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Garcia vs.

Drilon 699 SCRA 352


Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws
clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because
of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is
not palpably arbitrary. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the
fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Womens Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be
closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and
men otherwise known as gender-based violence. Societal norms and traditions dictate
people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in
society while women are nurturers, mens companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form
of mens expression of controlling women to retain power. The enactment of R.A. 9262
aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against
women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioners contention, therefore,
that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an anti-male, husband-bashing, and
hate-men law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination
of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the

inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women. Justice Puno correctly pointed out that (t)he paradigm shift changing the
character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the
development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the
judges.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 407 SCRA 10
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. During the
interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there
was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum. To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders
issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without
judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill
of Rights. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights
during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of
Rights of the Freedom Constitution. Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision
excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all
sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the
Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rightsrecognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The
Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that
[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the
Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the
Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during
the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its

obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue
here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of
international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did
not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 446
SCRA 299
It is settled in constitutional law that the equal protection clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union, and reiterated in a long line of cases: The guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
discrimination and/or provisions about equality. The general international provisions
pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In the
broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as
the American Convention on Human Rights; the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; the European Social Charter of
1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of
particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab
States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be
ratified by the Member States of the League. The equality provisions in these
instruments do not merely function as traditional first generation rights, commonly
viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State action. Article 26
of the ICCPR requires guarantee[s] of equal and effective protection against
discrimination while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige
States Parties to ensure the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] without any
discrimination and to secure without discrimination the enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed. These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties
to take steps to eradicate discrimination. The two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of
the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent
operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other

jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal
protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational
discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution,
coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.
Ocampo vs. Abando 715 SCRA 673
International humanitarian law (IHL) is the body of international law that regulates the
conduct of armed conflicts, whether of an international or non-international character.
This body of law seeks to limit the effects of the conflict on individuals. The 1949 Geneva
Conventions and its Additional Protocols are the main instruments that govern IHL.
Nevertheless, IHL and the rules and principles contained in the Geneva Conventions are
largely regarded in the international sphere as having the character of general or
customary international law given the fundamental nature of the rules and because they
constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law. In the Philippines,
Republic Act No. 9851 was enacted in view of its policy to [renounce] war x x x, [adopt]
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
[adhere] to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations. Accordingly, [t]he most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be
ensured by taking measures at the national level, in order to put an end to impunity for
the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it
being the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes.
International humanitarian law and international human rights law are two sets of
regimes in international law. The two regimes have been compared and contrasted with
each other, to wit: The two sets of rules certainly have a different history and often a
different field of application, both ratione personae and ratione temporis. Human rights
thus apply to all people and humanitarian law applies to certaingroups of persons (for
example, to the wounded, to prisoners o[f] war, to civilians) and, furthermore,
humanitarian law applies only in times of armed conflict. On the other hand, human
rights and humanitarian law regulate, ratione materiae, similar rights at least insofar
that they all intend to increase the protection of individuals, alleviate pain and suffering
and secure the minimum standard of persons in various situations. (Emphasis in the
original) Thus, all persons are protected in both times of war and peace. The protection
accorded by human rights laws does not cease to apply when armed conflict ensues.
Still, some human rights are allowed to be derogated in times of emergency which
threatens the life of the nation. Nevertheless, provisions on the right to life, prohibition
from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and slavery remain free from any
derogation whatsoever, having acquired a jus cogens character. Rep. Act No. 9851
defines and provides for the penalties of crimes against humanity, serious violations of
IHL, genocide, and other crimes against humanity. This law provides for the nonprescription of the prosecution of and execution of sentences imposed with regard to the
crimes defined in the Act. It also provides for the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
over the crimes defined in the Act. These crimes are, therefore, separate from or
independent from the crime of rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued
to be connected with the armed uprisings. Concomitantly, persons committing crimes
against humanity or serious violations of international humanitarian law, international
human rights laws, and Rep. Act No. 9851 must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine
crafted to recognize the different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political

dissent. The contemporary view is that these can never be considered as acts in
furtherance of armed conflict no matter what the motive. Incidentally, this is the view also
apparently shared by the CPP/NPA/NDF and major insurgent groups that are part of the
present governments peace process. View that torture and summary execution in any
context are shameful, naked brutal acts of those who may have simply been transformed
into desperate cowards. Those who may have suffered or may have died because of
these acts deserve better than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel.

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