2006:10

RESEARCH REPORT

Fires in tunnels and their effect on rock

- a review

Kristina Larsson

Lule University of Technology

Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Division of Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering
2006:10 - ISSN: 1402-1528 - ISRN: LTU-FR--06/10--SE

PREFACE
This report is a literature review of the knowledge of fires in tunnels at present. It summarizes
part of the fire dynamics necessary to understand the development of fire in tunnels, state-ofthe-art of concrete research concerning fire behaviour, and tries to collect what is known
about how rock behaves at high temperatures. The report will form a basis for deciding the
direction of continued research in the field of rock behaviour at high temperatures. The report
is funded by Banverket.

Lule, February 2006

Kristina Larsson

ii

SUMMARY
During the past 15 years there have been several major fires in tunnels all over the world,
most of them caused by accidents. Many of these fires have occurred in road tunnels, and
many have involved heavy goods vehicles carrying goods not classified as dangerous. The
heat developed by these fires has been on par with that expected from a fire in a fuel tanker,
and the damage to the tunnel structure has in some cases been severe. Sweden has been spared
disasters so far, but since many tunnels are being built as parts of major rail and road routes
around and under cities, more transportation will take place underground so the risks are
increasing.
A brief investigation of Swedish railroad tunnels has shown that reinforcement is used in
almost all tunnels; only 6 % does not have any reinforcement at all. Selective reinforcement
(the tunnel carries all load and is only reinforced with spot bolting and/or shotcrete in a few
places) is used in 38 % of the tunnels. In 61 % of the tunnels interacting reinforcement is
used, which refers to systematic bolting, mesh and shotcrete that together with the rock mass
carries the load. Concrete constructions that carries load (supporting reinforcement) is used in
26 % of the tunnels, and then usually only on short sections. In Sweden most tunnels are
constructed in relatively strong rock, and at shallow depths, which makes concrete lining
excessive. It is therefore interesting to study the behaviour of strong, hard rocks subjected to
high temperatures from a tunnel fire.
The aim of this literature review was to find the state of the art of how rock behaves at high
temperatures caused by a fire, but very little information was found. Some large scale fire
tests have been performed in rock tunnels, but only a few of the reports from these tests
mention anything at all about what happened to the rock during the test. In a few cases it has
been noted that rock fell from the roof during and after the fire, but no investigation of the
cause of these rock falls has been made. During most of the large scale fire tests performed in
rock tunnels, the rock has been protected from the heat to prevent fall-outs. It seems no tests
have been performed to check the actual behaviour of rock during a fire.
Two areas of interest for future research can be noted. The behaviour of some typical Swedish
rock types found in tunnels should be investigated with focus on the behaviour at high
temperatures. For concrete there is a maximum temperature defined that the concrete can be
exposed to, to avoid spalling. A similar type of maximum temperature limit should if possible
be defined for different rock types. The other area of interest is the behaviour of typical rock
reinforcement used in Swedish tunnels. This reinforcement is usually a combination of rock
bolts and shotcrete, but the amount of reinforcement used varies. The effect of rock bolts must
be investigated, since they are mainly made of steel, which transfers heat very well. The bolts
iii

will conduct heat into the rock mass, forming local hot spots at some depth. The bolts will
also loose the majority of their strength at temperatures of about 300-400C, which means
that they will no longer carry load. The effect of this must be considered and the risk
estimated for the people escaping the tunnel, and the fire fighters entering the tunnel. It has
been shown by several authors that shotcrete can be used for fire protection of concrete. It
should be investigated if shotcrete can fill the same function for rock, and still have the
reinforcing capabilities required, and if so what the minimum thickness is to prevent spalling
of rock.

iv

SAMMANFATTNING
Under de senaste 15 ren har det intrffat flera svra brnder som en fljd av olyckor i tunnlar
ver hela vrlden. Mnga av dessa brnder har intrffat i vgtunnlar, och flera har omfattat
lngtradare med en last som inte klassificerats som farligt gods. Vrmeutvecklingen i dessa
brnder har varit av den storleksordning som man frvntar sig frn en brand i en
brnsletanker, och i vissa fall har det blivit omfattande skador p tunneln. Sverige har hittills
klarat sig undan strre brnder, men med den utbyggnad av infrastruktur i form av vg- och
jrnvgstunnlar runt och under strre stder och den kning av transporter under jord som
fljer, s kar riskerna fr att ngot ska intrffa.
En underskning av svenska jrnvgstunnlar i berg har visat att frstrkning av ngot slag
anvnds i nstan alla tunnlar, bara 6 % av tunnlarna r ofrstrkta. Selektiv frstrkning
anvnds i 38 % av tunnlarna och innebr att tunneln br all last och att bultning och/eller
sprutbetong anvnds p korta strckor. Samverkande frstrkning anvnds i 61 % av
tunnlarna, vilket innebr att bergmassan tillsammans med frstrkning i form av systematisk
bultning, nt och sprutbetong br lasten. Betongkonstruktioner som br last (brande
frstrkning) anvnds i 26 % av tunnlarna, och d vanligtvis bara p kortare strckor (t.ex. i
portaler). I Sverige r de flesta tunnlar byggda i relativt h llfast berg och ganska ytligt, vilket
innebr att betonglining r verfldig. Det r drfr intressant att studera hur hghllfast berg
beter sig vid de hga temperaturer som kan uppkomma vid en tunnelbrand.
Mlet med denna litteraturstudie var att inventera kunskapsnivn om bergs beteende vid hga
temperaturer (vid brand), men endast begrnsad information har hittats. Ngra storskaliga
brandfrsk har utfrts i bergtunnlar, men enbart ngra f av rapporterna frn dessa tester
nmner ngot alls om vad som hnde med berget under frsken. I ngra frsk har man
noterat att det fll ned berg frn taket under och efter branden, men man har inte underskt
orsakerna till nedfallen. Under de storskaliga brandfrsken har man skyddat berget mot
hettan fr att frhindra utfall. Det verkar inte som att ngra frsk alls har utfrts fr att
underska hur berget verkligen beter sig under en brand
Tv omrden har bedmts som intressanta fr vidare forskning. Man br bestmma
egenskaper och beteende fr ngra av de typiska svenska bergarter man kan frvnta sig i
tunnlar med avseende p hga temperaturer. Liksom fr betong s br man ta reda p den
maximala temperatur olika bergarter kan utsttas fr utan att spjlkning initieras, om en sdan
temperatur existerar. Det andra forskningsomrdet r hur typisk bergfrstrkning i en svensk
tunnel beter sig vid hga temperaturer. Frstrkningen r ofta en kombination av bergbultar
och sprutbetong, men mngden frstrkning varierar. Bergbultars pverkan mste underskas
eftersom de tillverkas av stl som r en vldigt god vrmeledare. Bultarna kommer att leda in
v

vrme i bergmassan s att man fr lokala vrmekllor p djupet. Vid temperaturer p ca 300400C har bultarna frlorat det mesta av sin hllfasthet, och kan allts inte lngre ta ngon
last. Vad detta innebr fr tunnelns stabilitet och vilken risk det innebr fr mnniskor som
ska utrymma tunneln i hndelse av brand och fr rddningspersonalen br underskas. Flera
forskare har visat att sprutbetong kan anvndas som brandskydd fr betong. Det br
underskas om sprutbetong kan fylla samma funktion fr berg och nd ha den frstrkande
effekt man efterstrvar, och i sfall vilken minsta tjocklek man mste ha fr att frhindra
spjlkning.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface ......................................................................................................................................... i
Summary.................................................................................................................................... iii
Sammanfattning.......................................................................................................................... v
Table of contents ...................................................................................................................... vii
1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
1.1
Background ................................................................................................................. 1
1.2
Swedish rock tunnels .................................................................................................. 1
1.3
Aim ............................................................................................................................. 2
1.4
Limitations .................................................................................................................. 3
2

3
4

5
6

7
8

Fires .................................................................................................................................... 5
2.1
General ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2
Smoke stratification in tunnels ................................................................................... 6
2.3
Flame length............................................................................................................... 8
2.4
Large fires in tunnels with high longitudinal air flow.............................................. 10
2.5
Fire spread in tunnels ................................................................................................ 11
2.6
Vehicle fire load ....................................................................................................... 11
2.7
Heat release rate (HRR)............................................................................................ 12
2.8
Case studies of tunnel fires ....................................................................................... 13
2.8.1
Channel tunnel.................................................................................................. 14
2.8.2
Mont Blanc tunnel............................................................................................ 14
2.8.3
Tauern tunnel.................................................................................................... 15
2.8.4
Hong Kong ....................................................................................................... 16
2.8.5
St Gotthard Tunnel ........................................................................................... 17
2.8.6
Kaprun tunnel................................................................................................... 17
High temperature properties of rock................................................................................. 19
Concrete............................................................................................................................ 25
4.1
Effects of high temperatures..................................................................................... 25
4.2
Failure modes ........................................................................................................... 26
4.3
Prevention of spalling ............................................................................................... 28
4.4
Test methods............................................................................................................. 30
4.5
Shotcrete as fire protection....................................................................................... 30
4.5.1
Shotcrete on concrete ....................................................................................... 30
4.5.2
Shotcrete on rock .............................................................................................. 31
High temperature properties of steel ................................................................................ 33
Fire tests............................................................................................................................ 35
6.1
Fire resistance tests ................................................................................................... 35
6.2
Fire behaviour tests................................................................................................... 37
6.3
Full scale tests........................................................................................................... 38
6.3.1
Repparfjord tunnel............................................................................................ 39
6.3.2
Lappeenranta tunnel ......................................................................................... 39
6.3.3
Runehamar tunnel............................................................................................. 40
6.3.4
Blasted rock tunnel, Sweden ............................................................................ 42
Swedish tunnel specifications ........................................................................................... 45
Discussion and conclusions .............................................................................................. 47

vii

9
10

Recommendations for future research.............................................................................. 51

References ........................................................................................................................ 53

viii

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Fire has been used by mankind for thousands of years, and its ability to break rocks is well
known and was used early for tunnelling and mining. The method of using fire to break rock
is called fire-setting and works as follows; a fire was started at the wall, and when the rock
was hot the embers were removed and water was thrown onto the wall, which cracked the
rock. Wedges were driven into the cracks and blocks of rock could be removed with an ironbar. The Egyptians built a tunnel in this way as early as 2000 BC (www.pbs.org, 2005). The
method was used in Europe up to the 18th century, when blasting with black powder took over
as the main mining method.
During the past 15 years there have been several major fires in tunnels all over the world.
Some have been caused by accidents, and some have been arsons. Many of these fires have
occurred in road tunnels, and many have involved heavy goods vehicles carrying goods not
classified as dangerous. These fires have turned into disasters and have killed several people.
The heat developed by these fires has been on par with that expected from a fire in a fueltanker, and the damage to the tunnel structure has in some cases been severe. Sweden has
been spared disasters so far, but since many tunnels are being built as parts of major rail and
road routes around and under cities, more transportation will take place underground so the
risks are increasing. The major part of European road and rail tunnels has concrete lining,
partly because of the weak rock under high pressure they are constructed in. In Sweden most
tunnels are constructed in relatively strong rock, and at shallow depths, which makes lining
excessive. Instead many of our tunnels are reinforced by a layer of shotcrete, which prevents
rocks from falling into the tunnels and also prevents water leakage into the tunnel.
After the tunnel fires in Europe several research projects have studied the behaviour of
concrete lining during and after a fire, and much have been learned on how to make the
concrete perform better. Addition of polypropylene fibres is one of the most efficient ways of
improving the spalling properties of the concrete, protecting the surface with fibre reinforced
(polypropylene) shotcrete is another.

1.2 Swedish rock tunnels

Some statistics on Swedish railroad tunnels (Lundman, 2005) are summarized in
Table 1-1. A total of 125 rock tunnels were included in the statistics. There are more tunnels
in the railnet, but only rock tunnels and tunnels with information on length have been
included. The column with longest concrete construction refers to reinforced concrete
portals. Almost 50% of the tunnels have concrete portals with a length between 1 and 9 m,

and only 6 % have concrete portal constructions longer than 50 m. Reinforcement is used in
almost all tunnels, only 6 % does not have any reinforcement at all, and 38 % has selective
reinforcement. Selective reinforcement means that the rock mass around the tunnel carries all
the load and that the tunnel is only reinforced with spot bolting and/or shotcrete in a few
places. In 61 % of the tunnels interacting reinforcement is used, which refers to systematic
bolting, mesh and shotcrete that together with the rock mass carries the load. Reinforced
concrete constructions that carries load (supporting reinforcement) is used in 26 % of the
tunnels, and then usually only over short sections. Over 50 % of the tunnels are grouted, but
38 % are not, and for the remaining tunnels no information on grouting was found. The whole
list of tunnels can be viewed in Appendix 1.
Table 1-1. Reinforcement statistics for rock tunnels in the Swedish railnet.
Longest concrete constr [m]
0
1-9
10-49 > 50
no of
tunnels

No reinf. /
selective

Interacting
reinf

Supporting
reinf

Grouting

22

62

20

7 / 47

76

32

66 / 48

18 %

50 %

16 %

6%

6 % / 38 %

61 %

26 %

53 % / 38 %

The Swedish road administration (Vgverket) operates 28 rock tunnels on the national road
network (Freiholtz, 2005). Only two of these have concrete lining, and the rest are reinforced
with bolts and shotcrete.

1.3 Aim
Little research has been made on the behaviour of rock during and after a fire. There are many
tunnels in Sweden that are unreinforced or that have only bolts or plain shotcrete as
reinforcement. What would happen in these tunnels during a fire? How much work would it
require afterwards to make them safe for traffic again? This depends on how the rock and
shotcrete reacts to the high temperatures developed by a fire. The behaviour of shotcrete has
been studied in several European research projects, and it has been stated that polypropylene
reinforced shotcrete is a cheap and easy way of improving the fire resistance of concrete. The
behaviour of rock at these high temperatures does not seem to have been studied at all,
probably because it has not been considered necessary since the rock in European tunnels is
always protected by thick layers of concrete. The aim of this literature review is to summarize
the knowledge of the effects of fires in rock tunnels. Current status of research regarding
concrete fire behaviour is summarized. The main focus is road and rail tunnels. Basic fire
dynamics in enclosures and tunnels is also covered, but not in great detail. Cases of recent
tunnel fires are summarized to provide a background for the theory of fire dynamics and to
show which parameters are important to know about a tunnel fire. Some of the large scale

tunnel fire tests performed during the past 10 years are described to see what has been studied
and learned from them.

1.4 Limitations
The limitations of the literature review are that fluid dynamics of a fire, smoke flow, and
chemistry are not covered. Numerical simulations of fires are not covered either, since these
are mostly concerned with smoke propagation and the development of exact temperature
gradients of the fire gases.
The focus of the review is rock tunnels and the use of shotcrete for fire protection. This
literature review is not a complete state-of-the-art document of tunnel fire research and
knowledge, but it should provide a basis for understanding fire theory, summarize the most
important results of concrete research regarding fire behaviour, and should provide a starting
point for further research on the behaviour of rock during a tunnel fire.
Many Swedish rock tunnels are grouted to prevent water leakage. The effect of fire on the
grout is not covered in this literature review, and neither are the effects on frost insulation
used in tunnels today. Other materials for fire protection than shotcrete have not been
reviewed.

2 FIRES
2.1 General
A fire is a manifestation of a chemical reaction, but the mode of burning may depend more on
the physical state and distribution of the fuel, as well as its environment, than its chemical
nature (Drysdale, 1999). The understanding of fire behaviour in general requires knowledge
of chemistry, heat transfer, fluid dynamics, etc., and the behaviour of a fire in a tunnel is even
more complex. When comparing a tunnel fire to a fire in the open air, there are two important
differences (Ingason, 2005); the heat reflection to the burning vehicles is more efficient in a
tunnel fire because of the confinement, and the interaction of the ventilation with the growing
fire. The heat reflection causes an increase in intensity of the burning vehicle, and may
increase the heat release rate by up to a factor of three (Carvel et al., 2004), see section 2.7.
The interaction of ventilation and fire generates aerodynamic disturbances in the air flow
through the tunnel, which may cause changes in the ventilation pattern, such as throttling of
airflow, and reverse flow of hot gases and smoke from the fire into the ventilation stream
(backlayering) (Ingason, 2005). These effects complicate the fire-fighting, and also transport
toxic fumes and gases far away from the fire.
Ingason (2005) also compared tunnel fires to compartment fires (rooms in buildings) and
stated three major differences. First, the maximum heat release rate (HRR) of a compartment
fire depends on the natural ventilation, which is determined by the area and height of the
openings into the compartment. In tunnels the natural ventilation depends on the fire size,
slope of the tunnel, cross-sectional area, length of tunnel, type of tunnel (concrete lined, rock),
and meteorological conditions at the entrance to the tunnel. Tunnels often also have forced
longitudinal ventilation, which has an effect on the combustion efficiency as well (Ingason,
2005). Second ly, compartment fires can grow to flash-over within a few minutes, but this is
unlikely to happen in a tunnel fire because of great heat losses to the surrounding walls, and a
lack of containment of the hot fire gases. Inside a truck cabin or train compartment located
inside a tunnel, however, flash-over can occur. Thirdly, in the early stages of compartment
fires an upper layer of buoyant smoke is formed, with a cold smoke-free layer below. If there
is very low longitudinal ventilation in a tunnel the same type of smoke layer can be formed in
the early stages of a fire. Further away from the fire source, however, the smoke will descend
to the floor. The distance at which this occurs depends on the fire size, tunnel type,
circumference and height of the tunnel cross-section. If the ventilation is increased, the
stratification of the smoke will dissolve, and backlayering is formed on the upstream side of
the fire, and the stratification of the smoke downstream of the fire is determined by the heat
losses to the surrounding walls, and by the turbulent mixing of the buoyant smoke layer and
the opposite moving cold air below.

There are two modes of combustion that are important to know and distinguish between
(Ingason, 2005), i.e., fuel-controlled and ventilation-controlled fire. Fuel-controlled fire
means that oxygen is in unlimited supply, and that the rate of combustion is independent of
the mass flow rate of air (oxygen supply rate), but is instead determined by the mass flow rate
of vaporised fuel (fuel supply rate). A ventilation-controlled fire has a limited oxygen supply,
and the combustion rate depends on both air and fuel supply rates. At the precise oxygen level
that enables complete combustion, the mixture is said to be stoichiometric. To determine
whether a fire is fuel- or ventilation-controlled, the air-to- fuel equivalence ratio ()
m&
= a ,
(2-1)
rm& f
can be used, where m& a is the mass flow rate of air (oxygen) supply, m& f is the fuel mass loss
rate (fuel supply), and r is the stoichiometric coefficient for complete combustion. If 1,
the fire is fuel-controlled, and if < 1, the fire is ventilation-controlled.

2.2 Smoke stratification in tunnels

In fuel-controlled fires the smoke stratifies, which is of importance for those trying to escape
the fire. The smoke spread is highly dependent on the air velocity in the tunnel, which can be
illustrated by using three typical air velocity ranges (Ingason, 2005):
- low or no forced ventilation (0-1 m/s),
- moderate forced ventilation (1-3 m/s), and
- high forced ventilation (> 3 m/s).
When the air velocity is low, e.g., in tunnels with natural ventilations, the stratification of
smoke is usually high around the fire source (Ingason, 2005). The backlayering distance can
be quite long, and sometimes the smoke travels almost equal distances in both directions, see
Figure 2-1a. When the velocity is close to 1 m/s, backlayering occurs upstream from the fire
source, for a distance up to 17 times the tunnel height.
When the tunnel has moderate forced ventilation, the stratification of the smoke near the fire
source is highly dependent on the air velocity, the higher the ventilation velocity, the shorter
the backlayering distance. For air velocities of 1-3m/s the backlayering distance can vary
between from 17 to zero times the tunnel height (Ingason, 2005), see Figure 2-1b.

Figure 2-1. Schematic of smoke stratification, from Ingason (2005).

In the third group, the smoke stratification is usually low downstream from the fire, and there
is little or no backlayering, see Figure 2-1c and d. The air velocity required to prevent
backlayering is called the critical velocity (Ingason, 2005).
Newman (1984) showed that for duct fires there is a correlation between local temperature
distribution and the local mass concentration of chemical compounds. Ingason and Persson
(1999) showed a correlation between local smoke optical density (visibility), temperature and
the oxygen concentration. Ingason (2005) then finds it reasonable to assume that there is a
correlation between the local temperature stratification, gaseous composition and smoke
stratification in tunnels. The temperature stratification depends on the parameters air velocity,
heat release rate (HRR) and height of the tunnel, which can be related through the local
Froude number (Fr) (Ingason, 2005). Newman (1984) defined three different temperature
stratification regions based on the Froude number, see Figure 2-2. In the first region (Fr
0.9), the stratification is severe, and the hot combustion products travel along the ceiling. The
temperature near the floor is close to ambient. The temperature stratification in this region is
buoyancy-dominated. In the second region (0.9 Fr 10) the stratification is not severe, but
still involves vertical temperature gradients and is largely mixture-controlled (Ingason, 2005).
There is strong interaction between the ventilation velocity and the fire- induced buoyancy. In
7

the third region (Fr > 10) there is little or no vertical temperature gradient, and consequently
little or no stratification.

Figure 2-2. Temperature stratification, from Ingason (2005).

Newman (1984) presented a formula for calculating the Froude number, which is valid for
ducts but have not been validated for tunnels
2
u avg
Fr =
,
(2-2)
Tavg
1.5
gH
Tavg
where H is the ceiling height, g is the gravitational constant, Tavg is the average temperature
over the entire cross-section at a given position (K), Tavg = Tavg - Ta (average gas temperature
rise above ambient over the entire cross-section at a given position (K)), and uavg = uTavg / Ta ,
where u is the ventilation velocity. presents The equations for calculating Tavg and Tavg are
presented in detail by Ingason (2005).

2.3 Flame length

The height of the luminous flames depends on the fuel supply rate, the entrainment rate, and
the properties and geometry of the fuel (Ingason, 2005). It is important to know the flame
length to be able to consider fire spread between vehicles. Most fuels (solid and liquid) burn
with a luminous diffusion flame where about 70 % of the total energy is released as
convective heat and about 30 % is released as radiation. The net emissive power of the flame
depends on the concentration of soot particles and the thickness of the flame. For most
hydrocarbon fuel fires, the highest radiative flux is measured when the diameter of the flames
is 3 m or larger (Ingason, 2005), which is also the size when the fire becomes optically thick.
A large portion of the radiative flux from hydrocarbon fires can be absorbed by the smoke
surrounding the flames, which results in lower radiative fluxes to the surroundings (Ingason,
2005). The simplest relation for flame height in the open is

h free = 0.2Q 2 / 5 ,

(2-3)

where hfree is the flame height, and Q is the heat release rate, and is valid for axisymmetric
fires. In tunnels there are two factors that must be considered to determine the flame length:
the presence of the ceiling, and the ventilation. When a non-combustible ceiling is present the
horizontal extension of the flames, hhor, can be related to the flame cut-off height, hcut, see
Figure 2-3.

Figure 2-3. Horizontal length of flame s under a ceiling, from Ingason (2005).
Babrauskas (1980) calculated the ratio hhor/ hcut for an unbounded horizontal ceiling and for a
corridor. The ratio was 1.5 for the unbounded ceiling. For the corridor the ratio was found to
be highly dependent on the width of the corridor, for a corridor of 3 m width the ratio was
1.81 and for a corridor width of 2 m, the ratio was 2.94. Assuming that a tunnel behaves
similarly to a corridor, Ingason (2005) states that the flames would extend along the ceiling to
a horizontal length of 1.5 3 times the cut-off height. The effect of the ventilation is not taken
into account in these calculations (Ingason, 2005).
Depending on the velocity of the air flow the effect on the flame length differs. High
longitudinal velocity creates a better mix of the oxygen supply with the fuel supply, and
thereby increases the efficiency of the combustion, which can lead to a shortening of the
flames. At moderate air velocities, an increase in the air velocity may cause a lengthening of
the flames, because at low velocities the volatiles must spread over a larger area before there
is sufficient oxygen to allow complete combustion (Ingason, 2005). At velocities slightly
below moderate, the flames will again grow shorter and interact to a larger degree with the
tunnel ceiling, which decreases the inflow of oxygen to the fire source. At air velocities lower
than moderate, the flames will become less horizontal and will interact with the ceiling to a
greater degree, which reduces the flow of oxygen into the fire source. At zero forced
ventilatio n (natural convection only) the flames will hit the ceiling and spread in both
directions.

2.4 Large fires in tunnels with high longitudinal air flow

In a tunnel where the vehicle density is high, and the longitudinal ventilation is high, a fire
can potentially spread between the vehicles and become ventilation-controlled. Ingason
(2005) states, based on research on duct fires in the 1970s by de Ris, that ventilationcontrolled fires occur more readily when the passage is narrow, the air flow (ventilation) is
high, the fuel load is high, and when the ignition source is large. This indicates that the
turbulent mixing in the combustion zone has to be high enough to completely exhaust the
oxygen supply before the fire becomes ventilation-controlled. This in turn means that a tunnel
fire has to involve at least two large vehicles with large fire load before it can become
ventilation-controlled (Ingason, 2005). Figure 2-4 shows a schematic of a ventilationcontrolled fire in a tunnel with relatively high forced longitudinal ventilation.

Figure 2-4. Burning zones in a tunnel with high longitudinal ventilation, from Ingason (2005).
The burning process itself can be seen as stationary, but to explain the process, five different
zones are assumed in Figure 2-4;
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

burnt-out cooling zone,

glowing ember zone,
combustion zone,
excess fuel zone, and
preheating zone.

The zones move forward in a dynamic manner, provided that the vehicle density is high
enough in the area of the initial fire. In the burnt-out zone, the vehicles have been completely
consumed by the fire and the fire gases have already cooled down. In the glowing ember
zone, the vehicles have stopped burning and are in a late stage of the decay phase, and are
literally a pile of glowing embers. In the combustion zone (x = 0 in Figure 2-4) the vehicle
fire is fully developed, and flaming combustion is taking place in the whole zone. The flames
cause high heat transfer rates from the gas to the fuel, which leads to high fuel vaporisation
10

rates (Ingason, 2005). The temperature of the gas phase just beyond x = 0 increases rapidly,
and reaches a maximum at x = x1 , where the oxygen level reaches a minimum. The excess
fuel zone starts at x = x1 , at which the oxygen is depleted. In this zone, fuel vaporises from the
vehicles, but no combustion takes place due to a lack of oxygen. The fuel vaporisation takes
place up to the point where the temperature drops below the pyrolysis temperature, (Tvap
300C for most solid materials). Beyond this point (at x = x2 ) no vaporisation takes place, but
the gas flows on and loses its heat to the tunnel walls and preheats the vehicles within this
zone (preheating zone) (Ingason, 2005).

2.5 Fire spread in tunnels

Vehicles stopped in a tunnel where there is a fire may ignite although they are not in contact
with the fire source. The possibility of ignition of a material is determined by evaluation of
whether or not the exposed surface will reach a critical ignition temperature, which depends
on the mode of ignition and also on the mode of heat transfer (Ingason, 2005). There are two
modes of ignition: spontaneous and piloted ignition. The difference between the two modes is
that a spontaneous ignition takes place when the vaporised fuel has reached a high enough
temperature without having a flame nearby (Drysdale, 1999). For spontaneous ignition to take
place, the critical temperature is 600C for radiant exposure, and 500C for convective
exposure. For piloted ignition the critical temperatures are lower, 300 - 410C for radiant
exposure, and 450C for convective exposure (Ingason, 2005).

2.6 Vehicle fire load

The fire load of a vehicle can be estimated by summing the fire load of all constituent
materials, both of the truck itself and the cargo. Fire load (for a compartment) is defined as the
combustible content per unit floor area (Drysdale, 1999). The fire load is related to the
potential fire severity, and can thus be correlated to the fire resistance required for a specific
construction component. Examples of fire loads for road vehicles are shown in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1. Fire loads and HRR of road ve hicles, from Egger (2005) and Firetun (1995).
Vehicle type

Typical fire Typical fire

load [GJ]
power [MW]

Remarks

Passenger car

3 3.9

2.5 5.0

Fire loads used in fire tests in Finland

Bus
Truck load

41
65

20
20 30

Fire loads used in EUREKA fire tests

Heavy goods vehicle

88

30

Railway car
Tanker with 50 m3
gasoline

41 77

12.5 22

1500

300

HRR without very combustible goods

Passenger cars made of steel
Level assumed by Dutch authorities for fires of
extreme dimensions

11

2.7 Heat release rate (HRR)

The most commonly used parameters for describing a fire is the heat release rate (HRR) and
the temperature of the fire. It has been noted by several authors that a fire in a tunnel has a
much higher HRR than would be expected from the same fire in unrestrained conditions.
Carvel et al. (2004) studied how the HRR varied with tunnel geometry and ventilation. To be
able to describe the influence of tunnel geometry on the size of a fire, they defined an HRR
enhancement coefficient (Eq. 2-4.)
Q
= tunnel ,
(2-4)
Qopen
where Qtunnel is the HRR of a tunnel fire, and Qopen is the HRR of a similar open air fire. To
find a relationship between tunnel geometry and HRR, Carvel et al., (2004) used results from
fire tests from different types of tunnels and performed with different kinds of fuels. As an
example a car fire test in the open in Finland gave HRR-values of 1.5-1.8 MW, while burning
the same size of car in a tunnel gave HRR-values between 3.6 and 6 MW. This gives an
enhancement factor () of 2-3. Carvel et al. (2004) found that two factors influence the
enhancement factor:
- a small fire dimension compared to the tunnel dimensions means that re-radiation from the
tunnel walls dominates the process, and
- a large fire dimension compared to the tunnel dimensions means that there probably is an
insufficient amount of oxygen available for the fire to burn at a maximum HRR.
The effect of this is that will increase with fire dimension up to a point, then the fire
becomes ventilation controlled and will decrease, see Figure 2-5. The position of the
maximum and the rate of decrease towards zero depend on the nature of the fuel and the
geometry of the tunnel.

Figure 2-5. Variation of the enhancement coefficient with fire dimension, from Carvel et al.
(2004).

12

HRR is difficult to estimate for a fire test in a tunnel even with a full set of measuring
equipment, and for a real fire it is even more difficult to estimate when the fire has already
occurred. To address this problem Carvel et al. (2004) presented an empirical relationship
(Eq. 2-5)
W
= 24 F
WT

+ 1

(2-5)

where WF is the width of the fire object and WT is the width of the tunnel. The relationship is
valid for tunnels with flat roofs and all fuels (petrol, heptane, cars, etc.) except methanol. It is
possible that Eq. 2 underestimates the enhancement factor for a concave roof by up to 10 %,
since a concave roof is thought to give a lens-effect, thus concentrating the heat back toward
the source (Carvel et al., 2004).
Carvel and Beard (2005) states that the HRR is the most important factor contributing to the
severity of a fire. The higher the HRR the more severe the fire.

2.8 Case studies of tunnel fires

Fires in tunnels are not new phenomena and neither are fatalities in tunnel fires. The ten worst
tunnel fires by November 2001 were tabulated by Turner (2001), and are shown in Table 2-2,
with subsequent severe fires added. The table makes no pretence of being complete. During
the past 10 years several serious incidents with fires in tunnels have occurred. Some of them
are briefly summarized belo w, with information regarding duration of the fire, damage to the
tunnel structure, necessary rehabilitation of the tunnel, and total time of closure of the tunnel.
Table 2-2. Tunnel fires the from 1978 to present day, modified after Turner (2001).
Tunnel

Country

Type of tunnel

Length

Fatalities

Year

Daegu metro
Gleinalm
Kaprun
St Gotthard
Tauern
Salerno
Mont Blanc
Gueizhou tunnel
Channel Tunnel
Isola Delle
Pfnder
Baku underground
Great Belt
Serra Ripoli

South Korea
Austria
Austria
Switzerland
Austria
Italy
France / Italy
China
UK / France
Italy
Austria
Azerbaijan
Denmark
Italy

metro
road
funicular
road
road
rail
road
rail
rail
road
road
metro
during construction
road

8.3 km
3.3 km
16.3 km
6.4 km
9 km
11.6 km
0.8 km
49.6 km
0.15 km
6.7 km
8 km
0.44 km

~ 200
5
155
11
12
4
40
> 80
5
3
289
4

2003
2001
2001
2001
1999
1999
1999
1998
1996
1996
1995
1995
1994
1993

13

Table 2-3 (concluded).

Tunnel

Country

Moscow
New York
London
Gumefens
Caldecott
London
Kajiwara
Nihonzaka
Velsen

Russia
USA
United Kingdom
Switzerland
USA
United Kingdom
Japan
Japan
Netherlands

Type of tunnel

Length

Fatalities

Year

metro
metro
metro
road
road
metro
road
road
road

0.34 m
1.02 km
0.74 km
2.04 km
0.77 km

7
2
31
2
7
1
1
7
5

1991
1990
1987
1987
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978

2.8.1 Channel tunnel

The Channel tunnel is a high speed railway tunnel crossing the English Channel, and it
consists of two parallel tubes, with a smaller service tunnel running in between. It was
finished in 1993. In November 1996 a fire in a HGV (Heavy Goods Vehicle) occurred on
board the shuttle train (Kirkland, 2002). Arson was suspected since no natural causes to the
fire could be found. The train was stopped in the tunnel and the passengers were evacuated.
There were no fatalities. The fire lasted about 7 hours, and can be considered severe since the
maximum temperature at the centre of the fire was estimated to 1000C. The tunnel lining
suffered severe damage over 46 m nearest to the fire source, serious damage over a length of
about 280 m, and was affected to some extent over 500 m (Kirkland, 2002). The remedial
measures were to install steel arches as a temporary support to ensure safe wo rking conditions
during the removal of debris from the site. Damaged concrete was removed by grit blasting,
and then damaged reinforcing steel was replaced. The damaged lining was replaced by 680
tons of plain shotcrete and 630 tons of fibre reinforced sho tcrete. The tunnel was closed for a
total of six months.
2.8.2 Mont Blanc tunnel
The Mont Blanc tunnel was built as a joint project between France and Italy and was opened
for traffic in 1965 (LaCroix, 2001). The tunnel is 11.6 km long, and the roadway is 7 m wide
with meeting traffic. The tunnel has a concrete lining, which carries the load and at lay-bys a
larger cross-section, see Figure 2-6. These lay-bys occur every 300 m, on alternating sides,
and every second lay-by is a shelter with a fresh air supply.
The fire accident occurred in March 1999, and was caused by a HGV that caught fire and
stopped halfway into the tunnel from the Italian side. This HGV had a refrigerated trailer with
margarine and flour. The fire started in the cab, but spread quickly to the trailer, which burned
emitting very toxic gases. The smoke was black and heavy. The flow of the ventilation was
from Italy towards France, making the air fairly clear upstream from the burning vehicle, and
filling the entire cross-section with smoke towards France (downstream). From the Italian side
14

eight HGVs and several passenger cars entered the tunnel before the entrance was closed, but
since they could see the smoke coming from the burning vehicle they could stop their vehicles
and escape. All passenger cars turned and drove out, while the eight HGVs were left behind
and later burned. During the same time 18 HGVs, 9 passenger cars, a motorcyclist and a pickup van entered the tunnel from the French side. Four of the HGVs ma naged to pass the
burning HGV and make it to safety, but all the others were trapped in the smoke, and later
burned. Totally 39 people died in the accident. The fire lasted for 53 hours. The tunnel vault
was severely damaged over a length of 900 m, and there was also damage to the roadway
pavement and slab. The secondary lining was also destroyed or badly damaged over a
considerable distance because of the high temperatures (LaCroix, 2001). The temperatures in
the tunnel during the fire have been estimated to between 800 and 1000C, with a maximum
temperature of 1200C (Abraham and Derobrt, 2003). The average concrete facing thickness
was 0.5 m, with no reinforcement and water tightness. Spalling does not seem to have
occurred, despite the high temperatures, which Abraham assumes can be explained by the
high permeability of the concrete (bad quality). The high permeability allowed water to
escape the concrete, which kept the stresses low enough for thermal spalling not to occur
(Abraham and Derobrt, 2003). The damage to the tunnel lining is instead caused by the
decreased strength of the concrete due to the high temperatures.

Figure 2-6. Cross section at a lay-by, from LaCroix (2001).

2.8.3 Tauern tunnel

The Tauern Tunnel is a 6.4 km long single tube tunnel, which was opened for traffic in 1975.
The roadway is 7.5 m wide, and the height is 4.7 m. The fire accident occurred in May 1999,
and was caused by a lorry running into some stopped vehicles from behind at relatively high
speed. A schematic of the incident is shown in Figure 2-7. One lorry and four passenger cars
had stopped in the tunnel at a stop sign. The stop sign was there because there was a
construction in progress in the tunnel. The ramming lorry shoved two of the passenger cars in
15

under the first lorry, and the other two smaller cars were pushed up against the tunnel wall.
The ramming lorry ended up with its cab right up against the back of the first lorry. In the
collision itself eight people were killed, and another four died as a result of deciding to stay in
their car during the ensuing fire (Eberl, 2001).

stop

stop

Figure 2-7. Schematic of accident causing the fire in the Tauern Tunnel.
The fire lasted for about 17 hours. During the extinction phase, engineers entered the tunnel
ahead of the fire fighters to ensure the stability of the roof. The tunnel (inner) ceiling sagged
in places and had to be propped. Soot cleaning was necessary in the entire tunnel, and about
350 m of inner ceiling had to be replaced (Eberl, 2001). The sidewalls over a length of 100 m
in the area of highest temperatures had spalled to a depth of 400 mm, and to a depth of 50 mm
over the whole sidewall surface or locally along another 450 m length. Totally some 600 m3
of spalled concrete was removed (Leitner, 2001). About 800 m of the roadway had to be
rehabilitated due to spalling. Here 5-8 cm of the surface was removed and a new pavement
added. The rescue niches in the tunnel worked as planned during the fire (radio and lighting).
The tunnel was closed to traffic for three months, during which also the ventilation system
was improved.
2.8.4 Hong Kong
The tunnel is a cross-harbour tunnel that was opened for traffic in 1972. It consists of two
double tubes, with two lanes each, having a roadway width of 6.6 m and a height of 5.1 m
(Chow and Li, 2001). The fire accident occurred in May 2000, and was caused by a passenger
car that caught fire. The driver tried to extinguish the fire himself, but failed. After about four
minutes firemen were on the scene, and started to evacuate people into the other tunnel tube.
After evacuation the fire was rapidly extinguished. The fire lasted for about 45 min, and 15
min after that the tunne l was reopened for traffic. No damage to the ceiling was reported, and
no remedial measures beyond soot cleaning were necessary.

16

2.8.5 St Gotthard Tunnel

The St Gotthard Tunnel is a 16.3 km long tunnel that was opened for traffic in 1981. The
tunnel is a single tube two-lane tunnel, 10 m wide and 4.5 m high. Above the roadway are two
ventilation ducts, one for exhaust and one for fresh air (Turner, 2001). The fire accident
occurred on 24 October 2001, and was caused by a heads-on collision between two lorries,
one carrying tyres and tarpaulin while the other had no load. The total number of fatalities
was 11. The fire took 36 hours to extinguish, and the maximum temperature has been
estimated to about 1000C. The high temperatures caused the inner reinforced concrete
ceiling to collapse over some length. Several of the survivors escaped by crossing into the
service tunnel running parallel to the main tunnel. Those that died are thought to have
suffocated from smoke inhalation during the first few minutes of the fire (Turner, 2001).
2.8.6 Kaprun tunnel
The Kaprun funicular tunnel is 3.3 km long, and has an average slope of 43 %. The cross
section is circular with a diameter of 3.4 3.6 m. The tunnel is designed so that the trains can
meet in the middle, where also a rescue tunnel connects with the train tunnel. The fire
accident occurred on 11 November, 2001, and was (probably) caused by faulty heater in the
lower drivers cabin (Ingason, 2003). The accident train was ascending, when the fire caused
the train to stop about 600 m into the tunnel. The descending train also stopped, about 1.5 km
uphill from the accident train. The fire developed rapidly, partly because of the fire load
associated with the passengers (skis and winter clothing) and partly because of the high
natural ventilation in the tunnel blowing in through a smashed window and fanning the fire
(Ingason, 2003). The natural draft in the tunnel is normally going upward, and on the day of
the accident the upward draft was about 10 m/s. About 30 minutes into the fire the lower
hauling rope (steel cable) snaps and shoots downhill. Since there was a risk of the emergency
brakes failing, the rescue attempt was abandoned at that time (Schupfer, 2001).The total fire
duration was about 3 hours, leaving the train totally burned out, and only 12 survivors who
had managed to escape downhill out of the tunnel. A total of 155 people perished in this
accident, 150 of them in the ascending train, two on the descending train, and three in the
upper terminal who died from the toxic fumes generated by the fire (Schupfer, 2001).

17

18

3 HIGH TEMPERATURE PROPERTIES OF ROCK

Several mechanical and physical properties of rock change with temperature. Heuze (1983)
published the result of an extensive literature study of the effect of high temperatures on
mechanical, physical and thermal properties of granitic rocks. The studied properties are listed
in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. Mechanical, physical and thermal properties studied by Heuze (1983).
Mechanical properties

Physical properties

Thermal properties

Youngs modulus
Poissons ratio
Tensile strength
Compressive strength
Viscosity
Thermal expansion

Density
Permeability

Melting temperature
Heat of fusion
Specific heat
Thermal conductivity
Thermal diffusivity

The most important mechanical properties to consider in regard to fires are Youngs modulus,
compressive strength and thermal expansion. Youngs modulus and compressive strength are
affected by both temperature and pressure. The variation of the normalized Youngs modulus
with temperature is shown in Figure 3-1. Increasing the surrounding pressure tends to delay
the decay of the normalized modulus when the temperature increases (Heuze, 1983).

Figure 3-1. Normalized Youngs modulus versus temperature, from Heuze (1983).

19

The compressive strength decreases with increasing temperature, as shown in Figure 3-2. At a
surrounding pressure of 500 MPa, the difference in strength is 700 MPa between samples at
300C and 900C, respectively.

Figure 3-2. Variation of compressive strength with temperature, from Heuze (1983).
Heating of rock leads to thermal expansion, which can be reversible or irreversible depending
on the heating rate and the maximum temperature. Richter and Simmons (1974) studied the
thermal expansion behaviour of igneous rocks, and found that for heating rates less than
2C/min, and a maximum temperature of 250C, the expansion curves are reproducible and
no permanent strains are induced. The thermal expansion of a rock type depends on its
constituent minerals. Quartz-rich rocks have a larger thermal expans ion than rocks with low
quartz content. The thermal expansions of some minerals are shown in Figure 3-3.

20

Figure 3-3. Thermal expansion of typical minerals found in granitic rocktypes, from Simmons
and Cooper (1978). The minerals are a) quartz, b) olivine, c) pyroxene, d) orthoclase, and e)
plagioclase.
A schematic of the variation of the linear thermal expansion with pressure and temperature is
shown in Figure 3-4. Increasing the pressure increase the --transition temperature, and
lowers the peak thermal expansion (Heuze, 1983). The --transition of quartz is an
important event, that occurs at a temperature of 573C. At this temperature quartz changes
from one form to another with an accompanying increase in volume. The physical properties
are not dependent on temperature in the short time interval considered here, i.e., the duration
of a fire.

Figure 3-4. Coefficient of thermal expansion versus temperature, from Heuze (1983).
21

Dry granite melts at about 1050C, but partially or fully saturated rock melts at lower
temperatures. The specific heat of granite is discontinuous around the --transition, but the
general trend is that the specific heat increases with increasing temperature (Heuze, 1983), see
Figure 3-5. The thermal conductivity decreases with increasing temperature, see Figure 3-6, in
the interval 20 to 300C. The thermal diffusivity also decreases with increasing temperature,
and shows a minimum at the --transition, see Figure 3-7 (Heuze, 1983).

Figure 3-5. Specific heat versus temperature, from Heuze (1983).

Figure 3-6. Thermal conductivity versus temperature, from Heuze (1983).

22

Figure 3-7. Thermal diffusivity versus temperature, from Heuze (1983).

The temperature related failures are spalling due to differential expansion of adjacent minerals
leading to build up of thermal stresses that are added to the compressive stresses already
acting. If the combined stress level exceeds the tensile strength of the rock, cracking (failure)
will occur, and spalling of material is the result.

23

24

4 CONCRETE
This chapter explains the behaviour of concrete when it is subjected to high temperature due
to fires. Some of the topics are the effects of raised temperatures, typical failure modes, and
how spalling can be prevented. Shotcrete is also covered as a means of protecting the
structural concrete from heat.

4.1 Effects of high temperatures

Two things happen in concrete subjected to high temperatures due to fire; 1) the mechanical
properties deteriorate, and 2) explosive spalling (Khoury, 2000). The deterioration of the
mechanical properties is caused by physicochemical changes in the cement paste and in the
aggregates and thermal incompatibility between the aggregates and the cement paste. These
are all influenced by environmental factors, such as temperature level, heating rate, applied
loading, and sealing (prevents moisture loss from the surface) (Khoury, 2000). The
physicochemical changes with temperature are listed in Table 4-1. The temperatures are for
the concrete material, not the fire. Explosive spalling occurs when the surface temperature of
the concrete is between 300C and 400C, and depends on type of concrete and heating rate
(Khoury, 2000).
Table 4-1. Physicochemical changes of concrete with temperature, after Khoury (2000).
Temperature (C) Event
100
300
600
700
800
1200
1300-1400

Hydrothermal reactions
Loss
of chemically
water starts.
Calcium
hydroxide bound
dissociates
Triple
point
of
water
Marked increase in creep
--inversion
quartz =>
expansion of aggregates
Dissociation ofofcalcium
carbonate
Ceramic binding
Total
loss
of water of hydration
Melting
starts
Concrete melted

The compressive strength of concrete decreases when the temperature is increased from room
temperature to about 80C, however, this decrease is largely reversible upon cooling. Above
300C most concretes show a strength reduction, how large depends on the aggregates and
cement paste used. Above temperatures of 550-600C the concrete has lost enough strength so
as not to be structurally useful (Khoury, 2000). In a fire, usually only the first few centimetres
closest to the surface are subjected to temperatures above 330C due to the low thermal
diffusivity of the concrete. This layer provides insulation to the inner concrete and the
reinforcing steel, although its structural strength is greatly diminished. This layer is usually
replaced after the fire.

25

Bostrm (2003) noted that the results from fire tests on concrete varied greatly with regard to
spalling. Several tests on three different kinds of concrete (normal, high strength, and self
compacting concrete) were performed to find the relation between spalling and water content,
water-powder ratio, and also to see the effect of addition of polypropylene fibres. The results
of testing of concrete columns showed a reduction of spalling when polypropylene fibres were
used, but a higher proportion of fibre did not give a better performance (Bostrm, 2003). The
optimum performance and proportion of fibres seemed to vary with concrete quality and
possibly with curing (in air or under water). The results from testing of slabs show a clear
reduction of spalling when polypropylene fibres were added. The conclusions from the tests
were that self compacting concrete spall much more than normal concrete with the same w/cratio, but that addition of polypropylene fibres or some kind of insulation reduces spalling
significantly.

4.2 Failure modes

Spalling is a common form of failure for fire heated concrete. The spalling can be either
violent (fast) or non-violent (slow), and can be grouped into four categories; aggregate
spalling, explosive spalling, surface spalling, and corner/sloughing-off spalling (Khoury,
2000). Khoury (2000) states that the first three types occur during the first 20-30 min of a fire
and that they depend on the heating rate (20-30C/min), while the last type occurs after 30-60
min of fire and depends on the maximum temperature. The damage caused by spalling can
vary from only superficial to severely reducing the safety of the structure in case of fire. The
most important factors that influence spalling are heating rate, permeability of the material,
pore saturation level, presence of reinforcement, and level of applied loading (Khoury, 2000).
Several different theories have been proposed to explain explosive spalling. There are three
main causes of spalling, namely:
- pore pressure,
- thermal stress, and
- combined pore pressure and thermal stress.
Characteristics of the different types of spalling are shown in Table 4-2, and their main
influencing factors in Table 4-3.
Table 4-2. Characteristics of spalling, modified after Khoury (2000).

Time of occurrence (min)

Nature
Sound
Damage

Aggregate

Corner

Surface

Explosive

7-30
splitting
popping
superficial

30-90
non-violent
none
can be serious

7-30
violent
cracking
can be serious

7-30
violent
loud bang
Serious

26

Table 4-3. The types of spalling and their influencing factors, modified after Khoury (2000).

Aggregate thermal expansion

Aggregate thermal diffusivity
Shear strength of concrete
Tensile strength of concrete
Age of concrete
Heating rate
Loading/restraint
Heating profile
Permeability
Section shape
Reinforcement
Aggregate size
Maximum temperature
Moisture content
Section size

Aggregate

Corner

Surface

Explosive
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Pore pressure spalling is influenced by the permeability of the concrete, the initial water
saturation level, and the heating rate (Khoury, 2000). Thermal stress spalling is explained by
the fact that heating of a material with low conductivity (like concrete or some ceramics)
creates temperature gradients that induce compressive stresses close to the heated surface and
tensile stresses in the cooler regions. The compressive stresses at the surface can be enhanced
by load. The theory behind the combined pore pressure thermal stress is that explosive
spalling is a result of pore pressure, compression in the region closest to the surface (caused
by thermal stresses and external loading), and internal cracking, see Figure 4-1. During
heating, cracks form in the material as the sum of the stresses exceeds the tensile strength of
the material. The formation of cracks is accompanied by a sudden release of energy and the
sudden failure of the heated surface material.
Tests performed by Jansson (2005) have shown that the pore pressures are not very high at the
onset of spalling. A fire test of a concrete panel showed that when spalling initiated 15 min
into the test, the temperature at 10 mm depth was about 200C and the pressure in the
concrete about 0.7 MPa. This pressure is lower than the tensile strength of concrete at the
measured temperature, and indicates that pore pressures probably are less important than
thermal stresses as a cause of spalling (Jansson, 2005).

27

Load, L, and
thermal stress, t

Pore pressure, p
Spall

Pores

Concrete
L + t
Figure 4-1. Forces in heated concrete, after Khoury (2000).

4.3 Prevention of spalling

Great efforts have been made on trying to prevent spalling. In the past the only effective way
of doing this was to create a thermal barrier to insulate the concrete from the heat. The
problem with the thermal barrier was that it had to be made of a material that in itself would
not burn easily. Since the invention of the polypropylene fibre, the thermal barriers are not as
important anymore. The addition of polypropylene fibres into the concrete mix increases the
permeability during heating above 160C (melting temperature of the fibres). The melted
fibre leaves a channel in the concrete that allows moisture to escape, preventing build-up of
pore pressures (Khoury, 2000). The results of Jansson (2005) seem to contradict this theory,
but still concrete with addition of polypropylene fibres tend to spall less than a concrete
without polypropylene fibres. A summary of different preventive methods is shown in Table
4-4.

28

Table 4-4. Methods for preventing spalling of concrete, modified after Khoury (2000).
Method

Effectiveness

Polypropylene fibres

Very effective, even in high strength

concrete

Air-entraining agent

Very effective

Thermal barrier

Very effective

Moisture content
control
Compressive stress
control

Comments

Reduces pore pressures

Reduce explosive pressures

Not economical as sections sizes increases

Choice of aggregate

Best to use low expansion and small

size aggregates

Reinforcement

Reduces spalling damage

Supplementary
reinforcement
Choice of section
shape

May not prevent spalling in expansive UHPC.

Does not reduce temperatures, only pore
pressures
Can reduce strength
Reduces concrete temperature, increases fire
resistance
Normal moisture content is usually above the
no spalling limit for most buildings

If low moisture lightweight concrete is used,

additional fire resistance is possible, but in
high-moisture conditions violent spalling is
promoted
Presence of reinforcement limited spread of
spalling in the Channel Tunnel fire

Reduces spalling damage

Difficult to use in small and narrow sections

Thicker sections reduce spalling

damage

Important for I-beams and ribbed sections

After a fire incident the damage to the concrete can be assessed by concrete petrography
(Nijland and Larbi, 2001). High temperatures results in changes of some phases of both the
cement paste and the aggregates which may alter the colour of the concrete and the original
mineralogical composition of both the cement paste and the aggregates. These changes can be
used to find isograds (horizons of similar composition and/or appearance) in the concrete.
Since these isograds depend on the temperature they will coincide with isotherms and can
therefore be used to trace the temperature variations with depth from the surface (Nijland and
Larbi, 2001). Concrete petrography can be done on three levels of increasing accuracy: visual
and stereomicroscopic inspection, fluorescent macroscopic analysis (FMA), and polarising
and fluorescent microscopy (PFM). The first is performed on drilled cores, FMA on flatpolished sections, and PFM on fluorescent thin sections. The visual inspection is aimed at
finding the colour variations with depth from the surface, patterns of cracking in and around
the aggregates, width and depth of cracks, dissolution and loss of bonding to the aggregate
particles, and the integrity of the cement paste (Nijland and Larbi, 2001). The isograds that
can be identified by the naked eye together with the corresponding temperatures are listed in
Table 4-5.

29

Table 4-5. Isograds in concrete with corresponding temperatures, after Nijland and Larbi
(2001).
Temperature (C)
< 300
300-350

573

> 800

Comment
Normal, no apparent macroscopic changes in concrete. The colour remains grey.
Oxidation of iron hydroxides like FeOOH in aggregate and cement paste to hematite,
-Fe2 O3 , causing a permanent change of colour of the concrete from grey to pinkish
brown.
Transition of -quartz to -quartz, accompanied by an instantaneous increase in
volume of about 5 %, resulting in a radial cracking pattern around the quartz grains in
the aggregate. This phase transition itself is reversible, but the radial cracking
provides a diagnostic feature that remains after cooling.
Complete disintegration of calcareous constituents of the aggregate and cement paste
due to both dissociation and extreme thermal stresses, causing a whitish grey
coloration of the concrete.

4.4 Test methods

The testing methods most commonly used are furnace tests, both in small and large scale.
Testing in a furnace has the advantage of controlling the temperature quite exactly, and the
tests can also be observed and documented as they proceed. The disadvantage is that they can
be quite expensive, since experienced personnel are required for the operation of the furnace.
Chapter 6 provides a more detailed description of fire tests, both furnace and full-scale tests.

4.5 Shotcrete as fire protection

The most common way of providing fire protection for tunnel elements made of concrete is to
add a layer of shotcrete. Shotcrete has several advantages over other insulation materials. It is
easy to apply in the desired thickness, the properties can be adapted to fit the requirements for
each project, and it can be applied economically with a machine. If a fire occurs, the shotcrete
can also easily be replaced.
4.5.1 Shotcrete on concrete
Fire testing of concrete slabs to be used as lining in tunnels is a way of ensuring that the fire
protection is sufficient. In the test described here, three different shotcrete qualities were
tested (Bostrm, 2005). The differences in shotcrete recipe were the amount of steel fibres,
amount of polypropylene fibres, and applied thickness (60 or 90 mm). All the cast concrete
slabs were of the same quality, K45. Before application of the shotcrete the surface was either
washed or water-jeted. To provide better contact between concrete and shotcrete different
mechnical bonds (bolts) were used. The slabs were subjected to the RWS-curve (see Figure
6-1). Already after 4 minutes some samples start to spall, and after about 22 minutes all
samples have had some spalling of the shotcrete. The maximum spalling depth for the
samples with shotcrete thickness 90 mm ranges between 50 and 91 mm. The spalling depth is
measured from the concrete-shotcrete interface, with the positive direction towards the

30

shotcrete. The samples with shotcrete thickness of 60 mm had a maximum spalling depth of
about 40 mm, i.e., spalling of the concrete had started (Bostrm, 2005).
4.5.2 Shotcrete on rock
Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1990) tested granite slabs protected by shotcrete according to
the ISO834 fire curve. The slabs had an area of about 1 m2 , and a thickness of 20 - 30 cm. The
shotcrete was applied in different thicknesses and with different reinforcement. In about half
of the tests the shotcrete was anchored to the rock slabs with bolts, which in some cases were
insulated, as indicated in Table 4-6. A summary of the composition of the samples is shown in
Table 4-6.
Table 4-6. Composition of samples, from Mangs and Keski- Rahkonen (1990).
Thickness
[mm]

Sample Process Reinforcement

1

dry mix

dry mix

3
4

wet mix
wet mix

Anchored

20 30

3.4 mm steel wire mesh

60 80

3.4 mm steel wire mesh

60 100
50 110

+, insulated
+, insulated

wet mix

steel fibre, 18 mm, 75 kg/m3

80 100

-, sample edges fixed to furnace

6
7

wet mix
wet mix

steel fibre, 25 mm, 70 kg/m3

plastic fibre, 900 g/m3

75 115
20 60

+, not insulated
-, sample edges fixed to furnace

wet mix

plastic fibre, 900 g/m3

40 - 120

+, not insulated

Changes of the shotcrete surface were observed visually (Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen, 1990).
The duration of the tests varied from 15 min to 4 hours. A summary of the results of the tests
and the observations made is shown in Table 4-7.
Table 4-7. Summary of shotcrete tests, from Mangs and Keski- Rahkonen (1990).
Sample Location Duration of test Test results
1

ceiling

16 min

wall

3h

ceiling

4h

wall

4h

wall

2 h 35 min

ceiling

53 min

ceiling

2 h 35 min

wall

55 min

Granite-shotcrete bond breakage at 11 min, the whole shotcrete

layer fell to the floor. Granite cleavage at 15 min.
No spalling observed. Cracking of granite at 1 h 28 min.
Slight spalling between 45 min and 1 h. Fissures in granite at 3
h 15 min.
Slight spalling between 25 min and 40 min. Fissures in granite
at 2 h 20 min, cleaving of granite at 3 h 15 min.
No spalling observed.
Granite-shotcrete bond breakage at 17 to 23 min. Breakage of
anchor bolts at 53 min and the whole shotcrete layer fell to the
floor. No spalling observed.
Variations in shotcrete thickness, thinner parts fell to the floor
during the test. No spalling observed in thicker part.
Spalling in a poorly insulated corner at 21 min.

31

Temperatures in the samples were measured at the shotcrete-rock interface and at halfthickness of the shotcrete layer. A summary of the temperatures for the different locations for
each sample are shown in Table 4-8. In some cases spalling of the shotcrete in the vicinity of
the thermocouples give anomalous temperature readings, these have been discarded in Table
4-8.
Table 4-8. Summary of temperature measurements by Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1990).
Sample

Duration Interface Half-thickness

Comment
of test
temp [C]
temp [C]

16 min

80

100

Temperature at 11 min.

3h

410-460

650-680

4h

360-440

420-470

4h

300-540

520-700

2 h 35 min

240-290

270-420

53 min

80-100

140-220

7
8

2 h 35 min
55 min

650-870
90-110

720-900
110-150

Lowe r temp refers to thermocouple at centre of

slab.
Thermocouple 4-5 mm from interface. Lower
temp refers to thermocouple at centre of slab.
Thermocouple 2-5 mm from interface

The temperature on the outside of the granite slabs (at the centre) was measured on samples 3
and 4. After 2 hours the temperature was about 30C, after 3 hours about 50C, and after 4
hours about 60C (Mangs and Keski- Rahkonen, 1990). No note of the exact thickness of these
slabs can be found in the article.
Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1990) summarized their observations from the tests:
- bond breakage occurred in all tests (both with and without mechanical anchoring),
- slight spalling of the shotcrete caused by water pressure was observed,
- when the shotcrete layer fell off, the hot fire gases caused a thermal shock to the granite
which started spalling, and
- large thermal stresses broke the shotcrete la yer and the granite slab in sample 7.
As a conclusion Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen (1990) say that mechanical anchoring of the
shotcrete to the rock is important, since bond breakage occurred in all samples, but that the
steel bolts have to be insulated from the heat.

32

5 HIGH TEMPERATURE PROPERTIES OF STEEL

Construction steel, e.g. steel used as reinforcement of concrete and as rockbolts (rebar), has
high tensile strength. When the steel is used for concrete reinforcement it can sometimes be
pre-tensioned, to provide a compressive force to the concrete beam. If the steel is heated to a
temperature of about 300C the steel looses the pre-tensioning and almost all strength. This is
a concern in building construction, and the concrete is therefore designed to insulate the steel
from the heat of a fire. This is accomplished by ensuring that the steel is covered by a thick
concrete cover. When steel is used as rock bolts to reinforce a rock mass, no such protection
from heat can be ensured, since the bolts are installed perpendicularly to the rock surface. To
provide the best possible reinforcement, the shotcrete is installed first, and then the bolts are
installed through the shotcrete, which leaves the ends of the bolts unprotected from heat.

33

34

6 FIRE TESTS
There are generally two types of fire tests, which will both be described in this chapter. The
first type is performed to determine the fire resistance of construction components such as
beams with regard to spalling, load carrying capacity and ability to function as a barrier. This
type of fire test is described in chapter 6.1. The second type of fire tests are performed to test
the behaviour of a fire with regard to different tunnel cross-sections, and can be performed on
different scales. These types of tests are described in chapter 6.2. Full scale tests performed
during the 90s and beginning of the 21st century are described in chapter 6.3. For more
details concerning tunnel fire experiments from the 1960s until present day, the reader is
referred to Carvel and Marlair (2005).

6.1 Fire resistance tests

Fire resistance is defined as the ability of an element of building construction to continue to
perform its function as a barrier or structural component during the course of a fire
(Drysdale, 1998). The fire resistance is determined by subjecting a full-scale sample to a
standard fire. The sample can be loaded to model its function in the structure, and it can be
tested to failure. The standard fire is a time-temperature relationship ensured by a furnace. To
determine the fire resistance of different materials some different fire curves have been
developed. For building materials it is common to use the ISO 834 fire curve, which is based
on a typical fire source of cellulose materials, e.g., wood, paper and fabric, such that can be
found in any home. The curve has a moderate temperature rise up to 1000C over a time
period of 120 min (Khoury, 2000), see curve ISO834 in Figure 6-1. The off-shore and
petrochemical industries use a different standard fire, in which the temperature rises rapidly
up to 900C over the first 5 min, and peaks at 1100C (Khoury, 2000). This curve is based on
hydrocarbon fires, and is shown as curve HC in Figure 6-1. After the tunnel fires during the
90s it was realized that a fire in a tunnel could produce a more severe fire scenario than the
hydrocarbon curve. The Netherlands, which has many under-water tunnels, has developed a
more severe fire curve than the hydrocarbon curve. The curve is based on a petrol tanker with
a fire load of 300 MW that causes a fire that lasts for 2 hours. The curve (RWS in Figure
6-1) has a very rapid temperature rise up to 1200C, a peak of 1350C after 60 min, and then
a gradual fall to 1200C after 2 hours (Khoury, 2000). The peak temperature represents the
melting temperature of concrete.
Two fire curves representing less severe tunnel fires than the RWS curve are the German
RABT and EBA curves. These curves has the same rapid temperature increase up to 1200C,
which is then sustained for 30 min (RABT) and 60 min (EBA), and then a cooling phase
follows (Carvel, 2005).

35

The importance of including the cooling-off phase was noted by Wetzig (2001). Heating of a
concrete sample up to 1600C for two hours produced no cracking or collapse, but 30 minutes
after the end of the test the sample exploded. Wetzig (2001) noted that as the sample cooled
glazing of the surface took place, thus preventing water vapour from escaping, which led to
pressure build- up and finally the explosive destruction of the sample.
1400

Furnace temperature [ C]

1200

1000
RWS
800

HC
ISO 834
EBA

600

RABT
400

200

0
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Time [min]

Figure 6-1. European fire curves, after Khoury (2000) and Carvel (2005).
In 2004 concrete panels of four different qualities were fire tested at SP (Wickstrm, 2004). A
summary of the different qualities is shown in Table 6-1. A total of 16 samples were tested,
samples 1 to 10 were tested without load, and samples 11 to 16 were tested with a load of 6.25
MN, which gives a theoretical compressive stress of 9.6 MPa. The samples were tested
according to the RWS fire curve, see Figure 6-1
Table 6-1. Sample numbering and concrete qualities, after Wickstrm (2004).
Concrete

Sample

K65, no fibres

1, 2, 9 and 10

K65, 1.0 kg/m3

3, 4, 11 and 12

K65, 1.5 kg/m

5, 6, 13 and 14

K45, 1.0 kg/m3

7, 8, 15 and 16

36

The unloaded samples (1 to 8) were tested first. It was noted that extensive spalling started
after only 2 minutes in samples 1 and 2 and after 3 minutes also sample 3 starts to spall
extensively. Spalling of sample 3 stopped after about 11 minutes. Spalling of samples 1 and 2
stopped after 27 minutes. After the test was concluded glazing of the surface as well as
formation of craters (diameter 5 30 mm) and stalactites (maximum diameter 10 mm and
maximum length 50 mm) was observed on all samples (Wickstrm, 2004). Craters and
stalactites were more common on the samples that did not spall.
The loaded samples (11 to 16) and samples 9 and 10 were tested together. It was noted that
extensive spalling started after only 1.5 minutes in samples 9 and 10 and after about 2 minutes
light spalling starts in sample 11. After about 2.5 minutes also samples 13 and 16 started to
spall lightly. After 3 minutes there is extensive spalling of sample 11. Spalling of sample 11
stopped after about 12 minutes. Spalling of samples 9 and 10 stopped after 23 minutes. After
the test was concluded glazing of the surface as well as formation of craters (diameter 5 30
mm) and stalactites (maximum diameter 10 mm and maximum length 50 mm) was observed
on all samples (Wickstrm, 2004). Craters and stalactites were more common on the samples
that did not spall.
The conclusion from these tests is that K65 concrete without fibres and with 1.0 kg/m3 of
polypropylene fibres spall more easily than K65 concrete with 1.5 kg/m3 of polypropylene
fibres. The influence of loading is uncertain since only one loaded sample (no. 11) spalled,
but the loaded sample showed spalling to a greater depth when compared with the unloaded
sample of the same quality. The samples with concrete K45 showed no spalling when
unloaded, and only light spalling (not measureable) with the load applied.

6.2 Fire behaviour tests

In this section tests on smaller scales than full scale are described. These types of tests are
mainly performed to test smoke flow and control. The tunnels in the reduced scale tests have a
height of 1.2 3 m, a width of 1.08 5.4 m and a length of 11 366 m. The advantage of
testing at a reduced scale is that it is cheaper than a full scale test, which means that more tests
can be performed at a lower cost. In these tests the heat source is often some kind of fuel pool,
(petrol, kerosene, heptane, or methanol) or wooden cribs. There are some limitations to small
scale tests that have to be considered. The results of a reduced scale test are only useful if
there is a similarity between the scale model and the full scale tunnel of interest (Carvel and
Marlair, 2005). If there is a strong similarity, the scale model can be used to test specific
aspects of the behaviour of the fire or smoke, and if the similarity is less strong the scale
model can only be used to gain general information. To scale between reality and a scale
model of strong similarity, the gas flow at and around the fire must be considered (Carvel and
Marlair, 2005). Gas flow can be described with non-dimensional numbers, such as the Froude
37

number, the Reynolds number, the Richardson number, and the Grashof number. In the ideal
case all of these numbers should be the same for the scale model and the real case. Typically
only conservation of the Froude number (see Eq. 6-1) is considered, since it is impossible to
conserve all the numbers (Carvel and Marlair, 2005). The Froude number is proportional to
HRR2 /L5 , where L is a characteristic dimension (usually the tunnel height) and is formally
defined as

Fr =

U2
,
gL

(6-1)

where U is the velocity of the gases, g is the acceleration due to gravity and L is a
characteristic dimension of the system (Ingason, 2005).
Reduced scale tests have been used to, e.g., test sprinkler systems, provide data for
comparison with numerical models, test conditions in refuges during a fire, and to investigate
how under-ventilation affects the HRR of a fire (Carvel and Marlair, 2005).
Laboratory scale tests should ideally be used as a complement to full scale tests and numerical
simulations, since although they may give information on the behaviour of larger-scale fires,
the similarity to full scale fires is not necessarily good (Carvel and Marlair, 2005). The Froude
scaling criterion may not apply to fires in tunnels smaller than about 1 m in diameter, and
small scale pool fires behave very differently from full scale pools. The size of these small
scale tunnels range from 0.1 0.3 m high, 0.2 0.5 m wide, and the length varies between 1
m and about 30 m. These small tunnels have been used to test smoke flow, to find the critical
ventilation velocity, and to provide information for comparison with numerical simulation
results.

6.3 Full scale tests

Full scale tests are expensive but can give valuable information about the fire behaviour that
cannot be found from a reduced scale or laboratory test. The effect of ventilation for instance
can be difficult to simulate correctly on a small scale. In full scale tests, the fire source can be
fuel pools, wooden cribs, real vehicles and/or combinations of these (Carvel and Marlair,
2005). The purpose of the tests can also vary. Some are performed to test different ventilation
set-ups to control the flow of smoke, others test the efficiency of sprinkler systems or the
effect of fire on the tunnel lining. Some of the tests performed the 90s and beginning of the
21st century are summarized below. Special notice has been given to the research objectives
and whether there is any note of the effect of fire on the surrounding rock.
Several full scale fire tests in tunnels have been performed during the past 15 years. The first
two tests (Repparfjord and Lappeenranta) were part of a EUREKA-project called Firetun,

38

which ran between 1985 and 1995. The project was a joint research project between nine
European countries, among them Sweden, Norway and Finland. The project examined fires in
transport tunnels, and the research was based on full scale tests (Firetun, 1995). The
objectives of the project were to provide information on:
- fire phenomena,
- escape, rescue and fire extinguishing possibilities,
- the effect of the surrounding structural parts on the fire,
- reusing the structure,
- accumulation of theory on fire behavior, and
- formation, distribution and precipitation of the contaminants.
Not all of the objectives were realized in the project, but the results provide an important
foundation of data for future research.
The Runehamar Tunnel tests were performed by SP (Swedish National Testing and Research
Institute), and were aimed at obtaining knowledge of fire development in different HGV
cargos in a tunnel with forced longitudinal ventilation (Ingason and Lnnermark, 2005).
In 1997 the Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA) performed a fire test in a blasted
rock tunnel. The aim of the test was to determine the effect of ventilation on the heat release
rate and to find correlations between optical density and gas concentration at different
locations in the tunnel (Ingason et al., 1997).
6.3.1 Repparfjord tunnel
The test tunnel is located in a mine in Repparfjord, Norway, about 45 km south-east of
Hammerfest (Firetun, 1995). The tunnel is 2.3 km long, 5.3 - 7.0 m wide, and 4.8 - 6.0 m
high. The cross-section is horseshoe shaped, but with irregular sides and a slightly flattened
roof. At one end of the tunnel there is a shaft, about 3 m in diameter and 90 m high. The walls
and roof of the tunnel around the fire location was reinforced with 15 cm and 20 cm of steelfibre reinforced light-weight shotcrete, respectively. The fibre-reinforcement worked well
since no spalling was noted after the tests (Firetun, 1995), despite maximum temperatures of
1000C close to the roof in several of the tests.
6.3.2 Lappeenranta tunnel
The tunnel in which the tests were conducted is situated in Lappeenranta, Finland, in a
limestone quarry (Keski- Rahkonen et.al., 1986). The tunnel is 140 m long, 5.5 - 6.1 m wide
and 4.5 - 5.0 m high. The rock mass is to 90 % made up of calcite. Two tests were performed
in the tunnel, the first to simulate a fire in a subway train, and the other was a simulated small

39

car multiple fire. In the first test measurement of the temperature in the centre of the ceiling
failed because falling rocks destroyed the thermocouple (or cable), but halfway between midceiling and abutment the measured maximum temperature was 210C, and the maximum
temperature at the wall was 100C (Keski-Rahkonen et.al, 1986). The heat release rate was
about 1.8 MW. In this test the rock was unprotected and large amounts of rock fell down.
Already 25 minutes from ignition spalling from the roof started, spalling occurred over nearly
the whole length of the tunnel. Closest to the fire location the damage was worst, with damage
to a depth of about 20 cm in the roof and 10 cm in the walls. The largest single block weighed
about 400 kg.
The second test consisted of 8 wood piles where two piles were ignited at the start of the test
to see if the fire would spread to the other piles (Keski-Rahkonen et. al., 1986). Fire spread
did not occur, so piles 7 and 8 had to be ignited separately. During the first part of the test the
measured maximum air temperature in the ceiling was 800C, giving a rock surface
temperature of 450C in the ceiling and 210C in the wall. During the second part of the test
the maximum air temperature reached only about 400C. The heat release rate of the first half
of the experiment was 8 MW but only 4 MW for the second half. No explanation for this big
difference in two very similar set-ups is offered by Keski- Rahkonen et. al. (1986). In this test
some roof sections were protected by 10 cm mineral wool, which was sufficient to prevent
blocks from falling down on the weighing platform. Rock still spalled from the ceiling, but
the pieces were smaller and the total amount less. No information on support of the tunnel
was found in the report.
6.3.3 Runehamar tunnel
The Runehamar tunnel is located about 40 km south of Molde, Norway, and is a two-way
asphalt road tunnel that has been taken out of use (Lnnermark and Ingason, 2003). The
tunnel is 6 m high, 9 m wide, 1.6 km long and has a slope of 1-3 %. The rock around the
tunnel is hard gneiss (Opstad and Wighus, 2003). During the fall of 2003 a series of four fire
tests were performed in the tunnel. To protect the rock and provide a safe working
environment an inner shell of protection boards was erected over a length of 75 m. At both
ends an additional 10-25 m of the tunnel was protected by ceramic curtains to prevent hot
gases from penetrating behind the protective shell. The fire test consisted of fake HGVs with
different loads, see Table 6-2. The loads consisted of about 80 % cellulose and 20 % plastic,
which is a good representation of the load of an actual HGV (Ingason and Lnnermark, 2003).

40

Table 6-2. Description of fire loads and results from measurements (Ingason and Lnnermark,
2003).
Test Description of load
T1
T2
T3
T4

380 wood pallets, 74 plastic pallets

216 wood pallets, 240 polyurethane
mattresses
Furniture and fixtures, 10 rubber
tyres (800 kg)
600 carton boxes containing
polystyrene cups, 40 wood pallets

Weight
[kg]

Theoretical calorific
energy [GJ]

Measured peak
HRR [MW]

10911

240

203 (average)

6853

129

158 (average)

8500

152

125

3120

67

70

The time from ignition to peak HRR varied between 8 and 18.5 min in the four tests, and the
fire growth (between 5 and 100 MW) varied between 17 and 29 MW/min for tests T1, T2 and
T3, and for test T4 the fire growth was about 18 MW/min from HRR 5 MW to 70 MW
(Ingason and Lnnermark, 2003). The maximum air temperatures measured in the tests varied
between 1281C and 1305C. Lemaire (2003) calculated the radiation temperature on the
walls of the tunnel for each test. The radiation temperature is calculated to estimate the
thermal load on the wall, and uses the heat flux measured during the tests. The heat flux is
converted to the temperature of a black body radiating the same temperature that is received
by the wall (Lemaire, 2003). The error in the conversion is on the order of 20C to 50C. For
test T1 the thermal load is on average 900C for about 30 min, with peaks up to 1100C. For
tests T2 and T4 the average temperature is 800C for about 15 min, and in test T3 the average
temperature over 15 min is 700C.
During and after test T1 rocks fell from the roof both upstream and downstream of the fire
location (Lnnermark and Ingason, 2003). During test T2 rocks fell through the roof of
protective boards. Downstream of the fire location the rock was affected almost all the way to
the entrance of the tunnel, about 400 m away. Upstream of the fire, rocks fell over a short
length due to backlayering of hot gases from the fire. There is no information on tunnel
support reported in the articles describing the fire tests.
HRR values in technical specifications are often given as one value for a given vehicle, and
the time history of the HRR is not included. For a general case one European standard
(PIARC) gives a value of 20-30 MW, and the Swedish guideline for road tunnels (ATB
Tunnel, 2004) specifies that the ventilation should be able to control smoke from a 100 MW
fire. No specification of type of fire load is given. Ingason and Lnnermark (2005) made
comparisons to three other fire tests involving HGVs; Repparfjord, Mont Blanc, and 2nd
Benelux tunnel. A summary of the HRRs from those fire tests are shown in Table 6-3.

41

Table 6-3. Fire loads in tunne l fire tests Ingason and Lnnermark (2005).
HGV fire load

Ventilation

Repparfjord

Real HGV 87 GJ
Simulated HGV 64 GJ

2-3 m/s and 5-6 m/s

0.7 m/s (natural)

Mont Blanc

Real HGV 76 GJ

2nd Benelux

Simulated HGV 10 and 20 GJ

0.5 m/s (natural),

4-6 and 6m/s

Comment
Load consisted of furniture
Load consisted of wood, rubber tyres
and plastic
Fire load less than what was estimated
from the fire accident
Load consisted of wood pallets

The results from the Runehamar test series showed that the growth rate of the fire was
approximately linear for all tests between HRR 5 and 100 MW, see Figure 6-2. The maximum
HRR developed was between 66 and 202 MW, and the time from ignition to maximum HRR
was between 7 and 18.5 min (Ingason and Lnnermark, 2005).

Figure 6-2. HRR versus time from the Runehamar tunnel fire test series, from Ingason and
Lnnermark (2005).
6.3.4 Blasted rock tunnel, Sweden
In November 1997 the Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA) made a fire test in a
blasted rock tunnel (Ingason et al., 1997). The tunnel was 3 m wide, 3 m high, and 100 m
long. Closest to the fire source the roof was covered for 15 m by 50 mm thick light- weight
concrete slabs. The walls were protected by 100 mm of insulation for 3-4 m around the fire
source. At all other locations the walls were unprotected (Ingason et al., 1997). The testing
time was very short, only 20-25 min, and the average heat release rate was about 1.5 MW for

42

both tests. The maximum temperature 1 cm into the concrete (measured from the side closest
to the fire) was 220C in one of the tests. No remark about fallen rock is made in the report.

43

44

7 SWEDISH TUNNEL SPECIFICATIONS

There are two technical specifications for tunnel constructions in Sweden, one concerning
railways (BV Tunnel 2005) and one for roads (Tunnel 2004 ). The main part of the
regulations regarding fire concerns concrete and its strength and fire resistance. The
requirements of a major structural component in case of a fire is that (BV Tunnel, 2005)
- collapse should not occur,
- fall-outs from the component should not become obstacles or be a danger during the time
required for escape of passengers and personnel,
- the safety of the rescue personnel should be considered regarding fall outs.
In both specifications the gas temperatures during a fire should be assumed to follow curve I
in Figure 7-1 for
-180 minutes in tunnels where transportation of goods (for road tunnels, all goods except
dangerous goods in class 2) is allowed, and
-120 minutes in tunnels where only passenger traffic takes place (for road tunnels also goods,
except dangerous goods in classes 1, 2 and 3 is allowed).

Figure 7-1. Fire curves specified in Swedish tunnelling specifications, from BV Tunnel
(2005).
Railway tunnels under water and under buildings should be designed for a cooling rate of
600C/h added to the fire curves in Figure 7-1, for other tunnels the load from the cooling
phase does not need to be considered (BV Tunnel, 2005). For road tunnels it must be checked

45

how the structure ais affected by a cooling phase corresponding to a cooling rate of 600C/h
(Tunnel 2004, 2004). It is stated in the technical specifications that components that are
necessary for ensuring safe escape and rescue operations must be proven to withstand fire
without local damage, such as fall outs, during the given escape and rescue time frame, which
is set to a minimum of 45 min. It is also stated that spalling of concrete can occur when the
200C isotherm has reached a depth of 2 cm (Tunnel 2004, 2004). It is noted that the moisture
content, porosity, heating rate, compressive stresses, and cross section has a large influence on
the occurrence of spalling. Measures that can prevent spalling of concrete are
- pre-investigation of the fire properties of the concrete,
- addition of polypropylene fibres, and
- using a non-combustible insulating material for insulation.
The ventilation velocity should be 3 m/s for fires with heat release rates up to 100 MW
(Tunnel 2004, 2004). If the standard fire has a larger heat release rate, special investigations
are necessary. For railway tunnels, no specification of the ventilation velocities is made (BV
Tunnel, 2005).
Doors that are a part of the escape route out of a tunnel should be dimensioned for gas
temperatures according to curve II in Figure 7-1, and with a fire duration of 60 min. Curve III
can be used for design of tunnels under water or tunnels that pass directly under a building
(BV Tunnel, 2005).

46

8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The aim of the literature review was to find the state of the art of how rock behaves at high
temperatures caused by a fire. Very few articles has been found on fire testing of rock, and
only a few of the reports of large scale tests in tunnels mention anything at all about what
happened to the rock during the test. In a few cases it has been noted that rock fell from the
roof during and after the fire, but there has been no investigation of the cause of these rock
falls. During large scale fire tests performed in rock tunnels, the rock has been protected from
the heat to prevent fall-outs. No references have been found to tests checking the actual
behaviour of rock during a fire. The consequences of a fire adjacent to a rock wall are
described in a report by Palmqvist (1998). The fire started in the plastic covering a house
wall, spread and finally covered the whole length of the wall. The fire lasted about 45
minutes, and was extinguished by water dousing. The effects of the fire were that rock blocks
could easily be removed by hand in some places, and that the rock had broken up enough
from the surface to require removal to ensure the stability of the rock face. Shotcrete had been
applied to some areas, and where no bolts had been used to ensure the connection, the
shotcrete had fractured from the surface and had to be removed. It was decided that all
surfaces that had been touched by the fire had to be scaled and where necessary the
reinforcement should be reapplied. Totally about 16 m3 of rock was removed (Palmqvist,
1998). Interesting to note is that one of the rock surfaces had been sawed, and that this surface
was more fractur ed than the surfaces that had been drilled and blasted. The shotcrete on the
sawed surface had a thickness of up to 120 mm, and was steel- fibre reinforced, but despite
this the rock below had fractured.
Much research has been done on concrete and how it reacts to high temperatures caused by a
fire. The mechanical properties deteriorate with increase in temperature. The compressive
strength is permanently reduced above a temperature of 300C, the reduction depends on the
type of aggregate and cement paste used. The most important type of failure at high
temperatures is spalling, which starts to occur when the concrete surface has reached a
temperature of 300-400C. Spalling is a combination of pore pressure build- up and
differential expansion of the aggregates. Several different factors influence the occurrence of
spalling, e.g., aggregate thermal expansion, shear strength of the concrete, heating rate,
loading of the section, moisture content, permeability etc. It is important to consider these
parameters when designing the concrete structure. Recent results by Jansson (2005) seem to
contradict the theory that the pore pressure is a major factor of spalling, since he measured
internal pressures below the tensile strength. Spalling of the concrete surface decreases the
thickness of the layer protecting the steel reinforcement and thus increases the risk of
reducing the strength of the steel. At a temperature of 300C the steel is regarded as having no
strength, which must be avoided. To ensure a thick enough cover for the steel rebar, concrete
47

lining in tunnels is often protected by a layer of shotcrete. The shotcrete is used only as
insulation, and not as a load carrying reinforcement. The concrete lining can also be protected
by other means, but polypropylene-fibre reinforced shotcrete is a cheap and easily applied
protection. The polypropylene fibres melt at about 120-130C, and forms channels in the
shotcrete where the water vapour can escape, thereby reducing the pore pressure and
preventing spalling.
Spalling of rock probably occurs for slightly different reasons than spalling of concrete. First,
there will not be any great pore pressure build- up due to the presence of cracks. If the rock
surface is sealed, pore pressures can maybe build up behind the sealing. Differential
expansion of the minerals is one probable cause of rock spalling, another is that local heating
gives differential stresses due to constraints by the surrounding unheated rock. The thermal
stress caused by the expansion is added to the compressive stresses parallel to the rock
surface, which leads to a local increase of tensile stresses (small scale) in the direction
perpendicular to the rock surface. If the tensile stresses exceed the tensile strength, failure will
occur. This failure can both be violent and non-violent, but the exact reasons are not known.
Shotcrete is used for improving the fire resistance of concrete and the results from Mangs and
Keski-Rahkonen (1990) suggests that it can be used for protection of rock as well. The
shotcrete thickness used in these tests varied between 20 mm and 115 mm. The thickness at
which no spalling occurred depended on the reinforcement used, but regardless of
reinforcement 20-30 mm is too thin. The results of the tests by Mangs and Keski-Rahkonen
(1990) indicate that only the first few centimetres of rock closest to the surface will be
affected by any major temperature raise above ambient rock temperatures. The increase in
temperature, on the outer side of the samples, after four hours was only a 30C, but in these
measurements the shotcrete was 50-110 mm thick, and the thickness of the granite slab was
20-30 cm. The results of measurements with a thinner shotcrete layer would be interesting to
see.
Fire testing of concrete has been performed in laboratory scale, reduced scale and full scale
tests. The advantage of concrete is that it can be moulded into any shape and size that you
desire to test, but this cannot be made with rock. Laboratory tests on rock would have to be
performed with care, to take into account the importance of grain sizes and the fire scale.
The tunnel specifications used in Sweden today does not seem to consider rock tunnels
without concrete lining. The requirements posed for a structural component in a tunnel may
be hard to meet for a rock tunnel without reinforcement. The specifications state that the
structural component may not collapse, but there is no definition of collapse for a rock tunnel.

48

Is it when blocks fall down or when the whole roof collapses? For tunnels under water and
under buildings there is a cooling rate specified, but not for other types of tunnels. This means
that for the average railtunnel the load from the cooling phase does not need to be considered.
For road tunnels it must be checked how the construction components are affected by a
cooling phase corresponding to a cooling rate of 600C/h. It is stated in the specifications that
components that are necessary for ensuring safe escape and rescue operations must be proven
to withstand fire without local damage, such as fall outs, during the given escape and rescue
time frame, which is set to a minimum of 45 min. There is however nothing mentioned in the
specifications how this requirement should be checked for a rock tunnel with minimum
reinforcement.

49

50

9 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Fire behaviour in tunnels and the high temperature behaviour of concrete is quite well known
today and a lot has been learned during the past 20 years in the full scale tests that have been
performed in Europe. However, most of the Swedish tunnels are not constructed of concrete,
but go through rock with partial concrete or shotcrete reinforcement. This leads to questions
about the behaviour of rock in case a fire would start in a tunnel. Swedish tunnel
specifications demand that collapse of structural components do not occur. How can this
requirement be met in a rock tunnel with reinforcement consisting of rock bolts and shotcrete?
This literature review summarizes some areas for future research.
Behaviour of some typical Swedish rock types
The behaviour of igneous and metamorphic rocks at high temperatures must be investigated in
relation to fire in tunnels. Some of the questions that should be answered are:
- At what temperature does spalling initiate in typical Swedish rocks?
- How much does the heating rate influence the occurrence and amount of spalling?
- How does the presence of water (in the rock type and in the joints) influence the
occurrence of spalling?
- How does the secondary stress around the boundary of the tunnel influence rock spalling?
- How is the spalling processes affected by the fact that it is a relatively local source giving
off heat?
- Are there any case studies available for study where unprotected rock has been subjected to
fire temperatures? If so, is there any kind of documentation of the state before the fire (fallouts, etc.)?
For concrete a maximum temperature has been defined that the concrete can be exposed to to
avoid spalling. The same type of maximum temperature limit should be defined for different
rock types. The rock surface should then be insulated to ensure that this maximum
temperature is not exceeded.
Behaviour of typical rock tunnel reinforcement
Some aspects of reinforcement that should be investigated are:
- Blasted rock tunnels in Sweden are often reinforced by shotcrete, to provide surface
reinforcement as well as preventing water leakage. It has been shown by several authors
that shotcrete can be used for fire protection of concrete. Can it fill the same function for
rock, and still have the reinforcing capabilities required? Since the rock tunnels usually
have a fairly rough surface, and the shotcrete is sprayed onto the rock, there will be a
certain variation in thickness of the shotcrete layer. What is the minimum thickness needed

51

to prevent spalling of rock? Are there any type of shotcrete that is better than others (with
regard to fibre-reinforcement etc.)?
- The effect of rock bolts must be investigated, since they are mainly made of steel, which
transfers heat very well. The bolts will also loose the majority of their strength at
temperatures of about 300-400C, which means that they will no longer carry load. The
effect of this must be considered and the risk estimated for the people escaping the tunnel,
as well as for the fire fighters entering the tunnel. Rock bolts are often cement- grouted,
how is this grout affected by the heat conducted by the bolt? Will the bolts function during
and after the fire?
Suggested methods
To answer the questions stated above, a series of tests should be performed on both laboratory
and on a larger scale. The tests should be used to find a correlation between the properties
determined in the laboratory and the damages noted in a real case. The laboratory tests should
include:
- Determination of Youngs modulus and Poissons ratio for dry and wet samples of some
typical rocks.
- Tests where part of a rock block is heated with e.g. a torch, to see differences in behavior
between:
o dry and wet samples
o loaded and unloaded samples
- Tests on jointed rock blocks.
- Tests on blocks containing natural joints, either dry or water saturated.
- Tests on rock blocks with a layer of shotcrete, where different types of shotcrete as well as
different thicknesses should be tested.
- Scale-tests of a fire in a tunnel (rock block with bore hole).
The results from the laboratory tests should be used in numerical analyses to model the rock
mass behavior when subjected to rapid temperature increase and high temperatures. Field
studies of rock tunnels subjected to fire should be made. The damages in the tunnel should be
documented and compared to the results of numerical analyses (coupled thermo- mechanical
models) to investigate the correctness of the models on a large scale
The Swedish tunnel specifications seem not to consider rock tunnels without heavy concrete
reinforcement when giving design requirements regarding fire. It should be investigated how
the requirements in the specifications compare to the real situation in the tunnels with regard
to standard reinforcement in rock tunnels.

52

10 REFERENCES
Abraham, O., Derobrt, X., 2003, Non-destructive testing of fired tunnel walls: The MontBlanc Tunnel case study. Non-Destructive Testing and Evaluation International vol 36, pp
411-418
Babrauskas, V., 1980, Flame Lengths Under Ceilings. Fire and Materials vol 4:3, pp 119126
Bostrm, L., 2003, Spalling of Tunnel Structure Linings New Swedish Results. Proc. Int.
Symp. Catatstrophic Tunnel Fires (CTF) / Bors / 20-21 November 2003, Ingason (ed.),
Bors: SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute
Bostrm, L., 2005, Fire testing of concrete slabs isolated with shotcrete. SP Report P501398
BV Tunnel, 2005, Banverket (Swedish Railroad Administration) standard BVS 585.40 (in
Swedish)
Carvel, R., 2005, Chapter 6 in Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety. Beard and Carvel (eds.),
London: Thomas Telford Publ. ISBN: 0-7277-3168-8
Carvel, R., Beard, A., 2005, Chapter 9 in Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety. Beard and Carvel
(eds.), London: Thomas Telford Publ. ISBN: 0-7277-3168-8
Carvel, R. O., Beard, A. N., Jowitt, P. W., Drysdale, D. D., 2004, The Influence of Tunnel
Geometry and Ventilation on the Heat Release Rate of a Fire. Fire Technology vol 40, pp 526
Carvel, R., Marlair, G., 2005, Chapter 10 in Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety. Beard and
Carvel (eds.), London: Thomas Telford Publ. ISBN: 0-7277-3168-8
Chow, W. K., Li, J. S. M., 2001, Case study: vehicle fire in a cross-harbour tunnel in Hong
Kong. Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology vol 16, pp 23-30
Drysdale, D., 1999, An Introduction to Fire Dynamics, 2nd edition. Chichester, UK: John
Wiley and Sons, ISBN: 0-471-97920-8
Eberl, G., 2001, The Tauern Tunnel incident what happened and what has to be learned.
Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels / Madrid / 2-6 April 2001, Vardy (ed.),
Dundee: University of Dundee, pp 17-28
Egger, M., 2005, Chapter 16 in Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety. Beard and Carvel (eds.),
London: Thomas Telford Publ. ISBN: 0-7277-3168-8
Firetun, 1995, Fires in transport tunnels: Report on full-scale tests. EUREKA-Project
EU499; Firetun, Studiengesellscha ft Stahlanwendung elV. D-40213 Dusseldorf

53

Freiholtz, B., 2005, personal communication: compilation of road tunnels in Sweden,

Swedish Road Administration
Heuze, F. E., 1983, High-temperature Mechanical, Physical and Thermal Properties of
Granitic Rocks A Review. International Journal of Rock Mechanics and Mining Sciences
and Geomechanics Abstracts, vol 20:1, pp 3-10
Ingason, H., 2005, Chapter 11 in Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety. Beard and Carvel (eds.),
London: Thomas Telford Publ. ISBN: 0-7277-3168-8
Ingason, H., 2003, Fire Development in Catastrophic Tunnel Fires (CTF). Proc. Int. Symp.
Catatstrophic Tunnel Fires (CTF) / Bors / 20-21 November 2003, Ingason (ed.), Bors: SP
Swedish National Testing and Research Institute
Ingason, H., Lnnermark, A., 2003, Large-scale Fire Tests in the Runehamar tunnel Heat
Release Rate (HRR). Proc. Int. Symp. Catatstrophic Tunnel Fires (CTF) / Bors / 20-21
November 2003, Ingason (ed.), Bors: SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute
Ingason, H., Lnnermark, A., 2005, Heat Release Rates from heavy goods vehicle trailer
fires in tunnels. Fire Safety Journal vol 40, pp 646-668
Ingason, H., Nireus, K., Werling, P., 1997, Fire Test in a Blasted Rock Tunnel. Tumba:
Defence Research Establishment (FOA). Scientific report: FOA-R97-00581-990-SE
Jansson, R., 2005. Termiska spnningar utlste spjlkning (Thermal stresses caused
spalling). Brandposten nr 33 (in Swedish)
Keski-Rahkonen, O., Holmlund, C., Loikkanen, P., Ludvigsen, H., Mikkola, E., 1986, Two
full scale pilot fire experiments in a tunnel. Espoo: Technical Research Centre of Finland
(VTT). Research Report 453
Khoury, A., 2000, Effect of fire on concrete and concrete structures. Prog. Struct. Engng.
Mater., vol 2, pp 429-447
Kirkland, C. J., 2002, The fire in the Channel Tunnel. Tunnelling and Underground Space
Technology vol 17, pp 129-132
LaCroix, D., 2001, The Mont-Blanc Tunnel fire what happened and what has been learned.
Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels / Madrid / 2-6 April 2001, Vardy (ed.),
Dundee: University of Dundee, pp 3-15
Leitner, A., 2001, The fire catastrophe in the Tauern Tunnel: experience and conclusions for
the Austrian guidelines. Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology vol 16, pp 217-223
Lemaire, T., 2003, Runehamar Tunnel Fire Tests: Radiation, Fire Spread and Back Layering.
Proc. Int. Symp. Catatstrophic Tunnel Fires (CTF) / Bors / 20-21 November 2003, Ingason
(ed.), Bors: SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute

54

Lundman, P., 2005, personal communication: data from database on railway tunnels (BIS) of
the Swedish Railroad Administration
Lnnermark, A., Ingason, H., 2003, Large Scale Fire Tests in the Runehamar Tunnel Gas
temperature and Radiation. Proc. Int. Symp. Catatstrophic Tunnel Fires (CTF) / Bors / 2021 November 2003, Ingason (ed.), Bors: SP Swedish National Testing and Research
Institute
Mangs, J., Keski-Rahkonen, O., 1990, Fire testing of shotcrete samples in a small furnace.
Shotcrete for Underground Support V: Proc. Engineering Foundation Conference / Uppsala
/ 3-7 June 1990, Sharp and Franzn (eds.), New York: American Society of Civil Engineers
ISBN: 0-87262-944-9
Nijland, T. G., Larbi, J. A., 2001, Unraveling the temperature distribution in fire-damaged
concrete by means of PFM microscopy: Outline of the approach and review of potentially
useful reactions. Heron vol 46:4, pp 253-264
Opstad, K., Wighus, R., Fire Suppression Systems for Road Tunnels (UPTUN). Proc. Int.
Symp. Catatstrophic Tunnel Fires (CTF) / Bors / 20-21 November 2003, Ingason (ed.),
Bors: SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute
Palmqvist, K., 1998, Utredning avseende brandskador p berg och bergfrstrkning.
Vgverket (Swedish Road Administration), BT Brand 00.0072 (in Swedish)
Richter, D., Simmons, G., 1974, Thermal Expansion Behavior of Igneous Rocks.
International Journal of Rock Mechanics and Mining Sciences and Geomechanics Abstracts,
vol 11, pp 403-411
Schupfer, H., 2001, Fire disaster in the tunnel of the Kitzsteinhorn funicular in Kaprun on 11
Nov 2000. Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels / Madrid / 2-6 April 2001,
Vardy (ed.), Dundee: University of Dundee, (paper not in proceedings)
Simmons, G., Cooper, H. W., 1978, Thermal Cycling Cracks in Three Igneous Rocks.
International Journal of Rock Mechanics and Mining Sciences and Geomechanics Abstracts,
vol 15, pp 145-148
Tunnel 2004, 2004, Vgverket (Swedish Road Administration) Publ 2004:124 (in Swedish)
Turner, S., 2001, St Gotthard Tunnel Fire. New Civil Engineer, 1 November, 2001, pp 5-7
Wetzig, V., 2001, Destruction mechanisms in concrete material in case of fire, and protective
systems. Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels / Madrid / 2-6 April 2001,
Vardy (ed.), Dundee: University of Dundee, pp 281-290
Wickstrm, U., 2004, Fire test of concrete. SP Report P401734

55

56

Appendix 1
Tunnels of the Swedish Railroad Administration (data from BIS-database)
Tunnel
length
265
1431
586
165
1000
732
1680
298
381
332
93
17
127
135
336
236
91
845
140
955
825
3850
450
468
71
49
167
159
152
122
218
590
535
440
421
227
210
320
210
45
200
37
118
32
261
100
65
133
139
93
385
381
243

Longest concrete-constr
0
1-9
10-49 > 50
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

No reinf. /
selective
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0
0
x

Interacting
reinf

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0
0
0
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
0
0
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Support- Grouting
ing reinf
x
x
0
0
x
x
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
0
x
x
x
0
x
0
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0
x
0
x
0
0
x
0
x
x
0
x
0
0
x
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
x

Comment

kbgjd

kbgjd
kvrig
kbgjd

kvrig
kvrig
bg + kbgjd + kvrig

kvrig
bg + kbgjd
bg + kbgjd

Appendix 1
Tunnel
length
239
577
146
1780
45
1295
114
895
52
377
185
657
691
307
201
520
411
321
574
180
429
132
163
537
96
127
679
182
285
2056
136
70
275
187
354
199
91
242
220
78
238
107
34
448
41
33
166
201
350
1840
530
220
365
76
106
76

Longest concrete-constr
0
1-9
10-49 > 50
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
-

No reinf. /
selective

Interacting
reinf
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
-

x
x

Support- Grouting
ing reinf
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0
0
0
x
x
x
x
0
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0
0
x
0
x
x
0
0
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
-

Comment

bg + kbgjd
kbgjd
bg + kbgjd
bg + kbgjd
bg + kbgjd
bg + kbgjd
bg + kbgjd

bg + kbgjd
bg + kbgjd

Appendix 1
Tunnel
length
53
68
62
181
380
156
466
242
280
79
431
196
1380
300
610
568

Longest concrete-constr
0
1-9
10-49 > 50
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x:22
-: 15

62

20

No reinf. /
selective
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Interacting
reinf

x
x
x
x
x

x
-

Support- Grouting
ing reinf
0
x
x
x
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
-

Comment

bg + kbgjd

bg + kbgjd
bg + kbgjd

bg + kbgjd
kbgjd + kvrig
kbgjd
kbgjd

x: 47
76
32
x:66
-: 11
-:11
0: 7
0:48
x; affirmative, -; information not available, 0; no reinforcement or no grouting, bg; rock carries load, kbgjd;
both sections where rock carries load and where load is carried by support, kvrig; other constructions

The total number of tunnels in the table is 125. There are more tunnels in the national railroad
network, but tunnels with no information on length have not been included.
Concrete constructions:
The longest concrete construction refers to constructed tunnel portals. Of 125 tunnels there
are 22 that have no constructed portals at all, 62 with portals between 1 and 9 m long, etc.
Reinforcement:
Selective reinforcement means that single bolts have been installed to prevent block fall
outs. "Interacting reinforcement means that the rock and the installed reinforcement together
carries the loads. This type can be systematic bolting, mesh and shotcrete. Supporting
reinforcement refers to constructions designed to carry the surrounding loads, and is often
some kind of concrete construction. 47 tunnels have selective reinforcement and 7 have no
reinforcement at all. Interacting reinforcement is used in 76 tunnels, and only 36 have
supporting reinforcement. The concrete constructions often occur only on short sections of the
tunnel.
Grouting:
Grouting with either cement based or chemical grout or both is used in 66 tunnels, and 48 of
the tunnels are not grouted at all.
Comment:
If there is no note, or the notation bg in the column comment it means that the rock mass
carries itself, possibly with selective bolting or very short sections with systematic bolting,
shotcrete and other load bearing constructions. The notation kbgjd means that most of the
tunnel has load bearing support, i.e., systematic bolting, shotcrete and other load bearing
constructions or concrete constructions. The notation kvrig means constructions of other
kinds than load bearing constructions. These notations can be combined, e.g., bg + kbgjd

Appendix 1
means that there are both sections where the rock mass carries itself, and sections where the
tunnel is supported with load bearing reinforcement or concrete constructions.