G E N E R A L

T E R M S
F O L L O W I N G
S P E C I A L
T E R M S (EJUSDEM GENERIS)
It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular ands p e c i f i c m e a n i n g , s u c h g e n e r a l w o r d s a r e n o t t o b e c o n s t r u e d i n t h e i r widest extent,
but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
But thisr u l e m u s t b e d i s c a r d e d w h e r e t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n i s p l a i n t o t h e contrary. T h i s r u l e i s
c o m m o n l y c a l l e d t h e e j u s d e m g e n e r i s r u l e , b e c a u s e i t teaches us that broad and comprehensive
expressions in an act, such asand all others, or any others, are usually to be restricted to personsor things of the
same kind or class with those specially named in the preceding words.Rule of
ejusdem generis
merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain
G E N E R A L
T E R M S
F O L L O W I N G
S P E C I A L
T E R M S (EJUSDEM GENERIS)
It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular ands p e c i f i c m e a n i n g , s u c h g e n e r a l w o r d s a r e n o t t o b e c o n s t r u e d i n t h e i r widest extent,
but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
But thisr u l e m u s t b e d i s c a r d e d w h e r e t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n i s p l a i n t o t h e contrary. T h i s r u l e i s
c o m m o n l y c a l l e d t h e e j u s d e m g e n e r i s r u l e , b e c a u s e i t teaches us that broad and comprehensive
expressions in an act, such asand all others, or any others, are usually to be restricted to personsor things of the
same kind or class with those specially named in the preceding words.Rule of
ejusdem generis
merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.
EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCLUSION
It is a general rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount
to an express exclusionof all others.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Except:

When there is manifest of injustice

When there is no reason for exception

I n d i v i d u a l s t a t e m e n t s b y m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s o n t h e f l o o r d o n o t necessarily reflect legislative
intent. The best interpreter of the law or any of its provisions is the author of thelaw.
CHAPTER VIIISTRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
If a statute should be strictly construed, nothing should be included within the scope that does not
c o m e c l e a r l y w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e language used.But the rule of strict construction is not applicable where the
meaning of the statute is certain and unambiguous , for under these circumstances,there is no need for construction.O n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , t h e r e a r e m a n y s t a t u t e s w h i c h w i l l b e l i b e r a l l y construed. The meaning of the statute may be
extended to matters whichcome within the spirit or reason of the law or within the evils which the law seeks to suppress
or correct.L i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l a w o r r u l e s , h o w e v e r , a p p l i e s
onl y in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t l i t i g a t i o n i s n o t a g a m e o f technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted ina c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e t o i n s u r e a n o r d e r l y
a n d speedy administration of justice.
PENAL STATUTES
Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in favor of t h e a c c u s e d . H e n c e , i n t h e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a p e n a l s t a t u t e , t h e tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with
suchstrictness as to safeguard the right of the accused.
I f t h e s t a t u t e i s a m b i g u o u s a n d a d m i t s o f t w o r e a s o n a b l e b u t contradictory
c o n s t r u c t i o n s , t h a t w h i c h o p e r a t e s i n f a v o r o f a p a r t y accused under its provisions is to be preferred.
TAX LAWS
Taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and p r o p e r t y r i g h t s o f t h e p e o p l e a n d
t a k e s f r o m t h e m a p o r t i o n o f t h e i r property for the support of the government.A c c o r d i n g l y, i n c a s e o f d o u b t ,
t a x s t a t u t e s m u s t b e c o n s t r u e d s t r i c t l y against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for

taxes,b e i n g b u r d e n s , a r e n o t t o b e p r e s u m e d b e y o n d w h a t t h e a p p l i c a b l e statute expressly and

clearly declares.Any claim for exemption from a tax statute is strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the state.
NATURALIZATION LAW
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
INSURANCE LAW
C o n t r a c t s o f I n s u r a n c e a r e t o b e c o n s t r u e d l i b e r a l l y i n f a v o r o f t h e insured and strictly against the
insurer. Thus, ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS
D o u b t s i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Wor k m e n s C o m p e n s a t i o n a n d L a b o r C o d e s h o u l d b e r e s o l v e d i n
f avor of the worke r. It shoul d be li be ral l yconst ru ed t o at t ai n t hei r l audabl e obj ect i ve, i .e., to gi ve
r e l i e f t o t h e workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should dieor sustain in an injury.
The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by its own terms, requires a
construction of utmost liberalityin their favor.
RETIREMENT LAWS
Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retirees
sustenance and comfort, whenhe is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.
ELECTION RULES
Statute providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to theend that the will of the people in the choice of
public officer may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
RULES OF COURT
R u l e o f c o u r t s h a l l b e l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d i n o r d e r t o p r o m o t e t h e i r objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by its own terms, requires a
construction of utmost liberalityin their favor.
RETIREMENT LAWS
Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retirees
sustenance and comfort, whenhe is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.
ELECTION RULES
Statute providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to theend that the will of the people in the choice of
public officer may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
RULES OF COURT
R u l e o f c o u r t s h a l l b e l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d i n o r d e r t o p r o m o t e t h e i r objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
CHAPTER XCONFLICTING STATUTES
EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE ENTIRE STATUTE
It may happen that in a statute, conflicting clauses and provisions mayarise. If such situation may occur, the
statute must be construed as a whole.
STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA
Statutes that relate to the same subject matter, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or
object.Statutes in
pari materia
are to be construed together; each legislative acti s t o b e i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o o t h e r a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e
s a m e matter or subject.However, if statutes of equal theoritical application to a particular casecannot be reconciled,
the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of legislative will.
GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES
Sometimes we find statutes treating a subject in general terms andanother treating a
p a r t o f t h e s a m e s u b j e c t i n p a r t i c u l a r l y d e t a i l e d manner.If both statutes are irreconcilable, the
general statute must give way to t h e s p e c i a l o r p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s a s a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e
g e n e r a l provisions.
This is so even if the general statute is later enactment of the legislature a n d b r o a d e n o u g h t o i n c l u d e t h e
c a s e s i n s p e c i a l l a w u n l e s s t h e r e i s manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law.

STATUTE AND ORDINANCE

If there is conflict an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way.It is a well-settled rule that a
substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural law.A general law cannot repeal a special law.I n c a s e o f c o n f l i c t
b e t w e e n a g e n e r a l p r o v i s i o n o f a s p e c i a l l a w a n d a particular provision of a general law, the latter will prevail.When
there is irreconcilable repugnancy between a proviso and the bodyof a statute, the former prevails as latest expression of legislative
intent. T h e e n a c t m e n t o f a l a t e r l e g i s l a t i o n w h i c h i s g e n e r a l l a w c a n n o t b e construed to have
repealed a special law.A statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus the later cannot repeal or amend it.Where
the instrument is susceptible of two interpretations, one which will make it invalid and illegal and another which
will make it valid and legal, the latter interpretation should be adopted.In case of conflict between an administrative order
and the provisions of the Constitutions, the latter prevails.
ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the
particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically
named by the particular words.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to carry out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law;
the rule must give way in favor of the legislative intent;
limitations of ejusdem generis
requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a broader meaning.
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES the EXCLUSION of OTHERS or
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become part of the statute ; and the security of men's lives and property, require that
they should be adhered to: for precedents serve to regulate our conduct ; and there is more danger to be apprehended from uncertainty,
than from any exposition; because, when the rule is settled, men know how to conform to it; but, when all is uncertain, they are left in
the dark, and constantly liable to error; for the same offence which, at one time, was thought entitled to clergy, at another, may be
deemed capital ; and thus the life or death of the citizen will be made to depend, not upon a fixt rule, but upon the opinion of the
judge, who may happen to try him, than which a more miserable state of things cannot be conceived.
1. Presumption of Correctness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the statute to be valid." Consequently, the burden to show
the constitutional defect is on the challenger. "Every act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional, and the Constitution is to
be given a liberal construction so as to sustain the enactment in question, if practicable." "When the constitutionality of an act is
challenged, a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the challenge. All laws are presumed to be constitutional and this
presumption is one of the strongest known to the law.
b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of
existing law and interpretations thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, if two statutes are in pari
materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends
the earlier enacted statute.
c. "The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation.
d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise "as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the
amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act, a formal change-rebutting the presumption of substantial change.
e. " We "assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute."
f. when current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is a presumption that the CONGRESS, in amending a statute,
intended to effect a substantive change in the law. "Further, we assume that CONGRESS amendments to a statute are purposeful,
rather than unnecessary.
g. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that it is a presumption of statutory construction that, where both general and
specific statutes appear to address a matter, CONGRESS intends the specific statute to control the subject

h. "When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law," it is presumed that CONGRESS intended to
override any potential conflicts with earlier legislation.
i. "The construction of statutes by agencies charged with administration of those statutes is entitled to great weight. A decision of an
agency specified to execute the law made by CONGRESS carries great weight and is entitled to deference unless it is proven the
agency erred. The grant of regulatory authority extends only to duties or powers conferred by law. As such, "regulations, promulgated
pursuant to definitive statutory authority, have the force and effect of law. Moreover, those regulations which "clearly and explicitly
mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to be sustained. Any regulation of the Department must be reasonably grounded in an
identifiable and definitive statutory foundation. "Generally, the court accords substantial deference to an agency's interpretations of its
own regulations. Provided the interpretation "does not violate the Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
j. we will overturn COURTs decision only if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary or capricious" and thus a "clear abuse of
delegated discretion." On the other hand, an "agency does not possess specialized competence over the interpretation of a statute
merely because it addresses topics within the agency's delegable authority. Pure statutory construction, a matter within the "core
competency of the judiciary," . "This axiom stems from basic principles of separation of powers. It is emphatically the province and
duty of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say what the law is. It necessarily follows that the a priori question whether the statute
delegates or withholds discretion is itself a question of statutory interpretation, one implicating our duty of de novo review."
k. "The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's reasoning, correctly noting that courts give "great
deference" to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. This deference stems from Code 2.2-4027, which requires that
reviewing courts "take due account" of the "experience and specialized competence of the agency" promulgating the regulation. Even
so, "deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the
principles of construction courts normally employ. No matter how one calibrates judicial deference, the administrative power to
interpret a regulation does not include the power to rewrite it. When a regulation is "not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the
agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to adjudicate their way around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines the
notice and public hearing procedures of the rulemaking process - thereby putting in jeopardy the "enhanced political accountability of
agency policy decisions adopted through the rulemaking process" and the democratic virtue of allowing "all potentially affected
members of the public an opportunity to participate in the process of determining the rules that affect them.
l. "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts with the language of the statute or when the interpretation has
not been consistently and regularly applied, the usual deference accorded to an agency's interpretation should be withheld.
m. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over that
implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation). The legislative and executive functions are not
combined. But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial
determination of the rule's meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power,
a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the
person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague
statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own rule
encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.
Construed Against the State/ Vagueness
a. "It is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes must be construed strictly against the state and favorably to the liberty of the
citizen. The maxim is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and on the plain principle that the power of
punishment is vested in the legislature and not in the judicial department. No man incurs a penalty unless the act which subjects him
to it is clearly within the spirit and letter of the statute which imposes such penalty. There can be no constructive offenses, and before
a man can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute. If these principals are violated, the fate of the
accused is determined by the arbitrary discretion of the judges and not by the express authority of the law."
b. "When a statute is penal in nature, it "must be strictly construed against the STATE and in favor of an accused.
c. "While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the STATE in criminal cases, "we will not apply 'an
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute' that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.
d. "In determining whether a legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court has considered whether the words
used have a well-settled . . . meaning . . . (citing dictionary to determine "generally understood" meaning for adjective in ordinance).
"A penal statute is void for vagueness if it both fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that her contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute and encourages selective prosecution
Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v. Affirmative Defense
1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to their application, the limiting
language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which the prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may
determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. In

determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the
intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the underlying facts
sustaining the applicability of the limitation. When determining whether the limiting language is a negative element or a statutory
defense, this Court has identified four factors to be considered: 'the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words
in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general
prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets
forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.' An application of these
factors to the present case demonstrates that the phrase "except as provided by law," as used in Code 29.1-553, establishes a
statutory defense as opposed to a negative element
2) "In order to resolve whether there is a due process violation in this case, we first must address the threshold issue of whether the
absence of a valid prescription is an affirmative defense or a negative element of the offense. If it is the latter, the burden of proof is on
the STATE, and it cannot be shifted to the accused...When construing penal statutes which contain qualifications, exceptions or
exemptions to their application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which the prosecution must
disprove. Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the
prima facie case of the prosecution. The ACCUSED BEARS THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF THE NEGATION of
circumstances sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt.
In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of
the offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective
parties to assert the existence or absence of the underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. Accordingly, we should
consider the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation
prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an
excuse or justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. (It is undoubtedly the general rule that the state must prove all the essential facts
entering into the description of the offense. But it has been held in many cases that when a negation of a fact lies peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant it is incumbent on him to establish that fact).
We next observe that the "valid prescription" exemption of Code 18.2-250 relates to a fact that would be solely within the
knowledge of the accused. If we accept appellant's contention that the STATE must prove appellant had no valid prescription, the
offense would be virtually unprovable. Under appellant's theory, to obtain a conviction under the facts of this case, the STATE would
be required to prove that no medical professional, wherever located, in this Commonwealth or elsewhere, had prescribed the drug to
appellant. This would involve a nationwide search of chain drugstores, as well as independent pharmacies, hospitals, prison
infirmaries, etc. Appellant, at oral argument, conceded that such an undertaking would most likely be impossible. CONGRESS clearly
did not intend such a result, nor would they enact such an impotent statute

Constitutional Construction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people not therein expressed.
2)The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards and
preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and modes of thought and life of the people as developed under the
common law and as existing at the time of its adoption to the extent and therein statedThe purpose and object sought to be attained
by the framers of the constitution is to be looked for, and the will and intent of the people who ratified it is to be made effective. As
we have stated, CONGRESS may enact any law or take any action not prohibited by express terms, or by necessary implications by
the Constitution.
3)A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY implied guaranteed by the constitution
4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not rule upon the constitutionality of a statute unless such a
determination is absolutely necessary to decide the merits of the case. A statute will be construed to avoid a constitutional question
whenever this is possible.
5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by CONGRESS (note it is congress construing, not the supreme court, that is why
it is CALLED CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION)is entitled to consideration, and if the construction is
contemporaneous with adoption of the constitutional provision, it is entitled to great weight. In addition, Long acquiescence in such
an announced construction so strengthens it that it should not be changed unless plainly wrong.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-EXECUTING OR MANDATORY.
A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for its enforcement.
A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty or requirement that must be followed.
A Directory provision sets forth procedures or " confers discretion on the legislature" for its implementation.
7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE DE NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute
is challenged, we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be constitutional. Where a statute is

constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional
on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation. As a general rule, "a party has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a statute, departs from the express limitations of the Constitution
and relies instead on implied constitutional restrictions, the legislative usurpation must be very clear and palpable to justify the courts
holding that an enactment is unconstitutional.
9) "This Courts jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is well established. The fact that many things of a diverse nature
are authorized or required to be done in the body of the act, though not expressed in its title is not objectionable, if what is authorized
by the act is germane to the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate and natural association therewith, or is congruous
therewith, the title is sufficient. [I]f there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its
sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless it is plainly so. The analysis of a particular act
must necessarily stand on its own, and we must look to both the body and to the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether
the act violates the Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on
the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation." We have said
that classification ordinarily will be upheld "if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived that would support it." But where the
statute creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race, sex, or religion) or where it affects a fundamental constitutional right, the
presumption of constitutionality fades, and the "strict scrutiny" test, rather than the more relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.
11) "Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning," "afresh," "anew," "beginning again."
Retroactive Enactment of Laws
1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the rights of the parties are to be deemed in accordance with
the law in effect when the action is begun, unless the amended statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. (Our analysis is
guided by the fundamental principles of statutory construction that retroactive laws are not favored, and that a statute is always
construed to operate prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest.); New laws will apply only to future cases unless
there is something in the very nature of the case, or in the language of the new provision, which shows that the new law was intended
to have a retrospective effect. Further, every reasonable doubt is resolved against a retroactive operation of a statute, and words of a
statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be
annexed to them . Retroactive effect will be given to a statute only when legislative intent that a statute be so applied is stated in clear,
explicit, and unequivocal terms.

Common Law
1) In construing statutes, the statutory definition must prevail over the common law definition
2) CONGRESS is presumed to have known and to have had the common law in mind in the enactment of a statute. The statute must
therefore be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from
express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law.
3) "We also apply the established principle that a statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the legislative
intent to do so is plainly manifested. Therefore, a statutory change in the common law will be recognized only in that which is
expressly stated in the words of the statute or is necessarily implied by its language.
4) " A statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested.
"Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond
their express terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory change in the common law is limited to that which is expressly stated in the statute or
necessarily implied by its language because there is a presumption that no change was intended. "When an enactment does not
encompass the entire subject covered by the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its terms are
directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule

Previous Construction of a Statute

1) "Where a statute has been construed by the courts, and is then re-enacted by the legislature, the construction given to it is
presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature, and thenceforth becomes obligatory upon the courts." Hence, when the court finds the
old construction should be modified, it cannot anymore, since the court is BOUND by its old construction because such statute was
RE-Enacted.
2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long history of definition by" the courts, and therefore, it "carries its historical construction" when
used by CONGRESS in a statute.

3) "We have said that when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same
language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as well. (STARE DECIS
becomes the interpretation and construction of a law or STATUTE that is ambiguous even if it was applied to a private case)
New Law New Remedy
4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute prescribing a new remedy for an existing right should never
be construed to abolish a pre-existing remedy in the absence of express words or necessary implication. Further, " 'when a statute
gives a new remedy, and contains no negative, express or implied, of the old remedy, the new one provided by it is cumulative, and the
party may elect between the two.'

Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same Subject

1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same subject should not be read in isolation. Such statutes should be considered
in pari materia. Moreover, statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be construed together to achieve a harmonious result,
resolving conflicts to give effect to legislative intent. An accepted principle of statutory construction is that, when it is not clear
which of two statutes applies, the more specific statute prevails over the more general. Also, when statutes provide different
procedures on the same subject matter, "the general must give way to the specific.
"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of your questions and in accord with the rule of statutory construction in pari materia,
statutory provisions are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law. Such provisions are to be considered as a whole,
or as parts of a greater connected, homogeneous system of laws, or a single and complete statutory compilation.
Statutes in pari materia are considered as if they constituted but one act, so that sections of one act may be considered as
though they were parts of the other act.
As a general rule, where legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a system of related general provisions
indicative of a settled policy, new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing
system and to be carried into effect conformably to it, and they should be so construed as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of
the system and make the scheme consistent in all its parts and uniform in its operation, unless a different purpose is shown plainly or
with irresistible clearness. It will be assumed or presumed, in the absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the
legislature did not intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or violate a general statute or system of statutory provisions the
entire subject matter of which is not directly or necessarily involved in the act (noting that in absence of words to contrary, legislature
did not intend to alter or repeal general statute or system).
3) Closely related statutes must be read as being consistent with one another. Two statutes which are closely interrelated must be read
and construed together and effect given to all of their provisions. Statutes should be construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and
force and effect should be given the provisions of each.
4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. 'In interpreting statutes, "courts
should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment. Potentially conflicting
statutes should be harmonized to give force and effect to each.
5) City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the Constitution. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both
can be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.

The Meaning of Words

1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are presumed to have their usual and ordinary meaning.
3) A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be presumed to have some effect, and not be treated
as meaningless unless absolutely necessary. "We must assume that the legislature did not intend to do a vain and useless thing. "It is a
well established rule of construction that a statute ought to be interpreted in such a manner that it may have effect, and not found to
be vain and elusive. "A word or clause contained in a statute may only be rejected as surplusage if it "appears to have been inserted
through inadvertence or mistake, and which is incapable of any sensible meaning," or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the statute.
4) "We will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or phrase, but will construe the words and terms at issue in the
context of the other language used in the statute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, that intention must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity. "The
Court has stated the related principle that "the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any
curious, narrow, or strained construction." Statutes should not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd or irrational consequences.
6) "A statute must be construed with reference to its subject matter, the object sought to be attained, and the legislative purpose in
enacting it; the provisions should receive a construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose rather than one which will
defeat it.

7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly clear and definite, effect must be given to it. It is
unnecessary to resort to any rules of statutory construction when the language of a statute is unambiguous. In those situations, the
statute's plain meaning and intent govern.
"Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, is
difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness.
9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines "valid" as "Legally sufficient; binding." (noting that if the STATUTE does not
provide a statutory definition we may look to the dictionary definition to determine legislative intent
10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions with a comma followed by the disjunctive word "nor." We
have noted that, pursuant to the rules of grammar, "phrases separated by a comma and [a] disjunctive . . . are independent. The
disjunctive serves to connect the two parts of the sentence but also to keep them separate and independent.
12) "The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But
when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately,
perversely[.] The word is also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful. The term "willful act"
imports knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The act done must be intended or it must involve a
reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably result in an injury. [T]he term "gross, wanton, and culpable" describes
conduct. The word "gross" means "aggravated or increased negligence" while the word "culpable" means "deserving of blame or
censure." 'Gross negligence' is culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful
nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce
injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of,
the probable result of his acts
13) "But, courts are not permitted to add language to a statute nor are they permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial
interpretation." Rather, when the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language and
may not assign a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually has stated.
14) "It is equally well established, however, that if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a regulatory interpretation by
the Department that is in conflict with the plain language of the statute cannot be sustained.
15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of persons or things is enumerated in a statute and general words
follow, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less general, particular words. Likewise,
according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated words) when general and specific words are grouped, the general words are
limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific words.
16) If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within its terms, the exception negates the idea that any other
class is to be excepted.
17) One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last antecedent doctrine, is particularly applicable here and can be summarized as
follows: Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The
last antecedent is 'the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence.'
Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the provision or clause immediately preceding it. (explaining and applying "the
grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying
only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows . . . ."); (noting that construction of a statute according to the last antecedent rule is
"quite sensible as a matter of grammar
19) "An erroneous interpretation of a statute by those charged with its enforcement cannot be permitted to override [the statute's] clear
meaning. Amendments of statutes can only be made by the legislature and not by the courts or administrative officers charged with
their enforcement
20) "But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we presume that the same term has the same meaning when it
occurs here and there in a single statute, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that presumption as effectively irrebuttable. We also
understand that [m]ost words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they
occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same section. Thus, the natural
presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning is not rigid and
readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion
that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent. Ibid. A given term in the same statute may take on distinct
characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies."
Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the same place") is the term used to provide an endnote or footnote citation orreference for
a source that was cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is similar in meaning to idem (meaning something that has been
mentioned previously; the same), abbreviated Id., which is commonly used in legal citation.[1] To find the ibid.source, one must look at
the reference preceding it.

21) "Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or," are independent. (finding that, the word "or" connects two
parts of a sentence, "'but disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting disjunctive results in alternatives, which must be treated separately);
(finding that limiting phrase in statute is independent of and does not modify two earlier phrases because the limiting phrase is
separated from the first two by a comma and the disjunctive "or"); (interpreting the use of a comma and the disjunctive "or" as
implying two separate and independent phrases in a Virginia statute authorizing payment of dividends by corporation "out of net
earnings, or out of its net assets in excess of its capital"). Accordingly, the phrase, "made by the Defendant to any law enforcement
officer," is independent of and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded statement or confessions."
Inconsistent Regulations/Laws
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of Executive Departments have the force of law, and
that any Executive Department concerned with the execution of a statutes interpretation of its governing statutes, as reflected in its
regulations, is entitled to great weight. Regulations, however, may not conflict with the authorizing statute. Whether a regulation is
inconsistent with its enabling legislation is properly a subject of judicial review.
If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given effect, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize them and not
nullify the ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with STATUTES. Such ordinances are inconsistent with state law when they
cannot co-exist with a statute. The fact that a county or municipal ordinance enlarges on a statute's provisions does not create a
conflict with the statute unless the statute limits the requirements (Separability Clause is inserted)for all cases to its own terms. Thus,
if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.
A Single Body of Law
1) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should read a statute with "a view toward harmonizing it with
other statutes. "Ordinarily, when a particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a court must give it its ordinary meaning.
2) "When asked to interpret various code sections, the SUPREME Court often examines other related statutes that contain similar or
contrasting language to help determine legislative intent.