1

DRAFT

TheKaloninAristotlesEthics
ByMichaelPakaluk
Aristotle Workshop, CUL, Louvain-la-Neuve, December 18-19, 2014

InthistalkIproposetodofourthings:
1. Setupaproblemabouttokalon;
2. Establishacontext,bybrieflysketchingsomeofPlatosthoughtsonthekalon,andarguingthat
AristotlemainlysharedPlatosview;
3. DiscussafewaspectsofAristotlesviewofthekalon
;
4. (Iftimeallows)Raisesomequestionsbyputtingbeforeyouthreeperplexingtextsonthekalon.
Idealwiththisquestionlargelybygoingthroughtexts,becausethatapproachseemssuitedtoa
workshopsuchasthis,andbecausemyideasareunformed,andIfinditnecessarytospendmoretime
lookingattheevidence.

1. TheProblem
TheproblemisstatedwellbyBostock(pp.9899):[Aristotle]givesusnoanalysisoftheconceptofthe
noble(tokalon),thoughitwouldseemtobeacentrallyimportantconceptforhim.Notonlydoes
Aristotlegivenoanalysis,butalsohiscommentatorsneglectthetopic.Wehaveentirebookson
eudaimonia,tohdu,todikaion,phronsis,akrasia,andphilia,but,exceptforaveryfewarticles(of
JosephOwens,TerryIrwin,andKellyRogers),nothoroughdiscussionoftokalon.Thisseminarinits
meetinglastyearentirelysidesteppeddiscussingit:hencePierreaskedmetogiveapaperonthetopic.
Soitisacompoundproblem.
Itisperhapseasytoexplainwhyrecentcommentatorshaveneglectedthetopic.Tokalonapparently
meansthefineorthebeautiful;Aristotlesview,then,seemstobethatethicaljudgmentsinvolve
aestheticjudgments;butwetendtoregardaestheticjudgmentsasunanalyzablereactionstoparticular
factsandcircumstances.IfwesupposethatAristotleisaparticularist,wellbemoreinclinedtoregard
judgmentsabouttokaloninthatway.IfwebelievethatanIdealObservertypeanalysisisthebestway
todealwithaestheticjudgments,thenwellbeinclinedtounderstandactionXiskalonalongthelines
ofactionXwillappearadmirabletoawellequippedobserver,thatis,toavirtuouspersonfrom
whichitwouldfollowthattheanalysisoftokalondependsontheanalysisofthevirtues,whichAristotle
gives.Onemightalsosupposethatmanysharethesuspicionthattokalonistobegroupedwithaclass
ofnotionsthatsetGreek,oratleastPlatonic,ethicsapartfromourownsuchastotheion,thesis,to
aidesandonthatbasisconcludethattheprincipleofcharitywouldimplythat,ifwewanttoconstrue
Aristotlesethicssoastomakeitaplausiblepositiontoadopttoday,weneedtoputasideorsomehow
recastthisnotion.
ButwhyAristotleneglectedthetopicismoredifficulttosee.Heseemstohavebeenabletogivean
analysis,ifhehadwanted:theancientlistssaythathewroteabookontokalon,anditishardtothink
thathisfairlyelaboratediscussionofwhatcountsastokalonforpurposesofpersuasion,inRhetoricI.9,
isnotinformedbysomedeeperandmorephilosophicalaccount.Moreover,tokalonisindeed,as
Bostocksays,acentrallyimportantconceptforhim.Consider:

a) AstandarddescriptionofforAristotleis.Amongmanyexamples,1
considerthefollowing:

,
,.
'
,

.NEI.8.1099a2226.

Alltheseattributes[sc.pleasant,kalon,
beneficial]belongtothebestactivities,and
these,orthebestamongthem,wesayis
happiness.Butitlooksneverthelessas
thoughhappinessrequiresexternalgoods
also,justaswehavesaid.Afterall,itis
impossible,ornoteasy,todokaladeedsif
someonelacksresources.

Hereisstrikinglynotdescribedasactivityinaccordancewiththevirtuesbut
simplydoingkalaactions,asifthereasonweacquirethevirtuesatallisforreliablydoingkala
actions.2

b) Tosaythattheactionsofsuchalifearekala,ismeantforAristotletoexplainwhyweare
willinglyethicalatall.Inthisregard,Aristotlestandardlycontraststhekalonwiththe
anangkaion.3Thekalonisattractiveandwillinglysought,theanangkaionisnotsoughtforitself
butsoughtonlybecauseofsomethingelse.ThusthekaloninAristotleprovidestheanswer,for
him,tothekindofchallengewhichGlauconposestoSocratesinRepublicII,ofaccountingfor
whyanyoneiswillinglyvirtuousandjust:forAristotle(asindeedforPlatotoo,inRepublicIV),
wedovirtuousactionswillingly,andindeedwithpleasure,becausetheyarekala,andthekalon
isattractive.

(),

.NEIII.1.1110b1012.

Ifsomeoneweretosaythatpleasantor
nobleobjectsarecoercive,asthey
necessitateus,sincetheyareexternal,then
everythingwouldbecoerciveforhim,asit
forthesakeofthesethateveryonedoes
everythingthattheydo.

.NEI.12.1101b3133.
'.NE
X.8.1179a46.,
',NEIV.1.1120a1113.Owens
arguesthat=forAristotleonthebasisofpassagessuchasthefollowingwhich
describethegoaloflegislators:,,
.I.3.1096b1416.
.
NEI.9.1099b304.
2
NotethatwhatissaidinNEXaboutthemodestmeansrequiredforrulesoutthatAristotlerefersin
thepresentpassagetokalainordertoemphasizethatthedeedsconstitutiveofhappinesswillbeconspicuous.
3
',NEIV.1.1120a21.
.NEIX.2.1164b2830.','.Ibid.
1165a34.,,'.NE
IX.11.1171a246.','Pol.1332a1012.

,
.NEX.10.1179b2931.

Acharacterwhichfindsvirtuecongenial
mustsomehowbeacquiredfirstone
whichclingstothekalonandrecoilsatthe
aischron.

ThesecondpassageisalsoagoodstatementofAristotlesmoralpsychologyofthekalon,
namely,thateveryonecanrecognizeit,butloveforit(anditislovewhichissuesinactions),is
weakinmostofusbynature,butitcanbestrengthenedbyeducationandcharacterformation.
c) SomecommentatorshavesupposedthatAristotleholdswhatmightbecalledanactualization
modelof,accordingtowhichconsistsinanexpansiveandsatisfying
developmentofallofthevariousrationalpowers,orrationallyinformedpowers,thatwehave
orcanpracticallyacquireorperhapsofonesuchpowerwhichisespeciallysatisfying.Whether
Aristotleholdssuchaviewisperhapsdebatable.Inanycase,inmanyplacesheseemstoevince
adifferentview,whatmightbecalledanacquisitivemodeloranachievementmodel,
accordingtowhichconsists,rather,ofconsistentlyandoptimallyacquiring
something,orachievingsomething.4Whenhespeaksinthisway,itisclearthattheworthof
whatisacquiredandachievedisaccountedforbysayingtheyarekala.Indeed,whatis
supposedtoexplainwhylivinglikethatcancountasatall,isthatthesethingsare
kala.NEIX.8providesmanyexamplesofthiswayofspeaking,asforexample:
Thispresumablyhappenswiththosewho
giveuptheirlivesforothers:theychoosefor
themselves,then,somethinggreatand
kalon.Theygiveupmoney,too,on
conditionthattheirfriendshavemoreofit,
sincethefriendhasmoney,butthegiverhas
thekalon.

Andsoon.Therearemanyexamplesofthiswayofspeaking.

d) Again,tokalonissupposedtobethesolemotiveonwhichonecansucceedinactingvirtuously.
Virtuousactionsarevirtuousbecauasetheyarebothkalonandchosenonaccountoftheirbing
kalon.5

'
Thevariousactionswhichspringfromvirtue
.NEIV.1.1120a1920.
arebothkalonanddoneforthesakeofthe
kalon.

''
.
''

Forexamplenotetheuseof(meaninghereareacquisition):
,'',
,',,
.NEI.9.1101a913.
5
.NEIII.6.1115b23.,NE
III.12.1119b16..NE
IV.2.1122b67.',,,,NEIX.8.

Onemightsaythatthemotiveofactingonthecondition,andsolelyonthecondition,thatthe
contemplatedactiskalonisanalogous,foritsimportance,tothemotiveofactingondutyin
Kantsphilosophy.Itisbafflingthatwehavenotgenerallyacceptedaccountofwhatthismeans
forAristotle.

e) Theprecept,Dowhatiskalon,avoidwhatisaischronseemstoberegardedbyAristotleasthe
single,dominantpreceptsufficientforlivingwell.Asproof,considerthatwemustfollowthis
precept,hesays,evenifdoingsoimpliesthatweforfeitourprospectsforfuture.6
Theprecept,then,takespriorityoverseekonesownandthereforetrumps
eudaimonism:

, Ifthissortofthingholdstoointhecaseof
courage,then:deathandwoundswillbe

, painfulforacourageousman,andnotsought
.
after,buthefacesthesethingsbecauseitis

kalon,orbecausenotdoingsoisaischron.
,
Andthemorehehasoftheothervirtues[lit.

virtueinitsentirety],andthemoreheis
,
eudaimn,tothatextent,hewillbemore
,.' greatlypainedbydeath.Thatsortofman
,,
mostdeserveslife;andheisawareofbeing
'
deprivedofthegreatestgoods;andthisis
.NEIII.9.1117b29.1168a3132.
somethingpainful.Butforallthatheshows
courageevenmorecourage,presumably
becausehechoosesforhimselfthekalonin
warfareinexchangeforthosethings.

f) ThekalonplaystheroleforAristotleofunifyingthespeculativeandpracticalvirtues,and
thereforetheprimaryandsecondaryforms,sincebothformsaredevotedto
acquiringthekalon,thoughtheydosoindifferentways:speculativeactivitythrough
contemplatingkalaobjects,andpracticalactivitythroughbringingaboutactions,routines,
culture,relationships,andinstitutionswhicharekala.

Noattainmentsinourhumanspherehaveas

muchsolidityasactionswhichspringfrom

' virtue.Theselooktohaveevengreater

lastingnessthan<actionswhichspring
' from?>thevarioustypesofexpert

knowledge.Ofthelatter,themostestimable

aremorelastingbecauseblessedlyhappy
.
menmaketheirlivesconsistmostlyofthese,
, andwiththefewestinterruptions(thisisthe

reason,mostlikely,whytheyarenever

HeretoothereseemstobeaPlatonicorSocraticprovenancetothiscommitment,ifweconsiderthatthe
principlestatedintheCrito,neverwronganyone,isregardedherebySocratesandCritotogetherasaninstance
ofthemoregeneralprinciple,dowhatiskalon,avoidwhatisaischron.

'.
NEI.10.1100b1220.

forgotten).Thenwhatwearelookingforwill
beattributabletotheeudaimnman.
Moreover,hellbelikethatthroughoutthe
wholeofhislifebecausehewillalways(or
moreoftenthananythingelse)beeither
doingordwellingupactionswhichspring
fromvirtue.

Insum,tokalonisundeniablyacentralnotionforAristotlesethics,andyetAristotlesayslittlebywayof
explainingit.Heseemssimplytotakethenotionforgranted.Perhaps,then,hetakesthenotionfrom
PlatoandisrelyinginpartonwhatwascommonlyheldaboutitintheAcademy?

2. Platosviewontokalon

Althoughwemightfindtokalonadifficultorunfamiliarnotion,forPlatoapparentlynothingcouldbe
moreobviousandclear.Atleast,invariousdialogues,whenSocrateswishestodrawhisinterlocutors
attentiontoForms,typicallyhisfirstexampleisoftokalon.
WearefamiliarwiththefamousUltimateArgumentofthePhaedoinreplytoCebes,wherethe
principlethatitisbytokalonthatanythingiskalonisPlatosfirstexampleofasecondvoyage.But
eventhoughthePhaedoisnotinanysenseaboutthekalon,stillintheCyclicalArgumenttooonefinds
thesamething,
',
,
,
,

Letusthenseeasregardsallofthesewhether
theycometobeinanyotherwaythanopposites
fromopposites,iftheyhaveopposites,asfor
examplethekalonisoppositetotheaischron,
andthejusttotheunjust,andamyriadother
thingslikethat(70e14).

LikewisetheRecollectionArgumentbegins:
,
,

If,aswearealwaysgoingonabout,thereis
somethingwhichiskalon,andgoodandevery
substancesuchastheseandallmattersfalling
underperceptionwetraceup()to
thatkindofbeing()(76d79)

Butthekalonleadsfirstinotherdialoguesaswell.Forinstance,SocratesasksTheatetus,whenan
exampleofapureconcept,immunefromcontradiction,iswanted:

'

Trytorememberifyouhaveeversaidtoyourself
thatthekalonisactuallyaischron,ortheunjust
just(190b12).

ParmenidesintheeponymousdialogueisevendepictedaspickinguponSocrateshabitofputtingthe
kalonfirst,since,whenhewarnsthatSocratesneedsmoretrainingbeforeheattemptstodefinethe
forms,hespecifiesthemas:todefinewhatthekalonis,andthejust,andthegood(135c9).
Theseexamplesshow,Ithink,thatPlatoregardedtokalonasthebestconceptorformforshowingthe
relationshipbetweensensibleparticularsandformsgenerally.Whatdoesthisamountto?Itmeans
suchthingsasthat:Anobjectsbeingkalonlookstobesomethingborrowedfronmanotherandnot
originallyorinevitablypossessed;thekalonstrikesusasakindorradiance,ormanifestation,and
itrepresentssomethingelsequamakinganappearance;yetthekalonisreceivedbyusnotassomekind
ofadumborbruteimpression,butratherasintelligible,andindeedascapableofstandinginfor
anythingthatisintelligibleatall.Thekalonshowsbesthowwetracethingsupand,asdescribedin
theSymposium,itbestshowshowwecanfollowthemupwardsaswell,ifweknowhowtodothat.
NowAristotlelargelystaysawayfromthissortofPlatonicromanticism,yetevenheretherearesome
signsofinfluence,forexample,inthematteroffactwayinwhichAristotlewillusekalonasastock
predicatefortestingsyllogismsintheAnalytics,alongwiththepedestrianpredicatesleukonand
anthropos,andotherslikethat,asifontheassumptionthatthekalonisentirelyunproblematic.
OragainconsiderwhetheritwouldbenaturalforsomeoneunaffectedbyPlatosviewtowrite,as
Aristotledoes,thatintheforebearancewhichagoodmancanshowinthemidstofadversity,tokalon
shinesforth,revealinghishighdestinyandgreatnessofsoul:
,
,',
,
I.10.1100b302

Thekalonshinesthrough,whensomeonewalks
withalightstepundermultiple,great
misfortunes,notbecausehehasatoughskinbut
ratherbecausehehasasenseofhisownworth
andisgreathearted.

AnevenbetterexampleisfoundofcourseinPartsofAnimalsI.5,where,afterdeclaringthatevena
glimpseofcelestialthingsgivesgreaterdelightthaneverythingputtogetherinourdomain(
',echoingaphraseintheProtrepticus),Aristotlenonethelessdeclaresthat,becauseof
thefashioningskill(),whichisevidentinthem,evenhumbleanimalshavea
shareofthekalon().InanunusualphraseAristotleaddsthatthese
humblecreaturscometooccupytherankofthekalon(,645a256.).
PlatoissurelythesourcetooofAristotlesconceptofthekalonasagoodthatcanbeacquiredthrough
action.OneseesthisideadevelopedbothinSocratesfirstrefutationofPolusintheGorgias,andalsoin
AlcibiadesI.Intheformer,Socratesisconcernedtoarguethatsomeonewhoappearstobebetteroff
bydoingsomethingaischron,infactputshimselfinaworseposition,becausethegoodheloses,and
theharmheendures,indoingtheaischronaction,isfarworsethanwhatevergoodhemightgain.In
theAlcibiadesI,Socrateslooksattheconversesituation,wheresomeonedoessomethingkalonatthe
costofcertaingoods,andtheretheargumentisthatthekalonhegainsisfargreaterthanwhathe

loses.ThelatterpassageisparalleltothepassageinNEIIIabove.Thesamepairofevilsismentioned,
deathandwounds(,).Inbothpassagestheyarefacedorreceived(,
).Onepassagesaysthedisplayofcourageisevil()inthatrespect,theotherthatit
agentisunwilling().Bothpassagessaythatthepersondoingthiscourageousactionobtains
(,)thekaloninwarfare()
,

,,
,;

;
[]
;

,,
,
;
;

Doyoumaintainsuchthings
asthese,thatforexample
manymenwhoinwarfare
sincetheycometotheaidof
acomradeorneighbor,
receivewoundsanddeath,
butotherswhodonotdoso
so,astheyought,getaway
healthy?

Courageisanevilforthem
asregardstheirdeathand
wounds?
Sothentheaidinginwarfare
ofonesfriends,insofarasit
iskalon,yourefertoas
simplykalon,asregardsthe
goodnessofthecourageous
action?Andthesemen
obtainthesethingsbyacting
wellandinakalonmanner?

',
,
'
.

Platoslineofthought,whichAristotleseemstoshare,isthatwecannotbeadmiringtheheroicaction
(ofrescuingacomradeasoneshould)fornoreason;ifwearedrawntoit,thentheremustbe
somethinggoodaboutit(asthatissimplywhatagoodis,anend);buttheverysamegoodwhichwe
admire,andinasenseacquirebywonderingatit,thedoerofthedeedacquires,presumablytoa
greaterdegree,7intheactitself;infact,thatthedoerpursuesandacquiresagoodexplainsthedoers
motivation;finally,theworthofthegoodshegivesuptestifiestothegreaterworthofthegoodhe
reasonablyacquiresinexchange.(Attheendofthepassage,Alcibiadesblurtsoutthathewouldnever
wanttobeacowardandwouldnthesitatetogiveuphislifetoavoidbeingso.)
SowehaveseenthekalonforPlatoasamanifestationwhichdrawsupward,andthekalonasagenuine
goodacquiredbydoingdeedsthatwegenerallyadmire.Ontheseunderstandings,thekalonisnot
presentedassomethinganalyzeable.ButthereisathirdmainunderstandingofkaloninPlato,inwhich
thekalonisanalysedasgoaldirectedintelligenceatwork.Wehadalreadyseenthisviewreflectedin
AristotlesPartsofAnimalsdiscussion,butitisvaluabletosaysomethingmore.

Itmakessensetodietosavesomeoneinbattle,assavingsomeone,butitmakesnosensetodieforthe
opportunitytopondertheadmirabilityofsavingsomeoneinbattle.

Thisthirdviewshowsupinpassinginmanyplaces.Forexample,intheTimaeus(87c):
,
:
.

Allthatisgoodiskalon,andthekalonisnotvoid
ofduemeasure;whereforealsotheliving
creaturethatistobekalonmustbesymmetrical.

HeremeansnotEnglishsymmetricalbutratherproportionateandindicatesarelationship
whereoneormorepartsfiteachotherforsomepurpose.
PlatosmostrevealingdiscussionofthisthirdunderstandingofkalonisprobablyintheCratylus(416c
d).Thetermtokalon,hesaysthere,derivesfromtokaloun,thatis,thenameconferringpower,andit
isappliedtoanyproductofthoughtandreasoning,onthegroundsthatwecanrefertotheworksofa
power,withanamederivedfromthenameofthatpower,andthebestnameforthepowerofthought
andreasoningisnameconferring,asthatisitsmostbasicandmostdistinctiveact.Sotokalonmeans
thatwhichistheworkofintelligencewhetherofgodsorofmen(
;).Thatiswhytokalonistoepaineton,Platosays,becauseweare
praisingtheintelligenceandreasoningresponsibleforthekalonobjectweadmire(
,,,;).Ineffect,tobekalonisto
evinceintelligentdesignthekalonispreciselyamanifestationofthewhich
Aristotletooksomuchdelightin.
Nowifwewantanadditionalanalysisandwonderwhatsomethingisthereforelike,ifitistheproduct
ofintelligence,wemightlooktowhatPlatosaysaboutinthelastthirdoftheGorgias.Perhaps
themostimportantassertionthereisthefollowing(503e4504a5):
Forinstance,ifyouwishtoconsiderpainters,
,
,,
housebuilders,shipbuilders,oranyoftheother
,,
craftsmen,youllfindthateachplaceseachthing
, thathedealswithinacertainorder,andifone

thingisdifferentfromanother,heforceseachto
,
beadaptedandtofitin,untilhesmadeitsothat

thewholeworkisputinorderandisbeautifully

arranged.

Notethattheprincipleforestablishingthevirtuesasinthemselveschoiceworthy(theprojectofRepII
IV)issetdownhere:oneneedsadistinctionofparts,withadueordering,whichstateswhereeachis
supposedtogo,andhowitsgoingtherecontributestosomeorderingofthewhole.ButintheGorgias,
Socratesisnotsomuchconcernedwiththebeautyofavirtuoussoulasawholebutratherwithrefuting
Calliclesbrazenaffirmationofunlimitedlibidoastheprincipleofagoodlife.Hethereforewishesto
insistthateveryvirtueisitselfakindofordering,8andthereforemanifestsprinciplesoflimitationand
boundedness,andwhichmoreoverequipsthethingwhichhasthatvirtuetobelawful(nominom)and
itselfabletofitwithinalargerorder.Lookingatthevirtuesinthisway,henaturallytakesmoderation
(sphrosun)tobethemostfundamentalvirtue,andfindsthattheorderlinessandcomeliness(kosmon,
kosmia)ofmoderationofimplythatanyonewhohasthatvirtuewillasaconsequencehavetheother
cardinalvirtues.Intheentirediscussionheseemstobeusingcomelinessratherthankalontoreferto

(506e1).

whatisappealingandadmirableinvirtue.Ifso,thenthepassagegivesusanexplicationofthekalonof
virtueandvirtuousaction:thisinvolvestheadaptationofparts(summetria),toconstituteanordered
whole,whichworkstogetherforsomeendbeyonditself,wherethatwholefitsreadilyintosomelarger,
reasonablelawlikearrangement.
Platosviewofthekalonasmanifestingintelligencecanbetraced,Ibelieve,backtowhathesaysabout
namingintheCratylus.Namingisthedistinctiveactivityofthepowerofintelligence,afterwhichto
kalongetsitsname.Hedoesnotconceiveofnamingasthearbitraryapplicationofaspokensoundtoa
thing.Rather,namingisanactionthatcanbecorrectornot,andtonamecorrectlyistoexhibit,reveal,
andshowthesortofthingitis,whichisnamed(
,,422d)9Namingismore
likewhatwemightcallforminganappropriateconcept,whichcapturestheessenceofathing,ofwhich
thesoundednameisonlyasign.
Alongtheselineshesaysthat,whenanameiscorrectlygiven,thenatureofthethingnamedatthe
sametimemakesthenameclear.Theyclarifyeachother,apparently.Thenaturemakesthenameclear
too(,429c).Theearliest
namesdosobyimitation,forinstance,raisingone'shandtoshow()whatisabove(423a1).In
generalanameandapictureare"correct",andthenamefurthermore"true,"ifitimitatesthatwhichit
namesand"rendersinreturntoeachthing()thatwhichsuitsitandisliketoit".10
ThisisalltosaythatPlatoispreparedtothinkofnamingaslikeareciprocalexchange,where
somethingisreceivedfromthethingtobenamed,itsnature,andsomethingis"givenback"inreturnto
thethingnamed,bythenaming,whichis"like"whatwasreceivedandforthatreason"suitable"toit
().(See431balso.)Inanotherplace,Platolikensanametoadistributionwhich,ofthe
variousnamestobedistributed(),assignsthatnametoathingtowhichismostlikeandbest
suited(,;).
Sothen,somethingiskalon,ifitrepresentstheactivityofintellect,whichisbestunderstoodbylooking
attheactivityoftheintellectinnaming,itsdistinctivework.Namingisarenderingbackordistribution
ofwhatissuitabletothatwhichisnamed,becauseitissufficientlylikeit,whichthen,inthe
comparison,"shows"whatthethingnamedislike.Hencethemarksofthekalon:itinvolvesproportion,
thatis,amatchingofsomethingplaced,toitsplacement;anorderlyarrangementofpartstoawhole,
whichisakintoadistribution;andthenclarity,akindofmovementinreasoningfromobscuritytoa
betterunderstanding,attainedbysimplification.This"clarifying"andshowingofthingsisthevery

9
Elsewherehesaysthatacorrectnameendeixetai("shows"or"exhibits")whatsortofthingsomething
is(428e).Therefore,tonameistoteachandtrain(ininvolvesdidaskalia),whichisthejoboflawgivers
(429a).
10

,430c.Thelikenessisnotanexact
reproduction,becausethenitwouldbethesamething,butratheralikenessthatisprosekon(432e).
Thisisalsosaidtobealikenessinwhich"theintrinsicqualityispresent"(433a),whichagainsuggests
somethingimmanentandhardtoseemadeexplicitthroughasimplifieddrawingattentiontoit
somehow.

10

purposeofnaming.Akalonobject,then,sinceithasbuiltintoitthedistinctivefeaturesofanactof
naming,isasitwereareflectionorimageofthismostbasicactivityofintelligence.
SoweseeabasisinPlatoswritingsatleastforthefamousstatementofPseudoDionysiusthatthe
kalonisthatwhichhasunity,proportion,andclarity.

3. AristotlesviewcomparedwithPlatos
IhavebrieflypresentedPlatosviewofthekaloninordertoshowsomepointswhereAristotlehas
drawnfromit,butalsotostrengthenourinitialproblem.GivenPlatosviews,andtheextentof
AristotlesborrowingonPlatosviews,thekalonwouldhavebeenanotionaboutwhichAristotlewould
havebeenexpectedtohaveatheory,yethedoesnotgiveoneintheworkinwhichhereliesonthat
notionmost,nordoesheevenhintatitwithoneofhisusualphrases(thatsaninvestigationwhich
doesnotbelonghereetc.).
WeprobablycannotcountRhetoricI.9asgivingsuchatheoryorevenasdescribingwhatreallycounts
askalon,asopposedtowhatanaudiencewillbeinclinedtoregardaskalon.ItistruethatAristotle
givesaformulationtherewhichatfirstglancelookslikeadefinition:

Kalonwouldbewhat,besidesbeing
,,. choiceworthyonaccountofitself,is
praiseworthy,orwhat,besidesbeing
good,isfoundpleasantonthegrounds
thatitisgood.

ButAristotlecouldnothaveacceptedthisasadefinition,becauseitrestrictsthekalontoobjectsof
humanchoice:theheavens,forexample,wouldnotcountaskalonbythisformulation,becauseit
makesnosensetosaythatwecouldchoosethem.Also,heimmediatelygoesontosay,afterthis
formulation,thatvirtueisthemainthingthatcountsaskalon,butthen,laterinthechapter,whenhe
wantstoexplainwhatpraiseis,heexplainsitwithreferencetovirtue:

Praiseislanguagewhichmanifeststhe
greatnessofavirtue.

Thusthepair,kalonpraise,isinterdefinedwhichnodoubtisunobectionable,ifonesaimismerelyto
tellarhetoricianhowtocraftpraise.
Butbesidesthis,Aristotlescharacterizationofvirtueinthechapterisununsual:

,
,.

Avirtueisapowerof(asisthought)
providingandsafeguardinggoods,and
apowerofconferringmanyandgreat
benefits,inallcircumstances[
]andforeveryone[].

11

Thus,Aristotlesays,acourageousmanispraisedforhiscourage,becausehetendstoactsoastosave
yourlifeandthatofothers;ajustmanispraisedbecausehewilldistributegoodsfairlytoyouand
others;aliberalmanisdisposedtogivehismoneyawaytoyouandothers;andsoon.Sotheupshotof
thisformulationofavirtueisthatitturnspraiseintoakindofsocialmechanismforencouraging
behaviorswhichbenefitthesocialgroupasawholewhichseems,again,asuitableenough
understandingofpraiseifoneisarhetorlookingtostirupacrowd,butnotnecessarilyasound
philosophicalanalysis.Inparticular,IseenoreasontoagreewithIrwinsinterpretation,inthe
aforementionedarticle,thathereAristotleisanalyzingkalonasmeaningpromotesthecommongood.
ItistruethatacoupleoftimesinRhetoricI.9Aristotlesays,ineffect,thatthelessabeneficentaction
workstothebenefittooofthebenefactor,themorekalonitis.IrwinsaysthatAristotlelookstobe
articulatingaprincipleofaltruism.Itmustbeadmittedthattheseremarkslineupnicelywithhandfulof
passagesinNEinwhichAristotleidentifyaparticularclassofactionsaskalon,asfollows:
11

'.12

',
,
,
,
'
',
,,
.13

Eagerlylookingtoreceivebenefitsisnot
kalon.

Itismorekalontosupplythesegood
thingstothecausesofyourexistence
thantoyourself.

[Doinggoodthingsforafriendismore
kalonthandoingthosesamegoodthings
foroneself.]
Abadmandoeseverythingforhisown
sakeButagoodmanactsonaccountof
thekalon,andtotheextentheisbetter,
moreonaccountofthekalon,andforthe
sakeofafriend.

Butwhatwouldbetheunderlyingprinciplehere?Isitthatoneshouldorderoneslifesothat,asmuch
aspossible,oneisconferringbenefitsonothersratherthanononeself?Butwhatmakesthatwayoflife
kalon?Notbecauseitsselfless,becauseAristotleholdsthatsuchapersonactuallyloveshimselfmore
thananyoneelse;andnotbecauseitshelpsothersgenerallyinallcircumstances,becauseAristotle
recommendsextendingonesbeneficiencetoonesfriendsandnotbeyondthat.
ImentionedAristotlesseemingtoadoptPlatosviewthatanyworkwhichevincesintelligentdesignis
itselfkalon.AsalastincidentalremarkaboutAristotlesview,IwishtoobservethatAristotleseemsto
regardpowers,inclinations,ortendencieswhichworkforthekaloninthiswaytobegovernedbysome
kindofhigherorderprinciple,ofseekinggreaterefficiency,greaterelegance,andakindofsuperiority
andexclusivityofattainment.Wearefamiliarwiththishigherorderprincipleofnaturalteleologyasin
theParvaNaturalia(469a29):

11

IX.11.1171b6.
IX.2.1165a23.
13
IX.8.1168a2934.
12

12

Weobservethatnatureineverycircumstance
producesfromthevariouspossibilitiesthemost
kaloneffect.

AndinthePolitics(1252b23):

,,
'
,
'

Naturedoesnotdothingsthewaycutlersmake
theDelphicknife,likesomeonewhohasto
stretchresources,butitmatchesinstrumentsand
purposesonetoone,sincethuseachinstrument
willbeaccomplishitsworkinthemostkalonway
possible.

IbelievethesameprincipleisfoundalsoinAristotlespracticalphilosophy,asinhisremarkinNEabout
howavirtuouspersonmakesthebestofbadcircumstances;histreatmentofmegalopsychiaas
involvingaconstantstrivingforevengreaterexcellence;hisnotionofcompetitionamongthevirtuous
toattainthekalon,foundinIX.8;andevenhisinterpretationofselfsacrificeinbattle,namely,thata
virtuouspersonwillpreferanextraordinaryachievementinashorttimeoveralongperiodof
undistinguishedaction.14

4. Someadditionaltexts
Therehavebeenmanytextsalreadyinthispresentation,asmyaimhasbeentoputbeforeyouthe
breadthanddepthofthisproblemofthekaloninAristotle,andtosetdownthephainomenawhich
needtobehandled,orsaved,indealingwiththatproblem.
Iseetheevidenceaspointinginoneortwodirections.CallthefirsttheBigIdeathatthereissome
largeinsightwhichunderliesanddirectsAristotlesethicaltheory,whichisevidencedinhistalkofthe
kalon,butwhichwehavenotsuccessfullyidentifiedorgivenappropriateweightperhaps,something
alongthelinesofPlatosastonishingassertionintheTimaeusthatgodhasnoenvyandcreatesfreely
outofbeneficence.IfoneweretoaddtothistheAristotelianthesis,statedinDeAnimaII.4,thatall
livingthingsstrivetoimitategodasmuchastheyareable,giventheirlimitations,onewouldarriveat
theviewthatanactioniskalontotheextent,basically,thatitimitatesdeusdiffusivussui.
Butthesecond,alternativedirectiontheevidencecouldconceivablypointtomightbecalledtheBig
Misapprehension,namely,thatwhatAristotlereferstoasthekalonnomoreexists,andplaystherole
Aristotlethoughtitplayedinhisethicaltheory,thanthatimpetusexistsandplaystherolethat
Aristoteliansthoughtitdidinphysicaltheorythat,sinceAristotlesdaywehavegottenclearthatthat
sameroleneedstobeplayed,rather,bysomekindoflaw,aKantianbindingallreasonablebeings,
perhaps,ormaybe,simply,properlygroundedhumanlaw.

14

','

13

Howeverthatmaybe,Iwanttoconcludebyputtingbeforeyouthreetextswhichraiseissues,in
particular,inrelationtothevirtuesofcharacter,whichweareconsideringatthisworkshop,yetwhich
havenotfitwellunderanyofthevariousheadingsunderwhichwehavesofarlookedatothertexts.
PASSAGEA.ThefirstisapassagefromEEdealingwithcourage.Itistryingtosolveapuzzlewhichis
actuallytakenuptwiceinthattreatise,namely,ofwhy,ifacourageouspersonlacksfear,asissaid,his
actionsshouldbepraiseworthyas,ifhereallydidlackfear,thenwouldseemtobenochallengefor
himinactingcourageously.
[1229]
,.
[
],
:
.[5]
,:
,.
,
.
,.
,[10],
,:
,.

[1229a]Courageisthefollowingoflogos.Logos
commandsthatwechoosethekalon.Thatiswhy
someonewhofaces[extremelypainfulthingsand
highlydestructiveforces],notonaccountofthe
kalon,iseitheroutofhismindoroverlybold.
Onlysomeonewhofacesthesethingsonaccount
ofthekalonisfearlessandcourageous.The
coward,then,additionallyfearswhatheshould
not,andtheoverlyboldmanisadditionally
emboldenedbywhatshouldnotemboldenhim.
Butthecourageousmanbothfearsandis
emboldenedbywhatheshould,andinthis
respectheisamean.Heiseitherfearfulor
emboldened,aslogoscommands.Butlogosdoes
notcommandtofaceextremelypainfulthings
andhighlydestructiveforces,unlessdoingso
wouldbekalon.Theoverlyboldmanfacesthese
thingsevenifreasondoesnotcommandit,and
thecowardwouldnotfacethemeveniflogosdid
commandit.Thecourageousmanistheonlyone
whofacesthesethingsonconditionthatlogos
commands.

Someobservationsonandquestionsaboutthispassage:
a. Supposeacommandingofficergivesanorder(logos),then,ifthesoldierwhoobeysitistoact
courageously,musthedosoonaccountofthekalonwhichthecommandingofficerpresumably
discerns,andwhichformsthebasisforthatorder,oronaccountofthekalonpresumablyfound
inthemerefactofhisfollowingalawfulorder,orforbothreasons?Whatisacting
forhim?15
b. Thisaccountseemstoleavenoneoftheworkoffiguringouttheappropriatenessofanactionto
theemotions.Italsoseemstomakeasoldiersemotionalresponseirrelevant,asfearlessin
thefaceofpainfulthingsanddeathseemstoamountsimplytotheactionoffacingthose
things.

15

ComparetheformulationofRhet.I.9,whichseemstogiveaplacetoboth:
,,.

14

c. Similarlyallofthedimensionswhicharetypicallythoughttogointofindingthemean(whenone
should,asoneshould,towhomoneshould,onthebasisofwhichoneshould,tothedegreethat
oneshould,etc.)arereducedtotheyes/noquestionofwhetheroneisfacingdangersonly
becausecommanded,andtohavetheviceofexcessistofacethemonmoreoccasionsthan
these,andofdefect,onfeweroccasions.

PASSAGEB,Thesecondpassage,fromtheendofNEIII.12,issomethingofananalogueofthefirst,but
nowdealingwiththevirtueofmoderation:
,

,
.

,
.

Thatiswhy[sensedesires]needtobemoderate
andfew,andnotsetagainstephithumtikonin
anywayandwerefertothatsort[of
ephithumtikon]asdulysubmissiveand
disciplinedandjustasachildneedstolivein
linewiththerequirementsofhispedagogue,so
theephithumtikonneedstoliveinlinewith
logos.Forthatreason,theephithumtikonofa
moderatepersonneedstobeinagreementwith
logos.Forthekalonistheaimofboth,anda
moderatepersondeisreswhatthingsheshould,
andhowheshould,andwhen.Butlogos
additionallycommandsinthatmanner.

Again,somequestionsandobservations:
a. Hereincontrastitlooksasthoughtokaloncananobjectofanonrationalfaculty,the
ephithumtikon.ThatisperhapsnotasurprisingviewforAristotletohold,giventhathethinks
thatnatureingeneralaimsatthekalon.
b. IsAristotlesimilarlydisposedtosaythatthemiddlefacultyofdesire,thethumikon,cantakethe
kalonasitsscope?Perhapsso:hesaysinNEVIIthatinakrasiawithrespecttoangersomething
akintoreasoningtakesplaceinthatfaculty.Andwhendiscussingthefalseformofcourage
whichinvolvesjustrageandadesireforvengeance,Aristotlesaysthatitisnotafterallcourage,
because'(1117a8),anditwouldmakesensetotakethe
firstclausetopointtoafaultrelativetothethumikonitself,andthesecondtothethumikons
relationshiptologos.
Inanycaseitsclearfromthesetwopassagesthatthethornyquestionoftherelationshipbetween
pathosandlogosinthevirtuesofcharactercannotwellbeaddressedwithoutabetterunderstandingof
thekalon.

PASSAGEC.Finally,apassageinsomewaysaboutthesameissuebutlookingatitfromadifferentway,
fromNEIII.4,aboutboulsisandwhetherboulsishasanaturalobjectornot.Attheendofthechapter,
Aristotleproposesthedoctrine,repeatedmanytimesinNE,thatthevirtuouspersonservesasa
standardfortruejudgmentsabouthumannature:

15

,
.'
,

,
.
.
,
.

Thegoodpersonjudgeseachkindofthing
correctly,andineachkindofthingthatwhichis
true,isthatwhichtohimseemstobeso.For
therearekalaandpleasurescorrespondingto
eachhexis,andpresumablythegoodpesonis
mostdistinguishedfromeveryoneelseinseeing
whatistrueineachcase,beingakindofstandard
andmeasureofthesethings.Butmostpeople,it
seems,aredeceivedbypleasure.Although
pleasureisnotgood,itseemsgood.Theychoose
thereforewhatispleasantassomethinggood,
andtheyavoidpainassomethingbad.

Aboutthispassage:Aristotlesaysthattherearekalaandpleasurescorrespondingtoeachstate.So
whenhesaysthat,forpersonswhoarenotvirtuous,pleasureappearstobegood,doeshemean,or
doeshealsohold,that,inthosecases,pleasurealsoappearstobekalon?Presumablynot,forthree
reasons:(i)heneedstoclaimonlythatpleasure,assuch,becomesanobjectofpursuit,thatis,anend,
andforthatclaim,itisenoughtosaythatthepleasureappearsgood;(ii)itseemsabsurdtosaythat
someoneseekingpleasureisinvariablyseekingitaskalon;and(iii)Aristotlesstandardclaimisthat
pleasureisanapparentgood,notthatitisanapparentkalon.Sotheninsayingthattherearekala
correspondingtoeachstateAristotledoesnotmean,aswemighthavetakenhimtomean,thatnot
onlyvirtuesbutalsoviceshavekalaassociatedwiththem.Hemustmeanthateachvirtuehasits
distinctivekalonthat,forinstance,thekaloninbattlesoughtbycourageisdifferentinkind,fromthe
kalonofanequaldistribution,andthatonereasonavarietyofvirtuesareneeded,isthatacompletely
virtuouspersonhastobesensitivetoallofthemanifestationsofthekaloninhumanlife.
Notethatthisreadingseemsconsistentwiththeplurals,and,asthesenaturally
connotearangeofcasesofdifferentkindsthatneedtobejudged.Also,inthelinesimmediately
precedingthequotedpassage,Aristotlelikenedavirtuouspersontosomeonewhobecauseheisin
goodhealthisthebestjudgeofsensibilia:buteachsensehasitsidiomsensibile,thus,onthisanalogy,
eachvirtuewouldhavesomedistinctkindofkalonsuchthatonlythatvirtuecouldmakesomeone
sensitivetoit.
Thisconsideration,ifcorrect,goessomewaytowardexplainingwhyAristotleinbookVIholdsthe
puzzlingdoctrinethattheseparatevirtuessetsomanyendsasregardswhich,then,phronsisidentifies
whatcontributestowardtherealizingofthoseends,