Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

Rnying ma Scholar Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po

Orna ALMOGI
1. Introduction

The doxographical affiliation of Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (b. 11th cent., henceforth Rong zom pa) has been until recently an unresolved issue. He has often been
thought to be a Yogcra-Mdhyamika (mainly because he does not make any
reference to Prsagika-Madhyamaka), but in a study focusing on his discourses on
various conceptions of Buddhahood I was able to demonstrate that he is clearly to
be identified as a proponent of Sarvadharmpratihnavda or the "strand which
maintains that all phenomena have no substratum whatsoever" (i.e., as opposed
to Myopamdvayavda or the "strand which maintains that [phenomena] are
one, inasmuch as they are like illusions") and not of Yogcra-Madhyamaka.1 In
brief, Rong zom pa belonged to a Madhyamaka tradition that maintained that phenomena have no substratum whatsoever and which at the same time propagated
the indivisibility of the two truths (or modes of reality). This is, however, not to say
that he did not avail himself of Yogcra theories. On the contrary, he discusses
the Yogcra school (employing also other appellations such as Cittamtra (sems
tsam), Vijnavda (rnam par shes par smra ba), Vijaptimtravda (rnam par rig
pa tsam du smra ba), and Vijnamtravda (rnam par shes pa tsam du smra ba))
on several occasions, and his writings are permeated with ideas and notions typical
of and in fact central to this school, which latter fact probably contributed to
modern scholars' false identification of him as a Yogcra-Mdhyamika. Nonetheless, as an advocate of both Madhyamaka and Rdzogs chen, Rong zom pa presupposes Yogcra theories but goes beyond them to establish the view that he

I would like to thank Mr. Philip Pierce (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu) for proofreading my English.
1
During the last phase of Buddhism in India, strongly permeated by Tantric concepts,
one finds the division of Madhyamaka into Myopamdvayavda and Sarvadharmpratihnavda. According to this division, all Madhyamaka traditions that in one way or
another relied on Yogcra theories of knowledge were considered Myopamdvayavda,
while only those strands of Madhyamaka that appeared not to have relied on any of the
theories of knowledge of Yogcra were considered to have embraced Sarvadharmpratihnavda. See ALMOGI (2009:39-42), where this division of Madhyamaka is briefly
touched upon, and ibid. 226-232, where Rong zom pa's Madhyamaka affiliation that is,
his identification as a Sarvadharmpratihnavdin is discussed. For a lengthy discussion
of the identification of these two subdivisions and their congruence with other schemes of
subdividing Madhyamaka known from Tibetan doxographies and other sources, see
ALMOGI 2010.

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1331

considers to be the highest. This attitude towards Yogcra is in fact shared by

most Tibetan scholars.2
In the present article, I shall examine Rong zom pa's position on Yogcra
theories from different angles. This will be done by availing myself of several of his
writings, including the Lta ba'i brjed byang (A Memorandum on the View), Grub
mtha'i brjed byang (A Memorandum on the Philosophical Tenets), Lta phreng
'grel pa (a commentary on the Lta ba'i phreng ba which is ascribed to Padmasambhava), and Theg tshul (a lengthy introduction to Rdzogs chen philosophy). First
(2), I shall treat two passages from Rong zom pa's writings where he provides a
general presentation of Yogcra. This will be followed (3) by a discussion of his
understanding of the subdivisions of Yogcra on the basis of differences in their
respective theories of knowledge. Next (4), Rong zom pa's treatment of specific
Yogcra theories will be discussed, including (4.1) the theory of the Three
Natures, (4.2) the Yogcra view on defilements, and ( 4.3) its method of refuting other systems and establishing its own.3 Lastly (5), I shall briefly discuss Rong
zom pa's presentation of Yogcra in relation to other systems, particularly
Madhyamaka.

2. Rong zom pa's Presentation of Yogcra in General

Rong zom pa offers a general description of the view of Yogcra on several
occasions. In the present section, I shall provide a translation of two passages
containing such descriptions. The first is his presentation in the Lta ba'i brjed
byang, where he focuses on the notion of mind-only (sems tsam: cittamtra), which
is fundamental to this school. The view that there are no truly existent external
phenomena is presented by arguing that these are nothing but mind, that is, merely
appearances that are the result of the ripening of residual impressions previously
implanted in the layavijna by the current forms of mind:4
Some {[i.e.,] the proponents of Cittamtra} state: It is true that residual impressions (bag chags: vsan ) [resulting] from karma have accumulated in the
mental continuum, and for that very reason it is logical that the result of
residual impressions [should] ripen in the mental continuum itself. For
example, how could a seed that had been sown in a field [down in a valley]
possibly ripen on a mountain peak?! Therefore, the mind itself in whose
continuum residual impressions [resulting] from karma have accumulated and ripened ripens as supposed (ltar) bodies (lus: deha), abodes

On the reception of Yogcra by the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, see Dorji
WANGCHUK's contribution in the present volume.
3
Rong zom pa's understanding of the layavijna (kun gzhi rnam shes) theory is a
rather complex issue, particularly considering the theory's knotty relation to the kun gzhi
theory of the Rdzogs chen tradition, and thus remains beyond the scope of this article. For
a brief discussion of Rong zom pa's stance regarding the difference between the laya of
Yogcra and the kun gzhi of Rdzogs chen, see KARMAY (1988:179), where a short passage from his Theg tshul is cited and translated.
4
Lta ba'i brjed byang (A, fol. 152a4-b5; B, pp. 1710-183). A critical edition of the Tibetan
texts of this and all other passages cited in this article is provided in the appendix.

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Orna ALMOGI

(gnas: pratih, pada), and objects of engagement (spyod yul: gocara).5

Therefore, whatever is conceptualized and known in the form of phenomena is the mind itself. That is, the mind itself [appears] as supposed
objects (yul: viaya) on account of residual impressions, and the [supposed] objects of the mind are said to be [the result of] residual impressions, because those that appear as supposed objects are [the result of]
the ripening of residual impressions. Moreover, when the residual impressions that is, [those that give rise to] the current [forms of] mind
('jug pa'i rnam par shes pa: pravttivijna, i.e., the five sense perceptions
and the mental perception) and [their] mind-associates (sems las byung
ba: caitta) that have accumulated in the fundamental [mind] (kun gzhi
['i rnam par shes pa]: laya[vijna]) become strong and potent, the fundamental mind itself ripens [as] the essence of the result, and so appears
as bodies, abodes, and objects of engagement. These very appearances
function as the dominant conditions (bdag po'i rkyen: adhipatipratyaya)
and also as the objective conditions (dmigs pa'i rkyen: lambanapratyaya)
of the current [forms of] mind. The ensuing (rgyu mthun pa: niyanda)
residual impressions, which have been implanted by the current [forms of]
mind themselves, function as the causal conditions (rgyu'i rkyen: hetupratyaya).
In short, unlike the non-Buddhist [systems], none of the [various
Yogcra] systems seeks a cause elsewhere, such as vara, a self (bdag:
tman), or primal matter (rang bzhin: prakti ). [The various Yogcra
systems] are similar inasmuch as [all of them] maintain that karmic [seeds]
accumulated by cognition itself sprout within this very [cognition], and
one's abodes and objects of engagement, too, come about [in this same
way]. Thus there are no additional major points of disagreement (rtsod
sgo) [among them].

In his discussion of Yogcra in the Grub mtha'i brjed byang, Rong zom pa focuses
on the efforts on the part of its followers to portray their view as what is called the
Middle Way (dbu ma'i lam: madhyam pratipad ). It is contended that Yogcra
avoids both the extreme of admitting true existence in regard to external objects, as
is done by the rvakas, and the extreme of negating the true existence of mind,
as is done by the Mdhyamikas. It is argued that if mind were non-existent, striving
for Buddhahood would be pointless. The objectsubject dichotomy is explained as
the error, on the part of the mental continuum, of taking one part of itself to be a
grasped object and another part to be a grasping subject. In reality, both
the grasped and the grasper are conceptual constructs. It is further argued that the
grasped, being a mental construct, appears to be manifold, while the grasper, being
the underlying component of conceptualization, appears to be single. Assuming
that the grasper and grasped must be of a similar nature in order for cognition to
be possible, it is further argued that if external objects were to exist apart from
one's mind, that is, if they were to consist of atoms of matter rather than moments
of mind, they could not be perceived by the mind. In conclusion, the assertion is
repeated that a mental element exists on the ultimate level as a continuous chain of
5

For references to the notion that the external world consists of bodies, abodes, and
objects (the latter is also referred to as [the sensation or objects of] enjoyment (longs spyod:
bhoga/artha)), see ALMOGI (2009:248, n. 33).

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1333

moments at the level of sentient beings as (ordinary) mind and at the level of the
Noble Ones as gnosis:6
The tradition of Vijnamtravda: [It] maintains the existence of mind
on the absolute level, [postulating] the mind-only [theory]. [According to
this tradition,] one should avoid the false imputation (sgro 'dogs pa:
adhyropa/samropa) in regard to objects which [in fact] are completely
(yong gis) non-existent as [done by] the rvakas, and the depreciation
(bskur pa 'debs pa: apavda) that on the absolute level even the mind is
non-existent, [as asserted] by the great Madhyamaka.7 If mind were not
to exist on the absolute level, there would be no basis for the accumulation of beneficial resources (bsod nams: puya), and striving for [the attainment of] release (thar pa: moka) would be superfluous. Thus, regarding mind, at the level of sentient beings mind merely exists as momentary cognition. [Whatever] appears [in the here and] now as objects is
[nothing but] mind. [Mind, in turn, constitutes of] the conceptually constructed that is, one grasped (gzung ba: grhya) "part" (cha: bhga
/aa) of the mind that has been from beginningless time erroneously
taken to be an object and one grasped "part" [of it] that has been erroneously taken to be the [subjective] mind and [of] what is called conceptual constructions [involving] residual impressions (bag chags tsam la bag
chags su rtog pa zhes bya), which are nothing but residual impressions. As
to the [perceived] object, therefore, although [it] has developed from
mind, [it] appears as inanimate matter; as to the mind, because [it] is the
main component (dngos gzhi ) of [all] cognition, it appears as knowledge
(rig pa). Because the object is conceptually constructed, [it] appears to be
manifold; because the mind is the main component of conceptualization,
it appears to be single. Because objects are manifested ('phrul pa) by
cognition, a connection exists [between the manifold objects and the single subject]. If objects were to exist as [something consisting of] minute
atoms (rdul phra rab: paramu) outside one's own mental continuum,
cognition of them would not be possible since there would be no [object
subject] connection [between them], for the two cognition and inanimate matter are generically dissimilar. Further, only single minute atoms,
not manifold appearances, would be possible. Therefore, [external] objects do not exist. Through failure to cognize [the true nature of] mind,
[the mind] appears [to one] in the form of objects. Mind exists at the ultimate level. If it were to be non-existent, this would result in the shortcoming that striving for [the attainment of] release would be superfluous,
and thus the statement that [mind] is non-existent is not tenable either.
By means of this logical reasoning, [it can be established that] at the level
of sentient beings, mind exists in a mere momentary form, [but at the
same time] in a permanent one, given the continuity8 of the fundamental

6
7

Grub mtha'i brjed byang (A, fols. 325b4-326b1; B, p. 2014-24).

The term "great Madhyamaka" here is clearly to be interpreted as simply a reference

to Madhyamaka in general, the adjective "great" being used in a non-restrictive sense.
8
Permanency (rtag pa: nityat ) as an expression of continuity (rgyun: prabandha) is
one of three kinds of permanency, alongside permanency as an expression of constancy or

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Orna ALMOGI

mind; while at the level of the Noble Ones, [it similarly] exists in a mere
momentary form, [but at the same time] in a permanent one, given the
continuity of gnosis. In this way, having eliminated the extremes of both
existence and nonexistence, [the proponents of the Yogcra system]
maintain that they are the ones who abide in the Middle Way, and thus
[their system is] called Cittamtra-Madhyamaka.9

3. Rong zom pa's Presentation of the Subdivisions of Yogcra

Rong pa Me dpung (ca. 11th/12th cent.), in his list of Rong zom pa's writings titled
Rje dharma bha dras mdzad pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs kyi tho yig, records under
the category "works on the foundation of the truth (bden gzhi )" a work solely devoted to theories of knowledge that focuses on the two main opposing stances
regarding the existence of images.10 Such a work, however, has unfortunately not
yet surfaced. On several occasions, nonetheless, Rong zom pa discusses Yogcra
in detail in terms of the subdivisions of it that have resulted from different theories
of knowledge, giving us a pretty systematic overview of these subdivisions. I have
already indirectly dealt with the issue elsewhere in the context of analyzing Rong
zom pa's presentation of Yogcra-Madhyamaka, where I discussed at length
various branches of Yogcra and their respective theories of knowledge, including
a clarification of the terms involved and the philosophical stance of the individual
subdivisions, with particular attention to the question surrounding the existence of
gnosis at the stage of a buddha.11 Here I shall therefore merely present a summary
of my findings, before providing a translation of a passage in which Rong zom pa
directly discusses the subdivisions of Yogcra. I have pointed out that Rong zom
pa's way of subdividing Yogcra raises doubts regarding the assumption that the
subclassification into Skravda versus Nirkravda (also Ankravda) and
that into *Satykravda versus *Alkkravda are equivalent an assumption
that has been widespread among modern scholars.12 Rong zom pa considers Skravda and Nirkravda to be the two main subdivisions, with *Satykravda
and *Alkkravda being further subdivisions of Skravda. I have also noted
that later Tibetan scholars have often presented a somewhat different scheme in
which *Satykravda and *Alkkravda are considered the two main subdivisions, while *Samala-Alkkravda and *Nirmala-Alkkravda are regarded as
two further subdivisions of *Alkkravda. Following a discussion of the theories
uninterruptedness (mi chad pa: asrasana) and permanency by nature (rang bzhin: prakti ). For more on this distinction, see ALMOGI (2009:329-330, n. 109).
9
The Buddhist tradition in general seeks to avoid extremes, thus propagating the
pursuit of what is referred to as the Middle Way. It seems, however, that as a reaction to
the Mdhyamikas, who, as the name of their school clearly suggests, claim to be the only
true followers of the Middle Way, the followers of the other Buddhist schools felt perhaps a
greater need to emphasize that their traditions, too, represented the Middle Way. One
good example is the so-called Vijpti-Madhyamaka tradition represented by Ratnkaranti, on which see SEYFORT RUEGG (1981:122-124).
10
ALMOGI (1997:248; Appendix A, 6.1.2.4): Rnam bcas rnam med.
11
See ALMOGI (2009:34 & 142-159), where, in addition to Rong zom pa's own presentation being analyzed, several passages on the issue from both Indian and Tibetan sources
are cited, and references to relevant secondary literature are provided as well.
12
For the Tibetan and English rendering of the names of the Yogcra subschools
mentioned in this passage, see the summary of Rong zom pas scheme below.

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1335

of knowledge of each of these branches, I demonstrated that what Rong zom pa

calls *Alkkravda has been referred to by later Tibetan scholars as *SamalaAlkkravda, and what he calls Nirkravda has been referred to by these same
scholars as *Nirmala-Alkkravda. One of the main points discussed by Rong
zom pa in this connection is the impact these theories of knowledge have on how
the various subdivisions of Yogcra (and hence also those of YogcraMadhyamaka, which are his main concern) conceive Buddhahood. Of the two subdivisions of Skravda (which maintains the existence of images), *Satykravda
(which maintains the existence of true images) asserts that just as the various
images of the external world (i.e., bodies, abodes, and objects) that appear at the
level of ordinary sentient beings are truly existent in the manner they appear, so
too are the images of pure phenomena at the level of a buddha (i.e., buddha Bodies and pure fields along with their embellishments). Consequently, according
to this branch, both the images of pure phenomena and the pure mundane gnosis
that cognizes them exist at the stage of a buddha. *Alkkravda (which maintains
the existence of false images) holds that although images of the external world
appear at the level of sentient beings they do not exist in the manner they appear.
Consequently, according to this branch, although images of pure phenomena at the
stage of a buddha appear they are not true, and thus the pure mundane gnosis that
cognizes them exists only conventionally, it being non-conceptual gnosis alone that
truly exists. According to the Nirkravda (which maintains the non-existence of
images), even at the level of sentient beings, the mind, being devoid of the object
subject dichotomy, is characterized by luminosity, and dual appearances simply
arise due to residual impressions. Consequently, according to this branch neither
images of pure phenomena nor pure mundane gnosis to cognize them exists at the
stage of a buddha, and thus only non-conceptual gnosis exists.13
I have also pointed out that Rong zom pa acknowledges the fact that these
branches could be subdivided further. One of the interesting allusions to such further subdivisions is no doubt his mention of the distinction among the followers of
Skravda between those who maintain the existence of an "original" ('dra gzhi )
and those who do not. These are subdivisions that had resulted from a dispute on
whether an image has an original, or an "objective support," from which it arises.
Unfortunately, Rong zom pa mentions these sub-branches only in passing. In any
case, he makes it clear that these supposed originals, too, are again nothing but
appearances born of the mind itself a deeper layer of steady images from which
the various perceived images develop. This point has been reinforced by Lambert
SCHMITHAUSEN (2005) in his recent discussion of the view lately expressed by a
number of modern scholars that Yogcra does not completely reject the existence
of external objects. Analyzing the Chinese sources in questions (primarily Xunzng's Chng wish ln , T1585), he demonstrates that these originals,
far from being external entities, are rather mental factors developed (parima) by
the mind. In the case of sense perceptions, these originals are commonly said to be
images of matter found in one's own layavijna. As pointed out by SCHMITHAUSEN, there was lack of agreement regarding the originals of the layavijna.

13

Significantly, while these stances of the subdivisions of Yogcra apply to the absolute level, the controversy regarding the existence of gnosis at the stage of a buddha among
the Mdhyamikas all of whom agree in postulating the absolute as freedom from manifoldness, not allotting any special status to mind refers to the conventional level.

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Orna ALMOGI

According to the more widely accepted view, however, these are images grounded
14
in other beings' layavijna.
Rong zom pa's scheme of the subdivisions of Yogcra can be thus summarized
as follows:15
(1) Skravda (rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba), "those who maintain
the existence of images"
(1.1) *Satykravda (rnam pa bden par smra ba), "those who maintain [the existence of] true images"
(1.1.1) rNam pa 'dra gzhi yod par smra ba, "those who maintain
that images (rnam pa: kra) have an 'original'"
(1.1.2) [rNam pa] 'dra gzhi med par smra ba, "those who maintain that images (rnam pa: kra) have no 'original'"
() etc.
(1.2) *Alkkravda (rnam pa brdzun par smra ba), "those who
maintain [the existence of] false images" [= *Samala-Alkkravda, "those who maintain [the existence of] false images
[and a cognition that] is accompanied by stains"]
(1.2.1) rNam pa 'dra gzhi yod par smra ba, "those who maintain
that images (rnam pa: kra) have an 'original'"
(1.2.2) [rNam pa] 'dra gzhi med par smra ba, "those who maintain that images (rnam pa: kra) have no 'original'"
() etc.
(2) Nirkravda (rnam pa med par smra ba), "those who maintain the
non-existence of images" [= *Nirmala-Alkkravda, "those who
maintain [the existence of] false images [and a cognition that] is without stains"]

The following is a passage from Rong zom pa's Lta ba'i brjed byang in which he
provides a systematic presentation of the subdivisions of Yogcra in the context of
discussing the views (lta ba: darana) of the various doxographical systems:16
Vijaptimtravda is [divided into] two [branches], namely, (1) Skravda and (2) Nirkravda. (1) Skravda has two further subdivisions
(nang gses kyi bye brag), namely, (1.1) *Satykravda and (1.2) *Alkkravda. These [latter two] in turn are known to have numerous factions
representing inner disagreements (nang mi mthun par smra ba), such as
(1.1.1 & 1.2.1) those who maintain that images (rnam pa: kra) have an
"original" ('dra gzhi ) versus (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) those who maintain that
[images] have no "original." But given that [the various factions] can be
14

For more on this, see SCHMITHAUSEN (2005).

Note that Rong zom pa also alludes on several occasions to two other subdivisions of
Yogcra, namely, (a) "Bodhisattvas who postulate a set of eight [vijna s]" (byang chub
sems dpa' tshogs brgyad du smra ba) and (b) "Bodhisattvas who postulate one [vijna ]"
(byang chub sems dpa' gcig pur smra ba, or simply, gcig pur smra ba).
16
Lta ba'i brjed byang (A, fols. 150b4-151b6; B, pp. 1516-1624).
15

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1337

simply subsumed under the [above-mentioned categories], I shall explain

only these:
Of these, (1) as regards Skravda, the word kra is taken here in
the sense of "duplicate" ('dra snang). And thus (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) those
[among them] who maintain the existence of an "original" ('dra gzhi )
[consider] the arising of a cognition that resembles the original [to be] a
"duplicate," while (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) [those who maintain that] there is no
original consider the appearing [of an image in such a way] as if [an original] existed though [such an original] does not exist at all [to be a]
"duplicate."
[All of the subdivisions] are collectively designated Skravda,
which maintains that external objects (phyi rol gyi don: bhyrtha) are
indeed non-existent, and yet cognition itself is divided into objective and
subjective images, as if [external objects] were existent. Of these [subdivisions], (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) those who postulate that an original exists maintain
that although no external objects exist separate from cognition, steady
appearances (snang ba brtan pa) of the mind itself in the form of external
objects do exist. [These] function as originals, and so all cognitions arise
as their images. (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) Those who maintain that there is no original say that there is no second layer to appearances in [the form of] external sense-bases (skye mched: yatana), and that it is cognition itself
that appears as though [external] objects were existent.
Of these, (1.1) *Satykravda states: All [things] that appear as
bodies, abodes, and objects of engagement are of the essence of the mind
itself, and therefore [they] are completely true, [that is,] in line with how
[they] appear. Just as [these appearances] at the level of sentient beings
are true, so also all [appearances of buddha ]-Bodies and arrays of
[buddha ]-fields [along with their embellishments] at the stage of a
buddha are true.
(1.2) *Alkkravda states: At the level of sentient beings conceptualizations, which arise in the form of the grasped (gzung ba: grhya)
and the grasper ('dzin pa: grhaka), are existent. These are, however, [instances of] false imagination (yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pa:
abhtaparikalpa). In reality, [the mind] is empty of both [the grasped and
the grasper, and] exists as merely [having] the characteristic of selfcognition (rang rig pa: svasavitti/svasavedana). At the level of the
Awakened Ones, pure mundane gnosis (dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes: uddhalaukikajna) is merely present in the mode of conventional truth (or
reality), whereas the correct gnosis (yang dag pa'i ye shes: samyagjna)
is nothing but momentary non-conceptual gnosis (rnam par mi rtog pa'i
ye shes: nirvikalpajna).17
(2) Nirkravda states: Even at the level of every sentient being, the
mind (sems: citta) and mind-associates (sems las byung ba: caitta) have
never arisen [in the form of] objective and subjective images, not even for
one moment, and thus [mind] merely exists as [something having] the
characteristics of luminosity (gsal ba: praka) [and] self-cognition. As
for the seeming appearance in [the form of] object and subject, [it] can be
17

171).

For a discussion of uddhalaukikajna and nirvikalpajna, see ALMOGI (2009:163-

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Orna ALMOGI

expressed neither as the mind itself nor as [something] other [than the
mind], and thus [it] is referred to as "[the result of] residual impressions
(bag chags: vsan ) relating to [the mind] itself," "objectsubject [dichotomy]," or "the Imagined" (kun brtags: parikalpita). That which can be
expressed in terms of neither X itself nor anything other [than X] cannot
be truly existent (rdzas su yod pa: dravyasat ), and thus is simply nominal
(btags pa tsam: prajaptimtra). Even at the level of the Noble Ones,
there is nothing that has been improved upon (bogs dbyung du med pa)
[that supersedes] this very nature [of the mind]. But the difference is that
[the mental continuum at this level] has become free from the seemingly
existent adventitious (glo bur ba: gantuka) residual impressions. Therefore, [they] do not maintain [the existence] of pure mundane gnosis at the
level of the Noble Ones either.

4. Rong zom pa's Discussion of Specific Yogcra Theories

4.1. The Three Natures Theory
Rong pa Me dpung, in his list of Rong zom pa's writings, specifies, again under the
category "works on the foundation of the truth (bden gzhi )," a work solely devoted
to the theory of the Three Natures, that is, the Imagined, Dependent, and Perfect.18 This work, however, has not survived either. In any case, Rong zom pa avails
himself of the Three Natures theory, as he does of other theories associated with
Yogcra, on numerous occasions in his writings. In his Grub mtha'i brjed byang,
he treats the Three Natures systematically under ten points, including definitions
of each of the Natures and their correlation with other Buddhist theories and
concepts:19
The Three Natures are the Imagined (kun [tu ] brtags [pa ]: parikalpita),
Dependent (gzhan dbang: paratantra), and Perfect (yongs su grub pa:
parinipanna). The following is stated in the authoritative scriptures:20
The Imagined is under the influence of imagination.
Imagination is the Dependent.
The Perfect is of two types,
The Unchangeable and the Infallible.

18

ALMOGI (1997:248; Appendix A, 6.1.2.3): Sems tsam gyi ngo bo nyid gsum pa.
Grub mtha'i brjed byang (A, fols. 346a6-348b3; B, pp. 2243-22611).
20
The third and fourth lines are a citation of Madhyntavibhga 3.11cd (Q5522.45b6;
D4021.42b2; Z, vol. 70, p. 90710-11), also cited in the Blo gsal grub mtha'. For references to
19

critical editions and discussions of the text, see MIMAKI (1982:118, n. 344). I have not been
able to locate the source of the first two lines. Compare, however, the following verse from
Asvabhva's Mahynasagrahopanibandhana (Q5552.270b3; D4051.221a1-2; Z, vol. 76, pp.
57721-5782): rnam par rtog pas brtags pa'i don [Q add. no] // kun tu [D du] brtags pa'i ngo bo
nyid// rnam par rtog pa gzhan gyi dbang// de yi stong nyid yongs su grub//. The verse is cited
twice with slight variation in the Blo gsal grub mtha', where it is once attributed to the
Madhyntavibhga and once to the Mahynasagraha. For references and a discussion of
these citations, see MIMAKI (1982:116, n. 337 & 119, n. 346).

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1339

The [Three Natures] will be taught under ten points: (1) what are the actual things (dngos [gzhi ])21 denoted by [each of] the Three Natures, (2)
etymology, (3) subdivisions, (4) assignment [of the Three Natures] to the
stages (sa: bhmi ), (5) correlation [of the Three Natures] with the three
Bodies (sku: kya), (6) subsuming [the Three Natures] under [the concept of] representation-only (rnam par rig pa tsam: vijptimtra), (7)
subsuming all phenomena under the Three Natures, (8) [the Three
Natures in terms of] three kinds of existence, (9) [the Three Natures in
terms of] three kinds of non-existence, and (10) [the Three Natures as
being free from] identicalness and dissimilarity.
(1) What are the actual things referred to by [each of] the Three
Natures? The Imagined refers to the objectsubject [dichotomy]; the Dependent refers to the conceptual thoughts constituting the minds and
mind-associates within the three realms [of existence];22 and the Perfect
denotes true reality, which is empti[ness].
(2) Etymology: Why is the Imagined called [so]? The grasped and
grasper appear on account of error within the Dependent: the Dependent, not having recognized that [these] are its own manifestations, imagines that the grasped and grasper exist apart from the Dependent. Therefore, the Imagined is called [so]. Why is the Dependent called [so]? The
minds and mind-associates within the three realms [of existence] are not
capable of arising on their own but are produced by other causes and
conditions. Therefore, the Dependent is called [so]. Why is the Perfect
called [so]? True reality (chos nyid: dharmat ), which is emptiness that
is, the Dependent [in the sense of] the bearer of properties (chos can:
dharmin) being empty of the objectsubject dichotomy never turns into
marks [consisting in appearances] (mtshan ma: nimitta) or entities (dngos
po: vastu) [that result from] conceptualization.
(3) Subdivisions: The Imagined is of two [types], namely, the Perceptible-imagined {such as the objects of each of the [five sense] faculties} and the
Imperceptible-imagined {such as sky flowers}. The Dependent is also of two
[types], namely, the Dependent that stands in relation [to something else]
{such as the unconditioned ('dus ma byas: asaskta) in relation to the conditioned ('dus
byas: saskta)} and the Dependent that is generated {such as objects and faculties generated by seeds, water, and manure}. The Perfect, too, is of two [types],
namely, the Unchangeable Perfect {referring to the true reality of phenomena}
and the Infallible Perfect {referring to correct gnosis}23.24
(4) Assignment [of the Three Natures] to the stages: The Imagined
is the object of engagement [of the mind] of ordinary beings; the De21

My reading of dngos as dngos gzhi is based on the reading of the passage, translated
below, that elaborates on this point.
22
This is in agreement with the definition of vikalpa in the Vinicayasagra. For the
relevant passage, see KRAMER (2005:69, Tibetan text, & 101, German translation). See also
ALMOGI (2009:170), where Madhyntavibhga 1.8ab, in which the same idea is conveyed, is
cited and translated.
23
Referring, that is, in an ontological sense, to nyat, and in an epistemological sense
to nirvikalpajna, respectively.
24
For a detailed presentation of these subdivisions, including further references to primary and secondary sources, see CARSTENS (2006:176-182).

1340

Orna ALMOGI

pendent is the object of engagement of pure mundane [gnosis]; the Perfect is the object of engagement of non-conceptual [gnosis]. How does
one know this? It is stated in the authoritative scriptures:25
Those [things] which arise dependently
Are by nature non-existent.
Those [things] which are by nature non-existent never arise.
The Dependent Nature, which arises on account of conditions
[But] without conceptualization
[And] which is in all respects inexplicable,
Is the object of engagement of pure mundane [gnosis].
The Perfect Nature, that which is utter emptiness
[And is characterized] by the nature of permanency,
Is the object of engagement of non-conceptual gnosis.
(5) Correlation [of the Three Natures] with the three Bodies: The
Perfect is the dharmakya, because [it] is composed of the dharmadhtu
and gnosis. The Dependent is the sabhogakya, because [it] appears to
(ngo gang = ngo ga)26 [one during] samdhi. The Imagined is the nirmakya, because things which are non-existent are imagined to be existent.27
25

Of the three following stanzas, the first is a citation from the Sgaramatiparipcchstra, where it reads slightly differently (S134.69a1; D152.48a4): rten cing 'brel par gang
byung ba// de dag gang la'ang rang bzhin med// gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gang
du'ang 'byung ba med//. The verse seems to have been quite popular and is cited, with slight
variation, in several other works, including ntarakita's Madhyamaklakravtti (Q5284.
70a6-7; D3884.72a5-6; Z, vol. 62, p. 94516-19: de lta bas na blo gros rgya mtshos bstan pa las 'di
skad gsung te/ gang dag rten cing 'brel byung ba// de dag dngos nyid ci yang min// gang dag
ngo bo nyid med pas// de dag gang du 'byung ba med// ce'o// ); Kamalala's Madhyamakloka (Q5287.227b7-8; D3887.206b1; Z, vol. 62, pp. 129220-12932: 'phags pa blo gros rgya
mtsho bstan pa las kyang/ gang dag rten nas byung de dag// ngo bo nyid kyis ci yang med//
gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gang du'ang 'byung ba med// ces gsungs so// );
Bhviveka's Prajpradpamlamadhyamakavtti (Q5253.130b7; D3853.107a1-2; Z, vol. 57,
p. 106512-14: de bzhin du/ gang dag brten nas skye ba ni// de dag dngos nyid gang yang med//
gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gar yang 'byung mi 'gyur// zhes bya ba dang/ );
Vidykaraprabha's Madhyamakanayasra (Q5293.54b6-7; D3893.48b2; Z, vol. 63, p. 1254-6:
gang dag rten cing 'brel te byung [Q 'byung]// de dag ngo bo nyid 'ga' 'ang [Q 'ga'ang] med//
gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gang du'ang 'byung ba med// ); and Gro lung pa's
Bstan rim chen po (fol. 424a7: blo gros rgya mtshos zhus pa las kyang/ gang dag brten nas
'byung de dag// ngo bo nyid kyis ci yang med// gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gang
du 'byung ba med ces so// ). The last two stanzas have been cited by Sthiramati in his
Madhyntavibhgak (Q5534.32a7; D4032.200a2-3; Z, vol. 71, pp. 5214-5): brtags min rkyen
las skyes pa dang// rnam pa kun tu brjod med pa// gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid// 'jig rten

dag pa'i [D pa yi] spyod yul lo// ; ibid. (Q5534.32a8-b1; D4032.200a3-4; Z, vol. 71, p. 5218-9):
brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis te// shin tu stong nyid gang yin pa// yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo
ste// mi rtog ye shes spyod yul lo//.
26
On the word ngo gang/ga, see ALMOGI (2009:259, n. 58 & 398, n. 53).
27

The correlation of the Three Natures with the three Bodies set forth here and the
assignment of the Three Natures to the stages (and by implication their correlation with

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1341

(6) Subsuming [the Three Natures] under [the concept of] representation-only: The error of the mind is the Dependent, [that is,] the mistaking [of one part of itself] for an object. The main component (dngos
gzhi ) of the mind is the Imagined, [which consists in] the objectsubject
dichotomy. As for the true reality of the mind, so it is the Perfect.
(7) Subsuming all phenomena under the Three Natures: Phenomena [can] be both outer and inner, both conditioned and unconditioned,
[and partake of] both pollution (kun nas nyon mongs pa: saklea, i.e.,
sasra) and purification (rnam par byang ba: vyavadna, i.e., nirva).
They can be subsumed under five [categories], namely, name (ming:
nman), marks [consisting in appearances] (rgyu mtshan: nimitta), conceptual thought (rnam par rtog pa: vikalpa), true reality (de bzhin nyid:
tathat ), [and] correct gnosis (yang dag pa'i ye shes: samyagjna).28
These five can be subsumed under the Three Natures as follows: Name is
subsumed under the Imagined; marks [consisting in appearances] and
conceptual thought are both subsumed under the Dependent; [and] true
reality and correct gnosis are both subsumed under the Perfect. Or [alternatively]: all imputations [that is, considering] non-existent [things]
to be existent are subsumed under the Imagined; all phenomena that
are comprehended in [the categories of] causes and conditions are subsumed under the Dependent; true reality, which is neither non-existent
like the Imagined nor produced by causes and conditions like the Dependent, is subsumed under the Perfect.
(8) [The Three Natures in terms of] three [kinds of] existence: The
Imagined is conventionally existent (tha snyad du yod [pa], that is, nominally existent (btags par yod pa: prajaptisat )); the Dependent is truly
existent (rdzas su yod [pa]: dravyasat ); the Perfect is existent as true reality (chos nyid: dharmat ).
(9) [The Three Natures in terms of] three [kinds of] non-existence:
The Imagined is non-existent in terms of [having an own]-nature; the

the stages gnoseological features) presented in the previous point are clearly in line with
the correlation between the three Bodies and the four (or five) gnoses advanced in various
Buddhist works. Often the dharmakya is associated with the mirror-like gnosis (darajna: me long lta bu'i ye shes), the sabhogakya with the gnosis of equality (samatjna:
mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes) and the discerning gnosis (pratyavekaajna: so sor rtog pa'i
ye shes), and the nirmakya with the gnosis of performing [beneficial] activities (ktynuhnajna: bya ba sgrub pa'i ye shes). In some traditions, however, the dharmakya is
equated with the purified dharmadhtu, while the svasabhogakya comprises the four
gnoses (the parasabhogakya and the nirmakya being merely physical manifestations).
For a discussion of this issue, including citations of and references to primary and secondary sources, see ALMOGI (2009:68, 167-168, n. 86), and also ibid., p. 115, where a passage
from Ratnkaranti's Guavat in which the three Bodies are accommodated within the
five-gnosis scheme is cited. See also ibid., p. 326, where a passage from Ngamitra's Kyatrayvatramukha is cited in which (v. 66) a correlation between the three Bodies and the
Three Natures (on the basis of three processes attributed to non-conceptual gnosis) seems
to be affirmed.
28
These five categories are the so-called five vastu s found in some Yogcra works. On
the five-vastu theory as expounded in the Vinicayasagra, see KRAMER (2005).

1342

Orna ALMOGI

Dependent is non-existent inasmuch as it cannot arise on its own; the

Perfect is non-existent [as] an entity on the absolute level.
(10) The teaching that [the Three Natures are free from] identicalness and dissimilarity: The Imagined is a non-existent phenomenon [and
thus one cannot talk here in terms of identicalness and dissimilarity]; the
[remaining] two, the Dependent and Perfect, it is taught, are free from
identicalness and dissimilarity. Objection: Provided [these two] were
identical, if one considers the Dependent as the dominant one (gzhan
dbang brtsan par byas na) [of the two], it would logically follow that a
buddha is impossible. If the Perfect is considered the dominant one, it
would logically follow that sentient beings are impossible. A response to
this: [The two] are free from identicalness and dissimilarity. When the
Dependent is not free from the Imagined, [the two] are not identical;
when [the Dependent] is free from the Imagined, [which consists in] the
objectsubject dichotomy, [the two] are not dissimilar either. This is stated in the authoritative sources:29
Dependent conceptual thoughts
Are conceptual thoughts that are causally conditioned.
The Perfect exists prior to it (i.e., the Dependent).
[The Dependent is] that which has always been non-existent.
Therefore it (i.e., the Perfect) is neither different from
Nor identical with the Dependent.

4.2. The Yogcra View on Klea s

Another central point discussed by Rong zom pa is how the various Buddhist
systems view the true nature of intellectual-emotional defilements (nyon mongs pa:
klea). In his Theg tshul, he seeks to prove, by employing the respective philosophical views of each of the systems, that in fact according to all of them (and by
their own philosophical standards) no defilements truly exist that need to be eliminated. As for Yogcra, he argues that if, as maintained by its advocates, mind is
in reality devoid of the objectsubject dichotomy and thus is merely characterized
by self-cognition, then defilements, which are considered to be rooted in error,
would stand in contradiction to mind. To elucidate his argument he employs two
analogies, each containing three elements in correspondence to the Three Natures.
Firstly, he draws an analogy between gold, earth, and the earth element and,
respectively, the Perfect (termed "the [true] characteristic of the Dependent"), the
Imagined (termed "the objectsubject dichotomy"), and the Dependent. He argues
that just as perceiving gold as earth is erroneous, whereas perceiving it as gold is
correct, so too considering the true characteristic of the Dependent (in other words,
the Perfect) as the Imagined is erroneous, whereas considering it as the Perfect is
correct. Moreover, just as the earth element includes both earth and gold, so the
29

This is a citation of Triik 21-22ab (Q5556.3a2-3; D4055.2b5; Z, vol. 77, p. 58-11).

The first line reads there, however, differently: gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid// ; the third
line reads la snga ma po instead of our las snga mar grub. The first four lines are also cited
in the Yogcra chapter of the Blo gsal grub mtha' in two separate citations of two lines
each. For references to critical editions and discussions of the text, see MIMAKI (1982:118,
nn. 342 & 345). Our first line may be the result of confusion with another verse (cf. above, n.
20).

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1343

Dependent includes both the Imagined and the Perfect. Finally he argues that, this
being the case, the Dependent cannot be truly existent as both the Imagined and
the Perfect. In order to illustrate this point, he draws another analogy, this time
between a firebrand, fire-wheel, and illumination and, respectively, the Perfect, the
Imagined, and the Dependent. He begins in a similar fashion, stating that perceiving a firebrand as a fire-wheel is erroneous, whereas perceiving it as a firebrand is
correct, and that illumination applies to both the fire-wheel and firebrand. Then he
continues with the argument that since it does apply to both, if one of the latter
were to be truly existent it would follow that illumination, too, would be truly
existent, and that too as something having the characteristics of the one that is truly
existent. And since there is no doubt that the wheel, being merely the result of a
continuous turning of the firebrand, is not truly existent, illumination is clearly of
the nature of the firebrand alone. Similarly, if one considers the Perfect to be truly
existent and the Dependent to partake of both the Imagined and the Perfect, as
under the Yogcra system, then even when dual appearances (i.e., the Imagined)
arise, the Dependent is of the nature of the Perfect, and thus also for Yogcra
there is nothing that truly exists as defilement that needs to be eliminated:30
[An explanation of why there are no truly existing intellectual-emotional
defilements to be eliminated] according to the Yogcra system: As regards the characteristic of the minds and mind-associates within the three
realms [of existence] that constitute false imagination, the philosophical
tenet [of Yogcra] maintains that [in reality sasric minds and mindassociates] are neither objects (gzung ba: grhya) of anything, nor do they
grasp anything as an object (i.e., they are not the subject ('dzin pa: grhaka) of anything), and that [they] are merely characterized by self-cognition devoid of the [objectsubject] dichotomy. In such a case, [the nondual characteristic of self-cognition] would stand in contradiction to the
characteristic of intellectual-emotional defilements, because defilements
have the characteristic of arising [as a result of] an erroneous [view of
their related] objects (yul la skye ba phyin ci log pa'i rnam pa can).31 The
following [propositions] are known among the [Yogcra] tenets: "When
there is gold in the interior of the earth, the three earth, gold, and the
earth element are observed. Of these, perceiving gold as earth is erroneous perception; perceiving [it] as gold is correct perception; the earth
element, for its part, belongs to both [earth and gold]. In the same way,
perceiving the [true] characteristic of the Dependent (i.e., the Perfect) as
objectsubject dichotomy (i.e., the Imagined) is erroneous perception;
perceiving [it] as the Perfect is correct perception; the Dependent, however, belongs to both [the Imagined and the Perfect]." In [this case,] one
[can]not find the real existence of both components (cha gnyis kyi rdzas)
in the Dependent. It is as in the following [example]: In a fire-wheel,
three [things] a firebrand ('gal dum: ulmuka), a wheel, and illumination are observed. So it is like saying: "Perceiving a firebrand as a wheel
30

Theg tshul (A, fols. 5a4-6a4; B, pp. 42017-42118).

Rong zom pa seems to suggest that kleas are by definition "erroneous" (phyin ci log)
both in terms of "occurrence/arising" (skye ba) and "perception" (mthong ba). That is to say,
klea s arise and evolve on account of false views, so that epistemically they can never be
31

valid cognitions.

1344

Orna ALMOGI

is erroneous perception; perceiving [it] as a firebrand is correct perception; illumination, for its part, belongs to both [the wheel and the firebrand]." In such [a case], if both the firebrand and the wheel were truly
existent, illumination, which belongs to both components, could also be
held to be [truly] existent. However, suppose the wheel were truly existent but not the firebrand; then illumination would have the characteristic of the wheel, not that of the other. The same [logic] is applicable to
supposing that the firebrand is truly existent but the wheel not. In that
case, then, at the time when a wheel appears, a firebrand is an object that
is turned around (gnon pa, lit. "pressed") successively (rim gyis), and thus
the wheel is totally non-existent. Therefore, illumination is nothing but
the firebrand itself, and thus does not [truly] partake of both [the wheel
and the firebrand]. Similar is the case if both [the Imagined and the Perfect] were truly existent: Supposing the Perfect to be truly existent and
supposing imagination (i.e., the Dependent) to include both [the Imagined and the Perfect], [as is indeed maintained by Yogcra,] at the time
of dual appearances [the Dependent] would be characterized by selfcognition (i.e., the Perfect). Since [it is] not at all [possible that] both [the
Imagined and the Perfect] are [truly] existent, imagination (i.e., the Dependent) [can]not exist [as] both [the Imagined and the Perfect]. And
hence, [again by Yogcra standards,] no truly [existing] entity [that
needs] to be eliminated is found in defilements.

4.3. How Yogcra Refutes Other Systems and Establishes Its Own
In the third chapter of his Theg tshul, Rong zom pa seeks to demonstrate how the
Buddhist understanding of illusionism culminates in the Rdzogs chen understanding of it. He explains that all Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical propositions take appearances (snang ba) as the premise (gzhi ), the issue at debate between various philosophical systems being what the actual characteristics (mtshan
nyid ) of phenomena might be. According to him, each system seeks to refute other
philosophical tenets (gzhan gi grub mtha' ) and establish its own philosophical
tenets (rang gi grub mtha' ) by an application of the fourfold modes of negation and
affirmation (dgag sgrub bzhi'i tshul ), namely, by affirming (sgrub pa) what is
"being" (yin pa) and "existent" (yod pa), and negating what is "not being" (ma yin pa)
and "non-existent" (med pa). The key questions in this regard are "what [the actual
characteristic of phenomena] is" (ji ltar yin pa) and "how [they] exist" (ji ltar yod
pa). Anything that is believed to be superimposed (kun tu brtags pa) on "appearance" by other systems is refuted by employing both non-affirming negation (med
par dgag pa: prasajyapratiedha) and affirming negation (ma yin pa dgag pa: paryudsa). A non-affirming negation, however, merely repudiates ('gegs par byed )
philosophical views believed to be conceptually constructed by others (gzhan gyis
kun tu brtags pa), whereas an affirming negation, in addition, establishes (sgrub
par byed ) what one believes to be a bona fide (rang gi mtshan nyid pa) view.
Importantly, each system is said to establish its own view by resorting to evidence
provided by direct perception (mngon sum: pratyaka) and non-perception (mi
dmigs pa: anupalabdhi ).32 The Yogcra system is said to negate the rvakas'
philosophical view and establish its own view as follows:33
32

The method of establishing one's philosophical system by resorting to evidence furnished by perception and non-perception is also employed in the Lta phreng 'grel pa (A,

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1345

The Yogcra system [seeks to negate the rvakas' philosophical

view and establish its own view as follows]: With regard to those [things]
which appear as external and internal entities, the rvakas maintain that
external objects that have particular characteristics (rang gi mtshan nyid
pa: svalakaa) truly exist, that is, independently of cognition and as
[something] characterized by the capability of being grasped, and that
cognition (i.e., an internal phenomenon), too, truly exists as [something]
characterized by the capability of grasping. This [position of the rvakas] is refuted [by Yogcra] by means of a non-affirming negation (med
par dgag pa: prasajyapratiedha), that is, [by showing these things] to be
conceptually constructed and thus totally non-existent (gtan med ). [The
Yogcra's own position is established by an affirming negation, as follows]: [Instances of] false imagination which are neither of these (de ma
yin pa) (i.e., neither graspable external objects nor a grasping subject)
[but] which [nonetheless] have the characteristic of appearing to be dual,
although [they] are non-dual, and which arise on account of causes and
conditions do not stand in contradiction to the general [means of verification such as] direct perception (mngon sum: pratyaka) and non-perception (mi dmigs pa: anupalabdhi). Are not minds and mind-associates
[by nature] direct perception, that is, self-cognition? Is not a direct perception a correct cognition? Thus, what other logical reasoning does one
need to authenticate a correct cognition? What second correct cognition
that could exceed [it] in power and be able to challenge [it] exists? Thus
[the Yogcra system] establishes that [a cognition free from the object
subject dichotomy] is true and truly existent (rdzas su yod pa dang yin pa)
on the absolute level.
Further, [the Yogcra views] based on [its] subdivisions:
(1) *Satykravda maintains that [images] truly exist on the absolute level in the manner [they] appear.
(2) *Alkkravda maintains [the following]: It is true that there is
the arising of false imagination accompanied by appearances of objective
and subjective images. This, however, is conventional truth. In reality,
[only] that which is characterized by self-cognition and is devoid of both
[objective and subjective images] is truly existent on the absolute level.
(3) Nirkravda maintains [the following]: None of the minds and
mind-associates within the three realms ever arises, not even for a moment, as [something] accompanied by objective and subjective images. As
for dual appearances, [they] are [the result of] residual impressions that
can be expressed neither as the mind itself nor as [something] other [than
the mind]. This very [duality] is what is called the Imagined. Therefore,
all obscurations (sgrib pa: varaa) [those] consisting in defilements
(nyon mongs pa: klea) and so forth are [the result of] adventitious residual impressions, and thus are characterized by the Imagined. As for
the nature of mind, even at the level of sentient beings [it] exists as [something] having the nature of luminosity [and] self-cognition, and even at
fols. 230a6-231b3; B, pp. 31012-3121), although there it seems to be applied only to the nonBuddhist systems. Perception and non-perception are understood there to be "seeing"
(mthong ba) and "not seeing" (ma mthong ba), respectively.
33
Theg tshul (A, fols. 44a4-45a4; B, pp. 46324-4652).

1346

Orna ALMOGI

the level of the Noble Ones there is nothing that improves upon (bogs
dbyung du med pa) it, and thus [it] exists as [something] having the nature of a gnosis free from images. The slight difference [between them] is
that at the level of sentient beings [the mental continuum], being obscured by adventitious residual impressions, is experienced as obscure,
[while] at the level of the Noble Ones [it] is experienced as luminous.
To conclude (mtha' bsdus na), all [the subdivisions of Yogcra]
maintain that non-conceptual gnosis devoid of the [objectsubject]
dichotomy and true reality are truly existent on the absolute level.

5. Rong zom pa's Presentation of Yogcra in

Relation to Other Systems
In his Lta phreng 'grel pa, Rong zom pa first discusses the non-Buddhist systems,
and then the differences between the various Buddhist systems in terms of their (1)
view (lta ba: di ), (2) path (lam: mrga) or practice (sgom pa: bhvan ), and (3)
result ('bras bu: phala). Under the rubric "Vehicle of Characteristics" (mtshan nyid
kyi theg pa: *lakaayna), he first discusses the systems of the rvaka saints (i.e.,
arhat s), pratyekabuddha s, and bodhisattva s with regard to these three points, and
then goes on to briefly discuss further points of disagreement, including the (4)
object of engagement (spyod yul ), (5) means of liberation (rnam par grol ba'i sgo),
(6) power of concentration (ting nge 'dzin gyi mthu), (7) strength of insight (shes
rab kyi stobs), (8) elimination of obscurations (sgrib pa spangs pa), (9) awakening
characterized by knowing [that the obscurations to be eliminated have reached the
state of] exhaustion (or: cessation) and non-arising (zad pa dang mi skye ba shes
pa'i mtshan nyid byang chub), (10) establishing of the ultimate (don dam pa rnam
par 'jog pa), (11) attachment (mngon par zhen pa), (12) non-attachment (yongs su
ma zhen pa), and (13) elimination of the two extremes (mtha' gnyis bsal ba).
In his explanation of the system of the bodhisattva s, he differentiates between
Yogcra and Madhyamaka only in the case of the four last points (10-13).
According to him, the differences regarding these points boil down to the following:
for Yogcra the ultimate is self-cognition while for Madhyamaka it is manifoldlessness; the former is attached to mind, the latter to the conventional truth; the
former is detached from the objectsubject dichotomy, the latter from the absolute;
the former eliminates the two extremes by bringing to bear the concept of the
Three Natures, the latter that of the two truths. Below I shall translate the passage
dealing with the last four points (omitting the portions having to do with the
systems of the rvaka saints and pratyekabuddha s):34
Furthermore, as regards differences concerning how the ultimate is
established, attachment, and so forth, Mahyna is of two types, namely,
Yogcra and Madhyamaka.
(10) As regards differences in establishing the ultimate, Yogcra
maintains that the ultimate is that which is characterized by self-cognition
devoid of the objectsubject dichotomy. The Mdhyamikas maintain that
the ultimate is true reality, [the state where] all manifoldness has come to
rest.
(11) As regards differences concerning attachment, Yogcra is
attached to the characteristic of one's own mind that appears [due to] the
34

Lta phreng 'grel pa (A, fols. 245a5-246a2; B, p. 3272-22).

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1347

"waves" of the fundamental mind. The Mdhyamikas are attached to the

object of engagement, that is, the conventional truth characterized by
impurity.
(12) As regards differences concerning non-attachment, Yogcra
is not attached to the objectsubject [dichotomy]. Madhyamaka is not attached to the ultimate.
(13) As regards differences concerning the elimination of the two extremes, Yogcra eliminates the two extremes by means of [the concept of] the Three Natures, and Madhyamaka eliminates them by means
of [the concept of] the two truths.

In the following passage, Rong zom pa summarizes the standpoints of the various
Buddhist systems in general. In the case of Yogcra, he once again presents the
views of its various subdivisions, namely, Nirkravda and Skravda, the latter
being further subdivided into *Satykravda and *Alkkravda. Here he particularly focuses on their view concerning the differences between the level of ordinary beings and the stage of a buddha as regards epistemological processes, and
notes the resulting differences in their conception of Buddhahood. It is pointed out
that according to Nirkravda non-conceptual gnosis alone exists at the stage of a
buddha, whereas according to *Satykravda the images of pure phenomena,
such as buddha Bodies, are real, thus implying the existence of both non-conceptual and pure mundane gnosis at the stage of a buddha, while according to
*Alkkravda, although pure mundane gnosis seems to be operative at the stage
of a buddha, it is not real. The question surrounding the existence of gnosis at the
stage of a buddha that resulted from the various epistemological views of the proponents of Yogcra in turn led to heated debates among the Mdhyamikas,
particularly in connection with the problem of explaining the manner in which a
buddha acts in the world for the sake of living beings, since they, as opposed to the
proponents of Yogcra, do not assign any special status to mind. I shall not go
here into this issue for, as pointed out above, I have already discussed it elsewhere
in detail. In brief, it can be said that while the proponents of Yogcra-Madhyamaka followed the views each of his own preferred Yogcra subdivision that is,
for their postulation of the conventional level and not the ultimate one the
Mdhyamikas who did not follow any of the Yogcra theories of knowledge
rejected the existence of any mental element at the stage of a buddha.
As regards Madhyamaka, Rong zom pa refers to two subdivisions, namely,
Yogcra-Madhyamaka and Sautrntika-Madhyamaka, both of which have been
subsumed by later Tibetan doxographers under Svtantrika-Madhyamaka. Here,
as throughout his entire collected writings, Rong zom pa does not refer to Prsagika-Madhyamaka. Remarking that these two subdivisions, being in agreement as
regards the absolute level, merely differ in their postulation of the conventional
level, he points out that Sautrntika-Madhyamaka follows the Sautrntika's notion
of dependent arising (rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba: prattyasamutpda), that is, as
pertaining to internal phenomena and external phenomena:35
(1) The approach (sgo) of Yogcra is of two types, namely, (1.1) Skravda and (1.2) Nirkravda.

35

Lta phreng 'grel pa (A, fols. 246a5-247a3; B, pp. 3286-3294).

1348

Orna ALMOGI

Of these, (1.2) Nirkravda maintains [the following]: At the level

of sentient beings, mind (blo) arises as [something] devoid of images, the
appearances which arise in [the form of] objective and subjective images being [simply the result of] residual impressions, which can be expressed neither as the mind itself nor as [something] other [than the
mind]. At the stage of a buddha (sangs rgyas kyi sa: buddhabhmi ), the
residual impressions having been cleansed, non-conceptual gnosis alone
exists. As for how [a buddha can] act for the sake of living beings, [he]
acts spontaneously without conceptualizing, like a wish-fulfilling tree and
a precious wish-fulfilling gem, in virtue of previous resolutions.
(1.1) Skravda, in turn, has two [subdivisions], namely, (1.1.1) *Satykravda and (1.1.2) *Alkkravda (bden pa ma yin par smra ba =
rdzun par smra ba).
Of these, (1.1.1) *Satykravda maintains [the following]: Although
no external objects exist, the appearance of mind in the form of images of
bodies, abodes, and objects of engagement do exist on the ultimate level.
As for the appearance of the great gnosis free from attachment to the
objectsubject [dichotomy] in the form of images of Bodies and embellishments of [buddha]-fields (i.e., fields along with their embellishments)
at the stage of a buddha, [they,] too, exist on the ultimate level.
(1.1.2) *Alkkravda maintains [the following]: Although cognitions that appear in the form of objective and subjective images arise at
the level of sentient beings, [these cognitions] are not true as such. Although there is pure mundane gnosis which knows the totality of sentient beings (sems can gyi khams: sattvadhtu), [their] negative propensities (bag la nyal ba: anuaya), and the like at the stage of a buddha, [this
gnosis] is not true as such either. On the ultimate level, non-conceptual
gnosis alone, characterized by momentariness, [can] be established.
(2) Madhyamaka, too, is of two [subdivisions], namely, (2.1) Yogcra-Madhyamaka and (2.2) Sautrntika-Madhyamaka. The two have no
differences regarding [their] view of the ultimate, merely differing on account of [their divergent postulations regarding] the conventional, [concerning which they] are in agreement with Yogcra and the Sautrntika
of the rvakas, [respectively]. Accordingly, the Sautrntika-Mdhyamikas claim, as regards the dependent continuum (gzhan dbang gi rgyud )
[of phenomena], that there are two continua, in line with the dependent
arising (rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba: prattyasamutpda) of internal [phenomena] and the dependent arising of external [phenomena].

In his Lta ba'i brjed byang, Rong zom pa proceeds to refute the philosophical view
of the rvakas and the views held by the proponents of Yogcra and Madhyamaka by using their own logical reasoning. His refutation of Madhyamaka should
be understood to be targeting by implication those Mdhyamikas who propagate
the two-truth/reality model, in contradistinction to those who propagate the
indivisibility of the two truths/realities, which latter being the position preferred by
Rong zom pa himself. The same logical reasoning used by the rvakas to negate
the existence of the person, he states, could be employed for negating the existence propounded by them of external phenomena. Similarly, in the case of
Yogcra, the same logical reasoning employed by its proponents to negate the
existence of minute atoms as the ultimate units of matter can be employed for

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1349

negating moments (of minds) propounded by Yogcra as the ultimate units of

time. In order to strengthen the argument that such ultimate units of time cannot
be attested through any direct valid cognition but merely by inference, he cites a
passage attributed by him to the Bhadraplaparipcch in which the air element is
cited as an example of something that cannot be proven through direct valid
cognition but only through inference, on the basis of its whistling sound and the
like. With that, he drives home the point that the mental element cannot be proven
through direct valid cognition either, but merely through inference on the basis of
its mental activities. He then concludes by stating that if cognition can only be
inferred, how much more so the ultimate units of time as being moments of the
mind. As for Madhyamaka, Rong zom pa argues that the same logical reasoning
applied by it to establish true reality as manifoldlessness undermines their claim
that phenomena exist on the correct conventional level:36
In short, [the same logical reasoning employed] by the rvakas to deconstruct [the notion of] a single and permanent Self of the person [is capable of] deconstructing the [notion of real] characteristics of phenomena
[propounded] by [the rvakas] themselves. [The same logical reasoning
employed] by Cittamtra to prove the inconsistency in [proposing the
existence of indivisible] fractions of minute atoms (rdul phra rab: paramu) of external objects [is capable of] proving the inconsistency in
[proposing the existence of] images and temporal fractions of the minds
and mind-associates, [propounded] by [Cittamtra] itself. Even if [the
Cittamtra system] objects by saying that minute atoms [in the sense of]
bearers of properties (chos can: dharmin) are not attested through any
[direct valid] cognition, [it can be equally said that] the ultimate units of
time, the moments of mind (sems kyi dus kyi mtha'i skad cig ma), [maintained by Cittamtra] itself, are not verifiable through any [direct valid]
cognition either. Even the "agitation" of the mental element (rnam par
shes pa'i khams: vijnadhtu) is merely an object of inference (rjes su
dpag pa: anumna), [and] how much more so moments [of minds], which
are the ultimate units of time! The following has been stated in the Bhadraplaparipcch, in the context of the young Mahauadha's enquiry:37
36

Lta ba'i brjed byang (A, fols. 159b5-160b3; B, p. 261-22).

37

I have not been able to locate an identical passage in the Bhadraplaparipcch. The
same idea, however, is expressed in various ways in the stra, and it seems that the passage
provided here by Rong zom pa is not an exact citation but rather a rendering of the idea in
it on the basis of several passages from it. See, for example, ibid. (S11.39.138b1-4; D83.74b1

3): bzang skyong dper na rlung gi khams gzugs can ma yin pa'ang [D yin pa yin yang] bstan

du yod cing gzung du yod pa dag las gzugs su snang ngo// de la bstan du yod pa ni shing 'gul
zhing g.yo ba dang/ sgra skad 'ur 'ur po'i sgra 'byin pa dang/ grang ba dang/ dro ba'i reg pa'i
[S pas] tshor ba skyed pa yin yang/ de la rkang lag dang mig dang/ gdong dmigs par mi 'gyur
te/ sngo bsangs dang dkar ba zhes kha dog lhag par mi dmigs so// bzang skyong de bzhin du
rnam par shes pa'i khams 'di'ang [D yang] gzugs su mi [D om.] dmigs shing gzugs su snang
bar mi 'gyur te/ khyod kyis rgyu'i bye brag dag gis rnam par shes pa'i khams rtogs par bya'o//;
ibid. (S11.39.147a5-6; D83.80b4-5): ji ltar rlung gi khams kyis shing g.yo ba dang/ grang ba
dang/ tsha ba'i reg pa len pa'i rkyen byed pa las rlung gi khams shes par 'gyur ba de [S om.]
bzhin du rnam par shes pa'i khams 'di'ang [D 'di yang] gzugs can ma yin te/; and ibid.
(S11.39.143b4-5; D83.78a2-3): dper na sa bon gyi khams sa gzhi la btab na/ khams bzhi po dag

1350

Orna ALMOGI

O Mahauadha, the air element is inferable through [its] whistling sound, the movement of plants, the rising of sandstorms,
and the movement of bodies. And yet the air element can be
neither seen nor cognized. Similarly, the mental element, too, is
inferred, from recollection (dran pa: smti ), sensation (tshor ba:
vedan ), and volitional impulses (sems pa: cetan ). And yet the
mental element can be neither seen nor cognized.
If cognition itself [can] be [merely] inferred from [its] mind-associates,
how much more so its moments, which are the ultimate units of time!
Therefore, the two minute atoms, which are the ultimate units of matter
(gzugs kyi mtha' ), and moments [of mind], which are the ultimate units of
time (dus kyi mtha' ) are similar inasmuch as both can be invalidated by
logical reasoning.
Likewise, [the same proposition of] Madhyamaka that phenomena
cannot withstand [the test of] logical reasoning [employed to] establish
the absolute (yang dag par sgrub pa'i rigs pa),38 and this same reasoning,
[employed by it] to establish freedom from all manifoldness, would undermine [its] own proposition that [phenomena] are truly existent on the
correct conventional level (yang dag pa'i kun rdzob: tathyasavti ). [The
truth] is as follows: It cannot be proven that two mutually exclusive properties can truly be of equal strength in one phenomenal entity. Their not
being equal implies that one of them is an object of delusion, and since
what is delusive is not what it seems to be, it does not have an own-nature
(bdag nyid thob pa: tmalbha).39 Thus the term "truly [existent]" is not
applicable to what cannot be grasped in this manner (i.e., to what does
not have an own-nature).

sdud par byed pa de bzhin du rnam par shes pa'i khams 'di'ang [D 'di yang] dran pa rab tu
'dzin cing tshor ba yongs su 'dzin te/. The first passage is cited in the Carymelpakapradpa, which, however, names the source as a certain Vijnasakrntistra (Rnam par
shes pa 'pho ba'i mdo). The Sanskrit text runs as follows (Carymelpaka-pradpa, p. 451116): yathokta vijnasakrntistre tadyath bhadraple vyudhtur arp anidaranopdnd rp sadyate tatra darana vkaspandanasamudra-aravarabhasataatajanitanirghoa toasparajanitaved na csya karacaraanaya-navaktropalabdhir bhavati na ca vardhikyenopalakate ymo v gauro veti/ evam eva bhadraple aya vijnadhtur na rpeopalakate na rpvabh samgacchati kraa-vieais tv aya vijnadhtur avagantavya iti/. The Tibetan text is similar to the text provided above, with only slight
variation (ibid., p. 2443-12).
38
The term yang dag par sgrub pa'i rigs pa here is clearly another formulation of the
more familiar don dam dpyod byed kyi rigs pa, that is, "logical reasoning that analyzes
the absolute."
39
On the term bdag nyid thob pa: tmalbha, lit., "obtaining (i.e., possessing) an ownnature" (i.e., "having come into existence"), which is central to Rong zom pa's philosophical
view, see ALMOGI (2009:256-258, n. 56), where various renderings of the term into Tibetan
are given and a passage from Rong zom pa's Mnyam sbyor 'grel pa and another from his
Theg tshul, in which he expands upon the term, are cited and translated.

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1351

6. Concluding Remarks
In the above, I have attempted to highlight some of the main points in Rong zom
pa's exposition of Yogcra and to some lesser extent the manner in which he
exploits Yogcra theories for advancing his own philosophical view, which I have
identified as being that of Sarvadharmpratihnavda. Further, Rong zom pa's
inclusivistic approach could be once again demonstrated, that is, his way of "uplifting" what is considered by him to be "lower" systems of provisional meaning to
the level of what is considered by him the correct view of definitive meaning, by
employing their own logical reasoning to show that in fact they, too, hold the correct view. This is particularly obvious in his presentation of their understanding of
defilements. Moreover, one of the most illuminating aspects in his treatment of
Yogcra is his eye-opening presentation of its subdivisions, which not only contradicts how these subdivisions have been commonly understood by most modern
scholars, but is unique within the Tibetan tradition as well. It is therefore hoped
that it will contribute somewhat to our future investigation of related topics, particularly ones put forward by influential proponents of Yogcra-Madhyamaka.
Here I would merely like to reiterate, as has become clear in my earlier study of the
various conceptions of Buddhahood, that Rong zom pa's nuanced presentation of
the Yogcra subdivisions has been instrumental in refining our understanding of
the epistemological background of the different views concerning Buddhahood
held by proponents of Yogcra, Yogcra-Madhyamaka, and Tantra alike. A
comprehensive study of the role Yogcra theories played in Rong zom pa's philosophical and doctrinal view is, however, yet to be undertaken, and as alluded to
above, such a study must take into account his understanding of the Rdzogs chen
philosophy as well.

Appendix
A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Texts
The following pages contain a critical edition of the Tibetan texts from Rong zom
pa's works cited and translated in this paper. For this purpose, two complete versions of Rong zom pa's collected works have been drawn upon, both of which are
based on the original Shr seng two-volume edition edited by Mi pham Rnam rgyal
rgya mtsho (1846-1912) at the beginning of the twentieth century and on the additional third volume that was compiled sometime later:
A = the three-volume xylographic edition prepared by Mkhar legs
sprul sku Padma kun grol (1916-1984) in Khams, apparently in
the early 1980s,
B = the two-volume set published in Chengdu, Sichuan, in 1999.
Since both are copies of the same edition, the text does not display major variants.
As I have already pointed out elsewhere, while the modern Chengdu edition seems
to present readings closer to the original Shr seng edition, Padma kun grol took
the liberty to introduce changes to his xylographic edition, albeit mostly minor ones,
such as modernization of orthography, bountiful employment of the punctuation
sign shad (e.g., / after the particles ni or after lhag bcas particles, // after final particles at the end of citations, // // instead of //), and the like.40 For that reason, I
40

For more details regarding these two versions of Rong zom pa's collected writings,
see ALMOGI (2009:363-366).

1352

Orna ALMOGI

commonly follow the orthography and punctuation of the modern Chengdu edition,
unless what is found in the xylograph edition is clearly preferable (this particularly
concerns faulty employment of shad, obvious typographical errors, and the like).
Variants in punctuation and orthography have not been recorded; most of these
concern the archaic employment of reversed vowel sign i (transliterated below as ),
da drag suffix, palatalized m, deviation from "sadhi rules" in the employment of
la don particles (e.g., du vs. tu), and the like.41 The few cases in which I emended
punctuation have, however, been recorded. Glosses found in the cited texts are
typed in smaller script and enclosed within braces. In the edition below, they are
inserted immediately following the word they refer to. Texts cited from the Bka'
'gyur are provided references to both the Stog (S) and Sde dge (D) editions, and
those from the Bstan 'gyur, to both Peking (Q) and Sde dge (D), along with the
location in the modern Bstan gyur dpe sdur ma (Z).

Text cited in 2
Lta ba'i brjed byang (A, fol. 152a4-b5; B, pp. 1710-183):
kha cig {sems tsam pa/} ni las kyi bag chags sems kyi rgyud la bsags pa ni bden na/ de
nyid kyi phyir bag chags kyi 'bras bu yang sems kyi rgyud nyid la smin par rigs te/42
dper na zhing la sa bon btab pa 'bras bu ri'i rtse mo la smin pa ga la srid/ de bas na
las kyi bag chags sems kyi rgyud la bsags shing smin pa'i sems de nyid lus dang gnas
dang spyod yul ltar rnam par smin pa yin no// de bas na ji srid du chos su brtags
shing grags pa thams cad sems nyid gyur pa yin no zhe'o// de la yang bag chags kyi
dbang gis sems nyid yul lta bu zhes pa dang/ yul lta bur snang ba de kho na bag
chags smin pa yin pas/ sems kyi yul bag chags yin no zhes pa dang/ gzhan yang 'jug
pa'i rnam par shes pa sems las byung ba dang bcas pa'i bag chags kun gzhi la bsags
pa dbang du gyur cing mthur gyur pa na/ kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa nyid 'bras bu'i
ngo bo rnam par smin pa ste/ de nyid lus dang gnas dang spyod yul du snang ba yin
no// snang ba de nyid kyis 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa'i bdag po'i rkyen dang43 dmigs
pa'i rkyen yang byed do// 'jug pa'i rnam shes rang gis bzhag pa'i rgyu mthun pa'i bag
chags kyis rgyu'i rkyen byed do zer ro//
bsdus na gzhung 'di dag kun phyi rol pa ltar dbang phyug dang/ bdag dang/ rang
bzhin la sogs pa rgyu gzhan du mi tshol te/ rnam par shes pa rang gis bsags pa'i las
rang la skye/ rang gi gnas dang spyod yul kyang grub par 'dod par 'dra bas/ lhag par
rtsod sgo chen po med do//
Grub mtha'i brjed byang (A, fols. 325b4-326b1; B, p. 2014-24):
rnam par shes pa tsam du smra ba'i lugs ni/ sems tsam gyis sems don dam par yod
par 'dod de/ nyan thos ltar yul yong gis med pa la sgro 'dogs pa dang/ dbu ma chen
pos sems kyang don dam par med do zhes bskur pa44 'debs pa spang dgos te/ sems
41

Such old spellings are particularly frequent in the Lta phreng 'grel pa and Theg tshul.
In the case of the former, Mi pham explicitly states in his catalog to Rong zom pa's
collected writings that he left the archaic style as it was in order to preserve an example of
such texts; in the case of the latter, he made changes only when needed for the sake of a
better understanding, but otherwise left the text, including old spellings, unchanged. See
ALMOGI (1997:112 & 115).
42
|] conj., om. AB
43
dang] A, dang yang B
44
pa] A, ba B

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1353

don dam par med pa zhig na ni/ bsod nams bsags pa'i gzhi med/ thar pa45 sgrub pa'i
don med pas/ sems ni sems can gyi dus na/ sems shes pa skad cig ma tsam du yod
do// da ltar yul du snang ba 'di sems yin te/ thog ma med pa'i dus nas sems gzung ba
cha gcig yul du 'khrul/ gzung ba cha gcig sems su 'khrul pa46 rtog pas brtags47 pa
dang/ bag chags tsam la bag chags su rtog pa zhes bya'o// des na yul ni shes pa las
gyur pa yin kyang bem48 por snang/ sems ni shes pa'i dngos gzhi yin pas rig par
snang/ yul ni rtog pas brtags pa yin pas tha dad par snang/ sems ni rtog pa'i dngos
gzhi yin pas gcig par snang/ yul rnams kyang shes pas 'phrul pa yin pas 'brel pa yod/
yul rdul phra rab rang rgyud du logs shig na yod par gyur na ni/ shes pa dang bem49
po gnyis rigs mi mthun pas/ 'brel ba med pa'i phyir de shes par yang mi rung ngo//
yang rdul phra rab gcig las tha dad par snang bar mi 'gyur ro// de bas na yul med
do// sems rtogs pa nyams nas yul du snang ngo// sems don dam par yod do// med na
thar pa bsgrub pa don med pa'i skyon du 'gyur bas/ med ces par yang mi rung ste/
gtan tshigs de bas na sems kyang sems can gyi dus na kun gzhi rgyun gyi rtag pa
skad cig ma tsam du yod la/ 'phags pa'i dus na ye shes rgyun gyi rtag pa skad cig ma
tsam du yod do// de ltar yod med gnyis kyi mtha' bsal nas/ dbu ma'i lam la gnas pa
bdag cag yin te/ sems tsam dbu ma zhes 'dod pa'o//

Text Cited in 3
Lta ba'i brjed byang (A, fols. 150b4-151b6; B, pp. 1516-1624):
rnam par rig pa tsam du smra ba la gnyis te/ (1) rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba
dang/ (2) rnam pa med par smra ba'o// rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba la yang/
nang gses kyi bye brag rnam pa gnyis te/ (1.1) rnam pa bden par smra ba dang/ (1.2)
rnam pa brdzun par smra ba'o// de dag la yang (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) rnam pa 'dra gzhi yod
par smra ba dang/ (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) 'dra gzhi med par smra ba la sogs pa nang mi
mthun par smra ba du ma grags mod kyi/ mdo 'di dag tsam du 'dus pas 'di dag tsam
bshad do//
de la (1) rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba zhes bya ba ni/ rnam pa'i sgra ni 'dir
'dra snang la bya ste/ de yang (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) 'dra gzhi yod par 'dod pa rnams ni/ 'dra
gzhi dang 'dra ba'i rnam par shes pa skye ba 'dra snang ste/ (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) 'dra gzhi
med pa ni50 gtan med kyang yod pa dang51 'dra bar snang ba la 'dra snang zhes
bya'o52//
bsdus nas rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba zhes bya ba phyi rol gyi don med
kyang yod pa dang 'dra bar rnam par shes pa nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par
dbye ba yod do zhes 'dod do// de la yang (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) 'dra gzhi yod par 'dod53 pa
ni rnam par shes pa las gud na phyi rol gyi don med kyang/ sems nyid phyi rol gyi
don lta bur snang ba brtan pa zhig yod de/ des 'dra gzhi byas nas rnam par shes pa
thams cad de'i rnam par skye'o zhe'o// (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) 'dra gzhi med par smra ba ni
45

pa] B, par A
pa] A, ba B
47
brtags] A, brtag B
48
bem] B, bems A; both readings, however, are possible.
49
bem] B, bems A
50
ni] conj., na AB
51
pa dang] conj., pas AB. Compare the following sentence, where a similar phrase is
found.
52
bya'o] A, bya' B
53
'dod] B, 'ded A, apparently due to damage to the wooden block.
46

1354

Orna ALMOGI

phyi'i skye mched du snang ba'i rim pa gnyis pa med de/ rnam par shes pa nyid don
yod par snang ba lta bu'o zhe'o//
de la (1.1) rnam pa bden par smra ba ni/ lus dang gnas dang spyod yul du snang
ba thams cad sems nyid kyi ngo bo yin pa'i phyir/ ji ltar snang ba de bzhin du yang
dag par bden pa ste/ sems can gyi dus na'ang de bzhin du bden pa nyid yin la/ sangs
rgyas kyi sa la yang sku dang zhing gi bkod pa thams cad de bzhin du yang dag par
bden pa yin no zhe'o//
(1.2) rnam pa rdzun par smra ba ni/ sems can gyi dus na yang gzung 'dzin du
skye ba'i rtog pa ni yod pa yin la/ de ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pa ste/
yang dag par na gnyis pos stong pa/ rang rig pa'i mtshan nyid tsam du yod la/ sangs
rgyas pa'i dus na yang/ dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i tshul
tsam mnga' ste/ 'on kyang yang dag pa'i ye shes ni rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes skad
cig ma tsam mo//
(2) rnam pa med par smra ba ni/ sems can kun gyi dus na yang sems dang sems
las byung ba gzung 'dzin gyi rnam pa skad cig54 tsam yang skye ma myong ste/ gsal
ba rang rig pa'i mtshan nyid tsam du gnas so// yul dang yul can du snang ba snyam
byed pa 'di ni/ sems dang de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa ste/ de nyid la bag
chags zhes bya/ gzung 'dzin zhes bya/ kun brtags zhes bya'o// gang de nyid dang
gzhan du brjod du med pa ni rdzas su yod par mi rung ste/ btags pa tsam mo//55
'phags pa'i dus na yang ngo bo nyid de las bogs dbyung du med de/ 'on kyang khyad
par ni glo56 bur ba'i bag chags yod pa snyam byed pa57 de dang bral ba'o zhe'o// de
bas na 'phags pa'i dus na'ang dag pa 'dzin rten pa'i ye shes mi 'dod do//

Text Cited in 4.1

Grub mtha'i brjed byang (A, fols. 346a6-348b3; B, pp. 2243-22611):
mtshan nyid gsum ni kun brtags dang/ gzhan dbang dang/ yongs su grub pa'o// de
yang lung las kyang/
kun tu brtags pa rtog58 pa'i dbang//
rnam par rtog59 pa gzhan gyi dbang//
'gyur med phyin ci ma log pa'i//
yongs su grub pa rnam pa gnyis//
zhes 'byung/ de la yang don bcus bstan te/ (1) mtshan nyid gsum dngos gang la bya
ba dang/ (2) nges pa'i tshig dang/ (3) dbye ba dang/ (4) sa bgo ba dang/ (5) sku
gsum la sbyar ba dang/ (6) rnam par rig pa tsam la bsdu ba dang/ (7) chos thams
cad mtshan nyid gsum du bsdu ba dang/ (8) yod pa gsum zhes bya ba dang/ (9) med
pa gsum zhes bya ba dang/ (10) gcig pa dang/ tha dad par bstan pa'o//
(1) dngos gzhi gang la bya zhe na/ kun brtags ni gzung 'dzin la bya/ gzhan dbang
ni khams gsum gyi sems dang sems las byung ba'i rnam par rtog pa la bya/ yongs su
grub pa ni stong pa'i chos nyid la bya/
54

cig] A, gcig B. It appears that A, too, originally read gcig, which was later corrected to
cig, since there is a space of approximately one letter before cig.
55
//] conj., / A, om. B
56
glo] conj., blo AB
57
add. / AB
58
rtog] conj., brtags AB
59
rtog] conj., brtags AB

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1355

(2) nges pa'i tshig ni/ ci'i phyir kun brtags zhes bya zhe na/ gzhan dbang la 'khrul
nas/ gzung ba dang/ 'dzin par snang la/ gzhan dbang rang snang bar ma shes nas/
gzung 'dzin gzhan dbang las logs na yod par brtags pa'i phyir/ kun brtags shes
bya'o// ci'i phyir gzhan dbang zhes bya zhe na/ khams gsum gyi sems dang sems las
byung ba rang skye mi nus kyi/ rgyu dang rkyen gzhan gyis bskyed pa'i phyir gzhan
dbang zhes bya'o// ci'i phyir yongs su grub pa zhes bya zhe na/ gzhan dbang chos can
de la gzung 'dzin cha gnyis kyis stong pa'i stong pa nyid kyi chos nyid ni rtog pa'i
mtshan ma dang dngos por nam yang mi 'gyur ba'i phyir yongs su grub pa zhes
bya'o//
(3) dbye na ni/ kun brtags pa la yang gnyis te/ snang ba'i kun brtags pa dang {yul
so so'i dbang po}/ mi snang ba'i kun brtags pa'o {nam mkha'i me tog lta bu}// gzhan dbang la
yang gnyis te/ ltos pa'i gzhan dbang dang/ {'dus byas la ltos nas 'dus ma byas yod pa lta bu}
bskyed pa'i gzhan dbang ngo {yul dang dbang po sa bon dang chu lud kyis bskyed pa lta bu}// 60
yongs su grub pa la yang gnyis te/ mi 'gyur bar yongs su grub pa dang {chos rnams kyi
61
chos nyid la bya/}/ phyin ci ma log par yongs su grub pa'o {yang dag pa'i ye shes la bya/}//
(4) sa bgos pa ni/ kun brtags ni so so'i skye bo'i spyod yul dang gzhan dbang ni
dag pa 'jig rten pa'i spyod yul/ yongs su grub pa ni rnam par mi rtog pa'i spyod yul
lo// cis mngon zhe na/ lung las/
gang gis rten cing 'brel bar 'byung//
de dag ngo bo nyid kyis med//
gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa//
nam du yang ni mi skye'o//
rtog med rkyen las skye ba ni//
rnam pa kun tu brjod med pa//
gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid//
'jig rten dag pa'i spyod yul lo//
rtag pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis de//
shin tu stong nyid gang yin pa//
yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid//
mi rtog ye shes spyod yul lo//
zhes 'byung/
(5) sku gsum dang sbyar ba ni/ yongs su grub pa ni dbyings dang ye shes yin pas
chos kyi sku'o// gzhan dbang ni ting nge 'dzin gyi ngo gang la snang bas/ longs spyod
rdzogs pa'i sku'o// kun brtags ni med pa rnams yod par brtags pas sprul pa'i sku'o//
(6) rnam par rig pa tsam du bsdu na/ sems kyi 'khrul pa62 ni gzhan dbang yul du
'khrul pa yin/ sems kyi dngos gzhi ni kun brtags gzung 'dzin yin/ sems kyi chos nyid
ni yongs su grub pa yin no//
(7) chos thams cad mtshan nyid gsum du bsdu na/ chos phyi nang gnyis/ 'dus
byas dang 'dus ma byas gnyis/ kun nas nyon mongs pa dang/ rnam par byang ba'o//
de yang lngar bsdu ste/ ming dang/ rgyu mtshan dang/ rnam par rtog pa dang/ de
bzhin nyid dang/ yang dag pa'i ye shes so// lnga po de mtshan nyid gsum du bsdu
ste/ ming ni kun brtags su bsdu'o// rgyu mtshan dang/ rnam par rtog pa gnyis ni
gzhan dbang du bsdu'o// de bzhin nyid dang yang dag pa'i ye shes gnyis ni yongs su
grub par bsdu'o// yang na gang dag med pa las yod par sgro btags pa thams cad kun
60

//] conj., // // A, / B
yongs] A, yungs B, obviously a typographical error.
62
pa] A, ba B
61

1356

Orna ALMOGI

brtags su bsdu'o// chos gang rgyu rkyen gyis bsdus pa thams cad gzhan dbang du
bsdu'o// chos nyid kun brtags ltar med pa yang ma yin/ gzhan dbang ltar rgyu rkyen
gyis bskyed pa yang ma yin pa ni yongs su grub par bsdu'o//
(8) yod pa gsum zhes bya ba ni/ kun brtags tha snyad du yod/ gzhan dbang rdzas
su yod/ yongs su grub pa chos nyid du yod do//
(9) med pa gsum zhes bya ba ni/ kun brtags mtshan nyid kyis med/ gzhan dbang

rang skye mi nus pas med/ yongs su grub pa don dam par dngos po med do// 63
64
(10) gcig dang tha dad pa las grol bar bstan pa ni/ kun brtags ni med pa'i chos
yin/ gzhan dbang dang yongs su grub pa gnyis gcig pa dang tha dad pa65 las grol bar
bstan to// rgol ba na re/ gcig na gzhan dbang brtsan par byas na/ sangs rgyas mi srid
par rigs so// yongs su grub pa brtsan par byas na/ sems can mi srid pa'i rigs so// zhes
pa la/ lan du gcig dang tha dad pa las grol te/ gzhan dbang kun brtags dang ma bral
ba'i dus na/ gcig pa yang ma yin la/ kun brtags gzung 'dzin gnyis kyis stong pa'i dus
na/ tha dad pa yang ma yin te/ lung las kyang/
rnam par rtog pa gzhan gyi dbang//
rnam rtog yin te rkyen las byung//
grub ni de las snga mar grub//
rtag tu med par gyur pa gang//
de phyir de nyid gzhan dbang las//
gzhan min gzhan ma yin pa'ang min//
zhes 'byung ngo//

Text Cited in 4.2

Theg tshul (A, fols. 5a4-6a4; B, pp. 42017-42118):
rnal 'byor spyod pa rnams kyi tshul ltar na'ang/ khams gsum pa'i sems dang sems las
byung ba/ yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun du rtog pa'i mtshan nyid ni/ gang gi'ang
gzung ba ma yin zhing gang la'ang 'dzin par byed pa ma yin te/ gnyis pos stong pa
rang rig pa tsam gyi mtshan nyid yin par grub pa'i mthas 'dod la/ de ltar na ni nyon
mongs pa rnams kyi mtshan nyid du 'gal te/ nyon mongs pa rnams ni yul la skye ba
phyn ci log gi rnam pa can yin pa' phyir ro// gang yang 'di skad du/ dper na sa
khong na gser yod pa la/ sa dang gser dang sa'i khams gsum dmigs so// de la gser la
sar mthong ba ni phyin ci log du mthong ba'o// gser du mthong ba ni yang dag par
mthong ba'o// sa'i khams ni gnyi' ga'i char gtogs pa'o// de bzhin du gzhan gyi dbang
gi mtshan nyid la gzung ba dang 'dzind par mthong ba ni phyin ci log du mthong
ba'o// yongs su grub par mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba'o// gzhan gyi dbang
ni gnyi ga'i char gtogs pa'o// zhes grub pa'i mtha' las grags na/ gzhan dbang la cha
gnyis kyi rdzas mi rnyed de/ de ni 'di ltar 'gal me'i 'khor lo la 'gal dum dang 'khor lo
dang gsal ba gsum dmigs so// de la 'gal dum la 'khor lor mthong ba ni phyin ci log du
mthong ba'o// 'gal dum du mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba'o// gsal ba ni gnyis
ga'i char gtogs pa'o zhes zer ba lta bu yin te/ 'di' ltar 'gal dum yang rdzas su grub la
'khor lo yang rdzas su grub pa zhig na/ gsal ba'ang gnyi' ga'i char gtogs pa yod par
grub tu rung la/ gal te 'khor lo rdzas su grub la 'gal dum rdzas su ma grub pa zhig
na/ gsal ba'ang 'khor lo nyid kyi mtshan nyid yin te/ cha gnyis pa myed do// 'gal dum
rdzas su grub la 'khor lo ma grub pa yin yang de bzhin te/ de bas na 'dir 'khor lor
63

med do//] conj., med// // A, med// B

pa] A, om. B
65
pa] B, om. A
64

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1357

snang ba'i dus nyid na/ 'gal me gcig yul rim gyis gnon pa yin te/ 'khor lo ni gtan ma
grub pas/ de bas na gsal ba'ang 'gal dum nyid yin par zad de/ gsal ba cha gnyis myed
do// de bzhin du gnyis po'ang rdzas su grub/ yongs su grub pa'ang rdzas su grub pa
zhig na/ kun du rtog pa'ang gnyis ga'i char gtogs su rung na/ gnyis su snang ba'i dus
nyid na rang rig pa'i mtshan nyid yin te/ gnyis po gtan ma grub pas/ de bas na kun
du rtog pa cha gnyis mi 'grub bo// de bas na nyon mongs pa rnams la spang bar bya
ba'i rdzas rnyed par mi 'gyur ro//

Text Cited in 4.3

Theg tshul (A, fols. 44a4-45a4; B, pp. 46324-4652):
de la rnal 'byor spyod pa'i tshul las/ phyi nang gi dngos por snang ba 'di dag la/ nyan
thos rnams kys phy'i yul don rang gi mtshan nyid pa shes pa las gud na gzung bar
bya ba' ngo bor66 rdzas su yod la/ shes pa'ang de la 'dzin par byed pa'i ngo bor67
rdzas su yod do zhes 'dod pa ni/ kun du brtags pa ste gtan myed zhes myed par 'gags
par byed la/ de ma yin pa'i yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun du rtog pa gnyis myed kyang
gnyis lta bur snang ba'i mtshan nyid can/ rgyu dang rkyen las skye ba 'di mngon sum
dang mi dmigs pa spyi dang yang mi 'gal la/ sems dang sems las byung ba nyid rang
rig pa'i mngon sum ma yin nam/ mngon sum nyid yang dag pa'i shes pa ma yin nam/
de lta na yang dag pa'i shes pa la rigs pa gzhan gyis bsgrub c zhig dgos/ de sun 'byin
par byed pa'i yang dag pa' shes pa gnyis pa mthu stobs kyis che ba gzhan gang zhig
yod zhes te/ don dam pa nyid du rdzas su yod pa dang yin par sgrub bo//
de yang nang gi bye brag gis
(1) rnam pa bden par smra ba ni/ ji ltar snang ba de ltar don dam par rdzas su

yod do zhes zer ro// 68

(2) rnam pa brdzun par smra ba ni/ yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun du rtog pa
gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par snang ba dang bcas par skye ba yod pa ni bden
na'ang69/ de ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin te/ yang dag par ni gnyis kyis stong pa
rang rig pa'i mtshan nyid 'di don dam par rdzas su yod do zhes zer ro//
(3) rnam pa myed par smra ba ni/ khams gsum pa'i sems dang sems las byung
ba thams cad/ gzung 'dzin gyi rnam pa dang bcas par skad cig kyang skye ma myong
ste/ gzung 'dzin du snang ba ni sems dang de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du myed pa'i
bag chags yin te/ de nyid kho na la kun du brtags pa zhes kyang bya ste/ de bas na
nyon mongs pa la stsogs70 pa'i sgrib pa thams cad kyang glo bur ba'i bag chags yin
te/ kun du brtags pa'i mtshan nyd yin no// sems kyi rang bzhin ni sems can gy dus
na 'ang gsal ba rang rig pa'i71 rang bzhin gyis grub pa yin la/ 'phags pa'i dus na 'ang
de las bogs dbyung du myed de ye shes rnam pa dang bral ba'i rang bzhin du gnas
so// cung zad bye brag du na sems can gyi dus na glo bur ba'i bag chags kyis bsgribs
nas mi gsal bar nyams su myong ngo// 'phags pa'i dus na gsal bar nyams su myong

ngo zhes zer ro// 72

66

bor] B, bo A
bor] A, bo B
68
zer ro//] A, zer/ B
69
na'ang] conj., na AB
70
stsogs] B, sogs A
71
pa'i] conj., pa AB
72
zer ro//] B, zer/ A
67

1358

Orna ALMOGI

mtha' bsdus na thams cad kyang rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes gnyis pos stong
pa73 de bzhin nyid dang bcas pa/ don dam par rdzas su yod do zhes zer ro//

Texts Cited in 5
Lta phreng 'grel ba (A, fols. 245a5-246a2; B, p. 3272-22):
gzhan yang don dam pa rnam par 'jog pa'i tshul dang/ zhen pa las stsogs pa'i bye
brag gis ni/ theg pa' chen po la'ang rnam pa gnyis te/ rnal 'byord spyod pa dang/ dbu'
ma pa'o//
de la
(10) don dam pa rnam par 'jog pa'i bye brag ni/ rnal 'byord spyod pa ni/
gzung 'dzind gyis stong pa'i rang rig pa'i mtshan nyd ni don dam pa'o zhe'o// dbu'
ma pa' ni/ spros pa thams cad yongs su zhi ba' chos nyid ni don dam pa'o74 zhe'o//

(11) mngon par zhen pa'i bye brag ni/ rnal 'byord spyod pa ni/ kund gzhi'i 75
rnam par shes pa'i dba' rlabs rang gi sems snang ba'i mtshan nyid la mngon par
zhen pa'o// dbu' ma pa ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa/ yongs su ma dag pa'i mtshan nyid
kyi spyod yul la mngon par zhen pa'o//
(12) yongs su ma zhen pa'i bye brag ni/ rnal 'byord spyod pa' n gzung ba
dang 'dzin pa la mngon par zhen pa myed pa'o// dbu' ma n don dam pa' la mngon
par zhen pa myed pa'o//
(13) mtha' gnyis bsal ba'i bye brag ni/ rnal 'byord spyod pa ni/ mtshan nyid
gsum gyi tshul gyis mtha' gnyis sel to// dbu' ma ni bden pa gnys kyi tshul gyis mtha'
gnyis sel to//
Lta phreng 'grel pa (A, fols. 246a5-247a3; B, pp. 3286-3294):
(1) rnal 'byord spyod pa sgo la yang/ (1.1) rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba
dang/ (1.2) rnam pa' myed par76 smra ba' bye brag gis rnam pa' gnyis te/
de la (1.2) rnam pa myed par smra ba ni/ sems can gyi dus na yang blo rnam pa
myed par skye la/ gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par skye bar snang ba ni/ sems
dang de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du myed pa'i bag chags yin te/ bag chags dag nas
sangs rgyas kyi sa la rnam par m rtog pa' ye shes 'ba' shig mnga' ste/ 'gro'77 ba'i don
mdzad pa'i tshul yang/ sngon gyi smond lam gyi shugs kyis/ dpag bsams ky shing
dang yd bzhin gy nor bu rn po' che bzhin du/ rtog pa myed par lhun gyis78 grub
par mdzad par 'dod do zhes so//
(1.1) rnam pa dang bcas pa smra ba la yang/ (1.1.1) rnam pa bden par smra ba
dang/ (1.1.2) bden pa ma yin par smra ba gnyis te/
de la (1.1.1) rnam pa' bden par smra ba ni/ phy rol gy don myed kyang/ sems
nyid lus dang gnas dang spyod yul gyi rnam par snang ba ni don dam par yod de/
sangs rgyas kyi sa la yang gzung 'dzin du mngon par zhen pa dang bral ba'i ye shes
chen po' de nyid sku dang zhing gi rgyan gyi rnam par snang ba ni/ don dam par yod
do zhes 'dod do//
(1.1.2) rnam pa' bden pa ma yin par smra ba ni/ sems can gyi dus na gzung ba
dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par snang ba'i rnam par shes pa skye 'ang/ de ltar bden pa ni
73

pa] conj., ba'i AB

pa'o] B, pa' A
75
kund gzhi'i] B, kun gzhi' A
76
par] B, pa' A
77
'gro'] B, 'gro'i A
78
gyis] B, kyis A
74

Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

1359

ma yin no// sangs rgyas kyi sa la'ang sems can gyi khams dang bag la nyal ba79 las
stsogs pa' mkhyend pa'i dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes mnga' yang/ de ltar bden pa ni
ma yin te/ don dam par rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes skad cig ma'i mtshan nyid
tsam 'di' ni grub bo zhes 'dod pa'o//
(2) dbu' ma yang (2.1) rnal 'byord spyod pa'i dbu' ma dang/ (2.2) mdo' sde dbu'
ma gnyis te/ 'di' gnyis kyang don dam pa'i lta ba la80 ni bye brag myed la/ kun rdzob
du rnal 'byord spyod pa dang sgo mthun pa dang/ nyan thos mdo sde pa81 dang sgo
mthund pas phye bar zad do// de'i dbang gis mdo' sde dbu ma pa ni/ gzhan dbang gi
rgyud kyang/ phy rten cing 'brel bar82 'byung ba dang/ nang rten cing 'brel bar83
'byung ba'i bye brag gis rgyud gnyis su 'dod do//

Lta ba'i brjed byang (A, fols. 159b5-160b3; B, p. 261-22):

mdor na nyan thos kyi gang zag gi bdag gcig rtag bshig pas/ rang gi chos kyi mtshan
nyid 'jig go// sems tsam gyis phyi rol gyi rdul phra rab la phyogs cha'i gnod pa
bsgrub pas/ rang gi sems dang sems las byung ba'ang rnam pa dang dus kyi cha shas

kyi gnod pa 'grub bo// rdul phra rab la chos can 84 shes pa gang gis kyang ma grub
zhes brgal na'ang/ rang gi sems kyi dus kyi mtha'i skad cig ma/ shes pa gang gis
kyang ma dmigs so// dus kyi mtha'i skad cig85 ma lta zhog gi/ rnam par shes pa'i
khams kyi rgyu ba nyid kyang rjes su dpag pa tsam gyi yul te/ 'di skad du/ bzang
skyong gis zhus pa'i mdo las/ gzhon nu sman chen gyis zhus pa'i skabs nas/
sman chen rlung gi khams ni/ sgra 'ur 'ur por grags pa dang/ rtsi
shing g.yo ba dang/ sa tshub ldang ba dang/ lus g.yo bar byed pa la
rjes su dpag gi/ rlung gi khams ni mi mthong mi rig go// de bzhin
du rnam par shes pa'i khams de yang/ dran pa dang tshor ba dang/
sems pa dag las rjes su dpag gi/ rnam par shes pa'i khams ni mi
mthong mi rig go//
zhes gsungs pa yin te/ rnam par shes pa nyid kyang sems las byung ba las/ rjes su
dpag par bya ba yin na/ de'i dus kyi mtha'i skad cig la lta ci smos/ de bas na gzugs kyi
mtha' rdul phra rab dang/ dus kyi mtha' skad cig86 ma gnyis la/ rigs pas gnod pa
mtshungs so//
de bzhin du dbu mas chos rnams87 yang dag par sgrub pa'i rigs88 pa mi bzod de/
spros pa thams cad dang bral ba'i rigs pa 'di nyid kyis/ rang gi yang dag pa'i kun
rdzob kyi rdzas su grub par 'dod pa la gnod de/ 'di ltar chos can gyi dngos po gcig la/
mtshan nyid gcig gis gcig spangs pa'i 'gal ba gnyis/ bden par rtsal mnyam du ni
bsgrub tu mi rung la/ mi mnyam na ni gcig shos 'khrul pa'i spyod yul du 'gyur/ gang
'khrul pa de ni ji89 ltar snang ba de ltar ma yin pas/ rang gi bdag nyid thob par mi
79

ba] B, om. A
la] A, om. B
81
pa] B, ba A
82
bar] A, par B
83
bar] A, par B
80

84
85

A syntactically preferable reading would be rdul phra rab chos can la.

cig] B, gcig A
cig] B, gcig A
87
rnams] conj., rnams la AB
88
rigs] conj., rig AB
89
ji] B, ngi A, obviously due to damage to the wooden block.
86

1360

Orna ALMOGI

'gyur te/ de ltar yongs su bzung bar bya ba ma yin pa de la ni rdzas kyi tha snyad mi
'jug go//

Abbreviations and Sigla

A
B
conj.
D

om.
Q

RZChZSB
RZSB
S

See RZSB.
See RZChZSB.
conjecture.
Sde dge Bka' 'gyur and Bstan 'gyur. Text numbers are according to
Hakuju UI et al. (1934), A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist
Canons (Bka-gyur and Bstan-gyur), Sendai: Thoku Imperial University.
omit.
Peking Bstan 'gyur. Text numbers are according to Shoju INABA et al.
(1985), The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition. Catalogue & Index ,
Reduced-size edition, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co.
Rong zom chos bzang gi gsung 'bum. 2 vols. Chengdu, Sichuan: Si khron
mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1999. (= B).
Rong zom gsung 'bum. 3 vols. Shr seng, Khams: Padma Kun grol, [early
1980s]. (= A).
Stog Bka' 'gyur. Text numbers are according to Tadeusz SKORUPSKI
(1985), A Catalogue of the Stog Palace Kanjur, Bibliographia Philologica
Buddhica Series Maior 4, Tokyo, International Institute for Buddhist
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1361

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HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES

Edited by MICHAEL WITZEL

VOLUME SEVENTY-FIVE

The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners

The Buddhist Yogcrabhmi Treatise and
Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet

Edited by
Ulrich Timme KRAGH

PUBLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENT

OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DISTRIBUTED BY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
AND LONDON, ENGLAND
2013

Copyright 2013
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Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist Yogcrabhmi Treatise and Its
Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet
Harvard Oriental Series; v. 75
ISBN 978-0-674-72543-0
I. Ulrich Timme Kragh 1969II. Title
III. Series: Harvard Oriental Series; 75
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