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THE
JOURNALOF
VolumeXXXIII
RELIGION
JANUARY 1953
Number
I
fort, and each of these phases of his caring for them permeates the other.
of interest.And the spirit whichdifferentiates this mode of interest is not an object of interest for the personin whom it
is realized. In so far as he may be said to
which a spirit enablingus to act conclusively permeates experience.Such reassurance,so far as it comesto life, involves
integrity of will. We may find ourselves
acting under great difficulty; our resources may be taxed to the limit; we
may be faced with a most uncertainfuture; and the failure of enterprises on
which we have set our hearts may stare
us in the face; yet, undergenuineobligation, we may stand and stand firm, we
may act and act decisively.Indeed,nothing short of such strengthof spirit seems
capableof makingus equal to the acceptance of our own limitationsand assets in
the vein of constructive self-criticismor
equal to the renunciations surely required of us. Man is capable of facing
extremeadversity and renunciationwith
poise. The moment of obligation is exactly akin with such a capacity.
Is it not in focalizingsuch possibilities
of spiritthat tragedyfulfilsat least one of
its basic themes?May not tragicart help
us to consummateawarenessof the possibility of rising with integrity to meet
even the most dire adversities sown of
our own deeds?At the bottom of tragic
consciousnessdo we not find our allegiance strengthenedto man in any person, born of this man in ourselves,do we
not find reliable hope? That very hope
strengthenedin tragic consciousnessand
involving self-transcendenceseems to me
the essence of sustainedwillingness;and
it seems to consist in our assurance of
being equal to what may lie ahead rather
than in the expectation of effecting any
specific results. Such assurancedoes not
lie in a tightenedgripupon the future;for
it involves appreciation of a ground of
action which we cannot ordain or contrive: a spirit arising in ourselves out of
profound frankness and trust. Is it not
personmay findimmediateincentiveand
confirmation from within himself for
complete commitment in action. I am
assuming, of course, as most ethical inquirershave done, that thereis some connection between our capacity to "fulfil
obligation"and our capacity to actually
benefitpeople. And I am suggestingthat
our capacity to benefitpeople at all profoundly is decisively formedin moments
of obligationin our own experience,when
we are gathered and founded on a basis
within ourselvesinstinct with authority,
where the authority in question is not
ours to wield but ours to serve, and consists in a spirit which we can honor with
all energyand resourcefulnessin action-no less in thejudgmentalphase of action
than in any other.Judgment is not the
valve, or the hand on the valve, that lets
the flow of good into life. To the extent
that judgmental activity may serve the
good, it presupposesthat very spirit essential to the groundingof any phase of
action. We may only hope that the good
may inform our judging as well as anything else we may do; we may not expect
to control the good by renderingit susceptible to judgmental control, as if the
possibility of justified action were contingent upon making groundsfor action
explicit for judgmentas we wouldadduce
explicitly the groundssupportinga truth
claim. It seemsfutile to supposethat justified action must await initiation froma
judgmentalconclusionby whichwe could
underwrite a policy of action with a
Q.E.D. The case for the view that virtue
is knowledge does not appear to have
made much headway when pursued in
this direction, whether argued in behalf
of philosopher-kings, of happiness-enhancers,or of engineersof social welfare.
Clear thought is indeed eminently re-
OF RELIGION
THE JOURNAL
names they are graced, however restrained their intonation. And the anom-
10
sary to the possibility of that fluency in regardfor our fellows. To grasp the full
action by which we can transcenda halt- force of this "ought," and to be able to
ing and artificial approach to what we indorseit apart fromall the prestigewith
are doing.' To act under full commit- which it is impressed upon us, is not
ment, we must know what we are about. merely to have enjoyed the companyand
But the full commitment of which I convenience of other men; nor is it a
speak as essential to obligation resides matter of susceptibility to feelings simiprecisely in those actions which tran- lar to theirs;it is primarilyto have found
scend routine or imitative performance, and cleaved to that man who is universal
when we give ourselves up to what we in ourselves,who is preparedto seek out
are doing with profound and implicit and recognizeand respect himself whertrust, the very opposite of bargainingon ever he may be found, in any man. As
a guaranty of what the future will bring. our analysis of respect attempted to
In retrospect we may conclude that no make clear, this mode of regard toward
actions could have been more prudent other men is one of which we become
than these. They are nonethelessvery far capable in so far as we achieve disinterfrom being merely prudentialacts.
ested interest. Our analysis of the willI would suggest, then, that to become ingness involved in the moment of obliobligatedis to find it possibleto give our- gation has brought us back upon the
selves up in action. I mean this in a spirit differentiatedin disinterested indouble sense: first, we find it possible to terest, now amplifiedas that which can
commit our resourcesunivocally, to the claim us wholly, free us from arbitrarilimit of our capacity and with utter will- ness, and endow those actions in which
ingness;second, we find it possible to re- we serve it with ultimate and conclusive
linquish a possessive concernfor making point.
secure some future good or forefending
Tii:
some future evil. We find ourselvesfree,
In the closing portion of this paper I
as it were,to cast our breadon the waters
would like to carry further the notion
without stringsattached. The stringsare
that the possibility of becoming oblinot attached because they are not
seems to involve a certain fundagated
needed. What we do satisfies us promental
relaxationand deepeningof earfoundly in the doing; the books are aland
of
I must urge
nestness;
ready balanced,whateverthe futuremay that I am notagain, course,
recommending
something
bring. Thus liberation and a liberality to be aimed at but
to
note
retrotrying
that can leave no man its bondsmanseem
and
spectively
experientially
something
to go hand in hand. In the liberationof
characteristic of the possibility of bethe
action
we
into
may experience
spirit
and very clear in those
growth of a compassion which reaches coming obligated
moments
of
obligation which we have
out from acknowledgmentof man as we
have discoveredhim in ourselvesto man been concernedto understand.It seems
in any person.Perhapsit is only fromex- to me that much of our striving, so tense
perience in which a man is awakenedin with effort,so preoccupiedwith security,
ourselves who knows his affinity with so imbued with the conviction that evman in any person that we may under- erythingdependson ourperspicacityand
stand the legitimacy of the perennial
moral claim that we ought to act with
11
12
IN EXPERIENCE
THE MOMENTOF OBLIGATION
13
14
15
NOTES
1. Ernst Cassirertakes importantnotice of this
in Languageand Myth (New York:Harper& Bros.,
1946), pp. 59-62, and offersa searchinganalysisof
man's regardfor things on which his power of inspirited (i.e., creative) action may crucially depend.
2. Especiallywhereworkis mentioned,but also
for discussionsof the entiresubjectof this paper,I
am verymuchindebtedto ProfessorJohnM. Anderson.
3. Cf. Thoreau'sremark:"If I knew for a certainty that a manwas comingto my housewith the
consciousdesignof doingme good, I shouldrun for
my life.. . for fear that I should get some of his
good done to me,-some of its virus mingledwith
my blood" (see the closingpages of the section of
Waldenentitled "Economy"for the context amplifying this remark).Cf. also John Dewey, Human
Nature and Conduct(New York: ModernLibrary,
1930), Part IV, Section I, especiallythe last three
paragraphs.
4. Ethics,Part V, Prop.XLII. I wouldstate one
reservation about this formulation: blessedness
seemsto suffuseand transfigure
whatmay be viewed
underthe aspectof desire,or inclination;it doesnot
seem to superveneas an opposingand morepowerful "force." Perhaps Spinoza is handicappedin
stating an insight that will not submitto the mode
of conceptionof whichhe availshimselfthroughout
his attemptto explainthe "mechanics"of affectivity
(cf. especiallyPart IV, Prop.VII: "An emotioncan
only be controlledor destroyedby anotheremotion
contrary thereto, and with more power for controllingemotion."On such a view action can only
be viewed as consequentupon prevailingmotivational factors, among which a responsibleperson
cannot be found).
5. Has any writerin our time pioneeredthe way
for this thoughtmorepersistentlyandpenetratingly
than WilliamFaulkner?Also I shouldmentionthat
ProfessorD. T. Suzuki, the Buddhistphilosopher,
has especiallyhelped me to surmise the original
man in all men.
6. Dr. Karen Horney's Neurosis and Human
Growth(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1950)
has seemed to me a mine of considerationswhich
may help us to understandhow we may come to
chain ourselves within the frameworkof "pride
systems" articulatedin the form of patterns of
what we oughtto be and do.
. 7. ProfessorD. T. Suzuki
bringsthis out with
great clarity in his discussionsof "stopping"and
"no-mindedness";
see, e.g., the chapteron "Swordsmanship"in ZenBuddhismandIts InfluenceonJapanese Culture (Kyoto: Eastern Buddhist Society,
1938).
8. See John Dewey, HumanNatureand Conduct
(New York:ModernLibrary,1930),p. 289.
9. I am very much indebted to the works of
Dr. KarenHomey forhelpingme to focuson "moral
earnestness"and release from tension as clues to
the meaning of humility. These same worksalso
point out very clearly the possible connections
between self-condemnatory"humility" and selfdetestation.