understanding the conceptualization and construal
of epistemic modality in ancient Greek A constructional approach can best account for
the primary methods through which epistemic stance is expressed in Greek texts, and a
typology by which a superior organization and understanding of primary epistemic
constructions is possible. However, before a typology of epistemic constructions is
possible, basic components of these constructions, basic constructions, and some
understanding of their interaction must be analyzed. The purpose of the present study is
to do just this.

1. Epistemic Modality

It is impossible to proceed with a description of how epistemic modality is
conceptualized in ancient Greek without first understanding what epistemic modality is:
Epistemic modality is defined here as (the linguistic expression of) an
evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs under
consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring, or has
occurred in a possible world which serves as the universe of interpretation
for the evaluation process In other words, epistemic modality concerns
an estimation of the likelihood that (some aspect of) a certain state of
affairs is/has been/will be true (or false) in the context of the possible
world under consideration. And this estimation of likelihood is situated on
a scale (henceforth called the epistemic scale) going from certainty that
the state of affairs applies, via a neutral or agnostic stance towards its
occurrence, to certainty that it does not apply, with intermediary positions
on the positive and the negative sides of the scale.
1

Epistemic modality is, then, includes a very large category of possible statements. There
are any number of methods through which a speaker can construe
2
their place on the
epistemic scale. From a pragmatic perspective
3
, this is not even limited to word choice.
Intonation, the context of utterance, and other factors make it possible to turn a simple
indicative statement into a construal of the likelihood of a situation. For example, the
statement
(1) He was at home.
is, in and of itself, not an expression or construal of epistemic modality. There is nothing
present in (1) itself to indicate the speakers stance on the likelihood of the situation
under consideration. It is presented as simple fact. However, when placed in a specific
context, the same statement can represent the speakers epistemic stance.
(2) Speaker 1: Theres no possible way he could have been studying,
because I swear I saw him at the club last night.
Speaker 2: He was at home.
In (2), the statement made in (1) is set in the context of discourse. A base space
4
is
present in which the act of studying by unnamed individual is under consideration. From
this base space a possibility space is constructed by the Speaker 1 in which the unnamed
individual is in fact not studying, but is at a club. Speaker 2, in making the same
statement present in (1) is now emphatically denying the state of affairs
5
described in the
possibility space constructed by Speaker 1. In this context, He was at home is certainly
a construal of epistemic modality because it is now concerned with the likelihood of a
particular state of affairs. In fact, the very aspects of the statement in (1) which it
excluded it from the realm of epistemic modality are in (2) the indication of the speakers
stance on the epistemic scale. In (1), no part of the statement indicates the possibility that
the state of affairs described did not happen. In (2), this lack of such indications places
the speaker at the far end (at certainty) on the epistemic scale, completely rejecting the
possibility of the state of affairs set up by the possibility space constructed by Speaker 1.
If (1), which contains nothing to indicate the speakers epistemic stance, can be an
expression of epistemic modality, then the number of ways in which epistemic modality
can be construed are limitless and form a complex and open class. Additionally, just as
the lack of any epistemic components can indicate a speakers epistemic stance, there are
a wide range of epistemic components which may be present in a statement to locate the
speakers statement somewhere on the epistemic scale: Epistemic modality can be
expressed by a variety of linguistic forms,such as epistemic phrases, adverbs, adjectives,
nouns, lexical verbs and participial forms.
6
The complexity and open-ended nature of
the linguistic construal of epistemic modality make it impossible to capture the infinite
number of ways epistemic statements can be made.
What is possible, however, and what the present study is concerned with, is the
following:
1. What are the typical or proto-typical components involved in the
general construal of epistemic modality in any given language (in this
case ancient Greek)?
2. Are these components typically structured in ways which make possible
meaningful generalizations concerning the nature of epistemic
constructions
7
in that language?
3. If it is possible to identify the basic components and constructions
generally used, is it possible to construct a typology of the methods in
which the simpler components and structures are used to indicate the
speakers epistemic stance?
In other words, simply identifying that any number of words, types of words, and
combinations of words can express epistemic modality does not aid in understanding how
speakers in a given language use lexical and syntactical features in that language in
conceptualizing and construing the likelihood involved in any given situation. On the
other hand, identifying patterns of lexical and syntactical constructions, and their
components, used by speakers to express epistemic modality enables a better
understanding of how speakers use their language to express a vital aspect of
communication.
In order to lay the groundwork for understanding epistemic modality in ancient
Greek, several texts of Greek oratory were examined
8
. From these texts, a corpus of
epistemic statements were extracted and examined. The typical components used in these
statements were identified, including lexical items and simple constructions. From this
examination, the present study constructs a tentative typology of basic epistemic
constructions and identifies not only some important aspects on the construal of epistemic
stance in complex epistemic constructions, but also notes areas where further
investigation is necessary.
2. Basic Components
As was already noted, no epistemic markers are necessary in the construction of
epistemic statements. It is possible for context alone to transform a statement which lacks
all such markers into an epistemic construction. However, in the corpus examined, many
common components were used as epistemic markers in epistemic constructions. Three
of the most important classes of epistemic markers are outlined below. Excluded are any
components which alone are capable of consideration as epistemic constructions.

1. Grammatical Mood
Greek grammars
9
traditionally recognize a number of moods any Greek word can take,
including indicative, subjunctive, and optative, which were the most common in
epistemic constructions. While the indicative mood was the most common mood used in
epistemic constructions, this likely due to the fact that it was also the most common mood
used throughout the texts. The optative mood, on the other hand, while not being enough
by itself to construe epistemic stance, was the only mood capable of being the primary
component in an epistemic construction in determining epistemic stance, but even here it
was often combined with an - clause:
(3)
, .
For it would be a great stroke of good fortune for the youth, if one alone
corrupts them, but the others aid. (Plat. Apol. 25b)
(4) ,
.
For if they mean this, I would admit I am an orator, [though] not in a class
with these. (Plat. Apol. 17b)
Both of the above lines contain a potential optative construction used as an epistemic
construction. However, the contrast between the two uses shows the ability of the
potential optative construction to be both the primary component in an epistemic
construction, as well as a more secondary one. In (3), the potential optative is the primary
component which is used to construe Socrates epistemic stance. In (4), the -clause sets
up a possibility space to consider, and the potential optative construction constructs a
resultative space from the possibility space. The -clause already indicates that the state
of affairs under consideration is non-actual, and therefore even before the potential
optative construction Socrates indicates that he doesnt believe his opponents mean what
he suggests as possible in the possibility space. However, in (3), the potential optative is
the component of the epistemic construction which initially construes the non-actuality of
the state of affairs under consideration, and the -clause is secondary. So while in neither
case, as found in the corpus in general, does the potential optative construction
encapsulate the epistemic construction, (3) show that it is quite possible for this
construction to be primary.

2. Tense
Various studies have shown the importance of tense in English in construing the
speakers epistemic stance
10
. The present study found tense was also a primary
component in epistemic modality in Greek. Epistemic constructions in the corpus used all
tenses, and often more than one in the same construction. However, two general
observations are important. First, future tense indicative epistemic constructions were less
present. Most epistemic statements used moods as a primary indicator of the possibility
of future states of affairs. Second, the use of the future tense indicative tended to place
the speakers epistemic stance towards the certainty end of the epistemic scale:
(5)

Being cleared of all forms of the charge, neither going into the holy places
will I profane the sanctity of the gods(Antiph. 2.2.11)
The very fact that the state of affairs under consideration is a future one makes it
unrealized. However, rather than distancing himself from the certainty that this
hypothetical state of affairs will be as described (e.g. by using words such as I think or
by using a different mood/tense of the verb to be) the use of the future indicative
construes the state of affairs as a certainty..
3. Particles
Greek particles are numerous and are found throughout Greek literature, used in
all manner of ways. In the corpus examined, the most common use of particles which
contributed to the construal of epistemic stance were emphatic (e.g. and )
11
.
However, other particles were often used as epistemic markers in interesting ways. For
example, in (4) above, the use of in the -clause without a corresponding may
suggest that some sort of clause to the effect of but they dont after Socrates states if
they mean this.
12
The therefore is an epistemic marker in that construction,
although this was not a common occurrence in the corpus.
One particle in particular, however, was of paramount importance in epistemic
constructions. The particle was used in a variety of epistemic constructions. J ust how
this particle should be understood will be discussed in the section below devoted to .

4. Adjectives/Adverbs
A common element in epistemic constructions in the corpus were qualifying
words used as secondary components to further determine exactly where the speakers
epistemic stance was on the epistemic scale. For example, two common adverbs, and
, were commonly used as components in Simple Epistemic Verbal Constructions
(SEVCs), but also in Complex Epistemic Constructions (CECs):
(6) ,

If we all were shown to be clever speakers, I know well that your own
situation would not be in anyway better. (Dem. Ex. 7.2)
(7)

For we know clearly that all of the city is being stained by him
(Antiph. 2.1.3)
In (7), a more complex form of an SEVC (by virtue of other components being present in
the construction), the adverb simply adds force to the speakers construal of his
epistemic stance (as does the use of the first person plural, which serves to pull the jury
into the speakers epistemic construal). In (6), the adverb serves the exact same
purpose, even though the epistemic construction is far more complex, using many
elements to construe the speakers epistemic stance.
3. The particle
Any comprehensive grammar of Greek will invariably list a number of
constructions in which either can or must be used. The variety of these constructions
make it difficult to define in any meaningful way. Smyth states explicitly that its
force varies as it modifies the meaning of the moods.
13
Goodwin argues that has, in
general, two separate main uses. In the first of these two it denotes that the action of
the verb to which it is joined is dependent upon some condition, expressed or implied.
14

In the second is joined with relative and temporal words, and sometimes final
particles
15
rather than verbs. Similarly, Basset divides an into its appearance in protasis
and apodosis: En grec ancient, la particule avait deux employs principaux
doublement divergents. Dans un protase, aprs ou , dans une relative, une
temporelle ou une finale, cest--dire dans des propositions subordonnes, elle
accompagnait un subjunctive et se liait au mot subordonnantDans une apodose de
systme hypothtique ou dans une proposition indpendante ou assimilable une
independente, elle accompagnait un optatif ou un temps secondaire de lindicatif.
i

16
As
a lexical item, what is it possible to say about the meaning of , not just in terms of
epistemic modality but in ancient Greek as a whole, given such diverse usage? First, any
lexical item used with any frequency is almost invariably polysemous: it has multiple
related meanings that have all been conventionalized to some degree and therefore there
is no single abstract meaning from which all its uses can be predicted.
17
Rather, an
encyclopedic view
18
of the various meanings of will more fully explain its uses,
and likely enable definitions of the particle that are avoided in descriptive grammars
19
.
Second, as noted by Smyth, Goodwin, Schwyzer & Debrunner, and so forth, the particle
is invariably linked to other words in constructions. As constructions are not merely
an unstructured list but rather form a structured inventory of a speakers knowledge of
the conventions of their language.
20
These constructions are represented in a
taxonomic network. In other words, does have meaning, and can be viewed like any
other lexical item in Greek. It simply is more closely linked with a limited number of
constructions than other lexical items. To understand the meaning of , each
construction in which the meaning differs must be understood as a separate node in the
network of constructions in which is used. Although such an exercise is beyond the
scope of this study, it would enable an encyclopedic definition of , and better account
for its use.

i
In ancient Greek, the particle has two principle uses for two different reasons. In a protasis, after
or , in a relative, a temporal or a final, that is to say, in subordinate clauses, it accompanies a subjunctive
and it links itself to a subordinate word. In an apodosis of [the Greek] hypothetical system or in a
independent clause or something comparable to an independent clause, it accompanies an optative or a
secondary tense of the indicative.

4. The Particle
In addition to being a common component in a variety of epistemic constructions, the
particle can make a statement an epistemic construction by itself:
(8)

For I do not suppose those plotting the deaths of their neighbors devise
and prepare in front of witnesses (Antiph. 1.28)
(8) is an epistemic construction, but is so solely due to the particle , which alone
acts as an epistemic marker, and which expresses the epistemic stance of the speaker by
adding at least some doubt to the evaluation of the likelihood of the state of affairs under
consideration. In this way, functions in a similar fashion to a SVEC (see below)
with a verb of thinking or supposing.
5. Compositionally Complex Epistemic Words
The fundamental hypothesis of construction grammars is the continuum between
syntax and lexicon. At the extreme of the lexical side are atomic morphemes. Although
these can be words, they are often not, and this is particularly true of Greek, a highly
flectional language. Morphology allows a single word to express more complexity, and
cannot therefore be considered atomic. Consider the word . From a constructional
perspective, this word is complex, consisting of an atomic componential (semantic)
aspect (-) and the morphological aspect which creates componential complexity by
adding syntactical elements such as number, tense, mood, and voice. In other words,
can be considered to consist of the atomic component loose whose morphological
properties add the components to form the complex construction I loose (actively and
indicatively) at this time. Additionally, it is also possible for a construction composed of
several words to be closer to the atomic side of the syntax-lexicon continuum by virtue of
be representing a single component. For example, although the idiom kick the bucket is
composed of several words, it is in fact noncompositional, in that it the entire expression
is mapped onto die.
21

Most words in ancient Greek exist at the level of complex but bound
22
by virtue
being morphologically complex. However, some words exist further to the syntactic side
of the continuum by way of being schematically conceptualized as representing,
semantically, more than can be predicted by it morphology. Simply put, a particular
adverb in Greek, despite its morphological expression and grammatical class, may be
better interpreted as phrasal: So kann auch ein Adverb statt eines kausalen oder finalen
oder auch eines anderen Nebensatzes stehen
ii
.
23

Among the many possible other Nebenstze and adverb and other Greek words
are subordinate clauses which construe epistemic stance. These may be called
Compositionally Complex Epistemic Words (CCEWs). An excellent example of this
category is the word . Arguably, this word is not typically even at the level of
complex but bound as it is morphologically invariable (and therefore, as an
instantiation of a grammatical class it is atomic and schematic). Pragmatic factors
determine how this word is construed, and often enough it is used as a simple epistemic
adverb meaning naturally or reasonably. However, at times this fits very
well into Khners category above, e.g. in Demosthenes speech Olynthiac (1.10):
ii
Thus, an adverb can also stand in place of a causal or final or also another subordinate clause.


(9) ,
Nevertheless, [his] gratitude will be great- as is to be expected.
A simpler adverbial reading here is inadequate. It fails to express the phrasal quality of
the adverb.
The question then becomes how these CCEWs are used to convey, modify, alter,
etc, the speakers epistemic stance. In fact, they are quite similar to the next type of
epistemic construction considered below in that their primary function is distancing. In
using a word like , the speaker is offering an epistemic evaluation, but is doing
so impersonally. In (9), a base space is set up containing the blessings the gods have
given the Athenians. From this space a possibility space is built in which any Athenian
can consider these blessings compared to the problems the Athenians are experiencing. A
resultative space is then constructed in which Demosthenes determines that any Athenian
will be grateful to the gods despite the current misfortunes. This resultative space
represents a positive epistemic stance formed from a Complex Epistemic Construction,
and will therefore be considered in full below. Here, what is important is how the CCEW
functions in the resultative space. This entire space is built from a possibility
space. In it, is used to construe Demosthenes epistemic stance on the
probability that any given Athenian, having weighed the blessings of the gods against the
current problems, will be grateful to the gods. However, does not directly
connect this stance to Demosthenes. Even though it, in fact, merely expresses
Demosthenes evaluation of a likelihood, it is designed to appear that this is not an
opinion of Demosthenes at all. Demosthenes does not say I expect X, in which it
would be clear that Demosthenes alone considers X as likely. Instead, he uses
as a way of construing the hypothetical situation as likely from any perspective.
The function of CCEWs is to do just that: construe an epistemic stance, a personal
evaluation of likelihood, as a general truth.
6. Simple Epistemic Vebal Constructions (SEVCs)
The simplest of the simple epistemic constructions in Gree, are phrases or clauses which
use a first person verb (or participle) of thinking, perceiving, believing, etc. Examples
found in the corpus include , , , , , and .
In a Simple Epistemic Verbal Construction (SEVC), the place of the speakers statement
on the epistemic scale, in the indicative mood at least, is determined solely by the
semantics of the verb selected. This is hardly surprising, as it is fairly obvious that an
epistemic stance taken with the statement I believe does not have the force of one taken
with I know. Consider, for example, the difference between the following:
(9) ,
.
And I know indeed from earlier reports already it has happened that sometimes
those murdered, and other times those having murdered, have not been found out.
(Antiph. 5.67)
(10)
.
For you will not, I suppose, deny what you did in front of all the Athenians.
(Lys. 13.32)
It is true that the particle attached to the first person pronoun, as well as the pronoun
itself, in (9) add emphasis apart from the verb choice itself
24
. However, even without
these the use of in (9) versus the use of in (10) are enough to place the
two statements at different points on the epistemic scale. The former makes a much
stronger epistemic stance, and the statement is made as if there is no doubt at all, and can
be no doubt, that the past events in question are as the speaker asserts. Examining the
second statement from a pragmatic point of view, it is easy to see why the speaker would
not wish to commit himself as in (9). On the one hand, he is asserting his belief that his
opponent will do X. However, as doing X would actually be an honest action on the part
of his opponent, a stronger epistemic stance is undesirable, as it would be the equivalent
of a commitment to the honest nature of his opponent.
Pragmatics is a central factor which often dictates the choice of verb in SEVCs.
What is most important here is that in these simple constructions it is the verb (or verbal
variant such as a participle) which makes the construction an epistemic one. As such,
these constructions are actually somewhat rare. Although included in this section for
contrastive purposes, the statement (9) above is actually a Complex Epistemic Statement
due to the use of an emphatic pronoun and particle. It uses other components than the
verb alone to make the statement an epistemic construction. In the corpus examined, this
was far more the norm than the exception.
7. Impersonal Epistemic Constructions
Impersonal Epistemic Constructions (IECs) function similarly to CCEWs
described above. These constructions can be subdivided into three different types.
Type 1: Qualifier (Q) +3
rd
Person Copula
As in English and many other languages, (e.g. French and German) Greek allows
impersonal constructions by combining a qualifier (adjective, participle, etc) with a form
of the third person copula. A few such qualifiers are commonly used in IECs, such as
, , , etc. For example:
(11)

It is not [at all] unclear that [the defence] themselves were avoiding clear
knowledge of the facts (Antiph. 1.13)
In (11), as is common in such constructions
25
, the copula has been omitted and must be
understood. The epistemic component of the above construction is the adjective (here
used adverbially) . The pragmatic function of such a construction is again to
make the epistemic stance of the speaker appear to be fact rather than opinion.
Type 2: Distanced Epistemic Impersonal Verbs
Greek has a number of verbs which are commonly used. In the examined corpus,
one of the most common was deontic modality (e.g. using ). However, possibility
that a particular action, situation, etc. could be done/would happen/etc. was also common
(generally using the impersonal verb ). However, this possibility should not be
confused with epistemic modality, as it concerns the ability of a particular state of affairs
to occur, rather than likelihood. In fact, there was not a single instance in the entire
corpus of this type of construction. This was a curious finding, given the prevalence of
such constructions in other languages (e.g. It is likely that X is Y).
Type 3. Personalized Impersonal Epistemic Constructions
Despite the above, there were numerous examples in the corpus examined of
impersonal verbs used in epistemic constructions but that brought the speaker himself
into the evaluation using the first person pronoun in the dative case (). The most
common verb used in this construction was :
(12)

That I speak the truth has been attested, and it appears quite evident to me [that]
this is the opposite of what the prosecution alleged.
Although this epistemic construction is formed impersonally, the use of the first person
pronoun connects the speaker with the evaluation. The purpose of this construction is not
to distance the speaker from the evaluation, but is rather a matter of construal and
perspectivization. By using this epistemic construction, rather than stating something to
the effect of I believe it is quite evident that. a mental space is created in which the
focal point of attention is on the situation (in which the prosecution is shown to be
wrong) rather than the epistemic stance of the speaker. In other words, this type of IEC
allows the speaker to make an epistemic stance, connect themselves with that stance, and
yet ensure that another facet of the discourse is the focus of attention.
8. Complex Epistemic Constructions
1. Conditions
Unlike epistemic modality, the topic of conditions in ancient Greek has received a
great deal of attention
26
. Additionally, the study of the nature of conditionals themselves
has been a focus of intense study. Even what constitutes a condition is debated
27
. Given
all of the above, attempting to go into Greek conditionals in any detail would either be a
waste of time, if nothing new was put forward, or would require a study several times the
size and complexity of the present one, in order to appropriately address the mass of
literature already published on conditionals in general and Greek conditionals
specifically.
What is important to note, however, is that all conditionals in Greek which may
be considered epistemic constructions are complex, and use a variety of basic epistemic
components (e.g. verbal mood, the particle , verbal tense, etc). Additionally, most
grammars of ancient Greek deal with conditionals as relatively fixed combinations of
these elements. This is largely appropriate, as there are set constructions which for
specific conditionals (e.g. a so-called irrealis conditional in the present is constructed
using +the imperfect indicative in the protasis, and aorist or imperfect + in the
apodosis). What has received no significant attention is the other components usually
involved in conditions. In the corpus examined, rarely were epistemic conditional
constructions formed using only the components described in typical grammars of Greek.
As far as conditionals are concerned, what will be examined below are how components
not required by particular conditional constructions are used in certain CECs, as well
as how simpler epistemic constructions are used in conditionals. Two conditionals, one
using a typical construction described in any Greek grammar, and the other an atypical
construction, are examined below with these purposes in mind.
(13) ,

If we all were shown to be clever speakers, I know well that your own
situation would not be in anyway better. (Dem. Ex. 7.2)
This type of conditional is often referred to as future less vivid or something similar.
The central function of this type of condition is to set up an unlikely hypothetical state of
affairs, and infer from that possibility space
28
. What is important to understand is that the
less vivid aspect is all contained within the protasis. If that hypothetical state of affairs
is realized, the use of this construction does not make it less likely, in the speakers mind,
that the apodosis will be realized. Hence, the apodosis of this conditional construction not
only combines a SVEC into the entire construction, and adverbial epistemic component
() is also used to make it clear that, in the unlikely event the protasis is realized, the
apodosis will surely be as well.
(14) ,
.
If indeed I have entered court [at some point](followed by a number of
other hypothetical situations) Let the one wishing rise up now and
refute me! (Andoc. 1.23)
In (14) Andocides begins by setting up a possibility space in which several states of
affairs (all having to do with things which might implicate him) are considered. The first
-clause sets up this possibility space, but there are no epistemic markers in any of the
various connected clauses which are used in the construal of Andocides epistemic
stance. In fact, there are no direct epistemic markers (e.g. a word or particle with a
particular semantic value used to express his epistemic stance, or a verbal mood/tense
combination which may do the same) anywhere in the entire condition. Andocides
epistemic stance is made indirectly by a third person imperative (). By issuing
a command to his audience to refute him, the implication is that there is no possible
refutation, because none of the various states of affairs ever happened. Once again, taking
pragmatics into consideration is necessary to understand the construal of epistemic
modality.
These are only two example of ways in which various standard components of
Greek epistemic constructions (i.e. SEVCs and verbal moods) can interact with Greek
conditionals in the construal of epistemic modality. Far more methods were found in the
corpus. In fact, every single component discusses above was found in conditionals in the
corpus. Although it is beyond the scope of the present study, a more thorough
investigation of epistemic markers in the various Greek conditionals is necessary.
2. Other CECs
Before going on to make some generalizations about CECs in Greek, and some
points for further investigation, it is useful to look at examples outside of conditionals.
After all, epistemic modality in Greek is most frequently expressed in CECs, and this is
hardly limited to conditionals.
(15) , ,
,
.
It would be fitting, gentlemen, whenever someone willingly brings
themselves into the dangers [of court], for you to have they exact same
opinion they of them as they themselves have. (Andoc. 1.3)
In (3), the hypothetical state of affairs (i.e. the unrealized aspect of the situation under
consideration), is constructed by the use of the optative + in a potential optative
construction. What is interesting about the above construction is that, despite the phrasal
use of to note the suitability of hypothetical state of affairs constructed, as well
as the use of the particle to add force to the statement, from an epistemic standpoint
there is little in the construction in which the speaker expresses his epistemic stance. In
other words, although this is a Complex Epistemic Construction, the epistemic modality
aspect is secondary. Pragmatic factors explain this secondary aspect. The potential
optative is used impersonally (like ) to distance the speaker from the state of
affairs, not only from an epistemic perspective but also from the truth of the statement
altogether. The likelihood that the state of affairs will actually occur is only realized as
possible by the potential optative construction, and nothing else in (15) construes the
speakers view on how possible or likely that state of affairs is. The purpose for the
distancing in epistemic stance is secondary. The force of the entire statement is not on the
likelihood that the state of affairs will be realized, but rather to convince the gentlemen
of the jury that this state of affairs should be conceptualized by all in a particular way (i.e.
as fitting or perfectly reasonable). By distancing himself from this conceptualization,
the speaker makes his opinion appear to be fact. If the speaker had made his epistemic
more personalized, it would have taken away from the illusion that the statement is not
opinion at all.

(16)

All of those present would have spoken better than but a few of them
concerning [the poetry] they themselves had made. (Plat. Apol. 22b)
Socrates in discussing the failure of the poets to understand their own work, constructs a
possibility space in which all of those present were also present with him at the time
when he was addressing the poets. The imperfect tense, combined with the particle , is
used to construct the speakers epistemic stance: this hypothetical state of affairs will not
be realized. The potentiality is constructed from the particle , while the speakers
epistemic stance is construed both by and by the verbal tense both of
(imperfect) and (pluperfect). In other words, the use of past tense verbs
places the time of the hypothetical state of affairs in the past. As it is in the past, by
necessity it either happened or didnt. Because makes the statement one of potential,
clearly the hypothetical state of affairs did not in fact occur. The past tense makes the
mental space constructed either hypothetical or not, and if it is hypothetical then it is
unrealized, and the epistemic stance of the speaker is clear (on the certainty end of the
epistemic scale that this hypothetical state of affairs will never happen).

9. General considerations
From the examination of epistemic constructions in the corpus, a number of
important general observations were made, as well as several notes of interest where
further investigation is needed.
1. As noted above, hypothetical state of affairs constructed from past tense verbs
almost invariably construed epistemic modality on the certainty end of the
epistemic scale. Although it is quite possible to speak of past events as possibly
happening when the speaker is unsure, this rarely happened in the corpus
examined.
2. Almost all epistemic constructions were complex. That is, quite rarely were
simple epistemic constructions used to construe epistemic stance. Most epistemic
constructions were either conditionals or simple epistemic constructions which
used particles, adverbs, adjectives, and other components to add to the construal
of epistemic stance.
3. Particles of emphasis were used everywhere as components in the construal of
epistemic modality. Additionally, the particles and were of great
importance in many epistemic constructions. However, particles were present in
almost all epistemic constructions in the corpus, and of singular difficulty was the
determination of when these particles were used as epistemic markers, and when
they were used for other purposes. A focus on particles from a standpoint of
epistemic modality alone would therefore be uniquely helpful in understanding
epistemic modality in Greek.
4. Epistemic constructions in Greek may be broadly divided into impersonal and
personal categories. Further, the more personalized the epistemic stance was,
the more it was possible for the speaker to place himself anywhere on the
epistemic scale. Impersonal epistemic constructions were often used as distancing
mechanisms.
5. In general, no singular component or simple epistemic construction stood out as
the primary method of construal of epistemic modality. However, the importance
of various components or constructions did stand out when the place on the
speaker on the epistemic scale is considered. For example, the further from
certainty the speaker was on the epistemic scale, the more verbal mood was
important, and other components played a secondary role and were less prevalent.
6. Given its prevalence in epistemic constructions, a typology of -constructions
from an epistemic standpoint would be useful not only in gaining a better
understanding of the encyclopedic meaning of the particle, but in constructing a
typology of epistemic constructions in general.

10. Conclusions
There is far more to the construal of epistemic modality than is covered above. The
topic itself is complex, and also forms an open-ended class. The present study was
concerned only with laying the groundwork towards a typology of epistemic
constructions. This was accomplished by identifying the components and simple
epistemic constructions used in the construal of epistemic modality. Additionally, several
epistemic constructions were analyzed so that points of interest could be identified for
further study. Furthermore, several Complex Epistemic Constructions were examined,
and again analyzed to identify points of interest. Finally, some general observations were
made. From all of the above, it is clear that although a great deal of investigation is
necessary towards the goal of understanding epistemic modality and creating a typology
of epistemic constructions in Greek, various regularities in expression appear to make
this goal possible.

1
Nyuts (2001), pp. 21-22.

2
The terms construe and construal are used here as they are in research in cognitive
linguistics: The cover term that has come to be used for different ways of viewing a
particular situation is construal. (Verhagen, 2007, p. 38). In other words, the construal
of epistemic modality refers to the ways in which the speaker, expresses, represents,
captures, etc, her or his particular viewpoint of this modality.
3
One outcome of research in functionalist linguistics is the importance of the context in
which speech or language occurs. Pragmatic as used here relates to the observation that,
in the context of the human behavioral repertoire, language has a specific role to play,
viz. (primarily) to allow communication with other members of the speciesHence,
investigating language also unavoidably means accounting for how this system fulfills
this communicative function (Nyuts, 2001, p. 22)
4
The term space here, e.g base space, hypothetical space, etc, is borrowed from
Fauconnier (1985; 2007), who describes mental spaces as a basic and common aspect
of human language.. The concept is used in a number of different approaches to language
in cognitive linguistics. It refers to very partial assemblies constructed as we think and
talk for purposes of local understanding and action (Fauconnier, 2007, 351). In other
words, during the course of discourse, speakers construct local spaces where important
elements of the conversation are located and may be expanded upon. It would be helpful
to condiser and example: Suppose that we are engaged in a conversation about Romeo
and J uliet and the following statement is made:
(1) Maybe Romeo is in love with J uliet.
The English sentence brings in a frame from our prestructured background cultural
knowledge, X IN LOVE WITH Y, with two roles highlighted (the lover x and the loved

one y)The word maybe is a space builder; it sets up a Possibility space relative to the
discourse Base space at that point. The Base space contains elements a and b associated
with the names Romeo and Juliet (Fauconnier, 2007, 355). In the construal of
epistemic modality in Greek, a possibility space is invariably constructed out of the base
space, and the epistemic stance of the speaker concerns the likelihood of the realization
of the state of affairs in that possibility space. The term state of affairs is borrowed from
Functional Grammar and is an all-encompassing term covering the entity to which the
whole of the predicate with its arguments refers, irrespective of whether this entity is an
event, an action, a situation, etc (Wakker, 1994, p. 7n14).
5
See note 4 above.
6
Krkkinen (2003) p. 32.
7
The term constructions here refers to constructions as they are conceived of in various
construction grammars, which posit that there is a uniform representation of all
grammatical knowledge in the speakers mind in the form of generalized construction
everything from words to the most general syntactic and semantic rules can be
represented as constructions (Croft, 2007, p. 471). The most important aspect of
construction grammars is the idea that syntax and lexicon form a continuum, rather than
being two separate components (Goldberg, 1995, p. 7, Langacker, 2008, p. 161).
Additionally, constructions are organized in a taxonomic network (Croft, p. 476-477),
and vary from very fixed to highly variable and schematic (ibid, pp. 470-471). All of
speech is formed from combining various constructions (Langacker, 2008, chaps. 1 and
6).

8
All of the texts were taken from the Perseus Project of Tufts University
(http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/collection?collection=Perseus:collection:Greco-
Roman). These included the speeches of Antiphon, Andocides, Demosthenes, Lysias, and
the Apology of Plato.
9
The Greek grammars consulted in the present study include Smyth (1956), Humbert
(1960), Schwyzer & Debrunner (1966), Goodwin (1889), and Khner & Gerth (1904).
10
See, e.g. Dancygier & Sweester (2005, sect. 2.4) and Dancygier (2004, chap. 2).
11
On the usage of particles in general, as well as the emphatic usage of these particles,
see Denniston (1950).
12
See Smyth, sect. 2896.
13
Sect 1762.
14
p. 64.
15
Ibid.
16
p. 27.
17
Langacker, pp. 37-38.
18
As opposed to a dictionary view (see Langacker, pp. 38-39). An encyclopedic view of
lexical semantics, lexical meaning resides in a particular way of accessing an open
ended body of knowledge pertaining to a cerain type of entity (Langacker, p. 39).
19
In other words, rather than simply describe a force has, it is possible to describe
its meanings as if it were any other lexical item. This is true of all particles, and would be
a superior method of describing them in Greek grammars.
20
Croft, pp. 476-77.
21
Croft, pp. 467; Croft and Cruse (2004) p. 253.

22
The levels of the syntax-lexicon continuum may be found in Croft and Cruse, p. 255:

23
Khner & Gerth, p. 115.
24
Goodwin pp. 115-116.
25
Schwyzer & Debrunner p. 623, Smyth sect. 944.
26
Apart from Greek grammars, see, e.g., Wakker, Seiler (1997), and Greenberg (1986).
27
Wierzbicka (1997) pp. 15-18.
28
Goodwin, pp. 168-69.