Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No.: 2:14-cv-03089
Case Filed:
May 31, 2014
v.
Led Zeppelin
James Patrick Page
Causes of Action:
Copyright Infringement
Right of Attribution
Falsification of
Parent of:
Defendants
I.
Summary
Defendants Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2) (lack of personal jurisdiction) and (3) (improper venue) (Doc. No. 35 & 36) 1 are so
clearly frivolous that they should not only be dismissed, but cost and fees should be imposed
on Defendants for filing them with the Court. All Defendants conduct significant and
continuous business with Pennsylvania and the Eastern District, and, furthermore,
defendants
Warner
Music
Group
and
Atlantic
Recording
Corporation are precluded by collateral and judicial estoppel from arguing that they are
not subject to personal jurisdiction and venue in Pennsylvania.
Defendants are unequivocally subject to personal jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania and the Eastern District because they systematically and
continuously market, advertise, promote, sell, and perform their music,
including the infringing work Stairway to Heaven, in Pennsylvania
and Philadelphiato the tune of millions of dollars.
Moreover, the last public performance by Led Zeppelin on US soil was in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. They performed Stairway to Heaven at JFK Stadium in front of a crowd
of over 100,000 Pennsylvania residents. This landmark concert, Live Aid, took place on
July 13, 1985. Led Zeppelin never again publicly performed in the United States. There is
no other state, and no other district court, that is more appropriate for purposes of
jurisdiction and venue than Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The
members of Led Zeppelin got on planes, and landed in Philadelphias airport. They used
Philadelphias police, firemen, and paramedics for security and safety. They used
Philadelphias infrastructure and highways to travel to John F. Kennedy Stadium.
Moreover, because Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District,
under the pertinent copyright venue statutes Philadelphia is undoubtedly an appropriate
venue in which to litigate these claims.
This is not the first case in which defendants Warner Music and Atlantic Recording
have filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Pennsylvania lacks personal jurisdiction over
1
Defendants briefs overlap each other and advance much of the same arguments. For that
reason, Plaintiff has opted to combine his responses to both the Corporate Defendants and
the Individual Defendants in a single, omnibus response.
Page 2 of 43
them. The last time these companies did so, a district court resoundingly ruled against
Warner Music and Atlantic and held they were subject to personal jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania. The court correctly found that because they conduct systematic and
continuous business in this forum, they could be sued here and that their arguments to the
contrary had no merit.
In this prior case, Wise v. Williams, the district court made the observation Warner
and Atlantic are huge companies whose entire business consists of targeting markets, such
as Pennsylvania and Philadelphia, to exploit their artists music. Because these companies
target Pennsylvania for exploitation, it was clear to the court that personal jurisdiction and
venue undoubtedly exists in Pennsylvania over those Defendants. Importantly, that court
also found that the individual defendant artists selling their music through Warner and
Atlantic are just as subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania as the companies
they use to distribute their music. In other words, if an artist and a company sell and
market their music in Pennsylvania, and make millions of dollars from its residents, they
cannot then claim that Pennsylvania has no jurisdiction over them and that the forum is
inconvenient. Not only is this the legally correct result, but it comports with common
sense. Given how clearly erroneous Defendants position is, it is astounding to see them
still trying to foist their failed argument on this Court. Defendants are trying to improperly
relitigate an issue which has already been decided against them and are collaterally
estopped from further contesting that Pennsylvania has personal jurisdiction over them.
That this motion is frivolous is confirmed by Defendants own conduct in the last
few months. In late October 2014, as one of Plaintiffs attorneys was driving into work, he
was listening to the Philadelphia radio station 102.9 WMGK. Knowing that Defendants are
claiming Pennsylvania has no personal jurisdiction over any defendantessentially
averring that Defendants have no contacts with the Commonwealthit was with a
considerable amount of surprise he heard the DJ start promoting an interview the station
had done with defendant James Patrick Page. The interview, available on WMGKs
website, was done to market, promote, and advertise the rerelease of Led Zeppelin IVan
album that includes the infringing song Stairway to Heavenin Philadelphia and
Page 3 of 43
Pennsylvania. 2 The rerelease even includes two versions of Stairway, which the
interview extensively discusses. It is astounding that defendant Page, and his fellow
defendants, filed a motion with this Court contesting personal jurisdiction, even as they
personally continue to target this forum to exploit Stairway to Heaven! The
hypocrisy is overwhelming and demonstrates that Defendants motions contesting
personal jurisdiction and venue have no merit.
Defendants also request that this Court transfer this case to California for reasons
of convenience. However, Defendants clearly fail to meet their burden and fail to identify
virtually any reason why this case should be transferred to California for conveniences
sakeCalifornia has little or no connection to this case. In reality, Defendants have
requested a transfer to California solely because they litigate in that forum often and it
gives them a home-court advantage. The individual Defendants actually requesting
this transferallegedly for reasons of conveniencelive in the United Kingdom and
will have to travel over 3,000 miles further to testify in California. Philadelphia, in
contrast, is a convenient midpoint. To claim that traveling twice as far is convenient,
doubling the required travel time, is absurd. Even most of the corporate Defendants are
headquartered in New York City, close to Philadelphia. Defendants transfer request
is factually unsupported and should be denied.
II.
Interview of Jimmy Page by John DeBella, 102.9 WMGK (October 28, 2014),
http://media.wmgk.com/Blogs/1001038/John_DeBella_Jimmy_Page_10_28_14.mp3.
2
Page 4 of 43
A defendant can only be sued in a state where they are subject to personal
jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction can be established by either specific jurisdiction or
general jurisdiction. In Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, he clearly laid out the basis for
personal jurisdiction and venue over Defendants. With respect to specific jurisdiction, he
averred:
163. Defendants are subject to specific jurisdiction in this district
because they make millions of dollars from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania by directly targeting this district for the exploitation of
Stairway to Heaven through CD sales, digital downloading, radio
and television play, advertising, marketing, concert performances,
other performances, licensing, and otherwise targeting resident
individuals and businesses to profit off the exploitation of Stairway
to Heaven.
164. Because Defendants knowingly and intentionally target this
district for album and song salesand various other advertising,
marketing, licensing, and promotional activities relating to the
exploitation of the infringing song Stairway to Heavenit is
reasonably foreseeable to all Defendants that they would be subject
to suit in this district. They have availed themselves of the privilege
of conducting activities and business within this forum and are
therefore subject to suit in this forum.
See Amended Complaint. Plaintiff continued with respect to general jurisdiction:
165. Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction because they
make millions of dollars from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by
exploiting all of their songs through CD sales, digital downloads,
radio and television play, advertising, marketing, concert
performances, other performances, licensing, merchandising, book
sales, T-shirt sales, poster sales and otherwise targeting individuals
and businesses in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to sell their
music and related goods and services.
166. Sales of albums, songs, and concert tickets are the bread and
butter of Defendants daily business and are their core business.
Because Defendants conduct their core business in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and target this district and state for
exploitation of their music copyrights, their contacts are of both a
quality and quantity that clearly subjects them to general
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.
Page 5 of 43
Page 6 of 43
Pennsylvania for the exploitation of Stairway to Heaven and Led Zeppelins music. For
instance, defendant Jimmy Page did radio interviews in Philadelphia to promote the
rerelease of Led Zeppelin IV and Stairway to Heaven as recently as October 28, 2014. 5
In addition, defendant Page has been promoting and selling his book, Jimmy Page, in the
Eastern District which further serves to market and sell Led Zeppelins music, including
Stairway to Heaven. 6
Interview of Jimmy Page by John DeBella, 102.9 WMGK (October 28, 2014),
http://media.wmgk.com/Blogs/1001038/John_DeBella_Jimmy_Page_10_28_14.mp3.
6
Whenever the Complaint refers to any act or acts of a Defendants, the reference shall
also be deemed to meant that the directors, officers, employees, affiliates, controlling companies
or agents of the responsible Defendants authorized such act while actively engaged in the
management, direction or control of the affairs of Defendant, and each of them, and/or by
persons who are the alter ego of Defendants, or while acting within the scope of their
agency, affiliation, control, or employment. Whenever the Complaint refers to any act of
Defendants, the references shall be deemed to be the act of each Defendant, jointly and
severally. See Amended Complaint at 158.
Page 7 of 43
jurisdiction to the extent the Constitution permits, which means that the defendants must
have certain minimum contacts with [Pennsylvania] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Personal jurisdiction can be established in two ways:
specific and general.
Specific jurisdiction exists when a defendants contacts with the forum state are
related to the subject of the litigation. Specific jurisdiction must satisfy a three-element test:
(1)
(2)
(3)
D'Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 102 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). Defendants presence in
Pennsylvania is immaterial; all that matters is that Defendants have deliberately engaged
in significant activities and have therefore manifestly . . . availed [themselves] of the
privilege of conducting business here, rendering it foreseeable they would be haled into
Pennsylvania courts. Wise v. Williams, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68898, *1011 (M.D. Pa.
May 18, 2011) (quotation marks omitted) (stating that deliberately marketing allegedly
infringing material, and placing the product in the stream of commerce, confers specific
jurisdiction on a state); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). For
instance, in a copyright infringement case, a defendant promoted and distributed allegedly
infringing books in New Jersey. Wellness Publishing v. Barefoot, 128 F. App'x 266 (3d Cir.
2005) (per curiam). The Third Circuit held that personal jurisdiction existed over the
defendants because, when the defendants marketed and distributed the books to New
Jersey, they should have expected to be subject to jurisdiction there. Id. Importantly, the
Court observed that [t]here was nothing fortuitous about the presence of these books in
New Jersey, and that being sued in New Jersey was foreseeable to the defendants. 7 Id.
Defendants maintain that only the Effects Test should be used to determine whether
specific jurisdiction exists, because they characterize the copyright claims against them as an
intentional tort. (Doc. No. 35, at p.6) and (Doc. No. 36, at p.10). Defendants position
is plainly wrong and highly misleading. Defendants essentially argue that the Effects Test
7
Page 8 of 43
General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has such systematic and continuous
contacts with the forum state that personal jurisdiction is appropriate even though the
defendants contacts are unrelated to the subject matter of the lawsuit. Reliance Steel
Prods. Co. v. Watson, Ess, Mashall & Enggas, 675 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir. 1992). When
analyzing general jurisdiction, factors to consider include if the defendant sells products in
the forum, obtains revenue from the forum, or advertises, promotes, and markets in the
forum. Wise, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68898, *19 (citing BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem.
& Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 262 (3d Cir. 2000)). To establish that a defendants contacts
are of sufficient quality to warrant finding general jurisdiction, those contacts must be
central to the defendants business. Provident, 819 F.2d at 438.
For either specific or general jurisdiction, [a] plaintiff may establish the
defendant's deliberate decision to market by showing that the defendant
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Wise, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68898, *13 (quotation marks omitted) (emphases added).
When a defendant undertakes and profits from the performance, sale, and advertising of
[an allegedly infringing song] in Pennsylvania, the defendant has availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State and [has] obtained the benefits
of protections of its laws. Id. at *16 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
when usedshould co-opt and replace the standard specific jurisdiction test. But such an
argument is plainly incorrect; the Effects Test merely offers plaintiffs an alternative way of
finding that specific jurisdiction exists over defendantsit does not replace the standard test.
Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007)(stating that the Effects Test is an
alternative to the traditional specific jurisdiction evaluation, not that it replaces it). The salient
question, no matter what test is used, is whether Defendants have sufficient contacts with
the forum to warrant finding personal jurisdiction; as explained below, Defendants have
extensive and sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania. Even if the Effects Test were to be used,
each element is satisfied and warrants finding specific jurisdiction over all Defendants.
Page 9 of 43
When, in a copyright infringement music lawsuit, the defendants are in the music
business, the presence of systematic concert performances, radio play, sales, and
advertising warrant finding that general jurisdiction exists. Wise, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68898, *23. Notably, the [s]ales of albums, songs, and concert tickets are the bread and
butter [of] their daily business, and are to be considered the defendants core
business. Id. at *24 (citing Provident, 819 F.2d 434). 8
b. Venue
In the context of copyright infringement, the controlling venue statute is 28 U.S.C.
1400(a). Section 1400(a) reads:
Civil actions, suits, or proceedings arising under any Act of Congress
relating to copyrights or exclusive rights in mask works or designs
may be instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent
resides or may be found.
Courts interpret section 1400(a) to mean that venue is appropriate wherever a defendant
is subject to personal jurisdiction. Donner v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 480 F.
Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (citing Battle Creek Equip. Co. v. Roberts Mfg. Co., 460
F. Supp. 18, 21-22 (W.D. Mich. 1978) and Mode Art Jewelers Co. v. Expansion Jewelry
Ltd., 409 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)); accord Elan Suisse Ltd. v. Christ, No. 06-3901,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93861, 2006 WL 3838237, at *2 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2006)
(citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Fuchs, No. 81-2594, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16043, 1981
WL 1389 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1981) (The copyright statute does not require a stronger
8
Defendants rely heavily on the recent Supreme Court case Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746, 760 (2014), claiming that it stands for the proposition that general jurisdiction may
only be asserted over a defendant where he is literally at home. See (Doc. No. 35, at
p.5) and (Doc. No. 36, at p.78). The holding of Daimler is distinguishable because it
concerned foreign corporations being sued in the United States for tortious conduct that
happened entirely in foreign countries. The Court held that general jurisdiction should not be
asserted over a foreign company given the utter lack of facts connecting the case to the
forum state. The Court noted that to be subject to general jurisdiction, a defendant should
be at home in the forum. In this case, all Defendants sell, market, advertise, and distribute
their music in Pennsylvania on a systematic and continuous basis such that they should be
considered at home in Pennsylvania. However, even if Defendants are not considered to be
at home in Pennsylvania under Daimler, they are still subject to specific jurisdictionwhich
Daimlers holding does not concern.
Page 10 of 43
presence of the defendant in the district to determine venue than to establish personal
jurisdiction.) and Kogan v. Longstreet, 374 F. Supp. 47, 50 (N.D. Ill. 1974)); Scholz
Design, Inc. v. Annunziata, No. 07-0853, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92624, 2007 WL 4526589,
at *3 (D. N.J. Dec. 18, 2007) (citing Elan Suisse, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93861, 2006 WL
3838237, at *2 n.6). The statute makes no distinction between corporate and individual
defendants. Donner, 480 F. Supp. at 1234. Thus, venue and personal jurisdiction coexist
for copyright infringement cases. In order to establish venue it must be shown that the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the specific district he is being sued inin this
case, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Wise, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68898, *26.
IV.
and had a full opportunity to argue the issue, the defendant is collaterally estopped from
rearguing the matter in another court. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331
(U.S. 1979). 9 Precluding parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation of
attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources and fosters reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions. Koresko v. Crosswhite,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3859 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2006) (quoting Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)). Collateral estoppel applies to determinations of personal
jurisdiction. Koresko, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3859.
9
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, may be used offensively and does not
require mutuality of parties. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331. All that is required is
Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to argue the issue in the prior action, and that
Plaintiff could not have joined that action. Id. None of those considerations are present in
this case. Defendants in the Wise case had every opportunity to defend the action, and
Plaintiff had no reason or ability to join the prior action.
Page 11 of 43
In Wise v. Williams, a case from the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the artist
Haley Williams of the band Paramore, as well as Warner and Atlantic, were sued for
copyright infringement. In Wise, as in the instant case, Warner and Atlantic filed motions
to dismiss pursuant FRCP 12(b)(2), claiming that Pennsylvania had no personal
jurisdiction over them.
The Court flatly rejected Warner and Atlantics arguments, finding that both
specific and general jurisdiction unambiguously existed over those defendants.
The Wise court, in addressing specific jurisdiction, stated that when a defendant
extensively advertise[s] and sells an infringing song in the subject jurisdiction, and
places the product in the stream of commerce, it is foreseeable that that defendant will be
called into court:
[The defendant band] knowingly and intentionally marketed and
sold CDs containing [the infringing song] to Pennsylvania residents.
In addition, the band traveled to Pennsylvania for live concerts, and
all defendants engaged in other types of advertising and
promotional activities, making it reasonably foreseeable that they
could be subject to suit here for claims arising out of or related to
the song. By undertaking and profiting from the performance, sale,
and advertising of [the infringing song] in Pennsylvania, defendants
"avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State" and obtained the "benefits of protections of its
laws." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109,
107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.
Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)). The nature of defendants' contacts
in Pennsylvania provide a firm basis for exercising specific personal
jurisdiction over defendants.
Id. at *1516 (emphasis added). 10 With respect to general jurisdiction:
[A]lthough the proportion of defendants' overall sales in
Pennsylvania is unclear, it is not the quantity, but the quality of the
contacts which determines the existence of general jurisdiction. It is
clear that defendants' presence in Pennsylvania is continuous and
ongoing. Through their concert performances, radio play, sales, and
advertising . . . defendants knowingly [ship] products into
10
To the extent collateral estoppel cannot apply to specific jurisdiction, the Wise courts logic
and reasoning is directly on point with this case as Stairway to Heaven is extensively
advertised, marketed, and sold in Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Page 12 of 43
(2)
(3)
then takes a contrary position merely because his interests have changed.
11
It should be noted that Wise was a magistrate decision. The district court adopted the
magistrates opinion without reservation, and noted that defendants Warner and Atlantic did
not contest the magistrates ruling. See Wise v. Williams, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63530
(M.D. Pa., June 15, 2011).
12
Although collateral estoppel technically does not exist over Defendants other than Warner
and Atlantic, the logic of Wise still clearly applies to them. Wise demonstrates that all
Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because of their targeting of
Pennsylvania and the Eastern District for the systematic and continuous exploitation of their
music, including Stairway to Heaven. Under section 1400(a), this also means that venue
is appropriate in the Eastern District.
Page 13 of 43
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 504 (U.S. 2006). Judicial estoppels purpose is to
prevent litigants from playing fast and loose with the legal system, changing their positions
to wherever a perceived advantage may lie.
Defendants Warner and Atlantic claim that they cannot be subjected to personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, but defendant Atlantic, a subsidiary of Warner, has filed
hundreds of copyright infringement lawsuits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
usually against John Doe defendants. When litigating many of these cases, Defendants
always averred personal jurisdictionpresumably specific jurisdictionand venue were
appropriate in this district solely because the allegedly infringing material was disseminated
through the Internet:
On information and belief, personal jurisdiction in this District is
proper because Defendant, without consent or permission of the
copyright owners, disseminated over the Internet copyrighted
works owned and/or controlled by the Plaintiffs. On information and
belief, such illegal dissemination occurred in every jurisdiction in the
United States, including this one. In addition, Defendant contracted
with an Internet Service Provider (ISP) found in this District to
provide Defendant with the access to the internet which facilitated
Defendants infringing activities.
See, e.g., 2:05-cv-03252-PBT (Doc. No. 1). In most of these cases, the John Doe defendants
failed to file a response and a default verdict for varying amounts of money was granted in
favor of Atlantic. To be clear, Defendants have repeated and successfully argued that
the mere act of placing infringing material on the internet anywhere in the world is
enough to create specific jurisdiction anywhere that material is accessed. Yet, despite
Defendants indisputably having far more significant contacts with the Eastern District in
this case than mere internet use, they nevertheless deny they are subject to personal
jurisdiction. Defendants want to eat their cake and have it too, arguing for the broadest
possible interpretation of personal jurisdiction when it suits their purposes, and for an
impossibly narrow interpretation when they are accused of wrongdoing.
Given that Defendants have argued in the past that just placing infringing material
on the internet is enough to create specific jurisdiction and venue in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and given that defendants indisputably market and distribute Stairway to
Page 14 of 43
Heaven and other music over the internetincluding in the form of digital
downloadsthey should be judicially estopped from contesting whether personal
jurisdiction exists and venue is appropriate in the Eastern District.
V.
Personal Jurisdiction
This Court must construe all disputes of facts in favor of Plaintiff when deciding a
motion to dismiss. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 316. Here, the Court is faced with determining
whether there is specific and/or general jurisdiction over Defendants. Whether personal
jurisdiction exists can be simplified by asking a single question:
Do Defendants sell, promote, and advertise their music,
including Stairway to Heaven, in Philadelphia and
Pennsylvania?
The answer is that they obviously do. Given that, and accepting the facts in Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint as true, both specific and general personal jurisdiction clearly exist
over Defendants.
Defendants arguments to the contrary are nonsensical. The corporate defendants
essentially argue that they cannot be sued in 48 out of the 50 states, even though by their
own admission they exploit each and every one of the 50 states and draw millions of dollars
from those states year-after-year, after year. The individual defendants, if their arguments
are taken seriously, are essentially arguing that they cannot be sued in any state without
their consent, even though they too make millions of dollars from the exploitation of the
residents of all 50 states.
i.
(2)
(3)
D'Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 102. All three elements are satisfied in this case as to all Defendants.
As the Wise court noted, [a] plaintiff may establish the defendant's deliberate
decision to market by showing that the defendant . . . advertised the product in the forum
state [and] . . . marketed its product through a distributor who served as the defendant's
sales agent for that state. Wise, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68898, *13 (quotation marks
omitted). When a defendant undertakes and profits from the performance, sale, and
advertising of [an allegedly infringing song] in Pennsylvania, the defendant has availed
himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State and [has] obtained
the benefits of protections of its laws. Id. at *16 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109).
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint avers that:
163. Defendants are subject to specific jurisdiction in this district
because they make millions of dollars from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania by directly targeting this district for the exploitation of
Stairway to Heaven through CD sales, digital downloading, radio
and television play, advertising, marketing, concert performances,
other performances, licensing, and otherwise targeting resident
individuals and businesses to profit off the exploitation of Stairway
to Heaven.
164. Because Defendants knowingly and intentionally target this
district for album and song salesand various other advertising,
marketing, licensing, and promotional activities relating to the
exploitation of the infringing song Stairway to Heavenit is
reasonably foreseeable to all Defendants that they would be subject
to suit in this district. They have availed themselves of the privilege
of conducting activities and business within this forum and are
therefore subject to suit in this forum.
....
167. In addition, when Led Zeppelin performed Stairway to
Heaven in concert in Philadelphia, multiple times, Defendants got
on planes and landed in Philadelphias airport. They used
Philadelphias police, firemen, and paramedics for security and
safety. They used Philadelphias infrastructure and highways to
travel to the concert venues. They used these venues to play to
millions of fans in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania.
Page 16 of 43
Indeed, one of the last times Defendants ever performed Stairway to Heaven live was
when Defendants played Live Aid in Philadelphia in 1985 in front of hundreds of thousands
of Pennsylvania residents.
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is clear that not only do Defendants deliberately
target Pennsylvania for sales of their music, but that they directly target Pennsylvania and
the Eastern District for marketing and sales of the infringing song Stairway to Heaven.
They have done so in the past and they do so now. Defendants motions sedulously seek to
ignore and minimize these basic and crucial facts, but the Court must accept Plaintiffs
well-pled allegations as true for purposes of these motions to dismiss.
It must be pointed out that, even as Defendants contest personal jurisdiction, they
have astonishingly continued to target this jurisdiction to promote and sell Stairway to
Heaven. Defendant James Patrick Page did an interview with a Philadelphia radio station
on October 28, 2014. The interview, available on 102.9 WMGKs website, was done to
market, promote, and advertise the rerelease of Led Zeppelin IVan album that includes
the infringing song Stairway to Heavenin Philadelphia and Pennsylvania: 13
Interviewer:
Jimmy Page:
JP:
Thank you very much. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Id like to think thats
how it is. The thing with Stairway was the fact of having
13
Interview of Jimmy Page by John DeBella, 102.9 WMGK (October 28, 2014),
http://media.wmgk.com/Blogs/1001038/John_DeBella_Jimmy_Page_10_28_14.mp3.
Plaintiff
requests that the Court take judicial notice of this interview.
Page 17 of 43
Jimmy, I know youre pressed for time, and I want to get to the
Sunset Sound version of Stairway to Heaven, but thank you
so much for taking this time with us.
JP:
Interview of Jimmy Page, at min 8:40 to 9:58. It is astounding that defendant Page, and his
fellow defendants, filed a motion with this Court contesting personal jurisdiction, even as
they personally continue to target this forum to exploit and sell the infringing song! 14
Defendant Page also currently targets this forum in that he markets and sells a book
in this forum, Jimmy Page by Jimmy Page, exclusively about Led Zeppelin. Plaintiffs
counsel ordered this book before this lawsuit was filed, and received it after the lawsuit was
filed. Jimmy Page promotes this book in Pennsylvania and the Eastern Districtincluding
in the interview described above. Such activity is designed not only so that defendant Page
profits personally from book sales, but also to promote the sale of Defendants music,
including Stairway to Heaven.
Given Defendants extensive contacts with this forum, the Third Circuits decision
in Wellness Publishing v. Barefoot is directly on point, as is the Middle Districts Wise
14
Whenever the Complaint refers to any act or acts of a Defendants, the reference shall
also be deemed to meant that the directors, officers, employees, affiliates, controlling companies
or agents of the responsible Defendants authorized such act while actively engaged in the
management, direction or control of the affairs of Defendant, and each of them, and/or by
persons who are the alter ego of Defendants, or while acting within the scope of their
agency, affiliation, control, or employment. Whenever the Complaint refers to any act of
Defendants, the references shall be deemed to be the act of each Defendant, jointly and
severally. See Amended Complaint at 158.
Page 18 of 43
decision. In Barefoot, the defendants marketed infringing books in New Jersey and shipped
the books there. Here, Defendants unambiguously market Stairway to Heaven in
Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, and ship the song to Philadelphiaas well as allow for
direct sales via digital downloading. Barefoots holding was the simple observation that it
is reasonably foreseeable that defendants who market and ship their product to a state will
be sued in that state. Barefoot, 128 F. App'x 266 (stating [t]here was nothing fortuitous
about the presence of these books in New Jersey). Restated for this case, there is nothing
fortuitous about the presence of [Stairway to Heaven] in [Pennsylvania]. The Barefoot
holding is directly applicable to this case and requires finding that specific personal
jurisdiction exists over all Defendants. The facts establishing specific jurisdiction pled in
Plaintiffs complaint are accurate and clearly demonstrate that Pennsylvania can validly
exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 15
ii.
In a copyright infringement music lawsuit, when the defendants are in the music
business, the presence of systematic concert performances, radio play, sales, and
advertising warrant finding that general jurisdiction exists. Wise, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68898, *23. Notably, the [s]ales of albums, songs, and concert tickets are the bread and
butter [of[ their daily business, and are to be considered the defendants core
business. Id. at *24 (citing Provident, 819 F.2d 434).
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint explicitly pled that all Defendants have systematic
and continuous contacts with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania:
165. Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction because they
make millions of dollars from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by
exploiting all of their songs through CD sales, digital downloads,
radio and television play, advertising, marketing, concert
performances, other performances, licensing, merchandising, book
15
Plaintiff knows of no reason why in the interests of fair play and substantial justice
Defendants cannot litigate in this forum, and does not believe there are any such reasons.
Indeed, Defendants have used the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to litigate hundreds of
cases. See Appendix A.
Page 19 of 43
Venue
Venue and personal jurisdiction, under section 1400(a), are coexistent for copyright
infringement cases. Thus, if Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, then venue is appropriate in this district. Wise, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68898, *2425.
16
Page 20 of 43
VI.
may be considered thoroughly. Square D Co. v. Scott Elec. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34127, *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2008); see also Sowonski v. AMTRAK, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9608, *56 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1999) (noting that parties are entitled to a fair
opportunity to engage in jurisdictional discovery to obtain facts necessary for thorough
consideration of the [jurisdictional] issue (quoting Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin
& Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270, 1285 n.11 (3d Cir. 1993))). Courts have realized that when the
anemic factual record interferes with [Plaintiffs] ability to meet [their] burden in showing
the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, the granting of jurisdictional discovery is
necessary if Plaintiffs can make a prima facie showing jurisdiction may be
warranted. Arlington Indus. v. Elec. Custom Distribs., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134177
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2010). Jurisdictional discovery is usually permitted unless a plaintiff's
claim is clearly frivolous. Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American
Bar Assoc., 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff believes that his Amended Complaint makes it explicitly clear that personal
jurisdiction exists with respect to all Defendants and that the appropriateness of venue in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under section 1400(a) is similarly clear. However,
should the Court require more facts, Plaintiff respectfully asks for leave to conduct
jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiff has made out far more than a prima facie case in support
of personal jurisdiction over Defendants, and is confident that if allowed to develop the
factual record Defendants motions to dismiss will be shown to be meritless.
Page 21 of 43
Federal law provides: For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought. See 28 U.S.C. 1404. Under section 1404 the burden lies
squarely on the Defendants to show that transfer is appropriate. In re United States, 273
F.3d 380, 388 (3d Cir. 2001). Indeed, Defendants burden is not just a preponderance, but
a strong preponderance in favor of transfer. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873,
87980 (3d Cir. 1995). There are two sets of factors that should be used in determining
whether to transfer an action: private and public factors. Id.
According to Jumara, the private factors include
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Id.; Wise, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68898, *2425. Public factors include practical reasons
that would make the trial expeditious and inexpensive, case load in the respective forums,
and the public policies in the forums. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 87980.
b.
Application
Defendants motion for a transfer to California is without any merit and fails to
explain how such a transfer is convenient; in fact, it is decidedly inconvenient. The purpose
of a convenience transfer under section 1404 is to hold the trial in a venue with an interest
in the litigation, and to make the litigation process easier on the parties. But what
Defendants fail to inform the Court is that this cause of action did not arise in California
where they want the case transferred toand that this case has little or no connection to
Page 22 of 43
that venue. Indeed, although Defendants claim this case arose in California, they cannot
present one fact supporting such an allegation. 17 Consider, Defendants themselves allege
that they wrote the infringing song in Wales, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendants first
heard and started copying Taurus while on tour. Defendants have the burden to justify
transferring the case, and wholly fail to demonstrate why this case should be transferred to
California.
i.
Private Factors
A.
This copyright infringement claim did not arise in any one place, and did not arise
in California, the jurisdiction Defendants want this case transferred to. Plaintiff alleges in
17
Defendants arguments for transfer largely focus on the fact that the Randy Craig Wolfe
Trust, the plaintiff in this dispute, was created in California. Therefore, they argue, that this
case arose in California. This argument is clearly nonsensical. The Trust was created in
2002, while the initial acts of infringement occurred in 196971 across the world. The
Trusts formation has no connection whatsoever to where this claim arose.
Page 23 of 43
his Amended Complaint that Defendants, while on tour with Randy Wolfe, made tape
recordings of Wolfe and his band, Spirit, that were later used to create the infringing song
Stairway to Heaven. See Amended Complaint, at 52, 18586. Plaintiff also alleges
that, while on tour, Defendants, specifically defendant Page, borrowed heavily from
Spirits setlist, songs, and technique. Id. at 4345. Concerts where Led Zeppelin and
Spirit played together include December 26, 1968 in Denver, Colorado; July 5, 1969, at the
Atlanta Pop Festival (artists included Janis Joplin); and July 27, 1969, in Seattle,
Washington (other artists included The Doors, Vanilla Fudge, and Ike and Tina Turner).
Defendants, for their part, allege that Stairway to Heaven was written in the United
Kingdom, in Wales. Id. at 5154.
Thus, when the Court is considering where the claim at issue arose, the answer is
that it arose in many places across the world. It did not arise in any one venue in the United
States, and it certainly did not arise in California. Given that the jurisdiction Defendants
want this lawsuit transferred to is not where the claim arose, this factor in no way supports
Defendants burden to justify a transfer for reasons of convenience.
Defendants bafflingly attempt to argue that this cause of action arose in California
because the Randy Craig Wolfe Trust was formed in California. (Doc. No. 35, at p.11)
([F]ocusing . . . on whose copyright was supposedly infringed the California Trusts
compels the conclusion the alleged claim arose in California). The Trust was only created
in 2002, while the initial acts of infringement occurred across the world in 196971; there
is simply no logical connection whatsoever between where the Trust was formed, and
where the cause of action in this dispute arose. That Defendants even advanced such a
nonsensical argument shows how grasping their argument for transfer is.
C.
Page 24 of 43
actually far closer. To claim that traveling twice as far is convenient, doubling the required
travel time, is absurd.
Furthermore, Plaintiff Michael Skidmore, trustee of the Randy Craig Wolfe Trust,
would also be inconvenienced as he
the Trust is a nonprofit, and has little to no money to support a trial across
the country;
It is important to realize that Mr. Skidmore does not individually benefit if this lawsuit is
successful; the Trusts beneficiaries are children who need musical instruments. As
Plaintiff noted in the Amended Complaint:
Funds obtained from a favorable resolution of this lawsuit will go to the
Randy Craig Wolfe Trust, which is run by Trustee Michael Skidmore, who
has selflessly dedicated years to preserving and promoting Randys spirit,
including releasing 12 previously unreleased albums featuring Randy
California. Mick and the Trust preserve Randys memory by supporting the
musical aspirations of children in public schools and by developing Randy
Californias music portfolio, the proceeds of which are provided to buy
children in need musical instruments.
See Amended Complaint, at n.1. Attending a lengthy trial in California would be extremely
difficult for Mr. Skidmore, if not impossible.
Many other possible witnesses are scattered around the United States, most of them
closer to Philadelphia than California. Mark Andes, a former member of Spirit lives in
Texas. Bruce Pates, a historian with much insight into this case, lives in Tennessee.
Marshall Burrell, a former tour manager of Spirit from 197577, lives in Florida. Plaintiffs
experts, who he cannot disclose at this point, mostly live in the tri-state area of
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. In addition, the Defendant companies are for the
most part headquartered in New York, a state extremely close to Philadelphia, especially
as compared to California.
Page 25 of 43
The only two potential witnesses who actually live in California are a former
member of Spirit, Jay Ferguson, and Randy Wolfes former publisher, Lou Adler. To the
extent that any witnesses prefer to be deposed where they live, Plaintiff is more than willing
to travel to take their deposition, as is customarily done in copyright cases. In addition,
video depositions can be utilized to lower the cost and inconvenience to any witness.
When examining the totality of what witnesses will be testifying at trial, it is
apparent that California is a far more inconvenient venue than Philadelphia. Indeed, most
of the witnesses, including the Defendants, will be required to fly nearly 3,000 miles across
the United Statesin fact, fly over Philadelphiato testify in California; this is not what
section 1404 contemplates when it provides for a transfer for convenience. That these
Defendants are nonetheless willing to claim this case must be transferred for reasons of
convenience, when such a move would actually severely inconvenience them, is telling.18
In truth, Philadelphia is a central location for many of the witnesses and is an otherwise
appropriate and convenient venue.
D.
The pertinent books and records in this case do not reside in California;
Philadelphia is the location of the Trusts books and records. Plaintiff Michael Skidmore
resides in Massachusetts and administers the trust in all respects from Massachusetts.
Defendants, in a failed attempt to justify a transfer to California, make much of the fact that
the Trust was formed in California. (Doc. No. 35, at p.11). That the Trust was formed in
California is irrelevant to the copyright infringement causes of action in the Amended
Complaint, and Defendants never explain why the location of the Trusts formation is
18
Defendants claim that Mary Quinting, Randy Wolfes ex-wife, and Wolfes son will be
witnesses in this case. (Doc. No. 35, at p.11). Both allegedly live in California. Plaintiff
can see absolutely no reason why these individuals would be called to testify regarding this
copyright infringement case. Their involvement in this case is nonexistent and Defendants
inclusion of them in the list of potential witnesses was done solely to improperly justify a
transfer of this case to California.
Page 26 of 43
remotely relevant. Furthermore, the Trust has little to no connection with California at this
point, and has not for many years. Even assuming the Trusts formation is somehow
relevant, Defendants, by attaching the Trusts formation documents, are missing the point:
a transfer under section 1404 must be convenientbut a transfer to California would be
inconvenient as none of the books and records currently reside there. In any case, the
documents at issue in this case are more than likely going to be tendered electronically. In
days past, the physical location of documents might have posed a significant problem, but
increasingly advances in technology have rendered such concerns moot.
E.
As Plaintiff notes above, defendant Atlantic, a subsidiary of Warner Music, has filed
literally over 400 hundred cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania within the last
decade. See Appendix A. Defendants are fully prepared to litigate in this forum, as they
have on many other occasions.
The burden is on Defendants to show by a strong preponderance that this case
should be transferred for reasons of convenience; they have failed to do so. In fact, this
cause
of
action
has
nothing
to
do
with
California,
and
a transfer there would be inconvenient for most of the witnesses, most notably
Defendants themselves.
ii.
In a diversity case, the familiarity of a local court with governing state law can
sometimes justify a transfer under section 1404. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. This case, however,
is obviously not a diversity case. Although Defendants claim that California state law
applies to this dispute and governs aspects of this claim, particularly whether Plaintiff has
standing to sue for copyright infringement, this is false. Federal law, and only federal law,
explicitly governs who can sue for copyright infringement, how one can transfer their
interests in copyrights, and who has standing to sue. See generally 17 U.S. Code 201 et
seq., 501 et seq. Defendants claims that California law applies to the copyright
Page 27 of 43
infringement claims in this case are demonstrably incorrect and in no way justify a
convenience transfer.
B.
Defendants claim that trying this case in California would make the trial easy,
expeditious, or inexpensive. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. However, as Plaintiff explained
above, this is not true as California has little or no connection to this dispute, and because
Philadelphia is a centrally located venue that would be far more convenient for many of the
witnesses, including Defendants. Plaintiff also notes that the individual Defendants brief
contains no factual application whatsoever concerning this factor; it merely quotes prior
court opinions whose reasoning is inapplicable to the instant matter. (Doc. No. 35, at p.13
14). Defendants have the burden to justify a transfer for reasons of convenience, and
merely quoting prior court decisions, without explaining how they are relevant, does not
satisfy that burden.
C.
Defendants attempt to claim that this action should be transferred to the Central
District of California because they allege that the Central District is less congested than the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and that cases move more quickly in the Central District.
(Doc. No. 35, at p.14). The evidence they present simply does not back up those contentions.
Defendants base their contention that the Eastern District is more congested than
the Central District by referencing statistics they claim they received from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. These statistics allegedly compare case load in
the Central District to case load in the Eastern District. See Request for Judicial Notice
(Doc. No. 37-2). First, Plaintiff objects to the consideration of these statistics because the
numbers are presented out of context. The numbers collected by Defendants fail to identify
case types, and other pertinent information, that could better explain what these numbers
actually mean. As it stands, one cannot draw concrete conclusions and relevant insight
about the congestion of the courts from these statistics.
Page 28 of 43
Second, the statistics presented by Defendants, assuming they are accurate, are
wholly unremarkable. They show that:
An average judge in the Eastern District has 515 pending cases, slightly
more than the 469 for the Central District.
Despite this, the average time it takes a case to go to trial in the Eastern
District is only 18.6 months, while in the Central District it is 21.1 months.
To characterize the relatively minor differences in case loads between these two districts,
both of which are major litigation hubs, as warranting transfer under 1404 is not realistic
and not based in fact. Defendants have the burden of justifying a transfer, and the
incomplete and unremarkable statistics they have compiled do not militate in favor of
transferring this case on grounds of convenience.
IX.
Conclusion
Plaintiff requests that this Court deny Defendants Motions to Dismiss and Motion
Page 30 of 43
Certificate of Service
Plaintiff hereby represents that Plaintiffs Omnibus Response in
Opposition to Defendants Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(2, 3) and Motions to Transfer Pursuant to 28 USC 1404 has been
served upon counsel by the electronic filing system.
Helene Freeman, Esquire
Phillips Nizer LLP
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10103-0084
T: (212) 841-0547
F: (212) 262-5152
E: hfreeman@phillipsnizer.com
Attorneys for Defendants James Patrick Page, Robert Anthony Plant,and John Paul
Jones (collectively with John Bonham (Deceased), professionally known as Led
Zeppelin)
Michael Eidel, Esquire
Fox Rothschild LLP
2700 Kelly Road | Suite 300
Warrington, PA 18976-3624
T: (215) 345-7500
F: (215) 345-7507
E: MEidel@foxrothschild.com
Attorneys for Defendants Super Hype Publishing, Inc., Warner Music Group Corp.,
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., Atlantic Recording Corporation, and Rhino
Entertainment Company-and-Local Counsel for James Patrick Page, Robert Anthony
Plant, and John Paul Jones (collectively with John Bonham (Deceased),
professionally known as Led Zeppelin)
Peter J. Anderson, Esquire
Law Office of Peter J. Anderson, PC
100 Wilshire Blvd. | Suite 2010
Santa Monica, CA 90401
T:(310) 260-6030
F: (310) 260-6040
E: pja@pjanderson.com
Attorney for Defendants Super Hype Publishing, Inc., Warner Music Group Corp.,
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., Atlantic Recording Corporation, and
Rhino Entertainment Company
Page 32 of 43
*****
Respectfully submitted,
Page 33 of 43
Appendix A
ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION is a plaintiff in at least 402 cases in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
2:05-cv-03252-PBT
2:05-cv-03303-JF
2:05-cv-03320-JG
2:05-cv-04019-ER
2:05-cv-04026-RK
2:05-cv-04625-SD
2:05-cv-04626-JCJ
2:05-cv-04636-MAM
2:05-cv-04645-HH
2:05-cv-04646-BWK
2:05-cv-04649-TON
2:05-cv-04676-PBT
2:05-cv-04695-PBT
2:05-cv-05586-BWK
2:05-cv-05616-BWK
2:05-cv-05645-SD
2:05-cv-05655-TJS
2:05-cv-05656-CMR
2:05-cv-06466-NS
2:05-cv-06496-CMR
2:05-cv-06515-MMB
2:05-cv-06516-RB
2:05-cv-06524-MK
2:05-cv-06534-NS
2:05-cv-06535-LS
2:05-cv-06536-RBS
2:05-cv-06543-NS
2:05-cv-06556-PD
2:06-cv-00416-MMB
2:06-cv-00456-WY
2:04-cv-00650-CN
2:04-cv-01241-CMR
2:04-cv-02246-CMR
2:04-cv-02932-SD
2:04-cv-02934-ER
2:04-cv-02935-JD
2:04-cv-02938-CMR
Page 34 of 43
2:04-cv-02941-CRW
2:04-cv-02943-RK
2:04-cv-02944-PBT
2:04-cv-02948-MAM
2:04-cv-02955-JF
2:04-cv-02959-JD
2:04-cv-02960-LDD
2:04-cv-02962-BMS
2:04-cv-02965-TON
2:04-cv-02966-MAM
2:04-cv-02971-CMR
2:04-cv-02979-RB
2:04-cv-02980-WY
2:04-cv-02984-WY
2:04-cv-02985-AB
2:04-cv-02986-JK
2:04-cv-02992-MK
2:04-cv-02995-CG
2:04-cv-02996-CMR
2:04-cv-03002-NS
2:04-cv-03003-RBS
2:04-cv-03004-LP
2:04-cv-03005-RB
2:04-cv-03008-NS
2:04-cv-03010-RK
2:04-cv-03011-ER
2:04-cv-03019-CG
2:04-cv-03020-BWK
2:04-cv-03021-WY
2:04-cv-03023-MMB
2:04-cv-03024-LDD
2:04-cv-03029-TON
2:04-cv-03033-JK
2:04-cv-03037-TJS
2:04-cv-03042-PBT
2:04-cv-03049-HB
2:04-cv-03050-MAM
2:04-cv-03060-BMS
2:04-cv-03064-TJS
2:04-cv-03068-PBT
2:04-cv-03069-JD
2:04-cv-03070-JD
2:04-cv-03071-RB
Page 35 of 43
2:04-cv-03074-PBT
2:04-cv-03076-MAM
2:04-cv-03078-MAM
2:04-cv-03082-JD
2:04-cv-03092-CRW
2:04-cv-03095-RK
2:04-cv-03098-HB
2:04-cv-03099-MK
2:04-cv-03106-MAM
2:04-cv-03117-TJS
2:04-cv-03125-JK
2:04-cv-03129-CG
2:04-cv-03132-CRW
2:04-cv-03133-CMR
2:04-cv-03408-WY
2:04-cv-04032-RB
2:04-cv-04033-JS
2:04-cv-04035-CMR
2:04-cv-04415-ER
2:04-cv-04416-RBS
2:04-cv-05050-LP
2:04-cv-05053-RB
2:04-cv-05054-NS
2:04-cv-05055-JCJ
2:04-cv-05828-CG
2:04-cv-05833-JF
2:04-cv-05834-TON
2:04-cv-05835-MAM
2:04-cv-05836-JF
2:04-cv-05842-TJS
2:04-cv-05843-BMS
2:04-cv-05845-SD
2:04-cv-05849-HB
2:04-cv-05858-SD
2:04-cv-05859-JD
2:04-cv-05863-AB
2:04-cv-05865-PBT
2:05-cv-00887-JCJ
2:05-cv-00888-MMB
2:05-cv-00891-JS
2:05-cv-00895-JF
2:05-cv-00909-CMR
2:05-cv-00915-LS
Page 36 of 43
2:05-cv-00916-BMS
2:05-cv-00919-RBS
2:05-cv-00922-TJS
2:05-cv-00923-ER
2:05-cv-00925-PBT
2:05-cv-00926-CN
2:05-cv-00934-MK
2:05-cv-00936-TJS
2:05-cv-00937-CN
2:05-cv-00939-RB
2:05-cv-00941-LDD
2:05-cv-00943-NS
2:05-cv-00944-EL
2:05-cv-00946-NS
2:05-cv-00956-BMS
2:05-cv-00958-GP
2:05-cv-00959-BWK
2:05-cv-01356-TON
2:05-cv-01361-CMR
2:05-cv-01363-ER
2:05-cv-01365-JCJ
2:05-cv-01374-RB
2:05-cv-01378-MAM
2:05-cv-01380-CRW
2:05-cv-01383-RB
2:05-cv-01384-CG
2:05-cv-01387-TJS
2:05-cv-01390-ER
2:05-cv-01707-CN
2:05-cv-01937-MK
2:05-cv-01939-LDD
2:05-cv-01945-PBT
2:05-cv-01948-MAM
2:05-cv-01955-CRW
2:05-cv-01975-BMS
2:05-cv-01981-LDD
2:05-cv-01984-JD
2:05-cv-01986-JS
2:05-cv-02476-TJS
2:05-cv-02477-NS
2:05-cv-02494-LDD
2:05-cv-03095-JS
2:05-cv-03096-SD
Page 37 of 43
2:05-cv-03102-LS
2:05-cv-03103-EL
2:05-cv-03104-NS
2:05-cv-03111-AB
2:05-cv-03118-NS
2:05-cv-03122-JP
2:05-cv-03123-MAM
2:05-cv-03124-AB
2:05-cv-03127-ER
2:05-cv-03129-LDD
2:05-cv-03137-NS
2:05-cv-03151-EL
2:05-cv-03152-AB
2:05-cv-03153-JP
2:05-cv-03156-TJS
2:05-cv-03159-JF
2:05-cv-03160-PD
2:05-cv-03161-BWK
2:05-cv-03163-BMS
2:05-cv-03168-HH
2:05-cv-03171-PBT
2:05-cv-03176-JD
2:05-cv-03178-BWK
2:05-cv-03179-EL
2:05-cv-03183-CMR
2:05-cv-03184-GP
2:05-cv-03191-WY
2:05-cv-03199-JCJ
2:05-cv-03207-JCJ
2:05-cv-03209-LS
2:05-cv-03215-HB
2:05-cv-03228-SD
2:05-cv-03235-BMS
2:05-cv-03248-MK
2:05-cv-03249-JG
2:05-cv-03251-BWK
2:05-cv-03253-RBS
2:05-cv-03255-TJS
2:05-cv-03259-BMS
BMG MUSIC et al
2:05-cv-03263-GP
2:05-cv-03266-RB
2:05-cv-03272-TJS
2:05-cv-03285-EL
Page 38 of 43
2:05-cv-03286-MAM
2:05-cv-03291-HH
2:05-cv-03294-NS
2:05-cv-03295-JS
2:05-cv-03296-HH
2:05-cv-03300-TON
2:05-cv-03307-WY
2:05-cv-03317-CRW
2:05-cv-03323-TJS
2:05-cv-03331-ER
2:05-cv-03336-EL
2:05-cv-03880-LDD
2:05-cv-03888-BWK
2:05-cv-03896-JP
2:05-cv-03903-ER
2:05-cv-03907-BWK
2:05-cv-03912-GP
2:05-cv-03914-BMS
2:05-cv-03919-MMB
2:05-cv-03920-AB
2:05-cv-03921-JF
2:05-cv-03924-MMB
2:05-cv-03932-MK
2:05-cv-03933-EL
2:05-cv-03934-JF
2:05-cv-03938-AB
2:05-cv-03941-BWK
2:05-cv-03952-HH
2:05-cv-03953-BWK
2:05-cv-03954-BMS
2:05-cv-03958-LP
2:05-cv-03961-RB
2:05-cv-03965-JG
2:05-cv-03972-MAM
2:05-cv-03977-JS
2:05-cv-03982-NS
2:05-cv-03984-PD
2:05-cv-03988-AB
2:05-cv-04001-WY
2:05-cv-04004-HH
2:05-cv-04007-RB
2:05-cv-04009-BWK
2:05-cv-04014-MMB
Page 39 of 43
2:05-cv-04021-HB
2:05-cv-04025-GP
2:05-cv-04425-AB
2:05-cv-04604-TJS
2:05-cv-04614-LDD
2:05-cv-04624-AB
2:05-cv-04628-NS
2:05-cv-04629-JP
2:05-cv-04631-TON
2:05-cv-04639-PD
2:05-cv-04641-GP
2:05-cv-04642-HB
2:05-cv-04647-LDD
2:05-cv-04651-LS
2:05-cv-04654-JS
2:05-cv-04660-HH
2:05-cv-04664-JF
2:05-cv-04668-JCJ
2:05-cv-04669-WY
2:05-cv-04671-JCJ
2:05-cv-04678-CMR
2:05-cv-04680-HB
2:05-cv-04682-TJS
2:05-cv-04683-SD
2:05-cv-04684-HB
2:05-cv-04688-MMB
2:05-cv-04690-HB
2:05-cv-04691-JF
2:05-cv-05073-MAM
2:05-cv-05078-MAM
2:05-cv-05080-ER
2:05-cv-05157-NS
2:05-cv-05568-LDD
2:05-cv-05574-SD
2:05-cv-05582-GP
2:05-cv-05589-PD
2:05-cv-05592-PBT
2:05-cv-05594-JD
2:05-cv-05608-CMR
2:05-cv-05613-TJS
2:05-cv-05617-BMS
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