Soviet war in Afghanistan

escaped government control.[32] In 1985, the size of the

LCOSF (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces) was increased to 108,800 and ghting increased throughout the
country, making 1985 the bloodiest year of the war. In
the mid-1980s, the Afghan resistance movement, assisted
by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United
Kingdom, Egypt,[10] the Peoples Republic of China and
others, contributed to Moscows high military costs and
strained international relations. Contingents of so-called
Afghan Arabs, foreign ghters who wished to wage jihad
against the atheist communists. Notable among them was
a young Saudi named Osama bin Laden, whose Arab
group eventually evolved into al-Qaeda.[33][34][35]

The Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted nine years from

December 1979 to February 1989. Part of the Cold War,
it was fought between Soviet-led Afghan forces against
multi-national insurgent groups called the Mujahideen,
mostly composed of two alliances the Peshawar Seven
and the Tehran Eight. The Peshawar Seven insurgents
received military training in neighboring Pakistan and
China,[9] as well as weapons and billions of dollars
from the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia,
and other countries.[3][4][5][9][26] The Shia groups of the
Tehran Eight alliance received support from the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Early in the rule of the PDPA government, the Maoist Afghanistan Liberation Organization also played a signicant role in opposition, but its
major force was defeated by late 1979, prior to the Soviet
intervention. The decade-long war resulted in the death
of 850,0001.5 million civilians[23][24] as well as causing
millions of Afghans to ee the country, mostly to Pakistan
and Iran.

By mid 1987 the Soviet Union announced it would start

withdrawing its forces. The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev
on the scene in 1985 and his 'new thinking' on foreign and
domestic policy was probably the most important factor
in the Soviets decision to leave. The nal troop withdrawal started on May 15, 1988, and ended on February
In June 1975, militants from the Jamiat Islami party 15, 1989. Due to the interminable nature of the war, the
attempted to overthrow the government. In 1978, the conict in Afghanistan has sometimes been referred to as
Taraki government initiated a series of reforms, includ- the Soviet Unions Vietnam War" or the Bear Trap by
ing a radical modernization of the traditional Islamic civil the Western media.[36][37][38]
society.[27] Between April 1978 and the Soviet Intervention of December 1979, thousands of prisoners, perhaps
as many as 27,000, were executed. Large parts of the
country went into open rebellion. The Afghan govern- 1 Background
ment, having secured a treaty in December 1978 that allowed them to call on Soviet forces, repeatedly requested The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was formed afthe introduction of troops in Afghanistan in the spring ter the Saur Revolution on April 27, 1978. The governand summer of 1979. They requested Soviet troops ment was one with a pro-poor, pro-farmer and socialisto provide security and to assist in the ght against the tic agenda. It had close relations with the Soviet Union.
mujahideen rebels. Foreign ministers from 34 Islamic On December 5, 1978, a friendship treaty was signed
nations adopted a resolution which condemned the So- between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. On July 3,
viet intervention and demanded the immediate, urgent 1979, United States President Jimmy Carter signed the
and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from the rst directive for covert nancial aid to the opponents of
Muslim nation of Afghanistan.[28] The UN General As- the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.[39]
sembly passed a resolution protesting the Soviet intervenRussian military involvement in Afghanistan has a long
tion in Afghanistan by a vote of 10418.[29]
history, going back to Tsarist expansions in the so-called
The initial Soviet deployment of the 40th Army in "Great Game" between Russia and Britain. This began
Afghanistan began on December 24, 1979, under So- in the 19th century with such events as the Panjdeh Inviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.[30] The rst phase began cident, a military skirmish that occurred in 1885 when
with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and their rst Russian forces seized Afghan territory south of the Oxus
battles with various opposition groups.[28] The war de- River around an oasis at Panjdeh. This interest in the reveloped into a new pattern: the Soviets occupied the gion continued on through the Soviet era, with billions in
cities and main axis of communication, while the mu- economic and military aid sent to Afghanistan between
jahideen, (which the Soviet Army soldiers called 'Dush- 1955 and 1978.[40]
man,' meaning 'enemy')[31] divided into small groups,
waged a guerrilla war. Almost 80 percent of the country In February 1979 the United States Ambassador to
Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped by Setami
1

BACKGROUND

Milli militants and was later killed during an assault carried out by the Afghan police, assisted by Soviet advisers.
The death of the U.S. Ambassador led to a major degradation in AfghanistanUnited States relations.[41]

On April 27, 1978, the Afghan army, which had been

sympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and executed Daoud along with members of his family.[48] Nur
Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, beIn the Middle East drastic changes were taking place con- came President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime
current with the upheavals in Afghanistan caused by the Minister of the newly established Democratic Republic
Saur Revolution. In February 1979, the Islamic Revolu- of Afghanistan.
tion ousted the American-backed Shah from Iran, making the U.S. lose one of its most powerful allies.[42] The
1.2 Factions inside the PDPA
United States then deployed twenty ships to the Persian
Gulf and the Arabian Sea including two aircraft carriAfter the revolution, Taraki assumed the Presidency,
ers, and there was a constant stream of threats of warPrime Ministership and General Secretaryship of the
fare between the US and Iran.[43] March 1979 marked
PDPA. The government was divided along factional
the signing of the U.S.-backed peace agreement between
lines, with President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister
Israel and Egypt. The Soviet leadership saw the agreeHazullah Amin of the Khalq faction against Parcham
ment as a major advantage for the United States. One
leaders such as Babrak Karmal and Mohammad NajibulSoviet newspaper stated that Egypt and Israel were now
lah. Within the PDPA, conicts resulted in exiles, purges
"gendarmes of the Pentagon". The Soviets viewed the
and executions of Parcham members.[49]
treaty not only as a peace agreement between their erstwhile allies in Egypt and the U.S.-supported Israelis but During its rst 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied
also as a military pact.[44] In addition, the U.S. sold more a Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, many
than 5,000 missiles to Saudi Arabia and also supplied the of which were viewed by conservatives as opposing
[50]
Royalist rebels in the North Yemen Civil War against the Islam. Decrees setting forth changes in marriage cusNasserist government. Also, the Soviet Unions previ- toms and land reform were not received well by a popously strong relations with Iraq had recently soured. In ulation deeply immersed in tradition and Islam, particuJune 1978, Iraq began entering into friendlier relations larly by the powerful land owners who were harmed ecowith the Western world and buying French and Italian- nomically by the abolition of usury (though usury is promade weapons, though the vast majority still came from hibited in Islam) and the cancellation of farmers debts.
By mid-1978, a rebellion started with rebels attacking
the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and China.
the local military garrison in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and soon civil war spread throughout
the country. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minis1.1 The Saur Revolution
ter Hazullah Amin seized power, arresting and killing
President Taraki. Over two months of instability overMain article: Saur Revolution
whelmed Amins regime as he moved against his opponents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion.
King Mohammed Zahir Shah ascended to the throne and
reigned from 1933 to 1973. Zahirs cousin, Mohammad
Daoud Khan, served as Prime Minister from 1954
1.3 SovietAfghan relations
to 1963. The Marxist Peoples Democratic Party of
Afghanistan's (PDPAs) strength grew considerably in Main articles: Kabul International Airport, Soyuz TMthese years. In 1967, the PDPA split into two rival fac6, Abdul Ahad Mohmand, Interkosmos, Bagram Aireld
tions, the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muham- and Naghlu Dam
mad Taraki and Hazullah Amin and the Parcham (Flag)
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had
faction led by Babrak Karmal.[45]
been a major power broker and inuential mentor in
Former Prime Minister Daoud seized power in a military
coup on July 17, 1973, after allegations of corruption and
poor economic conditions against the Kings government.
Daoud put an end to the monarchy, and his time in power
was widely popular amongst the general populace but unpopular amongst PDPA supporters.

Afghan politics, ranging from civil-military infrastructure to Afghan society.[51] In the 1980s, many Afghans
were procient in the Russian language.[51] Since 1947,
Afghanistan had been under the inuence of the Soviet
government and received large amounts of aid, economic
assistance, military equipment training and military hardIntense opposition from factions of the PDPA was ware from the Soviet Union.
sparked by the repression imposed on them by Daouds The economic assistance and aid had been provided to
regime and the death of a leading PDPA member, Mir Afghanistan as early as 1919, shortly after the Russian
Akbar Khyber.[46] The mysterious circumstances of Khy- Revolution and when the regime was facing the Russian
bers death sparked massive anti-Daoud demonstrations Civil War. Provisions were given in the form of small
in Kabul, which resulted in the arrest of several promi- arms, ammunition, a few aircraft, and (according to denent PDPA leaders.[47]
bated Soviet sources) a million gold rubles to support

1.4

Initiation of the insurgency

Afghanistan Scout Association in 1950s.

the resistance during the Third Anglo-Afghan War. In

1942, the USSR again moved to strengthen the Afghan
Armed Forces, by providing small arms and aircraft, and
establishing training centers in Tashkent (Uzbek Soviet
Socialist Republic). Soviet-Afghan military cooperation
began on a regular basis in 1956, and further agreements
were made in the 1970s, which saw the USSR send advisers and specialists. The Soviet Union built an extensive amount of infrastructure, notably giving assistance
building the Kabul University, Polytechnical institutes,
hospitals, civilian infrastructure, power plants, and local schools. During the 1980s, Soviets established the
universities in Blakhe, Herate, Takhar, Nangarhar and
Fariyab provinces. Russian faculty soon joined the universities, teaching Afghan students in Russian language
prociency.

3
meeting in an attempt to reconcile Tarakis Khalq faction
and the Parcham against Amin and his followers. At the
meeting, Taraki was successful in negotiating some Soviet support, including the redeployment of two Soviet
armed divisions at the Soviet-Afghan border, the sending
of 500 military and civilian advisers and specialists and
the immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at
25 percent below the original price; however, the Soviets
were not pleased about the developments in Afghanistan
and Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for party
unity. Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, the
Soviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further in
Afghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military intervention within Afghan borders during Tarakis rule as
well as later during Amins short rule.[56]

1.4 Initiation of the insurgency

Main articles: Soviet UnionUnited States relations and
PakistanSoviet Union relations
See also: Kidnapping and assassination of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs
Afghanistan cemented regional problems with Pakistan,

In 1978, after witnessing India's nuclear test, Smiling

Buddha, President Daud Khan initiated a military
buildup to counter Pakistans armed forces and Iranian
military inuence in Afghan politics. A nal pre-war
treaty, signed in December 1978, allowed the PDPA to
call upon the Soviet Union for military support.[52]
Following the Herat uprising, President Taraki contacted
Alexei Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and asked for practical and technical assistance
with men and armament. Kosygin was unfavorable to
the proposal on the basis of the negative political repercussions such an action would have for his country, and
he rejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet
military aid in Afghanistan.[54] Following Kosygins rejection Taraki requested aid from Leonid Brezhnev, the
general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and Soviet head of state, who warned Taraki that
full Soviet intervention would only play into the hands of
our enemies both yours and ours. Brezhnev also advised Taraki to ease up on the drastic social reforms and
to seek broader support for his regime.[55]

Soviet infantry at the time of deployment.

after Daoud pressed his hard-line Pashtunistan policies

to Pakistan.[57] Pakistan retaliated, and Prime minister
Zulkar Ali Bhutto authorized a covert operation under M.I.'s Major-General Naseerullah Babar.[57] In 1974,
Bhutto authorized another secret operation in Kabul
where the ISI and the AI extradited Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbadin Hekmatyar to Peshawar, amid fear
that Rabbani and Hekmatyar might be assassinated by
Daoud.[57] According to Baber, Bhuttos operation was
an excellent idea and it had hard-hitting impact on Daoud
and his government which forced Daoud to increase his
desire to make peace with Bhutto.[57] Another part of
this operation was to train hard-line Jamiat-e Islami mil[57]
HowIn 1979, Taraki attended a conference of the Non- itants against the Daouds secular government.
ever,
this
operation
went
into
cold-storage
after
Bhutto
Aligned Movement in Havana, Cuba. On his way back,
[57]
he stopped in Moscow on March 20 and met with Brezh- was removed from power.
nev, foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and other Soviet In June 1975, militants from the Jamiat Islami party atocials. It was rumoured that Karmal was present at the tempted to overthrow the government. They started their

4
rebellion in the Panjshir valley (a part of the greater
Parwan province), in the present day Panjshir province,
some 100 kilometers north of Kabul, and in a number
of other provinces of the country. However, government
forces easily defeated the insurgency and a sizable portion of the insurgents sought refuge in Pakistan where
they enjoyed the support of Zulkar Ali Bhutto's government, which had been alarmed by Daouds revival of the
Pashtunistan issue.[58]

Soviet forces after capturing some Mujahideen.

BACKGROUND

ernment brooked no opposition to the reforms[49] and responded with violence to unrest. Between April 1978
and the Soviet Intervention of December 1979, thousands of prisoners, perhaps as many as 27,000, were executed at the notorious[59] Pul-e-Charkhi prison, including many village mullahs and headmen.[60] Other members of the traditional elite, the religious establishment
and intelligentsia ed the country.[60]
Large parts of the country went into open rebellion.
The Parcham Government claimed that 11,000 were executed during the Amin/Taraki period in response to
the revolts.[61] The revolt began in October among the
Nuristani tribes of the Kunar Valley in the northeastern part of the country near the border with Pakistan,
and rapidly spread among the other ethnic groups. By
the spring of 1979, 24 of the 28 provinces had suered
outbreaks of violence.[62][63] The rebellion began to take
hold in the cities: in March 1979 in Herat, rebels led by
Ismail Khan revolted. Between 3,000 and 5,000 people
were killed and wounded during the Herat revolt. Some
100 Soviet citizens and their families were killed.[64][65]
In 1979, the contentious law and order situation led to a
serious diplomatic incident involving United States, Soviet Union and Afghanistan when U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Adolph Spike Dubs was kidnapped by four
militants belonging to radical communist faction, Settame-Melli (lit. National Oppression).[66] The National Operation demanded the release of their communist leader
Badruddin Bahes, which the Afghan government denied
holding and refused categorically to negotiate with the
militants, in spite of the U.S. embassys demands.[66] The
U.S. increased pressure on the Afghan government and
the Soviet Union forcefully demanding for peaceful negotiations for the release of their ambassador.[67]

Dubs was held in Room 117 of the Kabul Hotel (now

called Kabul Serena Hotel), the United States sent its
embassy and diplomatic sta at the Kabul Serena Ho40th Army headquarters, Tajbeg Palace, 1986.
tel where the negotiation with the communist faction and
the U.S. was started.[66] During this time, the Afghan
security forces, accompanied by the Russian advisers
swarmed the hallway and surrounding rooftops, but negotiations stalled, leading to an intense exchange of cross
re, after Russian advisers ordered an assault.[67] Documents released from the Soviet KGB bureau archives
by Vasily Mitrokhin in the early 1990s clearly showed
that the Afghan government clearly authorized the assault and that the KGB adviser on scene, Sergei Batrukihn,
may have recommended the assault, as well as the execution of a kidnapper before U.S. experts could interrogate
him.[68] All attempts were failed, and U.S. Ambassador
Adolph Dubs was caught between the cross re leading to
his death.[67] Afterwards the United States formally exSoviet soldiers conducting training.
pressed to Soviet Union its disapproval of the assault by
the security forces, putting more stress on U.S.-Soviet reIn 1978, the Taraki government initiated a series of re- lations.[69]
forms, including a radical modernization of the traditional Islamic civil and especially marriage law, aimed Despite these drastic measures, by the end of 1980, out
at uprooting feudalism" in Afghan society.[27] The gov- of the 80,000 soldiers strong Afghan Army, more than

5
half had either deserted or joined the rebels.[62]

1979: Soviet deployment

The headquarters of the Soviet 40th Army in Kabul, 1987. Before

the Soviet intervention, the building was Tajbeg Palace, where
Hazullah Amin was killed.

The Afghan government, having secured a treaty in

December 1978 that allowed them to call on Soviet
forces, repeatedly requested the introduction of troops
in Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 1979. They
requested Soviet troops to provide security and to assist
in the ght against the mujahideen rebels. On April 14,
1979, the Afghan government requested that the USSR
send 15 to 20 helicopters with their crews to Afghanistan,
and on June 16, the Soviet government responded and
sent a detachment of tanks, BMPs, and crews to guard
the government in Kabul and to secure the Bagram and
Shindand airelds. In response to this request, an airborne battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.
Lomakin, arrived at the Bagram Air Base on July 7. They
arrived without their combat gear, disguised as technical
specialists. They were the personal bodyguards for President Taraki. The paratroopers were directly subordinate
to the senior Soviet military advisor and did not interfere
in Afghan politics. Several leading politicians at the time
such as Alexei Kosygin and Andrei Gromyko were against
intervention.
After a month, the Afghan requests were no longer for individual crews and subunits, but for regiments and larger
units. In July, the Afghan government requested that two
motorized rie divisions be sent to Afghanistan. The following day, they requested an airborne division in addition to the earlier requests. They repeated these requests
and variants to these requests over the following months
right up to December 1979. However, the Soviet government was in no hurry to grant them.
Based on information from the KGB, Soviet leaders felt
that Prime Minister Hazullah Amin's actions had destabilized the situation in Afghanistan. Following his initial coup against and killing of President Taraki, the KGB
station in Kabul warned Moscow that Amins leadership

Soviet ground forces in action while conducting an oensive operation against the Islamist resistance, the Mujahideen.

would lead to harsh repressions, and as a result, the activation and consolidation of the opposition.[71]
The Soviets established a special commission on
Afghanistan, comprising KGB chairman Yuri Andropov,
Boris Ponomarev from the Central Committee and
Dmitriy Ustinov, the Minister of Defence. In late April
1978, the committee reported that Amin was purging his
opponents, including Soviet loyalists, that his loyalty to
Moscow was in question and that he was seeking diplomatic links with Pakistan and possibly the Peoples Republic of China (which at the time had poor relations
with the Soviet Union). Of specic concern were Amins
secret meetings with the U.S. charg d'aaires, J. Bruce
Amstutz, which, while never amounting to any agreement
between Amin and the United States, sowed suspicion in
the Kremlin.[72]
Information obtained by the KGB from its agents in Kabul
provided the last arguments to eliminate Amin. Supposedly, two of Amins guards killed the former president
Nur Muhammad Taraki with a pillow, and Amin was suspected to be a CIA agent. The latter, however, is still
disputed: Amin repeatedly demonstrated ocial friendliness to the Soviet Union. Soviet General Vasily Zaplatin,
a political advisor at that time, claimed that four of President Tarakis ministers were responsible for the destabilization. However, Zaplatin failed to emphasize this

1979: SOVIET INTERVENTION

enough.[73]
Also during the 1970s, the Soviet Union reached the peak
of its political inuence in comparison to the U.S. as the
SALT I treaty was created to cooperate in matters of nuclear weapons and technology between the two nations.
A second round of talks between Soviet premier Brezhnev and President Carter yielded the SALT II treaty in
June 1979. (The United States Senate failed to ratify the
treaty). This process would eventually culminate and lead
up to the buildup and intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 to preserve, stabilize and militarily interSoviet paratroopers aboard a BMD-1 in Kabul
vene on behalf of the communist regime there.

1979: Soviet intervention

That operation began at 19:00 hr., when the KGB-led
Soviet Zenith Group destroyed Kabuls communications
hub, paralyzing Afghan military command. At 19:15,
the assault on Tajbeg Palace began; as planned, president
Hazullah Amin was killed. Simultaneously, other objectives were occupied (e.g., the Ministry of Interior at
19:15). The operation was fully complete by the morning
of December 28, 1979.

The Soviet intervention

On October 31, 1979 Soviet informants to the Afghan

Armed Forces who were under orders from the inner
circle of advisors under Soviet premier Brezhnev, relayed information for them to undergo maintenance cycles for their tanks and other crucial equipment. Meanwhile, telecommunications links to areas outside of Kabul
were severed, isolating the capital. With a deteriorating security situation, large numbers of Soviet Airborne
Forces joined stationed ground troops and began to land
in Kabul on December 25. Simultaneously, Amin moved
the oces of the president to the Tajbeg Palace, believing this location to be more secure from possible threats.
According to Colonel General Tukharinov and Merimsky, Amin was fully informed of the military movements, having requested Soviet military assistance to
northern Afghanistan on December 17.[74][75] His brother
and General Dmitry Chiangov met with the commander
of the 40th Army before Soviet troops entered the country, to work out initial routes and locations for Soviet
troops.[74]
On December 27, 1979, 700 Soviet troops dressed in
Afghan uniforms, including KGB and GRU special forces
ocers from the Alpha Group and Zenith Group, occupied major governmental, military and media buildings in
Kabul, including their primary target the Tajbeg Presidential Palace.

The Soviet military command at Termez, Uzbek SSR,

announced on Radio Kabul that Afghanistan had been
liberated from Amins rule. According to the Soviet
Politburo they were complying with the 1978 Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness and
Amin had been executed by a tribunal for his crimes
by the Afghan Revolutionary Central Committee. That
committee then elected as head of government former
Deputy Prime Minister Babrak Karmal, who had been
demoted to the relatively insignicant post of ambassador to Czechoslovakia following the Khalq takeover,
and announced that it had requested Soviet military
assistance.[76]
Soviet ground forces, under the command of Marshal
Sergei Sokolov, entered Afghanistan from the north
on December 27. In the morning, the 103rd Guards
'Vitebsk' Airborne Division landed at the airport at
Bagram and the deployment of Soviet troops in
Afghanistan was underway. The force that entered
Afghanistan, in addition to the 103rd Guards Airborne
Division, was under command of the 40th Army and consisted of the 108th and 5th Guards Motor Rie Divisions,
the 860th Separate Motor Rie Regiment, the 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, the 36th Mixed Air Corps.
Later on the 201st and 58th Motor Rie Divisions also
entered the country, along with other smaller units.[77]
In all, the initial Soviet force was around 1,800 tanks,
80,000 soldiers and 2,000 AFVs. In the second week
alone, Soviet aircraft had made a total of 4,000 ights
into Kabul.[78] With the arrival of the two later divisions,
the total Soviet force rose to over 100,000 personnel.

International positions on Soviet

intervention

Foreign ministers from 34 Islamic nations adopted a resolution which condemned the Soviet intervention and demanded the immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Muslim nation of
Afghanistan.[28] The UN General Assembly passed a resolution protesting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan
by a vote of 10418.[29]
Weapons supplies were made available through numerous
countries; the United States purchased all of Israels captured Soviet weapons clandestinely, and then funnelled
the weapons to the Mujahideen, while Egypt upgraded
their own armys weapons, and sent the older weapons
to the militants, Turkey sold their World War II stockpiles to the warlords, and the British and Swiss provided Blowpipe missiles and Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns
respectively, after they were found to be poor models
for their own forces.[26] China provided the most relevant weapons, likely due to their own experience with
guerrilla warfare, and kept meticulous record of all the
shipments.[26]

A mujahideen ghter in Kunar uses a communications receiver.

called 'Dushman,' meaning 'enemy')[31] divided into small

groups, waged a guerrilla war. Almost 80 percent of
the country escaped government control.[32] Soviet troops
were deployed in strategic areas in the northeast, especially along the road from Termez to Kabul. In the west, a
strong Soviet presence was maintained to counter Iranian
inuence. Incidentally, special Soviet units would have
also performed secret attacks on Iranian territory to desuspected mujahideen bases, and their helicopters
5 December 1979 February 1980: stroy
then got engaged in shootings with Iranian jets.[82] ConOccupation
versely, some regions such as Nuristan, in the northeast,
and Hazarajat, in the central mountains of Afghanistan,
The rst phase began with the Soviet intervention in were virtually untouched by the ghting, and lived in alAfghanistan and their rst battles with various opposi- most complete independence.
tion groups.[28] Soviet troops entered Afghanistan along
two ground routes and one air corridor, quickly taking
control of the major urban centers, military bases and
strategic installations. However, the presence of Soviet
troops did not have the desired eect of pacifying the
country. On the contrary, it exacerbated a nationalistic
feeling, causing the rebellion to spread further.[79] Babrak
Karmal, Afghanistans new president, charged the Soviets with causing an increase in the unrest, and demanded
that the 40th Army step in and quell the rebellion, as
his own army had proved untrustworthy.[80] Thus, Soviet
troops found themselves drawn into ghting against ur- Mujahideen with two captured artillery eld guns in Jaji, 1984.
ban uprisings, tribal armies (called lashkar), and sometimes against mutinying Afghan Army units. These forces Periodically the Soviet Army undertook multi-divisional
mostly fought in the open, and Soviet airpower and ar- oensives into mujahideen-controlled areas. Between
tillery made short work of them.[81]
1980 and 1985, nine oensives were launched into the
strategically important Panjshir Valley, but government
control of the area did not improve.[83] Heavy ghting
6 March 1980 April 1985: Soviet also occurred in the provinces neighbouring Pakistan,
where cities and government outposts were constantly unoensives
der siege by the mujahideen. Massive Soviet operations
would regularly break these sieges, but the mujahideen
Main article: Panjshir oensives
would return as soon as the Soviets left.[36] In the west and
The war now developed into a new pattern: the Sovi- south, ghting was more sporadic, except in the cities of
ets occupied the cities and main axis of communication, Herat and Kandahar, that were always partly controlled
while the mujahideen, (which the Soviet Army soldiers by the resistance.[84]

6 MARCH 1980 APRIL 1985: SOVIET OFFENSIVES

The Soviets did not, at rst, foresee taking on such an

active role in ghting the rebels and attempted to play
down their role there as giving light assistance to the
Afghan army. However, the arrival of the Soviets had
the opposite eect as it incensed instead of pacied
the people, causing the mujahideen to gain in strength
and numbers.[85] Originally the Soviets thought that their
forces would strengthen the backbone of the Afghan army
and provide assistance by securing major cities, lines of
communication and transportation.[86] The Afghan army
forces had a high desertion rate and were loath to ght,
especially since the Soviet forces pushed them into infantry roles while they manned the armored vehicles and
artillery. The main reason though that the Afghan soldiers
were so ineective was their lack of morale as many of
them were not truly loyal to the communist government
but simply collecting a paycheck. Once it became apparent that the Soviets would have to get their hands dirty,
they followed three main strategies aimed at quelling the
uprising.[87] Intimidation was the rst strategy, in which
the Soviets would use airborne attacks as well as armored
ground attacks to destroy villages, livestock and crops
in trouble areas. The Soviets would bomb villages that
were near sites of guerrilla attacks on Soviet convoys or
known to support resistance groups. Local peoples were
forced to either ee their homes or die as daily Soviet
attacks made it impossible to live in these areas. By forcing the people of Afghanistan to ee their homes, the
Soviets hoped to deprive the guerillas of resources and
safe havens. The second strategy consisted of subversion
which entailed sending spies to join resistance groups and
report information as well as bribing local tribes or guerrilla leaders into ceasing operations. Finally, the Soviets used military forays into contested territories in an
eort to root out the guerillas and limit their options.
Classic search and destroy operations were implemented
using Mil Mi-24 helicopter gunships that would provide
cover for ground forces in armored vehicles. Once the
villages were occupied by Soviet forces, inhabitants who
remained were frequently interrogated and tortured for
information or killed.[88]

To complement their brute force approach to weeding out

the insurgency, the Soviets used KHAD (Afghan secret
police) to gather intelligence, inltrate the mujahideen,
spread false information, bribe tribal militias into ghting and organize a government militia. While it is impossible to know exactly how successful the KHAD was
in inltrating mujahideen groups, it is thought that they
succeeded in penetrating a good many resistance groups
based in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.[89] KHAD is
thought to have had particular success in igniting internal rivalries and political divisions amongst the resistance groups, rendering some of them completely useless because of inghting.[90] The KHAD had some success in securing tribal loyalties but many of these relationships were ckle and temporary. Often KHAD secured neutrality agreements rather than committed political alignment.[91] The Sarandoy, a KHAD controlled
government militia, had mixed success in the war. Large
salaries and proper weapons attracted a good number of
recruits to the cause, even if they were not necessarily
pro-communist. The problem was that many of the recruits they attracted were in fact mujahideen who would
join up to procure arms, ammunition and money while
also gathering information about forthcoming military
operations.[90]
In 1985, the size of the LCOSF (Limited Contingent of
Soviet Forces) was increased to 108,800 and ghting increased throughout the country, making 1985 the bloodiest year of the war. However, despite suering heavily,
the mujahideen were able to remain in the eld, mostly
because they received thousands of new volunteers daily,
and continue resisting the Soviets.

A Soviet Spetsnaz (special operations) group prepares for a mission in Afghanistan, 1988.

6.1 1980s: Insurrection

In the mid-1980s, the Afghan resistance movement, assisted by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the
United Kingdom, Egypt,[10] the Peoples Republic of
China and others, contributed to Moscows high military costs and strained international relations. The U.S.
The Afghan village left in ruins after being destroyed by Soviet viewed the conict in Afghanistan as an integral Cold
forces.
War struggle, and the CIA provided assistance to anti-

6.1

1980s: Insurrection

Soviet forces through the Pakistani intelligence services, plosions of manpowercustomarily common immediin a program called Operation Cyclone.[92]
ately after the completion of harvestproved obsolete
A similar movement occurred in other Muslim countries, when confronted by well dug-in defenders with modern
bringing contingents of so-called Afghan Arabs, foreign weapons. Lashkar[93]durability was notoriously short; few
ghters who wished to wage jihad against the atheist com- sieges succeeded.
munists. Notable among them was a young Saudi named Mujahideen mobilization in non-Pashtun regions faced
Osama bin Laden, whose Arab group eventually evolved very dierent obstacles. Prior to the intervention, few
into al-Qaeda.[33][34][35]
non-Pashtuns possessed rearms. Early in the war
In the course of the guerrilla war, leadership came to be they were most readily available from army troops or
distinctively associated with the title of commander. It gendarmerie who defected or were ambushed. The interapplied to independent leaders, eschewing identication national arms market and foreign military support tended
with elaborate military bureaucracy associated with such to reach the minority areas last. In the northern reranks as general. As the war produced leaders of reputa- gions, little military tradition had survived upon which
tion, commander was conferred on leaders of ghting to build an armed resistance. Mobilization mostly came
units of all sizes, signifying pride in independence, self- from political leadership closely tied to Islam. Roy
suciency, and distinct ties to local communities. The convincingly contrasts the social leadership of religious
title epitomized Afghan pride in their struggle against a gures in the Persian- and Turkic-speaking regions of
powerful foe. Segmentation of power and religious lead- Afghanistan with that of the Pashtuns. Lacking a strong
ership were the two values evoked by nomenclature gen- political representation in a state dominated by Pasherated in the war. Neither had been favored in the ideol- tuns, minority communities commonly looked to pious
learned or charismatically revered pirs (saints) for leadogy of the former Afghan state.
ership. Extensive Su and maraboutic networks were
Afghanistans resistance movement was born in chaos, spread through the minority communities, readily availspread and triumphed chaotically, and did not nd a way able as foundations for leadership, organization, commuto govern dierently. Virtually all of its war was waged nication and indoctrination. These networks also prolocally by regional warlords. As warfare became more vided for political mobilization, which led to some of
sophisticated, outside support and regional coordination the most eective of the resistance operations during the
grew. Even so, the basic units of mujahideen organiza- war.[93]
tion and action continued to reect the highly segmented
The mujahideen favoured sabotage operations. The more
nature of Afghan society.[93]
common types of sabotage included damaging power
Olivier Roy estimates that after four years of war, there lines, knocking out pipelines and radio stations, blowwere at least 4,000 bases from which mujahideen units ing up government oce buildings, air terminals, hotels,
operated. Most of these were aliated with the seven ex- cinemas, and so on. In the border region with Pakistan,
patriate parties headquartered in Pakistan, which served the mujahideen would often launch 800 rockets per day.
as sources of supply and varying degrees of supervision. Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried out
Signicant commanders typically led 300 or more men, over 23,500 shelling attacks on government targets. The
controlled several bases and dominated a district or a sub- mujahideen surveyed ring positions that they normally
division of a province. Hierarchies of organization above located near villages within the range of Soviet artillery
the bases were attempted. Their operations varied greatly posts, putting the villagers in danger of death from Soviet
in scope, the most ambitious being achieved by Ahmad retaliation. The mujahideen used land mines heavily. OfShah Massoud of the Panjshir valley north of Kabul. He ten, they would enlist the services of the local inhabitants,
led at least 10,000 trained troopers at the end of the So- even children.
viet war and had expanded his political control of Tajikdominated areas to Afghanistans northeastern provinces
under the Supervisory Council of the North.[93]
Roy also describes regional, ethnic and sectarian variations in mujahideen organization. In the Pashtun areas
of the east, south and southwest, tribal structure, with
its many rival sub-divisions, provided the basis for military organization and leadership. Mobilization could be
readily linked to traditional ghting allegiances of the
tribal lashkar (ghting force). In favorable circumstances
such formations could quickly reach more than 10,000,
as happened when large Soviet assaults were launched in Mujahideen praying in Shultan Valley, 1987.
the eastern provinces, or when the mujahideen besieged
towns, such as Khost in Paktia province in July 1983.[94]
They concentrated on both civilian and military targets,
But in campaigns of the latter type the traditional exknocking out bridges, closing major roads, attacking

10

6 MARCH 1980 APRIL 1985: SOVIET OFFENSIVES

convoys, disrupting the electric power system and industrial production, and attacking police stations and Soviet military installations and air bases. They assassinated government ocials and PDPA members, and laid
siege to small rural outposts. In March 1982, a bomb
exploded at the Ministry of Education, damaging several
buildings. In the same month, a widespread power failure darkened Kabul when a pylon on the transmission line
from the Naghlu power station was blown up. In June
1982 a column of about 1,000 young communist party
members sent out to work in the Panjshir valley were ambushed within 30 km of Kabul, with heavy loss of life.
On September 4, 1985, insurgents shot down a domestic Bakhtar Airlines plane as it took o from Kandahar The image of Afghan ghters shouldering STINGER missiles and
shooting down Soviet helicopters became an icon of the latter
airport, killing all 52 people aboard.
years of the War in Afghanistan.

Mujahideen groups used for assassination had three to

ve men in each. After they received their mission to
kill certain government ocials, they busied themselves
with studying his pattern of life and its details and then
selecting the method of fullling their established mission. They practiced shooting at automobiles, shooting
out of automobiles, laying mines in government accommodation or houses, using poison, and rigging explosive
charges in transport.

years of the war, most directly attributed to the Stingers,

the eect of the Stinger was at least notable. In a 2011
article commemorating several Mujahideen ghters, the
Wall Street Journal celebrated the Stinger as The Missile
that Made History. [95] A Foreign Policy article about the
Stinger used in Afghanistan called it so much a game
changer in the Afghanistan war, that military analysts
had coined the term Stinger eect.[96]
In reality, the weapons eectiveness even by western reports, were considerably less, closer to 40 percent, and
even as low as 20 percent. Also, during the rst six, seven
months, only about 20 STINGERS per month were sent
to the war torn area, making a prolonged rate of more
than one aircraft downed per day impossible, even with
an improbable success rate of 100 percent.[97]

6.3

The areas where the dierent mujahideen forces operated in

1985.

In May 1985, the seven principal rebel organizations

formed the Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance to coordinate their military operations against the Soviet army.
Late in 1985, the groups were active in and around
Kabul, unleashing rocket attacks and conducting operations against the communist government.

6.2

1986: Stinger Missile and perceived

impact

Many Western military analysts credit the introduction of

the Stinger as the turning point in the war but many Russian military analysts tend to be dismissive of the impact
to the Stinger. With a kill ratio of about 70% and with
over 350 aircraft and helicopters downed in the last two

Stinger eect

According to American analysts, the introduction of the

Stinger changed the battleeld and the Soviet aircraft
turned from being the hunter to being the hunted. The SU
25 and Mi 24 were particularly vulnerable as they tended
to y low and thus remained for a long time within the
range of a Stinger missile. After the Stinger was introduced to the war, the Mujahideen shot down on average
more than one aircraft per day. The suddenly escalating
costs of aircraft losses became a major additional drain
on the costs of the war and many analysts believe the unsustainable aircraft losses caused by the Stinger was the
primary catalyst to cause the Soviet Union to withdraw
from the war. US Congressman Charlie Wilson who was
instrumental in funding the Stingers for the Mujahideen
said that before the Stinger the Mujahideen never won a
set piece battle with the Soviets but after it was introduced, the Mujahideen never again lost one. Through
most of the war, the Soviet air force was able to control the skies and y sorties at will. With the introduction of the Su-25 ground-attack jet and the Mi-24 attack
helicopter, the Soviets had aircraft that were impervious
to Mujahideen attacks, as both aircraft were armored to

11
withstand even large calibre machine gun re. This meant
that whenever the Soviet army would nd itself in trouble, all it needed was to call air support and either the SU
25 or Mi 24 would arrive shortly to disperse any marauding Mujahideen units. Through an increasing project of
military assistance via the US CIA and partly funded by
Saudi Arabia, the USA started to supply the Mujahideen
with its man-portable anti-aircraft missile system called
the Stinger. The US supplied at least 250 launcher systems and at least 500 individual Stinger missiles to the
Mujahideen as well as the training needed to operate the
system.

The rst step of the Soviet Unions exit strategy was to

transfer the burden of ghting the mujahideen to the
Afghan armed forces, with the aim of preparing them to
operate without Soviet help. During this phase, the Soviet
contingent was restricted to supporting the DRA forces by
providing artillery, air support and technical assistance,
though some large-scale operations were still carried out
by Soviet troops.

Awards ceremony for the 9th Company

8 January 1987 February 1989:

Withdrawal

Under Soviet guidance, the DRA armed forces were built

up to an ocial strength of 302,000 in 1986. To minimize the risk of a coup d'tat, they were divided into
dierent branches, each modeled on its Soviet counterpart. The ministry of defence forces numbered 132,000,
the ministry of interior 70,000 and the ministry of state
6.4 Endwar
security (KHAD) 80,000. However, these were theoretical gures: in reality each service was plagued with
By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced it would start desertions, the army alone suering 32,000 per year.
withdrawing its forces. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was
selected as the head of the Interim Islamic State of The decision to engage primarily Afghan forces was
Afghanistan, in an attempt to reassert its legitimacy taken by the Soviets, but was resented by the PDPA,
against the Moscow-sponsored Kabul regime. Mo- who viewed the departure of their protectors without
jaddedi, as head of the Interim Afghan Government, met enthusiasm. In May 1987 a DRA force attacked wellwith then Vice President of the United States George H. entrenched mujahideen positions in the Arghandab DisW. Bush, achieving a critical diplomatic victory for the trict, but the mujahideen held their[98]ground, and the atIn the spring of
Afghan resistance. Defeat of the Kabul government was tackers suered heavy casualties.
1986,
an
oensive
into
Paktia
Province
briey occupied
their solution for peace. This condence, sharpened by
the
mujahideen
base
at
Zhawar
only
at
the
cost of heavy
their distrust of the United Nations, virtually guaranteed
[99]
losses.
Meanwhile,
the
mujahideen
beneted
from extheir refusal to accept a political compromise.
panded foreign military support from the United States,
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other Muslim nations. The
US tended to favor the Afghan resistance forces led by
7 April 1985 January 1987: Exit Ahmed Shah Massoud, and US support for Massouds
forces increased considerably during the Reagan adminisstrategy
tration in what US military and intelligence forces called
"Operation Cyclone". Primary advocates for supporting
Massoud included two Heritage Foundation foreign policy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, both
of whom championed Massoud as the Afghan resistance
leader most worthy of US support under the Reagan Doctrine.[100][101][102]

Main article: Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan

Soviet soldier in Afghanistan, 1988.

The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the scene in 1985

and his 'new thinking' on foreign and domestic policy was
probably the most important factor in the Soviets decision to leave. Gorbachev was attempting to change the
stagnant years of Brezhnev and reform the Soviet Unions
economy and image across the board with Glasnost and
Perestroika. Gorbachev was also trying to ease cold
war tensions by signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty in 1987 with the U.S. and withdrawing the
troops from Afghanistan whose presence had garnered so

12

Soviet T-62M main battle tank withdraws from Afghanistan

much international condemnation. Gorbachev regarded

confrontation with China and resulting military build ups
on that border as one of Brezhnevs biggest mistakes.
Beijing had stipulated that a normalization of relations
would have to wait until Moscow withdrew its army from
Afghanistan (among other things) and in 1989 the rst
Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years took place.[103] At the
same time, Gorbachev pressured his Cuban allies in Angola to scale down activities and withdraw even though
Soviet allies were faring somewhat better there.[104] The
Soviets also pulled many of their troops out of Mongolia in 1987 where they were also having a far easier time
than in Afghanistan and restrained the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea to the point of an all out withdrawal
in 1988.[105] This mass withdrawal of Soviet forces from
contested areas shows that the Soviet governments decision to leave Afghanistan was based on a general change
over in Soviet foreign policy.
In the last phase, Soviet troops prepared and executed
their withdrawal from Afghanistan. They limited oensive operations.
In September 1988, Soviet MiG-23 ghters shot down
one Pakistani F-16 and two Iranian AH-1J Cobra, who
intruded in Afghan airspace.[106]
The one exception was Operation Magistral, a successful
sweep that cleared the road between Gardez and Khost.
This operation did not have any lasting eect, but it allowed the Soviets to symbolically end their presence with
a victory.[107]
The rst half of the Soviet contingent was withdrawn
from May 15 to August 16, 1988 and the second from
November 15 to February 15, 1989. In order to ensure a
safe passage the Soviets had negotiated ceaseres with local mujahideen commanders, so the withdrawal was generally executed peacefully,[108] except for the operation
Typhoon.
General Yazov, the Defense Minister of Soviet Union,
ordered the 40th Army to violate the agreement with
Ahmed Shah Masood, who commanded a large force in
the Panjshir Valley, and attack his relaxed and exposed
forces. The Soviet attack was initiated to protect Na-

JANUARY 1987 FEBRUARY 1989: WITHDRAWAL

Soviet troops withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1988

CGen of 40th Army, Boris Gromov, announcing the withdrawal

of Soviet contingent forces.

jibullah, who did not have a cease re in eect with Masood, and who rightly feared an oensive by Masoods
forces after the Soviet withdrawal.[109] General Gromov,
the 40th Army Commander, objected to the operation,
but reluctantly obeyed the order. Typhoon began on
January 23 and continued for three days. To minimize
their own losses the Soviets abstained from close-range
ght, instead they used long-range artillery, surface-tosurface and air-to-surface missiles. Numerous civilian casualties were reported. Masood had not threatened the
withdrawal to this point, and did not attack Soviet forces
after they breached the agreement.[110] Overall, the Soviet attack represented a defeat for Masoods forces, who
lost 600 ghters killed and wounded.[109]
After the withdrawal of the Soviets the DRA forces were
left ghting alone and had to abandon some provincial
capitals, and it was widely believed that they would not
be able to resist the mujahideen for long. However, in the
spring of 1989 DRA forces inicted a sharp defeat on the
mujahideen at Jalalabad.
The government of President Karmal, a puppet regime,
was largely ineective. It was weakened by divisions
within the PDPA and the Parcham faction, and the
regimes eorts to expand its base of support proved futile. Moscow came to regard Karmal as a failure and
blamed him for the problems. Years later, when Karmals

13
inability to consolidate his government had become obvious, Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the
Soviet Communist Party, said:
The main reason that there has been no
national consolidation so far is that Comrade
Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul
with our help.
In November 1986, Mohammad Najibullah, former chief
of the Afghan secret police (KHAD), was elected president and a new constitution was adopted. He also introduced in 1987 a policy of national reconciliation, devised by experts of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, and later used in other regions of the world. Despite high expectations, the new policy neither made the
Moscow-backed Kabul regime more popular, nor did it
convince the insurgents to negotiate with the ruling government.

9 Consequences of the war

9.1 International reaction
Carter placed a trade embargo against the Soviet Union
on shipments of commodities such as grain and weapons.
The increased tensions, as well as the anxiety in the West
about tens of thousands of Soviet troops being in such
proximity to oil-rich regions in the Persian Gulf, eectively brought about the end of dtente.
The international diplomatic response was severe, ranging from stern warnings to a US-led boycott of the 1980
Summer Olympics in Moscow (in which Afghanistan
competed). The intervention, along with other events,
such as the Iranian revolution and the US hostage stando that accompanied it, the IranIraq War, the 1982
Lebanon War, the escalating tensions between Pakistan
and India, contributed to making the Middle East and
South Asia extremely violent and turbulent regions during
the 1980s. The Non-Aligned Movement was sharply divided between those who believed the Soviet deployment
to be legal and others who considered the deployment
an illegal invasion. Among the Warsaw Pact countries,
the intervention was condemned only by Romania.[113]
India, a close ally of the Soviet Union, refused to support the Afghan war,[114] though by the end of the hostilities oered to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghan
government.[115][116]
9.1.1 Foreign involvement and aid to the mujahideen

A column of Soviet BTR armored personnel carriers departing

from Afghanistan.

Informal negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan had been underway since 1982. In 1988,
the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the
United States and Soviet Union serving as guarantors,
signed an agreement settling the major dierences between them known as the Geneva Accords. The United
Nations set up a special Mission to oversee the process.
In this way, Najibullah had stabilized his political position enough to begin matching Moscows moves toward
withdrawal. On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from the country was announced. The withdrawal
of Soviet forces was planned out by Lt. Gen. Boris Gromov, who, at the time, was the commander of the 40th
Army.
Among other things the Geneva accords identied the
US and Soviet non-intervention in the internal aairs of
Pakistan and Afghanistan and a timetable for full Soviet
withdrawal. The agreement on withdrawal held, and on
February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops departed on
schedule from Afghanistan.

U.S. President Reagan supportively meeting with Afghan Mujahideen at the White House, to highlight Soviet atrocities in
Afghanistan.

The Afghan Mujahideen were supported by a number of

other countries, with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia oering
the greatest nancial support.[3][4][5][11][118] United States
President Carter insisted that what he termed Soviet aggression could not be viewed as an isolated event of limited geographical importance but had to be contested as
a potential threat to US inuence in the Persian Gulf region. The US was also worried about the USSR gaining

14

9 CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

access to the Indian Ocean by coming to an arrangement mujahideen militants was one of the CIAs longest and
with Pakistan.
most expensive covert operations.[120] The CIA proNational Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, known vided assistance to the fundamentalist insurgents through
for his hardline policies on the Soviet Union, initiated the Pakistani secret services, Inter-Services Intelligence
in 1979 a campaign supporting mujaheddin in Pakistan (ISI), in a program called Operation Cyclone. At least
and Afghanistan, which was run by Pakistani security 3 billion in U.S. dollars were funneled into the counservices with nancial support from the Central Intelli- try to train and equip troops with weapons. Together
gence Agency and Britains MI6.[4] Years later, in a 1997 with similar programs by Saudi Arabia, Britains MI6
and SAS, Egypt, Iran, and the Peoples Republic of
CNN/National Security Archive interview, Brzezinski
[7]
detailed the strategy taken by the Carter administration China, the arms included FIM-43 Redeye, shoulderred, antiaircraft weapons that they used against Soviet
against the Soviets in 1979:
helicopters. Pakistans secret service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was used as an intermediary for most of
We immediately launched a twofold prothese activities to disguise the sources of support for the
cess when we heard that the Soviets had enresistance.
tered Afghanistan. The rst involved direct
No Americans trained or had direct contact with the
reactions and sanctions focused on the Soviet
mujahideen.[121] The skittish CIA had fewer than 10 operUnion, and both the State Department and the
atives in the region because it feared it would be blamed,
National Security Council prepared long lists
like in Guatemala.[122] Civilian personnel from the U.S.
of sanctions to be adopted, of steps to be taken
Department of State and the CIA frequently visited the
to increase the international costs to the Soviet
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area during this time.
Union of their actions. And the second course
of action led to my going to Pakistan a month
Shortly after the intervention, Pakistans military ruler
or so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq called for a meeting of
for the purpose of coordinating with the Paksenior military members and technocrats of his military
istanis a joint response, the purpose of which
government.[123] At this meeting, General Zia-ul-Haq
would be to make the Soviets bleed for as much
asked the Chief of Army Sta General Khalid Mahmud
and as long as is possible; and we engaged
Arif and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta Admiin that eort in a collaborative sense with the
ral Muhammad Shari to lead a specialized civil-military
Saudis, the Egyptians, the British, the Chinese,
team to formulate a geo-strategy to counter the Soviet
and we started providing weapons to the Mujaaggression.[123] At this meeting, the Director-General of
heddin, from various sources again for examthe ISI at that time, Lieutenant-General Akhtar Abdur
ple, some Soviet arms from the Egyptians and
Rahman advocated for an idea of covert operation in
the Chinese. We even got Soviet arms from the
Afghanistan by arming the Islamic extremist, and was
Czechoslovak communist government, since it
loudly heard saying: "Kabul must burn! Kabul must
was obviously susceptible to material incenburn!".[123] As for Pakistan, the Soviet war with Istives; and at some point we started buying arms
lamist mujaheddin was viewed as retaliation for the Sofor the Mujaheddin from the Soviet army in
viet Unions long unconditional support of regional rival,
Afghanistan, because that army was increasIndia, notably during the 1965 and the 1971 wars, which
ingly corrupt.[119]
led the loss of East Pakistan.[123]
After the Soviet deployment, Pakistans military ruler
General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq started accepting
nancial aid from the Western powers to aid the mujahideen. In 1981, following the election of US President
Ronald Reagan, aid for the mujahideen through Zias
Pakistan signicantly increased, mostly due to the eorts
of Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson and CIA ocer
Gust Avrakotos.[124][125]

Three mujahideen in Asmar, 1985.

The supplying of billions of dollars in arms to the Afghan

The early foundations of al-Qaeda were allegedly built

in part on relationships and weaponry that came from
the billions of dollars in U.S. support for the Afghan
mujahideen during the war to expel Soviet forces from
that country.[126] However, scholars such as Jason Burke,
Steve Coll, Peter Bergen, Christopher Andrew, and
Vasily Mitrokhin have argued that Osama Bin Laden was
outside of CIA eyesight and that there is no support in
any reliable source for the claim that the CIA funded

9.1

International reaction

15
ing o of aid weapons, in which the weapons logistics
and coordination were put under the Pakistan Navy in
the port city of Karachi, contributed to disorder and violence there, while heroin entering from Afghanistan to
pay for arms contributed to addiction problems.[128] The
Navy went into covert war and coordinated the foreign
weapons into Afghanistan, while some of its high-ranking
admirals were responsible for storing the weapons in the
Navy depot, later coordinated the weapons supply to mujahideen.

In retaliation for Pakistans assistance to the insurgents, the KHAD Afghan security service, under leader
Mohammad Najibullah, carried out (according to the
Spetsnaz troops interrogate a captured mujahideen with Western Mitrokhin archives and other sources) a large number of
operations against Pakistan. In 1987, 127 incidents reweapons in the background, 1986
sulted in 234 deaths in Pakistan. In April 1988, an ammunition depot outside the Pakistani capital of Islamabad
bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteers who came was blown up killing 100 and injuring more than 1000
to support the mujahideen.[127]
people. The KHAD and KGB were suspected in the perpetration of these acts.[129] Soviet and Afghan ghters and
bombers occasionally bombed Pakistani villages along
the Pakistani-Afghan border. These attacks are known
to have caused at least 300 civilian deaths and extensive
damage. Sometimes they got involved in shootings with
the Pakistani jets defending the airspace.[130]
Pakistan took in millions of Afghan refugees (mostly
Pashtun) eeing the Soviet occupation.
Although
the refugees were controlled within Pakistans largest
province, Balochistan under then-martial law ruler General Rahimuddin Khan, the inux of so many refugees
believed to be the largest refugee population in the
world[131] spread into several other regions.
All of this had a heavy impact on Pakistan and its eects
continue to this day. Pakistan, through its support for the
mujahideen, played a signicant role in the eventual withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Afghanistan.
During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between
China and Soviet Russia resulted in bloody border clashes
and mutual backing for the opponents enemies. China
and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other
during the Kings rule. When the pro Soviet Afghan
Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly
turned hostile. The Afghan pro Soviet communists supA German database showing the channeling of the money and
ported Chinas enemies in Vietnam and blamed China for
weapons, provided by ISI ocer Mohammad Yousaf in his book:
supporting Afghan anti communist militants. China reAfghanistan The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower
sponded to the Soviet war in Afghanistan by supporting
the Afghan mujahideen and ramping up their military
Pakistans ISI and Special Service Group (SSG) were acpresence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang. China acquired
tively involved in the conict. The SSG are widely susmilitary equipment from America to defend itself from
pected of participating in Operation Hill 3234, near the
Soviet attack.[132]
Pakistani border where nearly 200 suspected SSG personnel were killed in a futile attempt to assault the Soviet The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army trained and supported the Afghan mujahideen during the war. The
held hill.
training camps were moved from Pakistan into China itThe theft of large sums of aid spurred Pakistans ecoself. Anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and machine
nomic growth, but along with the war in general had
guns, valued at hundreds of millions, were given to the
devastating side eects for that country. The siphon-

16

9 CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

mujahideen by the Chinese. Chinese military advisors proportion of casualties were those who fell ill. This was
and army troops were present with the Mujahidin during because of local climatic and sanitary conditions, which
training.[133]
were such that acute infections spread rapidly among the
troops. There were 115,308 cases of infectious hepatitis,
31,080 of typhoid fever, and 140,665 of other diseases.
9.2 Soviet personnel strengths and casual- Of the 11,654 who were discharged from the army after
ties
being wounded, maimed, or contracting serious diseases,
10,751 men, were left disabled.[134]
Material losses were as follows:[17] {not in the source
given}
451 aircraft (includes 333 helicopters)
147 tanks
1,314 IFV/APCs
433 artillery guns and mortars
11,369 cargo and fuel tanker trucks.
Soviet soldiers return from Afghanistan, October 1986

9.3 Destruction in Afghanistan

Estimates of Afghan civilian deaths vary from 850,000 to
1,500,000.[23][24] 510 million Afghans ed to Pakistan
and Iran, 1/3 of the prewar population of the country,
and another 2 million were displaced within the country. In the 1980s, half of all refugees in the world were
Afghan.[135]

Afghans commemorating Mujahideen Victory Day.

Felix Ermacora, the UN Special Rapporteur to

Afghanistan, said that heavy ghting in combat areas cost the lives of more than 35,000 civilians in 1985,
15,000 in 1986, and around 14,000 in 1987. Ermacora
also noted that armed attacks by anti-government forces,
such as rocket attacks on Kabuls residential areas,
caused more than 4000 civilian deaths in 1987.[136] R.J.
Rummel, an analyst of political killings, estimated that
Soviet forces were responsible for 250,000 democidal
killings during the war and that the government of
Afghanistan was responsible for 178,000 democidal
killings.[137] There were also a number of reports of
large scale executions of hundreds of civilians by Soviet
and DRA soldiers.[138][139][140]

Between December 25, 1979, and February 15, 1989,

a total of 620,000 soldiers served with the forces in
Afghanistan (though there were only 80,000104,000
serving at one time): 525,000 in the Army, 90,000 with
border troops and other KGB sub-units, 5,000 in independent formations of MVD Internal Troops, and police
forces. A further 21,000 personnel were with the So- Along with fatalities were 1.2 million Afghans disviet troop contingent over the same period doing various abled (mujahideen, government soldiers and noncomwhite collar and blue collar jobs.
batants) and 3 million maimed or wounded (primarily
The total irrecoverable personnel losses of the Soviet noncombatants).[141]
Armed Forces, frontier, and internal security troops came Irrigation systems, crucial to agriculture in Afghanistans
to 14,453. Soviet Army formations, units, and HQ ele- arid climate, were destroyed by aerial bombing and
ments lost 13,833, KGB sub-units lost 572, MVD forma- strang by Soviet or government forces. In the worst
tions lost 28, and other ministries and departments lost 20 year of the war, 1985, well over half of all the farmers
men. During this period 312 servicemen were missing in who remained in Afghanistan had their elds bombed,
action or taken prisoner; 119 were later freed, of whom and over one quarter had their irrigation systems de97 returned to the USSR and 22 went to other countries. stroyed and their livestock shot by Soviet or government
Of the troops deployed, 53,753 were wounded, injured, troops, according to a survey conducted by Swedish relief
or sustained concussion and 415,932 fell sick. A high experts[135]

9.3

Destruction in Afghanistan

17
remove all the Soviet land mines in Afghanistan.[144]

A PFM-1 mine, often mistaken for a toy by children. The mines

shape was dictated by aerodynamics.[145]

U.S. military personnel (with civilian far right, in suit) at Rhein

Main Air Base, Frankfurt, Germany. A civilian volunteer with
an Afghan NGO in Germany assists a blinded Afghan Mujahid
o the air stair.

Charlie Wilson (D-TX), 2nd from the left, dressing in Afghan

clothing (armed with AK-47) with the local Afghan mujahideen.

The population of Afghanistans second largest city, Kandahar, was reduced from 200,000 before the war to no
more than 25,000 inhabitants, following a months-long
campaign of carpet bombing and bulldozing by the Soviets and Afghan communist soldiers in 1987.[142] Land
mines had killed 25,000 Afghans during the war and another 1015 million land mines, most planted by Soviet
and government forces, were left scattered throughout the
countryside.[143] The International Committee of the Red
Cross estimated in 1994 that it would take 4,300 years to

A great deal of damage was done to the civilian children

population by land mines.[146] A 2005 report estimated
34% of the Afghan population were disabled due to Soviet and government land mines. In the city of Quetta, a
survey of refugee women and children taken shortly after
the Soviet withdrawal found child mortality at 31%, and
over 80% of the children refugees to be unregistered. Of
children who survived, 67% were severely malnourished,
with malnutrition increasing with age.[147]
Critics of Soviet and Afghan government forces describe
their eect on Afghan culture as working in three stages:
rst, the center of customary Afghan culture, Islam, was
pushed aside; second, Soviet patterns of life, especially
amongst the young, were imported; third, shared Afghan
cultural characteristics were destroyed by the emphasis on
so-called nationalities, with the outcome that the country
was split into dierent ethnic groups, with no language,
religion, or culture in common.[148]
The Geneva Accords of 1988, which ultimately led to the
withdrawal of the Soviet forces in early 1989, left the
Afghan government in ruins. The accords had failed to
address adequately the issue of the post-occupation period and the future governance of Afghanistan. The assumption among most Western diplomats was that the
Soviet-backed government in Kabul would soon collapse;
however, this was not to happen for another three years.
During this time the Interim Islamic Government of
Afghanistan (IIGA) was established in exile. The exclusion of key groups such as refugees and Shias, combined
with major disagreements between the dierent mujaheddin factions, meant that the IIGA never succeeded in
acting as a functional government.[149]
Before the war, Afghanistan was already one of the
worlds poorest nations. The prolonged conict left
Afghanistan ranked 170 out of 174 in the UNDPs Human Development Index, making Afghanistan one of the

18

9 CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

ten indiscriminately against civilians.[88][155][156] A declassied CIA report from 1982 states that between 1979
and 1982 there were 43 separate chemical weapons attacks which caused more than 3000 deaths.[157] By spring
1980, attacks with chemical weapons were reported in
all areas with concentrated resistance activity.[157]

9.5 Refugees
Main articles: Afghan refugees and Afghans in Pakistan

Afghan guerrillas that were chosen to receive medical treatment

in the United States, Norton Air Force Base, California, 1986.

least developed countries in the world.[150]

A massive total of 3.3 million Afghan refugees were

housed in Pakistan by 1988, some whom continue to
live in the country up until today. Of this total, about
100,000 were based in the city of Peshawar, while more
than 2 million were located in other parts of the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then known
as the North-West Frontier Province).[158][159] At the
same time, close to two million Afghans were living
in Iran. Over the years Pakistan and Iran has put on
tighter controls for refugees that has resulted in numerous returnees.[160][161] In 2012 Pakistan banned extension of visas to foreigners.[159][162] Afghan refugees have
also settled in India and became Indian citizens over
time.[163][164][165] Some also made their way into North
America, the European Union, Australia, and other parts
of the world.[166] The photo of Sharbat Gula placed on
National Geographic cover in 1985 became a symbol both
of the 1980s Afghan conict and of the refugee situation.

Once the Soviets withdrew, US interest in Afghanistan

slowly decreased over the following four years, much of
it administered through the DoD Oce of Humanitarian
Assistance, under the then Director of HA, George M.
Dykes III. With the rst years of the Clinton Administration in Washington, DC, all aid ceased. The US decided not to help with reconstruction of the country, instead handing the interests of the country over to US allies
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Pakistan quickly took advantage of this opportunity and forged relations with warlords
and later the Taliban, to secure trade interests and routes.
From wiping out the countrys trees through logging practices, which has destroyed all but 2% of forest cover
country-wide, to substantial uprooting of wild pistachio
trees for the exportation of their roots for therapeutic 9.6
uses, to opium agriculture, the ten years following the war
saw much ecological and agrarian destruction.[151]

Civil war

Captain Tarlan Eyvazov, a soldier in the Soviet forces

during the war, stated that the Afghan childrens future
is destined for war. Eyvazov said, Children born in
Afghanistan at the start of the war... have been brought up
in war conditions, this is their way of life. Eyvazovs theory was later strengthened when the Taliban movement
developed and formed from orphans or refugee children
who were forced by the Soviets to ee their homes and
relocate their lives in Pakistan. The swift rise to power,
from the young Taliban in 1996, was the result of the disorder and civil war that had warlords running wild because of the complete breakdown of law and order in
Two Soviet T55 tanks left by the Soviet army during their withAfghanistan after the departure of the Soviets.[152]
drawal lie rusting in a eld near Bagram Aireld, in 2002.

The CIA World Fact Book reported that as of 2004,

Afghanistan still owed $8 billion in bilateral debt, mostly
Main articles: Conict in Afghanistan (1978present)
to Russia,[153] however, in 2007 Russia agreed to cancel
and Civil war in Afghanistan (19891992)
[154]
most of the debt.
The civil war continued in Afghanistan after the Soviet
withdrawal. About 400,000 Afghan civilians had lost
their lives in the chaos and civil war of the 1990s.[167]
There have also been numerous reports of chemical The Soviet Union left Afghanistan deep in winter, with
weapons being used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, of- intimations of panic among Kabul ocials. The Afghan

9.4

Use of chemical weapons

19
mujahideen were poised to attack provincial towns and
cities and eventually Kabul, if necessary.
Najibullahs government, though failing to win popular
support, territory, or international recognition, was however able to remain in power until 1992. Ironically, until demoralized by the defections of its senior ocers,
the Afghan Army had achieved a level of performance
it had never reached under direct Soviet tutelage. Kabul
had achieved a stalemate that exposed the mujahideens
weaknesses, political and military. But for nearly three
years, while Najibullahs government successfully defended itself against mujahideen attacks, factions within
the government had also developed connections with its
20th Anniversary of Withdrawal of Soviet Military Forces from
opponents.
According to Russian publicist Andrey Karaulov, the
main trigger for Najibullah losing power was Russias refusal to sell oil products to Afghanistan in 1992 for political reasons (the new Yeltsin government did not want
to support the former communists), which eectively
triggered an embargo. The defection of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam and his Uzbek militia, in March 1992,
further undermined Najibullahs control of the state. In
April, Najibullah and his communist government fell to
the mujahideen, who replaced Najibullah with a new governing council for the country.
Grain production declined an average of 3.5% per year
between 1978 and 1990 due to sustained ghting, instability in rural areas, prolonged drought, and deteriorated infrastructure. Soviet eorts to disrupt production in rebel-dominated areas also contributed to
this decline. During the withdrawal of Soviet troops,
Afghanistans natural gas elds were capped to prevent
sabotage. Restoration of gas production has been hampered by internal strife and the disruption of traditional
trading relationships following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan. Stamp of Belarus, 2009.

11 Perception in the former USSR

Commemorating the intervention of December 25, 1979,
in December 2009, veterans of the Soviet war in
Afghanistan were honoured by the Duma or Parliament
of the Russian Federation. On December 25, the lower
house of the parliament defended the Soviet war in
Afghanistan on the 30th anniversary of its start, and
praised the veterans of the conict. Diering assessments
of the war mustn't erode the Russian peoples respect
for the soldiers who honestly fullled their duty in implementing tasks to combat international terrorism and
religious extremists.
Duma member Semyon Bagdasarov (Just Russia) advocated that Russia had to reject Western calls for stronger
assistance to the US-led ISAF-coalition in Afghanistan
and also had to establish contacts with the anti-Western
forces"; the Taliban, in case they regain power.[169][170]

11.1 Memorials

9.7

Ideological impact

The Islamists who fought believed that they were responsible for the fall of the Soviet Union. Osama bin Laden,
for example, asserted that the credit for the dissolution
of the Soviet Union ... goes to God and the mujahideen
in Afghanistan ...[168]

Russian President Vladimir Putin at the memorial

in Moscow to paying respect to the soldiers killed in
Afghanistan.
Speaker of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov,
right, commemorate the war veterans who performed the international duty in Afghanistan on the
day of the 15th anniversary of the Soviet troop withdrawal from that country.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attending the
ceremony to commemorate the veterans of Afghan
war in 2010.

10

Media and popular culture

Afghan War veterans celebrate 20 years since the

withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Main article: Soviet war in Afghanistan in popular culture

A Memorial to local soldiers killed in the War in

Afghanistan in Yekaterinburg

20

12

13

See also

Soviet occupation zone

Dissolution of the Soviet Union
Military of Afghanistan
Shuravi
Spetsnaz (Russian Special Purpose Regiments)
PostWorld War II air-to-air combat losses
CIA Osama bin Laden controversy
Terrorism and the Soviet Union
Soviet involvement in Indo-Pakistan war of 1971
Political philosophies and doctrines

13

Interventionism
Brezhnev Doctrine
Carter Doctrine
Zia Doctrine
Reagan Doctrine

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2001. P. 66

[122] The New Republic, Back to Front by Peter Beinart, Oc- [143] Pear, Robert (August 14, 1988). Mines Put Afghans in
Peril on Return. New York Times. p. 9.
tober 8, 2001.
[123] Yousaf, PA, Brigadier General (retired) Mohammad [144] Reversing the gun sights: transnational civil society targets land mines. International Organization. June 22,
(1991). Silent soldier: the man behind the Afghan jehad
1998.
General Akhtar Abdur Rahman. Karachi, Sindh: Jang
Publishers, 1991. pp. 106 pages.
[145] McGrath, Rae (1998). Landmines: Legacy of Conict: A
Manual for Development Workers. pp. 3940. ISBN 0[124] Ralph G. Carter; James M. Scott (3 July 2009). Choosing
7881-3280-6.
to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs. Duke University Press. p. 122. ISBN 978-0[146] Gorbachev, The Iraqi War & Afghan Atrocities. Real8223-4503-9. Retrieved 24 July 2013.
news247.com. Retrieved July 28, 2011.
[125] Todd Leopold (23 April 2008). The real Charlie Wilson: [147] Zulqar Ahmed Bhutta, H. (2002). Children of war: the
'War' got it right. CNN. Retrieved 24 July 2013.
real casualties of the Afghan conict. Retrieved December 11, 2007
[126] William D. Hartung (October 27, 2006). We Arm The
World. TomPaine.com. Retrieved 2008-11-21.

[148] Hauner, M. (1989). Afghanistan and the Soviet Union:

Collision and Transformation. Boulder, Colorado: West[127] See Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (Penguin, 2003), p. 59;
view Press. (p.40)
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,
Afghanistan and Bin Laden (Penguin, 2004), p. 87; Peter [149] Barakat, S. (2004). Reconstructing War-Torn Societies:
Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (Free Press, 2006),
Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (p. 5)
pp. 601; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The
Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (Penguin, [150] Barakat, S. (2004). Reconstructing War-Torn Societies:
Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (p. 7)
2006), p. 579n48.

24

14 FURTHER READING

[151] Panetta L. (2007) Collateral damage and the uncertainty

of Afghanistan... San Francisco: OpticalRealities. Retrieved August 17, 2009
[152] Kirby, A. (2003). War 'has ruined Afghan environment.'
Retrieved November 27, 2007, from , Zulqar Ahmed
Bhutta, H. (2002). Children of war: the real casualties of
the Afghan conict. Retrieved December 11, 2007, from

[153] USSR aid to Afghanistan worth $8 billion. CIA. Retrieved February 15, 2012.
[154]
[155] SCHWARTZSTEIN, STUART J. D. (Winter 198283).
Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan: An Independent Assessment. World Aairs. Retrieved October 21, 2014.
[156] The Story of Genocide in Afghanistan Hassan Kakar

14 Further reading
Andrew, Christopher & Mitrokhin, Vasili (1999).
The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive
and the Secret History of the KGB. New York: Basic
Books. ISBN 0-465-00310-9.
Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An Army, its Role and
Rule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil 19471999. Pittsburgh: RoseDog
Books. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3.
Borovik, Artyom (1990). The Hidden War: A
Russian Journalists Account of the Soviet War in
Afghanistan. New York: Grove Press. ISBN 08021-3775-X.
Carew, Tom (2001). Jihad!: The Secret War in
Afghanistan. Mainstream Publishing. ISBN 9781-84018-495-2.

[157] Use of toxins and other lethal agents in Southeast Asia

and Afghanistan. CIA. 2 February 1982. Retrieved 21
October 2014.

Corera, Gordon (2011). MI6: Life and Death in the

British Secret Service. London: Phoenix. ISBN 9780-7538-2833-5.

[158] Pakistan Restricts Afghan Refugees by Donatella Lorch

for the New York Times. November 16, 1988.

Braithwaite, Rodric (2011). Afgantsy: The Russians

in Afghanistan, 197989. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 417. ISBN 978-0-19-983265-1.
LCCN 2011015052. OCLC ocn709682862. LCC
DS371.2 .B725 2011

[159] Visa extension to foreigners banned

[160] Iran
[161] IRIN Asia | PAKISTAN: UN cautions on Afghan refugee
camp closures | Pakistan | Migration | Refugees/IDPs
[162] No more visa extensions for foreigners in Pakistan | Pakistan Today
[163] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (February 20, 2008). Afghan refugee teaches Hindi to tots in
India. UNHCR. Retrieved February 15, 2012.
[164] Escape from War. The Times Of India (India).
[165] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Afghan refugees in India become Indian, at last.
UNHCR. Retrieved February 15, 2012.
[166] A Thomson Reuters Foundation Service. AlertNet. Retrieved February 15, 2012.
[167] "Life under Taliban cuts two ways". The Christian Science
Monitor. September 20, 2001
[168] Messages to the World, 2006, p. 50. (March 1997 interview with Peter Arnett)
[169] Afghanistan: le Parlement russe rend hommage aux anciens combattants
[170] Russian parliament hails Afghan war vets.
Times. Retrieved July 28, 2011.

Khaleej

Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History

of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York:
Penguin Press. ISBN 1-59420-007-6.
Crile, George (2003). Charlie Wilsons War: The
Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in history. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
ISBN 0-87113-851-4.
Feifer, Gregory (2009). The Great Gamble: The Soviet war in Afghanistan. New York: Harper. ISBN
978-0-06-114318-2.
Galeotti, Mark (1995). Afghanistan: the Soviet
Unions Last War. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 07146-8242-X.
Kakar, M. Hassan (1995). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 19791982.
Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0520-08591-4. (free online access courtesy of UCP).
Kaplan, Robert D. (2001) [1990]. Soldiers of God:
With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
New York: Vintage Books. ISBN 1-4000-3025-0.
Lohbeck, Kurt (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory:
Eyewitness to the CIAs Secret War in Afghanistan.
Washington: Regnery Publishing. ISBN 0-89526499-4.

25
Novinkov, Oleg (2011). Afghan boomerang. Houston, TX: Oleg Novinkov. ISBN 978-1-4392-74514.
Prados, John (1996). Presidents Secret Wars: CIA
and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II
through the Persian Gulf. Chicago: I.R. Dee. ISBN
1-56663-108-4.

15

External links

Afghan-militants-trained-in-a-barn-in-rural-Sussex
Compound War Case Study:
Afghanistan

The Soviets in

Video on Afghan-Soviet War from the Peter Krogh

Foreign Aairs Digital Archives
Soviets and the Gulf War from the Dean Peter
Krogh Foreign Aairs Digital Archives
J.Bruce Amstutz Afghanistan the rst ve years of
Soviet occupation (1986)
CIA Factbook on Afghanistan
The Art of War project, dedicated to the soldiers of
the recent wars, set up by the veterans of the Afghan
war. Has Russian and English versions
Afganvet
(Russian:
"")
USSR/Afghanistan war veterans community

The Role of Afghanistan in the fall of the USSR by

Rameen Moshref
Empire Museum of Military History (Spain)
USSR/Afghanistan conict original photos
U.N resolution A/RES/37/37 over the Intervention
in the Country
Afghanistan Country Study (details up to 1985)
A highly detailed description of the Coup de Main
in Kabul 1979
The Take-Down of Kabul: An Eective Coup de
Main
Primary Sources on the Invasion Compiled by The
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Soviet Airborne: Equipment and Weapons used by
the Soviet Airborne (VDV) and DShB from 1979 to
1991. English only.

26

16

16
16.1

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

Text

Soviet war in Afghanistan Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%20war%20in%20Afghanistan?oldid=639596808 Contributors:

TwoOneTwo, Derek Ross, Mav, Ed Poor, Heron, Vovkav, Hephaestos, Bobdobbs1723, Stevertigo, Rbrwr, Edward, Patrick, Infrogmation, Kwertii, Fred Bauder, Delirium, (, Ahoerstemeier, Williamv1138, Pjamescowie, Snoyes, Kingturtle, Andres, Jiang, Dwo, Janko,
RickK, Wik, Tpbradbury, Maximus Rex, Morwen, Joy, Fvw, Cuye, Jerzy, UninvitedCompany, JessPKC, Robbot, Astronautics, ChrisO,
Fredrik, RedWolf, Fifelfoo, Altenmann, Naddy, Modulatum, Lowellian, Academic Challenger, Moink, Delpino, Unyounyo, PBP, Superm401, Jrash, Whiskey, Dominick, DocWatson42, YAGN, Wolfkeeper, Lupin, Orangemike, Fastssion, HectorRodriguez, Everyking,
CMJ, DO'Neil, Just Another Dan, Ragib, Bolo1729, Mike R, BruceR, Formeruser-81, Antandrus, Piotrus, Rattlesnake, Comandante,
Ellsworth, PFHLai, Ary29, Bk0, Cynical, Gscshoyru, Neutrality, Klemen Kocjancic, Laisak, Adashiel, Esperant, Shotwell, Gazpacho,
D6, Jayjg, Freakofnurture, N328KF, Random contributor, Lan56, Maestro25, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Engti, Clawed, Vsmith,
Rupertslander, R6144, Berkut, Trey Stone, MarkS, Bender235, ESkog, Mashford, Neko-chan, Nabla, Brian0918, CanisRufus, Omnibus,
Zscout370, Friism, MBisanz, Izalithium, El C, Kwamikagami, Kross, ThierryVignaud, Aude, Tom, RoyBoy, XerKibard, Bobo192, Vervin,
Rhysn, Robotje, Smalljim, BrokenSegue, Giraedata, SecretAgentMan00, Polylerus, Ultra megatron, Melah Hashamaim, Bharat, Phils,
Jumbuck, Etrigan, Storm Rider, Alansohn, Gary, LtNOWIS, Sherurcij, Arthena, Mu5ti, Geo Swan, Mr Adequate, CR7, Ashley Pomeroy,
Lectonar, Messhermit, Jhomayne, Rwendland, Snowolf, Dhartung, Benhutchings, Docboat, Mikeo, Cmapm, Dominic, BlastOButter42,
Dragunova, Kusma, Axeman89, Ultramarine, Jimgeorge, Brookie, Zntrip, Dejvid, Elchup4cabra, Angr, OwenX, Woohookitty, Zealander,
Kosher Fan, MrDarcy, Rtdrury, Tabletop, Lapsed Pacist, Uris, Bbatsell, Tejastheory, Vanished user 05, SDC, Jdorney, Xiong Chiamiov,
Gimboid13, Rangeley, Radiant!, Marvelvsdc, RuM, Matilda, Deltabeignet, Magister Mathematicae, Descendall, Cod, BD2412, David
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SchuminWeb, Ground Zero, Ysangkok, JdforresterBot, Who, Mark83, Payo, Atrix20, Jondor, Tedder, Russavia, Le Anh-Huy, Idaltu,
Chobot, Mmx1, VolatileChemical, Bgwhite, Shomat, Crosstimer, Cornellrockey, Elfguy, YurikBot, Tommyt, Osomec, SirGeneral, RussBot, Kauner, Anonymous editor, Briaboru, Lareneg, Kurt Leyman, Gaius Cornelius, Alex Bakharev, Wimt, Daveswagon, Evstaev,
NawlinWiki, Dysmorodrepanis, Joshdboz, Grafen, Voyevoda, Siddiqui, Milo99, Dijxtra, Welsh, Mmccalpin, CJK, Megapixie, Victors
Monster, Taco325i, Awiseman, Ijomer, Sfnhltb, Misza13, Amakuha, Dbrs, Lockesdonkey, Bark, Karl Meier, Ke5crz, Black Falcon,
Limetom, Tonywalton, Jkelly, Blacksand, Zello, Capt Jim, StuRat, Ali K, Fastboy, Closedmouth, Errabee, Abune, De Administrando Imperio, Mercenary2k, Ray Chason, Jonny555, Petri Krohn, Rande M Sefowt, Vandalbot on wheels!, DaltinWentsworth, Mediatetheconict,
Peter, Cyberodin, Cartwarmark, Mais oui!, Jaranda, Mikus, Nixer, Johnpseudo, Tajik, Kungfuadam, Junglecat, Fluythemonkey, NeilN,
Nick-D, TheY4Kman, Victor falk, Wizofaus, Heaviestcat, Wai Hong, Attilios, SmackBot, YellowMonkey, Slarre, Matthew king, Moeron,
Hux, Justinstroud, Impaciente, Hydrogen Iodide, Korossyl, Petercorless, Jagged 85, Esaborio, Chem Lady, ProveIt, GoOdCoNtEnT, Kintetsubualo, Jtnelson89, Edgar181, IstvanWolf, Supra90, Jkp1187, Gilliam, Brianski, Arash red, Squiddy, Anwar saadat, Chris the speller,
Philosopher, Persian Poet Gal, BureX, Cattus, Jprg1966, Sadads, Baa, Robth, Incoherent fool, DHN-bot, Deckchair, A. B., Can't sleep,
clown will eat me, Eliezg, MadameArsenic, Jojorocko, Chlewbot, MJCdetroit, Sayfadeen, Rohawn, MarshallBagramyan, InnocentMind,
Leoboudv, Zvar, Afghanets, Khoikhoi, Pisslub-S, Downwards, Detruncate, EVula, Zvesda@netscape.net, MrPockets, DenisRS, Ccdcmos,
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o4, BrownHairedGirl, Rklawton, Ariefwn, AmeriCan, Jamevay, Heimstern, LWF, Akupta321, Benesch, Shyamsunder, JorisvS, Speedboy Salesman, MaximvsDecimvs, Agathoclea, Hvn0413, Makyen, Publicus, Dicklyon, Fedallah, Enlightenedment, Darz Mol, PRRfan,
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Australia, Twas Now, Wikipediatastic, Zachary Newton, DarkFighter, Shonebrooks, Whaiaun, W123, Cyber Innity, Artdriver, Tawkerbot2, Dlohcierekim, PGSable, Wikichico, Afghana, Ilyatch, SkyWalker, JForget, CmdrObot, Ale jrb, Dycedarg, Aherunar, Avanu, 0zymandias, Nunquam Dormio, Otsego, Maximilli, Borism, WHATaintNOcountryIeverHEARDofDOtheySPEAKenglishINwhat, Moreschi,
Neelix, Vikaspisal, Albert Cheng, Fordmadoxfraud, Beh-nam, C33, Cydebot, Fnlayson, Ketamino, Parslad, P0LARIS, Grammaticus Repairo, Vanished user vjhsduheuiui4t5hjri, Gogo Dodo, Bellerophon5685, Xxhopingtearsxx, ST47, TenthEagle, Daniel J. Leivick, Ocean
Wave, Odie5533, Barvinok, Tawkerbot4, DumbBOT, RottweilerCS, Asenine, Ssilvers, ObjectivityAlways, Grant76, Jguard18, ,
CieloEstrellado, Jdlyall, Thijs!bot, Barticus88, Srilina, CopperKettle, F J, Staberinde, Headbomb, Id447, Marek69, Seomann, SGGH, Esemono, Lexio, Dcanem, Heroeswithmetaphors, MinnesotanConfederacy, Kenmore, Escarbot, Mentisto, KrakatoaKatie, Glistening, Hires
an editor, AntiVandalBot, The champ, Dictator Asad, Seaphoto, Rux, Lielais Rolands, Lothar76, Dbrodbeck, IrishPete, Superzohar, Darklilac, Killerman2, Historypre, Myanw, Kami888, Leuqarte, Giant squid, Saqib22, HanzoHattori, Fennessy, JAnDbot, Leroy65X, Ndyguy,
Turgidson, MER-C, Scythian1, Hello32020, Joeb988, Pdwiki314, Buunga88, Hut 8.5, Black max, Blitzhund, Acroterion, Russianmissile,
Magioladitis, WolfmanSF, Vlad Dracula, Parsecboy, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, Djkeddie, Askari Mark, Dentren, Vikas Kumar Ojha, CattleGirl, Puddhe, Buckshot06, Kevinmon, Charlesbaldo, Lachliggity, BrianGV, Spellmaster, Vssun, Mr A, Lost tourist, Raoulduke47, Readeraml, Jacob Peters, MartinBot, Mark Galeotti, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, Brothejr, Bentaguayre, Kentucho, Francis Tyers, RSCAMWSA,
J.delanoy, Zhushuihua, Trusilver, PalestineRemembered, NightFalcon90909, Maurice Carbonaro, Spoonman.au, Day in fall, Pajfarmor,
Alphalux, Hodja Nasreddin, Gabefarkas, St.daniel, It Is Me Here, Katalaveno, Bad Night, Sandjr, AKA MBG, Little Professor, Crocodile
Punter, Gurchzilla, Ash sul, Dmz5, AntiSpamBot, Warrior on Terrorism, Krasniy, Ko Soi IX, EconomistBR, Kansas Bear, Dragonfae9,
Olegwiki, Tiyoringo, Juliancolton, Wizzel, Bogdan, Ejrcito Rojo 1950, Mike V, TopGun, Wolcott, Useight, Otto Schmidt, Goyston,
Edwardwe, CardinalDan, Spellcast, Wikieditor06, Thester11, Cerberus0, 28bytes, VolkovBot, Gamer112, Tourbillon, Saad64, DarthScorcho, Orphic, Je G., TheQuandry, BoogaLouie, AlnoktaBOT, Sjones23, Ilya1166, Fox33, Dom Kaos, Philip Trueman, TXiKiBoT, Pahari
Sahib, Cosmic Latte, Khutuck, Thelmguy, Perohanych, Burpen, Thundermaker, Hissami, Chiafriend12, Ann Stouter, Anonymous Dissident, Charbroil, C.J. Grin, Lradrama, Sanfranman59, Jackfork, WikifanEx, Josephabradshaw, Beallthere, FrankSanMiguel, Agharo,
Complex (de), Lamro, Synthebot, Falcon8765, Bobylee2, Bahamut0013, Timt1006, Shortcord, Unused0030, Kompassi, Imperfection,
Scottywong, Uncle Scrooge, Red, XVreturns, Ponyo, Thw1309, SieBot, Stark1, Citizen, WereSpielChequers, BotMultichill, PeterPredator, DBose2, Gerakibot, Kickerandkeeper, Smsarmad, August Dominus, KP-TheSpectre, Berserkerus, Mimihitam, Oxymoron83, 1.21
jigwatts, AnalLube, Lightmouse, Poindexter Propellerhead, MASQUERAID, Iain99, Tomi T Ahonen, General osman, OKBot, Onopearls,
Johnanth, Svick, Jmj713, Wuhwuzdat, Sean.hoyland, Tigerassault, Poland1939, Treesthis, Micov, Denisarona, Tamerlane1360, Miyokan,
TFCforever, Zwanee3, Loren.wilton, Sfan00 IMG, Captain Crush, ClueBot, Noorkhanuk85, The Thing That Should Not Be, EvertonRock,
Afrique, Tamdinh, Mild Bill Hiccup, Boing! said Zebedee, Lordbecket, Blanchardb, Shovon76, Dem466, Pointillist, Double Happiness, Supergodzilla2090, Ktr101, Excirial, Prof. Spaghetti, Socrates2008, Tripping Nambiar, Ioannes Tzimiskes, GoRight, Asmaybe, Junglerot56,
SpikeToronto, Hadjin, Coinmanj, Tyler, NuclearWarfare, Jonjames1986, DeltaQuad, Jaja radio, Redthoreau, Doprendek, Atheist Haircut,
SchreiberBike, Wikimedes, Muro Bot, Bobbytheonlyone, Thingg, Garciacheech1, Tablelegs55, Kabul-Shahan2020, Versus22, PotentialDanger, Mhockey, DJ Sturm, CanadianAnthropologist, ALEXF971, Shurup06, Dupree3, Misterbeal, Nikitn, Metziker, XLinkBot, Fastily,

16.2

Images

27

Jordanp, Rio4tense, Plottruly, IAMTrust, WikHead, Borock, Harlock81, WikiDao, Kobold9, Pedro magalhaes86, Neutrino 1, MatthewVanitas, Corath, Dave1185, Charli 55, Amirkabir, Addbot, Alchemyst10, Tcncv, Crossy 26, Fyrael, TheNeutroniumAlchemist, Bolegash, Ronhjones, TutterMouse, Sam white121, Fieldday-sunday, Mohamed Ouda, , CanadianLinuxUser, Fluernutter, Damiens.rf,
Krjhgbwriuhbg, LaaknorBot, CarsracBot, Glane23, SoloWing3844, FiriBot, AnnaFrance, Jasper Deng, Brufnus, 5 albert square, Aktsu, Komkom7, Berkunt, Angry Shoplifter, Tassedethe, SamB135, RTFArt, Greyhood, , VVPushkin, Ketabtoon, Wikifan12345,
Legobot, Math Champion, Abonazzi, Luckas-bot, Yobot, WikiDan61, Jda82, Legobot II, Nirvana888, Kummel, Bradway2, THEN WHO
WAS PHONE?, Murmurer, Reenem, Hinio, Inemanja, AnakngAraw, AnomieBOT, Decora, SwiftlyTilt, Bsimmons666, Grey Fox-9589,
Jim1138, Tavrian, JackieBot, Piano non troppo, Qajar, Scythian77, AdjustShift, Lakerking04, Tymo77, Crystal whacker, ASMassoudPhotos, Dicttrshp, Materialscientist, Serres, Wandering Courier, Hixteilchen, Citation bot, Vanished user zm34pq51mz, Rabastan41, GB fan,
Afghanvoice, UltraBibendum, LilHelpa, Apjohns54, Xqbot, Creo11, Estlandia, Poetaris, 4twenty42o, Jerey Mall, Tagryn, Sportslover26,
DSisyphBot, Fancy steve, Amore Mio, Tyrol5, Srich32977, Zhiva, J04n, JanDeFietser, Andres arg, Coltsfan, Anotherclown, Saalstin, Smej,
HoyaPro, Mousedit, AustralianRupert, JImitinpinglo, Richard BB, Hashmore, Mughalnz, Orto, Nicolaert, Grinofwales, Jackriter, FrescoBot, CaptainFugu, LucienBOT, Tobby72, Dr J.D Salenger M.D, Ironboy11, Im a Socialist! What Are You, Johnniewowwow, Adilrye
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Libertyfortheoppressed, Nakh, Lb.at.wiki, ComradeWiki, Babbooshca, Gorbee22, Petroloko, RodinovJr, Rooskiey, Williamson1965,
Doddegr, Nemchino, Helkinji, Zunbreshen, Do0ger234, Jervis654, Comet Tuttle, Cempin, Gardezz, Falkone3, Squro, Gary Pec, Dinamikbot, Vrenator, Green-Halcyon, Raidon Kane, Doc Quintana, Nikola.schmidt, Reaper Eternal, Rzuwig, Propaganda328, Stroppolo, The
grey side, Mikroblgeovn, DARTH SIDIOUS 2, Splinter1044, AYousefzai, RjwilmsiBot, Helsned, IshmaelMarcos, Wiki id2, Jaenis1,
Gameboy1947, Yuliya1974, Tpanov, Animadversio, WildBot, Lord Eastfarthing, Derim Hunt, EmausBot, John of Reading, Domesticenginerd, WikitanvirBot, Solopiel, Lipsio, Scalibane, Magicalpoem, Dewritech, El gato verde, Sentinel R, Minimacs Clone, Huckamike,
Rabbabodrool, Wikipeacekeeper, Slightsmile, Davelewisface, ChoraPete, Wikipelli, K6ka, Chiton magnicus, Djembayz, Steven Kevil,
AltaDeSaxa, Kkm010, The Madras, Illegitimate Barrister, A2soup, W1 m2, Alcea setosa, Mar4d, Userofsite1, Dpenn89, Stemoc, Alpha
Quadrant (alt), Sixteenthcause, Pakistanfanforeva, Sue.Merrit, Greyshark09, HammerFilmFan, Triplespy, Fanofnaruto2, EkoGraf, JCAla,
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enistein, Mcc1789, CiriloMechas, IR393harrisonkatz, Ace of Raves, Afranelli, TRAJAN 117, Whoop whoop pull up, TitaniumCarbide,
Wilson5000, Melvinpenael, TheTimesAreAChanging, Woolfy123, Mikhail Ryazanov, ClueBot NG, Jacsam2, Adamrce, Soviet union
studier, Handcued, DamonFernandez, Timthemerciful, Wibach, Arpitbajpai, Smuorz, Themane2, Snotbot, Milad930, Gef05, Falerstico, SilverSoul91911, Armogamer13, Paracelzus, Jim47nm, Jaishadeen, V Debs, Writerplus, Nbeast, Milmi24, Helpful Pixie Bot, Thegreatgame, Strike Eagle, DBigXray, Carachi, Lowercase sigmabot, DesiFoodie, BG19bot, Mohiobrother, Wasbeer, Machinarium, Flix11,
Gorillaface12345, Scythomatian, Freddybobbitts, IiXtC, Darkness Shines, Abhay245, Adeel004, MrPenguin20, FutureTrillionaire, Luzzy
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SpidErxD, Novajet, Gsov6249, Rohiljkny, BattyBot, Highstakes00, Repitile1, Aginwald, Afghankera, ChrisGualtieri, Dmollison, Stumink, Goalisraised, Qbek16, AngryPlansMadeInHaste, May koleka, R-9e=56, Kharadea, EagerToddler39, Dexbot, Tvanhare, Dadi Atte,
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LouisAragon, MateoTimateo, Flak155, Te og kaker, AbelM7, Chipperdude15, Krisxlowry, Afgggaaa2, Monkbot, Thehungergames191,
Lugnuthemvar, Coolguy922, Nationxer, Davidmereld, Billyjean1001, StanTheMan87, BEARtruth89 and Anonymous: 1526

16.2

Images

File:2009._Stamp_of_Belarus_02-2009-01-16-m.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/2009._Stamp_

of_Belarus_02-2009-01-16-m.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.wnsstamps.ch/en/stamps/BY003.09?lang=en Original artist: post of Belarus
File:9thCompanyAwarded.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fd/9thCompanyAwarded.png License: CCBY-SA-3.0 Contributors: http://www.pravdao9rote.ru/articles/9rota.php Original artist: http://www.pravdao9rote.ru/
File:Afgan1986Kabul_40ArmyShtab.jpg
Source:
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40ArmyShtab.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: own scan photo E.Kuvakin by personal collection Original artist: .
(1986); scanned and processed by User:Vizu (2009); Permissions
File:Afgan30mmAutoMinomet.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/39/Afgan30mmAutoMinomet.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: own scan photo E.Kuvakin by personal collection Original artist: . (1986); scanned and
processed by User:Vizu (2009); Permissions
File:AfganPrisoners1985.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/Afgan_prisoners_in_Vardak_1987.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: own scan photo E.Kuvakin by personal collection Original artist: . (1985); scanned and
processed by User:Vizu (2009); Permissions
File:AfganSpecnaz2.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/45/AfganSpecnaz2.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0
Contributors: own scan photo E.Kuvakin by personal collection Original artist: . (1987); scanned and processed by User:Vizu
(2009); Permissions
File:AfghanAirForce1.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2b/AfghanAirForce1.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: [1] Original artist: David Votroubek, MC1
File:AfghanGuerillainUS1986e.JPEG Source:
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JPEG License: Public domain Contributors: dodmedia.osd.mil Original artist: T.Sgt. Bob Simons
File:Afghan_Girl_Scouts_1950s.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/Afghan_Girl_Scouts_1950s.jpg
License: Public domain Contributors: Originally published in a photobook about Afghanistan produced by the countrys planning ministry; republished in Once Upon a Time in Afghanistan... Record stores, Mad Men furniture, and pencil skirts -- when Kabul had rock 'n' roll,
not rockets by Mohammad Qayoumi, Foreign Policy, 27 May 2010. Original artist: Unknown
File:Afghan_village_destroyed_by_the_Soviets.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Afghan_village_
destroyed_by_the_Soviets.jpg License: CC BY 2.0 Contributors: Destroyed Village Original artist: Todd Human from Phoenix, AZ

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TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Afghanistan_insurgency_1985.png Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/Afghanistan_insurgency_
1985.png License: Public domain Contributors: This map is available from the United States Library of Congress's Geography & Map
Division under the digital ID g7631r.ct001104.
This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information.

Original artist: Central Intelligence Agency

File:Afghanistankrieg-Ressourcen.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Afghanistankrieg-Ressourcen.
svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Ambox_important.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, based o of Image:Ambox scales.svg Original artist: Dsmurat (talk contribs)
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File:BMD-1_in_Afganistan.JPG Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ca/BMD-1_in_Afganistan.JPG License:
Public domain Contributors: http://www.dodmedia.osd.mil/Assets/1986/DoD/DD-ST-86-06667.JPEG (this link is dead!) Original artist:
?
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Own work Original artist: LA2
File:Charlie_Wilson_with_Afghan_man.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/Charlie_Wilson_with_
Afghan_man.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: I took this picture and release it to the public domain. Transferred from
en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Melesse using CommonsHelper. Original artist: Tripalis at en.wikipedia
File:Coat_of_arms_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Coat_of_arms_of_the_
Soviet_Union.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work from Image:Soviet Hammer and Sickle and Earth.svg and Image:Soviet
coat of arms.svg. It was then corrected and is believed to be close to ocial version, for example, one from the 3rd ed. of the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia, available online here Original artist: Madden, reworked by F l a n k e r
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artist: ?
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%281980%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Orange Tuesday (talk) Original artist: Orange Tuesday (talk)
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%281987%E2%80%931992%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work. Original artist: Orange Tuesday.
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Gulbuddin.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: MrPenguin20
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Original artist: Various
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CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work, vectorization of a JPEG draw by a afghan. Original artist: Falerstico
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File:Flag_of_Pakistan.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Flag_of_Pakistan.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: The drawing and the colors were based from agspot.net. Original artist: User:Zscout370
File:Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg License:
CC0 Contributors: the actual ag Original artist: Unknown
File:Flag_of_the_National_Islamic_Front_of_Afghanistan.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f2/Flag_
of_the_National_Islamic_Front_of_Afghanistan.svg License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: MrPenguin20
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People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, http://www.protocol.gov.hk/flags/eng/n_flag/
design.html Original artist: Drawn by User:SKopp, redrawn by User:Denelson83 and User:Zscout370

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File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://pravo.levonevsky.org/ Original artist: see below
File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1955-1980).svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Flag_of_the_Soviet_
Union_%281955-1980%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: self-made from Image:Flag of the Soviet Union.svg using background color from Image:Flag of the Soviet Union 1923.svg Original artist: Cmapm
File:Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/ae/Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_the_United_States.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a4/Flag_of_the_United_States.svg License: ?
Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/48/Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg License: Cc-bysa-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Logo_of_Hezb-e_Islami_Khalis.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/22/Logo_of_Hezb-e_Islami_
Khalis.svg License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: Own work. Based on logo visible here. Original artist: MrPenguin20
File:Mortar_attack_on_Shigal_Tarna_garrison,_Kunar_Province,_87.jpg Source:
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commons/6/6c/Mortar_attack_on_Shigal_Tarna_garrison%2C_Kunar_Province%2C_87.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors:
Private collection; apparently a crop of this image at Flickr Original artist: Erwin Lux
File:Muja_on_radio_in_Munda_Dir.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/Muja_on_radio_in_Munda_
Dir.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Private collection Original artist: Erwin Lux
File:Mujahideen_prayer_in_Shultan_Valley_Kunar,_1987.jpg Source:
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Mujahideen_prayer_in_Shultan_Valley_Kunar%2C_1987.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Private collection; appears to be a
crop of this image at Flickr Original artist: Erwin Lux
File:Padlock-silver.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Padlock-silver.svg License: CC0 Contributors:
http://openclipart.org/people/Anonymous/padlock_aj_ashton_01.svg Original artist: This image le was created by AJ Ashton. Uploaded
from English WP by User:Eleassar. Converted by User:AzaToth to a silver color.
File:Portal-puzzle.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fd/Portal-puzzle.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ?
Original artist: ?
File:RIAN_archive_476785_Soviet_Army_soldiers_return_from_Afghanistan.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/a/a5/RIAN_archive_476785_Soviet_Army_soldiers_return_from_Afghanistan.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: RIA
Novosti archive, image #476785, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#476785 35 mm slide / 35 Original artist: Yuriy Somov /

File:RIAN_archive_644461_First_stage_in_the_Soviet_troop_withdrawal_from_Afghanistan.jpg
Source:
http://upload.
wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/48/RIAN_archive_644461_First_stage_in_the_Soviet_troop_withdrawal_from_Afghanistan.jpg
License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: RIA Novosti archive, image #644461, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#644461 35 mm slide / 35
Original artist: Yuriy Somov /
File:RIAN_archive_660671_Pullout_of_Soviet_troops_contingent_from_Afghanistan.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/4/4f/RIAN_archive_660671_Pullout_of_Soviet_troops_contingent_from_Afghanistan.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0
Contributors: RIA Novosti archive, image #660671, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#660671 35 mm lm / 35 Original artist:
A. Solomonov / .
File:Reagan_sitting_with_people_from_the_Afghanistan-Pakistan_region_in_February_1983.jpg Source:
http://upload.
wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/Reagan_sitting_with_people_from_the_Afghanistan-Pakistan_region_in_February_1983.jpg
License: Public domain Contributors: THE PRESIDENT AT WORK/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (le: c12820-32.jpg) Original artist:
Unknown, possibly Tim Clary [1]
File:Russische_Schmetterlingsmine_PFM-1.jpg
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Schmetterlingsmine_PFM-1.jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: work of Juergen Lumpp Original artist: Juergen Lumpp
File:Shoot_down_of_Soviet_helicopter_by_Mujahedin_fighter_armed_with_Stinger_missile.jpg
Source:
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wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8f/Shoot_down_of_Soviet_helicopter_by_Mujahedin_fighter_armed_with_Stinger_missile.jpg
License: Public domain Contributors: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/images/artifacts/450x360/
Painting_FirstSting.jpg at https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/index.html#!/artifact/143 Original
artist: CIA photo
File:Shuja_Shah_Durrani_of_Afghanistan_in_1839.jpg Source:
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Shah_Durrani_of_Afghanistan_in_1839.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: The British Library - Online Gallery Original artist:
James Rattray (1818-1854)
File:SovietInvasionAfghanistanMap.png
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SovietInvasionAfghanistanMap.png License: Public domain Contributors: http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil Original artist: Unknown
File:SovietafghanwarTanksHelicopters.jpg
Source:
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SovietafghanwarTanksHelicopters.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: dodmedia.osd.mil Original artist: Undetermined (Soviet Military Power, 1984. Photo No. 130, page 116. U.S Department of Defense publication)
File:Symbol_book_class2.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/Symbol_book_class2.svg License: CC
BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: Mad by Lokal_Prol by combining: Original artist: Lokal_Prol
File:T-54A_and_T-55_at_Bagram_Air_Base.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/15/T-54A_and_T-55_
at_Bagram_Air_Base.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.dodmedia.osd.mil/DVIC_View/Still_Details.cfm?SDAN=
DNSD0412785&JPGPath=/Assets/Still/2004/Navy/DN-SD-04-12785.JPG Original artist: PH1 (SW) ARLO K. ABRAHAMSON, USN
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from_Afghanistan.JPEG License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

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File:Text_document_with_red_question_mark.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a4/Text_document_

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File:US_military_personnel_with_Mujahideen_in_1989.JPEG
Source:
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License:
Public
domain
Contributors:
http://www.
defenseimagery.mil;
<a data-x-rel='nofollow' class='external text' href='http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imagery.html#guid=
77137c248fc271004068e01dfccf35304b66aebc'>VIRIN: DF-ST-91-06723</a> Original artist: SSGT F. Lee Corkran
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