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Table of Contents
1.
2.
Assumptions ...................................................................................................... 17
3.
4.
5.
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Table of Figures
Figure 1-1 : CO2 Phase Diagram ..................................................................... 4
Figure 1-2 : CO2 Pressure - Enthalpy Diagram ................................................ 6
Figure 1-3 : Proposed Offshore Infrastructure ............................................... 10
Figure 1-4 : Pressure Upstream of the Offshore Depressurisation Orifice as
Function of Time (Gas Phase Operation) ................................................ 13
Figure 1-5 : Pressure Upstream of the Offshore Depressurisation Orifice as a
Function of Time (Dense Phase Operation) ............................................. 14
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1.
1.1
Introduction
This design philosophy describes the design requirements for the
Offshore Infrastructure Pressure Letdown system. The design
philosophy will ensure that a consistent approach is taken by all
parties throughout the design, construction and operational phases
of the project.
This document will cover the following elements:
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1.2
The CO2 phase diagram has 3 phases gaseous, liquid and solid.
The triple point (5 bara, -56.7C) is defined as the temperature and
pressure where three phases (gas, liquid and solid) can exist
simultaneously in thermodynamic equilibrium. The critical point
(72 bara, 31.1C) is the point above which the liquid and gas phase
cannot exist as separate phases. Another feature is the solid-fluid
phase boundary. Physically this boundary means that the gas /
liquid and solid can co-exist and transform back and forth by
removal or addition of latent heat.
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1.2.2
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DensePhase
GasPhase
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1.3
It is assumed that all the vessels and pipework will be fully rated for
the maximum pressure that could be seen. Full flow process
pressure relief will therefore not be required.
1.3.1.2
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1.3.1.3
Fire/Thermal Relief
Fire relief would normally be provided for the process vessels for a
typical hydrocarbon gas duty. However, CO2 is not flammable or
explosive and as such poses no risk. Obviously the rupture of the
vessel/pipework itself in the event of a fire would be unacceptable.
However, the causes of a fire in a non flammable process would
have to be considered and credible scenarios whereby a pool fire
or impingement fire could occur would need to be demonstrated. It
is highly unlikely that such a scenario could occur, although there is
the potential if a fired heater is used in the development (e.g. dense
phase mode of operation.
It is usual for an electrical heater in a hydrocarbon system to be
protected against overpressure due to overheating. This is usually
catered for by the provision of a relief valve on the shell of the
exchanger. However, consideration should be placed on the
elimination of this type of relief valve on the CO2 system.
Consideration should be given to utilizing a high temperature trip
on the shell in conjunction with a high temperature trip(s) on the
heating elements.
When the design matures further thought will be required into
whether venting for CO2 fire or thermal relief should be provided
for.
1.3.1.4
Maintenance Venting
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1.4
Mode of
Operation
Approx.
Operating
Pressure
(barg)
Estimated
Density
at 4C
(kg/m3)
Physical
Volume
(m3)
Mass
Inventory
(kg)
Gas
Volume
(Sm3)
Gas Phase
35
~90
59
5,310
2854
Dense Phase
80
~950
59
56,050
30,121
Dense Phase
150
~980
59
57,820
31,072
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1.5
Depressurisation Times
The time to depressurise the individual sections is driven by a
number of technical and HSE factors. The HSE factors are outwith the scope of this report as they pertain to issues such as
dispersion and corresponding risk to individuals from suffocation
etc. These are considered in a separate report.
A range of typical depressurisation times have been determined for
a range of orifice sizes for both gas phase and dense phase
operation. The primary driver for depressurisation is obviously the
mass inventory and pressure of the CO2 within the system.
Typically as the pressure declines during depressurisation through
a fixed orifice or valve opening, the driving force reduces with time
and the depressurisation rate declines giving a classic decay profile
(see figures 1-4 and 1-5). It should be noted that the curves
presented are typical only, and that these curves are provided to
show how the pressure could decline to atmospheric pressure.
Depending
on
the
depressurisation
orifice
size
(i.e.
depressurisation rate), it is estimated that the system can be let
down at the following rates from gas phase or dense phase
operating conditions:
0.25"
0.5"
0.75"
1"
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1.6
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1.7
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2. Assumptions
1. It is assumed that all the vessels and pipework will be fully rated
for the maximum pressure that could be seen. Full flow process
pressure relief will therefore not be required.
2. It is assumed that the Offshore Infrastructure Let-down System
will be designed to handle a maximum inventory of CO2 from the
topsides isolation valve, installed at the top of the riser through
to the isolation at the wells. The isolation to the wells could also
include the inventory down to the subsurface isolation valve.
At this stage of design it is assumed that if the sealine were
required to be depressurised, the CO2 inventory in the flowline
would be displaced with an alternative motive fluid (i.e. dry air)
into the reservoir. The sealine could then be depressurised after
being emptied of CO2. If this changes then the design (capacity)
of the system may need to be modified.
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3.
Design Requirements
3.1
Blowdown Initiation
The scenarios that should initiate a blowdown of the Offshore
Infrastructure should be confirmed at the next stage of design.
3.2
Blowdown Criteria
Unlike a typical oil and gas installation there should not be a
requirement to blowdown the offshore installation within a specific
timeframe.
There could however be a requirement to limit the speed of
blowdown to avoid creating wall temperatures in the system below
the design temperature. This is an issue where boiling liquids are
present during depressurisation (i.e. dense phase mode). Using an
extended blowdown time will ensure that the operation becomes
less adiabatic i.e. the fluid will have more time to warm due to the
heat transfer with the surroundings.
3.3
Blowdown Pressure
It is recommended that the system pressure is not depressurised to
below a pressure of 7 barg. This will avoid the potential for solid
formation within the transportation system following a blowdown
event.
3.4
Blowdown Piping
A conventional collection header, drum and vent stack
arrangement cannot be used owing to the high potential for solids
blockage. The blowdown piping and vent stack needs to be
designed to avoid blockage with solids.
A fully rated flare system may require to be installed to guard
against this potential outcome.
3.5
Vent Location
The vent location needs to be placed in a suitable location that will
limit the potential asphyxiation risks to personnel.
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3.6
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4.
Mandatory References
M1
5.
Supporting References
S1
S2
S3
S4