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Background
The Philippines began claiming parts of the Spratly Islands the Kalayaan
Island Group or KIG in the 1950s when Tomas Cloma discovered them
unoccupied. Since then, the Philippines has promulgated laws on archipelagic
baselines and the geographic scope of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and
placed the KIG under the administrative jurisdiction of Palawan province. In
2009, the Philippines submitted the geographical coordinates for its archipelagic baselines to the United Nations. Using the regime of islands principle
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the coordinates
show Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc) to be within the countrys EEZ.
The government routinely protests the actions of other claimants, and its
coast guard arrests shermen and poachers in the KIG and in the EEZ. The
Philippines currently occupies eight islands in the KIG.
These actions are not unique to the Philippines. All South China Sea (SCS)
claimants have followed a pattern of (re-)naming, claiming, mapping, occupying
islets, protesting each others statements or actions, and arresting shermen and
other would-be encroachers. The Philippines has held bilateral consultations
with China on SCS-related issues since 1995 but progress has been slow and
insignicant.
The Philippines, however, differs from other SCS claimants in two ways.
It is the only claimant who has a formal alliance with a major power, the
United States. Attacks on Philippine or American vessels could potentially lead
MARIA ORTUOSTE is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the California State University
East Bay, United States.
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located near the SCS. The United States also has signicant signals intelligence
and satellite communications facilities on the western and northern coasts of
Australia, and hopes to gain access to Vietnams Cam Ranh Bay to safeguard
freedom of navigation and commerce in the SCS.6
For the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries, U.S. presence is
reassuring. The Philippines possibly sees this presence as some sort of tripwire to
trigger U.S. action against an aggressor. Article V of the MDT states: an armed
attack will include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of
the Parties, or the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacic ocean,
its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacic. However, Article IV
implies that U.S. response will not be automatic and subject to Congressional
approval. It states: Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacic
area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with
its constitutional processes.
The MDT does not delineate the Philippines metropolitan territory.
The Philippines considers its EEZ and the KIG as part of that metropolitan
territory, and argues that letters from previous American ofcials support this
interpretation. The 1979 Vance-Romulo letters, reaffirmed by Ambassador
Thomas C. Hubbard in 1999, states that an attack on Philippine or American
vessels would not have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the
Philippines or island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacic in order to
come within the denition of Pacic area in Article V. Moreover, Hubbard
noted that then Defence Secretary William Cohen stated that the U.S. considers
the South China Sea to be part of the Pacic Area.7 Despite reafrming
its treaty obligations, there are no other ofcial statements conrming these
interpretations. If the United States wanted to signal a rmer commitment, it
could have negotiated defence guidelines as it did with Japan in 1997. Those
guidelines detail actions in response to an armed attack against Japan which
includes Japans surrounding waters and sea lines of communication.
But the Philippines will probably not be able to secure similar afrmations
for two reasons. Current U.S. policy not to take sides in territorial disputes
will be compromised if it protected Philippine ships in the KIG. The United
States strategic ambiguity is also necessary in its relations with China. While
recalibrating bilateral ties in the Asia-Pacic, U.S. ofcials are quick to say that
they are not creating bases. Secretary Panetta visited Beijing in 2012 to deepen
bilateral military ties which were broken in 2010 over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
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Panetta assured Beijing that the United States was not trying to contain China,
but rather trying to initiate a new model relationship.8 China is still more
important to the United States than the Philippines: not only does China hold
US$3.2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, but Chinas cooperation in the UN
Security Council is necessary to respond to other issues such as Irans nuclear
weapons programme.
This ambiguity is probably acceptable to other Southeast Asian countries
who also want to improve economic ties with China. In fact, some ASEAN
members were uncomfortable with the Philippines vociferous calls for U.S.
involvement during the Scarborough Shoal incident. China protested American
meddling when it called on all parties to resolve the dispute peacefully. Any
American statement stronger than that might push China to be more hostile.
Thus, the revitalization of American ties in the Asia-Pacic is a way for the
United States to signal its commitment to its regional allies and partners without
upsetting the Chinese even more.
The sad and inevitable conclusion is that Philippine external defence
capability depends on Americas resolve and capability to assert itself as a Pacic
nation and to remain the primary Pacic power.9 American commitment will be
constrained by limited nances, Congressional bickering, or more urgent security
concerns. The Philippines diversication of military equipment suppliers may
not sufciently replace U.S. weapons transfers. The Philippines has approached
other countries for military cooperation: Russia said that it was open to joint
exercises on anti-piracy and search-and-rescue operations, while the Philippine
Senate ratied the Philippines-Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement in
July 2012 following the Scarborough Shoal incident. The bill, which languished
in the Senate for more than four years, was overwhelmingly approved by 171,
much to the satisfaction of the Defence Department which hopes to conduct
exercises on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and border and maritime
security. It remains to be seen whether, without defence treaties, the Philippines
can rely on middle powers to come to its aid.
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cent of the countrys total receipts: this travel advisory led to the cancellation
of scheduled airline seats by approximately 1520 per cent according to the
Centre for Aviation. Many Filipinos were also concerned that Chinas government would retaliate against the OFWs in the mainland and in Hong Kong.
While not the top destination for OFWs, remittances from China have been
increasing since 2003: they now account for 15 per cent of remittances from
Asia according to the Philippine Central Bank.
Partly because of this pressure, the Philippines declared that it will bring
the SCS dispute to international courts. But this move is problematic for
both parties. First, since they are dismissing each others claim outright,
they would probably never agree on a legal venue. Besides, China entered a
declaration to the UNCLOS and, therefore, does not recognize the authority
of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Second, both
claimants need to rene their legal cases. Chinas nine-dash line is beyond
any of the boundaries set in UNCLOS, while the Philippines still has to
resolve important issues such as distinguishing which features are islands and
which are rocks, and dealing with the overlap of its EEZ with Palau, Taiwan,
and Japan.17 Thus, it might be premature even for the Philippines to seek
advisory opinions from ITLOS. Finally, any compromises will be difcult
as both sides issued statements effectively putting their leaders on the line:
China by claiming indisputable sovereignty and the Philippines by stating that
[i]t would be an impeachable offense if the President would cede any part of
our territory.18
Any settlement in the SCS will be political. The UNCLOS, according to
Sam Bateman, only comes into play when sovereignty over land features has
been agreed and the convention is therefore not intended to address sovereignty
disputes.19 But the political atmosphere in 2012 has been toxic in both countries
due to domestic power plays and nationalist rhetoric.
Chinas aggressiveness is either an attempt to divert attention from
domestic problems or to demonstrate the countrys power to its citizens. In
2012, Chinas leadership transition was occurring amidst scandals, and growing
public dissatisfaction with corruption and socio-economic inequality. The
International Crisis Group also raised the possibility that Chinese actions are
the result of bureaucratic politics involving civilian agencies, military establishments, national and local governments, energy companies, and other government
ministries without effective control by the central government. 20 Regardless
of the accuracy of these claims, the fact is that these machinations prevent
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other way. There is no substitute for peaceful political relations even if only as
a safeguard against possible abandonment by the United States.
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13. PNoy brings home $11-billion investment deals from China, GMA News Online,
4 September 2011 <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/231398/news/nation/pnoybrings-home-11-billion-investment-deals-from-china>.
14. Roy C. Mabasa, Philippines welcomes China investment advisor, Manila Bulletin,
27 March 2012 <http://mb.com.ph/node/355580/philippine>.
15. Carlyle A. Thayer, ASEANs Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A litmus
test for community building, Asia Pacic Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 10, issue 34,
no. 4 (20 August 2012).
16. Joseph Santolan, Philippine protests further escalate tensions with China, 11 May
2012 <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/may2012/phch-m11.shtml>.
17. Rodolfo C. Severino, The Philippines National Territory, in Southeast Asian
Affairs 2012, edited by Daljit Singh and Pushpa Thambipillai (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 25762.
18. Matikas Santos, Lacierda: Aquino wont give up Scarborough Shoal, Inquirer
Global Nation, 23 July 2012 <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/45205/lacierda-aquinowont-give-up-scarborough-shoal>.
19. Sam Bateman, Managing the South China Sea: Sovereignty is not the issue, RSIS
Commentaries no. 136/2011, 29 September 2011 <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/
Perspective/RSIS1362011.pdf>.
20. ICG, Stirring up the South China Sea (I), 23 April 2012 <http://www.crisisgroup.
org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i>.
21. Gil C. Cabacungan, Aquinos back channel to China is Trillanes, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 19 September 2012 <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/50558/aquinos-backchannel-to-china-is-trillanes>.
22. ICG, Stirring up the South China Sea.
23. Thayer, ASEANs Code of Conduct.
24. Ibid.
25. Jason Szep and James Pomfret, Tensions are over South China Sea at Asian
summit, Reuters, 19 November 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/19/
us-asia-summit-idUSBRE8AI0BC201221119>.
26. Kyodo News Agency, PH scraps meet of 4 ASEAN claimants in S. China Sea
disputes, ABS-CBN News.com, 7 December 2012 <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/
nation/12/07/12/ph-scraps-meet-4-asean-claimants-s-china-sea-disputes>.
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