Professional Documents
Culture Documents
INTRODUCTION
Given that no such study has been undertaken for Mauritius, such a
work attempts to extend the literature in various ways. First, an
examination of the impact of financial deregulation on the efficiency
(allocative and technical) and productivity (TFP) of banks would
contribute to the literature on a small and deregulated open economy
in the African region. Moreover, we also incorporate different
objectives of the banking industry in our analysis of efficiency and
productivity. Following Leightner and Lovell (1998), two aspects
are examined. Firstly, we look at banks as profit maximisers and
secondly, as banks pursuing the objectives of the Central Bank in
terms of financial stability and economic performance. We apply the
non-parametric approach Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (see
Coelli, 1996), a widely applied technique to estimate efficiency
scores and productivity of banks for the period 1994-2004. These
estimates can be used to compare Mauritius with other countries in
terms of efficiency of the banking system.
II.
In the early 1980s, the control over the overall credit was modified
whereby sectors were categorised into priority and non-priority and
ceilings were imposed respectively on both types of sectors.
Furthermore, banks were individually subject to a certain quantum
of credit depending upon their extent of deposit mobilisation and
credit creation. The early 1980s were marked by the beginning of
the process of gradual liberalisation of the financial system. Controls
over interest rates were gradually lifted. Exchange control on current
transactions was no longer imposed as from mid 1980s. By late
1980s, interest rates were fully liberalised. However, quantitative
controls in the form of reserve requirements and credit ceilings
continued to be imposed. The 1990s were marked by the relaxation
of most of the remaining banking sector controls. Credit ceilings
were gradually abolished and the exchange control act was
suspended by mid 1990s. The cash ratio and liquid asset ratio were
gradually lowered and the liquid asset ratio was brought down to
zero in 1997.
government
securities
amongst
others.
Most
recently,
III.
OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE
constructed
the
Malmquist
growth
indexes
and
the other derived from the objectives of the Bank of Thailand. They
found higher productivity growth of banks when the bank objective
of profit-maximisation was pursued as compared with the model
when the Bank of Thailand's objective was achieved.
IV.
METHODOLOGY
10
11
Max
e0
0
j
y 0j
0
i
0
i
j 1
(1)
i 1
Subject to
J
0
j
y nj
j 1
1; n 1,..., N ;
0 n
i i
i 1
where
DMU and
12
Max
h 0 u 0j y 0j
(2)
j 1
Subject to
I
x 1,
0 0
i i
i 1
u
j 1
0
j
y nj vi0 xin 0;
i 1
is
introduced in problem (2) to ensure that all of the known inputs and
outputs have positive weight values and that the optimal objective
function of the dual problem to problem (2) is not affected by the
values assigned to the dual slack variables in computing the DEA
efficiency score for each DMU. The condition
the base
h 0 1 ensures that
with respect to all other DMUs in the test. A complete DEA model
involves the solution of N such problems, each for a base DMU,
yielding N different
13
changed. Finally, these DEA problems are solved in the paper using
the computer software developed by Coelli (1996).
14
15
V.
16
include time and savings deposits and other borrowed funds. The
price of labour has been derived by dividing total staff expenses by
the number of employees of respective banks. A proxy for the price
of capital is derived by dividing the book value of premises and
fixed assets, net of depreciation by operating expenses other than
staff expenses. The sample size consists of 10 banks and is
comparable to other works carried out using DEA. The sample size
exceeds the rule of thumb given by Soteriou and Zenios (1998) and
Dyson et al., (1998) which state that the sample should be larger
than the product of the number of inputs and outputs. According to
Evanoff and Israeillevich (1991), DEA can be used in small
samples. The study has been carried out over the period 1994 to
2004, which represents more or less the post-deregulation period.
The data on inputs and outputs of the 10 banks are not reported here
because of its magnitude. Such data were fed into the program
DEAP. However, table 5 in the appendix gives some summary
statistics of the banking industry over the years. The charge for
doubtful debts has increased from Rs 407 millions in 2002 to attain
Rs 817 millions in 2004. Total advances, interest and non-interest
income as well as the overall expenses of banks have increased over
the years under study.
17
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
MCB
0.823
0.945
0.936
0.812
0.923
0.909
0.873
0.854
0.795
0.926
0.895
Barclays
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.886
1.000
1.000
0.900
0.856
0.954
1.000
1.000
HSBC
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.965
0.897
0.812
Baroda
0.953
0.752
0.877
0.804
0.761
0.888
1.000
0.925
0.859
0.965
0.854
Habib
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.825
0.925
BNPI
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.814
0.825
0.825
0.963
0.915
SBM
0.943
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.985
0.925
0.916
0.856
IOIB
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.954
0.935
0.950
0.950
0.960
0.890
SEAB
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.897
0.857
0.926
0.850
0.820
0.850
0.950
Delphis
0.955
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.938
0.940
0.950
0.950
0.960
Mean
0.967
0.970
0.981
0.981
0.958
0.961
0.940
0.960
0.950
0.940
0.930
Source: Computed.
18
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
MCB
0.857
0.803
0.592
0.899
0.570
0.821
0.826
0.850
0.820
0.860
0.850
Barclays
0.536
0.583
0.418
0.639
0.373
0.702
0.608
0.950
0.720
0.750
0.820
HSBC
1.000
1.000
0.761
0.901
0.529
0.920
0.976
0.920
0.930
0.950
0.940
Baroda
0.838
0.997
0.770
0.742
0.845
0.881
1.000
1.000
0.850
0.820
0.930
Habib
0.401
0.332
0.290
0.298
0.356
0.495
0.441
0.250
0.440
0.460
0.520
BNPI
0.824
0.744
0.463
0.842
0.336
0.646
0.636
0.620
0.540
0.550
0.620
SBM
0.984
0.889
0.783
0.762
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.960
0.850
0.960
IOIB
1.000
0.998
0.737
0.688
0.816
0.990
0.983
0.950
0.960
0.925
0.930
SEAB
0.619
0.620
0.404
0.418
0.433
0.590
0.646
0.650
0.560
0.650
0.630
Delphis
0.935
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.968
1.000
0.920
0.960
0.940
0.930
0.920
Mean
0.799
0.797
0.622
0.719
0.623
0.805
0.804
0.810
0.820
0.750
0.960
Source: Computed.
19
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
MCB
0.705
0.759
0.554
0.730
0.526
0.746
0.721
0.852
0.808
0.825
0.963
Barclays
0.536
0.583
0.418
0.566
0.373
0.702
0.547
0.903
0.837
0.840
0.962
HSBC
1.000
1.000
0.761
0.901
0.529
0.920
0.976
0.960
0.948
0.952
0.856
Baroda
0.799
0.750
0.675
0.597
0.643
0.782
1.000
0.963
0.855
0.865
0.896
Habib
0.401
0.332
0.290
0.298
0.356
0.495
0.441
0.625
0.720
0.725
0.856
BNPI
0.824
0.744
0.463
0.842
0.336
0.646
0.518
0.723
0.683
0.745
0.854
SBM
0.928
0.889
0.783
0.762
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.993
0.943
0.952
0.856
IOIB
1.000
0.998
0.737
0.688
0.816
0.944
0.919
0.950
0.955
0.925
0.963
SEAB
0.619
0.620
0.404
0.418
0.388
0.506
0.598
0.750
0.690
0.526
0.968
Delphis
0.893
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.968
1.000
0.863
0.950
0.945
0.745
0.935
Mean
0.773
0.772
0.610
0.683
0.597
0.773
0.754
0.885
0.885
0.885
0.825
Source: Computed.
20
21
for 0.529 in 1998). Barclays, which ranks just after the HSBC in
terms of size, showed relatively, lower OE fluctuating between
0.373 and 0.702. The overall economic efficiency of banks however
showed a declining trend in the first few years, falling from 0.773 in
1994 to 0.597 in 1998. It picked up to 0.773 in 1999 but fell again to
0.754 in 2000. The low levels of average overall efficiency are due
to lower allocative efficiency (that is the suboptimal input-output
mix given prices) rather than technical inefficiency. Table 5 reports
the summarised results across banks as well as over the period 1994
through 2004.
TABLE 5. Summary of Means (1994-2004) (Banks Own Objective)
Technical
Efficiency
Allocative
Efficiency
MCB
Barclays
HSBC
Baroda
Habib
BNPI
SBM
IOIB
SEAB
Delphis
0.889
0.969
1.000
0.862
1.000
0.973
0.992
0.984
0.954
0.985
0.767
0.551
0.870
0.868
0.373
0.642
0.917
0.887
0.533
0.975
Overall
Economic
Efficiency
0.677
0.532
0.870
0.749
0.373
0.625
0.909
0.872
0.508
0.961
Mean
0.961
0.738
0.709
Source: Computed.
22
23
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
MCB
0.956
1.000
0.950
1.000
1.000
0.996
0.950
0.960
0.950
0.830
0.850
Barclays
0.918
0.833
0.873
0.948
1.000
0.936
0.873
0.850
0.852
0.790
0.850
HSBC
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.925
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.860
0.920
0.930
Baroda
1.000
0.962
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.982
0.796
0.825
Habib
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.988
0.859
0.916
0.936
BNPI
1.000
1.000
0.727
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.727
0.925
0.725
0.852
0.745
SBM
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.985
0.956
0.952
0.936
IOIB
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.952
0.963
0.985
SEAB
1.000
1.000
0.939
1.000
0.976
0.837
0.939
0.936
0.940
0.952
0.965
Delphis
0.998
1.000
0.906
1.000
0.948
1.000
0.906
0.925
0.936
0.895
0.954
Mean
0.987
0.980
0.940
0.987
0.992
0.977
0.940
0.952
0.954
0.856
0.985
Source: Computed.
24
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
MCB
0.908
1.000
1.000
0.971
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.925
0.936
0.944
Barclays
0.927
0.989
0.998
0.990
0.890
0.985
0.998
0.985
0.925
0.925
0.889
HSBC
0.964
0.907
0.791
0.999
1.000
0.756
0.791
0.812
0.852
0.936
0.942
Baroda
0.841
0.866
0.622
0.896
0.739
0.728
0.622
0.633
0.625
0.825
0.741
Habib
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.925
0.985
0.936
0.988
BNPI
0.875
0.842
0.910
0.993
0.778
0.692
0.910
0.895
0.941
0.952
0.899
SBM
0.800
0.972
1.000
0.859
0.855
1.000
1.000
0.658
0.988
0.758
0.985
IOIB
0.846
1.000
0.889
0.945
0.871
0.973
0.889
1.000
0.925
0.952
0.985
SEAB
1.000
0.962
0.891
0.947
0.874
0.993
0.891
0.825
0.936
0.952
0.940
Delphis
0.916
0.842
0.896
1.000
0.865
0.863
0.896
0.856
0.825
0.936
0.863
Mean
0.908
0.938
0.900
0.960
0.887
0.899
0.900
0.925
0.936
0.852
0.842
Source: Computed.
25
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
0.868
1.000
0.950
0.971
1.000
0.996
0.950
0.980
0.938
0.883
0.897
Barclays 0.851
0.824
0.871
0.939
0.890
0.922
0.871
0.918
0.889
0.858
0.870
HSBC
0.964
0.907
0.791
0.924
1.000
0.756
0.791
0.906
0.856
0.928
0.936
Baroda
0.841
0.833
0.622
0.896
0.739
0.728
0.622
0.817
0.804
0.811
0.783
Habib
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.957
0.922
0.926
0.962
BNPI
0.875
0.842
0.662
0.993
0.778
0.692
0.662
0.910
0.833
0.902
0.822
SBM
0.800
0.972
1.000
0.859
0.855
1.000
1.000
0.822
0.972
0.855
0.961
IOIB
0.846
1.000
0.889
0.945
0.871
0.973
0.889
1.000
0.939
0.958
0.985
SEAB
1.000
0.962
0.837
0.947
0.853
0.831
0.837
0.881
0.938
0.952
0.952
Delphis
0.914
0.842
0.812
1.000
0.820
0.863
0.812
0.891
0.881
0.916
0.909
Mean
0.896
0.919
0.845
0.948
0.880
0.878
0.845
0.939
0.945
0.854
0.914
MCB
Source: Computed.
26
27
Allocative
Efficiency
Overall Economic
Efficiency
MCB
Barclays
HSBC
Baroda
Habib
BNPI
SBM
IOIB
SEAB
Delphis
0.979
0.912
0.989
0.995
1.000
0.922
1.000
1.000
0.956
0.965
0.983
0.968
0.887
0.759
1.000
0.857
0.927
0.916
0.937
0.897
0.962
0.881
0.876
0.754
1.000
0.786
0.927
0.916
0.895
0.866
Mean
0. 972
0. 913
0. 886
Source: Computed.
It would be interesting to compare efficiencies of banks under these
two conditions, namely when banks are pursuing their own
objectives and banks are incorporating the objectives of the Central
bank. In both conditions, as indicated in Table 4 and Table 6, we
find that banks have been maintaining relatively high scores of
average technical efficiency from 1994 to 2004. But the difference
in efficiencies is more explained in terms of allocative efficiencies.
From Table 3 and Table 7, it is found that the mean allocative
efficiency scores of banks over the period were lower in the case
when banks are pursing their own objectives rather than the central
banks objectives. Thus, the overall economic efficiency of banks
turns out to be lower when the central banks objectives are taken
into account. The mean allocative efficiency score for the period
28
appendix.
29
V.
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
Athanassopoulos, A.D. and Giokas, D. 2000. The Use of Data
Envelopment Analysis in Banking Institutions: Evidence from the
Commercial Bank of Greece. Interfaces 30: 2-81.
30
31
32
33
Data
34
35
Efficiency in
36
Swary,
Itzhak,
and
Barry
Topf.
1992.
Global
Financial
37
APPENDIX
The Mauritian banking sector can be categorised into three domestic
banks, five foreign banks and two foreign banks locally
incorporated. Two of the domestic banks, namely MCB and SBM,
hold about 70 per cent of the total banking assets and deposits,
dominating the loan banking landscape. Although MCB has
maintained its deposit share over the period 1994 and 2004, the
share of deposits of the SBM has declined from 29.8 per cent in
1994 to 24.6 percent in 2004. Among the foreign banks, HSBC has
the largest share of assets and deposits of about 9 per cent, followed
by Barclays with a share of about 6 per cent. Among the foreign
banks locally incorporated, the deposit share of Delphis increased
from about 2 per cent to 4.4 per cent in 1997 as it took over a bank
in liquidation. It gradually rose to 5.0 per cent in 2004. The ratio of
profit after tax out of the total is relatively high for the SBM as
compared to MCB although the deposit share of the SBM (28 per
cent on average) is much lower than that of the MCB with an
average deposit share of 43 per cent.
fees and
38
banks with the two largest banks allocating about 75 per cent of total
loans. The credit-deposit ratio, which describes the extent to which
banks fund their loan activities out of deposits and which also
measures the extent of risk has been on an upward trend over the
period 1994-2004, rising from 67.3 per cent in 1994 to 79.2 per cent
in 2004. Banks' provision for loan losses as a ratio of total loans
averaged to 0.9 per cent over the period 1994-2004. Baroda and
Habib made the highest provisioning while MCB, SBM and Delphis
had relatively lower provisions for loan losses.
Profit
before
Tax
Loans Provision
for Loan
Losses
Local Banks:
MCB
1994
2000
1994-2004
SBM
IOIB
44.2
44.1
32.1
36.3
46.1
45.5
0.83
45.6
43.9
38.2
45.6
44.8
50.2
0.82
44.5
41.28
40.85
45.23
44.4
49.5
0.82
1994
29.7
29.8
31.3
32.0
21.7
28.7
0.76
2004
26.0
25.6
39.9
26.8
35.7
29.0
0.45
1994-20042
29.7
29.1
35.4
30.8
31.8
27.0
0.58
1994
2.2
2.2
4.1
3.1
1.7
2.1
1.16
200
2.5
2.7
1.5
2.9
1.0
2.1
1.07
1994-20042
2.5
2.5
2.3
3.0
1.5
2.4
1.02
39
Assets Deposits
Profit
before
Tax
Loans Provision
for Loan
Losses
Foreign Banks:
HSBC
1994
7.4
7.3
13.5
8.2
9.3
8.1
0.05
2004
10.0
10.9
10.8
9.9
10.7
6.7
0.63
1994-20042
8.8
9.1
9.6
8.7
10.4
8.3
1.22
Barclays 1994
6.6
6.7
6.7
7.7
10.5
5.8
2.22
2000
6.1
6.6
4.5
6.0
7.0
6.2
1.56
6.1
6.3
5.3
6.2
8.4
5.5
1.89
1994
3.9
4.0
5.5
5.0
4.9
4.3
0.01
2004
2.9
3.1
1.3
2.7
2.6
1.9
1.73
3.3
3.4
3.6
3.6
3.9
3.1
0.85
1994
2.2
2.2
3.3
3.1
1.5
1.9
0.32
2004
1.9
2.1
1.0
2.1
1.1
0.8
7.49
2.0
2.1
1.7
2.2
1.2
1.3
3.06
0.8
0.9
1.4
1.2
0.9
0.6
9.27
0.7
0.7
1.4
0.9
0.5
0.3
13.57
0.8
0.8
1.2
0.9
0.7
0.4
8.51
1994-2000
BNPI
1994-2004
Baroda
1994-2004
Habib
1994
2004
1994-2004
1.6
1.5
1.2
1.7
1.4
1.5
0.65
2004
5.3
5.0
3.1
5.4
3.1
3.9
0.85
1994-20042
3.6
3.5
2.7
3.9
2.8
3.3
0.94
1994
1.3
1.2
1.0
1.7
1.8
1.6
5.94
2004
1.0
1.1
0.1
1.3
0.6
0.9
0.75
1.2
1.1
0.5
1.4
1.1
1.2
1.86
SEAB
1994-2004
40
2001
2002
2003
2004
407
685
936
814
71507
10572
6857
4521
2954
3594
8754
74715
10572
6371
4201
2941
3353
8598
85839
12154
7232
4922
3653
4275
8965
89037
1325
7584
5845
3954
4521
8457
mean
0.967
0.97
0.981
0.981
0.958
0.961
0.94
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.93
minimum
0.943
0.752
0.877
0.812
0.761
0.857
0.814
0.825
0.82
0.825
0.812
gap (%)
3.3
3
1.9
1.9
4.2
3.9
6
4
5
6
7
Gap: (1-mean)*100 indicates how much less, in percentage, the nonbest practice banks produce the best practice banks on average.
Source: Computed.
41
Chart 1
Mean and minimun efficiency scores of technical efficiency
1.2
Efficiency scores
0.8
mean
0.6
min
0.4
0.2
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Years
42
2004
2006
mean
0.799
0.797
0.622
0.719
0.623
0.805
0.804
0.81
0.82
0.75
0.96
min
0.536
0.583
0.418
0.418
0.336
0.495
0.441
0.81
0.54
0.55
0.52
gap (%)
20.1
20.3
37.8
28.1
37.7
19.5
19.6
19
18
25
4
Gap: (1-mean)*100 indicates how much less, in percentage, the nonbest practice banks produce the best practice banks on average
Source: Computed.
43
Chart 2
Mean and minimum allocative efficiency scores
1.2
Efficiency scores
0.8
mean
0.6
min
0.4
0.2
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Years
44
2002
2004
2006
min
0.536
0.332
0.29
0.418
0.388
0.506
0.518
0.625
0.68
0.52
0.82
mean
0.773
0.772
0.61
0.683
0.597
0.773
0.754
0.885
0.885
0.885
0.825
gap (%)
22.7
22.8
39
31.7
40.3
22.7
24.6
11.5
11.5
11.5
17.5
Gap: (1-mean)*100 indicates how much less, in percentage, the nonbest practice banks produce the best practice banks on average
Source: Computed.
45
Chart 3
Mean and Minimum economic efficiency scores
1
0.9
0.8
Efficiency scores
0.7
0.6
min
0.5
mea
n
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Years
46
2002
2004
2006
min
0.918
0.833
0.727
0.825
0.948
0.837
0.727
0.925
0.725
0.79
0.93
mean
0.987
0.98
0.94
0.987
0.992
0.977
0.94
0.952
0.954
0.856
0.985
gap (%)
1.3
2
6
1.3
0.8
2.3
6
4.8
4.6
14.4
1.5
Gap: (1-mean)*100 indicates how much less, in percentage, the nonbest practice banks produce the best practice banks on average
Source: Computed
47
Chart 4
1.2
Efficiency scores
0.8
min
0.6
mea
n
0.4
0.2
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Years
48
2002
2004
2006
min
0.841
0.866
0.622
0.971
0.739
0.692
0.791
0.812
0.941
0.826
0.741
mean
0.908
0.938
0.9
0.96
0.887
0.899
0.9
0.925
0.936
0.852
0.842
gap (%)
9.2
6.2
10
4
11.3
10.1
10
7.5
6.4
14.8
15.8
49
Chart 5
Mean and Minimum efficiency scores
1.2
efficiency scores
0.8
min
0.6
mea
n
0.4
0.2
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Years
50
2002
2004
2006
min
0.851
0.833
0.622
0.859
0.778
0.692
0.662
0.817
0.881
0.854
0.822
mean
0.896
0.919
0.845
0.948
0.88
0.878
0.845
0.9385
0.945
0.854
0.913
gap (%)
10.4
8.1
15.5
5.2
12
12.2
15.5
6.15
5.5
14.6
8.65
51
Chart 6
Mean and minimun efficiency of banks
1.2
Efficiency scores
0.8
min
0.6
mea
n
0.4
0.2
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Years
52
2002
2004
2006
Chart 7
Gaps of efficiency measures
45
40
Efficiency scores
35
30
te1
25
ae
1
oe
1
20
15
10
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Years
53
2002
2004
2006
Chart 8
Efficiency gaps in model 2
18
16
Efficiency measures
14
12
te2
10
ae
2
oe
2
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Years
54
2002
2004
2006