Professional Documents
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The economy of India is the tenth-largest in the world by nominal GDP and the third-largest by
purchasing power parity (PPP). The country is one of the G-20 major economies and a member
of BRICS. On a per-capita-income basis, India ranked 141st by nominal GDP and 130th by GDP
(PPP) in 2012, according to the IMF. India is the 19th-largest exporter and the 10th-largest
importer in the world. The economy slowed to around 5.0% for the 201213 fiscal year
compared with 6.2% in the previous fiscal. On 28 August 2013 the Indian rupee hit an all time
low of 68.80 against the US dollar. In order to control the fall in rupee, the government
introduced capital controls on outward investment by both corporates and individuals. India's
GDP grew by 9.3% in 201011; thus, the growth rate has nearly halved in just three years. GDP
growth rose marginally to 4.8% during the quarter through March 2013, from about 4.7% in the
previous quarter. The government has forecast a growth rate of 6.1%6.7% for the year 201314,
whilst the RBI expects the same to be at 5.7%. Besides this, India suffered a very high fiscal
deficit of US$ 88 billion (4.8% of GDP) in the year 201213. The Indian Government aims to
cut the fiscal deficit to US$ 70 billion or 3.7% of GDP by 201314.
The independence-era Indian economy (from 1947 to 1991) was based on a mixed economy
combining features of capitalism and socialism, resulting in an inward-looking, interventionist
policies and import-substituting economy that failed to take advantage of the post-war expansion
of trade. This model contributed to widespread inefficiencies and corruption, and the failings of
this system were due largely to its poor implementation.
In 1991, India adopted liberal and free-market principles and liberalised its economy to
international trade under the guidance of Former Finance minister Manmohan Singh under the
Prime Ministry of P.V. Narasimha Rao, prime minister from 1991 to 1996, who had eliminated
Licence Raj, a pre- and post-British era mechanism of strict government controls on setting up
new industry. Following these major economic reforms, and a strong focus on developing
national infrastructure such as the Golden Quadrilateral project by former Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, the country's economic growth progressed at a rapid pace, with relatively large
increases in per-capita incomes.
people to save is very low in under developed countries for which capital formation is
very low .
6. Poor Technology:
The lever of technology is a common factor in under developed economy. India
economy also suffers from this typical feature of technological backwardness. The
techniques applied in agriculture industries milling and other economic fields are
primitive in nature.
7. Back ward Institutional and social frame work:
The social and institutional frame work in under developed countries like India is
hopelessly backward, which is a strong obstacle to any change in the form of
production. Moreover religious institutions such as caste system, joint family universal
marriage affects the economic life of the people.
8. Under utilization of Resources:
India is a poor land. So our people remain economically backwards for the lack of
utilization of resources of the country.
9. Price instability:
Price instability is also a basis feature of Indian economy. In almost all the
underdeveloped countries like India there is continuous price instability. Shortage of
essential commodities and gap between consumption aid productions increase the price
persistently. Rising trend of price creates a problem to maintain standard of living of the
common people.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
With a GDP growth rate averaging 8 percent over the last decade, India is second only
to China as one of the worlds fastest-growing large economies; Indias economic
transformation began in 1991. Faced with near bankruptcy, the government started
dismantling the license Raj that had shackled the private sector by controlling even
little things such as the price of soap. This policy shift unleashed entrepreneurship on a
grand scale, a phenomenon that continues to gather momentum. A second factor was
the countrys global advantage in information technology and other knowledge-intensive
services. Over the last ten years, India has emerged as the worlds No. 1 destination for
outsourcing of everything from low-end services such as call canters to high-end work
such as pharmaceutical development, data analytics, financial market research and
legal services. The third major driver of growth has been a major ramp-up in levels of
domestic savings and investment. In the early 1990s, Indias gross capital formation
stood at only 24 percent of GDP. Since then, it has increased rapidly and now stands at
almost 40 percent of GDP, only slightly smaller than Chinas and almost doubles that of
every other large economy in the world.
2.
Information Technology
Telecommunications hardware
Consumer durables
Textiles
Construction machinery
Power equipment
Food grains
Leather products
Jewellery
Plastics products
Exports grew by 18.11% during the 1st quarter of 2007-2008 and the imports shoot up
by 34.30% during the same period
3.
4.
5.
6.
Indian economic policy after independence was influenced by the colonial experience
(which was seen by Indian leaders as exploitative in nature) and by those leaders'
exposure to Fabian socialism. Policy tended towards protectionism, with a strong
emphasis on import substitution, industrialization under state monitoring, state
intervention at the micro level in all businesses especially in labour and financial
markets, a large public sector, business regulation, and central planning. Five-Year
Plans of India resembled central planning in the Soviet Union. Steel, mining, machine
tools, water, telecommunications, insurance, and electrical plants, among other
industries, were effectively nationalized in the mid-1950s.
A Balance of Payments crisis in 1991 pushed the country to near bankruptcy. In return
for an IMF bailout, gold was transferred to London as collateral, the rupee devalued and
economic reforms were forced upon India. That low point was the catalyst required to
transform the economy through badly needed reforms to unshackle the economy.
Controls started to be dismantled, tariffs, duties and taxes progressively lowered, state
monopolies broken, the economy was opened to trade and investment, private sector
enterprise and competition were encouraged and globalisation was slowly embraced.
The reforms process continues today and is accepted by all political parties. Today,
fascination with India is translating into active consideration of India as a destination for
FDI. The A T Kearney study is putting India second most likely destination for FDI in
2005 behind China. It has displaced US to the third position. This is a great leap
forward. India was at the 15th position, only a few years back. To quote the A T Kearney
Study India's strong performance among manufacturing and telecom & utility firms was
driven largely by their desire to make productivity-enhancing investments in IT, business
process outsourcing, research and development, and knowledge management
activities
7.
evaluation of banking sector reforms and economic growth of the country since from the
globalization and its effects on Indian economy. Competition among financial
intermediaries gradually helped the interest rates to decline. Deregulation added to it.
The real interest rate was maintained. The borrowers did not pay high price while
depositors had incentives to save. It was something between the nominal rate of
interest and the expected rate of inflation. Finally the paper deals with conclusion and
inflation rates from the different years and regulation of economy and finance of the
country through government policies and banking sector reforms.
8.
Weaknesses
1.
2.
3.
Predominance of agriculture.
4.
5.
Unemployment
6.
Scarcity of capital
7.
Trade deficit
8.
Growth in India
Indias economy has grown very rapidly in recent years. Since 1991 it has been among
the top 10% of the worlds countries in terms of economic growth.
The primary challenge for India is to sustain this growth while spreading its benefits
more widely. This requires continuous effort as international experience shows that
growth slows down unless reforms are pushed through when growth is high.
Major obstacles to Indias growth are:
Infrastructure Shortages
Infrastructure
Crippling infrastructure shortages are the leading constraint to rapid growth as well as in
spreading this growth more widely. These shortages have resulted in a skewed pattern
of growth that is not sustainable.
While the high skill services sector that employs the better educated among Indias work
force has flourished, the growth of more labor-intensive manufacturing that generates
jobs for low and semi-skilled workers has remained constrained.
Infrastructure shortages have particularly hindered the growth of export oriented
manufacturing and value-added agriculture that integrate into global supply chains, and
need good roads, ports, airports, and railways as well as reliable power and water to
prosper.
Challenges:
Fiscal Deficit
The countrys consolidated fiscal deficit has been persistently large for many years.
While recent efforts to tackle the deficit have paid off in substantial progress, it remains
a continuing concern.
Challenges:
The existing deficit leaves no fiscal space for new government spending on
areas of high social priority. Initiatives in rural and urban infrastructure,
employment, education, and rural health will have to be financed with some
combination of higher taxes or user charges, or by cutting existing expenditures.
Large deficits and an unreformed banking sector reduce the private sectors
ability to obtain bank financing.
Labor Regulations
Indias existing labor regulations - among the most restrictive and complex in the world protect only the insiders, the small number of workers who are already working in the
organized sector, while hobbling the creation of manufacturing jobs for the tens of
millions unemployed or working in poor quality jobs.
There are at least four times more unemployed people (around 35 million) than are
employed in the organized private sector. Firms with more than 100 workers consider
labor regulations to be as constraining to their operation and growth as power
shortages.
Challenges:
Reforms should protect the interests of all workers by ensuring that workers
legitimate interests are met. The World Bank does not advocate a regime of
"automatic hire and fire" - though that is what the vast majority of workers in the
unorganized sector actually face.
Financial Sector
Financial sector reforms have led to a booming stock market that has helped large firms
finance their expansion easily. However, small and medium enterprises - which are an
important engine of growth and productivity - have not been able to access finance as
they are too small to be of interest to equity markets or FDI.
Growth in lending to this sector has been slow due to the closely regulated publicly
owned banking sector which has few incentives for innovation, and a large deficit with
the attendant fears of making new loans.
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Chinese economic
Chapter 1 Introduction; Chinas economic reform in comparative perspective
Collapse of Soviet-style socialism in economic planning took place by the end of the
1980s in many socialist countries (China, Yugoslavia, Poland). Soviet leaders were
encouraged to explore reforms on their own after seeing the success the Chinese had
with exploratory reforms. China was the only socialist country to undertake system
transformation without tumbling into profound economic crisis. Since the early 1980s,
China has been the fastest growing large economy in the world.
The distinctive pattern of Chinas economic reform emerged from the interaction
between government policy and the often unforeseen consequences of economic
change. (Not solely by the government strategy)
Characteristics of the Chinese transition process;
1. The dual-track system
2. Growing out of the plan
3. Entry(Open market to the new entrants)
4. Price that equate supply and demand
5. Incremental managerial reforms in the state sector
6. Disarticulation
7. Initial macroeconomic stabilization achieved through the plan
8. Macroeconomic cycles persisted throughout the reform process
9. Continued high saving and investment
10. Ex-post coherence
Three models of reform
(1) European rationalizing reforms
Rationalizing reforms was never a strategy for transition to the market, rather to
introduce some market-like elements to perfect the planning system. Critical limitation of
this reform was, first, planners never renounced the effort to guide all fundamental
economic decisions. Second, prices were never set free to equilibrate supply and
demand. Third, the administrative hierarchy remained intact. This rationalizing reform
failed due to these limitations.
(2) Big bang reforms
Big ban reforms were brought with a belief that destruction of the system at a single
blow is necessary because disentangling the elements of the system was impossible.
Institutional transformation, such as privatization, reform of banking system, is the most
difficult and contentious element of this transformation. This model succeeded in
destroying command economy and eventually creating a market economy. However, it
concentrates so many of the costs of transformation in the early stages, oppressing
domestic production and unemployment. (This has been a center of debate)
Uncompleted tasks
Painful adjustments such as restructure of the financial system, privatization and
restructure of failing state-owned enterprises, are still to be completed. The two biggest
dangers that confront the Chinese economy are the specter of macroeconomics
instability and public discontent.
The future of Chinese economic reforms
Institutional development will probably continue to lag behind the demands of the
economy. The chronic problems, such as fiscal shortfalls, investment inefficiency and
excess subsidy burdens will continue. An accelerated period of industrial restructuring
can raise efficiency and prolong very rapid growth well in to the next century.
Characteristics of Chinese Economy
Watching China grope its way towards a market economy is kind of moving, exhilarating
and mystifying at the same time.
It must be a bit like it how would have been in the 1780s watching the United States set
up the rules for what became the 20th centurys economic superpower. China is
becoming the 21st centurys economic superpower but its rules are very different the US
Constitution, although they are being amended as rapidly as Americas were in the
years after the Constitution was passed.
Reading the 3500-word communiqu issued last night reminded me of going
mushrooming as a kid: youd walk gingerly through a field full of cow pats looking for the
perfect white mushrooms growing in the bullshit.
The 3rd Plenum gave high appraisal to the successful practices and magnificent
achievements of the Party in the 35 years since the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party
Congress (which brought Deng Xiaoping to power and introduced the idea of Socialism
with Chinese characteristics). There are quite a few magnificents in fact, referring to
the great strides of the past 35 years, rather different from Tony Abbotts strange
declaration this week that the adults are back in charge.
Theres a lot to be said for a one-party state; all this lurching about every few years from
children to adults is bad for business.
Anyway, the Chinese communists have now discovered the market. The Plenum
pointed out that we must closely revolve around the decisive function that the market
has in allocating resources. Deepen economic structural reform, accelerate the
perfection of modern market systems
The word perfection suggests they need to catch up with what happened in the US
and Europe in 2008, but meetings of the Chinese Communist Party are hyperbolic
chambers so thats just in keeping with the language of the whole communiqu.
The question of whether Comrade Xi Jinping would focus on economic reform or
clamping down on Chinas incipient credit bubble has been answered: its all about
reform.
Finance gets a brief mention well down the document while the mushrooms of reform
are sprinkled throughout the field.
We must realistically transform government functions, deepen administrative structural
reform, innovate administrative management methods, strengthen government
credibility and implementation, and establish a rule of law government and a servicetype government.
The communiqu even talked about democracy: to develop Socialist democratic
politics, we must pay more attention to completing democratic systems, enriching
democratic forms and fully giving rein to the superiorities of our countrys Socialist
political system.
Goodness knows what that actually means, although its very clear that the Party has no
intention of giving power. In fact quite the reverse: the reforms spelt out last night are
designed to entrench it.
Why will it work better this time than when Hu Jintao took over ten years ago, and also
issued a 3rd Plenum communiqu full of talk about reform and open government?
Mainly, I suspect, because it has to. Xi Jinping appears to be a stronger character better
able than Hu to push through reforms, but also it is ten years on. Chinas economy is
twice as large and in the meantime the internet has happened.
The people now know far more than they used to, and are demanding more more
stuff and more freedoms. For the CCP to retain power peacefully it must provide both.
As the communiqu says, it must unwaveringly encourage, support and guide the nonpublicly-owned economy at the same time as the publicly-owned economy.
This is critical to shifting Chinas reliance away from exports and heavy industry towards
an energetic domestic economy (a bit like what Australia has to do, except on a much
bigger scale).
A year ago it seemed Xi Jinping was confident he could do this while at the same time
getting control of credit growth and stopping the development of bubbles.
Reading between the lines of last nights communiqu, it seems he has given up on
that: reform is taking precedence; the speculators will have to look after themselves.
This is both understandable and dangerous. The great risk of a credit collapse in China
remains, but as long as there isnt one China should continue to grow and develop into
the worlds largest market economy, what you might call a market economy with
Chinese characteristics
market share rapidly. As well as this, few of China's products are famous internationally,
so high quality products do not attract high prices, which means lower profits and higher
costs.
Obviously, if China's enterprises compete with transnational corporations (TNCs) under
such conditions, a great number of them must go bankrupt, or be taken over by the
latter. In fact, the beverage, brewing, detergent, bicycle, paper, medical, elevator,
computer, aviation, and machine tool industries are all controlled by transnational
corporations, or at the least the high value-added markets of these industries have been
totally conquered by foreign companies. Other industries under more strict protection of
government, such as the automobile industry, petrochemicals, steel, coal, even
agriculture, are under serious threat from imported products and the penetration of
TNCs. Some domestic firms within these industries have become the production base
of TNCs. Hence, China's enterprises have been suffering from decreasing profits since
1996, and have been forced to dismiss workers, reduce wages and freeze welfare. One
of the results has been that the bad debts in China's major banks have been soaring. In
my opinion, the primary reason for the rising bad debts is fierce competition, especially
competition from foreign enterprises and imported goods. The second important reason
is corruption.
I want to emphasise the issue of agriculture. The rural population in China adds up to
900 million, 500 million of whom have the ability to work. The average household owns
only 0.4 hectares of land. To ensure that such tiny plots of land produce enough food,
the price of food must be maintained at a high level, which means that the prices of the
main agriculture products such as wheat, rice, and corn of China are constantly higher
than those of the international market. The price of agricultural land has been
decreasing since 1996. The price fell to such a level that, per hectare, wheat brought
$120 loss to peasants in the autumn of 2000, while an average peasant's annual
income in purely agricultural areas is only $80. Almost 600 million people live in such
areas. If the "Agriculture Cooperation Agreement between P.R.C and U.S.A" is
implemented after China joins WTO, the income of peasants will go down steeply, more
land will lie waste, and more peasants will flood into every city and fall into a poverty
trap without any hope.
As a result, China's GDP might increase temporarily, but employment, tax and wage per
GDP unit will decrease continuously. More importantly, China will no longer have an
independent industrial system, and will become instead the production base of
transnational corporations. Most of the rural population will lose land and income. The
financial system could collapse because of increased bad debts. Meanwhile, China will
have no ability to construct a social security system with sufficient funds because the
government will be unable to levy enough taxes on foreign enterprises, which will
certainly lead to a deterioration in public security.
Then, a second question naturally arises: why is China so eager to join WTO?
A great many of people find it hard to understand the motivation of China's accession to
WTO. However, China's mainstream media spares no enthusiasm in its praise of the
WTO. They loudly proclaim that accession will speed up the pace of reform and open up
policy, motivate the energy of China's enterprises in the face of international
competition, normalise China's market economy, and finally make China run in the
same orbit as a developed country. If some enterprises are eliminated, this is only the
necessary cost of China's development. The media also appeals to consumers,
implying that they will be able to buy more high quality imported goods with less money.
No voice from businesses directly faced with international competition appears in the
media. Collective enterprises owned by villages and towns or small private enterprises
are unable to compete directly with TNCs, and their main rivals are domestic firms.
Although these small businesses feel vaguely the threat from foreign goods, they have
little information about the whole situation, no organisation, and no representation in
political affairs. Most big enterprises still belong to the state, their leaders are appointed
by central or local government, and bear no final responsibility. If the government is
dedicated to joining the WTO, they will raise their hands automatically. These leaders
will have the possibility to enjoy salaries as high salary as do their foreign counterparts,
a consideration which far outweighs their concern for the overall interest of the
enterprises. Workers and peasants might be expected to hold different opinions, but
they are much less informed and organised. Most do not even know what the WTO is.
What kind of force could get rid of all these obstacles and push forward the process of
accession to WTO? The answer lies in the logic and history of China's reform-open
policy. It is generally considered that the reform-open policy allows the Chinese
economy to grow rapidly, and the living standards of Chinese people to improve rapidly.
However, the thing is not so simple. The core of reform-open policy is the introduction of
market logic, which means putting the development in the hands of those with the
desire and ability to become wealthy, which at the same time means allowing the law of
the jungle to start functioning. Before 1985, the central government improved the price
of agriculture products and the wages of workers while keeping the consumer price.
Local governments and state-operated enterprises gained more self-determination
power and were able to use bonuses and other incentives. As a result, the largest and
weakest group won a greater share in wealth distribution, which strongly promoted
development. The open-reform up policy won support from all social groups.
After 1985, however, peasants' income grew slowly while their costs grew rapidly.
Leaders of state-owned enterprises gradually seized more profit for themselves while
the political position and relative income of workers fell continuously. Nobody seems to
care about the long term; every one, from top to bottom, even the workers, learned to
use power for himself. State-owned enterprises began to die gradually under the
pressures of internal erosion and external pressure.
This process has produced a large wealthy group which included cadres in all levels of
government who hold real power, leaders in state-owned enterprises, grass roots
cadres in the countryside, leaders of collective enterprises owned by villages and towns,
owners of private enterprises, and those employed as white-collar workers in foreign
capital enterprises.
Foreign capital once played a positive role in China's economic development. During
the 1980s, the scale and level of foreign capital was relatively low, constituted mainly of
capital from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, which did not threaten China's
enterprises. Meanwhile, the government adopted a strict protectionist policy. The
domestic market boomed for five years or so, supplying all kinds of commodities whose
production once fell short of demand. The internal and external problems of stateowned enterprises existed but were not so serious.
At the end of 1980s, however, overproduction visited every walk of life, and competition
became very fierce. In other words, China ran into its first economic crisis, the most
notable marks of which were "triangle debts". To solve the crisis, it is necessary to
enlarge domestic demand, reduce the gap between the wealthy and the poverty, and
absorb overproduction capability, using financial, monetary and taxation tools; but this
solution was excluded from the beginning, because it could not gain support from the
new wealthy group, against the logic of the law of the jungle. Instead, the door was
opened far wider to foreign capital, the hope being that foreign direct investment could
stimulate growth. After 1992, and the publication of the famous speech of Deng, all
levels of government in every district competed with each other to supply more
favourable treatment to attract foreign capital. Many areas were designated
"development zones", within which governments were responsible for providing a high
standard of infrastructure. Not surprisingly, a great boom developed because of the
building real estate and infrastructure in these development zones. All the storage
space was sold out, and idle productive capacity was put to use; but the boom ended as
rapidly as it appeared. Real estate prices fell sharply.
A similar story was taking place in the entire China economy. All competitive industries
went into a descending spiral. The prices of colour TVs, refrigerators, air conditioners,
motorcycles and other manufactured goods went down by more than 50%. Idle capacity
was much more extensive than in the last crisis. The growth rate may have been 7%
p.a., but growth was evident only in foreign direct investment and export/import, which
at the same time compressed the market space of domestic industries, and aggravated
the domestic economic crisis. Indeed, foreign direct investments focused in two fields:
high value-added industries such as automobile, medical, chemical, and microelectronics; and labour-intensive export-oriented industries such as toys, shoes, leather,
and garments. Though export industries generated some employment, wages were too
low to compensate for the lost high wage jobs in high value-added industries. More
inimical to her long-term interest, China runs the risk of losing an independent industrial
capacity. To indicate how China's economy relies on foreign capital and markets, the
ratio of the sum of export and import to GDP rose to 46% in 2000.
During the process that saw Chinas economy fall into the long term deflation crisis from
the boom-bubble-bust of the 1990s, the law of the jungle functioned to its extreme.
Workers and peasants experienced a ten years' stagnation of income, while cadres in
central government and rich regional governments enjoyed an income growth to a factor
of ten and white-collar employees and intellectuals gained even more. These latter
three groups are the core force in contemporary China's politics, economics, and
culture. They all benefit from the foreign-oriented economy, even from the lasting
deflation. In their eyes, if domestic growth demands more tax and fewer imported
goods, then it must be the worst solution. Hence, when Chinas economy is faced with
the choice of acceding or not acceding to the WTO, they automatically support joining.
We are told. Join the WTO, so that reform and the opening up policy won't be reversed.
This could be translated as Join the WTO, so that the wallets of the rich won't be under
threat.
The third question is simply, `how could the public be persuaded?
In reality, even the rich will become dependent on transnational corporations if China's
accession to the WTO does take place, and thus they would not be so enthusiastic in
their support if they were fully aware of the probable consequences. It does no good,
either, to other countries and most of the people in the world if China loses the ability to
grow independently and becomes a country competing with others by its low wage
level. However, such a "fail-fail" game was presented as a "win-win" game by both the
Chinese and world media - why?
The reason lies in the neoliberalism which dominates academic discourse and public
opinion, and which has been strongly supported by transnational corporations. Almost
all Chinese economists embrace Adam Smith's "invisible hand" and its modern
representatives such as Milton Friedman; every leader in all levels of government is
trained in Smith's dogma. In fact, it's Adam Smith not Karl Marx who is the real hero.
With no exception, the media, reporters and editors all embrace Smith's dogma, and
seldom know that protectionism rather than free trade was the secret prescription of
development of America, Germany, France, Japan, and even Great Britain. In their
eyes, protectionism is equivalent to "close the door".
It is very interesting that under the surface of rejecting the western model China learnt
everything from America, putting it into practice with the reform and opening up policy.
American neoliberalism became Chinese fashion; Nasdaq upswings, the second board
stock market, became the hot topic of China's capital market; American communication
industry opens to competition, and China's communication industry becomes eager to
be dismantled. This kind of model thinking plays an important role in persuading the
public.
The fourth point I would like to point out is that things are changing.
With the explosion of the Asian financial crisis, with the rapid growth of the unemployed
population and the deterioration of the countryside, with more state-owned enterprises
going bankrupt, public feeling against market-oriented reform strengthened. In
economic academia, critiques of the IMF and the Washington consensus from several
American economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman became clearly
influential. The translation of a German book on the way in which globalisation
undermines democracy and welfare gave a shock to intellectuals both inside and
outside academia. Suffice it to say that anti-neoliberalism forces are developing quickly.
Since the first half of 1999, I have written many papers criticising the policy of accession
to WTO and the related treaties. My book Collision: The globalization trap and China's
real choice was published in January 2000. Though I fell under all kinds of pressures
and difficulties, I am also gaining more support from a broader base. To my surprise,
China's central policy research institute published a long summary of my book, and the
journal International Trade belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation published my article "Thinking on anti-globalisation". In addition, dozens of
magazines have published abstracts of and made comments on my view. I have been
invited to attend various seminars and give lectures. At the beginning of every lecture, I
am in the minority, but when I finish my speech, I have become one of the majority.
It is evident that the Chinese economic academia has been split. Those neoliberal
scholars still command the majority, but have lost their arrogance, while anti-neoliberal
scholars are the minority but are now more confident and encouraged, with justice on
their side. This is why I could come here and introduce my opinion. I believe deeply that
democratic forces all over the world must oppose neoliberalism, outlaw it, because it
promotes polarisation, tragedies, and disasters in every corner of the world.
GDP by Administrative Division
There are 31 administrative divisions in China. Below are the top administrative
divisions in China ranked by GDP in 2012. GDP was converted from CNY to USD using
a FX rate of 6.3125 CNY/USD
Rank
Administrative
Division
GDP $ billions
2012
mid-year
Population
2012
Guangdong
904.05
8,570
105,494,200
Jiangsu
856.37
10,827
79,093,900
Shandong
792.29
8,201
96,610,000
Zhejiang
548.22
10,022
54,700,000
Henan
472.24
5,025
93,970,000
Hebei
420.99
5,796
72,640,100
Liaoning
392.89
8,958
43,860,000
Sichuan
377.82
4,686
80,631,000
Hubei
352.48
6,111
57,682,500
10
Hunan
350.96
5,304
66,172,500
year
CN
growth
based
on
CN
(%)
2012
51,932,210
9.8
2011
47,310,400
17.8
2010
40,151,280
17.8
2009
34,090,281
8.6
2008
31,404,543
18.1
2007
26,581,031
22.9
2006
21,631,443
17.0
2005
18,493,737
15.7
2004
15,987,834
17.7
2003
13,582,276
12.9
2002
12,033,269
9.7
2001
10,965,517
10.5
2000
9,921,455
10.6
1999
8,967,705
6.2
1998
8,440,228
6.9
1997
7,897,303
11.0
[71]
CN
38,449
real
gro
wth
(%)
7.2
35,198
17.3
5,450
8,411
8.8
30,015
17.2
4,434
7,571
9.9
25,608
8.0
3,749
6,798
8.7
23,708
17.5
3,414
6,201
9.1
20,169
22.2
2,652
5,562
13.6
16,500
16.3
2,070
4,759
12.0
14,185
15.0
1,732
4,115
10.7
12,336
17.0
1,490
3,625
9.4
10,542
12.2
1,274
3,227
9.3
9,398
9.0
1,135
2,891
8.4
8,622
9.7
1,042
2,625
7.5
7,858
9.8
949
2,388
7.6
7,159
5.3
865
2,172
6.7
6,796
5.9
821
2,007
6.8
6,420
9.8
774
1,858
8.2
1996
7,117,659
17.1
856,085
17.6
1995
6,079,373
26.1
727,981
30.2
1994
4,819,786
36.4
559,224
-8.8
1993
3,533,392
31.2
613,223
25.6
1992
2,692,348
23.6
488,222
19.3
1991
2,178,150
16.7
409,173
4.8
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1,866,782
1,699,232
1,504,282
1,205,862
1,027,518
901,604
720,805
596,265
532,335
489,156
454,562
406,258
364,522
9.9
13.0
24.7
17.4
14.0
25.1
20.9
12.0
8.8
7.6
11.9
11.4
13.2
390,279
451,311
404,149
323,974
297,590
307,023
309,757
301,799
281,287
286,895
303,446
261,259
216,462
-13.5
11.7
24.7
8.9
-3.1
-0.9
2.6
7.3
-2.0
-5.5
16.1
20.7
33
2,054,6
66
1,832,8
27
1,618,5
89
1,401,8
23
1,203,4
62
1,029,0
43
910,270
844,044
781,297
678,661
590,966
531,421
454,455
380,210
329,799
284,910
247,622
12.1
10.0
5,846
15.9
703
1,688
8.9
13.2
10.9
5,046
24.8
604
1,521
9.7
15.5
13.1
4,044
34.9
469
1,358
11.8
16.5
14.0
2,998
29.7
520
1,190
12.7
16.9
14.2
2,311
22.1
419
1,033
12.8
13.0
9.2
1,893
15.1
356
894
7.7
7.8
8.0
15.1
14.8
11.2
16.9
19.5
15.3
15.8
15.1
3.8
4.1
11.3
11.6
8.8
13.5
15.2
10.9
9.1
5.2
7.8
7.6
11.7
1,644
1,519
1,366
1,112
963
858
695
583
528
492
463
419
381
8.2
11.2
22.8
15.5
12.3
23.4
19.3
10.4
7.2
6.2
10.5
10.0
11.7
344
403
367
299
279
292
299
295
279
289
309
270
226
802
755
709
626
554
506
438
372
327
287
252
2.3
2.5
9.5
9.8
7.2
11.9
13.7
9.3
7.5
3.9
6.5
6.1
10.2