HEC Coach LBO Case

This
case is prepared by Jian-Ming Yang of MBA-PT-2013 at HEC Paris. It is intended purely for the Internal Competition held by the PE
Club in October 2014. All rights are reserved. Please contact the author at jian-ming.yang@hec.edu for requests of usage.
Coach, Inc.
A ccessible luxury brand buyout

It's late September 2014. The sun was still shining and the water was still warm at
least in this far and away paradise on earth.
You were on your way back to your beach chair with two Cosmoplitans in hands when
your newly wedded wife nodded at the direction of the small table next to your chair.
Your Blackberry was vibrating like crazy and you immediately felt a hundred butterflies
storm into your stomach.
You carefully handed one Cosmopolitan to your new life partner, whose eyes hid behind
a pair of Dolce & Gabbana sunglasses and couldn't be deciphered. Then you put down
your own drink on the table, picked up the phone and steered yourself as discreetly as
possible through the crowded beach and toward a quiet corner at the bar.
Twenty-two hours later, you were already back in Manhattan, on a taxi straight from
JFK to the office. However, you were unsure whether your wife had left Bora Bora as
well in the flight 6 hours later than yours. You had no time to worry about her anyway.
As you walked into your boss' office as instructed by his secretary, you found three
managing partners, including your boss, waiting for you.
Fosun Group and buyout of Coach, Inc.

I just got off the phone with Guangchang. He confirmed that he wanted us to start
evaluating the possibility of buying out Coach, said Terry Xu, who recently joined the
firm as a Managing Partner upon a successful fund-raising round of $700m, in which
80% of the committed capital came from Asia.
You immediately realize he was referring to Guangchang Guo, the founder and chairman
of Fosun International, the largest investment group in China. Called by many as the
Warren Buffet of China, Guo is currently the 10th richest man in China worth some $5.4
billion. Since 2010, Guos closely held conglomerate has spent more than $3.7 billion on
foreign acquisitions. They include U.S. and European fashion labels, a Hollywood film
studio and a famous skyscraper in New Yorks financial district, One Chase Manhattan
Plaza, bought last year from JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) for $725 million.
This case is prepared by Jian-Ming Yang of MBA-PT-2013 at HEC Paris. It is intended purely for the Internal Competition held by the PE
Always open about his admiration for the Oracle of Omaha and his intention to follow
the same strategy, Guo paid $1.36 billion earlier this year to buy out the majority shares
of the largest insurance group in Portugal, Caixa Geral de Depositos SA, outbidding the
famed PE firm Apollo Global Management LLC along the way.
And having acquired in 2010 a ten percent stake in Club Mediterrane, the famous
French vacation & resort group, Fosun worked with Ardian Private Equity in Paris
(formerly AXA Private Equity) last year to buy out the rest of Club Med. The deal
launched with dispute with certain shareholders and ended with Fosun walking away in
August this year when an Italian investor Andrea Bonomi joined the bidding war with a
$1 billion offer.
However, that did not deter Guo's plan to global expansion. In a recent interview with
Bloomberg Businessweek, Guo made it clear that their goal is to upgrade the life of
Chinas middle class and to that end Fosun will continue its effort to acquire foreign
brands, technology and financial assets in particular, businesses that can cater to his
countrys increasingly affluent consumers.
Still, you're surprised by Coach as the target. While waiting for the flight at the Bora
Bora Airport, you have checked the basics of the luxury brand famous for its women's
bags. The market cap is around $10 billion currently, which means that the ultimate
purchase cost would probably be above $13 billion at least. Even with leverage, this
would by far a much larger deal than any that Fosun has completed before.
Your boss, Managing Partner Nicholas Winterman, saw the hesitation in your eyes and
said: We've been in discussion with Mr. Guo since Terry joined us. You know Terry
went to college with him and has advised Mr. Guo on several international deals as a
friend for many years. The conversation got really serious in late July. Looking back, Mr.
Guo probably already made the decision back then to walk away from the Club Med
deal.
He stopped to take a sip of Pu-erh, his favorite since winning an auction of the prized
luxury Chinese tea in Shanghai three years ago, then continued: Two days ago during
the call with him I felt very strongly that he wanted this and we could be their partner.
That's why I called you back oh, by the way, sorry for ruining your honeymoon. I
hope Sarah didn't take it too badly.
It's Sally, not Sarah. You whispered in your mind out loud but didn't say anything.
Anyway, we've discussed a bit on this and we quickly came to the conclusion that you'll
be helping Nicholas and Terry on this one. said Henry Singar, the founder of your firm,
LEOPARD PARTNERS. He had been typing away on his iPad since you walked in and
now finally raised his head to address to you.
This would be one of our largest deals ever if we decide to go for it. While Fosun is
currently not subscribed to any of our funds, they will take their usual stance as a Co-
Investment Partner. Even though Mr. Guo said he's ready to pour in any amount of
capital to do this if it's the right deal, personally I think we need another co-investor or
two. Within ourselves we'll use LEOPARD VII, the one that Terry recently helped us
raise, as the main vehicle. Let's earmark up to 40% of it for now. If the deal is right our
LPs shall be very happy that we could put the dry powder to work so quickly. But only
IF THE DEAL IS RIGHT. Henry looked into your eyes while enunciating every single
syllable in his last sentence.
The Investment Committee wants your initial assessment tomorrow evening at around
six. You've been with the firm for so long I think you know what to do. Take whoever is
not closing any deal right now with you. Just tell their boss that this is my decision.
Henry wrapped up his order while struggling to lift his 260-lb body off the designer's
sofa. Your experience told you that this would be all from their side and it's time you get
to work.
A brief history of Coach, Inc.

Despite its image of a young brand compared to the likes of Herms, Coach was actually
founded in 1941 as a family-run workshop on the 34th street of Manhattan. In 1946,
Miles and Lillian Cahn joined the firm and took over the business in no time. After some
hit products they eventually acquired the entire company through a leveraged buyout in
1961.
Designer Bonnie Cashin joined the firm at about the same time and introduced the silver
toggle clasp design that would become Coach's hallmark. In 1979, Lewis Frankfort
joined the company as Vice President of Business Development. He would go on to be a
key person in the company's development for more than 30 years.
In 1985 the Cahns family decided to sell the leatherware business to Sara Lee
Corporation for a reported price of $30 million. Lewis Frankfort became president of
the Coach brand upon closing of the transaction. Under the new strategy implemented
by Sara Lee, the company expanded to 12 direct-owned stores and nearly 50 boutiques
in major department stores around the country.
Coach started its international expansion in early 2000's. The expansion strategy is to
enter into joint ventures and distributor relationships to build market presence and
capability. Coach has also made a habit of acquiring its partners interests, in order to
further accelerate brand awareness, aggressively grow market share and to exercise
greater control of the brand.
For example, Coach Japan was formed in June 2001 as a joint venture with Sumitomo
Corporation. On July 1, 2005, Coach purchased Sumitomos 50% interest in Coach Japan,
which became a wholly owned subsidiary of Coach, Inc.
For its expansion into Europe, Coach purchased a non-controlling interest in a joint
venture with Hackett Limited in 2011. Through the joint venture, it opened retail
locations in Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom in fiscal 2011, in France and
Ireland in fiscal 2012 and in Germany in fiscal 2013. At the beginning of fiscal 2014, the
Company purchased Hackett Limiteds 50% interest in the joint venture.
Coach also acquired the retail businesses from its distributors as part of the expansion
strategy:
Fiscal 2009: Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China (Coach China).
Fiscal 2012: Singapore and Taiwan.
Fiscal 2013: Malaysia and South Korea.
By 2012, there were more than 350 Coach retail stores with annual revenue of $4.76
billion in the fiscal year that ended on June 30. The main source of sales was women's
handbags, which accounted for 61% of the overall revenue, followed by the women's
accessories that accounted for another 24%.
In February 2013, Coach ushered in a new ear by naming Victor Luis President and
Chief Commercial Officer, with Lewis Frankfort continuing as Executive Chairman.
Victor Luis would later be promoted to become the CEO of Coach, Inc. in January 2014,
as initially planned.
Accessible Luxury
Coach, Inc. competed and succeeded in a particular luxury sector, Accessible Luxury,
also called Affordable Luxury, Aspirational Luxury or the rather disparaging Mass
Luxury.
The luxury industry used to be the stronghold of the old European family-owned
businesses such as Herms and Chanel. The clients used to be rich individuals who only
wanted the best of the best in terms of quality, design and customer services.
This has changed, however, in the 90's, when clever marketing shifted the perception of
the middle-class mass. Once strictly beyond their financial and moral boundary, certain
luxury items such as women's bags transformed themselves into reasonably desired
targets for hardworking white-collar middle classes, even though each item could easily
eat up a half-month worth of salary.
The new sector born out of this seismic wave is the Accessible Luxury. The key
difference between the brands in this sector and the good old luxury brands lies in
"customer perceived value".
Traditional luxury customers are usually quite sensitive to the design and build
qualities of the products. It's true that they go with the famed luxury brands, but what's
behind the brands is the uncompromising product quality, from the stiches to the
leather to the metallic add-ons. Each component has to be impeccable.
Accessible Luxury, however, has to carry price tags that could be affordable by the mass
middle class while exuding a sense of luxury. The balance among design,
manufacturability, quality control and the overall cost is therefore very critical.
Throwing marketing into all these, the branding for Accessible Luxury is arguably more
difficult than pure luxury brands.
For example, one of the well-known strategies carried out by Coach in its establishment
as a luxury brand was its store location. In the 90's, Coach was known for willing to pay
higher rent just so its retail stores could be next to brands such as Louis Vuitton and
Gucci, especially in locations such as airports where consumers had limited time for
shopping and tended to build a collective impression toward shops that were in the
same block. A casual passenger in the era would get accustomed to seeing Coach's
delicate brand logo next to the shining two letters of LV and therefore associate the two
easily. That strategy paid off as Coach found itself among the leading brands that
established the Accessible Luxury sector.
Like its older brother, Accessible Luxury also suffers from the paradox of "the more
desirable the brand becomes, the more it sells but the more it sells, the less desirable it
becomes". In many cases it's an even bigger challenge in Accessible Luxury since
companies face competition both from the top and the bottom, in addition to those from
within the sector itself. And as middle-class consumers in a growing economy naturally
move "up" to real luxury brands, the Accessible Luxury brands have to naturally move
to countries where macro trend is on their side.
The Accessible Luxury sector has become attractive to the Private Equity firms in recent
years. Part of the reason is there's simply too much dry powder out there looking for
deals, but more importantly this sector has captured the imagination of PE firms that
seek to ride the macro growths of large emerging economies such as China and Brazil.
For example, last year KKR bought out 65% of the French fashion group Sandro and
Maje. While it's a private buyout deal the seller was L Capital, the private equity firm
owned by LVMH, and Florac, another buyout group the deal was valued at 650
million.
Other than buyout deals, growth capital investments in this sector have also become
popular. In January 2013, Tory Burch, the womenswear brand announced its welcome
to two minority investors, BDT Capital Partners and General Atlantic, to help with its
expansion.
Competition facing Coach, Inc.

Coach used to be the leader in branding in such a sensitive sector. With proper
marketing and spot-on international expansion, Coach saw its share price rebound after
the financial crisis from $11.80 in early 2009 to the high point of $77.84 in early 2012
(Exhibit 1).
However, with success came competition. Notably Michael Kors (Exhibit 2), armed with
the fresh new cash raised in its IPO in 2011, attacked the sector relentlessly and
successfully outgrew all its peers during the past two years. The current CEO John Idol
aims to add 500 more shops to the existing 1,560 shop locations in operation at the end
of fiscal 2014. The company also is planning a further rollout of travel stores in airports
where it now has 50 sites. The brand that really started only in 2002 now boasts 89%
consumer name recognition, exceeding names like Gucci, Burberry, Prada, Ralph Lauren
and others.
Old foe Kate Spade also enjoyed healthy growth throughout the period that saw its
share prices nearly quadrupled (Exhibit 3) by bringing more freshness and newness in
handbags. Under the management of Craig Leavitt and Deborah Lloyd the company has
grown rapidly and currently has over 80 retail stores in the United States and 100
internationally with plans to open another 35 in 2014.
All of these came at the expense of Coach, which saw its overall revenue drop by more
than 5% in fiscal year 2014. Worse still, its main business Women's Handbags
contracted by almost 10%. Its shares plunged from the high point of $77.84 in March
2012 to the low point of $33.70 in August 2014, while the share prices of Michael Kors
and Kate Spade doubled and tripled, respectively (Exhibit 4).
Outlet and brand erosion

While struggling to fight off competitors, Coach also suffered from a brand erosion
generally believed to be the result of its erroneous outlet strategy in North America,
which accounts for 65% of its annual revenue in fiscal 2014 (Exhibit 6).
Outlets have been a major focus of former CEO Lewis Frankfort, who has since ceded
the position to Victor Luis and become Executive Chairman. In its 10k filing dated June
2014, the company described its North American outlet strategy as follows:
Coach's outlet stores serve as an efficient means to sell manufactured-for-outlet

product, including outlet exclusives, and to a lesser extent, discontinued and
irregular inventory outside the retail channel. These stores operate under the
Coach name and are geographically positioned primarily in established outlet
centers that are generally more than 30 miles from major markets.
Coachs outlet store design, visual presentations and customer service levels
support and reinforce the brand's image. Through these outlet stores, Coach
targets value-oriented customers.
Manufactured-for-outlet is a standard practice in North America where the outlet
culture was born. It basically means the brands would manufacture brand new products
with lower quality and finish so that they can be sold at the outlet stores with a huge
discount.
While manufactured-for-outlet is a common practice for all mass garment and accessory
brands, industry experts questioned whether it's a good strategy for an Accessible
Luxury brand, which is always one step away from falling out of favor among the moody
middle class consumers.
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Morgan Stanley analyst Kimberly
Greenberger expressed their concerns that (Coachs) market share losses havent yet
stabilized, while pointing out that Coach generates about 65% to 70% of its North
American retail sales from outlets, the majority of which are outdoors and subject to
heavier weather impact given the especially cold winter in the East Coast early 2014.
On the other hand, Coach seems to remain efficient in retail sales, recently ranked by
eMarketer.com as the 6th most efficient US-based retailer with a $1,532 average sales
per square foot. Its archrival Michael Kors, however, ranked at No. 4 with an even better
figure of $1,886 (Exhibit 7).
Exhibit 8 shows the trends of Coach's retail and outlet stores in North America as well
as the store information in the International segment over the past three fiscal years,
respectively.
Macro and market trends

After years of impressive growth driven by the rise of large emerging economies, the
overall luxury industry seems to be slowing down.
Brazil has sunk into the most severe recession since its emergence as one of the BRIC
members while dealing with perennial high inflation. Russia and India have stagnated.
China is still projected to grow 7~8% in the coming years, but that's also a notable
slow-down from its previous norm of 10%. In addition, the anti-corruption crackdown
led by the government of President Xi impacted all major luxury brands as gift
purchases slowed down significantly.
However, the middle class in emerging countries is still on the rise, led by China and
followed by similarly vibrant South-East Asia countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia.
In its report on middle class trends, the Brookings Institute mapped out the impressive
growth of global middle class beyond 2030 (Exhibit 12) while pointed out the main
global GDP driver to be Asia (Exhibit 13).
Among all, the Brookings Institute projected China to become the worlds largest single
middle-class market by 2020, surpassing the United States (Exhibit 14). On the other
hand, India has the potential to surpass both China and US by 2030 to become the
largest middle-class consumer market in the world.
In terms of luxury, Bain & Co updated in May 2014 its widely followed report
"Worldwide Luxury Markets Monitor" (Exhibit 15). In terms of product categories, the
report described Accessories, which include bags, as "Strong polarization in leather
goods with growing attention to quality" with "Absolute and Accessible brands
outperforming". It also noted that "Men's segment outperforming".
Impossible to predict, exchange rate fluctuations impact global luxury purchasing
patterns deeply, as shown in the snapshot in Exhibit 16.
Overall the US luxury market is projected to grow from 62 billions in 2013 to 65-66
billions in 2014.
In Japan, a complicated picture of Abenomics and local pricing strategies led Bain & Co.
to project a growth of 17 billions in 2013 to 19-20 billions in 2014.
Asia Pacific as a whole is projected to grow modestly from 45 billions in 2013 to 46-
47 billions in 2014. Out of this total market, China is projected to grow from 15.3
billions in 2013 to at most 16 billions in 2014 with the corruption crackdown still
impacting the gifting sales. Interestingly, the report also highlighted the "wannabe"
group of consumers, namely young middle class, and their preferences for "American
trendy brands" instead of European bellwethers. It's also worth noting that the
international purchasing patterns of Chinese people are changing (Exhibit 18).
Overall Bain & Co. projected a global 4~6% growth for 2014 with regional breadown
shown in Exhibit 18. The report also hesitantly project similar CAGR percentages in the
coming years due to the maturing and consolidation in the luxury markets. Without the
booming phenomena that characterized the China growth in the past decade, the
market seems to enter a new norm where brands have to increase its focus on grasping
organic growth.
In terms of sales channel, Bain & Co. highlighted travel retail, outlet and online stores as
the three trends in 2014. Travel retail has recently become a major source of sales for
luxury brands, especially in tourist destinations in Europe and US. Outlet appeals to
mature consumers who are seeking to cut budgets. Many outlet openings in the coming
years will also be in Asia. Online sales have seen solid growth in established markets
(US & Europe), while M-commerce is quickly catching up in Asia.
New CEO = new era?

At age of 48, Victor Luis' ascension to the top executive position after less than 8 years
with the company signifies the watershed point of this 73-year old firm.
While Lewis Frankfort oversaw the company's hyper growth throughout the last two
decades, including the company's IPO on NYSE in October 2000, it became obvious that
the company has too many things to fix that the veteran Frankfort is no longer capable
of executing effectively.
Prior to his appointment as the CEO in January 2014, Victor Luis held the role of
President and Chief Commercial Officer of Coach, Inc., with oversight for all of the
companys revenue-generating units, strategy and merchandising, also serving on
Coachs Board of Directors. He has been a member of the senior leadership team since
joining Coach in 2006, holding a number of key international management roles and
spearheading the companys successful expansion strategy in Asia.
Most recently, Victor Luis served as President of International Group, with
responsibility for all of Coach's operations outside of North America. Prior, he was
President of Coach Retail International, where he oversaw the company's directly
operated businesses in China (Hong Kong, Macau and Mainland China), Japan,
Singapore, and Taiwan, and President & CEO, Coach China and Coach Japan. Mr. Luis
originally joined Coach as President & CEO, Coach Japan, Inc.
Prior to joining Coach, from 2002 to 2006, Victor Luis was the President and Chief
Executive Officer for Baccarat, Inc., the famed luxury crystalware brand from France,
running the North American operation. Earlier in his career, Mr. Luis held marketing
and sales positions within the Mot-Hennessy Louis Vuitton (LVMH) Group.
In the first couple months after his appointment as the CEO, Victor Luis told Wall Street
analysts that he planned to close 20% of its full-service stores in North America, where
comparable sales fell 21% last quarter, in the coming months. Some outlet stores in the
region will be consolidated as well. To make up for the lost revenue, the company will

seek better spots in department stores and flagship stores in the 12 major North
American markets.
People who have worked with Victor Luis generally described him as sharp and
visionary. His hunger for talented co-workers manifests itself in his active involvement
in regional hiring of key executives. Moreover, instead of paying big money now for
people who've been there and done that to replicate their success at Coach, he explicitly
expressed his preference to have the flexibility for a key hire to grow into bigger
positions after demonstrating the potential to grow the upside of the business.
Exhibit 20 shows the most recent compensation package for Victor Luis.
Presentation to the Investment Committee

It's now past 8pm in the evening and 5 hours since you walked out of Nicholas' office.
You consider yourself lucky by being able to grab two relatively idle analysts in the first
hour and get to work. Though relatively young, they're starting to churn out useful
numbers, including a list of possible comparables for valuation (Exhibit 11).
You checked your Blackberry one more time but there's still no sign of your lovely
newly wed with her 44-inch long legs. With the presentation to the Investment
Committee less than 22 hours away, an all-nighter seems inevitable.
As usual, you knew the slides have to be fewer than 10, excluding the title page. Its
purpose should be allowing the Investment Committee to quickly analyze the potential
of this public buyout deal and be able to form their opinions on what extra information
to collect to help them finalize their decision. As a rule of thumb, the pitch deck, should
be prepared with the following questions in mind:
1. Shall LEOPARD pursue the deal or not?
2. What's the proposed price per share for acquisition if it's a go, and why?
3. How should the premium be calculated and communicated? Over the current
share price? Over the average share price for the past month? Over the average
share price over the past 12 months? And why?
4. What are the main value drivers of the deal? Is there any obvious value locked
inside Coach? If so, how to unlock the value after the buyout?
5. Why Coach? Why not the others? Is there any other possible target that could
give Fosun exposure to the sector but at a better term?
6. How should the firm finance the deal? should Fosun remain the sole co-investor?
Shall Fosun remain a silent partner, i.e. pure co-investor?
7. What does the expected cash flow of the deal look like? What is the expected IRR
for the deal?
10
8. What added value shall Leopard bring to Coach after the buyout in order to
achieve the expected IRR: Operation improvement? International strategy? A
new CEO? Or something else?
9. What's the percentage of shares that shall be allocated to the management post-
buyout?
10. What are the key risks with the deal and the firm?
11. How should Leopard prepare for a potential bidding war?
12. What is the exit strategy in 5 years?
You also know that the deck has to open with an Executive Summary that summarizes:
1. Proposed Price/Premium/Multiples
2. Deal structure
3. Expected IRR
You reminded the two analysts that usually the nine other slides should be 20%~30%
financials and 70~80% strategy and risk analysis. The financial parts obviously have to
come from DCF analyses completed with sensitivity tests on IRR. However, even the
strategy part should be backed up by numbers, not just qualitative description
"Surely it's not a strategy nor a marketing case that one would attempt to solve in an
MBA program," you joked before realizing the two young men did not do an MBA but
instead have passed CFA Level III exams, both of them.
You gave orders to the two analysts regarding the debt assumption. You told them that
in the evaluation phase you usually assume only one tranche of debt with a yield rate
equivalent to that of a corporate bond for large manufacturers based on the spread
table in Exhibit 21. You know in reality the partners pride themselves for being able to
structure multi-tranche debt financing and achieve an effective cost of debt lower than
your estimation. You want to make sure that your presentation give them the
satisfaction of laughing at your pessimism and bragging about their track records.
You told them that for the one tranche of debt, assume paying down as much of the
principal as possible every year with whatever free cash that's left.
For the sake of convenience, you also instructed the analysts to ignore the 6-month
difference in the fiscal year designation of Coach, Inc. and treat the fiscal year that ends
on June 30th 2014 as the full calendar year of 2014. You ask them to apply similar
simplifications to the comparables. If the fiscal year ends in March, then the numbers
are allocated to the previous year. On the other hand, if the fiscal year ends in June or
September, the numbers will be allocated fully to this year. You also asked them to
assume that the deal close on December 31st 2014, despite the fact that the whole
buyout process usually drags on for months.
11
You further instructed them to take the 10-year Treasury bond yield as the risk-free
rate. They looked at you puzzled, as if you just stated the most obvious. You couldn't
help but recall all the painful exercises you did in the first month of your Master in
Financial Engineering program on selecting the most proper risk-free rate and equity
premium for valuation in different markets. You sighed and told them to use 5.5% for
equity premium. They did, however, appreciate you giving them this particular number.
Observing their reaction, you murmured to yourself that for a quick-and-dirty modeling
this later figure one does not even matter. Somewhat annoyed, you further told them to
stick to the textbook 40% corporate tax rate for now.
Furthermore you knew that for this kind of deal the firm usually exits in 5 years. Given
the rather stable outlook of the luxury industry projected in Bain & Co.'s report, you
instructed the analysts to use the same exit multiple as the industry multiple at this
moment.
Critical juncture in your career

Having been stuck in the Principal position for years, you believe this could be a golden
opportunity. A deal of this size that involves the most exciting Asian investors could
pave way for a job with much higher responsibility and better pay at another PE firm.
However, you also know that the Investment Committee is too smart and too
experienced to buy in all of your pitches. You shall identify the key weaknesses of the
deal and give a clear recommendation of "go" or "no-go", even if the later means you
will be back in the waiting mode for the next big deal.
You picked up the phone and send the Nth unreturned SMS to your wife, telling her you
won't be home by tomorrow night, then dived right back into the pile of data printed
out in standard US-letter formats...

12

HEC Coach LBO Case

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HEC Coach LBO Case

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Fosun Group and buyout of Coach, Inc.

A brief history of Coach, Inc.

Competition facing Coach, Inc.

Outlet and brand erosion

Coach's outlet stores serve as an efficient means to sell manufactured-for-outlet

Macro and market trends

New CEO = new era?

Presentation to the Investment Committee

Critical juncture in your career

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