Nicomachean Ethics: Books I to IV

Scholars do not agree on where the name for the Nicomachean Ethics comes from. Both
Aristotle’s father and his son were named Nicomachus, so it is possible that the book is
dedicated to either one. Other scholars suggest that Aristotle’s son may have edited the book
after Aristotle died, so that the title “Nicomachean” may refer to this particular edition of
Aristotle’s ethical works.

Summary

Happiness is the highest good and the end at which all our activities ultimately aim. All our
activities aim at some end, though most of these ends are means toward other ends. For example,
we go grocery shopping to buy food, but buying food is itself a means toward the end of eating
well and thriftily. Eating well and thriftily is also not an end in itself but a means to other ends.
Only happiness is an end in itself, so it is the ultimate end at which all our activities aim. As
such, it is the supreme good. The difficulty is that people don’t agree on what makes for a happy
or good life, so the purpose of the Ethics is to find an answer to this question. By its nature, the
investigation is imprecise because there are so many variables involved when considering a
person’s life as a whole.

Aristotle defines the supreme good as an activity of the rational soul in accordance with virtue.
Virtue for the Greeks is equivalent to excellence. A man has virtue as a flautist, for instance, if
he plays the flute well, since playing the flute is the distinctive activity of a flautist. A virtuous
person is someone who performs the distinctive activity of being human well. Rationality is our
distinctive activity, that is, the activity that distinguishes us from plants and animals. All living
things have a nutritive soul, which governs growth and nutrition. Humans and animals are
distinct from plants in having a sensitive soul, which governs locomotion and instinct. Humans
are distinct above all for having also a rational soul, which governs thought. Since our rationality
is our distinctive activity, its exercise is the supreme good.

Aristotle defines moral virtue as a disposition to behave in the right manner and as a mean
between extremes of deficiency and excess, which are vices. We learn moral virtue primarily
through habit and practice rather than through reasoning and instruction. Virtue is a matter of
having the appropriate attitude toward pain and pleasure. For example, a coward will suffer
undue fear in the face of danger, whereas a rash person will not suffer sufficient fear. Aristotle
lists the principle virtues along with their corresponding vices, as represented in the following
table. A virtuous person exhibits all of the virtues: they do not properly exist as distinct qualities
but rather as different aspects of a virtuous life.

Sphere of action or feeling Excess (vice) Mean (virtue) Deficiency (vice)

Fear and confidence Rashness Courage Cowardice
Pleasure and pain Licentiousness Temperance Insensibility
Getting and spending
Prodigality Liberality Illiberality
(minor)
Getting and spending
Vulgarity Magnificence Pettiness
(major)
Honor and dishonor (major) Vanity Magnanimity Pusillanimity
Honor and dishonor (minor) Ambition Proper ambition Unambitiousness
Anger Irascibility Patience Lack of spirit
Self-expression Boastfulness Truthfulness Understatement
Conversation Buffoonery Wittiness Boorishness
Obsequiousness or
Social conduct Friendliness Cantankerousness
flattery
Shame Shyness Modesty Shamelessness
Righteous
Indignation Envy Malicious enjoyment
indignation
We can only be held responsible for actions we perform voluntarily and not for cases involving
physical compulsion or unavoidable ignorance. The best measure of moral judgment is choice,
since choices are always made voluntarily by means of rational deliberation. We always choose
to aim at the good, but people are often ignorant of what is good and so aim at some apparent
good instead, which is in fact a vice.

Analysis

The Nicomachean Ethics advances an understanding of ethics known as virtue ethics because of
its heavy reliance on the concept of virtue. The word we translate as virtue is aretê, and it could
equally be translated as “excellence.” Something has aretê if it performs its function well. A
good horseman, for example, has the aretê of being good at handling horses, and a good knife
has the aretê of sharpness. For the Greeks, moral virtue is not essentially different from these
other kinds of excellence. The Greeks do not have a distinctive concept of morality like we do,
which carries associations of sanctity or duty. Moral virtue is simply a matter of performing well
in the function of being human. For the Greeks, the motivation for being good is not based in a
divine legislator or a set of moral dos and don’ts but rather in the same kind of striving after
excellence that might make an athlete train hard. The Greek word ethos, from which we derive
the word ethics, literally means “character,” and Aristotle’s goal is to describe what qualities
constitute an excellent character.

The important lesson to draw from Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean is that virtue consists of
finding an appropriate middle ground between two extremes. As such, each virtue has not one
opposite but two. The opposite of courage is both cowardice and rashness, for example. This idea
that there are two opposites for every virtue goes against much of the received wisdom of
Aristotle’s time, including Plato’s writings on virtue. It also emphasizes the importance of
moderation: we achieve virtue by finding a middle ground, not by aiming for an extreme. Where
exactly this middle ground lies, however, is less obvious. Aristotle repeats a number of times that
his table presents only a rough approximation and that virtues lie closer to one vice than another
to different extents for different people. The Table of Virtues just presented is not intended as a
set of exact rules. On the contrary, Aristotle argues that a truly virtuous person will naturally be
inclined to behave appropriately and will have no need of rules.

Aristotle is clear that we arrive at moral virtue primarily through practice and that the value of
studying ethical texts such as the one he has written is limited. This view makes sense when we
consider that moral virtue is not essentially different from other forms of excellence as far as the
Greeks are concerned. If we want to achieve excellence in rock climbing, for instance, it helps to
study texts that show us how to improve our technique, but we can’t make any significant
improvements except by getting on a rock wall and practicing. Analogously, it helps to read texts
like the Nicomachean Ethics to get a clearer understanding of moral virtue, but the only way to
become more virtuous is through practice. We can only become more courageous by making a
point of facing down our fears, and we can only become more patient by making a habit of
controlling our anger. Since practice, not study, is the key to becoming virtuous, Aristotle takes a
strong interest in the education of the young. He perceives that there is only so much we can do
to improve a nasty adult, and we can more easily mold virtuous youths by instilling the proper
habits in them from a young age.

Aristotle calls happiness an “activity,” which distinguishes his conception of happiness both
from our modern conception of happiness and from virtue, which Aristotle calls a “disposition.”
We tend to think of happiness as an emotional state and hence as something we are, rather than
as something we do. The Greek word generally translated as “happiness” is eudaimonia, and it
can equally be rendered as “success” or “flourishing.” People who are eudaimon are not in a
particular emotional state so much as they are living successfully. While happiness is the activity
of living well, virtue represents the potential to live well. Excelling in all the moral virtues is fine
and good, but it doesn’t ensure our happiness unless we exercise those virtues. Courageous
people who never test their courage by facing down fear have virtue, but they are not happy.
Aristotle illustrates this distinction between happiness and virtue by saying that the best athletes
only win at the Olympic Games if they compete. A virtuous person who does not exercise virtue
is like an athlete who sits on the sideline and watches. Aristotle has a proactive conception of the
good life: happiness waits only for those who go out and seize it.
St.thomas Aquinas

Ethics

Aquinas affirms Aristotle's definition of happiness as "an operation according to perfect

virtue,"[46][47] and that "happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or
enjoyment of the supreme good."[48] Regarding what the virtues are, Aquinas ascertained the
cardinal virtues to be prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude. The cardinal virtues are
natural and revealed in nature, and they are binding on everyone. There are, however, three
theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. These are supernatural and are distinct from other
virtues in their object, namely, God.[49]

In accordance with Roman Catholic theology, Aquinas argues that humans can neither wish nor
do good without divine grace.[50] Therefore, happiness is attained through the perseverance of
virtue given by the Grace of God,[51] which is not fully attained on earth;[52] only at the beatific
vision.[53][54] Notably, man cannot attain true happiness without God.[55]

Aquinas also argues in favor of intellectual virtues independent of morality or divine grace.
Three of them are the speculative virtues of sophia (wisdom), episteme (science) and nous
(understanding), which deal with what is; techne (art), which is concerned with the man-made;
and phronesis (prudence), which deals with practical actions.[56] Specifically, he says that "the
intellectual virtues are habits by which the soul expresses the truth."[57]

Thomist ethics hold that it is necessary to observe both circumstances[58][59] and intention[60] to
determine an action's moral value, and therefore Aquinas cannot be said to be strictly either a
deontologicalist or a consequentialist. Rather, he would say that an action is morally good if it
fulfills God's antecedent will.[61]

Of note is the principle of double effect, formulated in the Summa, II-II, Q.64, art.7, which is a
justification of homicide in self-defense. Previously experiencing difficulties in the world of
Christian philosophy, Aquinas used this principle to also formulate the doctrine of Just War. He
says:

In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the

“ sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged... Secondly, a just cause is

required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve
it on account of some fault... Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a
rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of
evil... (Summa, II-II, Q.40, art.1.)