ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner, vs. HON.

CATALINO MACARAIG, JR
G.R. No. 88291 May 31, 1991; G.R. No. 88291 June 8, 1993
FACTS: On November 3, 1986, Commonwealth Act No. 120 created the NPC as a public corporation to
undertake the development of hydraulic power and the production of power from other sources.
Effective March 10, 1987, Executive Order No. 93 once again withdrew all tax and duty incentives granted
to government and private entities which had been restored under Presidential Decree Nos. 1931 and 1955
but it gave the authority to FIRB to restore, revise the scope and prescribe the date of effectivity of such tax
and/or duty exemptions.
On June 24, 1987 the FIRB issued Resolution No. 17-87 restoring NPC's tax and duty exemption privileges
effective March 10, 1987. On October 5, 1987, the President, through respondent Executive Secretary
Macaraig, Jr., confirmed and approved FIRB Resolution No. 17-87.
Though the issues raised was resolved by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 88291, the issues was again
brought to the Supreme Court for the second time by the petitioner in G.R. No. 88291.
ISSUE: Whether or not the powers conferred upon the FIRB by Section 2(a), (b), and (c) and (4) of
Executive Order No. 93 "constitute undue delegation of legislative power and is, therefore,
unconstitutional.
RULING: No.
With the growing complexities of modern life and the many technical fields of governmental functions, as in
matters pertaining to tax exemptions, delegation of legislative powers has become the rule and nondelegation the exception. The legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time,
to provide direct and efficacious solutions to many problems attendant upon present day undertakings. The
legislature could not be expected to state all the detailed situations wherein the tax exemption privilege
would be restored. The task may be assigned to an administrative body like the Fiscal Incentives Review
Board (FIRB).
When E.O No. 93 (S'86) was issued, President Aquino was exercising both Executive and Legislative
powers. Thus, there was no power delegated to her, rather it was she who was delegating her power. She
delegated it to the FIRB, which, for purposes of E.O No. 93 (S'86), is a delegate of the legislature. Clearly,
she was not sub-delegating her power.
And E.O. No. 93 (S'86), as a delegating law, was complete in itself it set forth the policy to be carried out
85 and it fixed the standard to which the delegate had to conform in the performance of his functions, 86
both qualities having been enunciated by this Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General. 87
For delegation to be constitutionally valid, the law must be complete in itself and must set forth sufficient
standards.
Certain aspects of the taxing process that are not really legislative in nature are vested in administrative
agencies. In this case, there really is no delegation, to wit: a) power to value property; b) power to assess
and collect taxes; c) power to perform details of computation, appraisement or adjustment; among others.