The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity

Author(s): Catherine Z. Elgin

Source: Synthese, Vol. 74, No. 3, Internalism (Mar., 1988), pp. 297-311
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20116504
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Z.

CATHERINE

THE EPISTEMIC

ABSTRACT.
stupid

people

consequence
and
possible
the standard

I show

that

ELGIN

EFFICACY

it follows

from

both

OF STUPIDITY*

externalist

to know
be in a better
may
position
results from taking our epistemic
goal
as possible,
as many
falsehoods
rejecting

than
to be

and
smart

internalist
ones.

accepting
with
combined

theories
This

that

untoward

as many
truths as
a recognition
that
will prevail. After

cannot
for acceptability
be set too high, else scepticism
I suggest
how causal,
and coherentist
theories
devalue
reliabilist,
showing
intelligence,
as contemporary
construe
that knowledge,
theories
valuable
it, is not a particularly
to reopen epistemology
to the study
and that we would
do well
achievement,
cognitive
of cognitive
of all sorts.
excellences

that he was

of men
in that he alone
avowal
is
his
nothing. Although
typically taken to
be ironic, he may have been telling the truth. For currently popular
that stupidity
have the surprising consequence
theories of knowledge
can enhance,
and intelligence
one's
for know
diminish,
prospects
if
of
theories
is
have
known
So
these
Socrates
correct,
may
any
ledge.
less than others precisely because he was wiser than they.
I will show that an unwitting
bias in favor of stupidity
is charac
It
teristic of both internalist
and externalist
theories of knowledge.
to
from the shared convictions
that (a) our epistemic
derives
is
goal
a sentence
if it is true and reject (or disbelieve)
it if
accept (or believe)
cannot be set too high,
it is false, and (b) the standard for acceptability
Socrates maintained
knew that he knew

the wisest

that
else scepticism will prevail. The epistemic
inutility of intelligence
fatalistic
that since no one
follows
is not the sceptic's
conclusion
knows anything, dullards are no worse off than the rest. It is the more
of mind
result
that since qualities
like sensitivity,
disconcerting
acumen
with
of the
the
and
often
interfere
satisfaction
breadth,
logical
in such qualities
for knowledge,
individuals
deficient
requirements
an epistemic
The
for
have
then be
may
quest
knowledge
edge.
furthered by the cultivation
of obtuseness.
It would be tedious to demonstrate
that this follows from all current
to focus on four - two
So I have chosen
theories of knowledge.
dominant
strains in
and two internalist. They
externalist
represent
contemporary

epistemological

Synthese 74 (1988) 297-311.

? 1988 by Catherine Z. Elgin

theorizing.

And

the difficulties

I find

298

CATHERINE

Z.

ELGIN

are not difficulties

in detail. So if all four find cognitive
deficiencies
to knowledge,
conducive
to suspect
there will be reason
that a
to the epistemic
of stupidity
to
commitment
is endemic
efficacy
current epistemology.
Toward
the end of my paper I consider what to
make

of this finding.
1.

at least: however
agree on this much
epistemologists
Contemporary
for p, one cannot
know
that p if p is false;
good one's grounds
one cannot know that p
then requires
truth. Moreover,
knowledge
to p; knowledge
without
committed
also requires
being cognitively
belief or acceptance.
And one cannot know that p if one's true belief
so knowledge
that p is accidental;
requires a tether.
take the tether to be epistemic.
Internalists
Knowledge,
they main
that is epistemically
to the
accessible
tain, is tied down by justification
concern
them
for
the
criteria
among
knowing
subject. Disagreements
and the range of accessible
information
the
epistemic
accessibility
account.
take
into
need
So
differ
the
over,
e.g.,
subject
they
epistemic
status of unacknowledged
of things one explicitly
knows,
implications
or of undermining
one does not, but could, possess.
evidence
For a true belief to
Externalists
take the tether to be metaphysical.
amount to knowledge,
it must be necessarily
connected
they contend,
to the fact that makes
it true, or to facts from which
its truth follows.
They differ over the type of necessity
required, but agree that it need
not be within the subject's ken. An individual can know that p even if
he is unaware
that his belief that p is appropriately
related to the facts.
to constitute
Some take the metaphysical
tether, known or unknown,
for a belief,
the justification
that
justification may
thereby conceding
be epistemically
in requiring
follow internalism
inaccessible.
Others
to
be
that
is
but
accessible,
epistemically
deny
justification
justification
or
to
for
To
avoid
I
will
confusion,
necessary
integral
knowledge.
a belief's
it open whether
tether
tethers,
speak of external
leaving
its
provides
justification.
2.
theories of knowledge
true
his
belief that p must
p,

Causal

maintain
be caused

that for a subject to know that

by the fact that p or by facts

THE

EPISTEMIC

EFFICACY

OF

STUPIDITY

299

from which
it follows that p. Sophisticated
versions
require that the
cannot result from a
causal connection
be lawlike, so that knowledge
fortuitous
of circumstances
Such
(Goldman
1967).
commingling
for inferential knowledge
theories account
that inferential
by claiming
and logical relations may be parts of causal chains.
to a causal theory then, my true belief
that there is a
According
a
me
caused
is
surface
before
response
yellow
by
neurophysiological
to the presence
of yellow in my visual field. A sequence of optical and
neural events
for
linking the surface with a brain state is responsible
of my belief. If that sequence
the production
instantiates a natural law,
I know that the surface is yellow. It is no accident
that I believe what I
nature
and the circumstances
in which I find
do; for, given the laws of
is a necessary
of the fact that the
my belief
consequence
myself,
surface

is yellow.
are common.
It is no accident
Such causal connections
that normal
to
believe
be
the colors
those objects
perceivers
typically
objects
actually are; for their beliefs are normally caused by the law-governed
of those colors.
response of the human nervous system to the presence
normal perceivers
That being so, causal theorists contend,
generally
Since causal theories do
know the colors of the objects
they perceive.
not require epistemically
accessible
they can recognize
justification,
are often in a position
to
and unintelligent
that unreflective
people
as
of knowing
that the surface
Holmes
know. Watson
is as capable
is
before him is yellow. And this is as it should be. Cognitive
virtuosity
of this kind.
hardly required for knowledge
are less comfortable.
But seemingly
conclusions
Consider
parallel
one involving
we may
the sense of taste. Holmes,
is an
suppose,
oenophile,
differences
it
because
the proper

to all but the most

Watson
is oblivious
obvious
a
two
wines.
The
share
of
bottle
and
Bordeaux,
among
nerve endings and brings about
stimulates
the appropriate
it causes each to believe
that he
connections,
neurological
we
can
assume
Bordeaux.
that
vividness
the
(For
exactly
while

is drinking
same neurological
to causal theories,
events occur in both.) According
both Holmes
know that the wine
and Watson
is
they are drinking
cannot
Bordeaux.
fact that Watson
tell a Bordeaux
from a
The
muscatel
for it
him from knowing
about this wine,
does not prevent
intrude upon the causal chain leading to his current belief.
to conclude
And unless we are prepared
that Holmes
lacks know
cannot
as
the chain
of neurological
events
dismiss
ledge, we
does

not

300

CATHERINE

Z.

ELGIN

If a causal law is instantiated

in the production
of Hol
it is instantiated
in the production
For
of Watson's.
belief,
the same events occur
in each. If Holmes
knows what he's
exactly
so does Watson.
drinking,
It follows from causal theories
that subjects can luck
into' know
to
it is
distinctions
wines,
among
ledge. Given Watson's
insensitivity
that the lawful causal chain eventuates
in a true belief.
accidental
anomalous.

mes's

belief is unreliable.
its impeccable
breeding, Watson's
Despite
that unreliability
The conviction
leads some
precludes
knowledge
on a
to reliabilism
externalists
the view that knowledge
depends
as well as in actual circum
relation to truth in counterfactual
belief's
a properly
stances. On a reliabilist account,
tethered belief is, roughly,
one the subject would harbor if it were true and would not harbor, at
least on account of that tether, if it were false (Nozick 1981; Dretske
tethered belief is no accident;
for such
1971). The truth of a properly
a belief tracks truth across possible worlds.
it seems - that Watson
Reliabilism
concludes
does not
correctly,
even if he
he was drinking Bordeaux
know, since he would believe
were drinking muscatel.
The problem
is that Holmes
fares
apparently
no better. Although
he can tell Bordeaux
from muscatel,
he cannot
sources
Bordeaux
from all other
of sensory
infallibly discriminate
like Watson,
fails the subjunctive
stimulation.
So Holmes,
test; there
are non-Bordeaux
to be Bordeaux,
and Bordeaux
he would believe
he
to be non-Bordeaux.
would believe
a fullblooded
seems practically
Indeed,
subjunctive
requirement
to
reliabilists
moderate
their
demands
So
satisfy.
by restric
impossible
to
of
alternatives.
the
counterfactual
condition
relevant
the
scope
ting
set out by
track truth through the minefields
Holmes's
belief needn't
in order to qualify as knowledge.
malevolent
demons
count
His epistemic
prospects
clearly depend on what alternatives
as relevant.
is to be possible at all, the sceptic's bogies
If knowledge
neurosur
and manipulative
of malevolent
demons
the machinations
are
as
If
all
other
actual
wines
must
irrelevant.
be
excluded
geons
for Holmes,
then in order to know, he needs the
relevant alternatives
and every other wine. The
Bordeaux
between
ability to discriminate
But
to knowledge
the class of
then remain
formidable.
obstacles
narrower
it
is limited to
still.
be
relevant alternatives
Perhaps
might
wines
cellar.

Holmes
Then

or even to the wines

in his own
is likely to encounter,
need not be so great. If he
his powers of discrimination

THE

EPISTEMIC

EFFICACY

OF

STUPIDITY

301

can distinguish
Bordeaux
from the other members
of fairly restricted
to know what he's drinking.
classes of wines, he is in a position
are variable,
Reliabilist
for knowledge
and
requirements
expanding
with
the
of
relevant
alternatives.
the
back
range
contracting
Against
Holmes
the back
knows; against
ground of one set of alternatives,
not.
of
he
does
if
the
is
another,
Indeed,
ground
range
sufficiently
or gerrymandered,
even Watson
restricted
turns out to know;
the
can
as
that
the
wine
is
muscatel
be
excluded
irrelevant.
possibility
as knowledge
any true belief can be constituted
Apparently
by suitably
the range of relevant alternatives.
The epistemic
status of
configuring
a true belief
on the selection
thus depends
of such a range; and
to guide us, it is hard to avoid
without
criteria
the appearance
of
a
in
the
selection.
Holmes's
Still,
begging
making
question
epistemic
more
situation
than Watson's
in that significantly
is better
austere
are required to constitute Watson's
restrictions
belief as knowledge.
In
this respect at least, the smarter man has an epistemic
advantage.
can sustain his advantage.
It is not clear though,
that Holmes
we may suppose,
Watson,
reliably classifies wines as rotgut, table wine
and what

'vintage stuff; and his beliefs about wine quality

to both reliabilist and
causal chains. So according
result
causal theories, Watson
knows he's drinking rotgut.
Holmes
knows
of the sort. 'Rotgut'
is not part of his
nothing
so
no
he formulates
beliefs about rotgut. Since
conceptual
repertoire,
from

he calls
lawlike

belief is required for knowledge, Watson

knows something
about their
shared experience
that Holmes
does not. Still, Holmes
brings to the
wine
of refined, delicate
distinctions.
The first sip
tasting a wealth
a 1986 Thunderbird,
him that he's drinking
convinces
from a
made
vacant
inferior
in
lots
off
the
Santa
grape grown
resoundingly
just
a
a
a
Monica
vat
wine
for
in
week
Freeway;
aged
plastic
previously
used to launder sweat socks. Holmes,
with his more sensitive percep
seems to be in a position
tual and conceptual
to know a
categories,
than Watson.
able to frame more hypotheses,
good deal more
Being
he has more candidates
than Watson
for knowledge
does.
a system of
is this: the more distinctions
The problem
categories
there is between
admits, the less difference
adjacent categories. As we
our
we
refine
of error.
increase our chances
schemes,
conceptual
can
Holmes
Although
usually tell the vintage of the wine he's drink
than anyone
is he infallible.
else
The
ing, no more
perceptible
differences

among

vintages

are often

extremely

subtle

and difficult

to

302

CATHERINE

Z.

ELGIN

Common
conditions
the beginnings
of a head cold, a poorly
a stuffy room - can throw the
rinsed glass, a moment's
inattentiveness,
most sensitive palate off, leading the taster to confuse a Margaux
with
a St. Julien. So Holmes's
true belief that he's drinking a Margaux
does
discern.

not

track

truth very far. Were

to such contingencies,
he victim
he
think he was drinking one wine when he was drinking another.
The sources of error here are not hyperbolic
or remote
constructions
but everyday eventualities.
So they cannot legitimately
be
possibilities,
excluded
the range of relevant alternatives.
On a
by circumscribing
reliabilist
does not know; nor does anyone else whose
theory, Holmes
are
to such contingencies.
vulnerable
The more delicate
judgments
our distinctions,
the more easily circumstances
to confound
conspire
we diminish our prospects
So as we refine our categories,
judgment.

would

for knowledge.
seem to do better here, being
Causal
to the
theories
indifferent
counterfactuals
that confute
If Holmes's
the reliabilist.
belief that he is
is caused by the fact that he's drinking a Margaux,
drinking a Margaux
a law
and if the causal chain that eventuates
in that belief instantiates
of nature, Holmes
knows that he's drinking a Margaux.
It seems then
can
that
the causal
accommodate
theory
increasing
categorial
refinement,
being concerned
solely with the genesis of actual beliefs;
for there is no a priori limit to the precision
of beliefs
that can be
generated.
lawfully
The problem
is that Holmes
is no dummy. He is well aware of the
circumstances
that might mislead
of the availability
of wines easily
mistaken
for a Margaux,
and of the physiological
and environmental
conditions
that can affect the palate. And he realizes that he cannot be
that no such circumstances
confident
obtain. This gives him pause.
that
he
is
he
he can't
Although
strongly suspects
imbibing a Margaux,
to
it.
himself
believe
And
without
there
is no
belief,
bring
fully
of the precariousness
So Holmes's
of his
appreciation
from
situation
him
prevents
epistemic
knowing.
for evidence may also inhibit knowledge.
there is
Respect
Suppose
such a thing as extrasensory
and
that
of
the
absence
perception,
for such a faculty is due to the fact that genuine extrasensory
evidence
are extremely
hard to distinguish
from a variety of unreli
perceptions
are equally extrasen
able sources of intimation.1 Watson
and Holmes
But
is
is not. So Watson
Watson
Holmes
credulous;
sorily perceptive.
out of hand.
of ESP, dismissing
believes
the evidence
the deliverances
knowledge.

THE

EPISTEMIC

EFFICACY

OF

STUPIDITY

303

and the methods

of the sciences
the evidence
that
respects
it. So he does not credit his extrasensory
produced
perceptions.
he cannot
himself
from experiencing
them, he
prevent
Although
for the suspi
withholds
belief, for he can find no legitimate
grounds
cions they produce.
Holmes
then does not know; for his epistemic

Holmes

scruples prevent him from forming the requisite beliefs.

both
causal
and reliabilist
Watson
does
know.
On
accounts,
Extrasensory
perceptions
yield true beliefs via lawful, if unrecognized,
causal chains. And
since ESP
is reliable
(even though we have no
reason to think it is), Watson
would believe
its deliverances
if they
were true, and would not believe
them via ESP if they were false. So
serves him well; it enables him
to the evidence
Watson's
obliviousness
to know.

In summary,
favors
of crude cate
externalism
the employment
If our objective
invite error and unreliability.
is
gories; for refinements
to believe what is true and disbelieve
to
what is false, it is reasonable
for belief to cases in which
truth and falsity are
restrict opportunities
easily distinguished.
to evidence.
A subject
Externalism
also favors obliviousness
is
if that evidence
affected
initiates
the causal chain or
by evidence
the reliable mechanism
for his belief. But there is
activates
responsible
no epistemic
to his being aware of the evidence,
for a
advantage
of its
belief's
tether is not strengthened
cognizance
by the subject's
to give
constitution.
Indeed, knowledge
may be lost by his attempt
can mislead,
its due. For evidence
evidence
inhibiting the adoption of
and encouraging
of false, un
the adoption
beliefs
true, tethered
do best then to let evidence
tethered ones. We
its effects
exercise
it is integral to a belief's
when
tether, and to ignore it
subliminally
it is not.
externalism
favors unreflectiveness
about one's epistemic
Finally,
to evidence
is but a special case
circumstances.
Indeed obliviousness
error
of this. Appreciation
of the opportunities
for
and of the claims of
cause reservations,
alternative
agent
hypotheses
leading the reflective
to suspend judgment. A heady, if unfounded,
borne of the
confidence,
the unreflective
obstacles,
supplies
ability to overlook
subject with a

when

store of beliefs, many

turn out to be true and
of which
goodly
on the
or fails depending
tethered. The unreflective
succeeds
subject
in
of
beliefs
his
doxastic
But
the
tethered
true,
system.
proportion
to
for
reflective
is
bound
to
is
unless
he
fail;
believe, he
subject
willing

304
is in no
disbelieves

Z.

CATHERINE

position
what

to know.
is false;

He

neither

ELGIN

what
believes
sufficient
evidence,

lacking

is true
he

nor

suspends

judgment.
3.
Internalism maintains
that a claim is justified to the extent
that it is
in light of what is already known. Justification
reasonable
thus depends
on coherence
with a system of already accepted
claims.2 Some take
take it to be social. I
the relevant
others
system to be individualist;
shall consider accounts of both kinds.
is an individualist
Keith Lehrer
(Lehrer 1986). He holds that the
a
a
matter
for
is
of its coherence
with a system
justification
hypothesis
of claims the subject already accepts, where a statement
coheres with
a system if its acceptance
to that system
is more
reasonable
relative
than is the acceptance
of any competing
claim. Epistemic
justification
does not, of course, demand
coherence
with everything
the subject
for purposes
holds. He may accept statements
other than knowledge,
status. K,
and coherence
with such statements
confers no epistemic
on the basis of faith and for the
e.g., he accepts a religious doctrine
of a claim with
of salvation,
the coherence
that doctrine
purpose
is required for epistemic
would be epistemologically
irrelevant. What
is that a hypothesis
Lehrer
cohere with
the
contends,
justification,
statements
the subject accepts
for the purpose
of knowledge.
These
statements
his personal
constitute
acceptance
system, and he is per
that coheres with that system.
anything
sonally justified in accepting
for personal
is not enough,
But personal
acceptance
justification
a statement
that coheres
falsehoods.
And
systems
typically contain
with antecedently
is not on that account a viable
falsehoods
accepted
to statements
for knowledge.
that
candidate
is restricted
Candidacy
to the subject's v?rifie acceptance
also belong
the system that
system
results when his personal
acceptance
system is purged of all error. A
claim that coheres with both is, Lehrer believes,
completely
justified
on any
for the subject. For its justification
does not depend essentially
to the truths the subject believes,
it is more
an
its rivals. Indeed, on Lehrer's
account,
truth
is
justified
knowledge.
accepted,
completely
a narrow
a
can fail to cohere with
What
with
coheres
system
that
with his limited purview,
knows
broader one. So Watson,
things
false belief;
reasonable

and relative
than any of

THE

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305

burdened with a more

one, does not. Upon
comprehensive
a
form
and Watson
the belief that it is a superb
bird, Holmes
sighting
are truths about the
Watson's
beliefs
relevant background
starling.
no beliefs about the
of
has
He
characteristic
markings
superb starlings.
in the
bird's habitat; for, although he studiously attends to the pictures

Holmes,

text. Given
he ignores the accompanying
bird watcher's
the
manual,
Watson's
is
in his acceptance
belief
information
system,
completely
from the London Zoo,
is in
justified. And since the bird, an escapee
a
knows that it is. Holmes,
does
fact
however,
superb starling, Watson
not. Although
has the
he too recognizes
that the bird in question
of a superb
that such birds, being
he realizes
starling,
markings
are unlikely
to be found on Baker
to equitorial Africa,
indigenous
to Holmes's
it is at least as
Street. So relative
acceptance
system,
a
to suspect
that they've sighted
local
reasonable
strangely marked
thus enables
him to know what Holmes
bird. Watson's
ignorance
cannot. The fact that prevents Holmes
from knowing,
being external
cannot
to Watson's
undermine
Watson's
system,
acceptance
(Ginet 1980).
justification
is not that Watson
from ignorance
of one
The point
benefits
fact. It is rather that relatively
specific, and in this case misleading,
than richer sys
sparse systems may be better sources of knowledge
can appeal only to markings
tems. Watson
to determine what kind of
are sufficient
for complete
he's looking at. Still, his resources
and knowledge.
Holmes's
information
includes
system
justification
about markings
and about habitat. So coherence with Holmes's
system
no more
is harder to achieve. But its achievement
than
gives Holmes
Watson
and (often) know
viz., complete
already has
justification
as in the present case, beliefs about habitat undermine
ledge. When,
an identification
based on markings,
Holmes
is not justified in accept
Watson
then know what
the bird
is;
may
ing any identification.
to
Holmes
is sufficient
system
surely does not. So if an acceptance
about a subject, additional
information about that
generate knowledge
bird

subject
system
harder

is otiose
increases
to know.

and potentially
the difficulty

detrimental.
of

achieving

Its incorporation
into the
it
coherence,
making

could
his justification
and
This
that Holmes
protect
suggests
his
from
enhance his epistemic
system
prospects
potential
by isolating
defeaters.
So long as he remains ignorant of history, for example,
his
cannot
unfortunate
historical
be
undermined
prec
by
justification

306

CATHERINE

Z.

ELGIN

that such self-conscious

Lehrer
however,
suggests,
protec
for knowledge.
"A
would
be incompatible
with
the quest
and impartial manner
person who seeks after truth in a disinterested
in this way" (Lehrer 1974, p.
would not arbitrarily
restrict his beliefs
is not obviously
the goal of
209). Such protectionism
arbitrary. Given
to accept
it seems a reasonable
the minimum
strategy
knowledge,
edents.
tionism

completely
justified true beliefs. For, as Holmes's
required to generate
to include superfluous
information
is to ask for
shows,
predicament
on the scope of his
if such intentional
restrictions
trouble.
Still,
could not, Lehrer believes,
system are arbitrary, Holmes
acceptance
stance without
the quest for knowledge.
forsaking
adopt Watson's
comes by his limitations naturally. So his motives
as a
But Watson
cannot
to
be impugned
because
of his failure
seeker
knowledge
certain information
into his acceptance
system. Indeed, he
incorporate
belief
may be incapable of doing so. Suppose Holmes's
confounding
from a complex
the in
statistical
derives
generalization
correlating
of its habitat
temperature
tensity of a bird's coloration with the mean
a generalization
from which
it follows that a brightly colored bird like
to be found in a temperate
is unlikely
the superb starling
climate.
the generalization;
he could not
Watson
does not know
moreover,
or appreciate
to him. So
its import, were
it imparted
understand
it nor its denial can enter into his personal acceptance
neither
system.
cannot defeat any of his completely
As a result, the generalization
For epistemically
inaccessible
truths are, for the
beliefs.
justified
not just his
inert. It is then his stupidity,
internalist,
epistemically
to know what
that enables Watson
the more
ignorance,
intelligent
cannot.

Holmes

favors the employment

of
internalism
are stark and instantiation
is easily
of such a system typi
verified. Reasonably
conscientious
application
But
when
category
systems admit of subtle
cally produces
knowledge.
to
is
It is, e.g., fairly
much
harder
achieve.
distinctions,
knowledge
a
to
is
hard
tell whether
it is
bird;
easy to tell whether
something
fairly
a tree pipit. So since Watson
at
is given to entertaining
the
hypotheses
Like

crude

individualist

externalism,

categories,

where

differences

level of
jc is a bird
he's
Holmes

a good deal of (trivial) knowledge.

Since
likely to generate
he has a harder time. Often no single
draws finer distinctions,

THE

EPISTEMIC

EFFICACY

OF

STUPIDITY

307

so
at the species
is most reasonable;
classification
level, for example,
one
none coheres with his personal
if
system. Moreover,
acceptance
it is apt not to beat its competition
does prevail,
alternative
by much.
in his relevant background
beliefs may exclude
So the least inaccuracy
it from his v?rifie acceptance
the only discernible
If, e.g.,
system.
a tree pipit and a buff meadow
between
difference Holmes
recognizes
is slightly
than the latter, his
is that the former
plumper
pipit
if he's even slightly wrong about how plump a
is defeated
justification
to be. So Watson
is likely to come away from a
tree pipit is expected
a
more
For
than Holmes.
lot
bird watching
knowledge
expedition with
Watson
will have formed many completely
justified beliefs:
jci is a bird;
x2 is a bird;
xn is a bird.
of xx,...,
classifications
xn
Holmes,
having
attempted more precise
some birds he could not identify, some whose
will have encountered
some whose
he was not personally
identification
justified in accepting,
he was not completely
and some in
identification
justified in accepting,
was
which
the identification
he was completely
justified in accepting
nonetheless

false. Indeed, under

Holmes
the circumstances,
might
at this level of
from accepting
refrain
any claims
reasonably
as well as to
to disbelieve
refinement.
Since he desires
falsehoods
to suspend
believe
the
be wise
truths, he would
judgment where
of error looms large. Here again, it seems rational to revert
prospect
to Watson's
safer stance. For Watson
achieves
the goal of believing
far better than Holmes
truths and disbelieving
falsehoods
does.
seem that Holmes,
This might be doubted.
It might
having a richer
a
more
to
in
form
undefeated
is
cognitive
repertoire,
position
justified
even
true beliefs
than Watson.
If so, he knows more
than Watson,
some
not.
Watson
knows
he
does
But
the
is
though
things
premise
can
at
true
for
Watson
beliefs
least
false;
generate undefeated
justified
as Holmes.
as quickly
Of course, Watson's
will tend to be trivial,
are
and
often original,
banal, and boring, while Holmes's
interesting,
not have
But
does
the
contemporary
important.
epistemology
resources
to discriminate
between
and insignificant
beliefs.
significant
So it has no basis for ruling that Holmes's
justified true beliefs are
better than Watson's.
epistemically

308

Z.

CATHERINE

ELGIN

4.

are

to credit Watson
with
because
he
reluctant
knowledge
to the justifiability of
that seems plainly relevant
information
neglects
for ignoring information
that
his beliefs. But we can't fault him merely
so
is inexhaustible,
such information
bears on the topic of his concern;
we
some of it is bound
to be ignored.
If
consider Holmes's
beliefs
into account. He
justified, it is because we think he has taken enough
no important
and no significant
has neglected
inference.
information,

We

if taking enough
into account
isn't taking everything
into
and isn't taking into account only what the subject considers
that 'enough'
Gilbert Harman
relevant, how is it determined?
suggests
that the standards of the epistemic
here is a social matter
community
are significant,
is important, what inferences
decide what information
But

account,

in order to know
is required
and how much
(Harman
1973). Since
an
an
not
is
achieve
ordinary,
extraordinary,
cognitive
knowledge
in question must be ones that normal members
of
the standards
ment,
meet.
Watson's
is
the community
normally
justification
inadequate
of the community
it omits reasons
that normal members
then when
invoke to justify such a belief.
would normally
of justification
has two consequences
worth not
The socialization
varies with community
standards. Holmes's
ing. First,
justifiedness
to the standards of one epistemic
belief may be justified according
to those of another. And
and fail to be justified according
community
on
in
results in variability
in the requirements
justification
variability
to one set of stan
knows relative
(Cohen 1986). Holmes
knowledge
to a
to another. Moreover,
relative
dards, but does not know relative
or
too
lax
Watson
has
with sufficiently
standards,
peculiar
community
and knowledge.
justification
is construed
Second,
Epistemic
accessibility
socially.
epistemic
to normal members
resources
count as accessible
if they are available
even if the peculiarities
of an individual's
situation
of the community,
to him. It follows that information
the subject
make them unavailable
his
and inferences
does not possess
he does not draw can defeat
if that information
is known to, or those inferences drawn
justification,
known fact that
of the community.
The widely
by, normal members
can defeat Watson's
to tropical
birds
is inhospitable
London
even though he is unaware
of that fact. And
the easy
justification,
a
of
from the extreme
inference
encountering
tropical
improbability

THE

EPISTEMIC

EFFICACY

OF

STUPIDITY

to the unreasonableness
one
of believing
bird on Baker
Street
even though he fails to draw
done so can defeat his justification,

309

has
that

inference.

more
than satisfies community
Holmes
his epis
standards,
he
temic success may seem assured. But it is not; for by excelling,
invites trouble.
infers that recent fluctua
validly
Being an acute reasoner, Holmes
Since

tions in grain prices discredit

the claim that the Prime Minister
lied
about the prospects
for peace. Normal members
of the community
to recognize
to the
lack the acumen
the relevance
of grain prices
Prime Minister's
and to draw the proper
inference
from
statement,
are too arcane
to
them. So the considerations
Holmes
adduces
for the claim. As it turns out, the
undermine
the social justification
Prime Minister
indicators are misleading.
did lie; the economic
Since
are not bound
to consider
normal members
of the community
those
is intact. So they know that the Prime
their justification
indicators,
If he need only satisfy the com
about Holmes?
Minister
lied. What
The
Prime
Minister
lied' is justified for him, since
standards,
munity's
that justifies normal members
he is privy to all the information
of the
But he pays
for his justification
by
that
the
evidence
of the grain prices
Realizing
he cannot consider
the community's
himself
justification,
in
the
Prime
he
Minister
lied.
So,
rational,
believing
being
justified
it. But without belief, there is no knowledge.
does not believe
Because
he is smarter than others, Holmes
is willy-nilly
answerable
to more exacting
standards. He cannot
ignore truths within his ken
their significance.
merely because others are incapable of appreciating
community
sacrificing
discredits

in

their

belief.

his belief.

thus fails to know, although his intellectual

inferiors succeed.
are more refined than those employed
ifHolmes's
Again,
categories
at large, his judgments
cannot be sustained
by the community
by
standards. But without
socially shared standards for their
community
are not candidates
for knowledge.
those
justification,
judgments

Holmes

and perceptual
does not
additional
conceptual
sensitivity
of the community
then enable him to know what normal members
on justification
are such that it
cannot. Indeed, the social requirements
to know what normal members
for someone
is impossible
of the

Holmes's

cannot.
community
Since social internalism
it might
temic community,

to be relative
to an epis
takes knowledge
seem to have the resources
to block these

310

Z.

CATHERINE

ELGIN

his due by evaluating

his
untoward
results. Can't we give Holmes
in terms of the standards
of a more
beliefs
sensitive
intelligent,
is that any epistemic
will have
The difficulty
community
community?
exceed
members
abilities
the norm. So Holmes's
whose
cognitive
will recur no matter
how we adjust
the membership
predicament
on the relevant epistemic
community.
and
individual or social, thus favors conformity
Internalism, whether
a sort of cognitive
are
minimalism.
A person's
prospects
epistemic
to justify
than is necessary
best if his doxastic
system includes no more
no
information
and greater
his beliefs. Additional
abilities produce
to undermine
and they have
the capacity
the
epistemic
advantage;
conditions

justification

the minimal

system

supplies.
5.

to
It should now be obvious
that Holmes's
is endemic
predicament
for it results from
This
is no surprise:
contemporary
epistemology.
count as virtues of their theories - features
features
that proponents
that yield the ability to make do, in one way or another, with less than
for know
ideal justification. The very limitations on the requirements
to know
world
Watsons
of
the
it
for
the
that
make
possible
ledge
more difficult for individuals
like Holmes.
make knowledge
as a counterexample
to
But this conclusion
should not be construed
some
cases
at least, it seems reasonable
theories. In
currently popular
to believe
that Watson
than Holmes.
The blunt man of
knows more
common
sense, being untroubled
solid, uninspired
by subtleties, may
is
know what's what, while the more sensitive, finely tuned intelligence
on
Nor
is it likely that a further condition
distracted
by nuances.
in favor of intelligence.
For to
could redress the balance
knowledge
to redress
in the
that balance
be to move
would
attempt
again
back into the snares of the sceptic.
of ideal justification,
direction
as
is that knowledge,
What Holmes's
shows, I believe,
predicament
not be our
conceive
theories
it, is not and ought
contemporary
For to treat it as such is to devalue
cognitive
objective.
overriding
and perceptual
like conceptual
logi
sensitivity,
to
and the capacity
and depth of understanding,
Even
knows
from
trivial
truths.
when
Watson
important
distinguish
more
better off.
he does not appear to be cognitively
than Holmes,
to the study
to restrict epistemology
that it is unwise
This suggests
excellences
cognitive
cal acumen, breadth

THE

EPISTEMIC

EFFICACY

OF

STUPIDITY

311

of what contemporary
theories count as knowledge. What
is wanted
is
a wide-ranging
of all sorts, and of the
excellences
study of cognitive
to or interfere with one another's realization. The
ways they contribute
fruits of such a study might
enable us to understand
how Socrates,
could be the wisest of men.
knowing nothing,
NOTES
*
I am grateful
to Warren
of wines with me, and
for sharing his knowledge
Goldfarb
for sharing his knowledge
of birds.
Kenneth
Winkler
1
in Bonjour
This example
is a variant of one developed
(1980).
2
Some
that are supposed
internalists
basic statements
e.g., Chisholm
recognize
are not basic,
statements
that most
be inherently
reasonable.
But they acknowledge

to

to
so

a matter
of coherence
is mostly
their ad
1982). Moreover,
(Chisholm
not be reason
statements
is problematic.
For it would
reasonable
inherently
to accept a putatively
that conflicted
with the
able on internalist
basic statement
grounds
not accept
I ought
that I see
the claim
system. For example,
appropriate
background
that I am color blind.
convinced
red if I am justifiably
something

justification
mission
of

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