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G.R. No. L-19060

May 29, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN GERONA,petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE GUZMANrespondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958, petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion,
Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida
de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first
wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him
several children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De
Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents
executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well
knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the
transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new
transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such
fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded
from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the
respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the latter prayed that
judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of
1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said
properties; ordering the register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above stated
and to issue new certificates of title in the name of both the petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for
the former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of said properties and to
deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to
share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is
barred by the statute of limitations.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by
first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint belonged to the conjugal partnership
of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife, Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already prescribed, and,
accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. On appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, with costs against them.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action
for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the
period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by
respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the
present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe,
this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title (Cordova vs.
Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse
title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857;
Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole
heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby
excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is
why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with
fraud. 1wph1.t
Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison v.
Fernandez, L-11764, January 31, 1959; Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956; and Sevilla v. De los Angeles, L7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based
upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations (Candelaria v.
Romero, L-12149, September 30, 1960; Alzona v. Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in
the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud (Mauricio v.
Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25,
1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of

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respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the
whole world (Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958; Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v. Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964).
As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at least constructively, of the alleged
fraud committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs'
complaint in this case was not filed until 4 November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio
Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to have discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948
and had, therefore, only 4 years from the said date within which to file this action. Plaintiff Maria Concepcion
Gerona became of age on 8 December 1949 or after the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement. She
also had only the remainder of the period of 4 years from December 1949 within which to commence her action.
Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9 January 1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained
knowledge (even if only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff
Delfin Gerona became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a minor at the time he gained
knowledge (although constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco Gerona
and Delfin Gerona had, therefore, two years after the removal of their disability within which to commence their
action (Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act 190), that is, January 29, 1952, with respect to
Francisco, and 5 August 1954, with respect to Delfin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners herein. It is so
ordered.

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G.R. No. L-8409

December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositorsappellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition
for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952,
residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente
and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and
that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the
ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and
granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her
aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the
Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad
condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October
29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring
his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr.
Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to
the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage
in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of
"acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A).
Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at Espaa Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he
resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the
absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new
domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of
Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another
domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose
and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently (Minor,
Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of
the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a
domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he
intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested his wish to live
indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the
allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to
reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate
full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
Espaa Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying
said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is
"manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so "due to his
illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its is very likely that said advice was given
and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that
"domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge
that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).

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Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children,
who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2,
by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A Espaa Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952,
or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A"
and "B" residence certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued
in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married,
in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his
demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the
legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the
deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have objected to
said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that
the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his
death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 which is particularly
strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent
has not been offset by the evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to entertain the
same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents during
the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action oppositors
may want to take later on because until now the personality of the oppositors has not been established whether or
not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the oppositors
refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P.
10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before appellants had
established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When appellants, however,
sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor,
the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to prove the
status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the deceased was never
a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status
of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not
yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged
lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the
question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by the
lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that
appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contestedthe
jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said
appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower court, appellants'
counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this
proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation
between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants'
counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the
oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon,
appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the
court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they
maintain that these proceedings should bedismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they
were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the
court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to appellee's petition,
but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if
true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In
other words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in
connection with the issue under consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the
settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing
thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order

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dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all
surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of
said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November
16, 1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of
the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question
of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive
jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts
with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested
therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by
law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to
non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective
estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts
then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts
but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows
the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court
of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question
of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide
said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in
the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed
and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the
Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed
appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs against the
appellee. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-27526 September 12, 1974
ANGELITA G. VDA. DE VALERA, AMANDA G. VALERA, OSCAR G. VALERA, DIONISIO G. VALERA, FELIXBERTO
G. VALERA, BENITO G. VALERA, EVA G. VALERA, LITA G. VALERA, TONIETTE VALERA, ANGEL V. COLET,
NORMAN PE BENITO and ROMEO PE BENITO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MACARIO M. OFILADA, as Probate Judge, Court of First Instance of Abra; ADORACION VALERA-BRINGAS,
as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Francisco Valera; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Abra; DOMINGO V. BANEZ
as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Abra, and CELSO VALERA, respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
Had the Court of First Instance of Abra been more cognizant of the limitations on its prerogative as a probate court, it
would not have committed the jurisdictional and procedural errors pointed out in this certiorari case by the petitioners, the
heirs of the late Virgilio Valera.
The record discloses that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing its orders of July 10, 1964, April 15, 1966 and
January 4, 1967 as well as the writ of execution against the assets of the deceased Virgilio Valera. The jurisdictional and
procedural errors committed by the lower court justify the writ of certiorari. Hence, We find the petition to be meritorious.
We have to set aside the said orders and writ of execution insofar as the heirs or estate of Virgilio Valera are concerned.
Civil Case No. 64, R-1 of the Court of First Instance of Abra is a special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Francisco Valera. Virgilio Valera was the administrator of the estate, He died on March 21, 1961. He was
survived by his widow, Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera and their ten (10) children, named Amanda, Oscar, Dionisio,
Benito, Felixberto, Eva, Lita, Toniette, Vicenta and Teresita, all petitioners herein, except Vicenta and Teresita, who were
abroad.

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Later (the exact date is not shown in the record), Adoracion Valera Bringas, who claims to be an acknowledged natural
child of Francisco Valera, was appointed administratrix. She filed on April 16, 1964 in the intestate proceeding a petition to
require "Celso Valera and family and Angelita de Valera and family to pay P100.00" as monthly rental for the onethird pro-indiviso portion of the Valera residence located in Bangued, Abra. 1
That residence is item 3 of the original inventory dated April 10, 1964 submitted by Mrs. Bringas. It is described as follows:
Residential land & Improvements. Covered by Tax Declaration No. 16922, declared in 1948 in the names
of Virgilio & Celso Valera; cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 21571 in the name of Virgilio Valera; cancelled by
Tax Declaration No. 29338, in 1962, in the name of Virgilio Valera, located in Partelo Street, Bangued, Abra,
bounded as follows: N. Alejandro Lizards; E. Partelo Street (now Virgilio Valera Street); S. Taft Street;
W'Consiliman Brook, with an area of 1,775 square meters, and assessed at P1,420.00 for the residential lot, and
P9,500.00 for the improvements.
Appraised value P45,600.00, 1/3 of which is P15,200.00. (p. 5 of Respondents' Memorandum)
The petition was not served on the widow and ten children of Virgilio Valera. Celso Valera interposed an opposition to it
on the ground that Francisco Valera had no interest in the Valera residence, that the property was never leased and that
the remedy of Mrs. Bringas was "in a appropriate remedy and/or procedure" and not in the intestate proceeding. 2
The lower court granted the petition in an order dated July 10, 1964 which reads: 3
ORDER
The administratrix, through counsel, has petitioned for an order to pay rental on the property (Item 1-B, 23 of the
Inventory submitted i)v the administratrix, pp. 415-416, rec.) owned in common by the estate of the deceased
Francisco Valera y Versoza and the late Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera, corresponding to one-third (1/3) interest
pertaining to the estate of the deceased Francisco Valera to be paid by the family of Virgilio Valera and Celso
Valera and family who have been occupying the property since April, 1945 in the amount of P100.00 a month,
plus legal interest, the same to be paid to the Administratrix.
WHEREFORE, finding the said motion to be well-founded and meritorious, the same is hereby granted. It is
further ordered that the Clerk of Court shall furnish Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera with a copy of this order by
registered mail.
SO ORDERED.
Done at Bangued, Abra, this 10th day of July, 1964.
(Sgd.) ALFONSO P. DONESA J u d g e
The directive of Judge Donesa to the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of the order by registered mail on Mrs. Valera implies
that the heirs of Virgilio Valera were not served with a copy of the petition. The said heirs, through Atty. Angel V. Colet, a
son-in-law of Mrs. Valera, filed a motion for the reconsideration of that order. They contended that the Valera residence
"should be excluded from the inventory," because that was their "absolute property of which they have been in complete
possession and occupation". 4 Mrs. Bringas replied that Francisco Valera's estate had "already consolidated" its
ownership over that one-third partition "through the submission of the inventory and its approval" by the probate court. 5
It was only nearly two years later that respondent Judge Macario Ofilada in his order of April 15, 1966 denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera. 6
On February 17, 1965 (before the motion for reconsideration was resolved) Mrs. Bringas filed in the intestate proceeding
a pleading known as "Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing Delivery of the Fruits of the Properties or Value and
Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix." 7
She prayed in that motion that Judge Donesa's order for the payment of rentals be executed against the heirs of Virgilio
Valera; that the heirs be ordered to deliver to her the fruits of the properties of the estate of Francisco Valera, which,
according to her calculation, amounted to P100,000 for twenty years, plus legal interest supposedly amounting to P5,000;
that the heirs be ordered to deliver the sum of P4,684.98 representing the insurance and war damage monies collected by
Virgilio Valera; and that the Sheriff be ordered to "to seize such properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs" "to be sold
according to law for the payment of double the value of the fruits and the amount of monies alienated and embezzled".
As already stated, in an order dated April 15, 1966, respondent Judge Macario M. Ofilada denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera and granted the motion of Mrs. Bringas for execution and for the
delivery of certain funds and properties. (Note that the execution was granted although the order was not yet final). That
order, which is being assailed in this case, is quoted as follows (pp. 7-9 of the Petition):
Pending resolution before the court are the following motions:

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1. Unsigned 'Motion for leave of Court to Intervene and Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 10,
1964', filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio Valera;
2. 'Motion' without any notice of hearing filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio Valera;
3. 'Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 10, 1965,' filed by counsel for petitioner Celso Valera; and
4. 'Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing Delivery of the Fruits of the Properties or Value thereof and
Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix', filed by counsel for the administratrix.
Also pending is the examination of persons regarding the properties of the estate as ordered by the court also on
July 10, 1964.
On January 27, 1966, the court directed the movants seeking a reconsideration of the order directing the payment
of rentals to the estate to submit their respective memoranda within 15 days from receipt of the order and the
administratrix 5 days from receipt of adverse parties memoranda to submit her reply if she so desires. Despite the
fact that the parties had received copies of the order of January 27, 1966, none complied. Considering that this
case is already more than 20 years old, the Court can not, in the interest of justice, further hold or suspend the
resolutions on these incidents. They must as they should now, be resolved.
The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio Valera and his subsequent 'Motion'.
appearing to be unfounded, is hereby denied.
The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for Celso Valera is a mere repetition of the 'Opposition to Petition
for an Order to Pay Rental dated May 8, 1964. This motion is merely intended to delay the proceedings and it is
hereby denied for lack of merit.
Finding the 'Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing the Delivery of Fruits of the Properties or Value
thereof and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix' well-founded and meritorious, it is hereby directed:
1. That a writ of execution issue against the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera insofar as the collectible
rents pertaining t the estate are concerned;
2. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera deliver to the administratrix properties still in their possession
which are among those listed in the 'Incomplete Inventory and Appraisal of the Real and Personal Estate of the
Deceased, Francisco Valera y Versoza' filed by the administratrix on September 17, 1965;
3. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera and family account to the Administratrix the fruits of the
properties of the estate listed in the said amended inventory;
4. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera deliver to the administratrix the sum of P4,784.98 representing the insurance
and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera;
5. That Celso Valera account to the administratrix the war damage monies received by him for the destroyed
Valera family residence and deliver 1/3 of the same to the administratrix; and
6. That failure to render a satisfactory account as hereby required within 15 days from receipt of this order shall,
conformably with See. 8 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, make the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera liable
to double the value of the fruits and monies unaccounted for.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court immediately set 2 days for the examination of the persons required to
appear in the order dated July 10, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
Bangued, Abra, this 15th day of April, 1966.
(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA
Judge
On January 5. 1967 Judge Ofilada directed the execution of his aforequoted order of April 15, 1966. That directive reads
as follows: 8
ORDER
Pending resolution before this Court are: (1) Omnibus Motion filed by the Administratrix dated September 15,
1966; and, (2) Omnibus Motion filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966.

8
The parties, by the order of this Court dated December 12, 1966 after the hearing on said date at which counsel
discussed their respective motions, were given three days time within which to submit their written memoranda.
No such memoranda have been filed by any of the parties, and the Court took time and efforts in considering the
said motions, oppositions, affidavit and counter-affidavits.
The Omnibus Motion of the heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966 seeks to stay the writ of execution
issued by this Court pursuant to the order dated April 15, 1966 and relies upon an alleged compromise agreement
entered into between said heirs and the administratrix on May 21, 1966.
The Court is aware of attempts to a compromise agreement between the aforementioned parties. There is nothing
however in the record of any amicable settlement such as that required by the Court in its order dated June 26,
1965, which required the parties 'to inform the court as soon as possible what arrangement or settlement have
been taken and arrived at by them.' The Court has given the parties long time to agree and settle their
differences, even taking time on Sundays to meet with them for this purpose and, until the present time, no such
agreement by all the parties has been presented for the approval of the Court. Certainly the alleged compromise
agreement is not such agreement especially when the administratrix takes vigorous exception citing facts of
record and valid points of law which have not been sufficiently answered and explained. To allow the alleged oral
compromise agreement in violation of fundamental principles of law such as the time limit within which to file a
petition for relief and unsupported by the facts on record as cited by counsel for and administratrix would be to
trifle with the administration of justice especially in this case which is the oldest in this court and which has been
pending for more than twenty years now. For these basic reasons, the Omnibus Motion of the heirs of Virgilio
Valera dated October 13, 1966 must be, as it is hereby, DENIED.
And considering the motion of the administratrix dated September 15, 1966 to be meritorious, the same, as
prayed for, is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby directed that:
(1) The orders of November 14 and 25, 1966 staying the execution of the order of April 15, 1966 are hereby lifted
and let another writ of execution immediately issue to effect the order of April 15, 1966.
(2) A writ of execution issue against said heirs of Virgilio Valera for the satisfaction of the amounts due the estate;
(3) A writ of execution issue against the properties of Celso Valera for the satisfaction of the amount due to
estate; and,
(4) The heirs of Virgilio Valera deliver to the administratrix the possession of the properties listed in paragraph 6
and 7 of her Omnibus Motion dated September 15, 1966 and the fruits or value thereof from April, 1945 until time
of delivery, and, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 87, of the New Rules of Court, to pay double the value of said fruits
upon failure to account and deliver same within thirty days from receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Bangued, Abra, January 4, 1967.
(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA Judge
The heirs of Virgilio Valera filed a motion dated February 6, 1967 for the reconsideration of Judge Ofilada's order of
January 4, 1967. 9 The motion was denied in the order dated February 13, 1967. 10 judge Ofilada in his order dated
February 27, 1967 ordered another execution. 11
The Deputy Provincial Sheriff levied upon the properties of the deceased Virgilio Valera and caused to be published a
notice of auction sale also dated February 27, 1967 which reads in part as follows: 12
1. Of the goods and chattels of Celso Valera and the heirs of Virgilio Valera the sum of Forty Thousand Three
Hundred Twenty (P40,320.00) Pesos for rent due the estate together with interest thereon from April, 1945
(P25,200.00) for the principal at P1,200.00 per annum from April, 1945 to March, 1966, and P15,120.00 for
interest due at six (6) per centum per annum), plus P100.00 a month from April, 1966 with interest at six (6) per
centum until date of payment and delivery of the interest, of the estate in the property to the administratrix;
2. Of the goods and chattels of the heirs of Virgilio Valera the sum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos
representing double the value of undelivered fruits of the properties of the estate for 20 years from April, 1945 to
October, 1965 or One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos per year, and the sum of Nine Thousand Five
Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Ninety Six Centavos (P9,569.96), respresenting double the value of the
undelivered insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera.
The petitioners filed a motion dated March 15, 1967 to quash the writ of execution and for the suspension of the auction
sale. 13 Judge Ofilada denied it in his order of April 1967. 14 The petitioners filed a motion dated March 31, 1967 to set

9
aside the lower court's orders of April 15, 1966 and February 27, 1967 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of
due process. 15
On April 3, 1967, the dated when Judge Ofilada denied petitioners' motion to quash the writ of execution, respondent
Deputy Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale and sold to the estate of Francisco Valera eighteen (18) parcels of land
supposedly belonging to the deceased Virgilio Valera. The price was P92,337.00. 16
The petitioners filed a motion dated April 11, 1967 for the reconsideration of the order of April 3, 1967.
denied it in his order of April 21, 1967. 18

17

Judge Ofilada

On May 8, 1967 the petitioners, the heirs of Virgilio Valera (except two children who were abroad) filed the instant petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Ofilada, Mrs. Bringas, the Provincial Sheriff and the Deputy
Provincial Sheriff. Celso Valera was joined as a nominal party. The respondents were required to answer the petition. The
Court directed that a writ of preliminary injunction should issue upon petitioners' posting a bond of P5,000.00.
The petitioners assail the brief, three-sentence order of July 10, 1964 on the following grounds: (a) that it decided the
issue of ownership as to the one-third pro-indiviso share of Francisco Valera in the Valera residence, an issue, which
according to them, is beyond the court's probate jurisdiction; (b) that it was issued without the benefit of a trial on the
merits and without hearing all the parties involved; (c) that it does not contain findings of fact and law; (d) that it is a
judgment for a money claim which should have been filed in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased debtor, Virgilio Valera, and (e) that the order has no basis in substantive law.
The petitioners attack Judge Ofilada's order of April 15, 1966 on the following grounds: (a) that, as a probate judge, he
had no jurisdiction to require the heirs of Virgilio Valera to account for the fruits of the six parcels of land administered by
him and that a separate action should be filed or the proper claim should be made against his estate; (b) that he had no
jurisdiction to order the heirs of Virgilio Valera to deliver to Mrs. Bringas the sum of P4,784.98 as "insurance and war
damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera"; (c) that Section 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court contemplates that "double
the value of the fruits and monies" should be recovered in an "action" and not in an intestate proceeding, and (d) that the
order was issued without any trial on the merits and it does not contain findings of fact and law.
The petitioners further contend that the orders of July 10, 1964 and April 15, 1966 are not enforceable by execution
because they are incomplete and not precise as to the amounts supposedly due from the judgment debtors.
As to the execution sale, the petitioners contend: (a) that the orders sought to be executed are void; (b) that the probate
court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution and that the instant case is not among the exceptional cases
wherein the probate court can authorize an execution, and (c) that execution for a money claim cannot be had against a
decedent's estate.
After a careful study of the arguments of the parties in their memoranda, reply, rejoinder and surrejoinder, We find that, for
the resolution of the case, it is not necessary to pass upon all those issues. The crucial issue in the last analysis is
whether the lower court, sitting as a probate court in the intestate proceeding for the estate of Francisco Valera, could
hold the heirs of Virgilio Valera answerable for certain supposed monetary liabilities of the latter to the estate and enforce
said liabilities against the properties of the deceased Virgilio Valera.
We hold that the trial court, as a probate court, erred in adjudging in the said intestate proceeding the monetary liabilities
of the late Virgilio Valera to the estate of Francisco Valera and in issuing a writ of execution against his properties to
enforce the supposed liabilities.
The controlling principle, which should govern this case, was announced by Justice Torres in 1907 in Pavia vs. De la
Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, a case which is on all fours with the instant case. This Court ruled in that case:
Administrators or executors; Code of Civil Procedure; Heirs. The heir legally succeeds the deceased from
whom he derives his right and title but only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same,
and the adjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge
by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed
by a competent court. (Syllabus based on page 77).
In the Pavia case, an action for damages was brought by Rafaela Pavia against Bibiana de la Rosa and Salud de la Rosa,
as the only heirs of the deceased Jose de la Rosa. Rafaela Pavia claimed that she empowered Jose de la Rosa to
administer the estate of Pablo Linart and that, as administrator, De la Rosa caused damages to the estate through his
negligence. The De la Rosa sisters contended that they could not be held liable for the negligent acts of their brother,
Jose de la Rosa.
This Court held that the action was not maintainable against the De la Rosa sisters and that it should be prosecuted
against the executor or administrator of the estate of Jose de la Rosa. Hence, the action was dismissed, reserving to
Rafaela Pavia "the right to institute proper action against the executor or administrator of the properties of the estate of the
deceased Jose de la Rosa".

10
In the instant case, Mrs. Bringas sought to hold the heirs of the deceased Virgilio Valera liable for his obligations to pay
rentals and to account for the fruits of the properties forming part of the estate of Francisco Valera and the war damage
and insurance monies collected by Virgilio Valera. The heirs of Virgilio Valera were dragged into the intestate proceeding
for the purpose of holding them liable for the amounts supposedly due from the deceased. As already noted, Mrs. Bringas
prayed for "an order directing the Sheriff to seize such properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs ... as may be sufficient, to
be sold according to law for the payment of double the value of the fruits and the amount of monies alienated and
embezzled" (Annex "E" of Petition). Judge Ofilada specifically directed that the execution be issued "against the heirs of
Virgilio Valera". The Deputy Sheriff literally followed that directive by levying upon "the goods and chattels of the heirs of
Virgilio Valera".
The procedure followed by the Sheriff was erroneous. The decedent's heirs are not liable personally for the debts of his
debts. Thus, it was held:
It happens, however, that the plaintiffs are not under obligation to pay the debts of their late father, such as items
(a), (f) and (h) of the counterclaim. It does not appear that they personally bound themselves to pay them, and the
mere fact that they are the deceased's heirs does not make them answerable for such credits against their
predecessor in interest, inasmuch as article 1003 of the Civil Code is no longer in force, having been abrogated
by certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, cited in Calma vs. Calma,
56 Phil. 102, 105).
The error becomes more glaring in the light of Section 7, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which allows execution in case of
the death of a party only "where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order". The implication is that if a
person, before his death, or the legal representative of his estate was never a party to a case, no execution can be issued
against his properties after his death. In this case, the Sheriff seems to have proceeded on the assumption that the
properties levied upon belonged to the deceased Virgilio Valera and that the said properties were in the possession of his
heirs.
Furthermore, there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It
is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the
estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The
probate court, as such, does not render any judgment enforceable by execution.
The circumstance that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution (a) to satisfy the
contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to
enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (e) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for
examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion
alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.
With particular reference to the sum of P4,784.96, which represents the insurance and war damage monies allegedly
embezzled by Virgilio Valera, the lower court, sitting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to enforce, by execution, the
payment of double the value of that amount. The alleged embezzler was dead. Execution was not warranted under
Sections 7 and 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, which both refer, to a living person, meaning a person entrusted with a
part of the decedent's estate "by an executor or administrator", and to a person who committed "embezzlement before
letters (were) issued". Section 8 explicitly provides that the embezzler's liability shall be determined in "an action", and not
in the intestate proceeding. 19
The record reveals that there is a dispute between Mrs. Bringas and the heirs of Virgilio Valera as to whether one-third of
the Valera residence and the six parcels of land listed in the "Amended Incomplete Inventory, etc." dated August 31,
1965 20 belong to the estate of Francisco Valera. The tax declarations for those properties are in the name of the
deceased Virgilio Valera.
Their inclusion in the inventory is not conclusive as to the ownership. "Questions on title to real property cannot be
determined in testate or intestate proceedings. It has, however, been held that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to he instituted between the
parties." 21 As stressed by Mr. Justice Zaldivar in Mangaliman vs. Gonzales, L-21033, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462,
the probate court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction.
We have studied carefully respondents' memorandum and rejoinder. We have not found therein any citation of a rule or
precedent which would justify the arbitrary and irregular procedure followed by the lower court in determining the liability
of a dead person without hearing the legal representative of his estate and in holding his heirs answerable for his
supposed liabilities and then enforcing those liabilities against his estate. Section 6(b), Rule 78 and Section 2, Rule 79 of
the Rules of Court assume that a creditor, as an interested person, may cause a debtor's estate to be placed under
administration.
The cases of Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 and Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 62 O.G. 2621 cited by the
respondents in page 19 of their rejoinder, refer to a living party, not to a decedent.

11
Without going into a more extensive and detailed discussion of the other irregularities committed by the lower court, We
believe that the jurisdictional errors already pointed out suffice to show that it acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion. Hence, the issuance of the writ of certiorari is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the writ of execution and the Sheriff's execution sale on April 3, 1967 and all proceedings relative thereto
as well as the orders of July 10, 1964, April 15, 1966, January 4, April 3 and May 2, 1967 of the lower court, are declared
void and are set aside, insofar as the heirs of Virgilio Valera or his estate are concerned, without prejudice to the right of
Adoracion Valera Bringas to institute the proper action against the administrator of the estate of the estate of the late
Virgilio Valera and to file the appropriate claims in the proceeding for the settlement of his estate. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

12
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. L-21938
against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental
and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively
praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July
1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying petitioner's omnibus motion to
intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings
pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings
had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from
proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare
itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as
prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be
rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first
disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said
court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution
deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the
merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that the
respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition forcertiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the
late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter,
he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the
same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date
for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record
discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special
administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the abovementioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will
and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this
Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the
intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in
the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following
grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said
intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the
alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.

13
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same
pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special
Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27, 1963,
petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said
orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the Negros
Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been
filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by this
Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the
Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court,
asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said
special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente
Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his
compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well
as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan
Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the
appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to
qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila
Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate
appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court
on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment
of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by
Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila
Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court
and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the
Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction
over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons
whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter
of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in
the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is
that of a non-resident alien like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite the Courts of First Instance in provinces where
the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts
province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise petitioner
argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special
Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that
consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.

14
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending
before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the
probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for the
probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 or
was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted said
will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose
filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the
orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be
involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place,
when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain,
of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the
alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition
for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the
settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in
his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for
probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona
filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the
latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of
the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition
to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court
since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All
these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396
an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein
up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit
said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail
the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court
is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a
case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he
was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case
No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings.
If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to
do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First
Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the
decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally
determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening
if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural
child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child (II
Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs.
Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in
view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition is
successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking

15
from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said heretofore beyond
petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful
purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said
orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a
result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition formandamus docketed as
G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs
against petitioner.

16
G.R. No. L-18148

February 28, 1963

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted
heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES,
ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was
admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando,
Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo.
Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of
the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos,
Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all
surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms
of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these
relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of
their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that
they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of
partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda
discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1)
that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to
the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2)
that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the
donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be
litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was
determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in
Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not
become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the
donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or
mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code,
which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it
does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code,
there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed
the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased
Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the
deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said
properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a
motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the
probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving
title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the
nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for new trial
was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review
by certiorari.

17
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and
special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed
upon on testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. 2 However, we have also held that when the parties interested are
all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when
so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v.
Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial
administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third
persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the
properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased
husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants
that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the
subject is null and void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because,
it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants'
contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case
of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to
property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court
lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure,
which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary
action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject
matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties
alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an
administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. 3 Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in
the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he
has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to
the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before
the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such
estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate
of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the
widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the
heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the
conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is
being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the
exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under
the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the
purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted
facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the
questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased
widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must
be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard
to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their
theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In
other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were
donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties
which is well within the competence of the probate court and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not
thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver
where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion. 5 They can not be permitted to
complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them. 6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties
involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the
inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties.
But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts
and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge

18
works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she
executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as
it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs
against appellants. So ordered.

19
G.R. No. L-14921

December 31, 1960

DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an action for liquidation and partition of the estate left by the spouses Mariano Bautista and Gertrudes Garcia, filed
on October 20, 1956 by plaintiffs Dolores B. Guico, et al., against defendants Pablo G. Bautista, et al., legitimate
grandchildren and children, respectively, of said deceased spouses.
The complaint alleged inter alia that Mariano G. Bautista died intestate on December 5, 1947 and that his properties had
already been extrajudicially partitioned among his heirs; that Gertrudes Garcia likewise died intestate on August 31, 1956
leaving as her legitimate heirs plaintiffs and defendants; that said Gertrudes Garcia, during her lifetime, made several
deeds of donation of some of her properties in favor of all the defendants, but did not provide that the properties donated
would not be subject to collation, so that the donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of
collation the value of the properties received by them in order that the net hereditary estate may be divided equally among
the heirs; and that the deceased Gertrudes Garcia left outstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
and the G.A. Machineries, Inc.
On a motion to dismiss filed by defendants alleging, among other things, that the action was premature because it is
admitted in the complaint that the deceased left certain debts, the lower court dismissed the complaint on that ground
without prejudice and without costs. From the order of dismissal, plaintiffs appealed to this Court, urging that their action
for partition and liquidation may be maintained, notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of the estate, subject to
the taking of adequate measures either for the payment or security of its creditors.
We are inclined to hold at the lower court that until all the debts of the estate in question are paid, appellants' action for
partition and liquidation is premature.
There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or
through an ordinary action for petition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator
for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians" (sec. 1, Rule 74). The reason is that were
the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer
the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled (Bondad vs.
Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Macalinao vs. Valdez, et al., 95 Phil., 318; 50 Off. Gaz., 3041; Intestate
Estate of Rufina Mercado vs. Magtibay, et al., 96 Phil., 383).
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be
first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an
amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted to
administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary partition, the regular estate proceeding offer the
advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose themselves and submit their respective claims within a
comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred;
while in ordinary judicial partitions the creditors 1claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period extinctive
prescription. An heir, therefore, may have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed from
invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the very estate proceeding sought to be avoided, and
he may properly object to an action for partition this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming
personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as those undisclosed, regular estate proceedings
can not be avoided.
It is no argument that under regular administration, the estate will incur greater expenses. As a matter of fact, plaintiffsappellants include in their complaint a prayer for the appointment of an administrator during the pendency of this case, in
view of the existence of debts of the estate and the lack of agreement among the heirs as to how debts would be
paid.lawphil.net
Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court from directing and ordering that the pending
obligations of the estate be paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the respective shares to be received by the
heirs. In other words, appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the purpose of paying off its debts be
accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court performing the duties of the administrator, or an administrator
appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed for in their complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action for partition can not
be converted into a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, without compliance with the procedure
outlined by Rules 79-90 of the rules of Court, especially the provisions on publication and notice to creditors.
As we see it, appellants' major objective in filing this action for partition is to have an early determination of the question
whether or not the donation inter vivos received by the defendants from the deceased are subject to collation. But there is
no reason why this question can not be determined just as expeditiously in special proceeding, because even before the
known debts of the estate are settled and paid and pending the expiration for the filing of other claims, the issue can, upon
motion of the heirs, be set for hearing, tried, and definitely settled.

20
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

21
G.R. No. L-273

March 29, 1947

CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.
TUASON, J.:
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez
who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land
of which he died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is particularly described in
the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This
portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition
alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not now important, the plaintiff
attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her original complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she offered
the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according to that complaint, the amount Andal had paid for Maria
Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the cause was called for trial on March 8,
she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase her sister's share from Andal for P860 and reimburse
Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th stating that he had made other expenses; that on
29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case was again postponed because the plaintiff's sisters
had intervened; and that meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for P970.
It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor of the intervenors, an amount
which included Andal's expenses as well as the normal sale price. The document of repurchase gave as reason for the
transaction the fact that it had been agreed that in the event trouble should arise the sellers should return to the buyer
what they had received and pay the latter his expenses.
On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had sold him their
respective portions of the inherited land for P860 and that he had no objection to disposing of those portions in favor of
the plaintiff for P860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of the deed of sale amounting to P50, but that he
was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the plaintiff offered him besides his expenses.
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was filed. The intervenors alleged that there had
been a partition among them and their brother and sisters "with the share of each delineated and marked, and after
partition and delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his portion in the partition."
They charged the plaintiff with bad faith in that "it was upon her request for chance that the sale to the defendant, about to
take place last November, was delayed till January of this year when she finally informed the intervenors that they could
sell to the defendant, or she could pay only P150 and could not raise the amount of P860 offered by the defendant."
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf. Substantially she reiterated the
allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession of the
land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land from
him long after he had bought it, that is, when she was about to file her action. He stated that after he came from
Candelaria, Tayabas, with the document of sale he showed it to the plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of January. He was able
to do this because he lived near Cresencia and passed by her house on his way home from Candelaria. He said that
Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown the document merely exclaimed, "Oh, so you already have a document." When
asked whether the land "described in the complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the object of partition among the coowners Pedro, Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez," counsel for the plaintiff objected on the
ground that the best evidence was the document of partition, and the objection was sustained. The same objection and
the same ruling were made on the same ground when the witness was queried how it was that the land he had bought
from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had been specified in the deed of sale, Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did not call any more witnesses but only
announced that he had witnesses ready to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters had been made,
mentioning the names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff again objected asserting that "under the Rules of
Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person against
whom the proof is offered. "Upon this objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute
of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to
decide the case it had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.
Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land by Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and
Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith. It, however, did not seem to have found as a fact the allegation that the
resale was simulated. The court then made this judgment:

22
(a) declarando y sin valor alguno el documento de reventaotorgado por el demandado Zacarias Andal en 26 de
marzo de 1944, a favor de Maria y Aquilina Hernandez sobre el terrenocuestionado que se presento como
Exhibito 2 de dichodemandado, y consiguientemente se anulan tambien todas lastransacciones posteriores que
las mencionadas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez hayan hecho sobre el terreno cuestionado despuesdel 26 de marzo
de 1944, asi como tambien cualquiera anotacionen la Oficiana del Registrador de Titulos de Batangas que
hayaanotado dicha reventa por el demandado Zacarias Andal a favorde las terceristas Maria y Aquilina
Hernandez en el citado dia 26 de marzo de 1944; y
(b) se ordena al aqui demandado Zacarias Andal, que otorgue unaescritura de reventa a favor de la aqui
demandante Cresencia Hernandez, de las participaciones de las terceristas en el terrenodescrito en la demanda
suplementaria previo pago de P860 mas lacantidad de P50 como gastos de documentacion. Se absuelve al
demandado de los daos y perjuicios que reclama la demandante. Se absuelve tambien a la demandante de la
contra-demanda de lasterceristas.
Sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto a las costas.
The defendant and the intervenors are appealing from the foregoing decision and in their joint brief made one assignment
of error:
The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a contract of partition among the heirs on the
ground that it was not admissible.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the questions raised we are tempted to point up some seeming incongruities in the
above-quoted judgment. Although Zacarias Andal is no longer interested in the case, as far as the land is concerned, and
even though the intervenors have become again the absolute owners and are now in full possession of the property, while
Andal has already gotten his money back, the judgment would have Andal execute a deed of resale in favor of the plaintiff
and received from her the price of repurchase. The judgment is silent as to the intervenors with reference to the execution
of the deed of sale or the receipt of the sale price. And the lower court made no finding and expressed no opinion as to
whether the offer of P150 instead of P860, not to mention Andal's expenses, by the plaintiff as price of repurchase was
sufficient compliance with article 1067 of the Civil Code on which the court rested the plaintiff's cause of action.
However, in this decision we are concerned mainly with the application of section 21 of Rule 123 and section 1 of Rule 74
both of the Rules of Court. Article 1248 of the Civil Code has no bearing on the case.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be in writing
under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no. The reason for the
rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a
separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each tenant in common. (27 C.J., 206.) The
differences in the conclusions reached are "due perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in the several states. (40
Amer. Jur., 15.) However the case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil
Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of
cases to be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C.J., 206.) In this jurisdiction
performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil., 485; Almirol and
Cario vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein enumerated void and of
no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the action for specific performance. (Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat, supra.)
In the United States, even in those states where the affirmative view of the question has been followed, "the weight of
authority upholds the rule that an oral partition is effective when several possession is taken under it by the respective
parties to the agreement." (27 C.J., 206.)
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it
has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in
proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty
and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce
such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases
involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise
partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in
accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of
the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of the land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will
recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the
partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise
recognizing the existence of the partition.

23
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part
performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held
that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity
would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.)
It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition that there are sharp divergences of
opinion among the members of this Court. This section reads:
If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves
as they see fit by means of a public instrument file in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed
that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the
death of the decedent.
It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts of the parties
short of the execution of a public document and its registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a
condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the
statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The decisions of
this Court which we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment
of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that
after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the
document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs .Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition? In other words, is writing the act that confers
legal validity upon the agreement? There are no indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative
answer to these questions. It must be noted that where the law intends a writing or other formality to be the essential
requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as
originally enacted in England and as enacted in some of the states, uses the words "utterly void" with statute transactions
required to be in writing are absolutely void and not merely voidable if not made in the manner indicated. Again article 633
of the Civil Code says that donation may be valid only when made in a public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage Law
makes known its intention to have the execution of a public instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to
the validity of the contract by using this phrase: "in order that voluntary mortgages may be legally created in a valid
manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same purpose similar expression with reference to the
execution of a public document: "in order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the formalities of
last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be valid to pass upon
any estate real or personal nor change or affect the same, unless it be written etc." Other examples might be mentioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public instruments is to be
constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court had
no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties dependent on the
execution of a public instrument and its registration. On the other hand, the opposite theory is not without reasonable
support. We can think of possible factors against the proposition that a public document and its registration were
contemplated as necessary ingredients to give life to a contract of partition so that without them no oral partition can bind
the parties.
1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part were promulgated by the Judicial
Department under authority to deal with matters of procedure exclusively. For this court to prescribe what is to be a
binding agreement between co-heirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of third
parties would be to transcends its rule-making power. We bring out this limitation upon the authority of this court to make
rules, as an aid to interpretation, as a method of arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be
remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical implications. It is
to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's functions and did not intend to
trespass on purely substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the extent the execution and registration of a
notarized instrument are made essential elements to validity to protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and
necessary; legitimate because decedent's estate are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts to administer and
distribute. The interests of third parties eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and practice and
invades the realm of substantive law.
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is enlightening and instructive. The former after
stating that heirs may apportion and divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit by agreement duly executed
in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not otherwise." These words, in our opinion, were expressive of an intention
to make the written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol partition. But what is far more to the point is that by
logical process of deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports the casting away
from the prescribed public document of its jural character which the document enjoyed in the former code. At the same
time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision serves to emphasize the necessity of a positive and clear
language if a given contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's binding effect on the parties. It is of
course unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the prescribed public instrument in section 596 of Act

24
No. 190 is no argument for contending that such document must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act
No. 190 was a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the legislative body itself which,
unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled, except by the fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects of
legislation.
2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments in acts and contracts with greater liberality with a view to better
adaptation to human frailties and idiosyncracies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of experience and
foresight, and their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. The advantages of
an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far short of compensating for the resulting damage, injustice,
inconveniences and confusion. So even though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made provisions for
public instrument for all transactions and contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction of real rights in
immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be effective between the parties. A leading case
on this subject is Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Williard writing the decision. It was said in that
case that when the essential requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the contract is binding upon the parties,
and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action under article
1279 to compel the execution of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not impose an obligation, but confers
a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact that the plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his action."
It further says that article 1279, far from making the enforceability of the contract dependent upon any special intrinsic
form, recognizes its enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting parties an adequate remedy whereby to
compel the execution of public writing or any other special form whenever such form is necessary in order that contract
may produce the effect which is desired according to whatever its object. This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a
series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any other legal topic. And it has been extended even to verbal contracts
involving land registered under the Torrens Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive
no sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart from it. No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of
hereditary estate among co-heirs greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which operates to create,
transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If as between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or
extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the requirement that it be put in
writing, the new rule could not be more intransigent when the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no change of
ownership but simply designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion, for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last
sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this
means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities
does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of
creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
It is said that the findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed decision are not assigned as errors and that for this
reason the appeal should be dismissed. We do not think that the premise of this objection is exactly correct. The evidence
on parol partition tendered by the defendant and intervenors was ruled out and they specifically complain of this exclusion
as error. In this manner the assignment of error squarely meets and attacks the opinion and judgment of the trial court. A
superficial analysis of the case will show that on the validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the entire litigation,
and on that validity depends in turn the competence of the excluded evidence. These two interrelated points are the core
of the whole case. All other points are incidental to and revolve around them. If a completed oral partition may be
enforced, as the defendant and the intervenors contend and as we opine, their evidence should be allowed, and if allowed
and it establishes their allegation, the plaintiff's cause of action vanishes.
If the appellant's assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge to the decision of the court below, we still
believe that the objection takes a narrow view of practice and procedure contrary to the liberal spirit which pervades the
Rules of Court. The first injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1, section 2) is that they "shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." In line with the modern trends of procedure, we are told that, "while an assignment of error which is required
by law or rule of court has been held essential to appellate review, and only those assigned will be considered, there are a
number of cases which appear to accord to the appellate court a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper
assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned. And an unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be
considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error." (4 C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J., 1341, footnote
77.) At the least, the assignment of error, viewed in this light, authorizes us to examine and pass upon the decision of the
court below.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceeding and a new decision not
incompatible with this decision, with costs of this appeal against the appellee.
FERIA, J.:
I reserve the right to express my view and write a dissenting opinion later.

25
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., with whom concurs PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Is oral evidence admissible to prove partition of land? The answer of the appellants is in the affirmative. Thus their only
assignment of error is as follows: "The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a contract of
partition of the land among the heirs on the ground that it was not admissible." Since no other question, either of fact or of
law, is raised by the appellants, I deem it unnecessary, under the circumstances of this case, to pass upon said
assignment.
A small parcel of land containing some 5,568 square meters was inherited by four sisters and a brother. It was surveyed
and is still assessed as a single lot, not in the name of the co-owners, but in that of an uncle. It appears that on January
23, 1944, two of the sisters sold a portion of the lot to defendant Andal who was neither a relative nor an adjoining owner.
The vendors stated:
Este terreno es parte del terreno referido en la declaracion Tax No. 53379 en nombre de nuestro tio Juan
Dimasacat y estaamillarado todo el terreno en P290. El referido terreno yase vio en el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Batangas en 29 de Septiembre de 1941, at nagcaro-on ng decreto noong ika-6 ng Noviembre, 1941,
na doon ay ipinasiya ang pagbibigay ng Titulo sa aming magcacapatid. (Exhibit A.)
Upon learning of the sale one week thereafter, a third sister expressed her desire to repurchase said portion of land and,
upon refusal of the buyer, she filed a complaint for the purpose of being subrogated to the rights acquired by Andal. The
latter, in his answer, is agreeable to the prayer provided that he be reimbursed in the total sum of P910 which he had
actually paid. In the meantime, the other two sisters (vendors) intervened in the case, alleging that, before the sale was
made to Andal, the plaintiff had been given the option to acquire the lot in question. By way of counterclaim, it was alleged
that they had repurchased the lot from Andal at a higher price.
After hearing, the lower court held that inasmuch as the plaintiff is willing to buy, and Andal to sell, the lot at the price fixed
by the latter, there is no reason why the former's complaint should not prosper, and Andal was accordingly ordered to
convey the property to the plaintiff upon payment by the latter of the total sum of P910. As regards the contention of the
intervenors, the court held that their alleged repurchase was fraudulent and, therefore, null and void.
As these pronouncements, necessarily based on findings of fact, have not been assailed, they should be considered final.
Hence, it is absolutely futile to decide the question of law raised in appellant's assignment of error, the same having
become academic.
Even so, the point whether the sale to Andal took place after a partition is immaterial, in view of his willingness to resell to
the plaintiff, not to mention the fact that the latter's right to redeem, as an adjoining owner, maybe based on article 1523 of
the Civil Code which provides: "The owners of the adjacent lands shall also have the right of redemption in case of the
sale of a rural estate whose area does not exceed one hectare."
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

July 30, 1947

TUASON, J.:
Plaintiff and appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration. She maintains that she is entitled to judgment because the
defendant has no objection to reselling her the land and she is, on the other hand, ready to reimburse him the purchase
price. She argues that the buyer having led her to believe that he would make the resale in her favor is estopped from
going against his own acts.
Superficially, the decision is obscure as to the relation which Andal's signification in his answer, that he was willing to sell
the land to the plaintiff, bears to the dispositive part or judgment. But read in its entirety, analyzed closely, the decision
reveals in no uncertain manner that it is anchored on articles 1067 and 1522 of the Civil Code and that all other matters
discussed therein revolve around this basic conclusion. With particular reference to Andal's signification abovementioned,
the court does not appear to have made or intended to make it an affirmative, separate basis of the judgment. Roughly,
the judgment was evolved along this process of reasoning: the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under the abovecited provisions of the Civil Code was evident, in the court's opinion. But, the court said in the same breath, a complication
emerged. The confusion was brought about by the resale of the property by Andal to the original owners. The court
seemed puzzled. Then it saw a way out of the perplexity; the resale was illegal and mala fide and hence ineffective. It was
illegal, mala fide and ineffective because the defendant had stated in his answer that he had no objection in allowing the
plaintiff to buy the land, and because the resale to the intervenors had been consummated during the pendency of the
action. Andal's signification in his answer estopped him from alienating the land in favor of others.

26
It was estoppel that the court invoked Andal's expression of his willingness to sell the land, citing section 68 (a), Rule 123,
Rules of Court. The court looked upon this expression not as a cause of action standing on its own feet but merely as an
equitable aid to keep the defendant and intervenors from making a mockery of the plaintiff's right under the aforecited
articles of the Civil Code. The Court found that the transaction between the defendant and the intervenors had been
entered into "con el proposito de desorientar al Juzgado y frustrar en cierto modo la administracion de justicia." The
appellee both in her brief and motion for reconsideration treats Andal's willingness to sell in the same light.
To put it differently, the central principle of the case, as the court saw it, was that the evidence on the oral partition was
inadmissible and so the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under articles 1067 and 1522 of the Civil Code was in order.
Andal's expression of willingness to sell the land to the plaintiff came into play not as a generator of a new obligation in
favor of the plaintiff, separate and distinct from the right of co-heirs to repurchase shares in property inherited in common
and sold to strangers by other heirs, but simply as a factor to prevent the defendant's and intervenor's attempt to nullify
that right.
Estoppel, in the sense in which the court regarded Andal's manifestation that he was willing to sell the land to the plaintiff,
partakes of the nature of the rule of evidence. Certainly, it belongs to the adjective branch of the law, and the court
regarded it under this criterion. The court's reference in its decision to Andal's signification cannot have a meaning other
than that the court assigned thereto a subordinate role, subordinate to the asserted right of the plaintiff under the
provisions of the Civil Code referred to.
The sole assignment of error in appellant's brief thus inevitably comprehends that part of the appealed decision and
judgment which relates to the defendant's expression of willingness to sell land to the plaintiff. A review of the error
specifically assigned necessarily carries with it the consideration of all matters related to and dependent upon that error.
Specifically, if there was a lawful partition and the partition bars the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under the
articles relied upon, the proposition formulated in the assignment of error then Andal's previous willingness to sell
loses its raison d'etre as estoppel; it disappears with the right which it was intended to uphold and with which it was
inextricably bound up.
It should be made clear that we are only construing the decision of the lower court. We have explained the ratio
decidendi as it appeared to the court, not the theory of the parties in their pleadings. If the supplemental complaint was
intended to present Andal's offer to sell the land to the plaintiff as constituting a new and separate cause of action a
point which cannot be determined with a fair degree of certainty from a reading of that complaint the court did not see
or consider it in that light. And, it should be remembered, it is what the court decided or how the court decided a case that
we have to look as a test for judging whether the questions for review have been formulated in the right manner.
If Andal's statement in his answer was alleged by the plaintiff to serve as an independent cause of action, that is all the
more reason, for his own benefit, why the cases should be remanded for further proceeding. The new trial as ordered in
our decision leaves the door open for the admission of evidence on the allegations in the supplementary complaint as well
as on the alleged parol partition. As matters now stand, the plaintiff could ask for judgment on the supplementary
complaint only on the untenable hypothesis that no assignment of error has been made relative to this feature of the case.
Without the benefit of this technicality, the plaintiff has not made out a case on the supplementary complaint. The
evidence is very meager to the point of nullity; many of the allegations have been left untouched, and there are essential
points that badly need amplication or clarification. It would be extremely improper, for obvious reasons, to go into these
defects and deficiencies in detail in this resolution in anticipation of the new trial.
The motion is denied.

27
G.R. No. L-10474

February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land described in
the complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the
estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged
belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left for parcels
of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs
his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25,
1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no
children or respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces,
but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above
properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of
P10,000. This sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950, Benny
Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special
Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on
June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was recorded on
certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration
of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that
Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to
the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action;
that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for
value; and that the complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of
adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void; declaring
plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in question, and finally declaring that the usufructuary rights of
Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that
the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that the annulment of the deeds
Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the
same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are
null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon.
Therefore, it ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Teodoro
Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of the lands described in the complaint, but reserved to Honorato
Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties may correspond to
Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon
and Benny Sampilo.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the following errors in
their brief:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her
co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.

28
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years after the affidavit
of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the
administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of two years as Prescribed
in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of McMickingvs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two years after the settlement
and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an
heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may
compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such
lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. If the decedent left no debts and the heirs
and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means
of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case in which there are two
or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which there is only one heir. The section
was taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section
596 as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. Whenever all the heirs of a person who
died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts
have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion
and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more
heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the
old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the
"distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the
other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons
who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part
or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have
been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand
their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such
rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to
their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death
of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be
required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who
did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the
fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we
held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had upon the application
of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made for notice, by
publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As
will be seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex
parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the court undertakes to
distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parteproceeding. It
cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no
knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of
such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no
similarity at all between the circumstances on which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so
hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition
after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or
taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement
or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because

29
not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the
decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the Provision
(Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the
contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar
of action against third person's. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but
not against third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different
chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would
naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one based
on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left
no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a period of four
years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted.
Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the
discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations,
which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed from
the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for value was rejected as
unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the heirs of
Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the evidence of record. As regards
defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living
with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who are claiming the property are residents of
San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny Sampilo did not know the existence of said
heirs, and that he was not aware that they were nephews and nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the
deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to
Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him
prepare the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same
date she conveyed to Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she
acknowledged before said notary public, coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the
consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny
Sampilo knew that the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property, and that the
immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as regards
Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title
issued to Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might be true, for he purchased the property on June 17,
1950, and the notice of lis pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he
cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction
that a purchaser of registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and
investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and investigation
cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid title thereto. Leung
Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the petitioners. So
ordered.

30
G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978
Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA
PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY,
EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS,
ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN
BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children, claimants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased
spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in issue in these two
cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same
land.
Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of August 13, 1969.
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possession a
homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of Juan Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief
in L-27082).
The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by OCT No. P-8419 issued
on November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record
on Appeal in
L-27082).
According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares which was
surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112, also forms part of the estate of the
deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on Appeal).
The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all
surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla
and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his
widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the
children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. See
pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on September 5, 1963 for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112
and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or CA-G.R. No. 6721-R,
February 27, 1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in accordance with the lower court's decision
dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No. 2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief in L-27082), three
hectares which should be taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;
(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361 hectares taken from Lot No.
1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-B;
(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-C,
and presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on Appeal).
(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No. 1927 and the remainder
of Lot No. 1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D.

31
It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to Concepcion
Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan
and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They contended that the
proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which recognized the right of the heirs of
Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan
should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720
hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.
The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were
claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares
in all which were excluded from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary
action.
On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they asked that Lot No. 1920,
with an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be included in the project of partition.
On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the project of partition. After
noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve hectares, it issued an order
approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.
That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did not
bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.
That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower court's order of December 6,
1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision
in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and 3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that
decision in its resolution of July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.
The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the
twelve hectares already mentioned, which was appropriated by the special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court
for reception of the evidence.
In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the administrator
should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her estate. The court further directed the
administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover any amount due from the special administrator, and to
pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of
August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the special administrator.
The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed from those two
orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).
The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelvehectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the
lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of
partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the
intestate. proceeding.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a
procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf.
Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That
question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).
That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action
Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the

32
probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership (Pascual vs. Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs.
Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be
ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing
of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the
intestate proceeding.
As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur additional
expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in the intestate,
proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for
the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, such as the partition made by Juan C.
Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their long
possession of the said portion, their claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.
Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer the motion within fifteen days from
service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the violation of section
118 of the Public Land Law) to support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan C.
Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses incurred
by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.
After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court should receive
evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs. Catolico, supra a full-dress hearing should be held.
Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of deciding what portion of
the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated
by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp. 26- 27, Record on Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed
from that adjudication.
After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan spouses should
include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If
necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should
be passed upon.
Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for
reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two
orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L-29545) should not be enforced. They should be
set aside.
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares from the partition of
the estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of
Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set
aside.
A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no amicable settlement is
reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment
in this case.
The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already set forth. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

33
G.R. No. L-1723

May 30, 1949

LUZ MARQUEZ DE SANDOVAL, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, Branch III, respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the petitioner against the respondent Judge Hon. Vicente Santiago.
The herein petitioner instituted a special proceeding in the Court of First Instance of First Instance of Quezon Province for
then probate of the will and codicil executed by the deceased Daniel Marquez in which she was designated as executrix.
The will and codicil were allowed and the petitioner was appointed on August 16, 1946, executrix in accordance with the
will but before the petitioner qualified as executrix the three heirs instituted in the will all age made an extrajudicial partition
of all the properties of he deceased on October 5, 1946 and entered into the possession of their respective share without
the authority and approval of the court. On August 22, 1947, that is one year after the probate of the will and appointment
of the petitioner as executrix the respondent judge required the petitioner to quality as such and file a bind of P5,000. In
response thereto the petitioner informed the respondent judge that it was not necessary for her to qualify because the
heirs had already made an extrajudicial partition in accordance with the will as shown by the copy the copy of said
partition which she submitted to the court. In view of the answer of the petitioner the respondent judge ordered the
executrix to qualify as such within forty-eight hour and declared the extrajudicial agreement of partition entered into by the
heirs null and void, on the ground that the probate proceedings having been commenced judicially it must also be
terminated judicially. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and denied by the court hence, the filing of
the present petition for certiorari.
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the respondent, Judge or Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, wherein the
deceased was residing at the time of his death, has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle the testate estate of the
deceased Daniel Marquez and over the heirs and other person interested in the estate of the deceased from the moment
the application for the probate of the decedent's will was filed with the said court and the publication required by law were
made; and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest the Court of First Instance of its already acquired
jurisdiction by the mere fact of dividing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among themselves.
If the extrajudicial partition made by the heirs of the deceased wassubmitted to the court and approved by the respondent
judge after verifying that it does not prejudicially affect the rights of third parties, the testate proceedings pending in the
court would have been legally thereby terminated. An extrajudicial partition of the estate of a deceased by the heirs
becomes a judicial partition after its approval by the court which had previously acquired jurisdiction of the estate by the
filing of an application for the probate of the decedent's will; but as the testate proceeding is terminated in such case
without the necessary publication ofnotices to creditors and other persons interested in the estate required ina required in
a regular judicial administration, the effect of such judicial partition would be the same as if it had been effected
extrajudicially without the intervention of the court under the provisions of section1,of Rule 74, that is, subject to the claims
against the distributees by persons mentioned in sections 4 and 5, of the same rule. (McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng. 21
Phil., 211.)
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is denied with costs against the petitioner, because the respondent judge
did not exceed his jurisdiction in not giving the deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition of the estate of the deceased
the effect of terminating the testate proceedingover which the court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction since said partition
was not submitted to said court for approval. So ordered.

34
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null
and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the
Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C.
Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was
acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of
his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had
two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and
had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the
petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator
devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate
and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son,
Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled
to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny
that I was legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons and justifications
known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and
avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past;
that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as
her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin
Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that
the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with
the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to
cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be
an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of
the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void
pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid except the devise in
favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in
intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that
the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read:
"The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to
costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.

35
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a
resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after
declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in
the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish
conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has
the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of
Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the
proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity
of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or
concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner
herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix
Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al.(G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975).
Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in
issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity
thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the
validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the
testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21
SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. ...
(Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would
be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon
the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:

36
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with
the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17
SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan
L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will
of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to
execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the
question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the
petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al.,
77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate
action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity
of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the
donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the
same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the testator's death on July 16,
1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so
many years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article IV,
he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the
petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in
truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of
my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will.
There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years
until his death.

37
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice
of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends
that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship
between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of
the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the
deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife, as already
married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the
Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to present
evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp.
56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the meretricious relationship of
his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the inception of the
case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery or
concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully offer the following
analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she
nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe
argued that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy.
But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would seem that
the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was brought
concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both single. That would be in
1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the
testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30 years in between. During those 30 years,
could it be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her anymore
after November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy, especially
so when she was already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that she
new that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already two
children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she would
not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is
un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it possible that she
would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent
Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and
that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?

38
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently
improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of
human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was
already married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain human
credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the irrefutable
fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the
deceased during their younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are
living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing
the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate
Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

39
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA
RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita
Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty
days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was
not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would
produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their
motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and improvement
of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to law and settled
pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23,
1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot
stand in lieu of the original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the
law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo
B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the
will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that
the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that
the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does not involve
question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE
PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;

40
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS
DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the
court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one
Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It
is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,"
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated
August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla,
is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

41
G.R. No. L-23445

June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of
petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in
the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1wph1.t
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create
intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are
the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
therein.1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on
appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this
litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a
belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete
nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do
hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid,
age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

42
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of
1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa
comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole
como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna
de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno
cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el
heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand
a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's
remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to
abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away
with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And,
the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of
Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal
heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the
nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se
aade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero
en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o
total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los
forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que
comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los
herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814,
al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal
institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such
institution of universal heir without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation.
Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
"Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of
interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente
interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en
algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion

43
de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en
todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes
en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido
es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien
testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y
eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a
un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del
testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion
contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una
cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion,
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so
expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will
void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent.
There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and
separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now
854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to
legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de
heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From
this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate
the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye
la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the
distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will
itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether.
Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from
preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the
will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one
hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les
corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso.23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said
legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited,viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage
should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced.
This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case
of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest
accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be
absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said
article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would
be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
Code.

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The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from
legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only
provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt
with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only
because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves different.
Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn
merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So
ordered.