Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda35 Phil.

252
Facts: Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,defendant, were
legally married in the city of Manila. They establishedtheir residence 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However,
the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the
complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted
marriage, demanded plaintiff to performunchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs in which the latter rejectthe said demands. With these refusals, the
defendant got irritated andprovoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed.
Unable to induce thedefendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of
maltreatingher, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge
inthe home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her
husband forsupport outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant
objectsthat the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugaldomicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a
newrelation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon
theagreement of the parties but upon the general law which defi nes
andprescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of
amarriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of theparties
and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to
support thewife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or
bymaintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option givenby law is
not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade orterminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leavethe conjugal abode
because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may
claim support from the defendant for separatemaintenance even outside of the
conjugal home.
It has been held that the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugalabode by
her husband, without fault on her part, may maintain an actionagainst the
husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provision of the law giving the person who isobliged to furnish
support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixedpension or by receiving and
maintaining in his home the one having theright to the same

Agapay vs. Palang276 SCRA 341

Facts: Miguel Palang contracted his fi rst marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the
church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding,h e l e f t t o w o r k i n
H a w a i i . O u t t h e i r u n i o n w a s b o r n H e r m i n i a Pa l a n g , respondent. Miguel
returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambaleswith his brother during the
entire duration of his year-long sojourn, notwith his wife or child. Miguel
had also attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife
andchild.W h e n M i g u e l w a s t h e n 6 3 y r s . o l d , h e c o n t r a c t e d h i s
s e c o n d marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As
evidencedby deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
locatedat Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlindaas
the sole vendee. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and
Corneliaexecuted a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement.
Theparties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land
to their only child, Herminia Palang.Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced
a son and then twoy e a r s l a t e r M i g u e l d i e d . T h e r e a f t e r , C a r l i n a
fi l e d a c o m p l a i n t o f concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought
to get back thericeland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during
hiscohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had
alreadygiven her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house
andlot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed infavor
of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision.
Issue: W h e t h e r o r n o t p e t i t i o n e r m a y o w n t h e t w o p a rc e l s
l a n d acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang.

of

Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired bycohabitation

between her and Miguel.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property wasnot
by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. The transactionwas properly
a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which wasclearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of thedonation.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing
for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are notc a p a c i t a t e d t o
marry each other live exclusively with each other ashusband and
w i f e w i t h o u t t h e b e n e fi t o f m a rr i a g e o r u n d e r a v o i d marriage. While
Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union waspatently void because
earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by
the latters de facto separation.Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is
engaged inthe business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to

persuadethe SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland.

Sincepetitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase priceof
the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguelover the same.

Partosa-Jo vs. CA216 SCRA 692

Facts: Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen
children. The first woman, petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to behis legal wife by
whom he begot a daughter.Petitioner fi led a complaint against Jo for judicial
separation of conjugal property and an action for support. The complaint for
support wasgranted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal
propertywas never entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA
butre t a i n i t s a ffi r m a t i o n o n t r i a l c o u r t s r u l i n g . W h e n t h e i r m o t i o n s
f o r reconsideration were denied, both parties appeal to SC for the complaint
of judicial separation of conjugal property. The SC, through the definite findings of
the trial court, holds thatthe petitioner and respondent were legally married and
that the propertiesmentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during
their marriagealthough they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy.
Issue: Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be granted
to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment.
Ruling: SC granted the petition. The record shows that respondent
hadalready rejected the petitioner. The fact that she was not accepted by
Jodemonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming
theirconjugal relationship. The respondent also refuses to give financial supportto
the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal bythe
respondent
to
give
support
to
the
petitioner,
suffi ced
to
constituteabandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their
conjugalproperty.

Modequillo vs. Breva185 SCRA 766

Facts: On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court
of Appeals entitled
"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al. The said judgment having
become fi nal and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of
Davao City to satisfy the said judgmenton the goods and chattels of the defendants
Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel
of residential landlocated at Davao del Sur registered in the name of defendant and
a parcelof agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. A motion to quash
and/or to set aside levy of execution was filedby defendant Jose Modequillo
alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where
the family home is built since 1969p r i o r t o t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t h i s c a s e
a n d a s s u c h i s e xe m p t f ro m execution, forced sale or attachment under
Articles 152 and 153 of theFamily Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article
155 thereof, and thatthe judgment debt sought to be enforced against the
family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the
FamilyCode. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may besatisfi ed
by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
Ruling: Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on ahouse and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There isno need to constitute
the same judicially or extrajudicially as required inthe Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore,a family home as contemplated by
law. Thus, the creditors should take thenecessary precautions to protect their
interest before extending credit tothe spouses or head of the family who owns the
home.In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner wasnot
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially underthe Civil
Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of
the Family Code.

Manacop vs. CA277 SCRA 941

Facts:
Petitioner
Florante
F.
Manacop
and
his
wife
Eulaceli
purchasedresidential lot with a bungalow. Private Respondent E & L Merchantile,
Inc.filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.before
the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect indebtedness. Instead of filing an answer,
petitioner and his company entered into a compromiseagreement with private
respondent. The
trial
court
rendered
judgment
approving
the
aforementionedc o m p ro m i s e a g re e m e n t . I t e n j o i n e d t h e p a r t i e s t o
c o m p l y w i t h t h e agreement in good faith. Private respondent filed a motion for
executionwhich the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment
wasdelayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and
otherpersonal properties of petitioner. These chattels were sold at public auctionfor
which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.Petitioner and
his company filed a motion to quash the alias writsof execution and to stop the
sheriff from continuing to enforce them on theground that the judgment was not
yet executory. Private respondentopposed the motion. The lower court denied
the motion to quash the writo f e xe c u t i o n a n d t h e p r a y e r s i n t h e
s u b s e q u e n t p l e a d i n g s fi l e d b y petitioner and his company. Finding that
petitioner and his company hadnot paid their indebtedness even though they
collected receivables, thelower court held that the case had become fi nal and
executory. It alsoruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution
as it wasnot duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
Issue: W h e t h e r o r n o t a w r i t o f e xe c u t i o n o f a fi n a l a n d
e xe c u t o r y judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed
on ahouse and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of FamilyCode.
Ruling: The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. It does not mean thatArticles
152 and 153 FC have a retroactive eff ect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes atthe time of
their occupation prior to the eff ectivity of the FC and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before thee ff e c t i v i t y o f t h e

F C . A r t . 1 6 2 s i m p l y m e a n s t h a t a l l e x i s t i n g f a m i l y residences at the time

of the effectivity of the FC, are considered familyhomes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a familyhome under the FC.

Espiritu vs. CA242 SCRA 362

Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first
met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National SteelCorporation
and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los
Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo wass e n t b y h i s e m p l o y e r , t h e
N a t i o n a l S t e e l C o r p o r a t i o n , t o Pi t t s b u r g h , Pennsylvania as its liaison officer
and Reynaldo and Teresita then began tomaintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife. On 1986, theirdaughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they
were on a brief vacationin the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married,
and upon theirreturn to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and
giventhe name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. The relationship of the couple
deteriorated until they decided toseparate. Instead of giving their
marriage a second chance as allegedlypleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his
children home to the Philippines,but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not
yet completed, he wassent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his
children withhis sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided
to return to the Philippines and filedthe petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners togain custody over the children, thus
starting the whole proceedings nowreaching this Court. The trial court
dismissed the petition forhabeascorpus. It suspended Teresita's parental
authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority over thembut with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by
the parties and to beapproved by the Court.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for
gaincustody over the children be granted.

writ

of

habeas

corpus

to

Ruling:
SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother
andretain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or
immoralactivities of the mother had already caused emotional

disturbances,personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values

against thechildren. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of
theparent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From
alli n d i c a t i o n s , Re y n a l d o i s a fi t p e r s o n . T h e c h i l d r e n u n d e r s t a n d
t h e unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in
theiremotional growth by her behavior.

ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)

FACTS:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City.
They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920,
defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live
separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis
of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of
separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel
fees and permanent separate maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to
P400, also other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him
as his wife.
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order
or permanent mandatory injunction
HELD:
1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by
plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient
cause was present.

Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two
parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and
separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is
under obligation to return to the domicile.
When people understand that they must live togetherthey learn to soften by
mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wivesnecessity is a powerful master in teaching the
duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the
courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said
order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much
criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself
without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to
support.

Quintana vs Lerma
Facts:
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals from the judgment of
the lower court granting his wife, the plaintiff-appellee Maria Quintana, a sum of
money allegedly due her based on a contract they made for support.
As shown in the evidence, the two were married in 1901 and entered, in February
1905, into a written agreement of separation, renouncing certain rights as against
each other, dividing the conjugal property between them and the defendant
undertaking the duty to provide plaintiff P20-worth of monthly support and
maintenance to be given within the first three days of each month.
In his original answer to the action, Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her right
to support by committing adultery. However, this special defense was stricken out
by the court on the ground that under Art. 152 of the Civil Code, adultery is not a
recognized ground upon which obligation to support ceases.

The lower court refused to recognize the same defense when defendant reentered it
in his amended complaint.
Issue:
W/N the written agreement made by parties is void
W/N adultery may be permitted as a special defense against action for support
Ruling:
Yes. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code provides that in
default of express declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the
property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a
judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50. However, the wife has a
right of action against defendant under the Code.
Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the
defendant may also set up adultery as a special defense, which if properly proved
and sustain will defeat the wifes action.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded for new trial with instructions to permit the
interposition of the special defense of adultery and such amendments of the
complaint and answer as may be necessary to carry the judgment into effect.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-lawspouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only
in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or
September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter,appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by
reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of
thedeceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of selfadjudication executed by her in1962, had the land declared in her name and paid
the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower courtof Sorsogon declared
that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when
Felix andPetronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a commonlawrelationship.

HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between
the spouses duringmarriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character
as well as the dictates of morality requires thatthe same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship.As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the
policy of the law is to prohibit donationsin favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons livingtogether as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.The lack of
validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellanthaving exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow,
Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the
other half.Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower,the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to theother half.

Onas vs Javillo
FACTS:
Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5 children. After Ramonas
death, he married Rosario Onas and they had 4 children. - During his first marriage
11 parcels of land were acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of land were
acquired.
Partition was made on the claim that the properties of the 2nd marriage were
products of the first marriage. - Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was
made by the administrator of the estate of her husband. She alleges the following
errors:

All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with
the properties of the first marriage.
TC erred in approving the partition dated September 9, 1931, notwithstanding
that the same did not include all properties of the deceased.

ISSUES

and

RULING:

1) WON the community partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased husband or wife - NO - When the marriage is
dissolved, the cause that brought about the community ceases, for the principles of
an ordinary partnership are not applicable to this community, which is governed by
special rules. - Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any
effect for community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to
unity of life, to the mutual affection between husband and wife, and serves as a
recompense for the care of preserving and increasing the property; all of which
terminates by the death of one of the partners. - Community terminates when the
marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during the marriage and agreement is
entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long
as
the
spouses
are
united.
2) WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the
properties of the first marriage - NO - Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse
on the dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the
acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own
capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share.
3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid - NO - Was based
on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second marriage were
produced by the properties of the first marriage. ** The property corresponding to
the first marriage consists of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels of
land were acquired during the second marriage.

Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways

Fa c t s : P l a i n t i ff Z u l u e t a , h i s w i f e a n d d a u g h t e r w e re p a s s e n g e r s
a b o a r d defendants plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake
Island thepassengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for
about30 minutes. Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but
fi nding itf u l l w a l ke d 2 0 0 y a r d s a w a y. U p o n re t u rn i n g h e t o l d a n
e m p l o y e e o f t h e defendant that they almost made him miss the fl ight
because of a defectiveannouncing system. He had a discussion with either
the plan captain or thet e r m i n a l m a n a g e r. H e w a s t o l d t h a t t h e y w o u l d

open his bags which her e f u s e d a n d h e w a r n e d t h e m o f t h e

c o n s e q u e n c e s . J u s t t h e s a m e t h e y opened his bags and found
nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane and left him at
Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and h e w a s a b l e t o l e a v e
Wa ke I s l a n d a n d re t u rn t o M a n i l a t h r u H o n o l u l u a n d Tokyo after two
days. This action was to recover damages from thedefendant.
Issue:
WON moral damages may be recovered.
Held
: The records amply establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral andexemplary
damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff receiveda t t h e h a n d s o f
Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the r a m p
(What in the hell do you think you are? Get on that plane);
t h e menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton and the supercilious manner in whichhe
had asked plaintiff to open his bags (open your bag, and when told that afourth
bag was missing, I dont give a damn); the abusive language and h i g h l y
s c o r n f u l r e f e r e n c e t o p l a i n t i ff s a s m o n k e y s b y o n e o f P A N
A M s employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta remarked, will you pull these
threemonkeys out of here?); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and
unkindremarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by
menin uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with
Sitton;the airline officials refusal to allow plaintiff to board the plane on the
pretextthat he was hiding a bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and highhandedd e c i s i o n t o l e a v e h i m i n Wa ke ; M r s . Z u l u e t a s h a v i n g s u ff e re d
a n e r v o u s breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a result of the
embarrassment,insults and humiliations to which plaintiff s were exposed by
the conduct of PAN AMs employees; Mrs. Zulueta having suff ered shame,
humiliation andembarrassment for the treatment received by her parents at the
airport allt h e s e j u s t i f y a n a w a rd f o r m o r a l d a m a g e s re s u l t i n g f ro m
m e n t a l a n g u i s h , serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliationthereby suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00
andmoral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos
75,000.00attorneys fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.

Peoples Bank and Trust Co. vs. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil 167
FACTS:
Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled
Agreement and Declaration of Trust in which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel
Sandoval living in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property, trustee was

to redeem mortgage constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents
or sale thereof, grant a loan of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and collect
the rents to be derived from said property while remained unsold.
ISSUES:
1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the wifes property which therefore belongs
to
CPG,
2. WON
management
belongs
to
husband
3. WON contract is null and void since husband did not give consent
HELD:
Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee
to collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since
they still have to answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the
paraphernal property. She may likewise do such without consent of the husband,
subject to recourse by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such contract merely
voidable or void.

VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR

C. ARRIOLA, Respondent.[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts:

Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John NaborArriola
(respondent) ,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G.Arriola, his second wife and his
other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola(petitioners).On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a
decision ordering thepartition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714
(84191)left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs JohnNabor C.
Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola inequal shares of one-third
(1/3) each without prejudice to therights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if
any.However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the abovementioned
property and so the respondent proposed to sell itthough public auction. The
petitioners initially agreed but refusedto include in the auction the house standing
on the subject land. The respondent then filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.When a motion of
reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, therespondent elevated the case to the
CA with a petition forcertiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with
theauction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CAgranted the
petition and ordered the public auction sale of thesubject lot including the house
built on it. Petitioners filed amotion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said
motion.Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition but in
view of the suspended proscription imposed under Article 159 of the family code, the subject
house immediately partitioned to the heirs.
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the
land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law.
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject
land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20
years back
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
thereafter. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.

Ansaldo vs. Sheriff

FACTS: Appellee Angel Ansaldo stood as guarantor for Romarico Agcaoili. He promised to
indemnify the Surety
Company for any damage that they may incur from Agcaoilis credits. Agcaoili defaulted and
thus theSurety Company was forced to pay the Philippine Trust Bank the amount of 19,065.17
pesos. Thus, theSurety Company instituted an action to get the said amount from Angel
Ansaldo. The Sheriff of City of Manila favored the Surety Company and levied on a
property that belongs to the conjugal property of Angel and Margarita Ansaldo. The
spouse s brought an action to the Court of First Instance of Manila and the court ruled
in their favor to the extent that the Sheriff should not have deducted from the sameproperty
and that the Surety Company should pay the spouses the amount of 636.80 pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sheriff was right in deducting from the conjugal property of the
Spouses
HELD:
NO. The decision of the lower court is affirmed by the Supreme
CourtRatio: The Civil Code provision, in Article 1408, that the conjugal property of
the spouses should beliable for all the debts and obligations contracted by either
spouses during the marriage, should beconstrued in line and be reconciled with Articles
1385 and 1386 of the same code. Construing the 3articles together leads to the conclusion that
the conjugal property should be held liable only when thesaid debt or obligation contracted
by either party was proved to have produced some level of benefit forthe family. It not
being showed to be such, the Sheriff could not have levied from the said property. Theissue of
the spouses is not that the said property was part of their conjugal property but that whether
itcould be subject to the levy of the Sheriff or whether it falls under the purview of 1408.

JOVELLANOS vs. CA
210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164)
Facts:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale
agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to
Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners. Leonor Dizon died
consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom he begot
two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil
Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back
portion of the premises. With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife
executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the
latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and
bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died. Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos
claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was acquired by her
deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of
the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the
property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage
under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2,
1955.
Issue:
WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES
Held:
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a
contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell
or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but
upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon
delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full
payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is
usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and
is common in sales on the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated
payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since
September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the
deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.

Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of
the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and,
under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights
of ownership.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in
Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H.
Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his
said second wife.
NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the
corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the
amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on
property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage,
such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
Cervantes v Fajardo
Facts: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the person of the minorAngelie Anne
Cervantes.Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo andGina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child foradoption to Gina
Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantesand Nelson Cervantes, spouses,
who took care and custody of the child when shewas barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of
Consent to the adoption of the child wasexecuted by respondent Gina Carreon. The petition for
adoption was filed bypetitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which granted the petition.Sometime in
1987, the adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes,received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back
their child. Petitioners refused. As aresult, while petitioners were out at work, the Gina Carreon
took the child from her"yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that she was
instructed to do soby her mother. Gina Carreon brought the child to her house. Petitioners
demandedthe return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire togive
up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption shehad executed was
not fully explained to her.
Issue: Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents have custodyover Angelie
Ann Cervantes.
Held: The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are granted topetitioners,
Zenaida and Nelson Cervantes, to whom they properly belong.
Ratio: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children,the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separatedfrom a child under five (5)
years of age, will not apply where the Court findscompelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of thechild concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
socialstanding of the contending parents.Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is
a common-lawhusband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord
theminor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an uprightand moral-

minded person. Gina Carreon had also previously given birth to anotherchild by another married
man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years butwho eventually left her and vanished.
For a minor to grow up with a sister whose"father" is not her true father, could also affect the
moral outlook and values of saidminor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married
appear to bemorally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor
andgiving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless butalso
maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.Minor has been legally
adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge andconsent of respondents. A decree of adoption
has the effect of dissolving theauthority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The
adopting parentshave the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise
parentalauthority and responsibility over him.

Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on
issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During
their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be
permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by
the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code.
She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to
confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail
over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married
woman legally separated from his husband.
HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being
no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her
husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It
must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958,
necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had

automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more

occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the
name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention
of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.

YASIN v SHARIA COURT

FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court
inZ a m b o a n g a C i t y a " P e t i t i o n t o r e s u m e t h e u s e o f m a i d e n
n a m e . T h e respondent court issued an order which ordered amendments
to the petitionas it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule
103, Ruleso f C o u r t , re g a rd i n g t h e re s i d e n c e o f p e t i t i o n e r a n d t h e
n a m e s o u g h t t o b e adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof
which should include allthe names by which the petitioner has been known.
Hatima filed a motion or reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that
the petition fi led is notcovered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a
petition to resumethe use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of
her marriageby divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, anda f t e r m a rr i a g e o f h e r f o rm e r h u s b a n d t o a n o t h e r
w o m a n . T h e re s p o n d e n t c o u r t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n s i n c e c o m p l i a n c e t o
rule 103 is necessary if thepetition is to be granted, as it would
re s u l t i n t h e re s u m p t i o n o f t h e u s e o f petitioners maiden name and
surname.
ISSUE:
whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husbandi s m a r r i e d

a g a i n t o a n o t h e r w o m a n a n d t h e f o rm e r d e s i re s t o re s u m e
h e r maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of
nameand comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
NOW h e n a w o m a n m a rr i e s a m a n , s h e n e e d n o t a p p l y a n d / o r s e e k
j u d i c i a l authority to use her husband's name by prefi xing the word "Mrs."
before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden
firstname. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when
themarriage ties or
vinculum
n o l o n g e r e x i s t s a s i n t h e c a s e o f d e a t h o f t h e husband or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorceeneed not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order tor e v e r t t o h e r m a i d e n
n a m e a s t h e u s e o f h e r f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s n a m e i s optional and not
obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, shedid not change her
name but only her civil status. Neither was she required tos e c u r e j u d i c i a l
a u t h o r i t y t o u s e t h e s u r n a m e o f h e r h u s b a n d a f t e r t h e marriage,
as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during themarriage, after
annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husbandis permissive and not
obligatory except in case of legal separation.T h e c o u r t fi n d s t h e p e t i t i o n
t o r e s u m e t h e u s e o f m a i d e n n a m e fi l e d b y p e t i t i o n e r b e f o r e
t h e r e s p o n d e n t c o u r t a s u p e r fl u i t y a n d u n n e c e s s a r y p ro c e e d i n g
s i n c e t h e l a w re q u i re s h e r t o d o s o a s h e r f o r m e r h u s b a n d i s already
married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.

Versola vs CA
Facts:
Dolores Ledesma secured a P1m loan from Dra Oh. Ledesma sold the house and
lot to petitioners Eduardo and Elsa Versola for 2.5m with a down payment of 1m. ledesma
asked for the rest of the payment. Petitioners were only able to give 50k. Petitioners secured a
loan from Asiatrust Bank to pay for their remaining balance. Bank settled an agreement
between parties that Dr. Oh will give another 450k to Ledesma making her debt 1.45m.
Spouses should execute a mortgage to secure a loan of 2m. When Asiatrust tried to register the
mortgage of the spouses, it discovered a notice of levy of execution on the title in connection
with another of Ledesmas to Miladays Jewels, Inc. Asiatrust refused to grant 2m loan to the
spouses. Dra. Oh filed a case against Asiatrust, petitioners, and Ledesma. RTC favoured Dra Oh
and sheriff auctioned the said house. The petitioners objected to this auction saying that the
house is their family home and should not be subject to execution.
Issue: WON the family home should be exempted from execution.

Held: The house is not exempted from execution. It is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. The claim must be proved to the
Sheriff. The records in the case do not disclose that petitioners proved that the property to be
sold was FH. They simply alleged it, and presupposed that the sheriff already knew of such.
They rigorously asserted such exemption only 2 years after the date of the auction sale. Their
assertion for exemption therefore is a mere afterthought, a sheer artifice to deprive private
respondent of the fruits of the verdict of her case.

De Leon vs RFC, 36 SCRA 289

Facts:
On October 8, 1951, Jose Ponce De Leon and Francisco Soriano took
out a loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation or RFC (now Development
Bank of the Philippines) for P495,000.00. The loan was secured by a parcel of land
owned by Soriano. A deed of mortgage was then executed in view of the loan.
Soriano and Ponce de Leon also executed a promissory note in the amount of
P495k, payable in monthly installments of P28,831.64.
Part of the P495k was used to pay off the previous encumbrances amounting to
P135k on the property of Soriano. The rest were released to Ponce de Leon in

various amounts from December 1951 to July 1952, still pursuant to the deed of
mortgage.
The loan went unpaid and so RFC initiated a foreclosure proceeding on the
mortgaged property. According to RFC, the monthly payments were supposed to be
due in October 1952.
In his defense, Ponce de Leon insists that the amortizations never became due
because allegedly, RFC did not complete the disbursement of the loan to him
(allegedly, P19k was withheld). He also invokes that on the face of the promissory
note it was written that the installments have no fixed or determined dates of
payment. Hence, the monthly payments were never due therefore the foreclosure
is void. He insists that the court should first determine the date of maturity of the
loan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ponce de Leon is right.
HELD: No. During trial and based on the records, Ponce de Leons lawyer admitted
that all the remainder of the loan was released to Ponce de Leon so he cannot
invoke that not all of the P495k was released by RFC.
Anent the issue of the loans maturity date, under Secs. 13 and 14 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, when a promissory note expresses no time for payment, it is
deemed payable on demand. Therefore, when RFC demanded payment on
October 24, 1952, the installments become due.

Vda. De Delizo vs Delizo (1976)

Facts:
Nicolas Delizo married Rosa Villasfer in 1981. She died in 1907. He remarried. The
second marriage with Dorotea de Ocampo lasted 46 years (1911-1957) until
Nicolas death. The act of partition was filed by Nicolas two children from his first

marriage, and theheirs of his other deceased child (also from the first marriage).
Lower court divided the properties in the following way:
a. 3 children of first marriage
b. Dorotea
c. children of both marriage (divided in 13 parts).
CA: Point of contention was Caanawan lands in Nueva Ecija. Other lands belong
tosecond marriage
No proof property owned by second marriage
Testimony of Dorotea not persuasive
Moises Patricio places acquisition sometime after the revolution: Rosa was
stillalive at this time
LC: conjugal partnership of first marriage transformed into co-ownership by
Nicolasand his children, thus fruits belong to co-ownership.
CA disagrees with LC: HOWEVER, IT WAS DOROTEA AND NICOLAS WHOCULTIVATED
THE LAND, HENCE THE FRUITS OF THE LAND SHOULD GO TO THESECOND
MARRIAGE. Dorotea elevated case to SC. According to her, Canaawan
properties were not part of first marriages CPG as lands were homesteads.
First marriage had possessory rights,but second marriage had exclusive right
over it as it was during the second marriagethat it was registered pursuant to
Act 926.
Issue:

To which CPG does the Caanawan lands belong to (1 st or 2nd marriage)?

Held: Property belongs to the CPG of the 2nd marriage as land was only registered
during secondmarriage.
Act 926 (Homestead Act): Rights of homesteader to land does not become
absoluteuntil the following requirements of law are fulfilled:a.Person filing
application backed by two credible witnesses has to prove he hasresided and
cultivated the land for 5 years after filing applicationb.Person fi ling has to make
affi davit attesting that the land is notencumbered/alienated. Lands were only
distributed by cabecillas in 1905
When Dacquel, Antolin, and Pascua conveyed the land to Nicolas, they could
nothave fulfilled the requirements of Act 926 before conveyances to Delizo.
Dacquel, less than a year, Antolin, 2 years, Pascua, 3 years
The 3 did not have legal rights to transfer to Delizo. What they transferredwere
inchoate rights, not ownership rights.
PRINCIPLE: Deciding factor where homestead belongs to time of registration NOT
when homestead patent is issued as registration is the onlytime all requirements
have been fulfilled.

Philippine National Bank vs. Margarita Quintos E Yparraguirre and Angel A. Ansalso

Facts: On June 20, 1918 PNB granted the defendants a credit to the amount of P31,284 to
whichdefendants mortgaged stocks from BPI, Compaia Naviera, Davao Agriculture and
CommercialCompany etc. In the document, it did not clearly show that they were husband and
wife, except intheir civil statues. On April 2, 1921/ July 22, 1921 a complaint was filed requiring
Mr. Ansalso to pay his debt.SC First TRIAL: Defendants claim that their debt is not of a solidary
nature and should thus only bind one tothe extent of their share in the obligation thus should
not be charged to their conjugal partnership.However Art 1408 of NCC provides that all debts
incurred by both husband and wife during themarriage are chargeable to the conjugal
partnership thus Margarita, the wife, is part of theobligation as her husband as the legal
manager of the conjugal partnership is liable for the debt. Supreme Court first decision held that
conjugal partnership should be used to pay for the debtincurred as well as private property of
each of them since they are both obligated.SC 2nd TRIAL (DECISION UPON MOTION
FORRECONSIDERATION) Reasserts that conjugal property is liable for the debt they incurred as
husband and wife. Conjugal partnership begins existing at celebration of marriage.
Confined to properties stated in Art 1401 of CC (a) Those acquired by onerous (heavy
obligations) title during themarriage at the expense of the common property whether the
acquisition is made for thecommunity or for only one of them;(b)those obtained by the industry,
salary or labor of the spouses or any of them;(c) the fruits, rents or interest received or accruing
during themarriage, from the common or the private property of each of the spouses. Conjugal
partnership DOES NOT merge the properties they acquired before. Therest of the property that
the spouse acquired before their marriage is separate fromthe conjugal partnership.
Guaranteed by absolute separation of capitals.
ISSUE:
partnership

Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred through conjugal

HELD: Under New Civil Code 1698 it states that partners are not solidarily liable with respect to
the debtof the partnership; New Civil Code 1137 that solidarity will exist only when it is
expresslydetermined. Meaning, partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the
partnership, becausethere is no legal provision imposing such burden up on one. And it is now
held that properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt to the
plaintiff, and in defaultthereof, they are jointly liable for the payment thereof. It is being
understood that the judgmentappealed from is modified in the sense above stated and the
motion of the appellants is denied.

Agapito Lorenzo vs. Florencio Nicolas Et Al.

Facts: Prior to 1910, Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the deceased Gregorio
Nicolas,Manuel Lorenzo, former husband of the deceased Carlosa Santamaria, was also at that
time awidower. On January 16, 1910, Magdalena Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo contracted
marriage.Manuel Lorenzo died on January 7, 1929, while Magdalena died on January 31, 1934.
During their coverture, the two had no children. In his first marriage, however, Manuel Lorenzo
left, as heirs,the plaintiffs Agapito and Marcela Lorenzo and Policarpio Lorenzo, deceased, who
had beensucceeded by his children, the plaintiffs Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and Manuel all
surnamedLorenzo; while Magdalena Clemente, in her first marriage, left as heirs, the deceased
Gerardo Nicholas, father of the defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix, Trinidad, Cecilia and Basilisa,
allsurnamed Nicolas.
As to Parcel of land No. 6 . This parcel of land which is lot No. 72 of the Friars
LandSubdivision in Guiguinto, Bulacan, was purchased in her own name by Magdalena
Clemente, for her own exclusive benefit on October 17, 1908, prior to her marriage with Manuel
Lorenzo. Shehad paid the sum of P169.16 on account of the purchase price before her marriage
with Lorenzoand, according to the terms of the contract of the sale, the balance of P833.32 was
payable oninstallments, namely: P25.32 on June 1, 1909, and the balance in annual payment of
P42.00 each, payable on the first day of June of each year, plus interest of 4% per annum. . The
amount spent for the payments of installments due during the marriage, or obligations affecting
the separate propertyof Magdalena Clemente, is certainly a useful expenditures because it
preserves her right to theownership of the land, and is, therefore, a credit which belongs to the
conjugal partnership, andmust be reimbursed to it by her.
As to Parcel of land No. 5 . This parcel was also purchased by Magdalena Clemente
from theBureau of Lands on October 17, 1908 for P967.16, of which amount P116.84 had
previously been paid by her, before her marriage to Manuel Lorenzo. According to the terms of
the sale, the balance of P850.32 was payable by installments: namely, P52.32 on June 1, 1909,
and P42.00annually on June 1, of each succeeding year. Payments on account of the
installments were made by her, the receipts therefor were issued in her own name by the
Bureau of Lands. On October 7,1933 or 4 years after the death of Manuel Lorenzo, the final,
certificate of sale was executed bythe Director of Lands in her favor and in her name. By virtue
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13269 was issued in the sole name of Magdalena
Clemente. The legal principles hereinabovediscussed apply with equal force to this parcel of
land No. 5.
Issue: Whether or not that parcels of land no. 5 and 6 held to be a paraphernal properties or
exclusive property of Magdalena Clemente.
Held: In case of death of a holder of a certificate which is only an agreement to sell it is not the
heirs butthe widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to be sold by the Government. Only do
the heirssucceed in the rights of the deceased holder of a certificate if no widow survives him.

The petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to one-half of the two
parcels of land. But the installments paid during coverture are deemed conjugal, there being no
evidence thatthey were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to the late Magdalena
Clemente.Upon these grounds and reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review
is affirmed,without cost.

LAHOM VS SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In
1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that,
despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use
their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.
Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption
(Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of
care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to
rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When
Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A.
8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it
was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee
for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
adopters action prescribed.

RULING:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right
of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom
after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, GR No. 148311

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to
be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her
mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname. The
RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held: One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section
17 of Article V of RA 8557. Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.

PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005
Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took
away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house
helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and
even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having
lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of the child to the
mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family
Code.
Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.
Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise,
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody
of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c reads:
Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reason for such measure.

HONTIVEROS VS. RTC

FACTS:
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto
a n d M a r i a Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private
respondentsGregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial
courto f I l o i l o C i t y , B r a n c h 2 5 , w h e r e i t w a s d o c k e t e d a s C i v i l C
a s e N o . 19504. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the ownerso f
a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz,
asshown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision
o f t h e Intermediate. Appellate Court, dated April 12, 1984. That
petitionerswere deprived of income from the land as a result of the fi ling
of
thel a n d re g i s t r a t i o n c a s e ; t h a t s u c h i n c o m e c o n s i s t e d o f re n t a l s f ro
m tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968
to1 9 8 7 , a n d P 5 9 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r y e a r t h e r e a f t e r ; a n d t h a
t p r i v a t e respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession
of the land from petitioners in bad faith.In their answer, private respondents denied
that they were marriedand alleged that private respondent Hontiveros was a
widower
whilep r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t A y s o n w a s s i n g l e . T h e y d e n i e d t h a t t h
e y h a d deprived petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On
thecontrary, they alleged that possession of the property in question hadalready
been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of possession,
dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz,
Mambusao, the return thereof havingbeen received by petitioners' counsel; that
since then, petitioners havebeen directly receiving rentals from the tenants of
the land, that thecomplaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not
allege

thate a rn e s t e ff o r t s t o w a rd s a c o m p ro m i s e h a d b e e n m a d e , c o n s i d e r i
n g that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent
GregorioH o n t i v e r o s a r e b r o t h e r s ; t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e I
n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25
was null andvoid since it was based upon a ground which was not passed
upon
byt h e t r i a l c o u r t ; t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s ' c l a i m f o r d a m a g e s w a s b a r r
e d b y prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were
norentals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor
ing o o d f a i t h a n d f o r v a l u e ; a n d t h a t p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t A y s o n
hadn o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e c a s e a s s h e w a s n o t m a rr i e d t o
p r i v a t e re s p o n d e n t G re g o r i o H o n t i v e ro s a n d d i d n o t h a v e a n y p ro p r i
e t a r y interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for
thedismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to
paydamages to private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well
asreconveyance of the subject land to private respondents.
ISSUE:T h e R e g i o n a l Tr i a l C o u r t p a l p a b l y e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g
t h e complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnesteff orts
toward a compromise were made prior to the fi ling thereof as required by
Article 151 of the Family Code.
HELD: The trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on
theground that, although it alleged that earnest eff orts had been
madetoward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaintwas
not verifi ed for which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of
the allegation. T h e a b s e n c e o f t h e v e r i fi c a t i o n re q u i re d i n A r t . 1 5 1
does
n o t a ff e c t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t o v e r t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r
o f t h e complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended
tos e c u r e a n a s s u r a n c e t h a t m a t t e r s w h i c h a r e a l l e g e d a r e t r u e
a n d correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations
regardingefforts made to settle the case among members of the same family,
itcould simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court hasalready
ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverifi ed p l e a d i n g s o r
act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules
ino r d e r t h a t t h e e n d s o f j u s t i c e m a y b e s e r v e d . O t h e r w i s e
, m e r e suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of
theallegation that earnest eff orts had been made toward a compromise b u t
t h e p a r t i e s ' e ff o r t s p ro v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l i s n o t a g ro u n d f o r
t h e dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had
notre a l l y b e e n e xe r t e d w o u l d t h e c o u r t b e j u s t i fi e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e
action.Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not
apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among thefamily members. Citing
several cases decided by this Court, petitionersc l a i m t h a t w h e n e v e r a
stranger is a party in the case involving
t h e f a m i l y m e m b e r s , t h e r e q u i s i t e s h o w i n g t h e e a r n e s t e ff
o r t s t o c o m p ro m i s e i s n o l o n g e r m a n d a t o r y. T h e y a rg u e t h a t s i n c e
p r i v a t e respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros
family,the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the

FamilyCode.We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private

respondentAyson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff
takest h e c a s e o u t o f t h e a m b i t o f A r t . 1 5 1 o f t h e Fa m i l y C o d e . U n d e r
t h i s p ro v i s i o n , t h e p h r a s e
" m e m b e r s o f t h e s a m e f a m i l y " re f e r s t o t h e husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half
blood. As this court held in Guerrero vs RTC, Ilocos Norte.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in
this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontivers, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros,
are considered strangers to the HOntiveros family, for purpose of Art 151.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA
MASAUDING
Facts: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City. Teresita left for Los
Angeles to work as a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later.
Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer. Reynaldo and Teresita
began to maintain a common-law relationship of husband and wife where a child was born,
Rosalind Therese. During their vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married
and by the time they returned to the United States, Reginald Vince was born. The relationship
soon deteriorated and Teresita left her family to go back to California. Because his assignment
is not yet completed, Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the
Philippines. Results of child psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five years old show that
the child experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S. to live with
her mother. She even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother kissing a bad man
who worked for her father. Both children are now over seven years of age and prefer to stay
with their father and aunt.
Issue: Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.

Held: NO, AS BOTH CHILDREN ARE NOW OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, THEIR CHOICE OF
PARENT SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPECT BY THE COURT. The rule that a child below seven years of
age should not be separated from the mother, unless there are compelling reasons is not
applicable in this case anymore. As the children can now ascertain what is right and moral, the
court should give due respect to their decision to stay with their father and aunt in the
Philippines. Furthermore, a mothers constant flirtations from one man to another is considered
by the court as a compelling reason not to award the childrens custody to her, for said
behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a growing child. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family
Code.

IN RE: JOSE BERMAS AND PILAR BERMAS,14 SCRA 327

Facts:
Upon the filing of the petition, the court issued an order setting it for hearing on July 7, 1962, and
caused a notice to that effect to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in
Zamboanga City, once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks. After said hearing, the court
rendered the appealed decision, denying the petition upon the ground that, under Article 192 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once legal
separation has been ordered, and this cannot take place, pursuant to Article 191 of the same
Code, except upon civil interdiction declaration of absence or abandonment.
Issue:

Whether or not conjugal partnership may also be dissolved, upon agreement with judicial
approval pursuant to Article 191?
Held:
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife as well
as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the
hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third
persons.

TUMLOS VS FERNANDEZ, GR-137650, April 12, 2000

Facts:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were the plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed before Branch
82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos and Gina
Tumlos. Defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
promised to pay P1,000.00 a month both as rental. Spouses have also demanded payment
incurred for the last seven years. Such demands were unheeded thus this present action of the
spouses. The MTC promulgated its decision on January 22, 1997. The defendants appeals to the
RTC, alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an

amorous relationship, and acquired the property. It was further alleged that they lived together
in the said apartment building. Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from
the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Guillerma Tumlos is a Co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148?
Held:
Mario Fernandez is validly married to Lourdes Fernandez, Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property relation governing their supposed
cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of
the Family Code. it is clear that actual contribution is required by its
provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. Such provision is not
included in article 148 of the Family Code.

BABAO VS VILLAVICENCIO, 44 PHIL 921

Facts:
In the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ignacio Trillanes, Maria Babao, the
herein appellee, petitioned the court below that an additional inventory be made of certain
properties of the deceased and an allowance be made to her minor children for their support,
pending the distribution of the estate. These minors are children of Jose Trillanes. This petition

was opposed by the administratrix of the estate on the ground that said minors are not entitled
to the support applied for, because section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides only for
the support of the children of the deceased and not of his grandchildren. The lower court,
however, held otherwise and allowed P15 monthly pension to. The administratrix of the estate
appealed from this ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to the provisional support granted by section 684 of the Code of Civil
Procedure extends to the grandchildren of the deceased?
Held:
The ordinary acceptation, therefore, of the word "hijo" or child does not include "nieto" or
"grandchild." The reference made in the aforesaid section to "allowances as are provided by the
law in force in the Philippine Islands," does not, in the opinion of the court, have the effect of
extending the right to this provisional support to persons other than the children of the
deceased. Appellee does not, and cannot, invoke but section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure
in support of her petition, whose provisions on this point do not, in the opinion of the court,
extend to the grandchildren of the deceased. She cannot invoke the Civil Code because the
grandfather against whose estate the allowance claimed is to be charged is now dead, and
therefore the obligation of such a grandfather to give support was already extinguished. (Art.
150, Civ. Code.)

MOORE AND SONS CO VERSUS WAGNER, 50 PHIL 128

Facts:

It is also appears from the record on appeal that the claims against the estate allowed by the
said committee amount to P2, 457.99. Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of the estate,
the lower court entered the order referred to of March 5, 1925, citing in its support article 1430
of the Civil Code and section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not support be demanded when the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of the
deceased spouse?
Held:
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of May 28, 1896, resolves this question
affirmatively. Sometime after the death of her husband, the widow applied for support from the
general inventoried estate of the property from the date of the death of the husband until the
delivery of her share. The court granted the application and the Audiencia affirmed its decision.
Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to the said judgment of May 28, 1896,
wisely observes "That the support does not encumber the property of the deceased spouse, but
the general estate, and that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the dowry
or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the
wife can always be allowed support as part payment of the income of her property. In any case,
the support is given prior to the termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it does not
seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just because
of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less
uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality. The judge or the administrator, as the
case may be, must grant the support.

GONZALES VS MILLER, 69 PHIL 340

FACTS:
Having issued writ of execution, is embargoed the lots 356 and 357, described in the certificates
of title 8373 and 8372, respectively, which lots had bought Catalina Climacus of Isabelo Front
and Julian In Front on 26 November 1928 with money from its exclusive property. Having passed
the deadline for the retracted them and not having exercised the right, the Sheriff of
Zamboanga Provincial granted final deed of sale of these lots in favor of the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lots in question are here paraphernal Catalina Climacus or spouses of her
and her husband, Charles H. Miller?
HELD:
Article 1407 of the Civil Code states that "It inhere acquired all the assets of the marriage while
it is proved that privatimente belong to the husband or the wife." While it is true that when
Catalina Climacus acquired by purchase from Isabelo Front and Julian before November 26,
1928 lots. 356 And 357 was already married to Charles H. Miller, consists for his statement not
contradicted or challenged of false that the money with which the acquired was its exclusive
property or parafernal. The fact that the transfer certificates of title we. 8372 AND 8373, relating
to the menmencionados lots, does not say that the registered owners are Catalino Climacus
and her husband Charles H. Miller, but that is said to be Catalina Climacus says, "the wife of
Charles H. Miller," indicates the paraphernal wife Catherine Climacus, since the English phrase
"the wife of Charles H. Miller" is simply a description of their marital status

PEREZ VS PEREZ, 109 PHIL 64

Facts:
On 03 June 1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public Auction Sale with Damages coupled with
Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Restraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against
the respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga, Bataan. It was originally
assigned to Branch 3, but was later re-raffled to Branch 1, presided over by Judge Benjamin T.
Vianzon. After trial, a decision was eventually promulgated by the RTC on 11 August 1993.
Finding no merit in the complaint, it dismissed the case. Not satisfied with the RTCs ruling, the
petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 15 June 2000, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the essential requirements for the validity of the sheriffs auction sale under Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, governing the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage, have been observed in the instant case?
Held:
Paradoxically, the petitioners have not adduced any evidence to support his theory. In fact, there
was no attempt at all towards that end. The supposition must, therefore, fall flat on its face. As
correctly held by the trial court and the appellate court, the deputy sheriff has in his favor the
presumption that his official duty was regularly performed. The petitioners herein were unable
to topple this presumption in the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now in this Court. To be a
newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of local
news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and
that it is published at regular intervals

RODRIGUEZ VERSUS DELA CRUZ, 8 PHIL 665

Facts:
On the 21st day of August, 1905, the plaintiff, through her attorneys, filed an amended
complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for the purpose of recovering
from the defendant certain pieces or parcels of land described in the complaint, alleging: That
she was the owner of the said lands; that she had acquired said lands during her first marriage
from her deceased father. As a special defense the defendants set up the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Albay of the 29th of March, 1905. The lower court found as a
fact from the evidence adduced during the trial that the lands described in the complaint were
acquired by Hilarion de la Cruz, the father of the present defendants, "during his married life
with his first wife, Andrea de Leon,".
Issues:
Whether or not said property belongs to Hilarion dela Cruz?
Held:
Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the ownership of her property
which she brings to the marriage relation. It is true that article 1384 prescribes that she shall
have the management of the property, unless she was delivered the same to her husband by
means of a public document, providing that he may administer said property; but it cannot be
claimed; from the mere fact that she has permitted her husband to administer her property
without having his authority to do so evidenced by a public document, that she has thereby lost
her property and that the same has become the property of her husband. No such claim was
made in the court below on behalf of the defendants. Their claim was that the said Hilarion de la
Cruz had acquired said property during the existence of his marriage with his first wife, Andrea
de Leon.

Quimiguing vs Icao 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were
neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao
was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force
and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for
support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the
lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the
court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of
action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD: Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742. Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the
order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this
constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for
the damage caused. WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

JOCSON VS EMPIRE INSURANCE CO.

Facts:
Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his minor children Carlos,
Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co. for surety and managed his
childrens properties that included war damage payments, which formed part of their inheritance from their
mother.
In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic accounts to the court for expenses for education
and clothing of the children.
After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority and thereafter appointed guardian of her still
minor brothers Enrique and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of Agustins accounts, claiming that illegal
disbursements were made from the guardianship funds for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of
majority, Enrique and Jesus adopted the petition and moved for declaration of illegality of disbursements
which Empire Insurance Co. and Agustins administratrix appealed fromon the ground that these should have
come instead from the support, which they were entitled to receive from their father.

Issue:
W/N the petitioners-appellants contention their fathers disbursements from their guardianship funds are
illegal are valid

Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes education and clothing) must be demanded and
established before it becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners mere relationship with their
father. The need for support, as already stated, cannot be presumed and especially must this be true in the
present case where it appears that the minors had means of their own. Therefore, the disbursements made by

Agustin, which were even sanctioned by the lower court, are not illegal. Claim for support should also be done
in a separate action, not in guardianship proceedings. Judgment affirmed; without costs since (case) is
a paupers appeal.

Jocson vs. CA (170 SCRA 333)

Facts: Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving
offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto
Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her
intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina JocsonVasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in
the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be
declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him
and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents. Petitioner filed his original complaint
(Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then Court of First Instance of Naic,
Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was twice amended. In his Second
Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed the evidence
documents for being null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R
rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed properties are part of the conjugal partnership of property of
their parents.
Held: NO. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name
of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.It
may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a
bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he
was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. There being no such proof, the

condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We
rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.

Mrs Henry Harding vs Commercial Union Assurance Company

Facts: In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a gift from
her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly authorized representative
(insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the Philippines. The cars value was estimated
with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr.
Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00.
This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that
the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but Commercial Union
denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the cost of the car were false; and
that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding
because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.

HELD: Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding to
his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The evidence does not prove
that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of the car is more than the price of the
insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body
paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance
was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of the automobile by its
examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the part
of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and it would be
outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such
estimated value.