ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
DUE Process
Equal Protection
1. Bill of Rights: Protection against abuse of Power

• Governments and social institutions exist for the defense and protection of freedom.
• Government needs to balance their power and the freedom of the governed
• Totality of governmental power:
○ Police power
 Most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs
 Power of the state to prohibit all that is harmful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
 Used to justify public health and public safety measures
 Public morals
 Laws are made for the promotion of the general welfare of the people
○ Power of eminent domain
○ Power of taxation
• Restrictions found in the Bill of Rights are directed against the State. They do not govern the
relations between private individuals. However, almost all the protections against the state found
in the Bill of Rights have been made applicable as civil law to relations between private persons
through Article 32 of Civil code.

2. Life, Liberty, or Property

• Life
○ Everyone including aliens, corporations as far as their property is concerned
○ Not just protection to be alive or protection of one’s limb against physical harm.
○ Right to life is also the right to a good life
○ Protection of the unborn, policy against nuclear weapons, abolition of death penalty
• Liberty
○ Right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude
○ Free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any vocation, etc.
○ Freedom to do right and never wrong… ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual
○ Petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual
• Property
○ One’s employment, profession, trade, or calling is protected property.
○ Company’s trade secrets

Hierarchy of Rights
• Primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized
• Property and property rights can be lost through prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.
• Superiority of rights of free expression and of assembly over property rights is underscored by the
fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent.
• Property is also a basic right. Property has an intimate relation with life and liberty.
○ Shylock “You take my life, when you do take the means whereby I live”

1. PBMEO v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. – The Company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
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 Human rights supreme to property rights. While the bill of rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and
vulnerable, as well as “supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.
• Property and property rights are prescriptible but human rights are not.
• Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred position. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the
rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation
and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such “priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
• Civil liberties are more superior than property rights.
○ a mere reasonable relation between the means employed by the law and its purpose – that law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive – would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. On the other hand, a valid infringement of human rights requires a more strict
criteria, namely, existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent.

Due Process: In General

1. Tupas v. CA
Facts:
• Appeal made was late.
• Decision was made April 3, 1989
• motion for reconsideration was filed on April 17, 1989, 14 days later
• order of denial of the motion – May 3, 1989 and was received by the counsel on May 9, 1989
• Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-
day reglementary period (May 10, 1989), the petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989 or 14 days
later.
• The law requires that if motion for reconsideration is denied, petitioner should file petition for
review with the Court of Appeals within the remaining period to file a petition for review. Hence, it
may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such
petition for review.

Issue:
W/N petitioner can file a petition for certiorari because they were denied due process.

Decision:
DENIED. They have forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners cannot claim that they were
denied due process.

Ratio:
• Counsel did not even ask for extension of period. Petitioner cannot say that counsel is inept
because of the credentials of his old counsel.
• Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection
of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested,
that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. Policy of the court is to give effect to both kinds of law, as
complementing each other in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
• Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
• Petitioner’s argument that they should not be prejudiced by the mistakes of their counsel because
they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the law is not acceptable.

Procedural Due Process

• Was understood to relate chiefly to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow.
• Procedural due process
○ There shall be a law
○ Law shall be reasonable in its operation
○ It shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed
○ That t shall be applicable to all citizens of a state or to all of a class
• Due process of law contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting
one’s person or property.
• What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation.

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 • Requirements of due process1
1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is
the subject of the proceedings
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
• Due process is not always a judicial process. Frequently, legal controversies have to be decided not by courts
but by administrative bodies. And administrative bodies are not always bound by the finer points of judicial
due process, though bound, too, they are by the due process clause.
• Cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings2
1. Right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support
thereof;
1. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
2. The decision must have something to support itself;
3. Evidence must be substantial;
4. Decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
5. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of the subordinate;
6. The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
• Heart of due process is the need for Notice and an Opportunity to be heard.
• Procedural due process helps achieve two purposes:
○ Contributes to accuracy and thus minimizes errors in deprivations
○ Gives the person who is subject to deprivation a sense of rational participation
• Fairness is not violated when officer is not the same person who decides the case
• There is violation of due process when the officer who reviews a case is the same person whose
decision is on appeal.
• While notice and hearing are required in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, they are not
prerequisites in the promulgation of general rules.
• Fixing rates, being a quasi-judicial process, requires hearing.3
• When a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic
standards of the school, the student forfeits his rights and courts are not at liberty to reverse the
discretion of university authorities in this matter.4
• Procedure which educational institutions must follow
○ May be summary
○ Cross-examination is not an essential part
1. Students must be informed in writing of the nature and the cause of any accusation against them
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

1. Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca

Failure of the clerk to mail the notice is not such an irregularity as amounts to a denial of due
process of law;
(1) Due process of law implies that there must be a court or tribunal clothed with power to hear and
determine the matter before it, (2) that jurisdiction shall have been lawfully acquired,
(3) that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard,
(4) and that judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Notification is a requirement in foreclosure. Publication is necessary.
What is required is the Order of Court to the clerk to mail the notification.
2. Ang Tibay v. CIR
Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

It was ruled that it is necessary to pass upon the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., but
in the case of the motion for reconsideration, it is not necessary.

1 Banco Espanol Filipino vs. Palanca

2 Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations
3 PHILCOMSTAT vs. Alcuaz
4 ADMU v.CA
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 In examining the entire record of the proceedings had before the CIR in this case, it was found no
substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers was due to their union affiliation or
activity.

The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation. It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but
its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of law creating it.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.
There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in administrative proceedings are:
1. Right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. Tribunal must consider evidence presented;
3. Decision must have something to support itself;
4. Evidence must be substantial. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
5. Decision must be based on evidence adduced, or at least contained in the records and disclosed to the parties;
6. Independent consideration of evidence, and not rely on the recommendation of a subordinate; and
7. The decision must state the facts and the law in such a way that the parties can know the issues involved and the
reasons for the decision rendered.
3. People v. Nazario
Facts:
• Petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of Quezon province because
he refuses to pay municipal taxes which he says are unconstitutional.
• Ambiguous and uncertain because ordinance states OWNER or MANAGER and he’s a mere lessee.

Issue:
a. W/N the law is unconstitutional for being ambiguous and uncertain.
b. W/N the law is ex post facto

Decision:
a. Law is not unconstitutional.
b. Law is not ex post facto.

Ratio:
• A statute may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men “of common
intelligence must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects:
1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
2. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the government muscle.

Doctrine relevant to Consti2:

• that ambiguous statutes may violate due process clause because it fails to give the people fair
notice of the conduct to avoid
1. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
• Joseph Estrada assails RA 7080 – An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder because it is
alleged that it violates his fundamental rights to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him for:
1. Being vague
2. Dispenses the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions
3. Abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the RPC
• Petitioner bewails the failure of the legislature to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
“combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts”
Issues:
a) W/N Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving plunder and therefore violates the
rights of the accused to due process
c) W/N Plunder is a malum prohibitum
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 Decision:
a) No.
b) No.
c) No. Malum in se.

Ratio:
• A law is always presumed to be constitutional.
• Plunder law contains comprehensible standards and well-defined parameters which would enable
the accused to determine the nature of his violation
• The void for vagueness doctrine does not necessarily mean that when general terms were used or
terms were not defined, the statute is void.
Panganiban, concurring
• To this date, SC has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity.
Kapunan, dissenting
• The “void for vagueness” doctrine is rooted in the basic concept of fairness as well as the due
process clause of the Constitution. Statutes must be clear and definite. Constitution guarantees
both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Overbreadth doctrine – applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of speech
• Void for vagueness doctrine – applies to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech
or other fundamental constitutional rights.
• Lack of mens rea – is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution, and this is a
limitation on police power.
Ynares-Santiago, dissenting
• A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where its language does
not convey sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited conduct.
Sandoval-Guttierez, dissenting
• The acts enumerated under Sec 4. Of the Plunder Law are only means and not essential elements
of plunder. It results to the reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

1. PHILCOMSTAT v. ALCUAZ
Facts:
• Philcomstat was not under the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of NTC. However, in 1987,
petitioner was placed under NTC’s control.
• Philcomstat applied for the requisite certificate of public convenience and was approved several
times for 6 months each
• NTC (Alcuaz) ordered the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for
certain specified lines of its service by 15%

Issue:
W/N the order by NTC is void for being unconstitutional

Decision:
Yes. VOID for violating the due process clause.

Ratio:
• The order is only applicable to PHILCOMSTAT; rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given
kind.
• PHILCOMSTAT is entitled to cross-examine the report made by NTC
• Though Alcuaz argues that the rate is temporary, PHILCOMSTAT still has the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing.

1. Gi alias Chia v. CA
Facts:
• 1958 – Secretary of Justice rendered that the Filomino Chia is a Filipino Citizen
• 1980 – Minister of Justice cancelled the earlier decision and set aside the citizenship of Chia, Sr. on
the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation
• 1981 – Charge for deportation was filed with the Immigration against Lao Gi and family
• 1981 – Amended charge was made alleging that said respondents refused to register as aliens
having been required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such.
• 1982 – CID set a deportation case against respondents for hearing and gave respondents three
days to move for reconsideration of the order directing them to register as aliens and to oppose
the motion for their arrest.
• They filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and they were ordered to register as
aliens within 2days from notice.

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 • Oct. 5 1982 - Deportation hearing was scheduled but on the same day, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
• 1985 – petition was dismissed by the RTC
• 1987 – their appeal to CA was dismissed. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Issue:
W/N CID Commissioner’s order for deportation/registration as aliens is valid.

Decision:
Invalid.

Ratio:
• While the Immigration Commissioner has the power to require an alien to register, such
requirement must be based on a positive finding that the person who is so required is an alien;
where the very citizenship of the petitioners is in issue, there must be prior determination that
they are aliens before they can be directed to register.
• Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the
constitutional right of a person to due process shall not be denied; the rules on criminal procedure
in the Rules of Court are applicable to deportation proceedings
• The charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be
stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on
what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.

1. Misamis Oriental Assoc. v. DOF

Facts:
• Prior to the issuance of NIRC, copra was classified as agricultural food product under National
Internal Revenue code, and therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages
• NIRC classified copra as agricultural non-food product and declared it “exempt from VAT only if the
sale is made by the primary producer”

Issue:
1. W/N copra is an agricultural food or non-food product
2. W/N petitioner was denied due process because it was not heard before ruling was made
3. W/N it is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause
4. W/N it is counter-productive because traders and dealers would be forced to buy copra from coconut
farmers.
Decision:
5. NIRC is correct, they are the one charged with the enforcement of the law and their opinion, in the
absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight.
6. No, what NIRC did was just to interpret the law.
7. No, Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable
basis for classifying them differently.
Ratio:
• Legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of
public hearing. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the
law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
1. Whether rule is within the delegated authority
2. Whether it is reasonable
3. Whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure
Nobody eats copra for food
1. Radio Communications v. NTC
FACTS:
• PLDT filed an application with respondent for the approval of rates for Digital Transmission
Services.
• Respondent issued a notice of hearing and petitioners were not able to receive any notice and they
weren’t included in the list of affected parties.

HELD:
• As to the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent to give personal notice to all parties
affected, not all of them being known to it. More than that, there is no dispute that the notice of
hearing was published. Petitioners have timely opportunity to oppose the petition in question so
that the lack of notice is cured. Under the circumstances, respondent can be deemed to have
substantially complied with the requirements. In any event, the provisional nature of the authority
and the fact that the primary application shall be given a full hearing are the safeguards against its
abuse.

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1. ADMU v. Capulong
Private schools have the right to establish rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and
promotion of the students. This right extends as well as to parents are under social and moral if not legal
obligation, individually and collectively to assist and cooperate with schools.
The provisions in the bills on the rights of students to participate on the policy making on the admission of
the students might run counter to rights of private schools on their right to establish rules and regulations for
admission, discipline and promotion of students. Such rules are incident to the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of the school. The rule may include those governing student
disciplines. The standard rules governing university students in relation to the students discipline maybe
regarded as vital that may lead to smooth and efficient operation of the institution but to its very survival.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see
and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they
were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be
said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate
students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A
closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being
summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that
this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.
academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 37 thus: (1) who may teach: (2) what
may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.
2. Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission
FACTS:
• Petitioner Ardeliza Medenilla was a contractual employee of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) occupying the position of Public Relations Officer II.
• In 1987, Medenilla was detailed as Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Administration and Manpower Management.
• Pursuant to Executive Order No. 124 dated January 30, 1987, a reorganization ensued within the
DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern together with the
guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was issued.
• Included in the revised staffing pattern is the contested position of Supervising Human Resource
Development Officer.
• On January 2, 1989, the petitioner was appointed to the disputed position.
• The protestants alleged that since they are next-in-rank employees, one of them should have been
appointed to the said position.
• Thus, on February 28, 1990, the Commission promulgated the assailed resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
○ WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to disapprove the promotional
appointment of Ardeliza Medenilla to the position of Supervising Human Manpower Development
Officer. Accordingly, the appointing authority may choose from among protestants Amparo Dellosa,
Marita Burdeos and Rosalinda Juria who to promote to the said position. The Civil Service Field Office is
directed to implement this resolution accordingly." (Rollo, p. 31)
• The petitioner on March 23, 1990 filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. On May 30,
1990 a supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration was also filed. However, prior thereto, the
Commission on May 23, 1990 denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent
portions of the denial are:

ISSUES:
• petitioner contends that she was not notified by the Civil Service Commission of the existence of
the appeal before it. The resolutions, therefore, were allegedly issued in violation of the
petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed due process of law.
• petitioner alleges that the Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion in disapproving her
appointment

DECISIONS:
• No
• Yes

RATIO
• "Due process of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the
tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its most
comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of
controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of the light in the matter
involved."
• The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not always
the cornerstone of due process. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but
the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.

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 • In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
• The preference given to permanent employees assumes that employees working in a Department
for longer periods have gained not only superior skills but also greater dedication to the public
service. This is not always true and the law, moreover, does not preclude the infusion of new
blood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the government service. If, after considering
all the current employees, the Department Secretary cannot find among them the person he needs
to revive a moribund office or to upgrade second rate performance, there is nothing in the Civil
Service Law to prevent him from reaching out to other Departments or to the private sector
provided all his acts are bona fide for the best interest of the public service and the person chosen
has the needed qualifications. In the present case, there is no indication that the petitioner was
chosen for any other reason except to bring in a talented person with the necessary eligibilities
and qualifications for important assignments in the Department.

1. Maceda v. ERB
Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross-examination of
Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He
points out that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process.We disagree. The Solicitor General
has pointed out:. . . The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and
to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in
permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper (88 C.J.S. 206-207).
Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in matters of rate
or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function As such administrative
agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings (Sec. 29, Public
Service Act; Dickenson v. United States, 346, U.S. 389, 98 L. ed. 132, 74 S. St. 152). (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides
that —
These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters
of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the
Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from
these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order.

2. Feeder v. CA
FACTS:
• The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder
International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric
tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of
Zamboanga, Philippines.
• On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying
the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo
authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information, the
Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on May 19, 1986 to verify the report.
• The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping
documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for
"Zamboanga."
• In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over
the same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to
Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order dated
December 12, 1986.

RATIO:
• It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not
criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the
penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the
code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative
in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident
to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is
distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted
importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
• In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings,
concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally
imported goods. These merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as such, have
been prevented from being assimilated in lawful commerce until corresponding duties are paid
thereon and the penalties imposed and satisfied either in the form of fine or of forfeiture in favor of
the government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. The importer or possessor is
treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty be falls on him is an inconsequential
incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply
because he was not held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the articles

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 are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported in
respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability
lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information
can only be determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the
administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws,
criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

1. CIR v. CA
FACTS:
• The quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946
by Gregoria Francisco, who died in 1976. It stands on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority
and faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio
Quirino, said land was declared for the exclusive use of port facilities.
• On 10 January 1989, the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San,
surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the building stands for a
period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the quonset for
the storage of copra.
• On 8 May 1989, Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan Gin
San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the
municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and. stressing the "clean-up
campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." This was
followed by another letter of 19 May 1989 of the same tenor.
• Since the notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the
demolition on 24 May 1989.
• Aggrieved, petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Basilan, Branch

ISSUE:
• whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition
of petitioner's quonset building.

HELD:
• Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the
Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting
on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a
tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There
was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials
of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily
petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of
law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not
cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior
to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
• For the precipitate demolition, therefore, petitioner should be entitled to just compensation, the
amount of which is for the Trial Court to determine. We are not inclined to grant petitioner
damages, however, as it simply ignored the demand to remove or relocate its quonset building.

RATIO:
• Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in
the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to
rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may
be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention.
• The provincial governor, district engineer or district health officer is not authorized to destroy
private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings
whatever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a fishery
constructed in navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a nuisance per
accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by causing water to
become stagnant. (Monteverde v. Generoso, supra).

1. Aris v. NLRC
On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management's failure
to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and
hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged, and believing that their appeal would

9
be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their work that day with other employees and marched
directly to the management's office to protest its long silence and inaction on their complaints.
On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who were
identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the rally requiring them to explain
why they should not be terminated from the service for their conduct. Despite their explanation, private
respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of the provisions
on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions.
Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino
Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila, which was docketed therein
as NLRC-NCR-00-0401630-88.
After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June 1989 a decision' the dispositive portion of which
reads:
On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution 2 pursuant to
the above-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715.
On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal. 3
On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del Sol, filed a Partial Appeal. 4
On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial Appeal. 5
On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition 6 to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on
execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not
expressly provide that it shall be given retroactive effect 7 and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending
cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal
since it would be burdened with the consequences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. In their
Reply 8 filed on 1 September 1989, complainants argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be given retroactive effect in
this case since the decision to be executed pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act. The said law took
effect on 21 March 1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989.
Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989.
DOCTRINE:
Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from the other. The
latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former
may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is
not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin 18 and, therefore,
available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or qualifications
thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution
pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows
execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order.

2. Telan v. CA
FACTS:
• 1977: PEDRO rented a 750 sq m lot from Luciano Sia. He set up an eatery and vulcanizing shop.
His cousins, ROBERTO, VICENTE and VIRGINIA followed suit by setting up their own businesses.
• 1984: His cousins executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the lot
shared by PEDRO and wife. Pedro received a Notice to Vacate from DPB and a demand letter from
his cousin ordering the same
• 1986: Roberto was able to secure a TCT under his name. with this new TCT, they filed a complaint
against PEDRO.
○ PEDRO and wife hired an attorney to defend them
○ 1988: Lower court awarded possession of property to COUSINS
○ Pedro and wife wanted to appeal but lawyer did not agree but they asked another person to sign the
appeal for them
• Pedro and wife met ERNESTO PALMA in the eatery who pretended to be a lawyer
• 1989: CA dismissed case because PEDRO and wife was NOT ABLE to file an appeal within the
period required.
• 1990: PEDRO and wife found out about the dismissal.
• PEDRO and wife couldn’t find the fake lawyer and filed a case against him.
• Sept 1990: judge of lower court issued a WRIT of DEMOLITION
• Oct 1990: writ for certiorari filed by PEDRO with Urgent Prayer for TRO
• TRO was issued
ISSUE:
• W/N the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to
counsel and hence a lack of due process
HELD:
• YES. They lost their right to appeal when they lost their counsel
RATIO:
• In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is
immutable. Xxx. There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different in civil cases.
The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also
to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his

10
 house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest means
of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
• The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times.
• a client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation even by
the attorney’s mistake or negligence in procedural technique. But how can be there negligence by
the counsel in the case at bar when the “lawyer”, turned out to be a fake? The affidavit of the
petitioner, the sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar Confidant’s Office and the IBP, and the
submitted records of criminal case against fake lawyer more than sufficiently establishes the
existence of the fake lawyer.

1. CIR v. CA
FACTS:
• 1987: Fortune was paying taxes for ‘Champion’ ‘Hope’ and ‘More’ cigarettes as local brands.
• 1993: Bill was enacted and became effective on July 03 1993 increasing the tax rate of locally
manufactured cigarettes at 55%
○ July 1 1993: Commissioner Vinzons-Chato wrote a Revenue Memorandum Circular stating that Fortune
Tobaccos are foreign brands for the purpose of determining the ad valorem tax.
○ July 19 1993: FORTUNE requested for a review, reconsideration, and recall. Request was denied.
○ July 30, 1993: CIR assessed the ad valorem tax deficiency to Php 9 Mil.
○ August, Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTA
○ CTA upheld the position of Fortune because the Memo was defective, invalid and unenforceable
because the brands in question were not currently classified.
ISSUE:
• W/N the Memo issued was only to interpret the law.
HELD:
• No.
RATIO:
• When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially adds or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
• Since the brand names of the imported cigarettes were changed to local ones, and they are
considered as local brands, the law passed wouldn’t have any effect on the Fortune Tobacco
brands. The Memo was made to include these brands within the scope of the amendatory law and
subject them to an increased tax rate. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, t
legislated under its quasi-legislative power. The due observance of the requirements of
notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been ignored.
Separate Opinion, Bellosillo
• Compared the memo to another memo issued to cocofed which was made to interpret the law.
• The issuance of the memo, the Commissioner of BIR was exercising her quasi-judicial or
administrative, adjudicatory power, consequently, prior notice and hearing are required.
Dissenting Opinion, Hermosisima
• Only legislative regulations and not interpretative rulings must have the benefit of a public hearing

1. Stronghold Insurance v. CA
FACTS:
• Urtesuela was hired by Pan Asia as captain for 12 months. The required surety bond was P 50K
submitted by Pan Asian and Stronghold Insurance to answer for the liabilities of the employer to
POEA. 3 months later, Urtesuela’s services were terminated.
• Urtesuela filed a complaint against Pan Asian with the POEA for breach of contract.
• POEA rendered a decision in favor of Urtesuela for the amount of 6K for his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract and cash value of his unused vaca leave, plus attorney’s fees and
costs. No appeal was made by Pan Asia and Stronghold
• Urtusela filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission against Stronghold on the basis of the
surety bond and prayed for the value thereof plus attorney’s fees and litigation costs.
• Stronghold asks for reversal of the CA decision. It submits that the decision of the POEA is not
binding upon it because it was not impleaded in the complaint; it was not notified thereof nor did it
participate in the hearing; and it was not specifically directed to pay the damages awarded to the
complainant.
ISSUE:
• W/N there was a lack of due process for Stronghold Insurance
HELD:
• No.
RATIO:
11
 • Stronghold agreed to answer for whatever decision might be rendered against the principal,
whether or not the surety was impleaded in the complaint and had the opportunity to defend itself.
Petitioner agreed to “answer for all liabilities” that “may be adjudged or imposed by the POEA
against the principal.”
• The right to be head is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long as the party is given an
opportunity to be heard on his behalf.
• Due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever
reason, not to be heard. It should be obvious that if he opts to be silent where he has a right to
speak, he cannot later be heard to complain the he was unduly silenced.

1. Macayayong v. Ople
FACTS:
• Macayayong was dismissed after 2 notices were sent to him requesting him to report to work as
his service was badly needed. He did not report.
• He was dismissed because of “abandonment of post”
ISSUE:
• W/N Macayayong’s summary dismissal is in violation of the due process of law.
HELD:
• No.
RATIO:
• Petitioner was given ample opportunity to be heard and to present his case.
1. Conti v. NLRC
FACTS:
• CONTI worked as cashier in Corfarm. CRUZ was warehouseman. Both of them were promoted to
Head of Commissary and Store Supervisor. In their contract, it was stipulated that their
employment shall be coterminous with the effectivity of the contract executed with MERALCO
re:management of commissary.
• The contract expired. However, Corfarm continued to operate the Meralco commissary despite of
the non-renewal of the contract.
• Several days after expiration, petitioners received a memo terminating their services based on:
○ Expiration of employment contracts
○ On-going evaluation of their past performances because of certain anomalous transactions.
• Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to NLRC and their dismissal was rendered to be
illegally done and an order of reinstatement was made.
○ This decision was reversed and they dismissed Conti and Cruz’s appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
• W/N NLRC gravely abused its discretion in”
1. reversing the labor arbiter’s decision finding petitioners dismissal to have been illegal for
lack of due notice and hearing
2. in ignoring the documents and testimony contained in the record which support the labor
arbiter’s decision finding the petitioners without fault on the alleged acts attributed to
them
HELD:
• YES.
RATIO:
• They were dismissed without a written notice. They did not receive the memo and the memo did
not specify the particular acts or omissions of petitioners.
• The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in the
dismissal of employees.
• In order that willful disobedience by the employee may constitute a just cause for termination the
orders, regulations, or instructions of the employer or his representative must be:
1. reasonable and lawful
2. sufficiently known to the employee
3. in connection with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge

1. Joson v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
• Joson was the governor of Nueva Ecija. During a meeting regarding a proposed 150 Million Peso
loan, he allegedly barged into the hall, kicking the door and chairs in the hall, uttering threatening
words, with armed men. the meeting was cancelled due to that and to lack of quorum.
• The employees present there filed a complaint praying for the suspension or removal of Joson; for
an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed
loan
• Joson’s three motions of extension to file his answer was approved. His last extension, the DILG
informed him that “failure to submit answer will be considered a waiver and that the plaintiff shall
be allowed to present his evidence ex parte.

12
 ○ Three months later, DILG issued an order placing the petitioner in default and to have waived his right
to present evidence.
• He filed several motions for reconsideration, etc. however denied. The motion to lift Default Order
and to Admit anwer Ad Cautelam was granted.
• Petitioner filed a “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. The petition was denied because DILG
says that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of
procedural due process in administrative proceedings.
• DILG ordered that he be suspended for 6 months without pay.
ISSUES:
I. W/N Letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements
II. W/N the DILG secretary has jurisdiction over the case.
III. W/N DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing a motion to dismiss
IV. W/N DILG erred in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension
V. W/N the finding of Executive Secretary that petitioner is guilty as charged is valid.
HELD:
I. No. verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite
II. Yes. The procedural lapse of the Office of the President in non complying with requiring the
petitioner for an answer is not fatal.
III. No. he was given more than enough time. He filed his answer 7 months later!
IV. No. all the requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with.
Petitioner’s failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as
a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence!
V. No. the denial of petitioner’s Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. The
petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process.
RATIO:
• An erring elective official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. The local
elective official has the:
1. the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;
2. right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him;
3. right to compulsory attendance of the witness and the production of documentary
evidence.
• Rules on removal and suspension of elective officials are more stringent. The procedure requiring
position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to
appointive officials but not to those elected.
• When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the
man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services
of the elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the
elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their
imposition.

1. Marcos v. Sandiganbayan
Marcos filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:
1. The informations are fatally defective for failure to adequately inform the accused of the
charge against her in violation of due process granted by the constitution
2. The informations state no offense
3. the court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the accused are protected by immunity
from suit.
Sandiganbayan denied Motion even before scheduled hearing because informations actually
state a valid accusation.
ISSUE:
W/N Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to
quash the informations filed after she had pleaded thereto.
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
Petitioner’s motion to quash is grounded on no offense charged, extinction of the offense or
penalty and jeopardy.
From a denial of motion to quash, the appropriate remedy is for petitioner to go to trial on the
merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized
by law.

2. Pefianco v. Moral
3. Roxas v. CA
4. Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita
5. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
FACTS:

13
 • An extradition request was given by the US government to the Department of Justice of the
Philippines for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for accusation of several crimes in the US. This was
in accordance to the Extradition Treaty of the Philippines and US. Upon the receipt of such request,
the DOJ arranged for a panel of lawyers to evaluate and assess such request.
• Jimenez requested for a copy of the said extradition papers so that he could have ample time to
comment on the said accusations and he also requested for the abeyance of the proceedings. This
was denied by petitioner, saying that the US requested that there be no unauthorized disclosure of
the papers, that it is too premature for Jimenez to be furnished the papers, and also, that the DOJ
doesn’t have authority to hold abeyance proceedings in an extradition request since in a treaty,
there must be expeditious action upon a receipt of an extradition request.
• This prompted Jimenez to file with the trial court a writ of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari
and the court issued a temporary restraining order against petitioner. Hence, this case at bar.
HELD:
• An individual’s right to due process is not dispensable even in extradition proceedings. It may not
be mentioned in the extradition treaty nor in the statute implementing it, nonetheless, this does
not mean that it should be foregone. A person’s right to due process the procedural aspect may
only be foregone in the following circumstances:
(1) In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant
facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of
filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate
threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
prosecution;
(2) Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person
affected, such as the summary distrait and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the
replacement of a temporary appointee; and
(3) Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been
claimed.

• Using the abovementioned conditions, not one is satisfied by the extradition proceedings.
Furthermore, it may be absent in the statute and treaty, but it constitutionally guaranteed. The
constitution not only guarantees one’s right to due process but also the right to information
regarding public concern.

1. US v. Puruganan
2. Lazaro v. CA
3. Agabon v. NLRC

Substantive Due Process

4. US v. Toribio
5. Agabon v. NLRC
6. Churchill v. Rafferty
7. People v. Fajardo
8. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operator v. City of Manila
9. Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals
10. Balacuit v. CFI
11. National Development Corporation and New Agrix v. Philippine Vet. Bank
12. Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC
13. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
14. Bennis v. Michigan
15. Cruzan v. Dir. Missoura
16. JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. CA
17. Corona v. United Harbor
18. Kelly v. Johnson
19. Chavez v. Romulo

Equal Protection of the Law

– Should also apply in the application of the laws
– Pass laws to promote equality and reduce and eliminate inequality before the law

1. People v. Cayat
○ Liquor ban to non Christians
Equal Protection of the Law does not prohibit classification as long as:
1. Classification must rest on substantial distinctions
2. Which must be germane to the purpose of the law
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions

14
 4. Must apply to members of the same class
1. Ichong v. Hernandez
○ Constitutional – laws on aliens with retail business
○ Legislative intent is to protect filipinos
1. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
2. Dumlao v. COMELEC
3. Goesart v. Cleary
4. Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City
5. Sison, Jr. v. PAGCOR
6. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
7. Himagan v. People
8. Almonte v. Vasquez
9. Telebap v. COMELEC
10. Tiu v. CA
11. Aguinaldo v. COMELEC
12. De Guzman v. COMELEC
13. People v. Mercado
14. People v. Jalosjos
15. People v. Piedra
16. International School v. Quisimbing
17. Central Bank Employee Association v. BSP

Section 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
General Rule: there should be a warrant!
1. Probable cause
2. Issued by a judge – only exception is by immigration
3. Personal examination under oath; basis of issuance : personal knowledge of
affiant/complainant; searching questions; search warrant: Face to face and attach
documents and record; Arrest: outside NCR: MCTR = similar to search warrant; RTC/MTC/NCR
- prosecutors
4. Particular description person, place, or thing
• To avoid abuse in execution of warrant; they should not be allowed to decide on
ANYTHING
a) Not very specific or technical – circumstances which ordinarily allow
b) Description expresses a conclusion of facts not a conclusion of law (ex. Things related
to murder shall be seized – not allowed)
c) Things which bear a direct relation/relevant things/relevant cases
GENERAL WARRANT not specific to an offense, person, place =INVALID
If business is 100% illegal, more lenient
Ex. Smuggling business: description need not distinguish
If business is 50% illegal 50% legal: description must be specific as to the documents related to
illegal activity
Documents not validly described = invalidly seized
John Doe – OK as long as specific description
Search – 10 days
Arrest – until person is caught but 10 days police report
** House – always needs warrant before search!
*Exception: Warrantless Search and Seizure
Search – going beyond what is in plain view
– Consti definition: applies to a situation where there is a reasonable exprectation of privacy
Instances when warrantless search and seizure is valid:
ALWAYS WITH PROBABLE CAUSE!
If in case we cannot classify, PC + Exigent Circumstances
1. Waiver of warrant
• Right is known to person
• Right exists and willingly consented
• Wants to cooperate
2. Incidental search to a lawful arrest
15
 • Relevant to the commission of a crime
• Things within reach or immediate control
• Fruit , evidence, proof of crime
3. Moving vehicles/movable
• Need to act immediately if it is within their complete control, there is a need for a warrant
4. Seizure of evidence in plain view
• Means open to your senses: plain touch, plain smell, plain sight, etc.
1. Evidence is illegal or prohibited
2. Plain view
3. Discovery is inadvertent
4. Must be in the right position to get the plain view
1. Customs/border searches
• Immigration (airport)
• Customs officers
• Enforcement of customs laws
2. Others
Checkpoints
○ Form of detention and search
○ Visual only; roll down window. If goes beyond, there must be PC
○ Established under abnormal situations
○ Opening of bag – there should be PC
 But people usually waive right because nobody complains. Legally though you can argue not to
allow it
Saturation Rights
• Area zoning
• Masked search and arrested per se is not unconstitutional only by way they are implemented
Stop and Frisk
• Policeman sees suspicious individual acting suspiciously may stop and frisk
• Patting only outer garments
• If beyond patting, there must be PROBABLE CAUSE
War
Probable cause + exigent circumstances  need to act immediately

Requisites of a valid warrant

1. People v. Veloso
2. Alvarez v. CFI
3. Stonehill v. Diokno
4. Central Bank v. Morfe
5. Blache and Co. v. Ruiz
6. Placer v. Villanueva
7. Burgos,Sr. v. Chief of Staff AFP
8. Corro v. Lising
9. Soliven v. Makasiar
10. Salazar v. Achacoso
11. Board of Comm (CID) v. De la Rosa
12. Sim, Sr. v. Judge Felix
13. Silva v. Pres. Judge of RTC of Negros Oriental
14. Allado v. Diokno
15. Ortiz v. Palayapayon
16. People v. Martiniez
17. Webb v. de Leon
18. People v. Woolcock
19. Tambasen v. People
20. Columbia Pictures v. CA
21. 20th Century Fox Film v. CA
22. Ho v. People
23. Gozos v. Tac-an
24. Flores v. Sumaljag
25. People v. CA
26. Kho v. Makalintal
27. Paper Industries v. Asuncion
28. Malalaon v. CA

Particularity of Description

16
 29. Yousef Al-Ghoul v. CA
30. Uy v. BIR

Warrantless Searches and Seizures

When is a search a “search”

31. Valmonte v. General de Villa
32. Guazon v. De Villa
33. People v. Saycon
34. People v. CFI
35. Roan v. Gonzales
36. Nolasco v. Pano
37. Papa v. Mago
38. People v. Lo Ho Wing
39. People v. Malmstedt
40. Posadas v. CA
41. Bagalihog v. Fernandez
42. People v. Cuachon
43. People v. De Gracia
44. People v. De Lara
45. Aniag v. Comelec
46. People v. Barros
47. People v. Tabar
48. Veronia School Distric v. ACTON
49. Manlavi v. Gacott
50. People v. Lengsiri
51. UniLab v. Isip
52. Malacat v. CA
53. People v. Encinada
54. Mustang Lumber v. CA
55. People v. Gatward
56. People v. Lacerna
57. People v. Aruta
58. People v. Cuenco
59. People v. Doria
60. People v. Sevilla
61. People v. Che Chun Ting
62. People v. Valdez
63. People v. Johnson
64. Del Rosario v. People
65. People v. Estrada

Searches and Seizures of “whatever nature and for whatever purpose”

66. Material Distributors v. Natividad

67. Oklahoma Press v. Walling
68. Camara v. Municipal Court

Warrantless Arrests

69. Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago

70. People v. Aminnudin
71. People v. dela Cruz
72. People v. Burgos
73. Umil v. Ramos
74. People v. Sucro
75. Go v. CA
76. People v. Briones
77. People v. Mengote
78. People v. Simon
79. People v. Rabang
80. People v. Lopez
81. Velasco v. CA
82. People v. Seguino
83. People v. Nazareno
84. People v. Mahusay
85. People v. Alvario
17
 86. Larranaga v. CA
87. People v. Jayson
88. People v. Aruta (same as 122)
89. Larranaga v. CA
90. People v. Olivarez
91. Cadua v. CA
92. People v. Elamparo
93. People v. Cubcubin
94. People v. Compacion
95. Posadas v. Ombudsman
96. People v. Buluran
97. People v. Rodriguez
98. People v. Acol
Section 3.
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 2 – applies only to tangible things
Section 3 – applies to intangible things
○ Phone msg
○ Letter
○ Communication and correspondence
• Judge will have to comply with warrant requirements – PC, Personal, particular descript.
Par 2. – exclusionary rule
“Any Evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.”
Why do we have this rule?
Because of deterrence.
Before the rule: arrest lang yan.. admissible naman yung evidence eh.
• Applies when there is deliberate violations of constitutional rights
• Whether or not evidence is incriminating this is still applicable. Kahit shabu pa!
Ex.,
1. Police officer found list of stolen goods owned by criminal who was illegally arrested and goes there =
inadmissible evidence
2. If a policeman illegally arrests you and was able to interview you after the illegal arrest and you tell them
that you hid the stolen goods in the locker, but somebody else saw you hide it in the locker and told the
policeman – 2 testimonies = valid source independent of a tainted source that will not make evidence
inadmissible
3. Idessa hid baby and was illegally arrested. Baby was found by someone who did not now or if it is
inevitable that the baby will be found, VALID
4. If warrant of arrest is issued against idessa, then later on lawyer finds that the signature is fake. Therefore,
warrant is invalid = illegal arrest
Question: since arrest was illegal, will evidence be inadmissible?
US Supreme Court: since police acted in good faith, Admissible
US Supreme Court: Not all unreasonable arrest, search and seizure will lead to inadmissible evidence
Phil SC: no jurisprudence like this yet.

Inadmissible evidence will not be returned to owner if:

1. Inadmissible evidence is illegal – it will be confiscated and disposed of
2. Inadmissible evidence even if legal is needed for prosecution of the case

Exclusionary Rule

1. Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA
2. Zulueta v. CA
3. Ramirez v. CA
4. Ople v. Torres
5. People v. Marti
6. People v. Aruta (again)
7. Gaanan v. IAC

18
Section 4.

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the

press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
Freedom of Speech and Press
• Not an absolute rights!!
• Freedom of speech led the Philippines to a revolution
Right of Assembly and Petition

Prohibited:
1. Prior Restraint
2. Subsequent Punishment
Unprotected Speech: (subsequent punishment is allowed)
1. Seditious Speech
2. Libelous Speech
3. Obscene

Prior Restraint = CENSORSHIP

– Official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination
– Presumed to be constitutionally invalid
Restrictions:
1. Content-based = Censorship = apply the C&PD test
2. Content-neutral – about when, where, how, time place, manner
 OK! Apply the O’Brien Test

1. Near v. Minnesota – Law is invalid

Issue: statute authorizing the state to obtain injunction against any news or magazine after finding by
a court that such has become a public nuisance – “Saturday Press” found to be a nuisance
○ Prohibition of Prior Restrain is NOT ABSOLUTE
 Exceptions: war, decency, publication of inciting documents
1. Freedman v. Maryland – Law is invalid
Freedman showed a film without getting a license as required by law.
○ Requirement of a license is not necessarily unconstitutional, however proper process should be
followed, in this case, the procedural scheme does not satisfy the criteria because:
1. The exhibitor must assume the burden of instituting judicial proceedings
2. Approval depends on the censor
Safeguard:
1.
2. Censor must decide within a reasonable period
3. Must be prompt final judicial decision
1. New York Times Co. v. US – invalid injunction
New York Times started publication of excerpts from a classified Pentagon Study.
Nixon said that continued publication will pose a threat. SC denied injuction
○ It was only the right of but the central purpose of free press is to scrutinize government
1. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance – EVAT is a valid law
Removing the press from the exemption while maintaining others is NOT discriminatory
What the Constitution prohibits are laws that prohibit the press or target groups for which in any way
discriminate the press on the basis of the content of the publication
VAT is not a license tax! Revenue tax kasi eto…
2. Alexander v. US – Valid forfeiture
Criminal case for violation of Obscenity and Racketeering – petitioner argues that the shut down of his
business is excessive and that there is a future restrain of his freedom of expression
SC: the forfeiture was due to the crime and will not hamper him from opening future businesses to express
his activities.. he just cannot use the proceeds of the crime
3. INC v. CA – invalid ban; INC can still air their show
INC has a TV show which shoes their doctrines and sometimes criticizes other religions.
○ There should be no prior restraint on the exercise of free speech UNLESS Such exercise possess
clear and present danger of a substantive evil.

Subsequent Punishment
– Not allowed unless:

19
 1. Dangerous Tendency Test – checks the content; requires that there is a rational connection between
the speech and the evil
2. Clear and Present Danger Test - checks the content and context; proximity and degree; W/N the
words were clear to present danger
i. Relative seriousness
ii. Value
iii. Moderate controls
iv. intent
1. Balancing of Interest Test – only when dangerous tendency test and clear and present danger
test cannot apply.
- weigh the circumstances and to apprise the substantiality of reasons
- individual vs. government : weighing of interests
* Clear and Present Danger Test and Balancing of Interest Test is more favored.
Difference related to the degree of proximity of the apprehended danger which justified the restriction upon speech
Dangerous Tendency Test Clear and Present Danger
Permitted the application of restrictions once a rational Required the government to defer application of
connection between the speech restrained and the restrictions until the apprehended danger was more
danger apprehended – the “tendency” of one to create visible, until its realization was imminent and nigh at
the other – was shown. hand.
More permissive of speech
Factors to be considered in restricting individual’s freedom and the social importance and the value of the freedom so
restricted:
(a) The social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by legislation
(b) The specific trust of the restriction, i.e. whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the persons
affected are few;
(c) The value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation – the nature and
gravity of the evil that is to be prevented
(d) whether the specific restriction is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such public
interest
(e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by some other measure
less restrictive of the protected freedom.
1. People v. Perez – Valid Subsequent punishment; perez was sentenced to imprisonment
Perez had a heated argument regarding General Wood, which resulted to Perez shouting a number of
times seditious words like “The Filipinos like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos for he has killed our independence”
Court decided that Perez uttered seditious words and shall be punished.
Doctrine: criticism is allowed no matter how severe as long as the speech is not seditious. When the
intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press
and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the Consti and the laws, and the existence of the State.
2. Dennis v. US- law is valid, there is a clear and present danger
Smith Act – a law making it a crime for any person willfully and knowingly conspiring:
(1) To organize as a Communist Party, group that advocates destruction of US gov’t by force
and violence; and
(2) Knowingly advocating necessity of overthrowing the government
• Clear and present danger test was applied
• It was during the cold war and there was substantial interest to be protected.
• Overthrow of the government by force and violence is substantial interest to limit speech; the words
can’t mean that before government acts it must wait until putsch is about to execute, the plans have
been laid and signal is awaited
1. Gonzales v. COMELEC – the law is valid, freedom of speech is not absolute.
RA 4880 – prohibits too early nominations of candidates and limiting the period for election campaign or
partisan political activity;
○ They seek to prohibit early campaigning to:
 Avoid huge expenditures on the part of the candidates
 Avoid violence and even deaths
 Avoid corruption of the electorate
• Freedom of expression is not absolute.
○ Clear and present danger – evil consequence of the comment is extremely serious and degree of
imminence is high.
○ Dangerous tendency rule – words uttered create a tendency which the state has a right to prevent
○ Assembly means the right to meet peaceably for constitution in respect to public affairs. It is not
limited nor denied except upon a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.
1. Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. – invalid closure of Eastern Broadcasting as it clearly violated the
Constitutional rights
○ the case is actually moot but court said that it could still set a decision for guidelines of lower courts.

20
 ○ Eastern Broadcasting is a radio station originally for news reporting but changed its programs gearing
towards public affairs
○ The station is closed down without proper due process because allegedly, they are inciting people to
commit acts of sedition.
Doctrine: - the protection given to TV and radio broadcasts is less in scope than accorded to print media.
It is because it is more accessible especially to the low income masses.
1. Ayers Production PTY. LTD. V. Judge Capulong – court ruling invalid. Honasan is a public figure
Ponce Enrile Case – Ayer Production wanted to make a film documentary of the Edsa revolution
○ There is no unlawful intrusion upon Enrile\’s right to privacy
○ Subject matter of the film is one of public interest and concern and does not relate to the individual life
and certainly not to the private life of Ponce Enrile
○ The court only asked that the film is required to be fairly truthful and historical in the presentation of
events.
○ Public figure – a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his
character, has become a public personage. He is a celebrity. It includes, in shot, anyone who has
arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person.
1. Kelley v. Johnson – regulation is valid.
○ There was a regulation on the country policemen’s hair and it is being attacked as violative of the
freedom of expression
○ The uniform reflects the desire to make policemen readily visible or to foster the esprit de corps that
similarity in the appearance may inculcate in the force.
A county regulation limiting the length of county policemen's hair held not to violate any right guaranteed
respondent policeman by the Fourteenth Amendment
1. Brandenburg v. Ohio
○ The Klu Klux Clan leader was convicted for advocacy on terrorism and doctrines of criminal syndicalism
○ Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.
○ Mere Advocacy
○ the person speaking is not an expert in bombing/terrorism acts
○ Imminent Lawless Action test :
 Intent
 Imminence
 likelihood

Speech and the Electoral Process

1. Sanidad v. COMELEC – Comelec’s prohibition is invalid
○ Sanidad was a columnist in a baguio newspaper and seeks to invalidate prohibition of ComElec for
writers regarding the Cordelliera Autonomous Region Plebiscite
○ Comelec cannot restrict freedom of expression especially in plebiscites when there is no candidate
being favored
1. National Press Club v. COMELEC – Comelec Time and Comelec Space is Valid
○ Comelec Time/Comelec Space
○ Constitution has expressly authorized the Comelec to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information
○ The prohibition seeks to ensure “equal opportunity between the rich and the poor”
1. Adiong v. COMELEC – Comelec’s prohibition is Invalid; no substantial governmental interest
justifying the restriction.
○ Stickers/Decals
○ W/N COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private,
and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. –NO
○ The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle
○ The prohibition on posting of decals on “mobile places” whether public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution.
1. Osmeña v. COMELEC- valid pa rin ang Section 11!
○ Osmena seeks to reexamine the ruling in the National Press Club v. Comelec regarding section 11
(Comelec space and Comelec time)
○ They are saying that the ban actually prejudiced the poor candidates
○ Court said that the Law is still valid.
○ The prohibition is justified
○ Atty. Medina: CHECK HOW COURT APPLIED the O’BRIEN TEST
1. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC – comelec’s prohibition is invalid.
○ Exit Polls are valid
21
 ○ The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of
securing participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintain the
balance between stability and change
○ The right to information, when faced with borderline situations which the freedom of a candidate or a
party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to
assure clean and free elections, the SC shall lean in favor of freedom.
○ An absolute prohibition on exit polls would be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents
the use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research
○ Comelec’s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls- disorder and confusion in
the voting centers – does not justify a total ban on them
1. SWS v. COMELEC – the Fair Election Act lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression,
and the press and is INVALID
○ There is prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication
of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days
immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local election.
○ The prohibition against surveys within the specified period is a prior and unreasonable restraint upon
freedom of expression.

Commercial Speech
– Speech which does nothing more than propose a transaction
(1) Must concern lawful activity
(2) Must not be misleading
(3) Is the asserted governmental interest substantial?
1. Rubin v. Coors Brewing – the prohibition violates the Constitution’s protection of commercial
speech.
○ There was a ban on putting the alcohol content of the beer in the label.
○ Information on the label is considered as commercial speech
Central Hudson Test
The Central Hudson test recognizes the constitutionality of regulations restricting advertising that
concerns an illegal product or service, or which is deceptive. For all other restrictions on commercial
speech, however, the Court's test requires that the government show that the regulation directly advances
an important interest and is no more restrictive of speech than necessary.
Regulations affecting commercial speech do not violate the First Amendment if:
1. The regulated speech concerns an illegal activity,
2. The speech is misleading, or
3. The government's interest in restricting the speech is substantial, the regulation in question directly
advances the government's interest, and
4. The regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest.
1. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network – the city’s prohibition in the racks for commercial handbills
violates the constitution
○ Prohibition on news rack dispensing handbills
○ City did not give license to Discovery network because it seeks to lessen the number of the news
racks. City contends that the prohibition seeks to increase safety and improve the attractiveness of the
city. It also contends that the commercial speech has only a low value.
○ Why prohibit only commercial handbills when the newspaper racks are equally or even more
problematic due to their great number?
○ The Court has held that government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner
of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified "without reference to the
content of the regulated speech.” The ban in this case is based on the content!
1. City of Ladue v. Gilleo – the city’s prohibition is invalid and violates freedom of speech
○ Gilleo posted a printed sign with words “Say not to War in Persian Gulf, Call Congress now” – the sign
is removed several times
○ There is a city ordinance that prohibits signs except those that fall within the exceptions
○ Restriction was content neutral BUT not valid because people express through cheap means and there
is NO ALTERNATIVE given

Libel
Atty Medina: Public and malicious imputation of a crime or a vice or defect whether real or imaginary or
any act, omission, status tending to cause dishonor, discredit/contemt of a natural or juricial or the
DEAD!
1. Policarpio v. Manila Times – the article is Libelous and malicious.
○ There was an article in the Manila times regarding Policarpio. Policarpio is a woman official working in
unesco charged with malversation and estafa.
○ To enjoy immunity for freedom of speech, a publication containing derogatory information must not
only be true, but, also fair, and it must be made in good faith without comments or remarks.
1. Lopez v. CA-
○ There was a wrong picture in a publication of an article relating to a hoax in Babuyan Islands.
22
 ○ Court said that publication of plaintiff’s photograph is actionable.
○ Pressure of deadline is not a defense in libelous publication in a weekly magazine
○ Retraction published to correct the wrong mitigates the amount of damages
○ Dissenting: actual malice should be proven
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan – New York Times did not violate constitution. Statements were
not made with knowing or reckless disregard for truth.
○ Sullivan is the Chief of Police, and there was an ad regarding the criticism by the action of policemen
○ Actual malice – actual knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard for the truth
○ SC ruled against Sullivan holding that public officials are insulated from libel judgments. The
guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that is was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
 to require critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain
of libel judgments would lead to self-censorship, since would-be critics would be dettered from
voicing out their criticisms even such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of
doubt
1. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. – Metromedia was not guilty of libel. Though Rosenbloom is a
private person, his acts greatly affected the public and the public deserves to know.
○ Rosenbloom sold nudist magazines. Police arrested him after collecting material from his newsstands.
A radio station reported this information without using the word “alleged”
○ SC upheld the freedom of the press. SC allowed “breathing space” for the press to upheld the truth.
1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
○ Gertz is a lawyer who represented a man who shot and killed another. A year later, there was an
article that alleged that Gertz framed the officer at the trial, etc. it claimed that Gertz orchestrated
the conviction of the man.
○ After reviewing the case history and prior decisions, Powell began with a reminder that "Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea ... (it) requires that we protect some falsehood in
order to protect speech that matters."
However, he rejected the idea that the mere public interest of the subject should outweigh any
consideration of Gertz's status as a private or public figure. The latter, he noted, have access to
more ways of counteracting allegations about them than private figures do, and thus they
deserved a lower standard to prove libel. He also highly doubted that one could involuntarily
become a public figure
○ A new trial was ordered
1. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell – creators of parodies of public figures are protected unless the
parody includes false statements of fact made in knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.
○ Falwell was a protestant minister and a public figure. The ad was a parody of both Falwell and the
Campari ad.
○ Parody of a public figure is not libel.
○ Reasonable people would not have interpreted the parody to contain factual claims.
1. In Re: Jurado AM – Atty. Emil Jurado was found to be guilty of contempt of court and was asked
to pay fine of 1000.
○ Jurado is a columnist-lawyer in a newspaper and he wrote several articles about the SC justices and
justices of Makati labeling them as the “dirty dozen” and the “magnificent seven” saying that they are
corrupt judges. He also wrote about a party in the “penthouse” of Equitable Bldg and a hongkong trip
sponsored by PLDT
○ Freedom of expression cannot be used to insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them
into disrepute – this would not be “to act with justice” or “give everyone his due”
○ The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the
norm does prohinit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory
statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.
1. In Re: Jurado
2. Vasquez v. CA – Vasquez was acquitted
○ Vasquez was interviewed by a reporter and he said that the Brgy. Captain landgrabbed.
○ Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless
the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not
Defamatory allegation - if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor
or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
1. Borjal v. CA – Borjal is acquitted. He is not guilty for libel.
○ Borjal wrote in several articles about a “hero”, “organizer of events”, etc. Francisco Wenceslao, the
one who claims that he’s the one being described in the articles is not even sure that he’s the one
being attacked or defamed.

23
 ○ In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named;
○ It is not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the one being attacked, but it must be
shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication.
○ Presumption of malice: while, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the
privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice.
○
1. Vicario v. CA
○ Vicario allegedly distributed photocopies of an article regarding a graft charged against a judge in the
Inquirer. He is sued by the judge for libel.
○ Elements of libel:
(1) Imputation of discreditable act or condition to another
(2) Publication of the imputation
(3) Identity of the person defamed
(4) Existence of malice
○ A person’s liability for libel, need not, admittedly, stem from the fact that he was the original publisher
of the discreditable act.
1. Pader v. People – Pader did not commit libel because of the circumstances affecting the
situation.
○ Pader appeared at the terrace of the house of Escolangco and uttered “putang ina mo Atty.
Escolangco. Napakawalanghiya mo!”
○ The factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. Trial court failed to appreciate
the fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the
defamatory words; and the fact that petitioner’s anger was instigated by what Escolangco did when his
father died.
○ Escolangco, as he was running for a electoral position, should be used to this kind of behavior of
people.

Obscenity
Kottinger test: “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall.”
– “is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.”
– However, it should still be based on ”the community standard”
– Not protected by the Freedom of Speech!!!!!!!
1. Miller v. California – obscenity is not protected by the freedom of speech!
○ Miller was engaged in large mail-order business of pornographic material. They sent a catalogue
depicting men and women in sexual acts with their genitals exposed.
○ The government can outlaw material based on the following standard: "whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
○ Miller Test: standards to determine whether or not speech is obscene
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards (not national standards, as
some prior tests required), must find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (sexually arouse men/women . indecency is different and is allowed but
depends on the place.)
(2) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory
functions[1] specifically defined by applicable state law; and
(3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
○ Obscene materials are defined as those that the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, find, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest; that depict or describe, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and that, taken as a whole,
lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
1. Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak – the board of review did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
classifying the film as “for adults only” – the court agrees that the board abused is discretion
but there were not enough votes to maintain that it was grave.
○ Kapit sa patalim film was classified by the board of review for motion pictures as “for adults only”
○ The test to determine whether a motion picture exceeds the bounds of permissible exercise of free
speech and, therefore, should be censored, is the clear and present danger test.
○ There is a difficulty in determining what is obscene.
 Test: whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, find, taken
as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest.
 The Hicklin Test:
• Judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well
encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally
restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides
safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.

24
 1. Pita v. CA – the court was not convinced that the mayor has shown the required proof to justify
a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been
sought.
○ Pita published and co-edited “Pinoy Playboy” magazines. Pita argues that the magazines are for art’s
sake.
○ There was a raid in Recto and their magazines were seized and burnt by the mayor and the policemen.
○ The court discussed the different definitions of obscenity.
○ It applied the Clear and present danger rule.
○ There was a void warrantless seizure.
○ Atty Medina: Proper Police Standard should be followed for smut  warrant first!!
1. Barnes v. Glen Theater – valid prohibition; State wanted to stop nudity. O’Brien test
requirements have been met.
○ Two businesses, Kitty Cat lounge and Glen Theatre, Inc. operated adult entertainment establishments.
○ Kitty Cat Lounge – exotic dancers
○ Glen Theatre – selling porno material such as magazines and videos
○ There was an Indiana statute prohibiting Indecent behavior. Minimum of Pasties and G-strings.
○ In determining the type of protection, the Court turned to the "time, place, or manner" test as
implemented in United States v. O'Brien, the four-pronged "O'Brien Test." The Court found that
enacting this sort of legislation was clearly within the constitutional authority of the state, and that the
statute furthered a substantial government interest.
○ Public nudity is the evil that the State is seeking to prevent.
1. Federal Communications Corporation v. Pacifica Foundation – the government has the power to
prohibit broadcast of offensive words. The words need not be obscene.
○ Atty Medina: this case distinguishes obscenity from decency.
○ During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue,
"Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included
shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the
monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC
received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his
young son.
○ Because of the pervasive nature of broadcasting, it has less First Amendment protection than other
forms of communication. The F.C.C. was justified in concluding that Carlin's "Filthy Words" broadcast,
though not obscene, was indecent, and subject to restriction.
○ The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast
of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to
warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in
determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the
parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."
1. City of Renton v. Playtime Theater - ordinance is a valid governmental response to the serious
problems created by adult theaters and satisfies the dictates of the First Amendment
○ Playtime theatre purchased to theaters in Renton, Washington.
○ City of Renton requested an injunction with regard to a city ordinance prohibiting adult theaters to
operate near residential homes.
1. Bethel School District v. Fraser – the school has a right to punish for giving a lewd and indecent,
but not obscene, speech at a school assembly.
○ Fraser gave a speech in nominating a classmate for a position in the student body. The speech was
filled with sexual innuendos, but not obscenity, prompting disciplinary action from the School.
○ He was suspended by the school and prohibited from giving a speech during graduation.
1. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier – the school has a right to censor articles that they think
are inappropriate for younger readers of the school.
○ the public school curricular student newspapers that have not been established as forums for student
expression are subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection that independent student
expression or newspapers established as forums for student expression.

Assembly and Petition

1. Navarro v. Villegas – mayor did not deny nor absolutely refuse the permit sought by Navarro.
○ Navarro requested for permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda. On the same day, mayor wrote a
reply denying his request. The mayor said “In greater interest of the community, this office, guided by
a lesson gained from the events of the past few weeks, has temporarily adopted the policy of not
issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies and demonstrations during weekdays.”
○ Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used
for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;
○ Right of assembly – a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs.

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 ○ right to petition – any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate brach or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
1. PBM Employees v. PBM – the company is guilty of unfair labor practice.
○ PBM Employees planned a demonstration against policemen. PBM Company said that those who have
work in the first shift who will join the rally shall be dismissed from work.
○ Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred position. In the hierarchy of civil
liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such “priority gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
1. JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing – prohibition of rally is void.
○ JBL Reyes requested for a permit to hold a rally from Luneta to the US Embassy regarding the bases
act.
○ Absent the clear and present danger, choice of Luneta and US Embassy for a public rally cannot be
legally objected to.
○ Freedom of access to public parks for staging a peaceful public rally is guaranteed by the Constitution.
1. Malabanan v. Ramento
○ Students held rally inside school but not within the area where they were permitted to rally.
○ These students were given a 1 year suspension but did not push through. The case is moot because
the students have already enrolled and their suspension only lasted for a few days.
○ Authority of school officials over the conduct of their students cannot go so far as to be violative of the
right to free speech and assembly.
○ It is understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and vitriolic language against
school authorities during a student rally.
1. BAYAN v. Ermita – BP 880 is valid but CPR (Calibrated Preemptive Response was held to be
serving no purpose)
○ BP 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies.
○ It also refers to all kinds of public assemblies. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
“peaceable” and entitled to protection.
○ The law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. “public” does not have to be difeined.
○ Freedom Parks – should be established, SC gave the LGU’s 30 days to establish freedom parks.
○ Maximum tolerance should be followed. CPR, calibrated preemptive response, serves no valid purpose
if it is equal to maximum tolerance. Maximum tolerance means the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
○ When mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when police demand a permit and rallyists
could not produce one and rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary
consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly
filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application
without the need to show a permit, the grant of permit being then presumed under law, and it will be
the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the
rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance.

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