Chinas

Rise and the Southeast Asian Maritime Security Environent

Prof. Aileen S.P. Baviera
Asian Center, University of the Philippines
July 2014


The paper explores how the rise of China is affecting the maritime security environment of
Southeast Asia. First, Chinas growing assertiveness with respect to territorial and
maritime claims is causing concern among Southeast Asian states surrounding the South
China Sea, particularly rival claimants Vietnam, the Philippines and to a lesser extent
Malaysia and Indonesia, pushing them to accelerate their hedging strategies. Secondly, the
changing balance of power and influence between a more militarily capable and
economically influential China and the regions older powers the United States and Japan,
has raised the stakes for all parties as Southeast Asia once again becomes an arena for
major power competition. Finally, ASEANs preferred strategy of building regional
cooperative security through norms- and rules-based multilateralism risks becoming
increasingly irrelevant as ASEAN itself becomes more fragmented due to differing interests
involving China, and as the major powers become less inclined to play along with its slow
and seemingly ineffectual diplomatic processes.



Many experts point to 2009 as the year marking a huge change in Chinas behavior with
respect to its neighbors, in particular those with whom it has territorial and maritime
jurisdiction disputes. In contrast to what had been labelled as a successful charm
offensive of the previous two decades, China began to demonstrate a more acerbic
attitude that one observer quipped was less charm and more offensive.

During the previous year, in 2008, the Chinese were found to have been secretly building a naval
base on Hainan Island, capable of holding submarines and providing deep-water access to crucial
sealanes in the South China Sea. US military activities in Chinas EEZ were evident, exemplified by
the USNS Impeccable incident in March 2009, in which this unarmed US Navy surveillance ship
reported being harrassed by five Chinese vessels about 75 miles off the Hainan coast. China
accused the US of spying within its EEZ, which China claims as jurisdictional waters but which US
considered to be international waters.


In the South China Sea, troubles between China and the Philippines may be traced to
earlier years when in 1995, the Philippines learned that China had occupied Mischief
Reef within the Philippines claimed area. Attempts to manage the disputes bilaterally
through confidence building measures and initial joint oil seismic survey efforts
(involving Vietnam as well) failed. Coincidentally, a few days after the Impeccable
incident, the Philippines passed an amended Archipalegic Baselines Law which among others
reiterated claims to islands in the Spratlys as well as the Scarborough Shoal. The new law was
preparatory to the filing of a continental shelf claim with the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS), but in the end the Philippines did not file a continental shelf claim on its
western seaboard facing the disputed South China Sea.

In March 2011, a Chinese vessel harassed a Philippine-commissioned survey ship near oil-rich
Reed Bank, leading to a halt in Philippine exploration activity in the area. In April 2012, in
response to Philippine attempts to apprehend Chinese fishermen in Scarborough Shoal, China
stationed ships in the area, successfully established control over the shoal, and began preventing
Filipino fishermen from accessing their traditional fishing grounds. In January 2013, the
Philippines filed a case before ITLOS requesting that an arbitration panel be convened to hear its
complaints against Chinas extensive 9 dashed-line claim. The panel was formed, and it received
the documentation of the Philippines complaints but China refused to participate in the
proceedings, instead making its positions and legal interpretations known through publications
by scholars and foreign experts acting as amicus curiae.

The Philippines also began to push back assertively against what it saw as Chinas
moves to change the facts on the ground, by entering into additional defense capability
building and maritime security cooperation agreements with friendly states, as well as
huge efforts (with very limited success) to unite ASEAN states around common
approaches to counter Chinese behavior. During a visit by US President Obama to Manila
in April 2014, the two sides signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
allowing for increased rotational presence by American troops and materiel in
Philippine military bases. The Aquino government also committed a budget of PhP 75
billion for beefing up the long neglected navy and air force.

Similarly, Vietnam also began to feel the brunt of Chinas new assertive policy,
particularly with tensions over access to fishing grounds and oil exploration areas off of
Vetnams coastline. On 6 May, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a joint continental shelf claim
to the CLCS, including an area within Chinas extensive nine-dashed line claim. China responded

by submitting its own nine dashed line map, which some interpreted as formalizing its claim for
the first time, although there were no specific location coordinates or explanations as to the
nature of the claim accompanying the map.

A much longer history of animosity between these two countries, compounded by a

shared land border and active trade and people-to-people as well as party-to-party
relations, present Vietnam with a serious dilemma on how to deal with China. Following
Chinas setting up its mega oil-rig near Vietnam in May 2014, intense nationalism by
Vietnamese led to public rioting against companies believed to be Chinese-owned,
resulting in some deaths and physical injury to many. Physical violence also took the
form of ramming incidents involving official vessels as well as fishermen of the two
countries. Against this backdrop Vietnam explored the idea of filing its case before the
International Court of Justice, following the principle if not exactly the same legal tack
taken by the Philippines against China. Just as the Scarborough Shoal occupation drove
the Philippines to international legal action, such was the effect of the oil rig incident for
the Vietnamese government. Meanwhile, Vietnam ordered new submarines from Russia
and began security consultations with the United States.

Subsequently even Malaysia and Indonesia, two countries who had chosen not to hype
up what many considered minor disagreements with China pertaining to its nine dashed
line, also became targets of Chinese intimidation. The PLA-Navy has been sailing since
2012 to James Shoal or Beting Serupai, 80 km off the coast of eastern Malaysia, which
Beijing has declared to be the southermost part of its territory. In March 2013, 4 Chinese
ships visited the shoal and sailors held an oath-taking ceremony to defend Chinese
territory that was widely reported in Chinese media. Malaysias government denied
knowledge of or belittled such developments, yet the leaders were sufficiently
concerned so as to increase consultations with other ASEAN countries, decide to set up a
marine base in nearby Bantulu, and open the door further to military cooperation with
the US. At the same time, Malaysia continued to pledge friendship to China, recently
celebrating 40 years since the normalization of diplomatic ties, emphasizing that
Malaysia was the first country in Southeast Asia to do so.

In the case of Indonesia, when China released a new passport showing its nine-dashed
lines map, the map was observed to include parts of the Natuna that Indonesia
considered its own. For the first time, Indonesian government acknowledged that it had
a dispute wih China in the South China Sea. Indonesias indirect response included

announcement of a major military buildup increasing TNI presence and the hosting of
multilateral joint exercises near the area. In 2010, there was an incident where an

Indonesian patrol boat captured a Chinese vessel illegally fishing within

Indonesian EEZ, but had to give it up after the Chinese dispatched the Yuzheng
311, a maritime enforcement vessel equipped with machine guns, light cannons,
and electronic sensors. The Yuzheng 311 allegedly pointed a machine gun at the
Indonesian patrol boat, compelling it to release the Chinese vessel. Again, in
March 2013, Indonesian officials boarded a Chinese vessel caught illegally fishing
in the Natuna Islands and tried to bring the Chinese crew ashore for legal
proceedings. Chinese armed vessels intercepted them and demanded the release
of the Chinese fishermen.

Such disputes over sovereignty, maritime resources and jurisdictions had been taking
place for over four decades, during which not only China but other countries had also
contributed to the escalation of tensions. However, the situation in recent years was
qualitatively different, and primarily because of one dominant fact a more confident
and militarily capable China had shifted to a more confrontational posture.

The South China Sea islands indeed appeared to grow in importance to Chinese security
planners, with some (albeit conflicting) reports that it had become a core interest of the
country. A US response came when Hilary Clinton at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum in
Hanoi said that it was the US national interest to see peaceful resolution of the
competing claims, and that US supported a collaborative diplomatic process by all
claimants in settling the disputes. This also signalled a shift in US policy which had
heretofore emphasized only an interest in ensuring that the disputes did not impact on
freedom of navigation.

Meanwhile, in the East China Sea, the disputes over Diaoyutai/Senkaku between China
and Japan took an ugly turn with a number of developments, including a collission in
September 2010 between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels which led
to Japans temporary arrest and detention of the Chinese skipper, resulting in ever more
acrimonious relations between the two. The decision by Japans new prime minister
Shinzo Abe to persist with visits to Yasukuni shrine (commemorating the war dead,
including WW2 criminals) and the move by his government to nationalize two of the
Senkaku islands by purchasing them from private owners, further rankled China. More

recently, China aggravated Japans threat perceptions with incidents where Chinese
fighter planes locked their weapons onto Japanese planes, by declaration of an air
defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the disputed area, and by its reclamation and
military build-up activities in the Spratlys.

What has driven this change in Chinese behavior? Various explanations come to mind,
with initial assessments pointing to (1) growing nationalism and pressure on the
Chinese government arising from the publics high expectations, including hubris arising
from economic confidence after China surpassed Japan as the worlds second largest
economy,; (2) poor coordination among different agencies involved with maritime
affairs, competing for resources and influence (e.g. local government, fisheries
authorities, oil industry players, PLA-Navy, etc.) and a weak foreign policy establishment
unable to persuade stakeholders to sustain moderate policies; (3) Chinas growing
energy needs. Subsequently, since the ascent of Xi Jinping to Chinas number one
leadership position and the further hardening of Chinas stance, the explanations turned
more toward (1) growing influence of the PLA in foreign policy, (2) perception of an
opportunity to hasten power balance in Chinas favor while the US is weak and
distracted, (3) and the need to rally public support against perceived external challenges
and threats to sovereignty rather than risk domestic dissatisfaction over economic and
social difficulties as the Chinese economy takes a downturn.

Calculations that a favorable external environment to promote Chinese national goals
appear to be relevant. In particular the United States, distracted both by internal
economic and political woes, was observed as unlikely to mount a strong response,
based on the sentiments seen recently in Washington DC and recent decisions to not
intervene in conflicts in other parts of the world. Other Southeast Asian countries,
Australia and South Korea might moreover be expected to take pragmatic positions due
to the perceived primacy of economic interests in their overall foreign policy postures
towards China. ASEAN itself was too divided over the issue of how to handle the
disputes, and would be preoccupied with integration efforts as the 2015 milestone for
economic integration approaches. Moreover, South Korea and Japan two of the United
States regional allies were themselves at loggerheads over their own territorial
disputes.

Against the backdrop of these internal drivers and external conditions, China began to
show greater boldness, indicating that the time for Deng Xiaopings policy of keeping a

low profile encapsulated in the statement taoguang yanghui (biding ones time and
hiding ones capabilities) had passed, and that Chinese leaders felt confident enough
that they could withstand any diplomatic flak or reputational costs of assertiveness
bound to arise from the neighborhood.

The strongest pushback came from the government of Shinzo Abe in Japan, where the
government has taken more formal steps towards freeing itself from constraints of a
pacifist constitution, toward actively exercising the right to collective self-defense. In a
major speech delivered at the Asian Security Summit (better known as the Shangri-la
Dialogue) in May 2014 in Singapore, he pledged outmost support for efforts by ASEAN

member countries to ensure the security of the seas and the skies, in the face of
Chinas ambitions to become a global maritime power. In July 1, the Japanese Cabinet
approved a decision that would allow Japan to reinterpret the nation's pacifist

constitution to allow its military to help defend allies, particularly the U.S., which
was welcomed publicly by US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who also
announced that the two countries will be working out new defense guidelines
accordingly.

Even prior to this, Japan had played a role in regional maritime security in Southeast
Asia, primarily through its support for an anti-piracy monitoring and coordination
center based in Singapore. It had provided equipment and training support for the

Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia to improve rescue operations in the event of

maritime accidents or attacks by pirates. The most recent agreement signed this July
was for the turn-over of 10 patrol boats to the Philippines for improved maritime
surveillance, preventing intrusions as well as other operations. Vietnam recently
became eligible for such aid programs.

In the meantime, US rebalance policy which in the discourse is played up both as a
cause (especially in Chinas eyes) or an effect (in the view of some US allies) of Chinas
aggressive (or defensive) position, has become more clear, notwithstanding the Obama
administrations rhetoric intended to avoid Chinese overreaction. Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagels remarks at the Shangri-la Dialogue reflected the most outspoken criticism
yet of Chinas recent actions in the South China Sea, in particular setting up its mega-oil
rig near the Paracels. Hagel accused China of undertaking destabilizing, unilateral
behavior. On the East China Sea disputes between China and Japan, there was little

ambiguity: We made it clear last November that the U.S. military would not

abide by Chinas unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in

the East China Sea, including over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands.
And as President Obama clearly stated in Japan last month, the Senkaku Islands
are under the mutual defense treaty with Japan.

At the political level, competition between China and US for influence over Southeast
Asia is also evident in the alternative visions for regional architecture that have
emerged. China has even begun to pressure ASEAN states more explicitly into choosing
between itself and the United States, and there has developed some regional discourse
about the desirability of multilateral mechanisms that China prefers and those that
would likely involve an important role for US influence: ASEAN Plus Three (without the
US) or the East Asia Summit (with US); Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(without the US) or the Transpacific Partnership (US-led), the more inclusive ASEAN
Regional Forum or the more China-friendly Conference on Interactions and Confidence
Building in Asia (CICA) where US and Japan are merely observers.

ASEAN itself has thus far been largely ineffectual in addressing the challenges in the
South China Sea. Its gradualistic processes and deferential consultations with China led
to an ASEAN-China Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea that was arguably
violated in letter and spirit almost immediately after its conclusion, and there is no
reason to believe that the current Code of Conduct discussions envisioned to lead to a
legally binding agreement will be taken more seriously by the claimants, most especially
China. Furthermore, there are geopolitical shifts under way that are bound to heighten
competition among the great powers for political influence over Southeast Asia,
mirrored to a certain extent in military terms as competition for naval dominance in the
South China Sea and its surroundings. This added layer of conflict may make solutions to
the territorial and maritime jurisdiction as well as fisheries and energy resource
competition challenges more difficult to address.

While this goes on, the Xi Jinping government has put forward a proposal to develop a
new kind of great power relations between China and the United States, one that would
be based on respect for equality and in essence recognition of Chinas new status as a
regional if not a world power. Whether the United States is ready to accept the prospect
of sharing Southeast Asias maritime heartland with a new regional power is uncertain.

To what extent China will be willing to risk reputational and political costs of its
aggressive and more confrontational stance is also uncertain. Whether the Southeast
Asian countries have enough shared interests and priorities, regional solidarity,
persistence and creative energy to continue collectively engaging in shaping a rules-
based and norms-based regional order, and in the process resist being overpowered by
great power interests, is probably most uncertain of all.