Camille May Savillo

LLB 1E

Constitutional Law II Case Digests

LUMIQUED vs. HON. APOLINIO EXEVEA, 282 SCRA 25

FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Cordillera Autonomous Region. President Fidel Ramos dismissed him from that position after
three complaints were filed against him with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The
complaints charged him of malversation through falsification of official documents by padding
gasoline receipts, of violation of COA rules and regulations through making unliquidated cash
advances, and of oppression and harassment.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17,
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution.
The investigating committee found Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him and
recommended his dismissal from office. Former DOJ Secretary Franklin Drilon adopted the
recommendation. President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 52, dismissing Lumiqued
from service.
Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he was denied the constitutional right
to counsel during the hearing. However, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died.
This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus prays for the reversal of the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the due process clause encompasses the right to be assisted by counsel
RULING:
The Court ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or the law. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.
In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of
any crime in the proceedings. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose
of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed
against him.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.

Camille May Savillo

LLB 1E

Constitutional Law II Case Digests

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH LANTION, October 17, 2000

FACTS:
On January 18, 2000, the Court ordered the Secretary of Justice to furnish private respondent
Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant Jimenez a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On February 3,
2000, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Private respondent Mark B.
Jimenez opposed the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process
RULING:
No. The Court holds that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt
or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked
by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an
extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in
the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The concept of due process is flexible for "not
all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the
nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous
and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, the Court accords
greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of
Justice.
The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is granted.

Camille May Savillo

LLB 1E

Constitutional Law II Case Digests

GOVT. OF THE USA vs. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, September 24, 2002

FACTS:
This case is a sequel to Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government requested the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. In Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, the Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by
the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for Extradition. In order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate
arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/ExParte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations
on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be
heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an
alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount
of P100,000. Thereafter, the court issued its Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued
2. Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings
are pending
RULING:
1. No. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and
setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and
execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the
very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested
state.
2. No. The constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Camille May Savillo

LLB 1E

Constitutional Law II Case Digests

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.
Jimenez detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a
violation of his right to due process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard
but does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances, such as
those present in an extradition case, call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In
the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Therefore, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD INC. vs. COMELEC, April 29, 2010

FACTS:
The COMELEC delisted The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system under Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 which states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds: (8) It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or fails to obtain
at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679
deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was
PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. The COMELEC stated in this Resolution that party adversely
affected can file a verified opposition.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, and sought for accreditation as a party-list
organization. PGBI asserted that the Supreme Courts ruling in the Minero case cannot apply in
this controversy because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBIs and that
Minero, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25
others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. It added that the requirement of
Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Courts ruling in Banat v. COMELEC and the exclusion of
PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI
2. Whether PGBIs right to due process was violated
RULING:
1. No. The Court abandoned the Minero ruling and stated it as an erroneous application of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941. Minero cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered
parties under the party-list system. Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list
vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in
an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. This is a confused
interpretation of the law.

Camille May Savillo

LLB 1E

Constitutional Law II Case Digests

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should
therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations
garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of
additional seats.
2. No. PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek,
as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute
lack of notice and hearing. Under the attendant circumstances PGBI was not denied due
process.

BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, December 7, 2010

FACTS:
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III found a
need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed
during the previous administration. Thus, on July 30, 2010, he signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
Petitioner Louis Biraogo. in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails Executive Order No. 1
for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office
and to appropriate funds therefor.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping
the powers of Congress
2. Whether or not the PTC supplants the powers already vested on the Ombudsman and the
DOJ
3. Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws
RULING:
1. Yes. The presidents power to create the PTC may find justification under the presidents duty
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The president has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees (whether
from past or present administrations) faithfully comply with the law. The purpose of ad hoc
investigating bodies such as the PTC is to allow an inquiry into matters which the president is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. No. The Court held that the investigative function of the commission will not supplant nor
threaten the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It will only complement the
functions of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice. The function of the PTC is merely
to recommend prosecution, which is just a consequence of its fact-finding investigation. The
actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges
against them, is not a function given to the PTC.
3. Yes. Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1
in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article

Camille May Savillo

LLB 1E

Constitutional Law II Case Digests

III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners contend that it does not apply
equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the previous
administration as its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility.Thus, in
order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. The
petitioners also argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption
must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo
but also during prior administrations where the same magnitude of controversies and
anomalies were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people.
The petitions are granted and the Court declared Executive Order No. 1 unconstitutional insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.