DAYAG vs HON. CENIZARES, JR.

(1998)
FACTS:
Petitioners were hired to work as tower crane operators by one Alfredo Young, a building
contractor doing business in the name of Youngs construction. In 1991, they were transferred to
Cebu City to work for Youngs Shoemart Cebu Project. Petitioner William Dayag asked permission
to go to Manila to attend family matters and was allowed to do so but was not paid for January
23-30 due to his accountability for the loss of certain construction tools. The other petitioners left
due to harassment by Young. Thereafter, petitioners banded together and filed a complaint against
Young before the NCR Arbitration Branch NLRC which was assigned to Labor Arbiter Cenizares.
Young filed a Motion to transfer the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region VII of the
NLRC. He contended that the case should be filed in Cebu City because there is where the
workplace of the petitioners.
Petitioners opposed the same, arguing that all of them are from Metro Manila and that they could
not afford trips to Cebu. Besides, they claimed that respondents main office is in Corinthian
Garden in QC.
Labor Arbiter Cenizares GRANTED Youngs motion to transfer the case in Cebu.
Petitioners appealed to NLRC but it was dismissed. Hence, they filed a MFR and this time the
Commission SET ASIDE its previous decision and remanded the case to the original arbitration
branch of the NCR for further proceedings.
Young filed his own MFR and the NLRC reinstated its first decision directing the transfer of the
case to Cebu City.
Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained Youngs
motion to transfer
HELD: NO
The SC ruled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
technicalities. Petitioners were able to file an opposition on the motion to transfer case which was
considered by Labor Arbiter Cenizares. Hence, there is no showing that they have been unduly
prejudiced by the motions failure to give notice and hearing.
However, Young cannot derive comfort from this petition. The SC held that the question of venue
relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case.
This is to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witness and to promote the ends of justice under
the principle that the State shall afford protection to labor. The reason for this is that the
worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party, the nearest governmental machinery to settle the
dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other party is not to be given the choice of
another competent agency sitting in another place as this will unduly burden the former
In the instant case, the ruling specifying the NCR Arbitration Branch as the venue of the present action
cannot be considered oppressive to Young because his residence in Corinthian Gardens also serves as
his correspondent office. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly expedite the proceedings and bring
speedy resolution to the instant case.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124193. March 6, 1998]

WILLIAM DAYAG, EDUARDO CORTON, EDGARDO CORTON, LEOPOLDO NAGMA,
ALOY FLORES, ROMEO PUNAY and EDWIN DAYAG, petitioners, vs. HON.
POTENCIANO S. CANIZARES, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and YOUNGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
On March 11, 1993, petitioners William Dayag, Edwin Dayag, Eduardo Corton, Edgardo
Corton, Leopoldo Nagma, Aloy Flores, and Romeo Punay filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay, holiday pay, service
incentive leave, 13th month pay, and actual, moral and exemplary damages against
Alfredo Young, a building contractor doing business under the firm name Youngs
Construction. They filed the complaint with the National Capital Region Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC which docketed the same as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-03-0189193. The case was subsequently assigned to Labor Arbiter Potenciano Canizares, Jr.
Petitioners alleged that they were hired in 1990 by Young to work as tower crane
operators at the latters construction site at Platinum 2000 in San Juan, Metro Manila. In
November 1991, they were transferred to Cebu City to work at the construction of his
Shoemart Cebu project. Petitioners worked in Cebu until February 1993, except for
Punay who stayed up to September 29, 1992 only and Nagma, until October 21, 1992.
On January 30, 1993, William Dayag asked for permission to go to Manila to attend to
family matters. He was allowed to do so but was not paid for the period January 23-30,
1993, allegedly due to his accountability for the loss of certain construction tools.
Eduardo Corton had earlier left on January 16, 1993, purportedly due to harassment by
Young. In February 1993, Edgardo Corton, Aloy Flores and Edwin Dayag also left
Cebu for Manila, allegedly for the same reason. Thereafter, petitioners banded together
and filed the complaint previously mentioned.
Instead of attending the initial hearings set by the labor arbiter, Young filed, on July 6,
1993, a motion to transfer the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region VII of the
NLRC. He claimed that the workplace where petitioners were regularly assigned was in
Cebu City and that, in consonance with Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC,i[1] the case should have been filed in Cebu City. Young
submitted in evidence a certificate of registration of business name showing his
companys address as Corner SudlonEspaa Streets, Pari-an, Cebu City; its
business permit issued by the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City and a certification by the
Philippine National PoliceCebu City Police Station 2 that petitioners had been booked
therein for qualified theft upon the complaint of Youngs Construction.

Petitioners opposed the same, arguing that all of them, except for Punay, were, by that
time, residents of Metro Manila and that they could not afford trips to Cebu City.
Besides, they claimed that respondent had its main office at Corinthian Gardens in
Quezon City. Young, in reply, declared that the Corinthian Gardens address was not his
principal place of business, but actually his residence, which he also used as a
correspondent office for his construction firm.
Agreeing that petitioners workplace when the cause of action accrued was Cebu City,
the labor arbiter, on September 8, 1993, granted Youngs motion and ordered the
transmittal of the case to the regional arbitration branch of Region VII. Petitioners
promptly appealed said order to the NLRC, which, however, dismissed the same on
January 31, 1995, for lack of merit.
Citing Nestl Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRCii[2] and Cruzvale, Inc. vs. Laguesma,iii[3]
petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the January 31, 1995 resolution of the
Commission. Acting favorably on said motion, the Commission, on August 25, 1995,
annulled and set aside its resolution of January 31, 1995, and remanded the case to the
original arbitration branch of the National Capital Region for further proceedings. This
prompted Young, in turn, to file his own motion for reconsideration seeking the reversal
of the August 25, 1995 resolution of the Commission. Finding the two above-cited
cases to be inapplicable to instant case, the Commission made a volte-face and
reconsidered its August 25, 1995 resolution. It reinstated the resolution of January 31,
1995, directing the transfer of the case to Cebu City. In addition, it ruled that no further
motion of a similar nature would be entertained. Hence, the recourse to this Court by
petitioners, who raise the following as errors:
1. THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO ERRED IN ISSUING THE DISPUTED ORDER
DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, THE SAID MOTION TO
TRANSFER VENUE WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 4 AND 5 OF
RULE 15 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
2. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN ISSUING THE DISPUTED JUDGMENT
WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, THE RESPONDENT, BY FILING ITS POSITION PAPER,
HAS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO QUESTION THE VENUE OF THE INSTANT
CASE.
3. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
WORKPLACE OF THE COMPLAINANTS IS AT CEBU CITY AND IN
DECLARING THAT THE PROPER VENUE IS AT CEBU CITY.
Petitioner contends that the labor arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained Youngs motion to transfer venue since it did not specify the time and date
when it would be heard by the labor arbiter. They raise the suppletory application of the
Rules of Court, specifically Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15,iv[4] in relation to Section 3 of
Rule I of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, in support of their contention.

We find no merit in petitioners argument. In a long line of decisions,v[5] this Court has
consistently ruled that the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may
be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice. As provided by Article 221 of the
Labor Code rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its
members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Furthermore, while it is true that
any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be
accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this Court has
likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case.
Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities.vi[6] Lastly, petitioners were able to file an opposition to the motion to
transfer venue which, undisputedly, was considered by the labor arbiter when he issued
the disputed order of September 8, 1993. There is, hence, no showing that petitioners
have been unduly prejudiced by the motions failure to give notice of hearing.
Given the foregoing, it seems improper to nullify Youngs motion on a mere technicality.
Petitioners averments should be given scant consideration to give way to the more
substantial matter of equitably determining the rights and obligations of the parties. It
need not be emphasized that rules of procedure must be interpreted in a manner that
will help secure and not defeat justice.vii[7]
Likewise, petitioners harp on Youngs so-called waiver of his right to contest the venue
of the instant case. They argue that Young is estopped from questioning the venue
herein as his motion to transfer venue was actually a position paper, a close scrutiny of
the same purportedly showing that he admitted and denied certain allegations found in
petitioners complaint.
Petitioners contention rings hollow. Even if the questioned motion was at the same time
a position paper, Section 1(c) of Rule IV provides: (w)hen improper venue is not
objected to before or at the time of the filing of position papers, such question shall be
deemed waived (Emphasis supplied). Consequently, there is no waiver of improper
venue if a party questions venue simultaneously with the filing of a position paper.
Moreover, nowhere in the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC is there a requirement
that a party must object solely to venue, on penalty of waiving the same. In fact, Section
1(d) provides that:
The venue of an action may be changed or transferred to a different Regional
Arbitration Branch other than where the complaint was filed by written agreement of the
parties or when the Commission or Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending so
orders, upon motion by the proper party in meritorious cases (Emphasis supplied).
Youngs acts are in consonance with this provision, for he seasonably made
representations to transfer the venue of the action in the proper motion.

Finally, while it is true that objections to venue are deemed waived if the respondent,
through conduct, manifests satisfaction with the venue until after the trial, or abides by it
until the matter has proceeded to a hearing,viii[8] no waiver of the defense of venue on
the ground of estoppel by conduct can be attributed to Young, who consistently and
persistently contested the same even before trial.
Similarly, petitioners reliance on Nestlix[9] and Cruzvalex[10] is likewise misplaced.
While Nestl ruled that Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC does not
constitute a complete rule on venue in cases cognizable by labor arbiters, Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Courtxi[11] having suppletory effect, it also held that the foregoing
provision of the Rules of Court applies only where the petitioners are labor unions or
where a single act of an employer gives rise to a cause of action common to many of its
employees working in different branches or workplaces of the former. It is not denied
that petitioners herein are not represented by a union; nor were they assigned to
different workplaces by Young. Likewise, Cruzvale is inapplicable to the case at bar,
the issue involved therein being the propriety of the DOLE Region IV Offices taking
cognizance of a petition for certification election when the companys place of business
was in Cubao, Quezon City, while the workplace of the petitioning union was elsewhere.
The instant case does not involve any certification election; nor are the workplace of the
employees and place of business of the employer different.
Young cannot, however, derive comfort from the foregoing, this petition having been
overtaken by events. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. NLRCxii[12] this Court
held that the question of venue essentially pertains to the trial and relates more to the
convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case. It
underscored the fact that the permissive rules underlying provisions on venue are
intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the
ends of justice. With more reason does the principle find applicability in cases involving
labor and management because of the doctrine well-entrenched in our jurisdiction that
the State shall afford full protection to labor. The Court held that Section 1(a), Rule IV
of the NLRC Rules of Procedure on Venue was merely permissive. In its words:
This provision is obviously permissive, for the said section uses the word may,
allowing a different venue when the interests of substantial justice demand a different
one. In any case, as stated earlier, the Constitutional protection accorded to labor is a
paramount and compelling factor, provided the venue chosen is not altogether
oppressive to the employer.
The rationale for the rule is obvious. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged
partywhether as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be, the
nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate
disposal, and the other party is not to be given the choice of another competent agency
sitting in another place as this will unduly burden the former.xiii[13] In fact, even in
cases where venue has been stipulated by the parties, this Court has not hesitated to
set aside the same if it would lead to a situation so grossly inconvenient to one party as

to virtually negate his claim. Again, in Sulpicio Lines, this Court, citing Sweet Lines vs.
Teves,xiv[14] held that:
An agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the
claimant, such as the private respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the
provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as
his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble
a passenger residing outside Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of
Cebu, he would probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus
defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner had
branches or offices in the respective ports of call of the vessels and could afford to
litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental,
as was done in the instant case will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice
petitioner.
In the case at hand, the ruling specifying the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch
as the venue of the present action cannot be considered oppressive to Young. His
residence in Corinthian Gardens also serves as his correspondent office. Certainly, the
filing of the suit in the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in Manila will not
cause him as much inconvenience as it would the petitioners, who are now residents of
Metro Manila, if the same was heard in Cebu. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly
expedite proceedings and bring about the speedy resolution of instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the resolution of February 12, 1996, of public
respondent NLRC, transferring the instant case to the Seventh Regional Arbitration
Branch, Cebu City, is SET ASIDE. Instead, its resolution dated August 25, 1995,
remanding the case to the Arbitration Branch of Origin, is hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
i[1] Section 1. Venue. (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and
decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the
workplace of the complainant/petitioner.
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the
employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the
place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail,
assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant
workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are
supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report
the results of their assignment to, their employers.

ii[2] 209 SCRA 834 (1992).

iii[3] 238 SCRA 389 (1994).
iv[4] Section 4. Hearing of Motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice.
Section 5. Notice of hearing.The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
v[5] Lopez, Jr. vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 644 (1995); Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs.
NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 (1993); Sadol vs. Pilipinas Kao, Inc., 186 SCRA 491 (1990); PT&T
Corporation vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 (1990); Ford Philippines Salaried Employees
Assocation vs. NLRC, 156 SCRA 284 (1987).
vi[6] People vs. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996).
vii[7] El Toro Security Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, 256 SCRA 363 (1996).
viii[8] 92 C.J.S., p. 774.
ix[9] Supra, Note 3.
x[10] Supra, Note 4.
xi[11] Section 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiffs or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
xii[12] 254 SCRA 506 (1996).
xiii[13] Supra, Note 3.
xiv[14] 83 SCRA 361 (1978).