[A.M. No. P-94-1067.

January 30, 1997]

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF LAOAG CITY, complainants, vs. BIENVENIDO ARZAGA and
ALFREDO MAURICIO, respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter arose from two (2) anonymous letters, one dated April 21,
1994 addressed to Judge Federico A. Llanes, MTCC, Branch I, Laoag City and the other dated
April 27, 1994 addressed to Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC, Branch 13, Laoag City,
charging Bienvenido Arzaga and Alfredo Mauricio, both process servers of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, MTCC, Laoag City, with influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling, bribery,
extortion and manipulation of bonds by using the same property for different cases.
On June 22, 1994, Judge Llanes forwarded the said letters, together with the
respondents' comments, to the Office of the Court Administrator.
In a resolution dated September 19, 1994, this Court referred the matter to Executive
Judge Wenceslao Agnir, RTC, Laoag City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his investigation report dated December 16, 1994, Judge Agnir stated, among others,
that both respondents had submitted their written comments denying the charges; that
upon receipt of the complaint, he requested the local media to announce to the public that
anyone who had evidence against the two respondents could see him; that however, after
two months of waiting, nobody came forward to offer any evidence against respondents;
that he also interviewed the employees of the City Court to verify the truth of the charges
against the respondents, but he obtained no information to give credence to said charges.
Judge Agnir, however, reported that he received a certification from the City
Prosecutor's Office of Laoag City, to the effect that Alfredo Mauricio was convicted of
Frustrated Murder on September 29, 1983 in Criminal Case No. 1260-XIII, but was placed on
probation. Alfredo Mauricio had also been charged with eleven (11) other criminal cases like
Illegal Possession of Firearms, Grave Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, Serious Physical
Injuries, but all of these had been dismissed.
Judge Agnir made no definite recommendation in his report, except to say that he was
leaving it to the Court Administrator to determine whether on the basis of "such a criminal
record, Alfredo 'Boy' Mauricio deserves to stay in the service of the Judiciary."
On February 1, 1995, this Court referred the Investigation Report of Judge Agnir to the
Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. Accordingly,
the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum to this Court recommending
that the charges against the two respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.

After a careful examination of the recommendation of the Office of the Court

Administrator, this Court on May 29, 1995, resolved to dismiss the charges against Benjamin
Arzaga as recommended but referred the case against Alfredo Mauricio to Judge Agnir for
further investigation relative to how said respondent managed to be appointed to the
position of process server despite a previous record of conviction of the crime of frustrated
murder. Judge Agnir was likewise directed to conduct an inquiry on whether said respondent
made untruthful statements in his application by suppressing the fact of his conviction as
well as other criminal charges filed against him though subsequently dismissed.
In compliance with the aforementioned resolution, Judge Agnir submitted his second
investigation report dated July 21, 1995. In his report, Judge Agnir narrated that respondent
Mauricio joined the judiciary on October 4, 1990 as Utility Worker I of MTCC, Branch 2, Laoag
City. His commission was signed by then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro and certified
by Chief Administrative Officer Adelaida Cabe-Baumann upon recommendation of Judge
Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., then presiding judge of Branch 2, RTC, Laoag City. On May 5, 1992,
respondent was promoted to the position of process server of the Office of the Clerk of
Court, MTCC, Laoag City. His commission was signed by Romeo P. de Leon in behalf of
Adelaida Cabe-Baumann.
Judge Agnir further narrated that respondent disclosed his conviction of the crime of
frustrated murder and that he was on probation for the same in his application. When
respondent was asked by Judge Agnir why he did not indicate that other criminal charges
were filed against him, he replied that the question in the application form simply asked for
conviction, not mere charges.
The Second Investigation Report also mentioned the name of two (2) persons from
whom respondent Mauricio allegedly asked favors using the name of Judge Fernandez. The
first was Jimmy Lao, a realtor-businessman of Laoag City who told Judge Agnir that two (2)
years earlier when he had a case pending before the sala of Judge Fernandez, respondent
Mauricio approached him and asked for two (2) tires allegedly for the car of Judge
Fernandez. Mr. Lao said that when he went to verify the request, he was not able to talk to
Judge Fernandez but a court staff member told him that Judge Fernandez was not in the
habit of asking favors from litigants and that in all probability, the tires were intended for
Mauricio's owner-type jeep which was then in the process of being assembled. When he
confronted Mauricio about it, the latter told him that he (Mauricio) was only joking.
The second interviewee was German Reantillo, administrative officer of the City
Engineer's Office of Laoag City who confirmed that sometime ago he gave Mauricio thirty
(30) liters of gasoline on the respondent's representation that this was for Judge Fernandez;
that sometime later he had the occasion to mention the matter to Judge Fernandez who
denied that he authorized Mauricio to ask gasoline in his behalf.
Both Lao and Reantillo however refused to be placed under oath or to reduce their
statements in writing because they did not wish to be involved in a formal investigation
where they would have to be confronted by respondent. Furthermore Lao said he did not
wish to incur the ire of the respondent and that anyway he did not give Mauricio the tires.

On July 17, 1995, Judge Agnir called respondent Mauricio to another hearing and
confronted him with these new charges. Respondent denied them as expected.
Judge Agnir further claimed that respondent is known to be a troublesome fellow. MTC
Judge Llanes even had to file an administrative case against respondent for serious
misconduct and insubordination.
Judge Agnir then strongly recommended the immediate and summary dismissal from
the service of respondent Mauricio for being the "ultimate undesirable employee and a
disgrace to the judiciary."[1] He added that he was recommending this course of action aware
of the potential danger to his person given respondent's violent nature as documented by
his criminal record. Judge Agnir was "hopeful though that the respondent's summary
dismissal will send a chilling message to other court employees similarly engaged in
nefarious activities and unethical practices which though petty in many instances indelibly
stain the image of the judiciary."[2]
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
The Deputy Court Administrator to whom the case was assigned for review submitted
the following observations, viz:
A careful scrutiny of the 201 File of respondent Mauricio shows that he joined the judiciary
not on 4 October 1990 as Utility Worker I but on 1 August 1989 as a Court Aide of MTCC,
Branch 2 of Laoag City as a recommendee of Judge Angelo M. Albano, MTCC, Laoag
City. Respondent's appointment was by virtue of a Supreme Court Resolution dated 1
August 1989 and his commission was signed by then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro
and certified by Former Assistant Chief Administrative Officer Orlando B. Carino and Former
Chairman of the Selection Board Daniel T Martinez.
It was also discovered that on 24 January 1990 Atty. Carino sent a telegram to Mauricio
ordering him to submit a copy of the Order placing him on probation pending the approval of
his appointment as Utility Worker I. Accordingly respondent sent a copy of the said Order
and in his 1st indorsement dated 22 February 1990, Atty. Carino referred the Probation Order
to Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa, Assistant Director of the Civil Service Commission Field Office for
appropriate action.
Per Court Resolution dated 4 October 1990 respondent was appointed as Utility Worker I and
was promoted as Process Server by virtue of a Court Resolution of 5 May 1992.
On 19 January 1993 Police Inspector Felizardo Ellano of the PNP-CIS Command in Camp Capt.
Valentin San Juan, Laoag City, sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice through the Record
Section requesting that a check be conducted on the records of Mauricio who was at that
time being charged by their Office with the crimes of Less Serious Physical Injuries and
Resistance and Disobedience Upon Agents of a Person in Authority. Police Officer Ellano
likewise informed the Court that the respondent has already been charged of several
offenses in different courts in Laoag City which according to him was a clear showing that
Mauricio is a violent man, a habitual offender and extremely defiant of the law.

Records show that the respondent twice accomplished Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service
Commission Form 212, Revised 1982) on two (2) separate occasions: on 5 June 1989 before
his appointment as Court Aide and on 13 September 1990 prior to his appointment as Utility
Worker. In both instances, Mauricio disclosed his conviction of Frustrated Murder and the
fact that he was on probation.
The charges against respondent Mauricio for influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling,
bribery, extortion and manipulation of bonds by using the same property for different cases
do not appear to have been sufficiently established by clear evidence. The two (2) persons
from whom the respondent allegedly asked favors using the name of Judge Fernandez both
refused to be placed under oath or reduce their statements in writing. But administrative
charges cannot be based on mere conjecture. The complainant has the burden of proof and
such proof must be clear, solid and convincing to compel the exercise of disciplinary power
over the person indicted.
On respondent's conviction of Frustrated Murder, there was full disclosure of the conviction
and apparently was not a legal obstacle to respondent's appointment because he was
placed on probation. Therefore, respondent's conviction of a crime should not be taken as a
basis of any administrative action against him.
The foregoing notwithstanding we do not see any reason to disturb the Investigating Judge's
finding that respondent is a troublesome and violent person as shown by his criminal record
certified by the City Prosecutor of Laoag City. There is therefore merit in Judge Agnir's
recommendation of immediate and summary dismissal of the respondent from the service
for being the "ultimate undesirable employee and a disgrace to the judiciary."
It is commendable that Judge Agnir has opted to resist the temptation to be silent in the face
of what he perceives to be a deleterious influence in the court.
Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws "being notoriously undesirable" is classified as a grave
offense with a corresponding penalty of dismissal, or forced resignation under Resolution No.
89-506 dated 20 July 1989 of the Civil Service Commission.
Time and again the Court has held that "A court employee being a public servant must
exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his duties
but also in his personal and private dealings with other people to preserve the court's name
and standing. Therefore, it becomes imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the
court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice." (Paredes vs.
Padua, 222 SCRA 81).
Equally compelling is the decision of the Court in the case of Mirano vs. Saavedra, 225 SCRA
77 which states that "The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the office
charged with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility."[3]
On the foregoing antecedents, it was recommended by the Deputy Court Administrator
that respondent be declared notoriously undesirable and be considered resigned from the

service with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification from
employment in the government service for a period of one (1) year. It was further
recommended, however, that respondent be reemployed in the government service other
than the judiciary.
In reviewing the aforesaid report and recommendation submitted for the Court's
consideration, we find the foregoing observations to be correct. We, nonetheless, find the
penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator to be very light.
Consequently, we adopt the investigating judge's recommendation for respondent's
dismissal from the service, the same being warranted and justified by the facts attendant to
the instant case.
Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public
servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people.
[4]
No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust,
and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. [5] In addition, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provide that every public servant shall at all
times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest. [6]
By his acts and misdeeds, respondent has undermined the public's faith in our courts
and, ultimately, in the administration of justice. The same make him unfit as a court
employee. His employment must therefore be terminated at once. Court personnel must
adhere to the high ethical standards of public service in order to preserve the Court's good
name and standing.[7]
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that the conduct required of court personnel,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any
suspicion that may taint the judiciary.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent ALFREDO MAURICIO is hereby DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

G.R. No. 116418

March 7, 1995

SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners,

vs.

HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner,
Civil Service Commission, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the
validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") and the
authority of the Commission to issue the same.

Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit
("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel
Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City,
Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by
public respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and
Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994. 1 Resolution No.
94-3710 needs to be quoted in full:

RESOLUTION NO. 94-3710

WHEREAS, Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides that ". . . as an

independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as
the need arises;"

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in the organization to

streamline its operations and improve delivery of public service;

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it necessary to immediately effect changes in the

organization of the Central Offices in view of the need to implement new programs in lieu of
those functions which were transferred to the Regional Offices;

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to effect

the following changes in its organization, specifically in the Central Offices:

1.
The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA [Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit] and OPR [Office of Personnel Relations] are merged to form the
Research and Development Office (RDO).

2.
The Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) is renamed Human Resource
Development Office (HRDO).

3.
The following functions and the personnel assigned to the unit performing said
functions are hereby transferred to HRDO:

a.

Administration of the Honor and Awards program under OCSS;

b.

Registration and Accreditation of Unions under OPR; and

c.

Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on appointments under OPIA.

4.
The Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) is renamed Management Information
Office (MIO).

5.
The Information technology functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit
are transferred to MIO.

6.
The following functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit performing
said functions are hereby transferred to the Office of the Executive Director:

a.

Financial Audit and Evaluation;

b.

Internal Management and Improvement;

c.

Research and Statistics; and

d.

Planning and Programming.

7.
The library service and its personnel under OCPR are transferred to the Central
Administrative Office.

8.
The budget allocated for the various functions shall be transferred to the Offices
where the functions are transferred. Records, fixtures and equipment that go with the
functions shall be moved to where the functions are transferred.

Annex A contains the manning list for all the offices, except the OCES.

The changes in the organization and in operations shall take place before end of July 1994.

Done in Quezon City, July 07, 1994.

(Signed)
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
Chairman

(Signed)

Did not participate

Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr., Thelma P. Gaminde

CommissionerCommissioner

Attested by:
(Signed)
Carmencita Giselle B. Dayson
Board Secretary V 2

During the general assembly of officers and employees of the Commission held in the
morning of 28 July 1994, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners,
expressed the determination of the Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710 unless
restrained by higher authority.

Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated 23 August 1994, the Court
required public respondents to file a Comment on the Petition. On 21 September 1994,
petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging
that petitioners had received Office Orders from the Commission assigning petitioner
Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando,
Pampanga and praying that public respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office
Orders. The Court, in a Resolution dated 27 September 1994, granted this Motion and issued
the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioners.

The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12 September 1994, on the Petition and then
moved to lift the Temporary Restraining Order. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a
separate Comment dated 28 November 1994, defending the validity of Resolution No. 943710 and urging dismissal of the Petition. Petitioners filed separate Replies to these
Comments. The Commission in turn filed a Rejoinder (denominated "Comment [on] the
Reply").

The principal issues raised in this Petition are the following:

(1)
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution
No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the
OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations],
to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and

(2)
Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to
security of tenure.

I.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets
out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure and organization of the
Commission in the following terms:

Sec. 16.

Offices in the Commission The Commission shall have the following offices:

(1)

The Office of the Executive Director . . .

(2)

The Merit System Protection Board . . .

(3)

The Office of Legal Affairs . . .

(4)

The Office of Planning and Management . . .

(5)

The Central Administrative Office . . .

(6)

The Office of Central Personnel Records . . .

(7)

The Office of Position Classification and

Compensation . . .

(8)

The Office of Recruitment, Examination and

Placement . . .

(9)
The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance
in the formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to
performance appraisal, merit promotion and employee incentive benefits and awards.

(10)

The Office of Human Resource Development . . .

(11)
The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules
and regulations for the effective conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel
management programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and

advisory services to Civil Service Regional Offices and government agencies in the
implementation of their personnel programs and evaluation systems.

(12)
The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the
development and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations governing
corporate officials and employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement,
career development, merit and awards systems, position classification and compensation,
performance appraisal, employee welfare and benefits, discipline and other aspects of
personnel management on the basis of comparable industry practices.

(13)

The Office of the Corporate Affairs . . .

(14)

The Office of Retirement Administration . . .

(15)

The Regional and Field Offices. . . . (Emphases in the original)

Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the Commission and their respective
functions, the 1987 Revised Administrative Code goes on to provide as follows:

Sec. 17.
Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed by
a Director with at least one (1) Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are
necessary to carry out their respective functions. As an independent constitutional body, the
Commission may effect chances in the organization as the need arises.

xxx

xxx

xxx 3

(Emphasis supplied)

Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and
as well each of the other Offices listed in Section 16 above, consist of aggregations of
Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division
and Office comprises a group of positions within the agency called the Civil Service
Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions.
These functions are related to one another, each of them being embraced by a common or
general subject matter. Clearly, each Office is an internal department or organizational unit

within the Commission and that accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all the
other Offices within the Commission constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a
little differently, these offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.

What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do? Examination of Resolution No. 943710 shows that thereby the Commission re-arranged some of the administrative units (i.e.,
Offices) within the Commission and, among other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS,
OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research and Development Office (RDO)."
The same Resolution renamed some of the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for
Human Resource Development (OHRD) was renamed Human Resource Development Office
(HRDO); the Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) was renamed Management
Information Office (MIO). The Commission also re-allocated certain functions moving some
functions from one Office to another; e.g., the information technology function of OPM
(Office of Planning and Management) was transferred to the newly named Management
Information Office (MIO). This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it
the transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the Office where the function was
transferred. Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to
the carrying out of such functions were moved to the Offices to where the functions were
transferred.

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were
described in that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to
streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These changes
in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization
and devolution of the Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14)
Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country,
to the end that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the
government employees that they are mandated to serve. In the past, its functions had been
centralized in the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service
employees all over the country were compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of
personnel transactions. Upon the other hand, the dispersal of the functions of the
Commission to the Regional Offices and the Field Offices attached to various governmental
agencies throughout the country makes possible the implementation of new programs of the
Commission at its Central Office in Metropolitan Manila.

The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to the CSC Regional Office No. 3
was precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing an application for retirement, thus
generating a need to find a replacement for him. Petitioner de Lima was being assigned to
that Regional Office while the incumbent Regional Director was still there to facilitate her
take over of the duties and functions of the incumbent Director. Petitioner de Lima's prior
experience as a labor lawyer was also a factor in her assignment to Regional Office No. 3
where public sector unions have been very active. Petitioner Fernandez's assignment to the
CSC Regional Office No. 5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitated by the fact that the
then incumbent Director in Region V was under investigation and needed to be transferred

immediately to the Central Office. Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely
designee for Director of Regional Office No. 5 considering that the functions previously
assigned to him had been substantially devolved to the Regional Offices such that his
reassignment to a Regional Office would result in the least disruption of the operations of the
Central Office. 4

It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite legitimate
considerations of administrative efficiency and convenience in promulgating and
implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez
to the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M.
de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga. It is
also clear to
the Court that the changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-3710 renaming of existing Offices; re-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and Sections
composing particular Offices; re-allocation of existing functions (and related personnel;
budget, etc.) among the re-arranged Offices are precisely the kind of internal changes
which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code), quoted above, as "chances in the organization" of the Commission.

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices,
something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created
those public offices in the first place.

The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term
"public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public. 5 We consider
that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the
law of public officers. 6 It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization"
introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination
of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and
employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code
having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to
freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the
commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of
the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative
authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the
organization," as the need [for such changes] arises." 7 Assuming, for purposes of argument
merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off changes
contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is
necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17
earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of

such delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"),
but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the
1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service Commission

as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a

career service, adopt measures to promote efficiency [and] responsiveness . . . in the
civil service . . . and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the
corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies where such functions can
be effectively performed. (Emphasis supplied)

II.

We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was breached
by the respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners'
assignment to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V. Section 2(3) of Article
IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution declared that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend
that they were unlawfully removed from their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the
implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without their consent, be
moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.

We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a
specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a
person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of
Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so
forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV,
without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the
other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.

Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes
reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter,
in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil service:

Sec. 26.

Personnel Actions. . . .

xxx

xxx

xxx

As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil
service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, re-instatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment,
demotion, and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules,
standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.

xxx

xxx

xxx

(7)
Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to
another in the same agency, Provided, That such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction
in rank status and salary. (Emphasis supplied)

It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous
positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in
the Central Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent
assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been
effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful
cause. It also follows that such re-assignment did not involve any violation of the
constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering that they retained their
positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their
new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at
the Commission's Head Office.

Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory provisions relevant in
the instant case, but also by a long line of cases decided by this Court in respect of different
agencies or offices of government.

In one of the more recent of these cases, Department of Education Culture and Sports, etc.,
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 8 this Court held that a person who had been appointed as
"Secondary School Principal II" in the Division of City Schools, District II, Quezon City,
National Capital Region, and who had been stationed as High School Principal in the Carlos
Albert High School in Quezon for a number of years, could lawfully be reassigned or
transferred to the Manuel Roxas High School, also in Quezon City, without demotion in rank
or diminution of salry. This Court held:

The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which
provides that except for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be
transferred without his consent from one station to another, finds no application in the case
at bar as this is predicated upon the theory that the teacher concerned is appointed not
merely assigned to a particular station. Thus:

The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as

the appointed indicates a specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of
tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected
the officer's demand to remain even as public service dictates that a transfer be made
in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the
following statement in Ibaez, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R. No.
L-26558, April 27, 1967; 19 SCRA 1002 [1967]);

That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil
Service System, is not open to debate. The mantle of its protection extends not only against
removals without cause but also against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly
enunciatEd, are tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental
guarantee. However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the
first instance, upon the nature of the appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].)
Such that the rule which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of
tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed not merely
assigned to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, et al., 108 Phil. 439 [1960]; Jaro v.
Hon. Valencia, et al., 118 Phil. 728 [1963]). [Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138 (1969)]

The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As
such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any
specific school. (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to the Carlos
Albert High School, it could not have been with the intention to let her stay in said school
permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be
assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the exigencies of public service require
even without consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138,
143

Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence.
Her refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not
impenetrable. She proceeds upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang
Elementary School by appointment. But her first appointment as Principal merely reads thus:
"You are hereby appointed a Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public Schools,
Department of Education", without mentioning her station. She cannot therefore claim

security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang Elementary School or any particular station. She
may be assigned to any station as exigency of public service requires, even without her
consent. She thus has no right of choice. 9 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

In the very recent case of Fernando, et al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, etc., et
a1., 10 the Court addressed appointments of petitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the
National Capital Region" in dismissing a challenge on certiorari to resolutions of the CSC and
orders of the Secretary of Labor. The Court said:

Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the National Capital Region. They were
not, however, appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in
the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned from
one organizational unit to another of the same agency where, in the opinion of respondent
Secretary, their services may be used more effectively. As such they can neither claim a
vested right to the station to which they were assigned nor to security of tenure thereat. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioners' reassignment is not a transfer for
they were not removed from their position as med-arbiters. They were not given new
appointments to new positions. It indubitably follows, therefore, that Memorandum Order No.
4 ordering their reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in order. 11 (Emphases
supplied)

In Quisumbing v. Gumban, 12 the Court, dealing with an appointment in the Bureau of Public
Schools of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, ruled as follows:

After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the appointment of private
respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which
does not indicate a specific station (Rollo, p. 13). A such, she could be assigned to any
station and she is no entitled to stay permanently at any specific station (Bongbong v.
Parado, 57 SCRA 623 [1974]; Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. 81032, March 22, 1990] citing Brillantes v. Guevarra [27 SCRA 138 [1969]). 13

Again, in Ibaez v. Commission on Elections, 14 the Court had before it petitioners'

appointments as "Election Registrars in the Commission of Elections," without any intimation
to what city, municipality or municipal district they had been appointed as such. 15 The
Court held that since petitioners "were not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to
any security of tenure or permanence in, any specific station," "on general principles, they
[could] be transferred as the exigencies of the service required," and that they had no right
to complain against any change in assignment. The Court further held that assignment to a
particular station after issuance of the appointment was not necessary to complete such
appointment:

. . . . We cannot subscribe to the theory that an assignment to a particular station, in the

light of the terms of the appointments in question, was necessary to complete the said
appointments. The approval thereof by the Commissioner of Civil Service gave those
appointments the stamp of finality. With the view that the respondent Commission then took
of its power in the premises and the demand of the mission it set out to accomplish with the
appointments it extended, said appointments were definitely meant to be complete as then
issued. The subsequent assignment of the appointees thereunder that the said respondent
Commission held in reserve to be exercised as the needs of each locality justified did not in
any way detract from the perfection attained by the appointments beforehand. And the
respective appointees were entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment
papers concerned actually conferred not in that of any place to which they may have
been subsequently assigned. . . . As things stand, in default of any particular station stated
in their respective appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the petitioners on
the basis of the mere assignments which were given to them. A contrary rule will erase
altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between appointment and
assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers. 16 (Emphases supplied)

The petitioner, in Miclat v. Ganaden, 17 had been appointed as a "Welfare Office Incharge,
Division of Urban, Rural and Community Administration, Social Welfare Administration." She
was assigned as Social Welfare Incharge of the Mountain Province, by an office order of the
Administrator, Social Welfare Administration. After a little more than a year; petitioner was
assigned elsewhere and respondent Ganaden transferred to petitioner's first station in
Baguio City. The Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to remain in her first station, In
Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 18 petitioner Dr. Jaro had been appointed "Physician in the
Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals." He was first assigned to the
Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics in Batulati, Davao, and later to the corresponding
clinic in Saug, Davao and then to Catil, Davao. He was later assigned to the Municipality of
Padada, also of Davao Province. He resisted his last assignment and brought mandamus
against the Secretary of Health to compel the latter to return him to his station in Catil,
Davao as Municipal Health Officer thereof. The Court, applying Miclat v. Ganaden dismissed
this Petition holding that his appointment not being to any specific station but as a physician
in the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals, he could be transferred
or assigned to any station where, in the opinion of the Secretary of Health, his services may
be utilized more effectively. 19

Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez 20 which involved the appointment of petitioner Sta.
Maria as "Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines." Dean Sta. Maria was
transferred by the President of the University of the Philippines to the Office of the President,
U.P., without demotion in rank or salary, thereby acceding to the demands of student
activists who were boycotting their classes in the U.P. College of Education. Dean Sta. Maria
assailed his transfer as an illegal and unconstitutional removal from office. In upholding
Dean Sta. Maria's claim, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, laid down the
applicable doctrine in the following terms:

4.
Concededly, transfers there are which do not amount to removal. Some such transfer
can be effected without the need for charges being preferred, without trial or hering, and
even without the consent of the employee.

The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the appointment." Where the
appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or
reassigned provided the transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary. Thus
one who is appointed "principal in the Bureau of Public Schools" and is designated to head a
pilot school may be transferred to the post of principal of another school.

And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies
only to an officer who is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. Such a
rule does not prescribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the
head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve
the service of the agency. The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel
management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum public service
cannot-be objected to. . . .

5.
The next point of inquiry is whether or not Administrative Order 77 would stand the
test of validity vis-a-vis the principles just enunciated.

xxx

xxx

xxx

To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of "Dean,
College of Education, University of the Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the
university." His appointment is to a specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific
station. 21 (Citations omitted; emphases supplied)

For all the foregoing we conclude that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de
Lima from their stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development
Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions Regional Offices in Regions V and III,
respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right
to security of tenure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary

Restraining Order issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs
against petitioners.

G.R. No. 145368

April 12, 2002

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223
"constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in
1998." The Committee was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the
National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine
Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."1

Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed
the Committee as the "National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the
reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M.
Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons.2

Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission "shall terminate upon the
completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor
Committee, the Commission was tasked to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for
the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine
Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."

Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the
responsibility to "prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the
Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of" the Executive Order.

E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:

Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by
a Secretariat to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential
Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National
Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time Executive Director who
shall be designated by the President.

Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the
Department of Tourism and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be
recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for
succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation

(Expocorp) was created.4 Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who
were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.

On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial
Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin
Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate
Committees for investigation.

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating
an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its component
activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.

On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the
Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees
recommendations was "the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair
of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of
centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest
bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring)
even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and
for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the

government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft
law."5

Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It
recommended "the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper
cases of," among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently
referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On
January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:

1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against
former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q.
Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;

2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal
complainant.6

In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and
those of his witnesses.

On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of said office.

In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.

On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the
motion was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.

On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.

On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a
resolution finding "probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and
TEODORO Q. PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594." The resolution also directed that
an information for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge
against Pea.

In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or
any court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral
argument.

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public
officer because:

A.

EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE

FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION,
NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.

B.

THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.

C.

PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A "PUBLIC
OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.7

In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,9
where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioners position
was purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently,
the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.

This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that "it is the
prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding
information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."

In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:

The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and
regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over
prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation
and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for
the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other
purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which
emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve
to limit the Ombudsmans and Special Prosecutors authority to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]

The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the
Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its
Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make
a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by

regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in

Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the
Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the
exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees by other
courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be
stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and
encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the
limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The
Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of
the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case
where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the
personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation
and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under
his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to
prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c)
of RA 6770.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most
important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately
endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent

of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. A review of the development of our
Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.]

Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which
petitioner relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not
a public officer.

The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as "protectors of the
people," who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations." Among the awesome
powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution11 upon the Office of the
Ombudsman is to "[i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."

The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989." Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law
respectively provide:

SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act
promptly on complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability
in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

x x x.

The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13,
supra:

SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.12

Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public
officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence13 is that provided by
Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.14

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of

sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of
the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.15

Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC
Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did
not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a
public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or

contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the

benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.16

Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government?
Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as
legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?

We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."17 The executive function,
therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.

The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture,
and Sports) thereof:

Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve,
promote, and popularize the nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well
as artistic creations.

In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the
National Centennial Celebrations in 1998:

Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the
centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of
Filipino identity;

Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen
Filipino values;

Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through longrange planning and continuous developmental programming;

Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and
capability, particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for
long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;

Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary
task of harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business
sectors to serve as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of this longterm project;

x x x.

E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998,
cited the "need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and
synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the
government and non-government or private organizations." It also referred to the "need to
rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries."

The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry
them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:

(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of

programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for
history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of
accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this
regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within Metro Manila, the original
eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;

(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration
of the Centennial;

(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information
about the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;

(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs
and projects;

(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this regard,
the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operatetransfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and maintenance of the
historical sites and structures;

(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite
private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,

(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as well
as the status of the preparations for the Celebration.18

It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,19 created the NCC
by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2
describes the nature of executive orders:

SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers
shall be promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.]

Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development,
especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments
before this Court:

MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:

And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you agree that the task
of the centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic
development of the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of
the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:

I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by
lack of material time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made
Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President
Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because of the
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by putting
this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also mention we
wanted to generate employment aside from attracting business investments and
employment. And the Estrada administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40
thousand people who lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75
thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated, accelerated the development of Central
Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to that because they had the airport and there are
plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the original plan.

There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment
is a fundamental state policy.20

Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla21 that the holding by a
municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner
argues that the "holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the nations 100th
birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of the national
governments proprietary function."22 In Torio, we held:

[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply
gives authority to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon
it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious
or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community
and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state.
The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to
provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private
undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like
which are for public service.

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true
nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a
particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however
beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is government in essence,
otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in character. Easily, no governmental or
public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court
cautioned that "there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true
nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a
particular case are to be considered and will be decisive." Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the
Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the "surrounding circumstances plus the
political, social, and cultural backgrounds" could produce a conclusion different from that in
Torio:

We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the
political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The
case of Pope v. City of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal
injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander
alleged to have been caused by defendants negligence. The defendants demurred to the
complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in the performance of a public
governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the
performance of which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the
Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that
the celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the
order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:

Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely
public governmental duties, unless made liable by statute.

A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute,

conducted a public Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a
bomb intended to explode in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground,
and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty. (99
A.R. 51)

This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.

At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:

"July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called
Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes.
While there is no United States statute making a similar provision, the different departments
of the government recognize, and have recognized since the government was established,
July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it has been recognized and celebrated
as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to

arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of
literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution,
accompanied by a musical program including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing
of cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general
public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x"

Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The
Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries
of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people
from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and
sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our
history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a "vehicle for fostering
nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity," an opportunity to "showcase Filipino
heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values." The significance of the Celebrations could
not have been lost on petitioner, who remarked during the hearing:

Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle
the love for freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody
feel proud that he is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their
time. x x x.

Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner,
as its Chair, is a public officer.

That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of
the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the
office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary
office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.23 Hence, the office of
petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a
lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are
attached.24 But it is a public office, nonetheless.

Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "ad-hoc body" make
said commission less of a public office.

The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position
which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. "But," says
Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by

the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to

perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining
them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to
distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the
duties from an officer."

At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as
indispensable, for, if the other elements are present "it can make no difference," says
Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the
office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good
behavior."25

Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.26 There the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission is an "office of trust" as to disqualify its holder as elector of the
United States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States
Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is
disqualified from being appointed an elector.)

x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office

of trust under the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector
of President and Vice-President of the United States.

The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871.
That statute provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products,
and manufactures, "under the auspices of the government of the United States," and for the
constitution of a commission, to consist of more than one delegate from each State and from
each Territory of the United States, "whose functions shall continue until close of the
exhibition," and "whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the execution of the plan
for holding the exhibition." Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the
President of the United States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and
Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed upon the commission, and under the
statute provision was to be made for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the
President should announce, by proclamation, the date and place of opening and holding the
exhibition. By an act of Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the
commission were further increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called "The
Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate with the commission and to raise and disburse
the funds. It was to be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh section
of the act provides "that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings
erected by the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the
United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation,
governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights,

privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by
the United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or privileges of any
description connected with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or
celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United States Centennial Commission,
and said commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all such grants, and
shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums." The tenth section of the act
provides that "it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise
the closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report
to the President of the United States the financial results of the centennial exhibition."

It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the
commission were various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully
performed only by men of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not
merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative, discretionary,
and final in their character. We think that persons performing such duties and exercising
such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not to be regarded as
mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are, properly speaking, officers,
and that the places which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were
originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under which they were appointed
declares, section 7, that "no compensation for services shall be paid to the commissioners or
other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury of the United States." The only other
officers provided for were the "alternates" appointed to serve as commissioners when the
commissioners were unable to attend.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is,
therefore, a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether
Expocorp is a private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private
corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his
Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be
viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.27

Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for
his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act
No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman.

Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which
reads:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term

xxx

(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.
[Emphasis supplied.]

It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a "public officer" is expressly
limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of
determining the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law,
matters that are best resolved at trial.

To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not
restrictive.28 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define

"public officers." Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public
officer is:

x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by

competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of
Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class.

Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,29 on the
other hand, states:

Officer as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a person whose duties not
being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of
the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to
do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power,
"officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or
exercise that function.

It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a "public
official" whether or not one receives compensation, thus:

"Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police
personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.

Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?

Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term
"compensation," which is not defined by said law, has many meanings.

Under particular circumstances, "compensation" has been held to include allowance for
personal expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling
expenses, payments for services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and
wages.30

How then is "compensation," as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be
interpreted?

Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not
receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium,
or some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is
entitled to per diems and compensation.31 Would such fact bear any significance?

Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the
trial court from resolving them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Courts
Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23226

March 4, 1925

VICENTE SEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO NOEL, respondent-appellant.

Provincial Fiscal Diaz for appellant.

Del Rosario and Del Rosario for appellee.
Vicente Zacarias as amicus curiae.

MALCOLM, J.:

The question to be decided on this appeal is whether that portion of Act No. 3107 which
provides, that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to

serve until they have reached the age of sixty- five years, should be given retroactive or
prospective effect.

Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21,
1907. He continuously occupied this position until having passed sixty-five mile- stones, he
was ordered by the Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the office. Since that date,
Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as justice of the peace for the
municipality of Dumanjug.

Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public scandal and of opposing physical resistance
to the occupancy of the office of justice of the peace by the auxiliary justice of the peace,
instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to inquire
into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of justice of the peace, to oust the latter
therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of the peace of Dumanjug. To this
complaint, Pedro Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground that it did not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and
because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had automatically ceased to be justice of the
peace. On the issue thus framed and on stipulated facts, judgment was rendered by
Honorable Adolph Wislizenus, Judge of First Instance, overruling the demurrer, and in favor
of petitioner and against respondent.

Proceeding by way of elimination so as to resolve the case into its simplest factors, it will
first be noted that the petitioner abandons the untenable position, assumed by him in one
portion of his complaint, to the effect that section 1 of Act No. 3107 is unconstitutional in
that it impairs the contractual right of the petitioner to an office. It is a fundamental principle
that a public office cannot be regarded as the property of the incumbent, and that a public
office is not a contract.

It will next be noted that, while the respondent as appellant assigns three errors in this
court, the first two relating to preliminary matters are ultimately renounced by him in order
that there may be an authoritative decision on the main issue. The third error specified and
argued with ability by the provincial fiscal of Cebu, is that the trial judge erred in declaring
that the limitation regarding the age of justices of the peace provided by section 1 of Act No.
3107 is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed
and acting before said law went into effect.

Coming now to the law, we find on investigation the original provision pertinent to the
appointment and term of office of justices of the peace, in section 67 of Act No. 136, wherein
it was provided that justices of the peace shall hold office during the pleasure of the
Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when Vicente Segovia was originally appointed justice of
the peace, amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by making the term of office of justices

and auxiliary justices of the peace two years from the first Monday in January nearest the
date of appointment. Shortly after Segovia's appointment, however, the law was again
amended by Act No. 1627 by providing that "all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of
the peace shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue."
Later amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections 203
and 206 of the Administrative Code.

Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that "one justice of the peace and one
auxiliary justice of the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-General for the City of
Manila, the City of Baguio, and for each municipality, township, and municipal district in the
Philippine Islands, and if the public interests shall so require, for any other minor political
division or unorganized territory in said Islands." It was this section which section 1 of Act
No. 3107 amended by adding at the end thereof the following proviso: "Provided, That
justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years." But section 206 of the Administrative Code entitled
"Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of the peace having the requisite legal
qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or
merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice," was left unchanged by Act No. 3107.

A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and
never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by
the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the
United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to
receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong,
and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of
the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive
when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil Code has it in article 3, "Law shall not have
a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." (Farrel vs. Pingree [1888], 5 Utah,
443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer vs. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Co. vs. Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306; Montilla vs. Agustinian
Corporation [1913], 24 Phil., 220; In re will of Riosa [1918], 39 Phil., 23.)

The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. A well-known New
York decision held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be
disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right
is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated."
(People ex rel. Ryan vs. Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In another case, a new constitutional
provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the incumbents of certain judicial
offices from retaining them was held prospective; it did not apply to persons in office at the
time of its taking effect. (People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb., 198; II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Chap. XVII, particularly pages 1161, 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, sec.
389.)

The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial ( [1916], 34 Phil., 329). In
that case, the question was as to the validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347. The law under
consideration not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years, but it further provided "that the present judges of Courts
of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the GovernorGeneral, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new
appointments of judges of Courts of First Instance ... ." There the intention of the Legislature
to vacate the office was clearly expressed. Here, it is not expressed at all.

The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code, gives
no indication of retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing
rights. A proviso was merely tacked on to section 203 of the Administrative Code, while
leaving intact section 206 of the same Code which permits justices of the peace to hold
office during good behavior. In the absence of provisions expressly making the law
applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly
indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would not be justified in giving the law an
interpretation which would legislate faithful public servants out of office.

Answering the question with which we began our decision, we hold that the proviso added to
section 203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing that justices
and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the
age of sixty-five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so is not applicable to
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went
into force. Consequently, it results that the decision of the trial court is correct in its findings
of fact and law and in its disposition of the case.

Judgment affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-16887

November 17, 1920

MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, petitioner,

vs.
ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal, and the PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL,
composed of ANDRES GABRIEL, PEDRO MAGSALIN and CATALINO S. CRUZ, respondents.

Gregorio Perfecto for petitioner.

MALCOLM, J.:

The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by
these proceedings in mandamus to have the provincial governor and the provincial board of
the Province of Rizal temporarily restrained from going ahead with investigation of the
charges filed against him pending resolution of the case, and to have an order issue directed
to the provincial governor commanding him to return the petitioner to his position as
municipal president of Pasay. The members of the provincial board have interposed a
demurrer based on the ground that this court has no right to keep them from complying with
the provisions of the law. The provincial governor has filed an answer to the petition, in
which he alleges as a special defense that numerous complaints have been received by him
against the conduct of Miguel R. Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay; that these
complaints were investigated by him; that he came to the conclusion that agreeable to the
powers conferred upon provincial governors, the municipal president should be temporarily
suspended, and that an investigation is now being conducted by the provincial board.

Counsel for petitioner has argued, with much eloquence, that his client has been deprived of
an office, to which he was elected by popular vote, without having an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense. The respondents reply that all that the provincial governor and the
provincial board have done in this case is to comply with the requirements of the law which
they are sworn to enforce. Obviously, therefore, we should first have before us the
applicable provisions of the Philippine law bearing on the subject of suspension of public
officers.

Under the title of "Provincial supervision over municipal officers," Article IV of Chapter 57 of
the Administrative Code, provides:

The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal officers
for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in office. for
minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems
to be desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the
officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer
shall be filed with the board within ten days.

Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written charges are preferred by a
provincial governor against a municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at its next
meeting, regular or special, furnish a copy of said charges to the accused official, with a
notification of the time and place of hearing thereon; and at the time and place appointed,
the board shall proceed to hear and investigate the truth or falsity of said charges, giving
the accused official full opportunity to be heard. The hearing shall occur as soon as may be
practicable, and in case suspension has been effected, not later than fifteen days from the
date the accused is furnished a copy of the charges, unless the suspended official shall, on
sufficient grounds, request an extension of time to prepare his defense.

Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the provincial board shall adjudge
that the charges are not sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall adjudge
that the accused has been guilty of misconduct which would be sufficiently punished by
reprimand, or further reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to deliver such
reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and in either case the official, if previously
suspended, shall be reinstated.

If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe discipline, it shall without
unnecessary delay forward to the Chief of the Executive Bureau certified copies of the record
in the case, including the charges, the evidence, and the findings of the board, to which shall
be added the recommendation of the board as to whether the official ought to be
suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from office; and in such case the board
may exercise its discretion to reinstate the official, if already suspended, or to suspend him
or continue his suspension pending final action.

The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident thereto shall be
given preference over the current and routine business of the board.

Action by Chief of Executive Bureau. Upon receiving the papers in any such proceeding the
Chief of the Executive Bureau shall review the case without unnecessary delay and shall
make such order for the reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the
official, as the facts shall warrant. Disciplinary suspension made upon order of the chief of
the Executive Bureau shall be without pay and in duration shall not exceed two months. No
final dismissal hereinunder shall take effect until recommended by the Department Head
and approved by the Governor-General.

With the foregoing legal provisions in mind, certain aspects of the case can be disposed of
without difficulty. Thus it cannot be seriously contended that the courts should interfere with
an orderly investigation which is about to be conducted by the provincial board. Nor can
there be any doubt as to the meaning of the law. A very minute and extensive procedure is
provided by the Legislature for central and provincial supervision of municipal officers. The

provincial governor, in receiving and investigating complaints against such officers, may
take three courses. For a minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; but if the
maladministration in office is more serious he may temporarily suspend the officer, and
thereafter may file written charges against the officer with the provincial board. The
procedure followed before the provincial board and later on appeal to the Chief of the
Executive Bureau, while interesting, does not concern us. The important fact is that the law,
in permitting a provincial governor temporarily to suspend a municipal officer, makes no
mention of a formal hearing of the charges.

In the exercise of this disciplinary power by the provincial governor, all that he can do before
the presentation of formal charges is either to reprimand the officer or to suspend him
temporarily from office. In the latter case the provincial governor's action is not a finality.
The law is especially careful to guard the rights of officer charged with maladministration in
office. But the point is made that, notwithstanding the provisions of the law and
notwithstanding long official practice, the temporary suspension of a municipal officer,
without an opportunity to be heared in his own defense, is in contravention of the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of Rights concerning due process of law.

So much has been written on the subject of due process of law that is would be futile to
enter into its intricate mazes. It is self-evident, however, that, in ordinary cases, to condemn
without a hearing violates the due process of law clause of the American Constitution and of
the Philippine Bill of Rights. It is for this reason that we can well understand the logic of
those who cling to this through and to whom a contemplated violation of the Constitution is
most repugnant. It is but fair, in ordinary cases, that a public official should not be removed
or suspended without notice, charges, a trial, and an opportunity for explanation. But not
permitting our judgment to be unduly swayed by sympathy for the petitioner's brave fight,
and recalling again that the courts have ordinarily to give effect to legislative purposes, it is
further only fair to mention certain exceptions to the due process of law rule, which would
seem to include the instant case.

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding
and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on
constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much
of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society
maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is
judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in
administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. (Weimer
vs. bunbury [1874], 30 Mich., 201; Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. [1856], 18
How., 272 followed in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco [1910], 16 Phil., 534; Tan Te vs. Bell {1914],
27 Phil., 354; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus [1915], 31 Phil., 218 and other Philippine cases). In
certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear
of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of
law. Examples of special or summary proceedings affecting the life, liberty or property of the
individual without any hearing can easily be recalled. Among these are the arrest of an

offender pending the filing of charges; the restraint of property in tax cases; the granting of
preliminary injunction ex parte; and the suspension of officers or employees by the
Governor-General or a Chief of a Bureau pending an investigation. (See Weimer vs. Bunbury,
supra; 12 C.J., 1224; Administrative Code, sec. 694.)

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United States,
that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due
proces of law, but is a public trust or agency. In the case of Taylor vs. Beckham ([1899], 178,
U. S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are numerous to the effect that
public offices are mere agencies or trust, and not property as such." The basic idea of
government in the Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is that of a popular
representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one
where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but
where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office
as a trust for the people whom he represents.

Coming now to the more specific consideration of the issue in this case, we turn to the
article by Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, generally considered the leading authority in the United
States on the subject of Administration Law, in Vol. 29, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure,
and find the rules as to suspension of public officers laid down very concisely as follows:
"Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to the person suspended." (P. 1405.) The
citation by Professor Goodnow to support his conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel. AttorneyGeneral vs. Johnson ([1892], 30 Fla., 433; 18 L. R. A., 410). It was here held by the Supreme
Court of Florida that the governor could, under section 15 of the executive article of the
Constitution, suspend an officer for neglect of duty in office without giving previous notice to
the officer of the charge made against him.

A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be found in 22 Ruling Case Law, pp. 564,
565. On the subject of suspension of public officers it is heared said:

The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, so as to tie his hands for the
time being, seems to be universally accepted as fair, and often necessary. . . . Notice and
hearing are not prerequisite to suspension unless required by statute and therefore
suspension without such notice does not deprive the officer of property without due process
of law. Nor is a suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial of the equal protection
of the laws because the evidence against the officer is not produced and he is not given an
opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witnesses.lawph!l.net

The case to support the first sentence in the above enunciation of the rule is State vs.
Megaarden (85 Minn., 41), which in turn is predicated on State vs. Peterson ([1892], 50
Minn., 239). In a discussion of the subject more general than specific, it was said:

The safety of the state, which is the highest law, imperatively requires the suspension,
pending his trial, of a public officer, especially a custodian of public funds, charged with
malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. Suspension does not remove the officer, but merely
prevents him, for the time being, from performing the functions of his office; and from the
very necessities of the case must precede a trial or hearing. Such temporary suspension
without previous hearing is fully in accordance with the analogies of the law. It is a
constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of his liberty or property except by
due process of law, which includes notice and a hearing, yet it was never claimed that in
criminal procedure a person could not be arrested and deprived of his liberty until a trial
could reasonably be had, or that in civil actions ex parte and temporary injunctions might
not be issued and retained in proper case, until a trial could be had, and the rights of the
parties determined. We have no doubt, therefore, of the authority of the legislature to vest
the governor with power to temporarily suspend a county treasurer pending the
investigation of the charges against him, of official misconduct.

The case cited by the editors of Ruling Case Law as authority for their second sentence is
that of Griner vs. Thomas ([1907], 101 Texas, 36; 16 Ann. Cas., 944). The holding of the
court here was that it is within the power of the legislature to authorize the temporary
suspension of a public officer during the pendency of valid proceedings to remove such
officer and as an incident to such proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the constitution
has given power to remove such officer only for cause and after a hearing. Notice and
hearing are not preprequisites to the suspension of a public officer under a statute which
does not provide for such notice and hearing.

The third case cited by Ruling Case Law comes from the United States Supreme Court.
(Wilson vs. North Carolina [1897], 169 U.S, 586.) An examination of the decision, however,
shows that while it tends to substantiate the rule, the facts are not exactly on all fours with
those before us. Without, therefore, stopping to set forth the facts, only the following from
the body of the decisioned be noted, viz.:

In speaking of the statute and the purpose of this particular provision the Supreme Court of
the State said: "The duty of suspension was imposed upon the Governor from the highest
motives of public policy to prevent the danger to the public interests which might arise from
leaving such great powers and responsibilities in the hands of men legally disqualified. To
leave them in full charge of their office until the next biennial session of the legislature, or
pending litigation which might be continued for year, would destroy the very object of the
law. As the Governor was, therefore, by the very and spirit of the law, required to act and act
promptly, necessarily upon his own findings of fact, we are compelled to hold that such

official action was, under the circumstances, due process of law. Even if it were proper, the
Governor would have no power to direct an issue like a chancellor."

The highest court of the State has held that this statue was not a violation of the constitution
of the State; that the hearing before the Governor was sufficient; that the office was
substantially an administrative one, although the commission was designed by a statute
subsequent to that which created it, a court of record; that the officer taking office under the
statute was bound to take it on the terms provided for therein; that he was lawfully
suspended from office; and that he was not entitled to a trial by jury upon the hearing of this
case in the trial court. As a result the court held that the defendant had not been deprived of
his property without due process of law, nor had he been denied the equal protection of the
laws.

xxx

xxx

xxx

We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any right guaranteed to him by
the Federal Constitution, by reason of the proceedings before the Governor under the
statute above mentioned, and resulting in his suspension from office.

The procedure was in accordance with the constitution and laws of the State. It was taken
under a valid statute creating a state office in a constitutional manner, as the state court has
held. What kind and how much of a hearing the officer should have before suspension by the
Governor was a matter for the state legislature to determine, having regard to the
constitution of the State. (There can also be cited as supporting authority State ex rel.
Wendling vs. Board of Police and Fire Commissioners [1915], 159 Wis., 295; Sumpter vs.
State {1906], 81 Ark., 60; Gray vs. McLendon [1901], 134 Ga., 224; State vs. Police
Commissioners, 16 Mo. App., 947; Preston vs. City of Chicago [1910], 246 III., 26; and People
vs. Draper [1910], 124 N.Y.S., 758, where it was held that the legislature has the right to
authorize an officer to remove an appointive or elective officer without notice or hearing.)

Certain intimations have been made that under the procedure prescribed by the law an
injustice might be done municipal officers. Such suppositions are not unusual even as to
cases before the courts, but in this as in all other instances, the presumption always is that
the law will be followed and that the investigation and the hearing will be impartial. In the
language of Justice Trent in Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 402), "the
presumption is just as conclusive in favor of executive action, as to its correctness and
justness, as it is in favor of judicial action." We entertain no doubt that the provincial
governor, fully conscious of the trust reposed in him by the law, will act only in cases where
strong reasons exist for exercising the power of suspension and upon a high consideration of
his duty.

The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might unduly delay the hearing is also without
much force. The same might be said of any administrative officer, or in fact of any judicial
officer. The presumption, again, is that every officer will do his duty promptly, and if he does
not, certainly a remedy can be found to make him do so. Not only this, but the law before us
expedites the proceedings by fixing a short period of ten days within which the provincial
governor must lay the charges before the provincial board, which must be heard by the
latter body within fifteen days. Of more compelling force is the suggestion from the other
side that the public interest might suffer detriment by postponing the temporary suspension
until after the hearing.

Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that the provisions of section 2188 of the
Administrative Code are clear and that they do not offend the due process of law clause of
the Philippine Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is our duty to apply the law without fear or favor.

Petition denied with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 110272

August 30, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAYSON DIADID y AGLUBAT, COZETTE ARAGON y TIMONEL, and RAINIER LISBOG y PAMPAG,
accused.

JAYSON DIADID y AGLUBAT, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Marcelino P. Arias for accused-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

In an information 1 dated 14 August 1991, filed by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Edwin D.

Sorongon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, four (4) minors, namely:
Jayson Diadid, Rainier Lisbog, Cozette Aragon and Reyderick Lago were charged with the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of July, 1991, in the municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping aiding each other, with intent of gain, by means of force upon things, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Benjamin Raymundo y Sta.
Teresa, by then and there removing one blade of the glass window jalousie near the door,
and once inside the house, take, steal and carry away cash money and jewelries worth
P92,000.00, belonging to said Benjamin Raymundo y Sta. Teresa, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said cash money and jewelries, in
pursuance of their conspiracy and to insure the success of their criminal act, with intent to
kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab said Benjamin Raymundo y
Sta. Teresa on the vital part of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which
directly caused his death.

Upon arraignment, Jayson Diadid and Rainier Lisbog both pleaded not guilty. Cozette Aragon,
assisted by his counsel, pleaded guilty to the crime of Robbery with Homicide but the court
deferred the promulgation of his sentence pending evaluation of the entire evidence, to
determine the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accused Reyderick
Lago, up to the present, has remained at large.

The prosecution's version of the incident runs as follows:

At around 7:30 to 8:00 o'clock in the morning of 24 July 1991, Rosanna Capacillo, a neighbor
of the victim who lived just across the street, was standing outside the front door of her
house when she noticed a person carrying a bag coming out of the gate of Benjamin
Raymundo's house. She observed the said person for about five (5) minutes as the latter
was standing in front of the gate. Thereafter, she went inside her house to call her husband
as they were to leave for work. When she went outside again, the person whom she had
observed earlier was no longer there. She remembered the face of the said person and
identified him in court as Rainier Lisbog. She testified, however, that it was only late in the
evening that she learned about the robbery and killing inside her neighbor's house and that

she recalled the unusual presence of Lisbog whom she saw in that place only for the first
time. 2

Earlier in the day, at around 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock in morning Ramon Bernardo, a
refrigerator/aircondition technician, went to the house of Benjamin Raymundo (the victim) to
borrow a refrigerator gasket. At the gate leading to the compound of Benjamin Raymundo,
he met a man leaving the compound clad in a white T-shirt and black pants, dark skinned
and thin-faced with medium built and around sixteen (16) to twenty (20) years old. However,
he was unable to remember the face of the said person.

Once inside the compound, Bernardo called out "Mang Ben, Mang Ben," after which
someone opened the door halfway. Bernardo asked him if Mang Ben was inside the house.
The man gestured with his hands, making a sign that Mang Ben was still asleep. Bernardo
countered with a sign that he would just come back later, which he did at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning. By that time, he was informed by a relative of Mang Ben (Raymundo)
that the latter was robbed and killed earlier that morning by unknown persons. On 24 July
1991 and 25 July 1991, respectively, Bernardo voluntarily gave his sworn statement 3 to the
Mandaluyong Police to shed light on the incident. 4

Elsa Raymundo, widow of the victim (Benjamin Raymundo), testified that she was in the
public market attending to their business at around 8:30 in the morning of 24 July 1991
when her daughter-in-law arrived and informed her that her husband was stabbed inside
their house. She hurriedly went home and found the lifeless body of her husband inside their
room. She discovered that her drawers were ransacked and looted of cash and jewelries
contained therein amounting to approximately P67,000.00. Thereafter, the police recovered
part of the loot, and she readily identified the same as part of her missing jewelries. 5 She
further testified that relative to the death of her husband, she incurred approximately
P18,650 in funeral expenses. She also identified the knife 6 which the police recovered from
the crime scene as the same knife they use in their kitchen. 7

Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, NBI Supervising Medico-legal officer, examined the cadaver of the
victim. The autopsy revealed that Raymundo suffered multiple stab wounds, fourteen (14)
stab wounds in the back and seven (7) in front 8 varying in depths from 4.5 cm. to 14 cm.
and inflicted on vital organs of the victim's body the upper, middle and lower lobe of the
right lung, the right lobe of the liver, the small and large intestines and the pancreas. He
opined that based on the characteristics of the wounds, the murder weapon was probably
sharp-pointed and single bladed, although not discounting the possibility that two (2)
weapons may have been used. He stated that the victim died due to severe hemorrhage
resulting from the stab wounds and estimated that the victim could have died between the
hours of 6:30 to 7:30 in the morning of 24 July 1991. 9

The police team which handled the investigation of the case leading to the arrest of the
suspects and recovery of part of the stolen items, was led by P/Cpl. Nicolas Cabalar of the
Mandaluyong Police. He testified that when they arrived at the crime scene, he noticed that
a jalousie blade at the left side of the door was detached. They found the lifeless body of
Raymundo with several stab wounds, lying on top of his bed. Beside him (Raymundo) were
the drawers and jewelry boxes 10 emptied of their contents. Beside the headboard of
Raymundo's bed, they also recovered a blood-stained kitchen knife wrapped in a blanket. In
the course of the investigation, Cabalar learned from Mrs. Raymundo about two (2) previous
robbery incidents in their house when they (Raymundos) caught their nephew Cozette
Aragon in flagrante. However, Cozette was eventually pardoned by them and was not
charged.

Cabalar referred this lead to a police follow-up unit which was assisted by Mr. Benny Aragon
(father of Cozette Aragon) and Randy Raymundo. Through the help of one Roy Torres, a
classmate of Cozette Aragon, they were able to persuade another classmate, Dennis Sison,
to give a statement to the police on what he knew about the robbery.

Dennis Sison told the investigators of Cozette Aragon's plan, together with Rainier Lisbog
and two (2) other schoolmates, to rob the house of his uncle (Raymundo).

When Rainier Lisbog was arrested by the police, and positively identified by Ramon Bernardo
at the police station as the person whom he saw at the door of Benjamin Raymundo's house,
he (Lisbog) pointed to Dennis Sison as the one in possession of the stolen articles. Rainier
Lisbog allegedly admitted his participation in the crime but claimed that he only acted as a
look-out. Lisbog stated that his companions were Cozette Aragon, Jayson Diadid and
Reyderick Lago but averred that he was only forced by Cozette Aragon to follow instructions.

Dennis Sison was invited for questioning at which he pointed to one Roberto Yambao who,
he claimed, had possession of the stolen jewelries. The articles were eventually recovered in
the house of Robert Yambao. 11

Cozette Aragon testified for the prosecution as an ordinary witness. He revealed that Dennis
Sison was originally included as a member in his plan to rob his uncle as clearly as two (2)
weeks before 24 July 1991. He admitted that, previously, he had robbed his uncle and that
he was caught in flagrante. 12 Eventually, the group was narrowed down to himself
(Aragon), Sison, Lisbog and Jayson Diadid. On 23 July 1991, Dennis Sison introduced Jayson
Diadid to Cozette since Cozette needed somebody who had the "guts" to participate in the
robbery. On the same day, they talked about Cozette's plan to which Jayson Diadid allegedly
asked Cozette if he wanted his uncle killed. Cozette said "no," as he just wanted to rob his
uncle. They resolved to carry out the plan the following day and agreed to meet at 6:00 a.m.
at a nearby monument near their school (Jose Fabella School).

The following day, the group met at the agreed place at around 6:45 a.m. Forthwith, they
boarded a jeep and arrived at Benjamin Raymundo's house at around 7:15 a.m. Cozette,
with the use of a fan knife, detached a portion of the glass jalousie window to reach the
inside knob of the front door lock.

Once inside the house, they first sat on the sofa. Jayson Diadid then asked Cozette the
location of his uncle's room. Cozette pointed to the room of his uncle as he saw Diadid
taking his uncle's wallet and three (3) packs of cigarettes on top of the refrigerator near the
kitchen. Diadid then placed the three (3) packs of cigarettes in Lago's bag but kept the
contents of the wallet. Then, Cozette and Diadid proceeded to the room of Raymundo. After
verifying that Raymundo was asleep, Cozette returned to the sala with Diadid at his back,
who was then carrying the short pants of Raymundo that he (Diadid) got from the hanger for
used clothing beside Raymundo's room. Cozette also saw Diadid take the wallet from inside
said short pants. All the while, Lago remained at the sala while Lisbog acted as look out
beside the door of the house.

Cozette and Diadid then returned to Raymundo's room where Cozette's uncle was sleeping
on his back. Cozette surreptitiously opened the drawers of her aunt and began taking the
money and jewelries. Suddenly, he heard his uncle shouting and when he looked back, he
saw Jayson Diadid stabbing his uncle.

According to Cozette, he shouted "Jayson, huwag, huwag" as he held the shoulders of his
uncle to pull him away from Diadid. He and Diadid instinctively ran away from the room but
Diadid allegedly went back afterwards to stab the victim anew. Cozette immediately followed
suit to again pull his uncle away from Diadid, after which they both ran away as he saw his
uncle fall down on the floor. When they went out of the room, Lago and Lisbog were no
longer around.

Cozette proceeded back to school to see Dennis Sison and entrusted to the latter a
clutchbag containing some of the stolen jewelries. Together with Rainier Lisbog, Dennis Sison
and another classmate, they proceeded to Shoemart (SM City) to take lunch. Diadid and
Lago were no longer with them as the two (2) did not show up at the designated store where
they had previously agreed to meet.

The group left Dennis Sison in SM and the rest proceeded to Olongapo and stayed there for
one night. When he (Cozette) returned to Manila, he learned that Lisbog had been arrested.
He decided to go back to Olongapo after which he went to hide in Bataan for two (2) months
where he was subsequently arrested by policemen who were accompanied by his father. 13

In their defense before the court a quo, Rainier Lisbog and Jason Diadid gave two (2)
different versions of the incident.

Rainier Lisbog testified that he was about to attend his chemistry class when he was forced
and threatened by Cozette Aragon to go with the group to get a certain "project" of Cozette
in his uncle's house. When they arrived at the house, he saw Cozette detach a jalousie blade
from the window by using a fan knife. Cozette Aragon allegedly told him to stay outside the
gate while Cozette, Jayson and Lago went inside the house.

Lisbog maintained that he never went inside the house and just stayed outside the gate for
about fifteen (15) minutes or so until he finally got impatient and decided to go back to
school.

In school, Lisbog looked for Dennis Sison to borrow the latter's notes in Chemistry.
Thereafter, Cozette arrived and invited him to SM City for lunch. Then they proceeded to the
house of one Ronaldo Abarete whom Cozette invited to go with them to Olongapo City.
Lisbog joined Cozette and Abarete in going to Olongapo City. Dennis Sison was left behind.
14

Lisbog initially claimed that Cozette never told him about the robbery and killing of Benjamin
Raymundo. Later, he admitted that while on their way to SM City on board a taxi, Cozette
showed him bundles of money, approximately about two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), and
told him what had happened inside the house. 15

Jayson Diadid gave a slightly different version of the incident. He claimed that on 23 June
1991, Cozette approached him together with Reyderick Lago and asked him if he could
accompany them to the house of Cozette's uncle where Cozette was to get something
important. He declined to go on that day because he had to attend class. One month after,
or on 24 July 1991, he saw Cozette and Reyderick Lago at a nearby store just outside the
Jose Fabella Memorial School. Again, Cozette and Lago persuaded him to go with them to the
house of Cozette's uncle, apparently to get something that is to rob his uncle. 16 He
(Diadid) agreed but allegedly told them that he would just stay in the sala. 17

Diadid corroborated Cozette Aragon's as well as Rainier Lisbog's accounts of how they were
able to enter the house but stated that Lisbog also entered the house and they (he and
Lisbog) both sat on the sofa while Cozette went around inside the house with Reyderick Lago
at his back. Diadid alleged that Cozette and Reyderick went inside the kitchen. When

Cozette came out of the kitchen, he (Diadid) saw Cozette holding a knife as he (Cozette)
walked towards his uncle's room with Reyderick Lago behind him. 18

It was at that moment that he (Diadid) allegedly became frightened that something wrong
might happen; that he decided to leave the house leaving behind Lisbog who was still
seated on the sofa. On his way out, he met a man who turned out to be Ramon Bernardo
whose name he only learned during the trial. He denied all of Cozette Aragon's allegations
and declared that he voluntarily surrendered to their barangay captain who, together with
his father, accompanied him to the police to prove his innocence. 19

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jayson Diadid y Aglubat, Rainier Lisbog y Pampag
and Cozette Aragon y Timonel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide punishable under Art. 294 par. (1) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the victim in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00); the sum of
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P18,600.00) representing reimbursement of
funeral expenses and SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P67,000.00) the value of the stolen
cash and articles; the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as moral damages and
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages and to pay the cost.

The accused are hereby committed to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

This case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED against accused Reyderick Lago who has remained at
large and to be revived upon the arrest of the said accused. 20

Rainier Lisbog did not appeal from the judgment. Instead, he jumped bail and went into
hiding upon learning of said judgment and the order for his
arrest. 21

Only Jayson Diadid appealed his conviction to this Court and submits the following
assignment of errors:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS DECISION IN FINDING ACCUSED DIADID GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON FACTS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AND
PROVED BY THE PROSECUTION IN COURT.

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED JAYSON DIADID WITHOUT

CONSIDERING IN FULL THE TESTIMONY OF RAMON BERNARDO TO THE EFFECT THAT
ACCUSED JAYSON DIADID LEFT THE COMPOUND WHILE RAINIER LISBOG WAS STILL INSIDE
THE HOUSE. 22

Accused-appellant Diadid argues that the testimony of prosecution witness Ramon Bernardo
is crucial to establish that he (Diadid) voluntarily desisted from the planned robbery, as he
immediately left the victim's house when he noticed that Cozette Aragon had a knife in his
hands in going to Benjamin Raymundo's room. He maintains that he was positively identified
by Ramon Bernardo as the person he (Bernardo) met leaving the gate of Raymundo's
compound just before Bernardo called out Raymundo's name, after which Rainier Lisbog
opened the door and signalled to Bernardo that Raymundo was still asleep. He (Diadid)
maintains that the presence of Lisbog at the front door of Raymundo's house negates the
testimony of Cozette Aragon that when he (Cozette) and Jayson Diadid left Raymundo's
house, they no longer noticed Lisbog nor Lago in the premises.

The necessary implication is, according to Diadid, that it was not he but Reyderick Lago who
was the companion of Cozette Aragon in the robbery and in the killing of Raymundo, for he
(Diadid) left earlier than Lisbog who was seen by Ramon Bernardo and identified by witness
Rosanna Capacillo who stood outside the gate at around 7:30 to 8:00 a.m.

We are not persuaded by accused-appellant Diadid's plea of voluntary desistance from the
commission of the crime charged.

Contrary to his claim, accused-appellant Diadid was not positively identified by prosecution
witness Ramon Bernardo. On cross-examination, Bernardo declared that:

Mr. Bernardo, this is your signature?

Yes, sir.

Exhibit A-2?

Yes, sir.

Q
Will you please read Question No. 12 and your answer please loud and clear? Will you
please read it very loud so that everyone could hear?

A
"T:
Iyon bang kasama ni Rainier Lisbog na nakita mong nasalubong sa iyo ng ikaw
patungo sa bahay ni Mang Ben, Nakilala mo ba kapag makita mo siya uli?" "S: Hindi ko po
natandaan ang mukha."

Q
Would you affirm that statement to be the truth Question No. 12 and the answer you
have just read a while ago?

Yes, sir.

Q
met?

So the truth of the matter is you cannot remember the face of that individual you

Yes, sir.

Q
The records had grown so big, you are trying to reiterate that you saw Jayson Diadid?
Why? When in truth and in fact you cannot remember the person of the man you met on the
way?

A
Because he was the one pointed to me by the policeman as the man I met while on
my way and he was also pointed to by the suspect. That was told by the suspect. (Emphasis
supplied) 23

It is clear that while Ramon Bernardo indeed saw someone going out of the compound, he
was not sure whether that person was Diadid or not. He only identified Diadid because the
latter was pointed to him by the police as a possible suspect in the crime. No evidence was
presented to prove whether Ramon Bernardo's description of the man matched or closely
resembled that of Diadid or Reyderick Lago. It may have been either of the two or some
other person who lived in the same compound.

Accused-appellant Diadid offers no convincing evidence to show that he was never a part of
the conspiracy to rob Raymundo, as hatched by Cozette Aragon. On the contrary, he had
prior knowledge that they were going to rob Cozette's uncle. He was present when Cozette
detached the jalousie from the window with a fan-knife, which was definitely not the normal
way of one who was only going to get something from a house where he did not live. The
group (including Diadid) all entered the house with only one purpose and that was to rob.
The evidence shows no motive on the part of Cozette Aragon nor Rainier Lisbog to falsely
implicate Diadid. In fact, Diadid himself admitted that the two, namely: Cozette and Lisbog,
are still his friends and that not one of them had any long-standing grudge against each
other. 24

We, therefore, reject accused-appellant's plea of voluntary desistance, in the absence of any
evidence leading thereto. Strangely, accused-appellant could have readily admitted that it
was really he whom Ramon Bernardo saw leaving the gate at around 6:30 - 7:00 in the
morning of 24 July 1991 but his counsel chose to cast the doubt on his identity as he
obtained an admission from Bernardo that he was not sure whether he had really recognized
his client. We have already ruled that:

. . . One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of
his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the common felonious intent. A person who
embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with his fellow
conspirators and to have taken his chances that things may go awry and that the offended
party may resist or third persons may get killed in the course of implementing the basic
criminal design. To free himself from such criminal liability, the law requires overt act on the
part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony or to
abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy to commit the initial felony. (People v.
Salvador, 163 SCRA 574, 580-582 [1988]; People vs. Bazar, 162 SCRA 609, 617 [1988];
People v. Escobar, 157 SCRA 541, 567 [1988]; People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153, 159-160
[1967] (Emphasis supplied) 25

This, appellant was not able to prove. He can no longer repudiate the conspiracy after it had
already materialized. 26

The conspiracy was clearly established in this case from the testimony of Cozette Aragon
against his co-conspirators. A co-accused in a criminal case is a competent witness for or
against any of his co-accused. 27

We also agree with the trial court's appreciation of the evidence when it concluded that:

However, the Court cannot believe the claim of accused Aragon that it was only accused
Diadid who stabbed his uncle. He testified that while his back was turned while emptying the
drawers of cash and jewelries, he heard the shouts of his uncle. When he looked around, he
saw accused Diadid stabbing his uncle successively. He stopped him and thereupon, pulled
the shoulders of his uncle away from accused Diadid. Then, he and Diadid went out of the
room but accused Diadid returned back to the room and stabbed his uncle again. He then
pulled his uncle away from him (TSN, Hearing of December 11, 1991). It should be noted
that when accused Aragon and co-accused Diadid were talking about their plan, the latter
asked him (Aragon) if he wanted his uncle to be killed, to which Aragon replied in the
negative. If indeed their plan was merely to rob the victim, why will accused Diadid stab
him? Aragon's uncle Benjamin Raymundo, could have been awakened by the noise created
in opening the drawers. Hence, the necessity to silence him. As testified to by their coaccused Lisbog, accused Aragon admitted to him that he (Aragon) embraced his uncle while
accused Diadid was stabbing his uncle (Exh. M). Additionally, the victim suffered 14 stab
wounds in the back portion of the body and 7 in the front portion thereof, which negates
accused Aragon's assertion that he tried to stop accused Diadid from stabbing his uncle. He
did not endeavor to prevent the unlawful killing but on the contrary, he held his uncle to
eliminate an obstacle or prevent the latter from parrying the blow.

The rule is already well established that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part,
depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the
case. The Court may accept such of the witness testimony as it may deem proper
notwithstanding his false statements. If parts of a witness testimony is found true, it cannot
be disregarded entirely (PP vs. Pacabes,137 SCRA 158).

xxx

xxx

xxx

The penalty for Roberry with Homicide under Article 294, par. (1) is reclusion perpetua to
death. The prosecution was not able to prove any aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime. However, there are mitigating circumstances adequately proven
and should be considered in favor of the accused. These are the privileged mitigating of
minority, having proven satisfactorily thru their birth certificates that accused were over 15
years but less than 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Accused Jayson
Diadid is, likewise, entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender while for
accused Cozette Aragon, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty having

confessed his guilt before the Court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution. There being no aggravating circumstance to offset the aforementioned
mitigating circumstances, the minimum penalty provided for under Article 194 par. (1) of the
Revised Penal Code shall be imposed i.e. reclusion perpetua. 28

Taking into account that Jayson Diadid was over 15 years but less than 18 years at the time
of the commission of the crime, the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law
should be imposed in its proper period.

The penalty for robbery with homicide being reclusion perpetua to death, one degree lower
from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. (Art. 61, par. 2 and Art. 71, Scale No. 1 Revised
Penal Code). Since the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also
present in favor of accused-appellant Diadid, there being no aggravating circumstance to
offset the same, the penalty to be imposed on Diadid would be reclusion temporal in its
minimum period.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Diadid should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction against accused-appellant Jayson Diadid y Aglubat

is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 147026-27

September 11, 2009

CAROLINA R. JAVIER, Petitioner,

vs.
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Carolina R. Javier in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898, entitled "People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff versus Carolina R. Javier, Accused," seeking to nullify respondent
Sandiganbayan's: (1) Order2 dated November 14, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 25867, which
denied her Motion to Quash Information; (2) Resolution3 dated January 17, 2001 in Criminal
Case No. 25898, which denied her Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Quash
Information; and (3) Order4 dated February 12, 2001, declaring that a motion for
reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 25898 would be superfluous as the issues are fairly
simple and straightforward.

The factual antecedents follow.

On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047,5 or otherwise known as the "Book Publishing
Industry Development Act", was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the State's goal in
promoting the continuing development of the book publishing industry, through the active
participation of the private sector, to ensure an adequate supply of affordable, qualityproduced books for the domestic and export market.

To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of the National Book Development
Board (NBDB or the Governing Board, for brevity), which shall be under the administration
and supervision of the Office of the President. The Governing Board shall be composed of
eleven (11) members who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, five (5) of
whom shall come from the government, while the remaining six (6) shall be chosen from the
nominees of organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry related
activities, students and the private education sector.

On February 26, 1996, petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector
representative for a term of one (1) year.6 During that time, she was also the President of
the Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in
the following year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position
and for the same period of one (1) year.7 Part of her functions as a member of the Governing
Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies.
On September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to
attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997.8 Based on her
itinerary of travel,9 she was paid P139,199.0010 as her travelling expenses.

Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.

On February 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to immediately
return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled.11 Petitioner,
however, failed to do so. On July 6, 1998, she was issued a Summary of Disallowances12
from which the balance for settlement amounted to P220,349.00. Despite said notice, no
action was forthcoming from the petitioner.

On September 23, 1999, Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive Director of the NBDB, filed
with the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for malversation of public funds and
properties. She averred that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to
liquidate or return to the NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival,
or in this case from the date of cancellation of the trip, in accordance with government
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio further charged petitioner with
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 671313 for failure to file her Statement of Assets and
Liabilities.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019,14 as amended, and recommended the filing of the corresponding
information.15 It, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the charge for violation
of R.A. No. 6713.

In an Information dated February 18, 2000, petitioner was charged with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

That on or about October 8, 1997, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, a public officer, being then a member of the governing Board of the National Book
Development Board (NBDB), while in the performance of her official and administrative
functions, and acting with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, without any justifiable cause, and despite due
demand by the Resident Auditor and the Executive Director of NBDB, fail and refuse to
return and/or liquidate her cash advances intended for official travel abroad which did not
materialize, in the total amount of P139,199.00 as of September 23, 1999, as required under
EO No. 248 and Sec. 5 of COA Circular No. 97-002 thereby causing damage and undue injury
to the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.16

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25867 and raffled to the First Division.

Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds,
as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for not liquidating the
cash advance granted to her in connection with her supposed trip to Spain. During the
conduct of the preliminary investigation, petitioner was required to submit her counteraffidavit but she failed to do so. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner
for the crime charged and recommended the filing of the corresponding information against
her. 17

Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25898, and raffled to the Third Division, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16, 1999, or for
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a high ranking officer, being a member
of the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board and as such, is accountable
for the public funds she received as cash advance in connection with her trip to Spain from
October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check No. 10188 in the amount of P139,199.00, which trip did
not materialize, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse,
misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit the
aforementioned amount of P139,199.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.18

During her arraignment in Criminal Case No. 25867, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
petitioner delivered to the First Division the money subject of the criminal cases, which
amount was deposited in a special trust account during the pendency of the criminal cases.

Meanwhile, the Third Division set a clarificatory hearing in Criminal Case No. 25898 on May
16, 2000 in order to determine jurisdictional issues. On June 3, 2000, petitioner filed with the
same Division a Motion for Consolidation19 of Criminal Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case
No. 25867, pending before the First Division. On July 6, 2000, the People filed an Urgent ExParte Motion to Admit Amended Information20 in Criminal Case No. 25898, which was
granted. Accordingly, the Amended Information dated June 28, 2000 reads as follows:

That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16, 1999, or for
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a high ranking officer, being a member
of the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board equated to Board Member
II with a salary grade 28 and as such, is accountable for the public funds she received as
case advance in connection with her trip to Spain from October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check
No. 10188 in the amount of P139,199.00, which trip did not materialize, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to
her own personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount of P139,199.00, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.21

In its Resolution dated October 5, 2000, the Third Division ordered the consolidation of
Criminal Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case No. 25867. 22

On October 10, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Information,23 averring that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 25867 as the information did
not allege that she is a public official who is classified as Grade "27" or higher. Neither did
the information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer
committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. She also averred that she is
not a public officer or employee and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a
private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be charged under
R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials.
Moreover, she claimed that she does not perform public functions and is without any
administrative or political power to speak of that she is serving the private book publishing
industry by advancing their interest as participant in the government's book development
policy.

In an Order24 dated November 14, 2000, the First Division25 denied the motion to quash
with the following disquisition:

The fact that the accused does not receive any compensation in terms of salaries and
allowances, if that indeed be the case, is not the sole qualification for being in the
government service or a public official. The National Book Development Board is a statutory
government agency and the persons who participated therein even if they are from the
private sector, are public officers to the extent that they are performing their duty therein as
such.

Insofar as the accusation is concerned herein, it would appear that monies were advanced to
the accused in her capacity as Director of the National Book Development Board for
purposes of official travel. While indeed under ordinary circumstances a member of the
board remains a private individual, still when that individual is performing her functions as a
member of the board or when that person receives benefits or when the person is supposed
to travel abroad and is given government money to effect that travel, to that extent the
private sector representative is a public official performing public functions; if only for that
reason, and not even considering situation of her being in possession of public funds even as
a private individual for which she would also covered by provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, she is properly charged before this Court.

On November 15, 2000, the First Division accepted the consolidation of the criminal cases
against petitioner and scheduled her arraignment on November 17, 2000, for Criminal Case
No. 25898. On said date, petitioner manifested that she is not prepared to accept the
propriety of the accusation since it refers to the same subject matter as that covered in
Criminal Case No. 25867 for which the Sandiganbayan gave her time to file a motion to
quash. On November 22, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information26 in
Criminal Case No. 25898, by invoking her right against double jeopardy. However, her
motion was denied in open court. She then filed a motion for reconsideration.

On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution27 denying petitioners motion
with the following disquisition:

The accused is under the jurisdiction of this Court because Sec. 4 (g) of P.D. 1606 as
amended so provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

xxxx

The offense is office-related because the money for her travel abroad was given to her
because of her Directorship in the National Book Development Board.

Furthermore, there are also allegations to hold the accused liable under Article 222 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. The provisions of this chapter shall
apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular,
provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository
of funds or property attached , seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property
belongs to a private individual.

Likewise, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 25898 on the ground of
litis pendencia is denied since in this instance, these two Informations speak of offenses
under different statutes, i.e., R.A. No. 3019 and the Revised Penal Code, neither of which
precludes prosecution of the other.

Petitioner hinges the present petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two
informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised Penal Code on
malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her
petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under
two (2) informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.

A motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of
law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.28

Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action.29

The above general rule, however admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the
court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is
that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not
the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is
made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In
such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.30

To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a
private sector representative, stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic
purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status
for the book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was
the President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held
liable for the crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book
publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was
enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as
for the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end,
the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. The
Governing Board was vested with powers and functions, to wit:

a) assume responsibility for carrying out and implementing the policies, purposes and
objectives provided for in this Act;

b) formulate plans and programs as well as operational policies and guidelines for
undertaking activities relative to promoting book development, production and distribution
as well as an incentive scheme for individual authors and writers;

c) formulate policies, guidelines and mechanisms to ensure that editors, compilers and
especially authors are paid justly and promptly royalties due them for reproduction of their
works in any form and number and for whatever purpose;

d) conduct or contract research on the book publishing industry including monitoring,

compiling and providing data and information of book production;

e) provide a forum for interaction among private publishers, and, for the purpose, establish
and maintain liaison will all the segments of the book publishing industry;

f) ask the appropriate government authority to ensure effective implementation of the

National Book Development Plan;

g) promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act in consultation with
other agencies concerned, except for Section 9 hereof on incentives for book development,
which shall be the concern of appropriate agencies involved;

h) approve, with the concurrence of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the
annual and supplemental budgets submitted to it by the Executive director;

i) own, lease, mortgage, encumber or otherwise real and personal property for the
attainment of its purposes and objectives;

j) enter into any obligation or contract essential to the proper administration of its affairs,
the conduct of its operations or the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives;

k) receive donations, grants, legacies, devices and similar acquisitions which shall form a
trust fund of the Board to accomplish its development plans on book publishing;

l) import books or raw materials used in book publishing which are exempt from all taxes,
customs duties and other charges in behalf of persons and enterprises engaged in book
publishing and its related activities duly registered with the board;

m) promulgate rules and regulations governing the matter in which the general affairs of the
Board are to be exercised and amend, repeal, and modify such rules and regulations
whenever necessary;

n) recommend to the President of the Philippines nominees for the positions of the Executive
Officer and Deputy Executive Officer of the Board;

o) adopt rules and procedures and fix the time and place for holding meetings: Provided,
That at least one (1) regular meeting shall be held monthly;

p) conduct studies, seminars, workshops, lectures, conferences, exhibits, and other related
activities on book development such as indigenous authorship, intellectual property rights,
use of alternative materials for printing, distribution and others; and

q) exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be required by the
law.31

A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the
nature of public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.32

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the
NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to
enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from
the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside the
meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it
that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts
collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing
members from the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the
implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry.

Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the AntiGraft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.33

Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or
appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing
Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private

person exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also
of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall
receive per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually
attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law,
the nature of one's appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still
considered a public officer.

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by
direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties
as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be
a public officer.34

Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of
R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public
functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any
rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and
promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was
supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain.

In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer. The next question for the Court to resolve
is whether, as a public officer, petitioner is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Presently,35 the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "Grade '27'" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "Grade '27'" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

xxxx

Notably, the Director of Organization, Position Classification and Compensation Bureau, of

the Department of Budget and management provided the following information regarding
the compensation and position classification and/or rank equivalence of the member of the
Governing Board of the NBDB, thus:

Per FY 1999 Personal Services Itemization, the Governing Board of NDBD is composed of one
(1) Chairman (ex-officio), one (1) Vice-Chairman (ex-officio), and nine (9) Members, four (4)
of whom are ex-officio and the remaining five (5) members represent the private sector. The
said five members of the Board do not receive any salary and as such their position are not
classified and are not assigned any salary grade.

For purposes however of determining the rank equivalence of said positions,

notwithstanding that they do not have any salary grade assignment, the same may be
equated to Board Member II, SG-28.36

Thus, based on the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, petitioner belongs to
the employees classified as SG-28, included in the phrase "all other national and local
officials classified as Grade 27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989."

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, We can not likewise give in to the contentions advanced
by petitioner. She argued that her right against double jeopardy was violated when the
Sandiganbayan denied her motion to quash the two informations filed against her.1avvphi1

We believe otherwise. Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and
25898 refer to offenses penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively.
It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the
accused pleaded to the charge.37 In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case
for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter
information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases
remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only
one in the criminal cases against her.

It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.38 The third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the present petition does not fall under the exceptions
wherein the remedy of certiorari may be resorted to after the denial of one's motion to
quash the information. And even assuming that petitioner may avail of such remedy, We still
hold that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions and Order of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 116033. February 26, 1997]

ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with
malversation of public funds as a principal after the said individual had been designated by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distrained property? Did such accused
become a public officer and therefore subject to the graft courts jurisdiction as a
consequence of such designation by the BIR?

These are the main questions in the instant petition for review of respondent
Sandiganbayans Decision[1] in Criminal Case No. 14260 promulgated on March 8, 1994,
convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds and property, and Resolution[2] dated
June 20, 1994, denying his motion for new trial or reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and
ore.[3] His services were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
(PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged the
services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers premises.
[4] From this set of circumstances arose the present controversy.

x x x It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was
issued by the Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) addressed to the Regional
Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City
commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property
of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The
Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer,
surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer
Ancla. The Warrant of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.[5]

Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under
Authority of the National Internal Revenue, assumed the undertakings specified in the
receipt the contents of which are reproduced as follows:

(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have received from Amadeo V. San Diego, an
Internal Revenue Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Philippines, the following
described goods, articles, and things:

Kind of property

---

Isuzu dump truck

Motor number

---

E120-229598

Chassis No.

---

SPZU50-1772440

Number of CXL

---

Color

---

Blue

Owned By

---

Mr. Jaime Ancla

the same having been this day seized and left in (my) possession pending investigation by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative. (I) further
promise that (I) will faithfully keep, preserve, and, to the best of (my) ability, protect said
goods, articles, and things seized from defacement, demarcation, leakage, loss, or
destruction in any manner; that (I) will neither alter nor remove, nor permit others to alter or
remove or dispose of the same in any manner without the express authority of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that (I) will produce and deliver all of said goods,
articles, and things upon the order of any court of the Philippines, or upon demand of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any authorized officer or agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.[6]

Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated November 21, 1985 to the BIRs Regional
Director for Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City stating that

x x x while I have made representations to retain possession of the property and signed a
receipt of the same, it appears now that Mr. Jaime Ancla intends to cease his operations with
us. This is evidenced by the fact that sometime in August, 1985 he surreptitiously withdrew
his equipment from my custody. x x x In this connection, may I therefore formally inform
you that it is my desire to immediately relinquish whatever responsibilities I have over the

above-mentioned property by virtue of the receipt I have signed. This cancellation shall take
effect immediately. x x x .[7]

Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security manager of PICOP,
Mr. Delfin Panelo, and requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out of the PICOP
concession. By the time the order to bar the trucks exit was given, however, it was too late.
[8]

Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter dated May 27, 1986, to wit:

An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals that while you are (sic) in possession
of the dump truck owned by JAIME ANCLA, you voluntarily assumed the liabilities of
safekeeping and preserving the unit in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This is
clearly indicated in the provisions of the Warrant of Garnishment which you have signed,
obliged and committed to surrender and transfer to this office. Your failure therefore, to
observe said provisions does not relieve you of your responsibility.[9]

Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that

On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue Document Processor of Revenue Region 10
B, Butuan City, sent a progress report to the Chief of the Collection Branch of the
surreptitious taking of the dump truck and that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain
contractor by the name of Oscar Cueva at PICOP (Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, the same company which engaged petitioners earth moving services),
Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. She also suggested that if the report were true, a warrant of
garnishment be reissued against Mr. Cueva for whatever amount of rental is due from Ancla
until such time as the latters tax liabilities shall be deemed satisfied. x x x However, instead
of doing so, Director Batausa filed a letter-complaint against the (herein Petitioner) and
Ancla on 22 January 1988, or after more than one year had elapsed from the time of Mrs.
Calos report.[10]

Provincial Fiscal Pretextato Montenegro forwarded the records of the complaint x x x to the
Office of the Tanodbayan on May 18, 1988. He was deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor and
granted authority to conduct preliminary investigation on August 22, 1988, in a letter by
Special Prosecutor Raul Gonzales approved by Ombudsman (Tanodbayan) Conrado Vasquez.
[11]

Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner Azarcon was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217
in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in the following
Information[12]filed on January 12, 1990, by Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual:

That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Alfredo L. Azarcon, a
private individual but who, in his capacity as depository/administrator of property seized or
deposited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, having voluntarily offered himself to act as
custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No. E120-22958, Chasis No. SPZU 501772440, and number CXL-6 and was authorized to be such under the authority of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, has become a responsible and accountable officer and said
motor vehicle having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in the
total sum of EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS and 59/100
(P80,831.59) became a public property and the value thereof as public fund, with grave
abuse of confidence and conspiring and confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his personal use and benefit the aforementioned
motor vehicle or the value thereof in the aforestated amount, by then and there allowing
accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu
Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and knowledge of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Butuan City, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of
P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991,
alleging that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the preliminary investigation; and (2)
the petitioner was not a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was being charged
with malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] The Sandiganbayan
granted the motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991.[14] After the reinvestigation,
Special Prosecution Officer Roger Berbano, Sr., recommended the withdrawal of the
information[15] but was overruled by the Ombudsman.[16]

A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March 25, 1992 on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner since he was not a
public officer.[17] On May 18, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion.[18]

When the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner then filed a motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence which was denied on November 16, 1992, for being
without merit.[19] The petitioner then commenced and finished presenting his evidence on
February 15, 1993.

The Respondent Courts Decision

On March 8, 1994, respondent Sandiganbayan[20] rendered a Decision,[21] the dispositive

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon y Leva GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 in
relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, and in view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal. To indemnify the Bureau of Internal
Revenue the amount of P80,831.59; to pay a fine in the same amount without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer special perpetual disqualification; and, to pay
the costs.

Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been brought within the jurisdiction of this
Court up to this date, let this case be archived as against him without prejudice to its revival
in the event of his arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through new counsel,[22] filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration on March
23, 1994, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[23] dated December 2,
1994.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The petitioner submits the following reasons for the reversal of the Sandiganbayans
assailed Decision and Resolution:

I. The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by private
individuals.

II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that the appointment of a private individual as a
custodian or a depositary of distrained property is sufficient to convert such individual into a
public officer, the petitioner cannot still be considered a public officer because:

[A]

There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue Code which authorizes the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to constitute private individuals as depositaries of distrained properties.

[B]

His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of a direct provision of law, or by election
or by appointment by a competent authority.

III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that the distrained vehicle was actually
owned by the accused Jaime Ancla; consequently, the governments right to the subject
property has not been established.

IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal Revenue Code concerning the
disposition of distrained property was not followed by the B.I.R., hence the distraint of
personal property belonging to Jaime C. Ancla and found allegedly to be in the possession of
the petitioner is therefore invalid.

V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly selling the distrained property of
accused Jaime C. Ancla in order to realize the amount of back taxes owed by Jaime C. Ancla
to the Bureau.[24]

In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the controversy. Corollary to this is the question of whether petitioner can
be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

It is hornbook doctrine that in order (to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not,
the provisions of the law should be inquired into.[25] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the
court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
presumed or implied.[26] And for this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of a court
is determined by the law at the time of commencement of the action.[27]

In this case, the action was instituted with the filing of this information on January 12, 1990;
hence, the applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, but prior to their amendment by R.A. No. 7975 on May 16,
1995. At that time, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 provided that:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty

prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxx

xxx

xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.

xxx

xxx

x x x.

The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when the Sandiganbayan
will have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint charges the private
individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee
who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?

The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no
jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public
officers:

Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the
preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election,
popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance
of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Thus,

(to) be a public officer, one must be --

(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or

Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent,
or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and

(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public
duties must be --

a. by direct provision of the law, or

b. by popular election, or

c. by appointment by competent authority.[28]

Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively
distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. The next logical query is
whether petitioners designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as
appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority.[29] We answer in the
negative.

The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck
allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in
possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated petitioner a
depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo,[30] a public officer.[31] This is based on the
theory that

(t)he power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a distrained
property as a depository of distrained property is necessarily implied in the BIRs power to
place the property of a delinquent tax payer (sic) in distraint as provided for under Sections
206, 207 and 208 (formerly Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, (NIRC) x x x.[32]

We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply
because the facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here.
While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached
property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIRs administrative act
of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his
back taxes, property which was received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was
clearly within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the
judicial deposit and give the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public
official.[33] However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require petitioner
Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint
Azarcon a public officer.

It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that

its branches and administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as
defined either in the Constitution or in legislation or in both.[34] Thus, although the
appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, x x x[35] the quantum of
powers possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will still
be limited to that conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication in its enabling
act. Hence, (a)n administrative officer, it has been held, has only such powers as are
expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.[36]
Corollarily, implied powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of
lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced
therein, nor are not incidental thereto.[37] For to so extend the statutory grant of power
would be an encroachment on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our
Constitution.[38] It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution,
authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve a
distrained property, thus:

x x x x x x

xxx

The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or
any person having possession or control of such property to sign a receipt covering the
property distrained and obligate himself to preserve the same intact and unaltered and not
to dispose of the same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the
Commissioner.

xxx

xxx

x x x

However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason
of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary
cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution

argues that Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code x x x defines the individuals covered by
the term officers under Article 217[39] x x x of the same Code.[40] And accordingly, since
Azarcon became a depository of the truck seized by the BIR he also became a public
officer who can be prosecuted under Article 217 x x x.[41]

The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads:

Officers included in the preceding provisions. -- The provisions of this chapter shall apply
private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial
municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds
property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs
a private individual.

to
or
or
to

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.[42] This is particularly observed in
the interpretation of penal statutes which must be construed with such strictness as to
carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant x x x.[43] The language of the foregoing
provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or
property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of
Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty
meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a
private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.

After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds petitioner Alfredo Azarcon
and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before
and convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The
Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of this case is of no moment since (j)urisdiction cannot
be conferred by x x x erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction.[44] As aptly and
correctly stated by the petitioner in his memorandum:

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private
individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore,
when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for
malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private
individuals without any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all
the proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent
Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.[45]

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and Decision of the Sandiganbayan are hereby SET
ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA,

G.R. No. 162059

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

SANDIGANBAYAN and

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.

January 22, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang
kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions[1]
of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information
and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent
of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.[2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings
and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.[4]
President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation.
The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.[5] The succeeding student
regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the
KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office
of the Ombudsman.[6]

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27819 of the Sandiganbayan.[7] The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined
and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student
Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of
her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage
of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be
renovated and renamed as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall, and for which
purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION
PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to
said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade
Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit,
and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount,
the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government
in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.[8] It has
no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by
Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II
of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even
assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from
the coffers of the government.[10]

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person.
As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in
contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added
that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds.
Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not
alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that
the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed petitioners interpretation of

the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all
phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.[13]

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public

officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the general powers of administration and
exercised the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office,
petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has
been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.[14]

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners

motion for lack of merit.[15] It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court.
As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this
Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to
his office.

Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the

student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor
does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g),
irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of
these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines

reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises
the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To
receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law
for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact
for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary
to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and
other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such
other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing
shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its
board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of
directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the

Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock
corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accusedmovant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is
vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15
Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the
government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the
merits of this case.[16]

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[17] The motion was
denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18]

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS
HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[19]

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed
in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada,
not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Wellestablished is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy
is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.[20] Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action.[22]

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the Court clearly explained and
illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot
be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The
ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule
applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea
is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require
the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the
denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or
a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to
the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the
case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent
judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by
prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent
judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the
amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the
motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him
to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.
[24]
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.[25] She
repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of
authorities.[27]

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears
stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.[28]

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history
of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by
P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.[29]

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December
10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30]

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As
it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

in all cases involving:

A.
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1)
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a)
Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;

(b)
City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c)

Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d)
higher rank;

Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of

(e)
Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;

(f)
City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g)
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

(2)
Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3)
Constitution;

Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

(4)
Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5)
All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B.
Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.

C.
Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP

officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may
be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times,
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The
said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute
graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.[31] Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No.
3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
[32]

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not
with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We
quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having
family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take
advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having
some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which
such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word close personal relation shall
include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to
commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and
provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those
crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner
isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding
paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at
katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.[34] The intention of
the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is
to be taken into view.[35] In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition
to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.[36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa
ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa
as one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks
Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive

Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and
other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966,
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman
respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest
Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the
NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government
agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating
expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc
v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court,
for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As
already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs
cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has
not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by
penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart
from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless
not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will
be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled
that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution
does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are
found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1).
The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public

office:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
[42]

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,[43]
We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.[44]

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.[45] By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of

public office.[46] At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.[47]

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an

individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.[48]

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and
technical training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.[50]

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the
BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract
with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the
state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to
public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.[51]

More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant
or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.[52] Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or
respondent.[53]

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being
then a student regent of U.P., while in the performance of her official functions, committing

the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
when it did not quash the information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds
and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Under the
information, it is averred that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying
and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00).

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the
P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of
the instant case.[54]

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote
or misrepresent.

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio
D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court
ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which
he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may
warrant suspension or disbarment.[56]

We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers
conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.[57]
The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and
honesty before the courts.[58]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 172602

April 13, 2007

HENRY T. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
Henry T. Go seeking to nullify the Resolution dated December 6, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and
Henry T. Go, which denied his motion to quash. Likewise sought to be nullified is the
Sandiganbayan Resolution of March 24, 2006 denying petitioner Gos motion for
reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On May 5, 2003, this Court rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),1 declaring as null and void the 1997 Concession Agreement,
the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), and the Supplemental Contracts
entered into between the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO.

By the aforementioned contracts (collectively known as the PIATCO contracts), the

Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer
(BOT) scheme pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).2

The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCOs predecessor-in-interest, was not a
qualified bidder as it failed to meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law.
Moreover, the PIATCO contracts were declared null and void for being contrary to public
policy. The penultimate paragraph of the Courts Decision states thus:

CONCLUSION

In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the
Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the
contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.
Further, considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial
amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession
Agreement into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997
Concession Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. The
provisions under Section 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997 Concession
Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a
direct government guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being
accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void.3

Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman by Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco, Corporate Secretary of Asias Emerging Dragon
Corporation (AEDC), charging several persons in connection with the NAIA IPT III project. The
AEDC was the original proponent thereof which, however, lost to PIATCO when it failed to
match the latters bid price.

After conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with
the Sandiganbayan the Information dated January 13, 2005 charging Vicente C. Rivera, as

then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and President of PIATCO, with violation
of Section 3(g)4 of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente
C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go. The Information reads:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, accuses VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR. and HENRY T. GO with Violation of
Sec. 3 (g), R.A. No. 3019 committed as follows:

On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C.
RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in
conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International
Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter
into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the
construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was
awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957
as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume
the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latters default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04
(c) in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO
and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

On February 11, 2005, petitioner Go posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty.

On February 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a Hold Departure Order against Rivera and
petitioner Go.

On March 28, 2005, petitioner Go was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty."

On May 26, 2005, Rivera filed a Motion for Judicial Determination (or Re-Determination) of
Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner Go a period of
ten (10) days within which to file a comment thereon.

On June 20, 2005, petitioner Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash. Adopting the view
advanced by Rivera, petitioner Go harped on the alleged "missing documents," including
Pesaycos amended affidavit-complaint and those others that were mentioned in the
resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman finding probable cause against Rivera
and petitioner Go, but which were not allegedly in the records. Petitioner Go maintained that
apart from the bare allegations contained in Pesaycos affidavit-complaint, there was no
supporting evidence for the finding of the existence of probable cause against him and
Rivera. Petitioner Go further alleged that he could not be charged under Section 3(g) of RA
3019 because he is not a public officer and neither is he capacitated to enter into a contract
or transaction on behalf of the government. At least one of the important elements of the
crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is not allegedly present in his case.

On June 21, 2005, petitioner Go filed a Manifestation with Motion to Substitute the Comment
with Motion to Quash, which the prosecution, through the Office of the Ombudsman,
opposed.

On December 6, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying Riveras
Motion for Judicial Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to
Dismiss and petitioner Gos Motion to Quash.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that, contrary to the prosecutions submission, it could still
entertain petitioner Gos Motion to Quash even after his arraignment considering that it was
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Nonetheless, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Gos Motion to Quash holding that, contrary to his claim,
the allegations in the Information actually make out the offense charged. More particularly,
the allegations that accused Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner Go,
entered into the ARCA with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which agreement was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government, are constitutive of the elements of the offense
charged as defined under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.

The Sandiganbayan explained that petitioner Gos contentions that he is not a public officer,
he did not conspire with Rivera in the execution of the ARCA and, in any case, the said
agreement cannot be said to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government,
could not be properly considered for the purpose of quashing the Information on the ground

relied upon by him. According to the Sandiganbayan, these matters raised by petitioner Go
have to be proved during trial.

The decretal portion of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the "Motion for Determination (Re-Determination) of

Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss" and the "Motion to Quash," filed by accused Vicente
C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, respectively, are hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner Go filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in the Resolution dated March 24, 2006.

Petitioner Go now seeks recourse to the Court and, in support of his petitioner, alleges that:

A.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in not ruling that Section 3(g) does not embrace a private person
within its proviso.

B.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in not ruling that there is no probable cause to hold petitioner for trial.7

Petitioner Go contends that Section 3(g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot be extended or even
enlarged by implication or intendment to bring within its limited scope private persons. The
said provision of law allegedly punishes only public officers as it penalizes the act of
"entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby." As a private person, he could not allegedly enter into a contract "on behalf of the

government," there being no showing of any agency relations or special authority for him to
act for and on behalf of the government.

Citing several cases,8 petitioner Go enumerates the following elements of Section 3(g) of RA
3019:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.

He also cites Marcos v. Sandiganbayan9 where the Court acquitted then First Lady Imelda R.
Marcos of the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as it found that she did not sign
the subject Lease Agreement, entered into between the Light Railway Transit Authority
(LRTA) and Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), as a public officer, but in her
capacity as Chairman of the PGHFI, a private entity. As such, the Court held that the first
element of the offense charged, i.e., that the accused is a public officer, was wanting.

Petitioner Go claims that, in the same manner, the first element of the offense charged
against him is absent because he is not a public officer who is authorized by law to bind the
government through the act of "entering into a contract." He also points out that, similar to
his case, in Marcos, the Information also alleged that the former First Lady conspired with a
public officer, then Minister Jose P. Dans of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications, in entering into a contract. Nonetheless, the Court therein dismissed the
allegation of conspiracy.

Petitioner Go maintains that by any of its definition,10 he cannot be considered a "public

officer." Further, only a public officer can enter into a

contract in representation of the government. He stresses that the first element of the
offense, i.e., that the accused is a public officer, is an essential ingredient of the crime under
Section 3(g) of RA 3019. He likens it to the crime of parricide where the essential element is
the relationship of the offender to the victim and, citing a criminal law book author, a
stranger who cooperates in the execution of the offense is not allegedly guilty of this crime.

The stranger is allegedly either liable for homicide or murder but never by "conspiracy to
commit parricide."11

By parity of reasoning, according to petitioner Go, the first essential element of the crime
penalized under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is that the offender must be a public officer. Since
he is not a public officer, one of the essential elements of the offense is lacking; hence, there
is no other recourse but to quash the Information.

Section 9 of RA 3019 was also cited which reads:

SEC. 9. Penalties for violation.

(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions
enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not
less than six years and one month or fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest
and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

xxx

Petitioner Go posits that had it been the intention of the lawmakers to penalize private
persons who supposedly "conspired" with public officers in violation of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6
of RA 3019, it could have easily used the conjunctive "and," not "or," between the terms
"public officer" and "private person" in Section 9 thereof.

Petitioner Go takes exception to the Sandiganbayans pronouncement that even as a private

individual he is not excluded from the coverage of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not
being accused singly but as someone who conspired with a public officer in violating the said
law. According to petitioner Go, this proposition applies only to Section 3(e)12 of RA 3019,
the elements of which include that "the accused are public officers or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them."13 He stresses that, unlike Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
Section 3(g) thereof penalizes only public officers as the operative phrase in the latter
provision is "on behalf of the government."

Petitioner Go vigorously asserts that there is no basis for the finding of probable cause
against him for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. In particular, he insists that the

allegation of conspiracy between Rivera and himself is not supported by any evidence. He
makes an issue out of those documents that were mentioned in the resolution of the Deputy
Ombudsman finding probable cause against him but were not in the records of the
Sandiganbayan. His mere signing of the ARCA does not allegedly establish culpability for
violation of RA 3019. Further, he faults the Sandiganbayan for invoking the doctrine of noninterference by the courts in the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of
probable cause. It is petitioner Gos view that the Sandiganbayan should have ordered the
quashal of the Information for palpable want of probable cause coupled with the absence of
material documents.

The petition is bereft of merit.

For clarity, Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is quoted below anew:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.

As earlier mentioned, the elements of this offense are as follows:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.14

Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a public officer
does not necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Petitioner Gos
simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be charged with violation of
Section 3(g) of RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of RA 3019
as embodied in Section 1 thereof:

SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the
principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella,15 the
Court had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public
officers and private persons:

x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature
of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this
construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act
3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private
persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.16

Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers and
private persons with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.

Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft laws application extends
to both public officers and private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in
part that:

SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years,
perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the
Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion
to his salary and other lawful income.

xxx

The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public
officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner
Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense
thereunder.

The case of Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan17 is instructive. In the said case, Gregorio Singian,
Jr., a private person who was then Executive Vice-President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI),
together with some officers of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), was charged with violation
of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 in connection with the loan accommodations that the said
bank extended to ISI which were characterized as behest loans.

A total of eighteen Informations were filed against Singian and his co-accused by the Office
of the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan corresponding to the nine loan
accommodations granted to ISI. Each loan was subject of two Informations alleging
violations of both Section 3(e) and (g), respectively. In other words, nine Informations
charged Singian and his co-accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and the other
nine charged them with violation of paragraph (g) of the same provision.

Singian filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for re-determination of existence of probable
cause but the same was dismissed. He then filed with the Court a petition for certiorari but it
was likewise dismissed as the Court held that the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan had
not committed grave abuse of discretion when they respectively found probable cause
against Singian for violations of both paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA 3019.

Singian thus illustrates that private persons, like petitioner Go, when conspiring with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019. Another case, Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,18 may likewise be applied to this case by
analogy.

In the said case, Diosdado Garcia, proprietor of D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, together
with Jaime Domingo, then municipal mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, was charged with Section
3(h) of RA 3019 as it appeared that he was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover up his
business transaction with the municipality. Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law reads:

SEC.3. Corrupt practices of public officers. x x x

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having an interest.

The elements of this offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) he has a direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction; (3) he
either: (a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or
(b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.19

Despite the first element mentioned above, the Court affirmed the conviction of Garcia, a
private individual, as well as that of Domingo, who was then a municipal mayor, for violation
of Section 3(h) of RA 3019. In so holding, the Court established that Domingo and Garcia
acted in conspiracy with one another in the commission of the offense. Domingo thus also
serves to debunk petitioner Gos theory that where an offense has as one of its elements
that the accused is a public officer, it necessarily excludes private persons from the scope of
such offense.

The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is
applicable to the present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed
policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

Reliance by petitioner Go on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan20 is not quite appropriate. To recall,

upon her motion for reconsideration, the Court therein acquitted former First Lady Imelda
Marcos of the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 in its Resolution dated October
6, 1998. Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the subject lease agreement
as a private person, not as a public officer. As such, the first element, i.e., that the accused
is a public officer was wanting.

Petitioner Go, however, failed to put the Courts ruling in Marcos in its proper factual
backdrop. The acquittal of the former First Lady should be taken in the context of the Courts
Decision dated January 29, 1998, in Dans, Jr. v. People,21 which the former First Lady sought
to reconsider and, finding merit in her motion, gave rise to the Courts Resolution in Marcos.
In Dans, the Information filed against the former First Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister
of Transportation and Communications, for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, alleged that
they were both public officers and, conspiring with each other, entered into the subject lease
agreement covering the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a private entity, under terms and
conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Ladys conviction for violation of
Section 3(g) of RA 3019 but acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As
stated earlier, upon the former First Ladys motion for reconsideration, the Court reversed
her conviction in its Resolution in Marcos.

It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of the former
First Ladys conviction was based on the fact that it was later held that she signed the
subject lease agreement as a private person, not a public officer. However, this acquittal
should also be taken in conjunction with the fact that the public officer with whom she had
supposedly conspired, her co-accused Dans, had earlier been acquitted. In other words, the
element that the accused is a public officer, was totally wanting in the former First Ladys
case because Dans, the public officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in committing
Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could
not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.

In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in his
case because he is not being charged alone but in conspiracy with Rivera, undoubtedly a
public officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC Secretary. The case against both of them
is still pending before the Sandiganbayan. The facts attendant in petitioner Gos case are,
therefore, not exactly on all fours as those of the former First Ladys case as to warrant the
application of the Marcos ruling in his case.

Anent the allegation of conspiracy, it is posited by the dissenting opinion that the
Information is infirm as far as petitioner Go is concerned because it failed to mention with
specificity his participation in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy. It
opines that "aside from the sweeping allegation of conspiracy, the Information failed to
mention any act as to how petitioner had taken part in the planning and preparation of the
alleged conspiracy. Mere allegation of conspiracy in the Information does not necessarily
mean that the criminal acts recited therein also pertain to petitioner." While it concedes that
the Sandiganbayan may exercise jurisdiction over private individuals, it submits that it may
do so only "upon Information alleging with specificity the precise violations of the private
individual." By way of conclusion, the dissenting opinion cites Sistoza v. Desierto22 where
the Court stated that a signature appearing on a document is not enough to sustain a
finding of conspiracy among officials and employees charged with defrauding the
government.

These asseverations, however, are unpersuasive. It is well established that the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that
may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.23 In the same manner, the

absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits.24

Following these truisms, the specific acts of petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracy with
Rivera in violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as well as the details on how petitioner Go had
taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy need not be set forth in
the Information as these are evidentiary matters and, as such, are to be shown and proved
during the trial on the merits. Indeed, it bears stressing that "[t]o establish conspiracy, direct
proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it
is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a
community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of
a chain of circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as coprincipals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them, for in contemplation of
the law the act of one is the act of all."25

In this connection, for purposes of the Information, it is sufficient that the requirements of
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are complied with:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

An accused, like petitioner Go, may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a)
of Rule 117 on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In such a
case, the fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an
Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic of the Information are not to be considered.26

As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the Information, if
admitted hypothetically, establish all the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis--vis
petitioner Go:

ELEMENTS ALLEGATIONS

1a\^/phi1.net
1. The offender is a public officer
[T]he accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking
advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of
Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., xxx"

2. He entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government

"[T]he accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., xxx in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO xxx did
then and there, willfully & unlawfully and feloniously entered into an Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO x x x

3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government

"xxx which ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the
construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718
(BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event
of the latters default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I, Section
1.06 of the ARCA which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT Law
and manifestly grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines."27

Finally, in the assailed Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated
thus:

The rule is that the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor, the Office of the Ombudsman in this case.
Such official is vested with authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court and the concomitant function of determining as well the persons to be
prosecuted. Also, it must not be lost sight of that the correctness of the exercise of such
function is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon, consistent with the policy of non-interference by the courts in the determination by
the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause.

Accordingly, upon the foregoing premises, we believe and so hold that any and all questions
relating to the finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman should be

addressed to the said office itself, then to the Court of Appeals and, ultimately, to the
Supreme Court.

On the matter of the judicial determination of probable cause, we stand by our finding that
the same exists in this case, the said finding we arrived at upon a personal determination
thereof which we did for the purpose of and before the issuance of the warrant of
arrest.1awphi1.nt While it may indeed be true that the documents mentioned by accusedmovant as being absent in the records are missing, we nevertheless had for our perusal
other documents assiduously listed down by accused Rivera in his motion, including the
information, which we found to constitute sufficient basis for our determination of the
existence of probable cause. It must be emphasized that such determination is separate and
distinct from that made by the Office of the Ombudsman and which we did independently
therefrom.28

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function of the

government prosecutor, which in this case is the Ombudsman. As a rule, courts do not
interfere in the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in determining probable cause, unless
there are compelling reasons.29 Mindful of this salutary rule, the Sandiganbayan
nonetheless made its own determination on the basis of the records that were before it. It
concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the records for the finding of the existence of
probable cause against petitioner Go.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in
an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have
been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.30 Clearly, in the light of
the foregoing disquisition, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed on the
Sandiganbayan when it held that there exists probable cause against petitioner Go.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated
December 6, 2005 and March 24, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092
are AFFIRMED in toto.

[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992]

MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G. TIOZON, petitioners, vs.
RAUL A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as Secretary of the House of Representatives, MR. JOSE
MARIA TUANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Gen. Services Division of the House of Representatives,
MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives, and the
HON. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:

On February 18, 1992, petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of Northern
Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent RaulDaza,
then incumbent congressman of the same congressional district, from continuing to exercise
the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful
permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974.

Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as
permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On March 13, 1992,

respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion for extension of time to file their
comment for a period of thirty days or until April 12, 1992. Reacting to the said motion,
petitioners on March 30, 1992, manifested their opposition to the 30-day extension of time
stating that such extension was excessive and prayed that respondent instead be granted
only 10 days to file their comment. On May 5, 1992, the Court noted the manifestation and
opposition.

On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition
before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992
elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (SPC 92-084) and that the
instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from
June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.[1]

On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact that
he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he was accorded a permanent
residency status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter order of the District Director,

US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A.,[2] he had long waived his
status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.[3]

On April 13, 1992, public respondent Camilo Sabio, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, Mr. Jose Mari Tuao, as OIC of the General Services Division, Mrs. Rosalinda
G. Medina, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives and Commission on Audit,
filed their comment. They contend that if indeed Congressman Daza is a greencard holder
and a permanent resident of the United States of America, then he should be removed from
his position as Congressman. However, they opined that only Congressman Daza can best
explain his true and correct status as a greencard holder. Until he files his comment to the
petition, petitioners prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted.[4]

Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before the COMELEC (SPC 92084) and hypothesizing that the case before the COMELEC would become moot should this
Court find that his permanent resident status ceased when he was granted a US nonimmigrant visa, asked this Court to direct the COMELEC to dismiss SPC No. 92-084.[5]

On May 5, 1992, petitioners filed their reply. On May 21, 1992, this Court gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent Daza should be
disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from exercising the functions
of his office being a permanent resident alien of the United States at the time when he filed
his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1987 Elections. To buttress their contention,
petitioners cite the recent case of Caasi v. Court of Appeals.[6]

In support of their charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder, petitioners presented
to us a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) which reads:[7]

File No. A20 968 618

Date: Nov 5, 1991

LOS914732
Geraghty, O'Loughlin and Kenney
Attn: David C. Hutchinson

386 N. Wasbasha Street

St. Paul, Minn. 55102-1308
SUBJECT:

Daza, Raul A.

Your request was received in this office on ____________; please note the paragraph(s)
checked below:

xxx

xxx

xxx

10. [XX] Other remarks:

Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject became a Lawful Permanent
Resident on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we know subject (sic) still has his greencard. No he has
not applied for citizenship.

Sinerely, (sic)

Sgd.

District Director

Form G-343 (Rev. 8-20-82)N

We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot and
academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992[8]
that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his
term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction
of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners
challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have
been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the
election[9] or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days
after Daza's proclamation.[10] Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against
respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to
provide for acts already consummated.[11] Fourth, as a de facto public officer,[12]
respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because
his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.[13]

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for being MOOT and
ACADEMIC.

G.R. No. 129616

April 17, 2002

THE GENERAL MANAGER, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) and RAMON

ANINO, petitioners,
vs.
JULIETA MONSERATE, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Decision dated June 20, 1997 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 39670, 2 declaring null and void the Resolution No.
952043 dated March 21, 1995 and Resolution No. 956640 dated October 24, 1995 of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), and ordering the reinstatement of Julieta G. Monserate as
Division Manager II of the Resources Management Division, Ports Management Office,
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Iloilo City.
The facts are:
Julieta Monserate, respondent, started her government service in 1977 as
Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office, PPA, Iloilo City. Barely a year later, she
was promoted to the position of Cashier II and then as Finance Officer (SG-16) in
1980.3
In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganization, respondent applied for
the permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division, same
office. The Comparative Data Sheet4accomplished by the PPA Reorganization Task Force
shows the ranking of the six (6) aspirants to the said position, thus:

"COMPARATIVE DATA SHEET

OFFICE:

PMO ILOILO

DIVISION:

RES.
MANAGEMENT
DIVISION

POSITION:

DIVISION MANAGER

REQUIRED CS ELIG.:

CS PROF / RA 1080

CANDIDATES

ELIGIBILITY

1.
MONSERATE, CS Prof.
JULIETA

xxx

TOTAL

xxx

79.5

2. ANINO, RAMON

1st grade

xxx

70

3. TEODOSIO, APRIL

PD 907 (CPA)

xxx

67

4. MORTOLA, DARIO

CS Prof.

xxx

67

5. ESPINOSA, AMALIK

Bar

xxx

63.5

xxx

59.5"

6. PERFECTO, BASCOS RA 1080

On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the PPA,
appointed5 respondent to the position of Manager II (Resource Management Division). On

even date, respondent assumed office and discharged the functions thereof. On July 8, 1988,
the CSC, through Guillermo R. Silva (Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA)
approved her appointment.
Meanwhile, on April 18, 1988, petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked second to respondent per
the Comparative Data Sheet earlier quoted, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals
Board, protesting against respondent's appointment. The PPA Appeals Board, in a
Resolution6 dated August 11, 1988, sustained the protest and rendered ineffective
respondent's appointment based on "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; 7 (2) CSC MC NO. 10,
s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B; 8 and (3) Civil Service Eligibility." These grounds were not
explained or discussed in the Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board upholds the appointment of Ramon A.
Anino as Resources Management Division Manager of the Port Management Office of
Iloilo."
On October 24, 1988, respondent was furnished a copy of PPA Special Order No. 479889 (entitled "Creation of the PPA Manager's Pool"), dated September 28, 1988, issued by the
new PPA General Manager, Mr. Rogelio A. Dayan. That Special Order excluded the name of
respondent from the pool-list and placed instead the name of petitioner as Manager II,
Resource Management Division. In effect, the Special Order implemented the August 11,
1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. 1wphi1.nt
Aggrieved, respondent filed with the PPA General Manager an appeal/request for clarification
dated November 2, 1988.10 She questioned her replacement under PPA Special Order No.
479-88, claiming that the proceedings before the PPA Appeals Board were irregular because
(1) she was not notified of the hearing before it; (2) she was not furnished a copy of the
August 11, 1988 PPA Appeals Board Resolution or a copy of the protest filed by petitioner
Anino;11 (3) she was not informed of the reasons behind her replacement; and (4) their Port
Manager (in Iloilo City), who was then an official member of the Board, was not included in
the said proceedings.
On November 8, 1988, pending resolution of her appeal/request for clarification, respondent
received a copy of PPA Special Order No. 492-88 12 dated October 21, 1988, also issued by
General Manager Dayan. This PPA Order officially reassigned her to the position of
Administrative Officer (SG-15) which was petitioner Anino's former position and was lower
than her previous position as Finance Officer (SG 16) before she was appointed as Division
Manager.
Apparently at a loss with the turn of events, coupled by the inaction of PPA General Manager
Dayan on her earlier appeal/request for clarification, respondent filed on November 25, 1988
a "precautionary appeal"13 with the CSC. She manifested that as of said date (November 25),
she has not yet been furnished a certified copy of the PPA Appeals Board Resolution.
On January 2, 1989, respondent received a copy of her new appointment as Administrative
Officer dated October 1, 1988.14 It was also during this time when she learned that PPA
General Manager Dayan had just issued petitioner's appointment dated October 21, 1988 as
Manager II in the Resource Management Division effective February 1, 1988.
On January 16, 1989, respondent filed with the CSC an appeal formally protesting against
petitioner Anino's appointment and at the same time questioning the propriety of the August
11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. This appeal remained pending with the CSC
for more than six (6) years despite respondent's requests for early resolution. In the
meantime, she assumed the position of Administrative Officer.

Eventually, the CSC, in its Resolution No. 95-2043 15 dated March 21, 1995, dismissed
respondent's appeal, thus:
"It is well-established rule that an appointment, although approved by this
Commission, does not become final until the protest filed against it is decided by the
agency or by the Commission. Although Monserate had already assumed the position
of RMD Manager II, the appointing authority may still withdraw the same if a protest
is seasonably filed. This is covered by Section 19, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules
implementing EO 292 x x x.
"Monserate's claim that she is more qualified than Anino is not relevant to the issue
before this Commission. In cases of protest filed or appealed to the Commission, the
main question to be resolved is whether or not the appointee meets the qualification
standard. x x x. The Commission will not disturb the choice of the appointing
authority as long as the appointee meets the qualification prescribed for the position
in question."
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CSC in its
Resolution No. 95-6640 dated October 24, 1995.
In due time, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review impleading as
respondents the PPA General Manager and petitioner Anino.
On June 20, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 16 nullifying the twin Resolutions
of the CSC. It ruled that the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board was not
supported by evidence and that the same was irregularly issued due to lack of proper notice
to respondent with respect to the Board's proceedings. It concluded that her reassignment
from the position of Manager II, Resource Management Division (SG-19), to the position of
Administrative Officer (SG-15) was a demotion violative of her constitutional right to security
of tenure and due process. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:
"THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as null and
void Resolution Nos. 952043 and 95640 (should be 956640) dated March 21 and
October 21, 1988 (should be October 24, 1995), of the Civil service Commission; and
directing the reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of Resource Management
Division Manager II.
"SO ORDERED."
Thereupon, Ramon Anino and the PPA General Manager filed on August 14, 1997 the present
petition. On November 30, 1997, petitioner Anino retired from the government service. 17
Petitioners ascribe to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUISLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
MONSERATE WAS DEMOTED FROM RESOURCES MANAGEMENT DIVISION MANAGER
TO ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, THUS VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALIGNING ITSELF WITH THE WELLNIGH RULE THAT RESPONDENT MONSERATE'S APPOINTMENT AS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT DIVISION MANAGER, ALTHOUGH APPROVED BY CSC, DOES NOT
BECOME FINAL UNTIL THE PROTEST FILED AGAINST HER IS FAVORABLY DECIDED IN
HER FAVOR BY THE AGENCY OR THE CSC.

III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF JUDGMENT IN

IGNORING THAT IN CASES OF PROTEST FILED OR APPEALED TO THE CSC, THE MAIN
QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER OR NOT THE APPOINTEE MEETS THE
QUALIFICATION STANDARD.18
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not there was due process when respondent was
replaced by petitioner Anino from her position as Manager II, Resource Management
Division, and demoted as Administrative Officer.
Petitioners vehemently aver that respondent was never demoted since demotion, being in
the nature of administrative penalty, presupposes a conviction in an administrative case.
Here, respondent was not charged of any administrative case. Rather, she was displaced
from her position as an "aftermath of the PPA reorganization, authorized by law, the
implementation of which having been carried out with utmost good faith."
Furthermore, the said displacement was just the necessary effect of the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board which sustained petitioner Anino's timely protest
against respondent's appointment. Petitioners theorize that the appointment of respondent
as Resource Management Division Manager did not become final until the protest filed
against her was favorably decided in her favor by the CSC. In support of this contention,
they cited Section 19, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), which provides inter alia:
"SEC 19. An appointment, though contested, shall take effect immediately upon its
issuance if the appointee assumes the duties of the position and the appointee is
entitled to receive the salary attached to the position. However, the appointment,
together with the decision of the department head, shall be submitted to the
Commission for appropriate action within 30 days from the date of its issuance,
otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective thereafter. Likewise, such
appointment shall become ineffective in case the protest is finally resolved
against the protestee, in which case, he shall be reverted to his former
position."
Petitioners also contend that the head of an agency, being the appointing authority, is the
one most knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the functions of the office. The
appointing authority has a wide latitude of choice subject only to the condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Consequently, "the CSC acted
rightly when it did not interfere in the exercise of discretion by the PPA appointing authority,
there being no evidence of grave abuse of discretion thereof or violation of the Civil Service
Law and Rules."
The petition is unmeritorious.
In the first place, the PPA reorganization in 1988 has nothing to do with
respondent's demotion from the contested position of Manager II, Resource Management
Office (SG-19), to the lower position of Administrative Officer (SG-15). Antithetically, it was
precisely because of the said reorganization that respondent applied to thehigher
position of Division Manager II. In fact, the Comparative Data Sheet accomplished by the
PPA Reorganization Task Force itself shows that respondent ranked No. 1, while petitioner
Anino ranked No. 2, from among the six (6) contenders to the said post. Respondent was
eventually issued a permanent appointment as such Division Manager on February 1, 1988
by then PPA General Maximo Dumlao, Jr., during which time she actually assumed office and
discharged its functions. This appointment was later approved on July 8, 1988 by the CSC,
through Assistant Director Guillermo R. Silva of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA.

Clearly, it was only after the reorganization and upon the issuance of the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board when respondent was demoted to the lower position of
Administrative Officer. This is further shown by the following orders and
appointments subsequently issued by then PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan:
1. PPA Special Order No. 479-88 dated September 28, 1988 which excluded
respondent Monserate from the PPA Managers' pool-list;
2. Appointment of respondent, dated October 1, 1988, to the position of
Administrative Officer;
3. PPA Special Order No. 492-88 dated October 21, 1988 which officially reassigned
respondent to the position of Administrative Officer; and
4. Appointment of petitioner Anino, dated October 21, 1988, to the position of
Manager II, Resource Management Division, effective February 1, 1988.
Therefore, contrary to petitioners' claim, respondent was demoted, not by reason of the PPA
reorganization in 1988, but due to the PPA Appeals Board Resolution dated August 11, 1988
sustaining petitioner Anino's protest against respondent's appointment.
Unfortunately for petitioners, this Court cannot accord validity to the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board which "upholds the appointment of Ramon A.
Anino as Resource Management Division Manager." But how can it uphold his
appointment when he was not yet appointed then? It bears stressing that he was appointed
on a much later date - October 21, 1988, or more than two (2) months after August
11, 1998 when the PPA Appeals Board Resolution was issued. Stated differently, the
PPA Appeals Board could not uphold an appointment which was not yet existing.
Equally questionable are the grounds for respondent's demotion stated in the August 11,
1998 Resolution: "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; (2) CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2
and Par. B; and (3) Civil Service Eligibility." These grounds are incomprehensible for lack of
discussion or explanation by the Board to enable respondent to know the reason for her
demotion.
We uphold the Court of Appeals' finding that the August 11, 1998 PPA Appeals Board
Resolution was void for lack of evidence and proper notice to respondent. As aptly held by
the Appellate Court:
"In the August 11, 1988 Resolution by the PPA Appeals Board (Ibid., p. 46) upholding
the appointment of the private respondent (Ramon Anino) as Division Manager, the
grounds against petitioner's (Julieta Monserate) appointment were: a) the CSC MC No.
5, s. 1988, Par 3; b) the CSC MC No. 10, 2. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B; and c) Civil
service eligibility.
"x x x
"To us, the August 11, 1988 Resolution by the PPA Appeals Board was not supported
by evidence. Of the CSC MC No. 5, the petitioner had no pending administrative or
criminal case at the time of her appointment as Manager. x x x.
"With respect to the CSC MC No. 10, Par. A (1.2) and Par. B, the processing, review,
evaluation and recommendation of her appointment as Manager II, passed several

committees created by the PPA. x x x. Moreover, she had a 1.9 average performance
rating compared to the private respondent who only got 2.03. x x x.
"On eligibility, she has a Career Service Professional eligibility while the private
respondent only has a First Grade Civil Service Eligibility.
"She added that she was not aware of any proceeding on her demotion as a Division
Manager. As a matter of fact, it was only upon her iniative sometime during the latter
part of November, 1988 that she was able to obtain a copy of the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the Appeals Board. The resolution sustained the private respondent's
appointment as Division Manager even if on August 11, 1988, he was not yet
extended any appointment. As a matter of fact, he was appointed only on October 1,
1988 (should be October 21, 1988).
"Furthermore, she said that the resolution of the PPA Appeals Board appears irregular,
if not null and void. She was never notified of any proceeding; she was not furnished
either a copy of the resolution. What she received instead was a Special Order dated
September 29, 1988 already ordering her demotion. She was not at all given the
opportunity of defending herself before the Appeals Board.
"x x x.
"In the case now before us, the petitioner did not receive or was not given a copy of
the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the Appeals Board. She did not even know that she
was demoted until after she received a copy of the of the Special Order No. 479-88." 19
From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and procedural irregularities attended
respondent's demotion from the position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, to
the lower position of Administrative Officer. Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a
revocation of her appointment as Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights
to security of tenure and due process. In Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission,20 this Court
emphasized that "once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a
position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely
equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the
constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or
by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing."
Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and
appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. 21 However, the
moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed
the duties and functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by
the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of
evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of respondent's appointment by
demoting her. Respondent's security of tenure guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution
[Article IX-B, Section 2, par. (3)] should not be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise of the
appointing power.22
Parenthetically, when the Court of Appeals reinstated respondent to her legitimate post as
Manager II in the Resource Management Division, it merely restored her appointment to the
said position to which her right to security of tenure had already attached. To be sure, her
position as Manager II never became vacant since her demotion was void. In this
jurisdiction, "an appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null and void ab
initio."23

We now delve on the backwages in favor of respondent.

The challenged Court of Appeals Decision ordered the reinstatement of respondent without
awarding backwages. This matter becomes controversial because respondent assumed the
lower position of Administrative Officer during the pendency of her protest against petitioner
Anino's appointment to the contested position. Also, petitioner Anino retired from the service
on November 30, 1997.
In this respect, while petitioner Anino's appointment to the contested position is void, as
earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of his
incumbency.24 A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly
exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such
appointment or election may be irregular. 25 In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals,26 this Court ruled
that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary
received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de
facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title. A de facto officer, not
having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to thede
jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure. In the
later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary,27 this Court allowed a de
facto officer to receive emoluments for actual services rendered but only when there is
no de jure officer, thus:
"x x x in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good
faith, has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining
thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate
action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office."
In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his wrongful
incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied
the office in good faith. This rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the present case
in view of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed under protest the position of
Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988, which position she currently
holds. Since then, she has been receiving the emoluments, salary and other compensation
attached to such office. While her assumption to said lower position and her acceptance of
the corresponding emoluments cannot be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her
rightful office (Division Manager), she cannot recover full backwages for the period when she
was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay differentials for the
period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual
reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Such backpay differentials pertain
to the difference between the salary rates for the positions of Manager II and Administrative
Officer. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he
wrongfully assumed the contested position up to the time of his retirement on November 30,
1997.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 20, 1997 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that petitioner Ramon
A. Anino is ordered to pay respondent Julieta Monserate backpay differentials pertaining to
the period from the time he wrongfully assumed the contested position of Manager II up to
his retirement on November 30, 1997.