Doctrine: Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette is one of the essential

requisites for a court to acquire jurisdiction in land registration and cadastral cases, and additional territory
cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new publication. Before a cadastral survey can be
amended so as to include land in which no publication has been made, new publication is necessary, - a
step essential to the protection of persons interested in the property which is intended to be included.
Director of Land vs. Benitez, 16 SCRA 557
FACTS:
In a previous cadastral proceedings, respondents were declared owners of lot 2457 in Tacloban Leyte 14.5k
sq/m. After 26yrs, the respondents under the same cadastral court and under Republic Act 931 claims that
through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect a portion of said Lot No. 2157 containing an area of
1,805 sq. m. has not been included in the original survey. the court
a quo issued an order admitting the petition, ordered that copies of the original as well as of the amended
petition be furnished the Solicitor General, the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, the City Fiscal of Tacloban City,
and the Register of Deeds of the province, setting.
the case for hearing on October 18, 1958. The court then declared the petitioners the owners of the said
misplaced lot. The spouses then moved for a write of execution and possession, but the 62 people who
were already occupying the said additional lot opposed saying that they were granted the land by Dir of
Lands. Subsequently, the Dir of lands made a motion to set aside the same judgment on the ground,
among others, that said decision was a nullity for the reason that the court
a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to act on the petition of Emilio Benitez and his wife for the reopening of
the cadastral proceedings for lack of the requisite publication and notice as required by law. This was
denied, and hence this petition.
Issue: is the re-opening of the cadstral proceedings legal?
a) due to lack of publication
b) there were already legal existing claimants at that time.
Held: There is no question that respondents Emilio Benitez and his wife may file a petition for reopening of
the Cadastral pursuant to Republic Act No. 931 with a view of claiming such portion of land which they may
have failed to include in their original petition for survey and registration as authorized by the Cadastral
Act provided that the petition be filed within the period prescribed by said Republic Act No. 931.
HOWEVER a) An order of a court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it include
land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new publication is made as a preliminary to such
step. Publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration and
cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new
publication b) Republic Act No. 931 makes insofar as the right of a claimant to have an additional portion of
land registered in his name is concerned in the sense that it can only be entertained if it does not refer "to
such parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or authorized provisionally or
permanently disposed of by the Government." Here it appears that the additional portion of land claimed
by respondents is actually occupied by persons who claim to be entitled to it by virtue of lease applications
or permits granted to them by the Bureau of Lands
[G.R. No. 113549. July 5, 1996]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely, ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE, LUIS
RIBAYA, ANTONIA RIBAYACONDE, and JOHN DOE REBAYA, all represented by ANDREA RIBAYABUENVIAJE as Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Ribaya, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution[1] of 24 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 17351, which set aside its earlier decision[2] of 9 January 1991. The latter affirmed the decision[3] of
11 November 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 6198 which
declared null and void an original certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree and a decision in a land
registration case decided on 18 September 1925.

After the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner their Reply, we gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial court's findings of fact.
Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in
a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[4] We are thus compelled to review the factual
antecedents.
From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the
following were established:
On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits,[5] on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a parcel
of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, was surveyed for
the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a
Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to comprise an area of 25,542,603 square meters.
The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by the Acting Director of Lands
on 3 January 1922. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 decision,[6] these
exhibits do not at all show the surveyor's signature. Moreover, as per Land Classification Map No. 871 of
the Bureau of Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part of the public forest and released for
disposition only on 31 December 1930.[7]
In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot covered by Plan II13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 52,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application, and hearing thereof were published in the 17 March
1925 issue of the Official Gazette,[8] and in its decision of 18 September 1925,[9] the CFI granted the said
application.
Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of land
covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to Plan II
13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an aggregate area of only
10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square meters. Plan II-13961-Amd.
appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26 February 1926.[10] The application was
not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not published.
On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued,[11] while on 19 August 1926,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd. was
issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya.[12]
On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate copy
thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. PO-10848 (3947).[13]
In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war.[14]
In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land covered by
OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075, approved on 16 December
1968.[15] Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
were issued to the private respondents.[16]
In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land[17] and claiming ownership
thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848 (3947).[18]
Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17 August 1978, with the
CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of nullity of OCT No. 3947, OCT No.
RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles emanating from the original title, viz., TCT Nos. T-31333 to T31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6198.
The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the land
registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the amended plan,
neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874.[19] The petitioner further
alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the land covered therein was forest land, and
therefore, inalienable.

On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-in-intervention and prayed that the
land revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions respectively occupied by them confirmed.
In its decision of 11 November 1987[20] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without force and effect;
2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T-31336, T- 31337, T31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T-31343, T-31344, T-31345, T-31346, T-31347, T- 31348, T31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T-31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T-31358, emanating
from OCT No. 3947 and OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina
Revatoris, as likewise null and void and without force and effect;
3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT No.
RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Albay,
who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the same;
4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the Philippines, as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.
The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for registration, the land was
already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land; however, the then CFI, as a land
registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of publication or republication in
the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the decree of registration and OCT No.
3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947 and its derivative titles were void.[21] In so finding, it relied on
Fewkes vs. Vasquez,[22] where it was held that any amendment or alteration in the description of the land
after its publication and decree of registration was not permissible unless coupled with republication.
The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the spouses Ribaya and
their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse under a bona fide claim of ownership for
the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any tax declarations. It then concluded
that the said Spouses may have occupied portions of the land at a later time, but not in the concept of
bona fide owners, for mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the land did not constitute
"possession" as contemplated by law.[23]
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in its
decision[24] of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court. The appellate
court further pointed out another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants was invalid, thus:
[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in their names
said land was still part of the public forest. The land was released for public disposition only on December
31, 1930 as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhs K, K-5).
Consequently, OCT No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is void ab initio.
It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands, are incapable of
registration in the names of private persons and their inclusion in a title nullifies the title (Director of Lands
vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 and cases cited therein.)[25]
In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the amended survey plan was
unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court in Benin vs. Tuazon,[26] the Court of Appeals held that the
facts in Benin were different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before the property was
decreed for registration, while in the present case:
[T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925, while its survey was performed sometime
in November and December 1925. The amended survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof was approved

by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of the
land in the instant case was approved when the land was already decreed for registration. . . .[27]
There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496.[28]
The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this decision.
In its resolution[29] of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and
set aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the trial court of 11 November 1987, and
dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 6198 of Branch 7 of the RTC of
Legazpi City. In overturning its previous decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that OCT No. 3947 "is
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No.
496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is
the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38,
Act No. 496)."[30]
It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya,
and even extended said presumption to their compliance with all conditions required by law, in particular,
their "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus burdened the Republic "to prove otherwise."[31]
It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax receipts was not fatal, and that
although they actually lived in Oas, Albay, such did not negate the character of their possession for
"[p]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before he can be said that he is in possession."[32]
The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkes case and applied, instead, the decision in
Benin, where this Court held that republication could be dispensed with in an amendment in the
application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a portion covered
by the original application and the original survey plan as published. Accordingly, the land registration
court retained its jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in question still formed part of the
public forest at the time of the application for registration. It asserted, instead, that there was insufficient
basis to conclude that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on the basis of the date of approval
of the land classification map, because such approval may have been made later by authority of a prior
executive declaration.[33]
Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that (1) the indefeasibility of title does not
lie against the State in an action for reversion of land; (2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove possession
of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their possession was not open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership; (3) the amended survey plan
was not published, (4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land, hence,
inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful.[34]
In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and argue
that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land was no longer part of the public
forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further contend, invoking Benin, that the issue
of republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey plan was already had in
compliance with law. Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-applicants, was duly
proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the government and the compensation they received
from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land
during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners of the land. Finally, the original
survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner.[35]
As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of
OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title; and

2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the
amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the
General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of 18 September 1925.
As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to repeat:
[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No.
496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is
the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38,
Act No. 496).[36]
First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review
and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second place, there are other remedies available to
an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No.
496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all
his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title."[37] Likewise, an action for damages is
sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which
may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud.[38] Recourse may also be had against the
Assurance Fund.[39]
Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public
forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered
under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic vs. Animas,[40]
we ruled:
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state
in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such
cases for the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of reversion or reconveyance
to the state is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and
released only on 31 December 1930,[41] the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land,
which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the certificates of title
issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No.
26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II-13961) or the
amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of
publication of the second.
As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing
of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was
published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication
thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision
of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the required publications. The
requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court;
[42] it is a jurisdictional requisite.[43] Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem
cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the Land through publication and service of
notice.[44]
Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey plan. The fact
remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and
the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court amended its decision to
conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even attempted publication
thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued was based on the amended plan insofar as the
four lots were concerned.
A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land.[45] On the basis of the decree,
OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended its decision
to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued

by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the
General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims
were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration
court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents, however,
maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin
vs. Tuazon.[46] This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial,[47] Juan and
Chuongco vs. Ortiz,[48] Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua,[49] Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus,
[50] and Director of Lands vs. Benitez,[51] that only where the original survey plan is amended during the
registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in the original plan, should
publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added
after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but
on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required.
Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the original
survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration court
rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable; however, no such
re- opening appears to have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court
acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan because of insufficient publication in the
Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by OCT No.
3947, which are based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the same and covered by the original
survey plan. This conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the original areas covered by Plan 13961
to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four parcels of land embraced in the amended plan, Plan II-13961Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus:
In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title of the land described as follows:
Parcel of land (Plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings and
improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, P.I. x
x x (Italics Supplied).
Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by Telesforo
Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which survey was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on
January 3, 1922, (Exh. 6).
The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was published in the March 17, 1925
issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-1).
The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses Ribaya on September 18, 1925 but for
a smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,503 square meters are applied for. On November 23 and 30,
1925, said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by
the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II-13961-Amd. (Exh. H and series).
Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of 10,975,022 square meters
separately described as follows:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318,454 square meters, more or
less;
2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575,195 square meters more or
less;
3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844,205 square meters, more or
less;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237,368 square meters, more or
less.[52]

This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991.[53]
In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for obvious reasons, dispute such
finding and so they not only quoted it therein,[54] they also explicitly assert that:
The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was published in the Official
Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The land actually embraced in the decree of
registration contained only 10,975,022 square meters.[55] (Italics supplied)
In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares, two
ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2 ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022
square meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares, and twenty-two centares (1,097
has., 5 ares, and 22 centares).
However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land covered by Plan II-13961, as well
as, that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.). Thus:
[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the report of
the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May 14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true and correct, . . .
that Plan II 3961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares,
located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21, December 8-9, 1925 by Private
Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926
(Exhibits G, G-l and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-l and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961
Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong,
Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and
was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-l and H-2 for plaintiff and
Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No RO-10848 (3947)
covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318.454 square
meters more or less, Lot No. 2, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters more
or less, Lot No. 3, Plan II-13961- Amd.), containing an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less, and
Lot No. 4, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237.368 square meters more or less with a total of
10,975.022 square meters more or less; x x x that Plan II-13961 of property as surveyed for Luis Ribaya,
situated in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, province of Albay, containing an area of
25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 in accordance with
Section 45 of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, and the said plan was
approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-A). . . .[56] (Italics supplied)
Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of the four lots covered by the
amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the original plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The
change from a comma to a period is of vital significance. For, translated into hectares, the 25,542.603
square meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares, and five hundred and forty-two (542) centares;
and the aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots embraced in Plan II-13961-Amd. would be
one (1) hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975) centares.
Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the land area of the
original survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was 25,542,603 square meters (twenty-five million five
hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square meters) as found by the former, or
25,542.603 square meters (twenty-five thousand, five hundred forty-two point six hundred and three
square meters) as found by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the original plan sought to be
established through Exhibits 6 and 6-A. The Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its decision of 9
January 1991 because these exhibits did not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor. Thus:
Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) Plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6, 6-A), did
not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said original plan (Plan II-13961) does not bear the
signature of the surveyor thereof, thereby casting doubt on its genuineness and due execution. x x x[57]
(Italics supplied)
Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced therein was that found by the
Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square meters with a comma before the last three digits it would
have been physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26,

and 27 July 1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey instruments were not then available.
Furthermore, the trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in addition to the four lots covered by OCT
No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.), viz.:
[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares,
located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and
GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of
608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay,... (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and
Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors);[58] (Italics supplied)
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because
no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6 and 6-A are a machine copy of
the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offer or to prove
any of the exception provided therein and to established the conditions for their admissibility. Even if they
are admitted, they have no probative value.
Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in OCT No.
3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9 January 1991
affirming in toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11 November 1987 in Civil
Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 85515
June 6, 1991 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

vs. FLORENCIA

The Solicitor General for petitioner, J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29 August
1988 1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October 1988 3 which,
respectively, affirmed the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial
Region, of 17 June 1987 4 granting the petition of private respondent for the reconstitution of the original
and the owner's duplicate copies of a transfer certificate of title despite lack of service of notices to
adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, and denied petitioner's motion for the
reconsideration of the Decision. 5
The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of
the land are mandatory and jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution of certificates of title.
On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered
owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294
square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said
Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's duplicate copy. 6 She alleged therein that she is in
possession "of the title subject matter of" the petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she
asked for the reconstitution.
In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in
the Official Gazette, which was done. Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual
occupants of the land, were given.

Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondent's evidence was made by the OICBranch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987, the trial court handed down an Order 7 which made
the following findings of facts:
From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain parcel
of land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters,
embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered in the name of Epifania
Alcano (Exh. "B") as evidenced by a document of sale executed by the registered owner (Exh. "I"). The
original copy of said title which was usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was
destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the entire Capitol Building then housing said
office on August 12, 1977 (Exh. "C"). It appears further that there are no co-owner's, mortgagee's, lessee's
duplicate copy of said certificate of title which had been previously issued by the Register of Deeds of this
province; that the petitioner is in actual possession of the area of 16,647 square meters which was sold to
her and that she is benefiting from the produce of the improvements existing on the area belonging to her.
and disquisition:
Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no opposition to its approval,
same is hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of this province is hereby directed to reconstitute the
original and the owner's duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the name of the
registered owners (sic) thirty days after receipt of this Order by the Register of Deeds of this province and
the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission, on the basis of the existing owner's duplicate copy
thereof.
Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the Court of
Appeals and made the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT
THE REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF
THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION. 8

The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.

In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No.
26 is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA 394.
In its Decision of 29 August 1988 9 respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of petitioner
and held that:
1)
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners and
actual occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to have been "at least impliedly amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1529" because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which provides that in original
registration cases publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court. Section 110 of said Decree provides:
Sec. 110.
Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title. Original copies of certificates
of title lost or destroyed in offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such
titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26
insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree. (emphasis supplied)
2)
The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the original
and the owner's duplicate copies of the certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant case
where the duplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the custody of the Register of
Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been lost were later found intact in the
names of other persons; and, more importantly, the Petition was not published in the Official Gazette but in
the Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in the instant case.

3)
The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is imposed upon the court, not
the party filing the petition for reconstitution (herein private respondent); any lapse in regard thereto
should not prejudice or injure the latter.
4)
Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the loss of the original
copy of the transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason of the burning of the Capitol Building; she
should not, therefore, be put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
of 18 October 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging therein that:
a.
The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it did not consider that the
trial court is without jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution of the original owners (sic)
duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining
owners and actual occupants of the land as required by Section 13 of R.A. No. 26;
b.
The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in granting the petition for
reconstitution of the original and duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062.
In Our resolution of 16 January 1989, 10 We required the respondents to comment on the petition. Private
respondent filed her comment on 10 February 1989. 11 She practically copied therein the questioned
decision of respondent Court of Appeals.
In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda, which petitioner complied with on 3 July 1989 12 and private
respondent on 10 June 1989. 13
The petition is impressed with merit.
The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of
Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June 1987,
must be set aside.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended. Since the requirement therein of
service of notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not
complied with in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals
gravely erred in affirming the Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section
13 has been "at least impliedly amended" by Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which
took effect on 11 June 1978.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 14 We ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 reading as follows:
Sec. 12.
Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c),
3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner,
his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among
other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been
issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the
nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the
land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining
properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments
affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has
not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in
evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same:
Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2
(f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the

property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the
description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Sec. 13.
The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published,
at the expense of the petition, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the
main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which
the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy
of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person
named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall
state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificates of title, if known, the name of
the registered owner, the name of the occupants or person in possession of the property, the owner of the
adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and
the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to
the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the
notice as directed by the court.
are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly null
and void. We reiterated this rule in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where, in
respect particularly to the required notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically declared:
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2
or as claimant or person having interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or
less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main
entrance of the municipality (sic) on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the
municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.
In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing doctrine:
The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, the service of the notice of
hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land, as well as the posting of the notices in
the main entrance of the provincial and municipal buildings where the property lies at least 30 days prior
to the date of the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are mandatory and jurisdictional
requisites.
This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted logic to support a sophistic
distinction between said case and the instant case and an implausible interpretation of the law.
We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26
"appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely
nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend
said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section
23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:
. . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied
amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter alia,
that:
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
As regards publication, it specifically provides:
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court . . .

This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What
it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is
published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the
latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication.
That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain
mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise,
said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named
in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of
the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is
clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent
anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land registration
proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of
the fact that only very few have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies
only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may
someday painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had
caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third
parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private
respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice because it was not through her
fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since the law does
not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally
unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices
and private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and
gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to
comply with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We
should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or
justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to
obey the laws.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition and
SETTING ASIDE the Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition No. 11,456.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-29075
June 10, 1971
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, ELDRED FEWKES, applicant-appellant,
vs.
NACITA VASQUEZ, DOMINGO VASQUEZ, TRINIDAD GERARTE, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO ARAMBURO,
SIMEON ARAMBURO, RAMON VELASCO, JOSEFINA VELASCO ISAAC, EMILIA VELASCO SAMSON,
HEIRS OF JUAN VELASCO, SEGUNDO CERDENIA, MAURICIO SAYSON, PACITA SAMSON and
FLORENCIO DYCOCO, oppositors-appellees.
Ignacio Calleja, jr. & Rafael Lucila for applicant-appellant. Victoriano Abrera for oppositor-appellee Florencio
Dycoco.
Antonio Alfane, & C. Bautista for oppositors-appellees Ramon Velasco, et al.

Delfin de Vera for oppositors-appellees Nacita Vasquez, et al.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal (before Republic Act 5440) from the order of the Court of First Instance of Albay (In Land Reg. Case
No. N-434), dismissing an application for registration on jurisdictional grounds.
On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay
a proceeding for the registration of 2 lots and the improvements thereon. It was alleged in the application
that Fewkes acquired by purchase from Juan G. Velasco, Jr., Brigida C. Velasco and Trinidad G. Velasco two
(2) parcels of land, referred to as Lot No. 21-A of Psu-61470 (a portion of Lot No. 1383, Libon PLs-763 D),
with an area of 223, 241 square meters more or less, and Lot with an area of 11,283 square meters,
situated in barrio Bubulusan (Bulusan), municipality of Libon, province of Albay; that applicant was in
actual possession of the lots, and that said properties were free from any encumbrance. Attached to the
application were the tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical
descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21-B of Psu-61470, the certified copies of the tax declarations on said land,
and the two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967, executed by the Velascos in
favor of applicant.
On 31 March 1967, finding that the application did not contain the plans and technical description of the
parcels of land sought to be registered and the surveyor's certificate, the court required the applicant to
submit the same. Upon compliance with the foregoing requirement, the applicant then submitted a motion
praying the court that the Director of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission be directed to
approve subdivision plan Psu-61470, wherein it appeared that the lots sought to be registered are parts of
a bigger lot identified in said subdivision plan as Lot No. 21.
In its order of 28 April 1967, the court denied the motion reasoning that the application being for
registration of land, it had nothing to do with the approval of the subdivision plan. On 2 August 1967, the
court issued another order, this time for amendment of the application in order to include the respective
postal addresses of the adjoining owners named therein.
On 23 February 1968, after the initial hearing of case, the court issued an order dismissing the application
for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the finding that the properties sought to be registered only formed
part of a bigger tract, of land which was described in the plan attached to the application, and that the
notice of initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the registration
proceeding. When the motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid dismissal-order was denied, applicant
filed the present appeal.
Appellant's complaint in this instance actually is directed against the outright dismissal of the application.
It is not denied that what was published in the Official Gazette at applicant's expense, 1 was not the
description of the two lots subject of the registration proceeding but that of a bigger parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 1383 of Libon Pls-763-D referred to as Lot No. 21 of Psu-61470). It is here contended,
however, that since the published description includes the motions being registered, then the court below
erred in declaring itself without jurisdiction over the proceeding. In other words, according to appellant, as
the description of the bigger parcel, 1383 of Pls-764-D, of which the properties sought to be registered
formed part, was already published, then there would have been no necessity for further publication of the
aforesaid small portions in order to vest jurisdiction on the land registration court. The flaw in this
argument lies in the assumption that by the publication of the bigger tract of land, jurisdiction over the
said property was acquired by the court below. That is not correct.
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required to contain,
among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the
applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if
known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial
hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in
the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical
description of the land being registered, 2 shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive
times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, 3 for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there

is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is
vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all
persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the
court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.
It must be remembered that the application in this case filed in the court below was for registration, not of
the big parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls-764-D or Lot No. 21), but of certain portions thereof designated by
applicant-appellant as Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B. It is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots,
therefore, that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may
be notified thereof. For, considering that the adjoining owners of Lot No. 21 would not be the same as the
owners of the properties adjoining Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B, the notification of the adjoining owners of the
big lot would not be the notice to the adjoining owners or occupants of the smolder lots required by law. In
short, it is the publication of the specific boundaries of Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B that would actually put the
interested parties on notice of the registration proceeding, and would confer authority on the land
registration court to pass upon the issue of the registerability of said lots in favor of the applicant.
Appellant insists, however, that the lower court should have merely directed the amendment of the
application or the approval by the Director of Lands of the subdivision plan, instead of issuing an order of
dismissal. There is no merit in this contention. Considering that it has been dully apprised of the absence
of the requisite survey plan and the technical description of the lots being registered. and of the
inadequacy of the necessary publication and notice to the interested parties, and consequently of the
existence of jurisdictional defects in the application, the lower court could not have taken any other course
of action than to order the dismissal of the case. In Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482, this Court
ruled:
'It is not permissible to make amendments or alterations in the description of the land after its publication
in the newspapers and after the registration of the property has been decreed, without the publication of
new notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the said alterations and amendments.
Otherwise, the law would be infringed with respect to the publicity which characterizes the procedure, and
third parties who have not had an opportunity to present their claims, might be seriously affected in their
rights, through failure of opportune notice.'
Nor was the court below technically qualified to declare the subdivision plan true and correct, and compel
its approval by the land authorities.
It may even be pointed out that on two occasions, the lower court had already directed appellant's counsel
to submit necessary annexes and amend the application. It can not really be charged, therefore, that said
court had been unfair or unduly harsh on the applicant-appellant when, finding the application to be still
fatally defective, it ordered the dismissal of the case.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant. The dismissal of the application here is understood to be without, prejudice to the filing of a
proper application in conformity with the legal requirements.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro and Villamor, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 108998

August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate
court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for
registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total
area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of
the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land
before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer
Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the
court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and confirms the
title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses
Mario B. Lapia and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by
naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton,
Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the certificate
of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the
land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private
lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty
considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant
action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the
owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It
is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar,
the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of
the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the
applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11,
1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse,
which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been
for the constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the
subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed
to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the
Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical
sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State . Petitioner further argued that it is only
when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become

privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the
evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest,
had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long
before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to
the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have been
complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
(Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone
established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau
of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by the
applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation
purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a public
instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on
June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what
is of great significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased
the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for
registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17.
The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
18.
Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for
registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in possession "since
June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there
is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their
application (on February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required possession if the starting point
is 1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in their
name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed
to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years
or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

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(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the

application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec.
4.
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the
subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has
been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case
at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does
not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to
be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed
parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn,
have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the
shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to
confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in
the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986
case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of
Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period
ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessorsin-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . .
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xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would
be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be

entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claims is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put
in Cario, ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property
(Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest
title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation
v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b)
his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions
set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v.
CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private
land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish
the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their
predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon
(Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister
Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor
Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G").
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the
Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable
zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of
foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at
the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants
in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in
the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of
the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the
matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple
ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land
Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-ininterest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the
"concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d)
the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information
title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA
1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-ininterest, since time immemorial.

If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial, the
rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890
[1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest (Cario v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law.
Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
(Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land
and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in
both Cario and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in
Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of
Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he
claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the
burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the
application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land
(and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in
question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When
referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man living
has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra).
Such possession was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
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To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed
the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and
testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs in such manner as to remove the
same from the public domain under the Cario and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest)
died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs.
This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's
benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
application . . .
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xxx

Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without
saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before
they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American
citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been

segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have
acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process,
the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-ininterest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong
materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapias mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows
private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of
the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided
by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then
1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence,
as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2.
Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who
has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land
up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the
case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired
shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to
be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those
already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the
legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a naturalborn Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there
could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution
ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are
already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12,
1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban,
or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant
whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the
parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in
accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private

respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-ininterest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by
private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6.
In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to
lands, no private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register
of deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing the date and
place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area, the
location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to reside
permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is
presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since
said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to
be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise
be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of
title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the
issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land
registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is
issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should
be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of
the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of
the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for
registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent. The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons.
It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the
ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born
Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized
Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the
land, they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent
spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a
former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:

Sec. 8.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents have
observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents' name
have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration under
the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and
should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have
become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we
should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached
therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive
portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16
March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent
spouses became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were natural-born
Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country.
B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were already
foreign nationals at the time they became transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were
previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become
applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come
before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements,
including a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be
acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be exceeded both by the land of which such
foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken together with other land previously acquired
by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses, that is,
purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.

# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons.
It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the
ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.

But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born
Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized
Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the
land, they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent
spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a
former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents have
observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents' name
have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration under
the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and
should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have
become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we
should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached
therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive
portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16
March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent
spouses became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were natural-born
Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country.
B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were already
foreign nationals at the time they became transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were
previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become
applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come
before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements,
including a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be
acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be exceeded both by the land of which such
foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken together with other land previously acquired
by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses, that is,
purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.
January 27, 1969
G.R. No. L-26093
VIRGINIA L. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.

HON. PIO MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, and RUFITO AKIA,
respondents.
Rogelio A. Cortes for petitioner.
Moises P. Cating for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The corrective powers of this Court are invoked in this, an original petition for certiorari, to strike down the
reopening proceedings before the cadastral court below upon the jurisdictional ground of lack of
publication, or, in the alternative, to annul said court's orders rejecting petitioner's intervention for want of
personality to sue.
The litigation below commenced from the petition of respondent Rufino Akia before the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City, acting as a cadastral court, for the reopening of cadastral proceedings, pursuant to
Republic Act 931.[[1]] Respondent Akia there sought the registration in his name of 15,922 square meters
of land situated in the City of Baguio.
On July 30, 1965, petitioner Virginia L. de Castro moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000 square
meters allegedly included in the 15,922 square meters of land specified in respondent Akia's petition
below. [[2]]
It appears that petitioner Virginia de Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales Application
[TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1,000 square meter-parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill
Subdivision, Residential Section "K", Baguio City. It was surveyed for which she paid a fee of P150.00 on
October 21, 1955. Public auction, duly published, was conducted at which petitioner de Castro was the
highest bidder. On December 17, 1955, the lot was awarded in her favor at a cost of P4.30 per square
meter, or a total of P4,300.00. Petitioner fully paid the purchase price which, with interests, amounted to
P4,306.38. Petitioner, it is claimed, had been paying taxes on the lot.
On August 16, 1965, petitioner's motion for intervention, despite Akia's opposition, was granted by the
court below.
At the trial on the merits, petitioner de Castro, respondent Akia, and different government agencies were
duly represented. Petitioner de Castro there presented documentary and testimonial evidence in support of
her opposition to the inclusion of said 1,000 square meters of land. The case was submitted for decision.
Thereafter, on October 24, 1965, Akia lodged a motion to dismiss petitioner's opposition to his (Akia's)
petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings. Ground therefor, amongst others, was that petitioner lacked
personality to sue.
On December 4 1965, over the objection of herein petitioner de Castro, respondent judge ruled out her
intervention and dismissed her opposition to the reopening of the cadastral proceedings. He declared that
mere applicants of public land have no capacity to sue independently of the Bureau of Lands. The judge
did not go into the merits of the case upon the evidence presented.
But, on January 13, 1966, de Castro moved to reconsider. She stressed the fact that she was not a mere
applicant of public land but an equitable owner thereof. Because, she was an awardee who had paid to the
government, in full, the sales value of the land she applied for.
On February 1, 1966, respondent judge refused reconsideration, this time upon a different ground. The
judge based his action on a "Manifestation" of counsel for the Director of Lands of January 21, 1966 stating
that on October 15, 1965, the Director of Lands had cancelled the award in favor of petitioner.
A second "motion for reconsideration dated February 21, 1966 was registered by petitioner de Castro. She
there informed the court that, thru a letter of December 3, 1965, she had urged from the Director of Lands
reconsideration of the revocation of the award in her favor. She appended to her motion the foregoing
letter where she made it clear that construction of her residential house on the lot as required was an
impossibility because, in the year 1955 and several years thereafter, there were no lighting, water and
road facilities within the immediate vicinity of the land, and later on, the City Engineer of Baguio refused to
issue the required building permit because of the pendency of respondent Akia's petition for reopening

heretofore adverted to. She also acquainted the court with the fact that because of her letter aforesaid, the
Director of Lands had asked its Baguio office to re-examine the revocation. At any rate, the land in
question, so she continued to aver in her motion, could not be the subject of petition for judicial reopening
as it was never in possession of respondent Akia.
On March 2, 1966, the foregoing second motion for reconsideration was perfunctorily denied by
respondent judge.
Then, on March 15, 1966, the Director of Lands came out with an order reinstating petitioner de Castro's
award, for the reason that lack of water and lighting facilities found to be true in the investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Lands caused delay in the construction of petitioner's house. The Director,
however, held in abeyance further action thereon until respondent Akia's petition for reopening is finally
decided by the Baguio court.
The next move of petitioner Virginia L. de Castro was to start certiorari proceedings in this Court thru a
verified petition praying that the orders of respondent judge, dismissing her opposition to the reopening,
be set aside and annulled.
Upon the return of respondents, and the memoranda of the parties, the case is now before us for decision.
1. First to merit attention is the question of jurisdiction.
The thrust of petitioner's argument is that the reopening of the cadastral case below is jurisdictionally
tainted by lack of publication.
Respondent Akia's petition for reopening was instituted under Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953,
which in its Section 1 reads:
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings,
who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had
been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such
parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land
of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years 3 after the date on which this Act shall
take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered
Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have
not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by
the Government, and the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the
Government, through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court shall find that all
conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof
have been paid from the time when land tax should have been collected until the day when the motion is
presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such parcels.
[[4]]
The foregoing provision establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such procedure
does not include publication. Neither is publication mentioned in any of the other provisions of Republic Act
931. Section 1 above-quoted merely states that "the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving
such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor General." About two years back, we held in
a case,[[5]] that under Republic Act 931, it is unnecessary to furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of the
reopening petition "inasmuch as said Act [931] only required service thereof to the Solicitor General."
Jurisprudence informs us that "[a]n order of court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to
make it include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new publication is made as a
preliminary to such step" and that "additional territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan
without new publication."[[6]] Upon the other hand, the jurisdiction of a court to issue orders providing for
exclusion of land included in the original plan is not affected by failure to order a new publication. [[7]]
Here, it should be undisputed that the court already acquired jurisdiction over the entire territory of the
Baguio Townsite in the original cadastral case sought to be reopened. It was a reservation suit instituted by
the Director of Lands in 1912 (Civil Reservation Case No. 1) to compel registration of lands in Baguio.[[8]]
The final decision therein was rendered on November 13, 1922. A petitioner who wishes to reopen that

case under Republic Act 931 is thus to be logically considered a claimant in the original cadastral
proceedings. The view has been expressed that in a sense, the government here is the plaintiff and all the
claimants are defendants, [[9]] who thus become oppositors. [[10]] Otherwise, the petition should not be
one for reopening but one that begins an entirely new proceeding completely distinct and separate from
said case of the Director of Lands.
The view we take is not without foundation. If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of land by an alleged
right that has accrued prior to the institution of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem, he is, of
course, to be deemed to have received notice thru the publication therein made. If his rights are derived
from the government after the land has been declared part of the public domain by the cadastral court,
then notice to the government of a reopening petition as provided by law, should suffice. For the
government is supposed to take up the cudgels for a public land grantee, or at the very least, notify the
latter. It must be remembered that a petition for reopening under Republic Act 931 can successfully be
blocked if it is shown that the land involved therein has already "been alienated, reserved, leased, granted
or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government."
True, Director of Lands vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966, ruled that the petition to reopen filed in that
case under Republic Act 931, must be published as required in Section I of the Cadastral Act (Act 2259)
because such case is still governed by the procedure laid down by the latter law. The Benitez case,
however, must be read in its factual context. There, the petition of the Benitez spouses for reopening the
cadastral proceedings covering the entire city of Tacloban, was based on the claim that "through oversight,
inadvertence and excusable neglect a portion of" 1,805 square meters of Lot 2157 of the land originally
registered in the name of petitioners therein "has not been included in the original survey." They prayed
that after appropriate proceedings, said portion (designated as Lot No. 1 of the subdivision plan) be
adjudicated to them pursuant to Republic Act 931. In fact, back of the Benitez declaration that publication
is necessary is jurisprudence heretofore stated, [[11]] that such publication is required when additional
territory is sought to be included in the original plan. Indeed, the record of Benitez in this Court shows that
the opposition to the reopening petition is predicated on the averment that the cadastral court did not
include the lots in controversy because those lots were "part of the offshore land" and hence, of the public
domain which could not be the subject of cadastral survey or of the cadastral case.[[12]]
To hold without qualification that failure of publication is jurisdictionally fatal in reopening cases under
Republic Act 931 is to inject into our statute books something not required.
In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia
was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the
Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition, the wherefore,
need not be published.
We hold that the authority of the cadastral court over the reopening proceedings below is not impaired by
failure of publication.
2. This brings us to the next question: Does petitioner Virginia L. de Castro have legal standing in the
proceedings below?
In an early case, [[13]] this Court declared that mere citizens could have no interest in public land. At
about the same time, this Court also held that to give a party standing in a court of land registration, he
must make some claim to the property. [[14]] Then, in Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio of Sto. Cristo, [[15]]
this Court pronounced that although an opponent in a land registration proceeding could not show title in
himself, he was not discapacitated from opposing the registration sought by another. Plain was the
statement there that "[a]ll that is necessary to enable anyone to exert the faculty of opposition is that he
should appear to have an interest in the property." And, so this Court added, "it is immaterial whether this
interest is in the character of legal owner or is of a purely equitable nature as where he is the beneficiary in
a trust." Later, this Court described a homesteader who had not yet been issued his title but who had
fulfilled all the conditions required by law, as a person who should be regarded as an equitable owner of
the land. [[16]] Similarly, a purchaser of friar land has an equitable title to the land before the issuance of
the patent.[[17]] Pitargue vs. Sorilla,[[18]] laid down the principle that a bona fide applicant of public land
may protect his right of possession and sue for forcible entry or unlawful detainer or pursue any suitable
remedy provided by law. Indeed, an awardee in a sales application is authorized to take possession of the
land to enable him to comply with the requirements of the award before title can be issued. [[19]] We held
in still another case, [[20]] that a homestead entry segregates the homestead from the public domain and

divests the Director of Lands of control and possession thereof except if the homestead application is
finally disapproved and the entry annulled or revoked.
Recently, we declared that persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and have applied
with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary personality to oppose registration. [[21]] We
have held, too, that an award under a sales application has "the effect of withdrawing the lands of the
public domain that were 'disposable' by the Director of Lands." [[22]]
Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is narrowed down by the specific conditions therein set
forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible "only with respect to such of said parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently
disposed of by the Government." [[23]] The statute made it abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall
be reopened only, if the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein established have been
complied with." Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any provisional or permanent
disposition by the government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening.
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public bidding held upon her
own township sales application. Of course, the award up to now has not been fully implemented because
she has not yet complied with one condition imposed on her. But, if the award is not a permanent
disposition, it is at least a provisional one, enough to prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the land
disputed.
We, accordingly, rule that petitioner has legal standing before the cadastral court below.
3. The plight of petitioner Virginia de Castro arrests attention. She is an awardee in a sales application of
the lot she claims. She paid the government the full price thereof. As such awardee, she was at first
allowed by respondent judge to intervene in the present proceedings. She had presented all her evidence.
And so had respondent Akia. In truth, the controversy between the two was already ripe for decision. Then
came the motion of Akia to throw out petitioner's opposition for want of personality to sue. Despite
petitioner's objections thereto, respondent judge granted said motion. Petitioner asked for reconsideration.
This was rejected by respondent judge, not on the ground originally set forth, but on a certain
"Manifestation" of the Director of Lands that petitioner's award had already been cancelled, because she
failed to make the necessary improvements on the property, a condition tacked to the award. That
revocation was done without notice to petitioner who came to know of the existence thereof only after she
had presented her evidence in this case.
Worse, petitioner was not served a copy of that manifestation. She was not given a chance to explain in
the Bureau of Lands and in court why she failed to introduce improvements on the property. When she
was finally apprised of the action by the court, she moved to reconsider. She told the court that she had
sought reconsideration from the Bureau of Lands of the cancellation of her award because it was an
impossibility for her to make the necessary improvements on her property as there were no lighting, water
and road facilities in the area, and that when she was about to construct her house afterwards, she was
told by the City Engineer of Baguio that she could not be issued the required building permit for the reason
that her lot was included in respondent Akia's reopening petition. She even made it of record in court that
because of her letter of reconsideration, the Director of Lands issued a memorandum to the Office of the
Bureau of Lands in Baguio directing reexamination of the cancellation. There was nothing more that
petitioner could have done at that time.
Respondent judge should have taken all these facts into consideration. While petitioner's plea for
reconsideration before the Bureau of Lands was pending, appeal by petitioner from respondent judge's
order would have been futile. For, there was then nothing definite on which to base her appeal. So, there
was really nothing to do but to wait. Upon the other hand, respondent judge should have taken stock of the
fact that petitioner was at an obvious disadvantage.
It should be here stressed that the court manifestation of counsel for the Director of Lands heretofore
adverted to was explicitly "without prejudice" to the Director's right "to submit further evidence within the
period allowable by law, if future circumstances so warrant." Respondent judge should have waited. But he
did not. Add to this the fact that if the court in this case should grant Torrens title to Akia, then all the
rights of petitioner would be foreclosed. Where else could petitioner go to establish her claim? Thus, when
respondent judge finally shut out petitioner's opposition, we perceive a grave abuse of discretion which
calls for the corrective powers of this Court.

The injustice suffered by petitioner becomes the more accentuated by the fact that shortly after the court
order throwing petitioner's case out of court, the Director of Lands did set aside the order of revocation and
reinstated petitioner's award. Well it is to remember that "[c]ourts ordinarily do not deny the writ [of
certiorari] if the result would be to deprive a party of his substantial rights and leave him without
remedy."[[24]]
For the reasons given, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted; the orders of December 4, 1965, February 1,
1966, and March 2, 1966 dismissing the opposition filed by petitioner Virginia L. de Castro in the matter of
the petition for reopening of judicial proceedings by respondent Rufito Akia (Civil Res. Case No. 1, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 211, Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I), are hereby annulled; and the respondent judge
or whoever may take his place is hereby directed to reinstate petitioner's opposition aforesaid and to
decide the case on the merits.
VALISNO v. PLAN
Facts:
Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blancos and subsequently declared ownership
over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property
who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed
of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriegas favor from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker
from the property and constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of
possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the
decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in
the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the respondents with their respective area
and boundaries appearing to be completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the
requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under the Civil Code, Articles
433 and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and he need not be
compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear that the respondent is the current
possessor of the property having constructed the apartment on the property in dispute. Contrasting the
evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondents evidence as they were able
to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known
boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as
mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before
the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that
the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res
judicata thus this appeal before the SC. With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders both parties
to submit their briefs. Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC
considered the case submitted for decision with the brief of the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion
to amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant to the petition.
Issue: Whether or not to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner?
Ruling:
The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to a motion to dismiss but
the Rules of Court allows its application in land registration proceeding as only suppletory when it is
practicable and convenient. Therefore, the court may sustain a motion to dismiss in land registration
proceeding as the case at bar. Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the counterclaim can be taken
as a complaint where the defendant becomes the plaintiff. The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in
the counterclaim and he may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or file a motion
to dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for the last choice.
The SC held that res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the case: [a] the
former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of
private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not
result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the
interests of the co-ownership. Although the first action was captioned for the recovery of possession,
possession is sought based on ownership, thus the action was one in the nature of accion reinvidicatoria.

The second action is for registration of title where the registration is sought based on ones ownership over
the property. The difference between the two is that the plaintiff seeks to exclude other persons from
ownership over the property in the first action while it seeks to exclude the whole world in the second
action. The cause of action however remains the same. The employment of two different actions does not
allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of action cannot be
litigated twice. Although the first action was litigated before a competent court of general jurisdiction and
the other over a registration court is of no significance since that both courts should be of equal jurisdiction
is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the
application for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both parties have
been settled and decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed the
petition.
[G.R. No. L-47644. August 21, 1987.]
FELIPA S. LARAGAN, INDEPENDENCIO SIBBALUCA, AURORA C. SIBBALUCA and ZENAIDA S.
VALDEZ, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TEODORO LEAO, TOMAS LEAO,
FRANCISCO LEAO and CONSOLACION LEAO, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND ACT; CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE; APPLICANT MUST BE
A BONA FIDE OCCUPANT OF THE LAND; FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENT IN CASE AT BAR. The
application for registration, filed with the lower court, was for the confirmation of an imperfect title. The
law applicable is Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. This Court has ruled that an applicant for
confirmation of imperfect title must first comply with all the requisites prescribed before he can acquire a
vested right over the land applied for. In the instant case, the appellate court found that, while it may be
true that the petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio Sibbaluca, have been in continuous
and adverse possession of the land in dispute for more than 30 years, they were not bona fide occupants
thereof.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; FAILURE OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS TO APPEAL DOES NOT RENDER
DECISION FINAL WHERE AN APPEAL WAS INTERPOSED BY OTHER OPPOSITORS. While it may be true that
the Director of Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his failure to so appeal did not
make the decision of the trial court final and executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other
oppositors, Teodoro Leao, Tomas Leao, Francisco Leao, and Consolacion Leao, who also seek the
confirmation of their imperfect title over the land in question.
3. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND LAW; SUBJECT LAND REMAINS PUBLIC UNTIL CONFIRMATION OF
TITLE THERETO. Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court
from declaring the land in question to be public land, since the oppositors and the herein petitioners are
both seeking the registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Law where the presumption always is that the land pertains to the state, and the occupants and
possessors claim an interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of
years. Thus, in their application for registration, the petitioners alleged that they "hereby apply to have the
land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have the title
thereto registered and confirmed." The petitioners are deemed to thereby admit that, until such
confirmation, the land remains public.
4. ID.; LAND REGISTRATION; APPLICANT NOT NECESSARILY ENTITLED TO HAVE LAND REGISTERED IN HIS
NAME. Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to
have the land registered in his name simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the
Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any
opposition, deny registration of the land under the Torrens system, if the facts presented do not show that
the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he seeks to register.
5. ID.; ID.; POSSESSORS IN BAD FAITH NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS THEREOF. The evidence shows that

the petitioners acquired the land from Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca only on 3 October 1968, or 11
days prior to the filing of their application for registration, and it was Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca who
had allegedly possessed the land for about 34 years. Thus, in their application for registration, the
petitioners alleged the following: "4. That the applicants have acquired said land in the following manner:
The parcel of land and its improvements thereon have been acquired by the herein applicants by way of
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE from their vendors, namely, the Spouses Anastacio B. Sibbaluca and Lucrecia
Sibbaluca, the latter having been in possession, occupation, and cultivation of said parcel of land for more
than 34 solid years, open, peaceful, continuous, public, notorious, and against third persons and in concept
of owner for that length of time." It would appear, however, that the possession and occupation of the land
by the spouses Anastacio and Lucresia Sibbaluca are tainted with bad faith so that the petitioners are not
entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF COURT, APPLICABLE TO REGISTRATION CASES ONLY IN SUPPLETORY
CHARACTER. We find that there has been substantial compliance with the Rules as to the filing of the
appellants brief. The appellants cannot be rigidly tasked to adhere to the provisions of Section 16, Rule 46
of the Rules of Court as to what an appellants brief should contain, for the reason that the rules contained
in the Rules of Court are applicable to land registration cases only in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient; and that said rules of procedure are to be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.
7. ID.; APPEALS; APPEAL BOND AND RECORD ON APPEAL, DISPENSED WITH. As to the appeal bond and
record on appeal, suffice it to state that an appeal bond and a record on appeal are no longer required for
an appeal. The filing of a record on appeal is required only in appeals under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
and in other cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The present proceeding is not one of such cases.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the judgment * of the respondent appellate court in CA-G.R. No.
48353-R which affirmed, with modifications, the decision ** of the Court of First Instance of Isabela in Land
Reg. Case No. N-275, Land Rec. No. N-36094, ordering the registration of the parcel of land described in
Plan HS-48806 in the names of the petitioners.
The facts of the case are as follows: On 14 October 1968, the herein petitioners, Felipa Laragan,
Independencio Sibbaluca, Aurora Sibbaluca, and Zenaida Valdez filed an application with the Court of First
Instance of Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of land with an area of 221,667 sq. m.,
more or less, situated in the Barrio of Sto. Tomas, Ilagan, Isabela, and described in Plan HS-48806. The
applicants alleged that they acquired said parcel of land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the
spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have been in possession thereof for more than 34
years. 1
The application was set for hearing on 20 May 1969. The Land Registration Commission issued a notice of
initial hearing, copies of which were furnished all the parties concerned. The notice was published in the
Official Gazette and also posted in the municipal building of Ilagan, Isabela as well as in conspicuous
places where the land is situated.cralawnad
On the date set for the initial hearing of the application that is, 20 May 1969, Teodoro Leao, Tomas Leao,
Vicente Leao, Francisco Leao, and Consolacion Leao appeared and served notice that they were
opposing the application for registration and they asked the court that they be granted a period of thirty
(30) days within which to submit their opposition. 2
Thereafter, the court issued an order of general default. 3
On 7 July 1969, the Solicitor General filed a written opposition, on behalf of the Director of Lands, alleging,
among others, that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient title to the parcel
of land sought to be registered, the same not having been acquired by composition title from the Spanish

Government or by a possessory information title under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, nor by
acquisitive prescription. He prayed that the land be declared public land. 4
On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leao, Tomas Leao, Vicente Leao, Francisco Leao, and Consolacion Leao
filed their opposition to the application for registration. They claimed that they are the owners, pro
indiviso, of the southern part of the land applied for, with an area of 16 hectares, which is covered by
Homestead Application No. 58202 of their deceased parents, the spouses Eleuterio Leao and Victoria
Sabido, and which has been in their possession for more than 30 years. 5
Hearings were then conducted, after which, the trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the
applicants over the parcel of land applied for and ordering its registration in the names of the applicants. 6
From said judgment, only the oppositors Teodoro Leao, Tomas Leao, Vicente Leao, Francisco Leao, and
Consolacion Leao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 9 November 1977, the appellate court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court, but excluded the southern portion of the land applied for, which is the
portion covered by Homestead Application No. 58202 (E-34962), the appellate court declaring such
excluded portion to be public land, and part of the public domain view of the failure of the applicants and
oppositors to prove registrable title over the same. 7
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, 8 but their motion was denied. 9
Hence, the present petition.
The application for registration, filed with the lower court, was for the confirmation of an imperfect title.
The law applicable is Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act which provides, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
(a) . . .
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by way or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) . . .
This Court has ruled that an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must first comply with all the
requisites prescribed before he can acquire a vested right over the land applied for. 10
In the instant case, the appellate court found that, while it may be true that the petitioners and their
predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio Sibbaluca, have been in continuous and adverse possession of the land
in dispute for more than 30 years, they were not bona fide occupants thereof. Said the appellate
court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The evidence on record indicates the facts to be as follows: Sometime in 1920, Eleuterio Leao, the father
of the oppositors-appellants applied for a homestead patent for a parcel of land located in barrio Guinatan,
(now Sto. Tomas) municipality of Ilagan, Isabela with boundaries: North Domingo Ancheta; East Felipa
Jamias; South Guinatan Creek; and West Juan Salvador and others; with an area of sixteen (16)
hectares. The application was covered by Homestead Application No. 5802 (E-34962). On August 20, 1920,
the application was approved subject to the conditions set forth in law. (Annex 2 of the Opposition). The
applicant, then started to cultivate the land planting corn and tobacco with the help of some tenants. On
May 27, 1928, Eleuterio Leao died, survived by his wife Victoria S. de Leao and his children, the
oppositors-appellants. On December 28, 1935, the widow, Victoria S. de Leao executed a deed of sale of

the homestead in favor of Hilario T. Maagay and his wife, Batolomea Adduro de Maggay. Hilario Maggay
gave the property as a reward to his nephew Sibbaluca, who from then on, took possession of the parcel
of land. However, upon investigation conducted by the Director of Lands, regarding the proposed transfer
of the rights over the said parcel of land, to Anastacio Sibbaluca, it was found out that the intention of the
parties was merely to constitute a mortgage on the homestead as a security for the widows indebtedness
to Hilario T. Maggay and not a real transfer of his rights thereto. Thus, in the order, dated December 16,
1940, the Director of Lands said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . the proposed transfer of the homestead under consideration should be, as hereby it is, dropped; and
Homestead Application No. 58202 (E-34962) of Eleuterio (deceased) now his heirs, shall be given due
course. (Exhibit 2)
"On February 10, 1941, Anastacio Sibbaluca filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the foregoing
order, questioning among other things, the fact that there was no mention whatsoever regarding
reimbursement of his expenses over improvements introduced by him. On June 6, 1946, the Director of
Lands in an Order regarding the matter said that under the Public Land Law, the Bureau of Lands could not
enforce his right to reimbursement. Nevertheless, he had ample remedy under substantive law. In short,
he could enforce his right in the courts of justice. (Exhibit 3) Despite this order, Anastacio Sibbaluca did
not vacate the premises so that on June 10, 1947, the heirs of Leao filed a Motion for Ejectment. On
February 2, 1949 the Director of Lands thru a certain Clodualdo Garcia, referred the matter to the district
Land Officer District No. 4, Bureau of Lands, Ilagan, Isabela for proper action. A portion of the letter
says:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . in order that proper action could be taken on the "Motion" you are hereby directed to immediately
take steps for the reconstitution of the records relative to the abovenoted application. (Exhibit 4)
"Pursuant to this order, Alejandro Ramos, Junior Public Lands Inspector was ordered to make an
investigation regarding the said parcel of land. In a letter, dated May 11, 1950, addressed to the Director of
Lands thru the District Lands, District No. 4, Bureau of Lands, Ilagan, Isabela, Alejandro Ramos
recommended the cancellation of the homestead application of applicant Leao stating his personal
findings of the improvements introduced by Anastacio Sibbaluca on the land in question. (Exhibit V)
However, despite this recommendation. The Chief Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands, in a Memorandum
dated July 8, 1968, In the matter of: HA No. 58202 (E-34962) Eleuterio Leao (deceased) now his heirs,
represented by Victoria Sabido de Leao (widow) (Proposed Transferor) Anastacio Sibbaluca (Proposed
Transferee), Guinatan, Ilagan, Isabela addressed to the Chief, Land Management Division of the same
office, stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We are referring to you herewith the folder of Homestead Application No. 58202 (E-34962) of Eleuterio
Leao (deceased) now his heirs, represented by Victoria Sabido de Leao, for further action thereon,
informing that the Order of this Office in the above-noted case, dated June 9, 1941, had long been final and
executory. (Exh. 7)
"Because of the Memorandum, Clemente Dizon, Land inspector of the Bureau of Lands, was ordered by the
Director Land Officer (the original order coming from the Director of Lands) to conduct an ocular inspection
on the land. Thus, on October 25, 1968, after proper notice was given to both parties, Clemente Dizon
conducted an ocular inspection of said land. In the course of his investigation, he found out that the said
land was fully cultivated, planted with mango trees, coconut trees, oranges, etc. Furthermore, a house was
built inside the lot. By virtue of these findings, Dizon, in his report recommended that HA application No.
58202 (Entry No. 34962) of Eleuterio Leao be cancelled for having been alienated and conveyed to a
second party without previous knowledge and consent of the Director of Lands. However, the record does
not show, whether this recommendation was acted upon or not. What appears on record is that on August
27, 1968, a Homestead Application for Reconstitution Purposes, was filed by the heirs of Eleuterio Leao,
represented by Tomas Leao, oppositor-appellant, herein, covering the parcel of land in issue. Also, on
October 3, 1968, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by spouses Anastacio Sibbaluca and Lucrecia
Sibbaluca in favor of the applicants-appellees, of the parcel of land, now in controversy. (Exhibit F)
"From the evidence adduced, we find the applicants-appellees lacking the prerequisite pursuant to Section
48 (b) CA 141, of bona fide acquisition of the said parcel of land. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioners now seek the reversal of the respondent appellate courts decision. They claim that the
respondent appellate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring the parcel of land in

question as public land, because the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the
registration of said parcel of land in their favor, had already become final and executory for failure of the
Director of Lands to appeal therefrom. The argument is untenable. While it may be true that the Director of
Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his failure to so appeal did not make the decision
of the trial court final and executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other oppositors, Teodoro
Leao, Tomas Leao, Francisco Leao, and Consolacion Leao, who also seek the confirmation of their
imperfect title over the land in question.
Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court from declaring the
land in question to be public land, since the oppositors and the herein petitioners are both seeking the
registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law where the
presumption always is that the land pertains to the state, and the occupants and possessors claim an
interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years. Thus, in
their application for registration, the petitioners alleged that they "hereby apply to have the land
hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have the title
thereto registered and confirmed." 11 The petitioners are deemed to thereby admit that, until such
confirmation, the land remains public.
Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to have the
land registered in his name simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the
Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any
opposition, deny registration of the land under the Torrens system, if the facts presented do not show that
the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he seeks to register. 12
The petitioners also contend that the bad faith of their predecessor-in-interest is of no legal consequence
to their application for registration as such alleged bad faith is not imputable to them, and what matters is
that they occupied and possessed the disputed parcel of land in 1934 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale,
executed in their favor by the spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca, in utmost good faith and in
concept of owners under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, and that they have been in open,
peaceful, continuous possession and occupation in the concept of owner for more than 34 years.
Petitioners claim is devoid of merit. The evidence shows that the petitioners acquired the land from
Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca only on 3 October 1968, or 11 days prior to the filing of their application
for registration, 13 and it was Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca who had allegedly possessed the land for
about 34 years. Thus, in their application for registration, the petitioners alleged the
following:jgc:chanrobles.c"4. That the applicants have acquired said land in the following manner: The
parcel of land and its improvements thereon have been acquired by the herein applicants by way of
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE from their vendors, namely, the Spouses Anastacio B. Sibbaluca and Lucrecia
Sibbaluca, the latter having been in possession, occupation, and cultivation of said parcel of land for more
than 34 solid years, open, peaceful, continuous, public, notorious, and against third persons and in concept
of owner for that length of time." 14
It would appear, however, that the possession and occupation of the land by the spouses Anastacio and
Lucresia Sibbaluca are tainted with bad faith so that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of the
provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law.
Finally, the petitioners claim that the respondent appellate court grossly erred in not dismissing the appeal
of the private respondents therein on the grounds that: (1) the record on appeal does not state that an
appeal bond was timely filed; (2) the record on appeal does not contain sufficient data to show that the
appeal was perfected within the reglementary period in that it does not state when the appellants received
a copy of the trial courts decision; (3) the appellants failed to file their brief since the brief filed for them
by Atty. Teofilo Leonin was unauthorized as their counsel of record was Atty. Dominador P. Nuesa of Ilagan,
Isabela and not Atty. Leonin and there has been no substitution of counsel; (4) the appellants brief is
deficient in that (a) it does not contain a subject index of the arguments and page references, and a table
of cases alphabetically arranged; (b) the "Statement of Facts" does not contain a clear and concise
statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and those in controversy, together with
the substance of the proof relating to the facts in controversy in sufficient detail to make it clearly
intelligible; and (c) there is no clear and concise statement of the issues of fact and/or law to be submitted
to the court for its judgment.

The contention is likewise without merit. We find that there has been substantial compliance with the Rules
as to the filing of the appellants brief. The appellants cannot be rigidly tasked to adhere to the provisions
of Section 16, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court as to what an appellants brief should contain, for the reason
that the rules contained in the Rules of Court are applicable to land registration cases only in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient; 14 and that said rules of procedure are to be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. 15
As to the appeal bond and record on appeal, suffice it to state that an appeal bond and a record on appeal
are no longer required for an appeal. The filing of a record on appeal is required only in appeals under Rule
109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The present proceeding is
not one of such cases. 16 WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. Without costs. SO
ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.