Case Digests in Special Procedure

Submitted by
Tiosen, Feliz Gemmavyn S.

G.R. No. 163081

June 15, 2007

ANITA UNGAB-VALEROSO, joined in by her husband, RUSELO VALEROSO, Petitioners,

vs.
AMANCIA UNGAB-GRADO, FELIX UNGAB, represented by his son ROSENDO UNGAB,
ESPENILA UNGAB-JAICTIN and RUSTICINA UNGAB-TAMALA, Respondents.

Facts:
Subject of this case is a 14.3375-hectare land in Binuni, Kolambugan, Lanao (now Binuni,
Bacolod, Lanao del Norte) registered in the name of Timoteo Ungab under Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. (P-41)-1,550. Petitioner Anita Ungab is the only child of Timoteo, now deceased.
Respondent Felix Ungab is the brother of Timoteo while the other respondents are the heirs of
Timoteos other brothers and sisters, namely Simeona, Eugenia, Lorenzo, Lazaro, and
Margarito.
In 1972, the heirs of Ciriaco Ungab filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. II-74 in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte against the brothers, sisters and
heirs of Timoteo for the partition, accounting and reconveyance of the subject land. When the
case was called for trial, the parties submitted a written compromise agreement.
On February 15, 1973, the CFI rendered judgment adopting in toto the compromise agreement.
The parties did not have the land partitioned but divided the proceeds of the land in accordance
with the decision. However, in December 1996, Anita refused to give respondents their
respective shares. Respondents then filed against petitioners Anita and her husband Ruselo
Valeroso, a complaint for recovery of possession, partition, enforcement of compromise
agreement and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 4048 with the RTC of Iligan City.
On December 1999, the RTC held that the compromise agreement bound all the parties thereto
including their heirs and assigns, and Timoteos affidavit whose presumption of regularity
petitioners failed to overcome, and the compromise agreement created an express trust which
has not yet prescribed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision
but deleted the award of attorneys fees.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether respondents are truly co-owners of the land, as shown by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment signed by Anita herself?

Held:
YES.
We note, however, that even without the Affidavit of Timoteo, there is still evidence on record
proving that the respondents and Timoteo indeed own the land in common. For one, there is the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment dated August 4, 1960.
Petitioners contend that respondents cannot use the Affidavit of Acknowledgment signed by
Anita and her mother as Anita was misled in signing it. A question involving the due execution of
the Affidavit of Acknowledgment would require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by
the trial court, a matter which this Court cannot do in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. The truth or falsehood of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment is a question of fact, of which
this Court cannot take cognizance. Moreover, the Affidavit of Acknowledgment, being a
notarized document, enjoys the presumption of regularity. Petitioners mere allegation that Anita
was misled by her mother into signing the affidavit could not overcome this presumption.
As properly held by the trial and appellate courts, the execution of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment and the compromise agreement established an express trust wherein the
respondents, as trustors, reposed their confidence on petitioner Anita and her mother, as
trustees, that they will hold the land subject of the co-ownership. There are no particular words
required in the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. This
express trust is shown in the two documents. Express trusts do not prescribe except when the
trustee repudiates the trust.

LORENZO vs. POSADAS

FACTS: Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal
properties. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his
estate were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to
administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years
after the two executors named in the will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he
resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue
(Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for
deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same
time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery.
Posadas overruled Lorenzos protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went to

court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzos complaint and Posadas counterclaim. Both parties
appealed to this court.
*Plaintiff contends that the lower court erred:
In not allowing as lawful deductions, in the determination of the net amount of the estate subject
to said tax, the amounts allowed by the court as compensation to the "trustees" and paid to
them from the decedent's estate.
ISSUE:
WON in determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the
compensation due to trustees?
RULING:
The SC modified the lower courts decision with respect to the deduction of compensation due
to trustees.
Certain items are required by law to be deducted from the appraised gross in arriving at the net
value of the estate on which the inheritance tax is to be computed (sec. 1539, Revised
Administrative Code). In the case at bar, the defendant and the trial court allowed a deduction of
only P480.81. This sum represents the expenses and disbursements of the executors until
March 10, 1924, among which were their fees and the proven debts of the deceased. The
plaintiff contends that the compensation and fees of the trustees, which aggregate P1,187.28
(Exhibits C, AA, EE, PP, HH, JJ, LL, NN, OO), should also be deducted under section 1539 of
the Revised Administrative Code which provides, in part, as follows: "In order to determine the
net sum which must bear the tax, when an inheritance is concerned, there shall be deducted, in
case of a resident, . . . the judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings, . . . ."
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services (Barney vs.
Saunders, 16 How., 535; 14 Law. ed., 1047). But from this it does not follow that the
compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate subject
to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees' commissions to be
deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax (61 C. J., p. 1705).
Furthermore, though a testamentary trust has been created, it does not appear that the testator
intended that the duties of his executors and trustees should be separated. (Ibid.; In re
Vanneck's Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 893; 175 App. Div., 363; In re Collard's Estate, 161 N. Y.
Supp., 455.) On the contrary, in paragraph 5 of his will, the testator expressed the desire that his
real estate be handled and managed by his executors until the expiration of the period of ten
years therein provided. Judicial expenses are expenses of administration (61 C. J., p. 1705) but,
in State vs. Hennepin County Probate Court (112 N. W., 878; 101 Minn., 485), it was said: ". . .
The compensation of a trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate, but in the
management thereof for the benefit of the legatees or devises, does not come properly within
the class or reason for exempting administration expenses. . . . Service rendered in that behalf
have no reference to closing the estate for the purpose of a distribution thereof to those entitled
to it, and are not required or essential to the perfection of the rights of the heirs or legatees. . . .

Trusts . . . of the character of that here before the court, are created for the the benefit of those
to whom the property ultimately passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended for the
preservation of the estate. No sound reason is given to support the contention that such
expenses should be taken into consideration in fixing the value of the estate for the purpose of
this tax.

G.R. No. L-3342

April 18, 1951

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS., petitionersappellees,
vs.
ANG CHIA, as Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO LEE, and
LEE BUN TING,respondents-appellants.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Zalazar for appellants.
Hector Bisnar and Rafael Dinglasan for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal by Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee, and Lee Bun Ting from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Capiz, issued in the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased Lee Liong,
holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an extrajudicial partition and the closing of
said proceedings until after the final termination of Civil Case No. V-331 of the same court,
entitled Rafael Dinglasan, et al., vs. Lee Bun Ting, Claro Lee and Ang Chia, in her personal
capacity and as administratrix of the estate of Lee Liong.
Rafael Dinglasan et al. filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Capiz on February 16, 1948,
against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz, Capiz, and damages in the amount of P1,000 a
month. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver to which
counsel for the defendants objected, and it was only at the hearing of said motion when plaintiffs
discovered that there was pending in the same court a case concerning the intestate estate of
Lee Liong. In view thereof, the motion for the appointment of a receiver was withdrawn and the
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the
administratrix of the estate, who is the same widow Ang Chia, who was already a partydefendant in her personal capacity. In order to protect their interests, the plaintiffs also filed in
the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a coadministrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix in the amount of
P500 be increased to P20,000. By their claim in intervention, the plaintiffs made of record the
pendency of the aforesaid civil case No. V-331 and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not
closed until said civil case shall have been terminated.

On June 21, 1948, the administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and
objected to the motion for the increase of her bond and for the appointment of a coadministrator. On August 4, 1948, the court issued an order denying the petition for a coadministrator but increasing the bond to P5,000, and as regards the petition not to close the
intestate proceedings until after civil case No. V-331 shall have been decided, the court stated
that it would act thereon if a motion to close the proceedings is presented in due time and is
objected to by petitioners. The court however took cognizance of the pendency of said civil case
No. V-331. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and instead
moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that
the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. To this motion the
petitioners objected, whereupon the court issued on July 15, 1949, an order holding in
abeyance the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the decision
in said civil case has been rendered. From this order the administratrix and the heirs appealed
and now assign the following errors:
I
The lower court erred in taking cognizance of and being guided by the supposed "claim" of
petitioners-appellees.
II
The lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
the termination of the separate civil action filed by the petitioners-appellees.
III
The lower court erred in ordering the administratrix to file an increased bond of P5,000.
Under the first assignment of error, the appellants question the validity of the order of the lower
court of August 4, 1948, whereby the court took cognizance of the civil case filed by the
appellees against the administratrix to recover possession of lot No. 398 and damages, and
required the administratrix to file a new bond of P5,000, contending that by taking such action
the court assumed jurisdiction over the case which it cannot do because its jurisdiction as
probate court is limited and especial (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, 37 Phil. 61). They claim
further that probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions are limited to the control
of the property upon the death of its owner and cannot extend to the adjudication of collateral
questions. (I Woermer, The American Law of Administration, 514, 662-663.) Appellees on the
other hand claim that said order of August 4, 1948, is not the subject of this appeal, as no
appeal has been taken by the appellants from said order and the same has long become final;
so that the present appeal is only from the order of the lower court dated July 15, 1949, which
denies the motion of the appellees to terminate the intestate proceedings on the ground that
they have already agreed on the extrajudicial settlement of the estate and to relieve the
administratrix of the obligation of filing an increased bond.
There is merit in the claim of the appellees. It really appears from the record that the order
increasing the bond of the administratrix to P5,000 was issued on August 4, 1948, and from said

order no appeal has been taken by the appellants which has become final long ago and that the
present appeal is only from the order of the lower court dated July 15, 1949. It is true that the
lower court in its later order of July 15, 1949, reiterated its order to the administratrix to file a
new bond in the amount of P5,000 within 30 days after receipt thereof, but this cannot have the
effect of receiving the former order of August 4, 1948, nor does it give the appellants the right to
question in this instance the validity of said order, which has long become final. Moreover, an
order requiring the filing of a new bond by the administratrix is interlocutory in nature and is
solely addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
The act of the lower court in taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 is not tantamount to
assuming jurisdiction over said case nor does it violate the ruling of this court which says that
"when questions arise as to the ownership of property, alleged to be part of the estate of a
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
such questions cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The Court of
First Instance, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which
must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a Court of First
Instance to try and determine ordinary actions. . . ." (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, 37 Phil., 61,
62-63.)
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to
their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said
proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and
distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a
far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking
cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case
but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and
cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no
rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate
action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot entertained. Section 1,
Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal
property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator". What practical value would this provision have if the action against the
administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close
the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule
is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property
alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a
separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
(Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, supra). These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold
that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs.

Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a
time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate
case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case wherein an
administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule nugatory.
Wherefore, the Court affirms the order appealed from, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Case Digest:

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS. v.s. ANG CHIA,
as Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO LEE, and LEE BUN
TING

Facts:
Rafael Dinglasan filed a civil case in the CFI of Capiz against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and
one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located in Capiz.
He also filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The counsel for defendants objected on
the basis that there was a pending case in the same court concerning the intestate estate of Lee
Liong. The plaintiffs withdrew the motion and filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion
of Ang Chia (widow), the administratix of the estate, as a party-defendant. The plaintiffs also
filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a coadministrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix be increased. The
plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the civil case and prayed that the intestate
proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the
administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the motions
made by the plaintiffs. The trial court denied the petition for a co-administrator but increased the
bond to P5,000 and stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the intestate
proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. It also took cognizance of
the pendency of said civil case. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new
bond and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix
on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The
petitioners objected. Subsequently, the CFI of Capiz issued in the intestate estate proceedings
an order holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an extra-judicial partition the
closing of said proceedings until after the final termination of the civil case of the same court.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
WON the lower court may hold the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination
of the separate civil action.

Held:
Yes. A probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of ordinary case because
to hold otherwise would render some rules in the ROC nugatory. Section 1, Rule 88, of the
Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the
estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator" What
practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be

prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings
without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the
estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. Section 17, Rule 3 also implies
that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case
wherein an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule
nugatory. Thus, the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a
far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate.

Vda De Lopez vs Lopez

35 SCRA 81
Facts:
On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the
deceased, filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and
her legitimate children with the deceased. The lower court approved the project of partition and
declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen
days thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, represented by their mother,
Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that
they were illegitimate children of the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital
relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their
shares in the estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the
ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was
already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was
not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual
distributees..
Issue/s:
(1) whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late; and
(2) whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.
Held:
1. The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding
closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or
orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30)
days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only

seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked
on time.
2.
In the recent case of Uriarte vs. Uriarte, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, May 29, 1970, this Court,
thru Justice Arsenio Dizon, pointed out that there are two alternatives for an acknowledged
natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent, to wit: (1) to
intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its reopening if it has
already been closed.
Demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in interest to a testate or intestate
succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the same special proceedings, and not in a
separate action, and the judge who has jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance,
and who, when the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the interested
parties, shall take cognizance of all such questions.

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NELIA S. SILVERIODEE, Respondents.

Facts:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding
for the settlement of her estate.
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to
remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005,
the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On
January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the
premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a
copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on
Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by
private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her
Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was
not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the

premises. Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated
May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the
prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
Issue:
W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are
Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.
Held:
The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed.
The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia SilverioDees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed
under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on
Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule
41.
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated
December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated
May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner
alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and
should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
instead.
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be decided upon.
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the
appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when
such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the
ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of
the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The
purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr.,
was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the
specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31,
2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an
appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of

Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have
been dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in
the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from
the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA

AND ALEJANDRO LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

FACTS:

Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children but
they have legally adopted Juanita Lopez then single but now married to Federico Guilas. Before
the adoption of Juanita, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole
heir and executor. Doa Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita
Lopez as one of her heirs.

Nevertheless, in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez
Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368
and 3441, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as
her share in the estate of Dona Jacinta. The rest of the estate of the deceased was allotted to
Don Alejandro.
On April 23, 1960, the trial court approved the said project of partition and on August 28, 1961,
the same court approved the correction of clerical errors appearing in the project of partition. On
April 10, 1964, Juanita filed a separate ordinary action to compel Alejandro to deliver
immediately to her lots nos. 3368 and 3441 which were allocated to her under the project of
partition.
Alejandro opposed and claims that by virtue of the order dated April 23, 1960 and order of
December 15, 1960 which "ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate
proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches
and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the
estate, when she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60) days from
December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court.

Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs,
and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines
the termination of the probate proceedings; and that she is not guilty of laches, because when
she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for the delivery of her share allocated to her under the
project of partition, less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the amended
project of partition was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the execution of judgment
by motion .
The trial court issued an order suspending the consideration of the action for delivery of the
shares considering that the action for the annulment of the project of partition is a prejudicial
question. Juanita then filed an amended complaint on the action for delivery, where she
acknowledges the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as the allocation in
her favor of the Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is seeking. She then filed a
motion seeking to set aside the order suspending the consideration of the action for delivery on
the ground that she already admitted the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
and it is longer a prejudicial question to her petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery of her
share.
The trial court denied Juanita's motion on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to
suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for
annulment of the project of partition has been finally settled and decided. The MR was denied
ISSUE:

WON Juanita is guilty of latches.

HELD:

NO. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the
probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated; because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed. The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent
action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or
order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of.

Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the
heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited
doctrines.
In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on
July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project
of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of
partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project
of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of
Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15, 1960 of the
probate court closing and terminating the probate case did not legally terminate the testate
proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has not been delivered to her.

TIMBOL V. CANO
Facts: Mercedes Cano died leaving her only son Floranto Timbol as sole heir. Her brother, Jose
Cano, was appointed judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the agricultural lands of the
estate be leased to him at P4,000 which was approved by the court. The court later on
approved the reduction of rent to P2,400 and the conversion of some of the agricultural lands to
a subdivision. A year later, a project of partition was approved by court designating Florante as
the sole heir and he was appointed judicial administrator. He then proposed moved that the area
designated for the subdivision be increased but was opposed by Jose because the enlargement
of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and his tenants will lose their
landholdings. Nevertheless, the court approved Florantes petition hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate court has jurisdiction to annul rights under the contract of lease though it
would prejudice the lessee

Held: YES
In probate proceedings, the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters of
administration of the party best entitled thereto, supervises and controls all acts of
administration, hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased, orders payment
of lawful debts, authorizes sale, mortgage, or any encumbrance or real estate, directs the
delivery of the estate to those entitled. The lease was obtained with the courts approval hence if
the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation or reduction
of the subject of the lease.

And though lessee may be prejudiced by the reduction, reduction alone cannot bar the
reduction of the land leased because such reduction is necessary to raise funds to pay and
liquidate the debts of the estate under administration.

Ariaga vda. De Guerrea, Et al. vs. Suplico

G.r. No 144320 April 26, 2006

Facts:

Ricardo Gurrea, represented by and through his counsel Atty. Enrique Suplico (the defendant),
filed an Opposition in Special Proc. No. 7185. Inconsideration of said representation, Ricardo
Gurrea agreed to pay Atty. Suplico "a contingent fee of twenty (20%) of whatever is due me,
either real or personal property" . During the pendency of the proceedings and upon the oral
instructions of Ricardo Gurrea, Atty. Supliconegotiated with the other heirs of Adelina Gurrea
regarding the transfer of the piso (apartment building) in Spain to Ricardo Gurreas daughter,
Juliet Gurrea de Melendres. Ricardo Gurrea further instructed Atty. Suplico not to enter into any
settlement with the heirs unless the piso is transferred to his daughter. Finally, the transfer of the
piso worth P64,000.00 was executed and the heirs arrived at an amicable settlement regarding
the estate of Adelina Gurrea. Hence, Ricardo Gurrea withdrew his Opposition and the heirs then
drew up a project of partition which was eventually approved by the probate court.

As payment of his attorneys fees, Ricardo Gurrea offered the San Juan lot to Atty. Suplico who
was initially hesitant to accept the same as the property is occupied by squatters. However, in
order not to antagonize his client, Atty. Suplico agreed to Ricardo Gurreas proposal with the
further understanding that he will receive an additional commission of 5% if he sells the Baguio
property. Thereafter, the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was drafted. The said deed was
presented to Ricardo Gurrea for his signature.

On August 20, 1975, the deed was finally signed by Ricardo Gurrea at the office of Atty. Pama,
in the presence of the latter, Atty. Suplico, Victor Tupas and another person, the last two acting
as witnesses.Later, on October 7, 1980, Atty. Suplico registered the deed and obtained a
title/TCT to the San Juan property under his name. Ricardo Gurrea died on October 22, 1980.
After his death, his heirs instituted Special Pro. No. 2722 for the settlement of Ricardo Gurreas
estate.

In the said proceedings, Atty. Suplico filed several claims for unpaid attorneys fees (no claim
was filed relative to Special Proc. No. 7185); however, all were dismissed withfinality . Also in
the same case, the estates administrator, Carlos Gurrea, filed an Inventory of Properties left by
the decedent, which did not initially include the property subject of this case. The said lot was
included only subsequently in the Amended Inventory.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

DULY EXECUTED BY RICARDO GURREA VIOLATES ARTICLE 1491 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE AND, THEREFORE, NULL AND VOID.

Ruling: Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code provides:1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. According to the
evidence for the defendant, a Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the
Executor and Bond dated June 20, 1975was filed in the case, alleging in paragraphs 3 and 5
thereof, that the executor Angel E. Ordoez has already turned over to the respective heirs and
devisees all their respective shares in accordance with the Project of Partition duly approved by
the Court. Thereafter, more than one month from the filing thereof, the Transfer of Rights and
Interest was executed on August 20, 1975. Hence, at the time of the execution of the
questioned document, it may be concluded that Special Proceedings No. 7185 had been
terminated. The property in San Juan is no longer the subject of a litigation and may be
alienated by the client to his lawyer as payment of attorneys fees rendered. It is clear from the
above-quoted ruling of the trial court that its sole basis in concluding that Special Proceedings
No. 7185 had been terminated and that the subject property is no longer the object of litigation
at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed on August 20, 1975 is the
allegation of the executor, Angel E. Ordoez, in his Motion for Termination of Proceeding and
Discharge of the Executor and Bond dated June 20, 1975, that he had already turned over to
the respective heirs and devisees all their respective shares in accordance with the project of
partition duly approved by the probate court.

In the present case, there is no proof to show that at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest was executed, the probate court had issued an order granting the Motion for
Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor and Bond. Since the judge has yet to
act on the above-mentioned motion, it follows that the subject property which is the subject
matter of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest, is still the object of litigation, that is Special

Proceedings No. 7185. Furthermore, we agree with the petitioners undisputed contention that
when the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the title over the subject lot was
still in the name of Adelina Gurrea and that it was only on October 7, 1980 that the title was
transferred in the name of Ricardo. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. In the present case, while the subject lot was assigned as
Ricardos share in the project of partition executed by the heirs of Adelina Gurrea, the title over
the subject lot was still in the name of the latter and was not yet conveyed to Ricardo when the
Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed. It having been established that the subject
property was still the object of litigation at the time the subject deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest was executed, the assignment of rights and interest over the subject property in favor of
respondent is null and void for being violative of the provisions of Article 1491 of the Civil Code
which expressly prohibits lawyers from acquiring property or rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

ANCHETA VS. DALAYGON

G.R. 139868

FACTS: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died, leaving a will and she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard
(husband), who was also designated as executor. The will was admitted to probate before the
Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due
to Richards renunciation of his appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.
Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
Audreys will was also admitted reprobate by then to Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding. As administrator of Audreys estate in
the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1)
Audreys conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at Forbes Park, Makati, Metro
Manila, (Makati property); (2) a current bank account in Audreys name; and (3) shares of stock.
Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was
also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N.
Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any
member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary
administrator.

Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 138, Atty. Ancheta was appointed as ancillary administrator.
Petitioner filed in Special Proceeding, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey
and project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard being apportioned the undivided
interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the
Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111
shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court and directing the
Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a
new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle
( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to
release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy. Since Richard left
his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,
shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to
respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order disapproved the project of
partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richards entire
undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the
trial courts Orders. Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in
accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to
Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely
thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.
CA annulled the trial courts Order, petitioner filed motion for reconsideration, but this
was denied by the CA and they filed a petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the Petitioner commits a fraud in the performance of duties as Ancillary
Administrator of Audreys Estate?
HELD: Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a
position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence
and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or
insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of

prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in
similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the
terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Audrey s was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland U.S.A and she was residing in the Phil.
The last Will and Testament probate before the MaryLand Court and reprobate in the Phil.
Court. Clear showing that petitioner knows the national law of the decedent.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While
such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to
extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latters last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who
are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided
in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside
the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or
of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according
to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of
as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an

official of the court.

BERNARDO v. CA February 28, 1963

FACTS:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died and his
properties were disposed in his will to his wife Hermogena and his 6 cousins which included
Deogracias Bernardo, the executor. The wife died and she was substituted by her collateral
relatives, upon executor Bernardo's petition. Petitioner-executor filed his project of partition, but
was opposed by collateral relatives claiming that of the properties disposed of in the will are
part of the spouses conjugal partnership. Probate court heard evidence. Petitioner contended
that it was donated by the wife to the husband so it was not part of CPG and that the oppositors
cannot question the validity of the donation in the probate proceedings. Oppositors rebutted that
since it was donated during marriage, it was void; hence, the husband did not own it and cannot
dispose it by will. Probate court ordered the donation voided and that executor submit another
project of partition. Petitioner filed Motion for New trial (MNT) on the ground that probate court
had no jurisdiction, but was denied. Petitioner filed for appeal to CA, but was also denied.
Hence, this petition for review by certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probate court can determine a question of ownership over property during
distribution.
HELD:
YES. Probate court has to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the testator's estate
to be distributed to the heirs who are parties to the proceedings.
As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings," except:
a. where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
b. when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to
the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court
may definitely pass judgment thereon
c. all parties give consent so that matters affecting property under judicial administration may be
taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of
third persons are not prejudiced

EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ

G.R. No. 167321 July 31, 2006

Facts
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the
devisees therein. Upon Loretos death a certain Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the
probate of the will. While the petition for the probate of the will was pending, the devisee Oscar
Casa died, intestate. Aquino filed a pleading entitled Appointment of Administrator signed by
Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed
Casa, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate
of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased. Petitioner contested the same.

Issue: Whether or not a person nominated as administrator by purported heirs of a devisee or

legatee in a will under probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate
proceedings despite the fact that such administrator is not the court-appointed administrator of
the estate of the devisee or legatee?

Ruling:
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an
administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his
shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a
prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary
for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. Said
heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.

Salinas vs Tuazon
GR No. 33626, March 2, 1931
FACTS:
On May 31, 1911, Francisco Salinas died in Spain who has been a resident of the Philippines.
There were no records showing when he left the Philippines. Sometime in 1900, Salinas
appointed Teodosio Pintado y Fernandez as his attorney-in-fact to administer his properties with
express authority to delegate his power as such attorney or to appoint his successor.

On April 24, 1905, Fernandez appointed Jose Moreno Lahaba to administer the properties of
Salinas. Lahaba reported the administration of Salinas' properties. Upon the request of the
heirs of Salinas through Spanish consul Vicente Palmalori, Lahaba stated that he only had in
possession the amount of P2500 and ready to deliver to the heirs. Pending receipt, Lahaba
died. Only P2500 was paid and delivered to the Salinas' heirs upon intestation proceedings of
the deceased Lahaba.
Further inquiries were made by the heirs of Salinas and found out that on November 24, 1918,
Lahaba sold two (2) parcels of land to Thomas Ortiz Luis paying only P5000 and subject to
annual installments of P5000 mortgaged the remaining P25000 to secure its payment in favor of
Lahaba. When Lahaba died, a balance of P20000 was still unpaid.
No report was further submitted by Lahaba from July 1911 up to his death in 1920 despite
inquiries made by the heirs of Salinas.
On May 26, 1928, Ana Callejon Salinas, et. al., through the Consul General of Spain in the
Philippines, initiated an action before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila to recover the
sum of P30,000 with interest at 10% to be reckoned from November 24, 1918 and claimed
thatthey were the heirs os Francisco Salinas.
Defendants demurred to the complaint but the court overruled. Defendants filed their answer on
the following grounds:
(1) lack of jurisdiction as the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter
(2) res judicata as to plaintiff's claim for the heirs were already paid P2500
(3) prescription that the action has already prescribed
(4) Lahaba spent P16000 for clearing said lands and for the survey and registration thereof.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the claim has already prescribed
(2) Whether or not P30000 is a claim against the estate of Lahaba

HELD:
(1)No.
"As a general rule, a trust estate is exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations. A
trustee, however, may acquire the trust estate by prescription provided there is repudiation of
the trust and this fact is known to the cestui que trust. The repudiation must be clear, open and
unequivocal. In that case the statute will commence to run from and after said repudiation and
the knowledge thereof by the cestui. Furthermore, prescription in order to be available as a
defense, the trustee must prove that there was a direct repudiation of the trust and that the
cestui que trust or beneficiary had knowledge thereof. Such is the rule as found in Vol. 37, C. J.,
secs. 249, 295 and 296, pp. 923-926.
SEC. 294. (2) Repudiation of Trust and Assertion of Adverse Claim (a) In General. In the
case of an express trust limitations do not start to run in favor of the trustee until the trust is
repudiated. A doctrine, the validity of which has been questioned, applying to all express trusts,
regardless of the manner in which the trust was created, is that if the trustee openly repudiates
the trust and asserts an adverse claim to the trust property, these facts being known to the

cestui que trust, the statute begins to run in the trustee's favor, although not until then, and even
though the trust is a resulting one, or a trust ex maleficio, . . . . And the general rule above
stated applies in favor of persons who become trustees by construction of law, and in case of a
voluntary constructive trust. As the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense to be alleged
and proved, it is incumbent upon the trustee to show that there was a direct repudiation of the
trust and that the cestui que trust had knowledge thereof. Every intendment and presumption is
against a repudiation.
SEC. 295. (b) Necessity for Notice But a trustee's repudiation of an express trust, or a trust
subject to the rule governing express trusts, and his assertion of an adverse interest will not be
sufficient to start the statute of limitations in motion, unless knowledge or notice of such
repudiation and claim is brought home to the cestui que trust, and the statute begins to run
when and only when the cestui que trust acquires the knowledge or receives the notice.
SEC. 296. (c) Character and Circumstances of Repudiation and Notice To set the statute in
motion the trustee's repudiation and adverse claim, whether by acts or words repudiation
may be proved by circumstances must be clear, open and unequivocal, and must be so
clearly and fully made known to the cestui que trust as to make it incumbent upon him to assert
his equitable rights. Mere failure of the trustee to respond to repeated inquiries addressed to
him by the cestui que trust is not enough. To constitute a repudiation there must be something
said or done by the trustee in open contravention of the terms of the trust, and of such character
that the relations of the parties will become and continue hostile."
(2) No. The P30000 is not a claim against the estate of Lahaba because it is not indebtedness
of Lahaba but represents the price of trust property administered by Lahaba who failed and
refused to account the properties.

Nual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005

RULING: REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; ONCE IT BECOMES FINAL,
MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT; EXCEPTIONS. In the case of Manning
International Corporation v. NLRC, (195 SCRA 155, 161 [1991]) We held that ". . ., nothing is
more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardle
ss of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the
highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course,
where the judgment is void." Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose."
FACTS: Case arose from a Civil Case filed by one Emma Lyon de Leon in her behalf and as
guardian ad litem of the minors Helen Sabarra and Kenny Sabarre, against Nual (now
deceased), as represented by her heirs. The subject parcel of land is located in Isabela, Basilan

City, subject for partition, to which Luisa Nual was in possession since 1946. She made no
accounting of the income derived from the property. It was petitioned that the decisions be
turned in their favor as Luisa is not a legitimate child. Hence the petition that the right over the
subject property be given to Lyon-de Leon and not of Nuals heirs, be overturned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter and , and may not be
amended, or modified?