Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Disaster
<
Kathleen J. Tierney
Disaster
INTRODUCTION
The
management
of
disasters
typicall]
is
described
as
Mitigation consists of
engineering
principles to make
disaster
vulnerability
and
what
to
do
to
reduce
that
The preparedness
These
other
activities
that
take
place
during
the post-impact
emergency period.
Disaster
recovery
involves
longer-term
efforts
to
(1)
may
appear
to be
stages in a
that have an impact on disaster recovery are often made very soon
after a disaster strikes, while the emergency response is still
ongoing, and as noted above, the recovery period following one
disaster is often a time for considering -how to mitigate losses
from future events.
The
two
disaster
phases
that
this
paper
considers--
The
Wherever possible,
u.
generating
behavior under
situations of
That
emergencies
(see Fritz
and
Marks,
1954,
for
this
earlier
work,
which
focused
on
the
responses
of
The
major
sociologically-oriented
center,
the
Disaster
DRC
emergency
preparedness
and
response;
its research
focuses
Examples
include:
organizational
adaptation,
Dynes
and
Quarantelli,
1977);
disaster
as
factor
in
Warheit,
1970;
Dynes
and
Quarantelli,
1977;
Wenger,
services
in
disasters
(Tierney
and
Taylor,
1977 :
DRC focuses on
recent
S.,
at
the University
of
Colorado at
Boulder
DRC,
work
of
natural
hazards
and
on
alternative
adjustment
Sorensen, who were associated with the Hazards Center in its early
years, have become recognized expeqts on public warning response
and evacuation processes (to be discussed below).
Through its
which links
(CENTED)
Clark
University
in
Worchester,
overview of CENTED's
which
like
established
during
the
conducting
studies
the
Office
1980s,
on
is
disaster
of
Hazards
Studies
also
heavily
involved
warning
and
was
in
forecasting,
Fitzpatrick, and
Farhar,
1990;
1992).
The
1992;
Hazards
at
Texas
A&M
university,
was
founded
in
1989.
with
S,
research
centers; in
7
are
research
Laboratories in Tennessee
in academic
centers
such
settings or in non-
as
Oak
Ridge National
(for a compilation of
see Yamamoto
and Quarantelli,
In
had
been
conducting
research
on
disasters,
or
who
were
International
Sociological
on
is
Disasters
Association's
professional
Research
organization
that
in this
worldwide
network.
The
Research
Committee
The
Among
risk
communication,
government.
are
typically
the
responsibility of
This section
begins
of
with, a
general
preparedness efforts,
discussion
on
features
effective
assumptions
principles
of
human
about
post-disaster
behavior.
Research
needs
and
suggests
on
basic
that
many
whether
carried
out
by
governments,
private-sector
summarized below:
1.
Planninu is a continuous Drocess. Planning does not consist
of developing written plans, which are then considered "finished;"
rather, it is an ongoing process that involves a continuing effort
to assess vulnerability an@ improve response capability.
2.
Planninu involves attemptinu to reduce the unknowns in the
anticiDated disaster situation. No planning effort can anticipate
everything that will occur when disaster strikes, but good plans
can at least identify major problems that are expected and attempt
to devise solutions. Because everything about a future disaster
situation cannot possibly be known, it is impossible to pre-plan
every aspect of the response, and flexibility is an absolute
necessity.
3.
Plannincr aims at evoking anpropriate actions.
Rather than
aiming at a rapid response, planning should emphasize acting
correctly--even if that means doing nothing until adequate
information is available. "It is far more important in a disaster
to obtain valid information as to what is happening than it is to
take immediate actions ...Planning, in fact, should help delay
impulsive reactions" (Quarantelli, 1982: 23-24).
4.
Plannincr should be based on what is likelv to haDpen. While
catastrophic and worst-case disasters do occur, preparedness
10
6.
Plannincr should focus on creneral princinles.
One reason for
keeping plans focused on principles is that Ita complex and detailed
plan is generally forbidding to most potential users and tends to
be ignoreds1 (Quarantelli, 1982: 24).
A second reason is that,
since disaster situations shift and evolve rapidly, no plan can
ever hope to cover all contingencies. Responding in a disaster
situation always involves unexpected and unanticipated challenges,
so plans must allow for flexibility.
8.
Planning alwavs has to overcome resistance. The benefits that
can be derived from preparedness activities are not self-evident.
Disaster planning always requires some form of change in behavior,
and change is often difficult to bring about.
Government
officials, business officials, and community residents have many
priorities other than disaster planning, and societal and community
needs are invariably greaterthanthe resources that are available.
Thus, getting preparedness measures developed, adopted, and
accepted involves overcoming barriers that are often quite
formidable.
9.
Plannina must be tested.
It is virtually a foregone
conclusion that disaster plans that are not rehearsed and exercised
will either not be used at all or will fail in an actual disaster
situation. All types of coordinated action require rehearsal; this
is especially true for the coordination that is needed following a
disaster.
11
unfamiliar
organizational
actors
(e.g.,
and
central
sometimes
government
example, for caring for the sick and injured, damage assessment,
and the provision of shelter to displaced victims, regardless of
the cause.
Third, planning is most effective when it is integrated rather
than fragmented. That is, rather than having various organizations
12
and
governmental
entities
(medical-care
organizations,
law-
\"
engage
This
and
"emergent
human
resourcest1 or
t*problem-solvinglg
situation governmental
other
and
responding
agencies must
be
be helpless
and overwhelmed:
(2) that
disaster response
13
is
based
on
the
notion
that
"problem-
communities and
The model
preparedness
considerable
amount
of
research has
focused
on
what
frequently.
concerned
although
about
the
earthquake
threat,
very
large
Personal
S.
and
For
is high,
indicated that
the
overwhelming majority
of
than
preparedness
10%
of
actions
the
like
households
storing
surveyed
food
reported
and water
or
taking
getting
One U. S. study on
U.
and
less
access
to
institutional
sources
of
1986).
This is
off
eponomically,
and
they
16
also have
more
difficulty
experience
community
literature
helps
to
level, Drabek's
concludes
that
personalize
the
threat.
At
the
the
frequency
that
disaster
the
agent
growth
of
(e.g.,
a
Itdisaster subculture,"
in
which
households and communities simply accept and learn to live with the
'il
Communities
"champions" or advocates.
the
role
taken by
government is critical in
interests
exist
that
attention to lapses.
have
the
policies.
capacity
actively
promote
preparedness
and
call
enact
and
to
enforce
hazard
reduction
Without fundamental
to
develop
valid,
realistic
18
planning
scenarios,
aftershocks).
Risk
communication
activities will
Members of the
lead people
Dramatic disaster
migrate
familiar
and
resettle,
less
hazards--for
they
leave
familiar
familiar areas--and
ones.
The
hazard-related
people more aware of hazards, they still may not take protective
actions.
of
the literature on
risk
focusing on hazards.
efforts
to
communicate
with
the
public
about
natural
and
and
in
stimulating
protective
action.
Developing
and
Fitzpatrick,
communication
communication
is based
is
1992)
-
on
four
process
suggest
general
and
that
that. successful
risk
principles:
(1) risk
the
of
impact
such
communication
involves
interaction
among
source
and, message
of
with
proximity
the
hazard,
to
the
hazard,
etc.:
risk
(3)
risk
they
had
earthquake damage;
through
several
been
given
to
(4) recalled
different
protect
themselves
against
channels;
the
printed
word
(e-g.,
respected
understandable,
in
DISASTW RESPONSE
Like disaster preparedness, disaster response is a major area
for social science inquiry.
This'kection will
(2)
situations;
typical
and
(3)
.responses by
the
organizational
public
in
disaster
adaptation
in
disaster
situations,
Public Warnins ResDonse and the Desisn of Warnins Systems
U, S. social scientists have been extensively involved in
research on the warning process and on factors that affect public
compliance with warnings.
r
true and that other people are taking it seriously, usually through
additional contacts with family members, friends, and recognized
authorities; and responding by taking protective action (see Mileti
and Sorensen, 1990; Sorensen, 1993).
describe
similar
sequence,
involving
four
stages:
risk
In the U.
S.,
and ease of dissemination, ease with which the warning can be heard
and understood by the public, and the expense associated with their
installation and operation; which technology is chosen depends upon
what planning officials expect it to do and how quickly, as well as
what is practically feasible. However, regardless of what warning
method is selected, the literature consistently concludes that
24
response
Nevertheless,
have
general
been
findings
from
conducted
in
this work
the
are
U.
S.
obviously
messages
homogeneous.
mainly
typically
are
heterogeneous,
rather
than
Warnings about
is
not
disbelief.
Warnings
that
are
accomgjanied by
clear
all
warning
efforts
must
overcome
what
social
in a warning message
fashion."
As Aguirre (1993: 3)
notes :
effective warning systems help people develop a
tradition, a custom, a collective acceptance of hazards
in their lives, so that testing and modification of
warning systems becomes a significant part of their
lives. ..The challenge is to reshape public perceptions,
attitudes, and customs towards the acceptance of
individual responsibility for disaster preparedness and
away from a unidirectional approach which makes people
passive recipients of the information generated by
experts and the services of government bureaucracies.
26
Evacuation
Frequently: the objective of issuing a warning is to encourage
h
is
well-researched
topic
in the ,U.
The
S.
Mileti, 1987).
Models of the Evacuation Process
Various empirical and conceptual models of evacuation behavior
have been proposed in the literature.
(1984) developed
causal
model
that
attempted
c
evacuation
decisions made
following
the
nuclear
to
explain
power
plant
subsequently validated
ten different
factors:
hazard
characteristics,
.
.
situational
constraints,
perceived
threat,
the
inEormation
is received
For example,
planning
efforts;
threat
conditions
resultant
social
processes
at
the
community
and
organizational levels, such as efforts at communication, decisionmaking, and task-allocation; patterns of behavior, such as the
issuance of warnings, the evacuation activities themselves, and
sheltering behavior; and the impacts or consequences those actions
have for future preparedness and response activities.
All
three
models
suggest
similar
frameworks
for
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
29
From
From
(1) that
should
the
warning
itself,
the
withdrawal
phase,
generally
are
very
reluctant
that
with
warning/evacuation
successful evacuations,
L
leave
their
homes
careful
process
to
it
attention
to
is possible
all
phases
to carry
of
out very
the
For
the
storm
in
U.
S.
history)
shocked, helpless, and unable to assist one another; that crime and
other
forms of
antiesocial
behavior
increase
markedly
after
disaster impactL; and that persons who have been assigned official
disaster response tasks will abandon their posts and think only of
caring for their loved ones, leaving the stricken community without
sufficient
assistance.
If
used
as
basis
for
emergency
empirical
research
behavior
in
of
than
disaster-stricken
being
areas
dazed
have
been
and
in
found
shock,
to
be
Pro-social
Y
To the
search
and
rescue
and
life-saving
The most
measures--
People
the 1985 Mexico City earthquake: Tierney, 1991, on the 1989 Loma
Prieta earthquake in California: and Aguirre, 1993, on the 1992
Guadalajara, Mexico, gas explosion.)
In this same vein, volunteer activity increases at the time of
disaster impact and remains widespread during the emergency period.
For example, in a survey conducted on a random sample of nearly
32
during
the
three
week
period
after
the
earthquake.
some
type
earthquake.
of
emergency
response
activity
following
the
Barton
"mass
assault" phase
following
discussed in more detail below), which are often based on predisaster social ties
(friendship networks,
extended
families,
invariably occur during the response period, but norms emerge that
33
the people who converge and the materials and supplies that are
sent aren't
1970).
needed or can't
for example, indicated that only 30% of the drugs sent to Armenia
planners
need
to
pay
close
groups,
and
must
adapt.
POP
used
extensively
(see
Dynes,
Quarantelli,
1971;
Stallings,
organizations
along
two
1970:
1978)
Brouillette 'and
classifies
dimensions--tasks
and
responding
structure--and
organized
response
to
disaster
(see
Figure
below).
they
basically
are
the
responsible
same
during
organizational
35
non-disaster
structure.
times,
with
Relatively
specialized
the emergency,
and
they
What
Tasks
e
4
Established
E
09,
+&
4 1
mu
m u
4 1
Gbl
mr,
ma
bl
0
Figure 3.
It can also
planners
fail
to
anticipate
these
in
changes
not
be
disaster.
Generally
speaking, the
the more
the
non-governmental
providers.
organizations,
and
international
aid
considerable political
accompanied by
friction.
Although
the politics
of
disaster
assistance and
dealing
other
with
emergency
frequently
managers
find
aspects
and
that
of
the
officials
tfiey
must
in
physical
disaster
disaster-stricken
become
experts
at
agent,
areas
handling
is to introduce readers to some major preparedness and responserelated topics that have been considered in the social science
literature.
38
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45