1

4 STATE OF ARIZONA
5 V
6 STEPHEN KANDIK
7

8 2 CA-CV 2009-0180/ CT-20090056

9

10 APPELLANT OPENING BRIEF

11 ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
12 DIVISION TWO
13

14 JANUARY 28, 2010

15

16

17

18
 2

19 TABLE OF CONTENTS:
20

21 * THE STANDING ISSUE

22 PAGES 3-17
23 STANDING CHALLENGE – CONSTITUTIONALITY CHECK
24

25 *DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AN JUDICIAL FRAUD

26 PAGES 17-27
27 WITNESS SUPPRESSION – OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
28

29 *EXTRAODINARY CIRCUMSTANCE'S
30 PAGES 27–30
31 EVASION OF DUTY TO INFORM ON ISSUE OF FACT
32

33 *DUE PROCESS DENIED AND VOID JUDGEMENTS

34 PAGES 30–45
35 LOSS OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND NULL
36 . JUDICIAL ORDERS
37

38 *SEC 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

39 PAGES 45-48
40 JUDICIAL DISDAIN FOR SEC 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT
41

42 *CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE

43
44 PAGES 49
 3

45 ¶1 The Constitution, in the words of John

46 Adams, was written for a moral and religious
47 people; being wholly inadequate for people who
48 have no morals, no conscience and certainly no
49 principles or standards; who believe right and
50 wrong are situational, pliant to whatever their
51 agenda is.
52

53 THE STANDING ISSUE:

54

55 ¶2 BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS, I

56 FORTHWITH CHALLENGE ARIZONA'S CLAIM OF STANDING

57 IN THE CAUSE AGAINST ME.

58 *****"standing is a jurisdictional matter antecedent to

59 the right to relief." Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W. 3d 447,
60 451 (Mo. banc 2002) (citing State ex rel. Williams v.
61 Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 227 n.6 (Mo. banc 1982)

62 ***** (...standing is “threshold requirement of every

63 case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v.
64 Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d
65 343 (1975) (“The rules of standing … are threshold
66 determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”).

67 *****standing is a "jurisdictional issue which may be

 4

68 raised by any party or the Court at any time City of

69 Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162, 166 (Miss. 2000)
70 (citing Williams v. Stevens, 390 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Miss.
71 1980)).P23.

72
73 ¶3 FURTHERMORE: THOUGH I RAISED THE MATTER,

74 THE PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING

75 THAT THEY HAVE STANDING.

76 *****THE PLANTIFF ULTIMATELY BEARS THE BURDEN

77 OF ESTABLISHING STANDING. SEE Fink v. Golenbock,
78 238 Conn. 183,199 n.13, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996)

79 *****THE PLANTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN OF

80 ESTABLISHING STANDING. SEE STORINO V. BOROUGH
81 OF POINT PLEASENT BEACH, 322 F. 293, 296 (3d Cir.
82 2003).

83 ***** plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he

84 or she has standing. Sierra Club, 100 Hawai'i at 250, 59
85 P.3d at 885.

86
87 ¶4 AS YET; ARIZONA, HAS NOT FACTUALLY PROVEN

88 THEY HOLD STANDING? AS OUTLINED IN THE ADJACENT

89 RULINGS THEY WILL NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY

 5

90 HAVE A LEGITIMATE "LEGAL" RIGHT, (TITLE OR

91 INTEREST...) NOT MIND YOU, A SUPPOSED, ASSUMED,

92 PRESUMED, CONJECTED OR HYPOTHETICAL RIGHT, BUT

93 RATHER ONE WHICH IS ESTABLISHED AS LEGAL.

94 *****Standing is the legal or equitable right, title, or

95 interest in the subject matter of the controversy which
96 entitles a party to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
97 Crosby v. Luehrs, supra; Hradecky v. State, 264 Neb.
98 771, 652 N.W.2d 277 (2002).

99 *****‘‘Standing is the legal right to set judicial

100 machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the
101 jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual
102 or representative capacity, some real interest in the
103 cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or
104 interest in the subject matter of the controversy.’’
105 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Board
106 of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 717, 629 A.2d 333 (1993).
107
108 *****The purpose of an inquiry as to standing is to
109 determine whether one has a legally protectable interest
110 or right in the controversy that would benefit by the
111 relief to be granted. Crosby v. Luehrs, supra; Hradecky v.
112 State, supra.
 6

113 *****Id. The litigant must have some legal or equitable

114 right, title, or interest in the subject of the controversy.
115 See, Crosby v. Luehrs, supra; Chambers v. Lautenbaugh,
116 263 Neb. 920, 644 N.W.2d 540 (2002).
117
118 ¶5 CAN A CLAIMANTS MERE ASSUMPTION OR

119 ASSERTION OF LEGAL STANDING SUFFICE IN SETTING THE

120 WHEELS OF JUSTICE ROLLING? IS THIS ADEQUATE?

121 ARIZONA IS LIKELY BANKING ON SUCH FAR FLUNG

122 FANCIFUL HOPES. YET THE LAW HAS MORE TO SAY ON THE

123 MATTER:

124 ****”. . . A legislative enactment is conclusively

125 presumed to be constitutional unless it is clearly shown
126 that the act contravenes the state or federal
127 constitution." Caldis v. Board of County Comm'rs, Grand
128 Forks County, 279 N.W.2d 665, 669-72 (N.D. 1979).

129 ****Constitutionally, "a statutory presumption cannot

130 be sustained if there be no rational connection between
131 the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed." Tot v
132 United States, 319 US 463, 467; 63 S. Ct. 1241, 1245, 87
133 L.Ed.2d 1519 (1943)
 7

134 ****"Substantive due process analysis requires a close

135 correspondence between legislation and the goals it
136 advances." Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 14, 595 N.W.2d
137 285. A court "may declare a statute unconstitutional on
138 substantive due process grounds if 'the Legislature had
139 no power to act in the particular matter or, having power
140 to act, [ ] such power was exercised in an arbitrary,
141 unreasonable, or discriminatory manner and [ ] the
142 method adopted has no reasonable relation to attaining
143 the desired result.'" Id. (quoting City of Fargo v.
144 Stensland, 492 N.W.2d 591, 594 (N.D.1992).

145 ****Laws that interfere with "fundamental rights" are

146 "suspect" and demand "close scrutiny" by courts. Laws
147 cannot simply be passed on whimsy, but there must be a
148 "compelling state interest." Any law that would "chill"
149 exercising a right is "patently unconstitutional." It is a
150 well established right of the people "to be free to travel
151 throughout the length and breadth of our land
152 uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which
153 unreasonably burden or restrain this movement."
154 Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 (1969).

155 *****"Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often

156 necessary to the well being of an American citizen, such
157 as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all
 8

158 delegated powers that curtail or dilute them... to repeat,

159 we deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen..."
160 Edwards v. California 314 US 160 (1941).

161
162 ¶6 AS I CLEARLY POINTED OUT IN MY INITIAL

163 APPELLANT BRIEF, THERE IS NO CONFUSION, ARS 41-

164 1722 THE AZ PHOTO ENFORCEMENT STATUTE COUPLED

165 WITH ITS ENFORCEMENT ARM A.R.S. 28-645 (A)(3)(a)

166 ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED IN A BLATANTLY AND OVERTLY

167 UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER BREACHING SECTION 13

168 ARTICLES 2,9,33, AS WELL AS,THE 9TH AMENDMENT OF

169 THE US CONSTITUTION.

170
171 ¶7 I AM TRULY DISAPPOINTED THAT MY WITNESSES

172 AND I WHERE UNABLE TO HALT THIS ASSAULT ON THE

173 PEOPLES RIGHTS, IT GRIEVES ME TO STAND BY AN WATCH

174 AS ARIZONA'S CORRUPT GOVERNMENT IMPOSES UNFAIR

175 ILLEGAL AND UNDERHANDEDLY MANIPULATED PENALTIES

176 AGAINST TARGETED CLASSES OF CITIZENS, WHILE

177 OTHERS (LIKE CORPORATE FLEETS AND EVERY TYPE OF

 9

178 GOVERNMENT VEHICLES), ARE BEING EXEMPTED FROM

179 THIS WHOLE SCALE TREASON WHICH CONTRAVENES BOTH

180 CONSTITUTION'S.

181 ¶8 I AM ANXIOUS TO HEAR HOW THE STATE WILL

182 JUSTIFY FINING AN INDIVIDUAL LIKE MYSELF AS A

183 REMEDY TO A PERCEIVED WRONG, WHILE AT THE SAME

184 TIME, SIMPLY OVERLOOKING AND IGNORING THAT SAME

185 VIOLATION, TO RECTIFY IT FOR GOVERNMENT AND

186 CORPORATE DRIVERS, WHAT IS THE RATIONAL FOR

187 PUNISHING SOME AND DISREGARDING THE ACTIONS OF

188 OTHERS.

189
190 ¶9 THIS WRONG DOING HAS HAD A POWERFULLY

191 CHILLING EFFECT ON ME, THE VICTIM OF THE CRIME. I

192 HAVE GIVEN UP ON DRIVING IN ARIZONA EVER AGAIN;

193 THIS WAS THE PLACE OF MY BIRTH AND MY FAMILIAL

194 HOME. I AM A TALENTED SCENIC PHOTOGRAPHER AN

195 WISH I COULD SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF MY PHOTOS, SO

196 YOU COULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THE MAGNITUDE OF

 10

197 LOSS TO MYSELF AND THE WORLD, RESULTING FROM THIS

198 TRAVESTY. EXTORTION RUN AMOK IN ARIZONA HAS

199 STRIPPED ME OF MY LICENSE, THOUGH I HAVE BEEN AN

200 EXEMPLARY DRIVER AND HAVE ONLY THIS SINGLE

201 ALLEGED OFFENSE CHARGED AGAINST ME FOR WELL OVER

202 A DECADE.

203
204 ¶10 IN ANY CASE, FOR THE STATE TO PROVE

205 STANDING TO MY SATISFACTION AND APPARENTLY TO

206 THE EXTENT REQUIRED BY EARLIER COURTS (I PREY WE

207 ALL REVERENCE), A WINK AND A NOD WILL NO LONGER

208 SUFFICE. IT IS TIME FOR CLOSE SCRUTINY AND THE

209 AFORE MENTIONED AND FOLLOWING CASE LAW SHOULD

210 DEFINE THE STANDARDS ARIZONA SHOULD NEED TO

211 MEET.

212 ****"Insofar as a statute runs counter to the

213 fundamental law of the land ,...(or state)...(constitution)
214 it is superseded thereby." (16 Am Jur 2d 177, Late Am
215 Jur 2d. 256)

216 **** "When an act of the legislature is repugnant or

 11

217 contrary to the constitution, it is, ipso facto, void." 2 Pet.

218 R. 522; 12 Wheat. 270; 3 Dall. 286; 4 Dall. 18.

219
220 ****"It (the legislature or statutory laws) may not
221 violate constitutional prohibits or guarantees OR
222 AUTHORIZE OTHERS TO DO SO." Lockard v. Los Angeles
223 33 Cal2d 553; Cert den 337 US 939.

224 ****"The State cannot diminish rights of the people."

225 Hertado v. California, 110 U.S. 516

226

227 ¶11 CAN THE JUDICIARY SIMPLY ALLOW ARIZONA TO

228 PROFESS THAT THERE ARE NO INFRINGEMENT'S AND

229 THEREBY MOVE AHEAD WITH MORE ILLEGAL

230 PROSECUTIONS IF THAT IS THEIR INTENTION?

231 ****“The court is to protect against any encroachment

232 of Constitutionally secured liberties.”It is the duty of the
233 Courts to be watchful for the Constitutional Rights of the
234 Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments
235 thereon. Their motto should be Obsta Principiis." Boyd v.
236 United 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885)

237 ****No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert
238 its full authority to prevent all violations of the principles
 12

239 of the Constitution." Downs v. Bidwell 182 U.S. 244

240 (1901)

241 ****"A rule cannot be simply (invented or) retained

242 when challenged. It must be shown valid, or be struck
243 down." Fox TV Station, Inc v FCC, Case No. 00-1222; _
244 US App DC _; 280 F3d 1027, 1034; 2002. US App LEXIS
245 2575; 30 Media L Rep 1705 (19 Feb 2002).

246 ****it’s not “legally” sufficient to just make allegations,

247 those allegations must be based on facts; those facts
248 must establish where, when, why and how the legal right
249 was allegedly acquired.. Rule 602 Federal Rules of
250 Evidence.

251 ****Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule, 74 U.S. 7 Wall.

252 433 433 (1868)...The (STATE) national government,
253 though supreme within its own sphere, is one of limited
254 jurisdiction and specific functions. It has no faculties but
255 such as the Constitution has given it, either expressly or
256 incidentally by necessary intendment. Whenever any act
257 done under its authority is challenged, the proper
258 sanction must be found in its charter, or the act is ultra
259 vires and void.

260 ****"Constitutional 'rights' would be of little value if

261 they could be indirectly denied." Gomillion v. Lightfoot
262 364 U.S. 155 (1966) cited also in Smith v. Allwright, 321
 13

263 U.S. 649.644

264 ****Mattox v. U.S., 156 US 237, 243.“We are bound to

265 interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it
266 existed at the time it was adopted.”

267

268 ¶12 TO PUT A FINER POINT ON IT, AND

269 ELEVATE THE BAR BACK TO WHERE OUR CREATOR

270 AND FORMER MEN OF HONOR AND REASON,

271 INTENDED IT TO BE SET, I FURTHER ADD THE

272 FOLLOWING DECISIONS FOR ARIZONA'S WOULD

273 BE CONSTITUTION CRUSHING LEGAL MINIONS TO

274 HURDLE:

275 ****Unconstitutional Acts are not Law. We must

276 distinguish form and substance. Not just anything
277 passed by legislators that have the form of a law, is in
278 fact, a law. To be a law, an enactment must be
279 constitutional, i.e., within the actual de jure authority of
280 the Legislature. This is res judicata. “All laws which are
281 repugnant to the Constitution are null and void.”
282 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (2 Cranch) 137, 174, 176; 2 LE
 14

283 60 (1803).

284 ****“Where rights secured by the Constitution are

285 involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
286 which would abrogate them.” Miranda v Arizona, 384 US
287 436, 491; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

288 **** “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no

289 rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection;
290 creates no office. It is in legal contemplation, as
291 inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Norton
292 v Shelby County, Tennessee, 118 US 425, 442; 6 S Ct
293 1121; 30 L Ed 178 (1886).

294 ****When laws (such as invented maximum numeric limits)

295 lack rational basis, they are invalid, and must be
296 stricken. See Industrial Union Department v American
297 Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607; 100 S Ct 2844; 65 L Ed
298 2d 1010 (1980).

299 ****No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law

300 and no courts are bound to enforce it." Bonnett v. Vallier,
301 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908) See also Bonnett v
302 Vallier, 136 Wis 193, 200; 116 NW 885, 887 (1908);
303 State ex rel Ballard v Goodland, 159 Wis 393, 395; 150
304 NW 488, 489 (1915); State ex rel Kleist v Donald, 164
305 Wis 545, 552-553; 160 NW 1067, 1070 (1917); State ex
306 rel Martin v Zimmerman, 233 Wis 16, 21; 288 NW 454,
 15

307 457 (1939); State ex rel Commissioners of Public Lands v

308 Anderson, 56 Wis 2d 666, 672; 203 NW2d 84, 87 (1973);
309 and Butzlaffer v Van Der Geest & Sons, Inc, Wis, 115 Wis
310 2d 539; 340 NW2d 742, 744-745 (1983).

311
312 ****"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice",
313 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14(1954)

314

315 ¶13 I NOT ONLY ASK THAT YOU DEMAND FULL

316 ADHERENCE TO THESE WELL ESTABLISHED PARAMETERS

317 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE DEMONSTRATION OF

318 STANDING, BUT THAT YOU ISSUE AN INJUNCTION

319 AGAINST FURTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF

320 THE STATE, UNTIL THEY CAN SHOW THAT THEIR

321 ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ARE NOT BEING UNDERTAKEN IN

322 A MANNER WHICH CONFLICTS WITH SECTION 13

323 ARTICLES 2, 9, 33, AS WELL AS, THE 9TH AMENDMENT.

324
325 ¶14 AT PRESENT THERE IS A JUDGE AND A SHERIFF

326 IN THE STATE AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHERS

 16

327 OF US TO WHOM THESE DEFIANTLY ILLEGAL

328 PROSECUTIONS ARE REPUGNANT AND DETESTABLE AND

329 WHO KNOW THAT JUSTICE DEMANDS THAT THIS BE

330 STOPPED. FURTHERMORE; EVENTUALLY, FULL

331 UNPROMPTED RESTORATION OF MY DRIVING PRIVILEGES

332 AND FAIR COMPENSATION FOR MY ATTORNEY'S

333 GRUELING TIRELESS HOURS WILL SOMEWHAT HELP TO

334 RECTIFYING THIS WRONG...

335 PRO SE RIGHTS

336 ****PRO SE RIGHTS "Following the simple guide of rule

337 8(f) FRCP that all pleadings shall be so construed as to
338 do substantial justice"... "The federal rules reject the
339 approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
340 misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and
341 accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
342 facilitate a proper decision on the merits.". Conley v.
343 Gibson 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)

344

345 ****Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner,

346 however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient"... "which we
347 hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
 17

348 drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S. 519

349 (1972)

350 ****Pro se pleadings are to be considered without

351 regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not
352 to be held to the same high standards of perfection as
353 lawyers Jenkins v. McKeithen 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959)
354 Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket
355 v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
356

357 DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL FRAUD:

358
359 ¶15 ACCORDING TO SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE MILLER,

360 MY RIGHT TO HAVE MY 8 SUBPOENAS ISSUED WAS

361 DENIED ME BECAUSE... (JUDGEMENT PAGE 4)... N0

362 PRETRIAL DISCOVERY SHALL BE PERMITTED ABSENT

363 EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. 17 B A.R.S.TRAFFIC

364 VIOLATIONS CASES CIV. PROC. RULES 13(b). HIS

365 DETERMINATION WAS FLAWED IN TWO CRITICAL WAYS.

366
367 ¶1 6 (1) THIS WAS THE SAME INTENTIONALLY

368 DECEPTIVE CLAIM THAT L.S.M. LEVITT MADE. THE

369 PROBLEM WITH THIS ASSERTION IS THAT BOTH OF THESE

 18

370 INDIVIDUALS HAVE ENGAGED IN DUPLICITOUS FRAUD

371 ENDEAVORING TO SWEEP MY WITNESSES UNDER THE RUG

372 OF DISCOVERY. THESE PEOPLE ARE PAID TO KNOW AND

373 UPHOLD THE LAWS AND BOTH KNEW FULL WELL, THAT

374 ONLY TWO VERY SHORT PARAGRAPHS DOWN THE PAGE,

375 THE RULES CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY STATE “BOTH

376 PARTIES MAY SUBPOENA WITTINESS".

377
378 ¶17 MY SUBPOENAS FOR SHERIFF PAUL BABEU OF

379 PINAL COUNTY, AND JUDGE JOHN KEEGAN OF

380 ARROWHEAD JUSTICE COURT, WERE EXCLUSIVELY FOR

381 PERSONS ONLY NO DOCUMENTS... AND NO RATIONAL OR

382 EXPLANATION WAS PROFFERED TO ME REGARDING THESE

383 STAND ALONE PARTIES. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY DONE

384 BECAUSE TO FOCUS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD HAVE

385 HIGHLIGHTED IT, AS AN ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE, THIS

386 WAS AND IS AN INTENTIONAL PREMEDITATED ACT OF

387 DECEIT. JURISTS ALWAYS HAVE a "Higher Duty" to know

388 the Constitution and law, and to convey the truth of the
 19

389 law to citizens. ONCE WAS PERHAPS AN ERROR (LEVITT),

390 TWICE OUT OF TWO IS A PATTERN (MILLER).

391
392 ******Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance,
393 (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 518, 533. "Before.....imposing a fine,
394 judges are required to provide due process of law,
395 including strict adherence to the procedural
396 requirements contained in the Code of Civil Procedure.
397 Ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating
398 but an aggravating factor”. Duncan v. Missouri, 152
399 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)
400
401 *****Fraud. An intentional perversion of truth for the
402 purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part
403 with some valuable thing belonging to him or to
404 surrender a legal right. A false representation of a
405 matter of fact… which deceives and is intended to
406 deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
407 injury. … It consists of some deceitful practice or willful
408 device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his
409 right, or in some manner to do him injury… (Emphasis
410 added) –Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth Edition, page 594
411
412 *****Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 135 Ariz.
413 480(1983).Fraud and deceit may arise from silence
 20

414 where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from

415 speaking an untruth.
416

417 ****** "Fraud in its elementary common law sense of

418 deceit - and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears
419 in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163,
420 168 (7th Cir. 1985) - includes the deliberate

421 concealment of material information in a setting

422 of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary
423 toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the
424 litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately
425 conceals material information from them he is guilty of
426 fraud....” McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S 350, 371-372
427

428 *****Fraud, Deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery

429 operating prejudicially on the rights of another, and so
430 intended, by inducing him to part with property or
431 surrender some legal right. 23 Am J2d Fraud § 2.
432 Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice
433 and accomplishing the purpose, whether it be an act, a
434 word, silence, the suppression of the truth, or other
435 device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty. 23
436 Am J2d Fraud § 2.

437
 21

438 *****"Silence can only be equated with fraud where

439 there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an
440 inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally
441 misleading. . . We cannot condone this shocking
442 behavior... This sort of deception will not be tolerated
443 and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately."
444 U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299. See also U.S. v.
445 Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A.
446 932.

447 *****“Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the 7th
448 Circuit Court of Appeals to embrace that species of fraud
449 which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a
450 fraud perpetrated by the officers of the court so that the
451 judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner
452 of its impartial task of adjudicating cases that are
453 presented for adjudication.” Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F. 3d.
454 689 (1968) j 7 Moore’s Federal practice, 2d ed., p. 512 ¶
455 60.23 The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced
456 by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at
457 all, and never becomes final.”

458
459 *****"The parties are entitled to know the findings and
460 conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion
461 presented on the record." citing Butz v. Economou 438
 22

462 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, (1978).

463 FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION v. SOUTH CAROLINA
464 STATE PORTS AUTHORITY et al. certiorari to the United
465 States court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 01-46.
466 2.535 U.S. 743, 122 S. Ct. 1864, 152 L. Ed. 2d 962,
467 (2002). Argued February 25, 2002--Decided May 28,
468 2002. See also FRCPA Rule 52(a) and United States v.
469 Lovasco 431 U.S. 783 (06/09/77), 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L.
470 Ed. 2d 752, and Holt v. United States 218 U.S. 245
471 (10/31/10), 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct.

472

473 *****A more alarming doctrine could not be

474 promulgated by any American court, than that it was at
475 liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to
476 decide for itself, without reference to the settled course
477 of antecedent principles.” Faye Anastasoff vs. United
478 States of America, 8th 41 Circuit Court, 2000.
479
480 *****No officer of the law may set that law at defiance
481 with impunity. All the officers of the government from
482 the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and
483 are bound to obey it." Butz v. Economou 98 S. Ct. 2894
484 (1978)

485 *****“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is

 23

486 incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures.

487 This is so even where the internal procedures are
488 possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be
489 required. MORTON v. RUIZ, 415 U.S. 199, 380 (1974)
490
491 *****Due process is violated if a practice or rule offends
492 some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
493 conscience of our people as to be ranked as
494 fundamental." Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105.
495
496 *****"Aside from all else, 'due process' means
497 fundamental fairness and substantial justice. Vaughn v.
498 State, 3 Tenn.Crim.App. 54, 456 S.W.2d 879, 883."
499 Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 500.
500

501 ******Due Process is that which comports with the

502 deepest notions of what is fair and right and just."
503 Solebee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Justice
504 Frandfurter dissenting.)

505
506 *****"the right to... [trial by jury, to the writ of habeas
507 corpus, and to]... due process of law. It has been
508 repeatedly decided that these amendments should
509 receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy
510 encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the
 24

511 rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of

512 courts ...". GOULED v. UNITED STATES. United States
513 Supreme Court February 28, 1921 65 L.Ed. 647; 41 S.Ct.
514 261; 255 U.S. 298

515
516 *****18 USC §241 makes it a crime to conspire to

517 oppress a constitutional right

518
519 ¶18 THESE CITATIONS MAKE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR

520 COURT ROOM FRAUD IS ALL TOO COMMON AND IS

521 ABHORRENT TO OUR WAY OF LIFE, AS WELL, IT

522 WARRANTS IMMEDIATE EFFORTS TOWARDS IT’S

523 RECTIFICATION. TO THE PUBLIC AND I, THERE IS NO

524 MISTAKING THAT THIS CALCULATED MANEUVERING TO

525 DENY MY WITNESSES WAS DONE, NOT ONLY TO ROB US

526 OF OUR MONEY, BUT ALSO OF OUR RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND

527 OF JUSTICE AS WELL, BY FORESTALLING THE

528 ADJUDICATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO

529 THE STATE RUN RACKETEERING RING.

530
531 ¶19 WHILE YOU MAY CHOOSE TO PROVIDE LEGAL
 25

532 COVER FOR THESE TRESPASSER /TRAITOR’S, BY

533 CLAIMING THAT THEY WERE SIMPLY MISTAKEN,

534 INCOMPETENT OR INEPT, AND I WOULD CERTAINLY

535 AGREE WITH YOU ON THAT, THE RECORD STILL POINTS

536 TO MUCH MORE SINISTER MOTIVATIONS.

537
538 ¶20 EXAMINE THE COURT RECORDS OF THESE

539 JUDGES, YOU WILL SEE THAT THEY BOTH HAVE INFACT;

540 REPEATEDLY ALLOWED WITNESSES IN THE PAST. AND

541 THAT THIS WAS NOT A MEMORY LAPS, THEY WERE WELL

542 AWARE OF THE LINE THEY CROSSED. THIS WAS AN

543 INTENTIONAL EFFORT, ONE ENGAGE IN WITH MALICE OF

544 FOR THOUGHT, TO DENY ME DUE PROCESS AND OBSTRUCT

545 JUSTICE AND THIS IS A FEDERAL CRIME WHICH YOU NEED

546 TO ADDRESS. (Any judge or attorney who does not report

547 a judge for treason as required by law may themselves be

548 guilty of misprision of treason, 18 U.S.C. Section

549 2382.Under Federal law) THESE FELONS NEED TO BE

550 DISBARRED AND JAILED AND IT HAS FALLEN UPON YOUR

 26

551 SHOULDERS TO TAKE APPROPRIATE EFFORTS TO BRING

552 THESE CULPRITS TO JUSTICE.

553
554 ¶21 BY THIS MEASURE ALONE, THE "JUDGMENT"

555 WHICH STRIPPED ME OF MY DRIVING PRIVILEGES AND

556 MORE THEN A THOUSAND DOLLARS, IS AND ALWAYS HAS

557 BEEN VOID, IT IS INVALID AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN.

558
559 ***** "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his
560 judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge
561 to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs
562 in the courthouse."".....When a judge acts as a
563 trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the
564 law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the
565 judges' orders are void, of no legal force or effect. When
566 judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or
567 they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge
568 without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the
569 law, and are engaged in treason The Court in Yates v.
570 Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757
571 (N.D. Ill. 1962)
572
573
 27

574 EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE'S

575 ¶22 (2) FURTHERMORE: JUDGE MILLER ASSERTED

576 THAT NO "EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE'S" EXISTED

577 IN THIS MATTER, YET HE AFFORDED NO SUBSTANTIVE

578 ACCOUNT AS TO HOW HE ARRIVED AT THAT

579 DETERMINATION. IN MY RESEARCH, I FOUND NO

580 DEFINITIVE EXPLANATION AS TO WHAT CONDITIONS

581 COMPRISES A BASELINE STANDARD. HOWEVER: I DID TAP

582 INTO A COMMON THREAD SIGHTED AS A KEY COMPONENT

583 CONSISTENTLY.

584 ¶23 {a}SUCH AS WHEN..."According to the FCC, an

585 STA can be granted in cases of extraordinary

586 circumstances where denying the grant would seriously

587 prejudice the public interest." I TAKE THIS TO MEAN, THE

588 FCC CAN BREACH IT'S OWN STANDARD PROTOCOLS, WHEN

589 IT SERVES THE GREATER PUBLIC INTERESTS.

590 ¶24 {b}AND; IN "a judicial nomination

591 (a)"circumstance” is "extraordinary" when the result of

 28

592 that nomination could have an "extraordinary" impact

593 upon the future of the country." I TAKE THIS TO MEAN, AN

594 EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE EXIST, IF IN A GIVEN

595 SITUATION, THE OUTCOME COULD HAVE AN LASTING

596 ADVERSE EFFECT UPON A LARGE SEGMENT OF OR THE

597 ENTIRE POPULACE.

598

599 ¶25 USEING THIS AS A GAGE, IT'S CLEAR TO SEE WHY

600 ARIZONA FELT IT NEEDED TO CURTAIL MY WITNESSES

601 FROM PUBLICLY DISMANTLING THE ALLEGED

602 CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LAWFUL STATUS OF IT'S

603 EXTORTION PRACTICES. INDEED IT BECAME NECESSARY

604 BECAUSE THE STATE RECOGNIZED THAT THE

605 "CIRCUMSTANCES" INVOLVED WERE NOT ONLY

606 "EXTRAORDINARY", BUT IN FACT, "EXTRAORDINARILY

607 EGREGIOUS". EVENTUALLY THEY WILL BE ON THE HOOK

608 FOR RETURNING TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS STOLEN

609 FROM TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT LAW ABIDING

610 CITIZENS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW.

 29

611 ¶26 FOR ANYONE TO CLAIM THAT THIS SITUATION IS

612 ANYTHING LESS THEN AN EXTINCTION LEVEL EVENT FOR

613 THIS GOVERNMENT AND THE STATE IS DELUSIONAL

614 ...THERE HAS BEEN NO MORE SIGNIFICANT ASSAULT ON

615 THE FREEDOMS OF ARIZONANS AND THEIR

616 CONSTITUTION SINCE MIRANDA. MILLERS LUDICROUS

617 CLAIM IS AN ABSURD ATTEMPT AT OBFUSCATION AT BEST,

618 AND DUPLICITY AND OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AT

619 WORST. AS ADDRESSED IN THE TRAILING COURT

620 DECISION, JUDGE MILLER SHOULD HAVE WENT ON

621 RECORD, CLEARLY EXPLAINING HIS RATIONAL. INDEED

622 WHAT QUALIFYS IN HIS EYES AS EXTRAORDINARY

623 CIRCUMSTANCES... I FOR ONE CAN'T WAIT TO HEAR.

624 *****"The parties are entitled to know the findings and

625 conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion
626 presented on the record." citing Butz v. Economou 438
627 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, (1978).
628 FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION v. SOUTH CAROLINA
629 STATE PORTS AUTHORITY et al. certiorari to the united
630 states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 01-46.
 30

631 2.535 U.S. 743, 122 S. Ct. 1864, 152 L. Ed. 2d 962,
632 (2002). Argued February 25, 2002--Decided May 28,
633 2002. See also FRCPA Rule 52(a) and United States v.
634 Lovasco 431 U.S. 783 (06/09/77), 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L.
635 Ed. 2d 752, and Holt v. United States 218 U.S. 245
636 (10/31/10), 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct.

637
638 "It is not the function of our government to keep the
639 citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the
640 citizen to keep the government from falling into error."
641 Perry v. United States 204 U.S. 330, 358

642

643 DUE PROCESS DENIED AND VOID JUDGEMENTS:

644 *****I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of

645 the States than permit it to invade, strike down, and
646 destroy the civil rights of citizens, A judicial power
647 perverted to such uses should be speedily invaded. ...
648 And if an officer shall intentionally deprive a citizen of a
649 right, knowing him to be entitled to it, then he is guilty of
650 a willful wrong which deserves punishment.” “
651 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 1680 (1866)
652 (presidential veto message to Congress). at 1837
653
654 ****"the evils of allowing intentional, knowing
 31

655 deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed far out

656 weighed the speculative inhibiting effects which might
657 attend an inquiry into a judicial deprivation of civil
658 rights." at 567 SANTIAGO V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,
659 435 F.Supp. 136

660
661 ¶27 AS STATED IN THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENT

662 ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS AND FRAUD, WITHOUT

663 ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OR CAUSE, MY SUBPOENAS FOR

664 WITNESSES WERE DENIED ME IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF

665 THE CITY'S LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE AS WELL AS...

666
667 ******The sixth amendment and the due process clause
668 of the federal constitution guarantee to a defendant the
669 right to subpoena a witness...." State, v. Montgomery,
670 A61 So.2d 387, 392, (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985). The "defendant
671 has a constitutional right to compulsory process of
672 witnesses to produce testimony which is admissible in
673 the cause for which he is on trial." Krantz v. State, 405
674 So.2d 211,212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
675
676 ******This constitutional protection exists "because of
677 the fundamental unfairness which results from placing a
678 man on trial on a criminal charge and denying him the
 32

679 means to compel the attendance of witnesses, within the

680 jurisdiction of the court, who are in possession of
681 material facts which show or tend to show his innocence
682 of the charge." Trafficante v. State, 92 So.2d 811,
683 815(Fla. 1957).
684
685 ******The "trial court has no more authority to refuse
686 to enforce for a defendant's benefit the production of the
687 evidence available to be procured and for which
688 compulsory process has been issued than to deny the
689 process itself in the first instance." Sims v. State, 867
690 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. 3dDCA 2004). 25. The right of the
691 Defendant to cross-examine witnesses and his right to
692 present evidence in opposition to or in explanation of
693 adverse evidence are essential to a fair hearing and due
694 process of law. Alexander v.State, 288 So.2d 538, 539,
695 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974)
696
697 ******"The facts and the law do matter and judicial
698 action by judges or the like must be in accords with
699 those presented to the court. This is to assure due
700 process of law and equal protection of the law..." E. g.,
701 ICC v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 -94 (1913);
702 Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S.
703 96, 103 -104 (1963).” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.254
 33

704 (1970).
705
706 ******"clear violations of laws on reaching the result,
707 such as acting without evidence when evidence is
708 required,...are just as much jurisdictional error as is the
709 failure to take proper steps to acquire jurisdiction at the
710 beginning of the proceeding". Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133
711 N.W. 209.
712
713 *****“The record must show that the statute was
714 complied with” In re Marriage of Stefini, 253 Ill. App. 3d
715 196, 625 N.E.2d 358 (1st Dist. 1993).
716 ******Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance,
717 (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 518, 533. "Before.....imposing a fine,
718 judges are required to provide due process of law,
719 including strict adherence to the procedural
720 requirements contained in the Code of Civil Procedure.
721 Ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating but an
722 aggravating factor”. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377,
723 382 (1894).
724
725 ******“In a court of limited jurisdiction, the court must
726 proceed exactly according to the law or statute under
727 which it operates.” Whenever a judge does not exactly
728 comply with the statute, he/she has lost subject-matter
729 jurisdiction and all orders or judgments issued without
 34

730 subject-matter jurisdiction are void, of no legal force or

731 effect. Flake v Pretzel, 381 Ill. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943)

732
733 ******"Where a court's power to act is controlled by
734 statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited
735 jurisdiction, and courts exercising jurisdiction over such
736 matters must proceed within the strictures of the
737 statute."; In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill.App.3d 813,
738 557 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1990). ALSO : Johnson v. Theis,
739 282 Ill.App.3d 966, 669 N.E.2d 590 (2nd Dist. 1996).
740

741 ******[T]he authority of the court to make any order

742 must be found in the statute.” Levy v. Industrial Comm'n
743 (1931), 346 Ill. 49, 51, 178 N.E. 370, 371."); Skilling v.
744 Skilling, 104 Ill.App.3d 213, 482 N.E.2d 881 (1st Dist.
745 1982)
746
747 *****The Judge, by ignoring guidelines as set by law,
748 did lose jurisdiction in the matter. His acts then became
749 ultra vires or outside of the powers of his jurisdiction.
750 "Jurisdiction, although once obtained, may be lost, and
751 in such case proceedings cannot be validly continued
752 beyond the point at which jurisdiction ceases". Federal
753 Trade Commission V. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 75 L.Ed.
754 1324, 51 S.Ct. 587.
 35

755 ¶28 ALL THESE FINDINGS SPEAK TO THE FACT THAT

756 THE TASK OF JUDGING ENTAILS APPLYING ESTABLISHED

757 LAW, NOT SIDE STEPPING OR CONTORTING IT TO THEIR

758 OWN ENDS, THERE IS NO LATITUDE OR DISCRETION FOR

759 THAT, THIS SHOULD BE THEIR PRIMARY DUTY, AND THEY

760 HAVE EACH TAKEN A SOLEMN VOW TO FULFILL THIS

761 RESPONSIBILITY, SO I ASK YOU.

762 ¶29 DID LEVITT AND MILLER KNOW THAT THEY WERE

763 TRAMPLING ON THE CONSTITUTION WHEN THEY

764 FORSTALLED MY WITNESSES AND DUE PROCESS? SHOULD

765 I REALLY CONCLUDE THAT THEIR INTENTIONS IN

766 TREADING ON MY RIGHTS WERE A WELL MEANING,

767 HONEST AND ABOVE BOARD EFFORTS TO RENDER

768 JUSTICE? PERSONALLY I'M NOT THAT NAIVE AND I DOUBT

769 YOU ARE EITHER.

770 ¶30 FROM THE RECORD, WHY SHOULD WE NOT

771 BELIEVE, JUDGE MILLER EXAMINED THE SUBPOENAS FOR

772 WITNESSES, SIMPLY DISREGARDED THE ISSUE AND

773 MOVED AHEAD ANYWAY WHITEWASHING THE CASE, AS

 36

774 THOUGH STANDING HAD NOT BEEN COMPROMISED? OR

775 SHOULD WE GIVE ALLOWANCES INSTEAD, IN THE

776 DIRECTION OF ASSUMING HIS JUDGELY SKILL SETS

777 AREN’T QUITE UP TO SNUFF, AND THAT THIS WAS ONLY

778 AN OVERSIGHT. IN EITHER CASE, THESE JUSTICES HAVE

779 CONVERTED THE COURTS INTO A RACKETEERING

780 COLLECTION AGENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION BE DAMD.

781
782 ******The judge has a duty to continually inspect the
783 record of the case, and if subject-matter jurisdiction
784 does not appear at any time from the record of the case,
785 then he has the duty to dismiss the case as lacking
786 subject-matter jurisdiction. Should a judge act in any
787 case in which he does not have subject-matter
788 jurisdiction, he is acting unlawfully, U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S.
789 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens
790 v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821),
791 and without any judicial authority
792
793 ******“inspection of the record of the case has been
794 ruled to be the controlling factor. If the record of the
795 case does not support subject-matter jurisdiction, then
796 the judge has acted without subject-matter jurisdiction.”
 37

797 The People v Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928)

798
799 *****"If the record does not show upon its face the
800 facts necessary to give jurisdiction, they will be
801 presumed not to have existed.” Norman v. Zieber, 3 Or at
802 202-03
803
804 *****Void judgment; when the local rules of the special
805 court are not complied with. Where the judge does not
806 act impartially, Bracey v. Warden, U.S. Supreme Court
807 No. 96-6133(June 9, 1997)
808
809 ****"The doctrine that where a court has once acquired
810 jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which
811 arises in the cause, and its judgment or decree, however
812 erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct
813 when the court proceeds according to the established
814 modes governing the class to which the case belongs and
815 does not transcend in the extent and character of its
816 judgment or decree the law or statute which is
817 applicable to it." In Interest of M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300,
818 681 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1997)
819
820 ****Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot
821 go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act
822 beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of
 38

823 it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities.

824 They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even
825 prior to reversal." Old Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v
826 McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Williamson
827 v Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850);
828 Rose v Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617
829 (1808). Also see Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340;”
830 Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348,
831 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920).

832
833 ****Violation of due process, Whenever any judge
834 engages in any act which is in violation of the Supreme
835 Law of the Land, the judge has lost jurisdiction. Johnson
836 v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019(1938) ;Pure Oil Co.
837 v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill.2d 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2d 289
838 (1956);Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936), (If
839 the court exceeded it's statutory authority. Rosenstiel v.
840 Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
841
842 ***** Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction of a
843 subject matter, as here, transcends the limits of the
844 jurisdiction conferred, its judgment is void." Armstrong v
845 Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921).
846
847 ***** "Scheuer v.Rhodes, 416US. 232,94 S.CL
 39

848 1683,1687 (1974). By law, a judge is a state officer. The

849 judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual
850 (in his person). When a judge acts as a trespasser of the
851 law, when a judge does not follow the law, the Judge
852 loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders
853 are not voidable, but VOID, and of no legal force or
854 effect.

855
856 ***** "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his
857 judicial function....it is not a judicial function for a judge
858 to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs
859 in the courthouse."".....When a judge acts as a
860 trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the
861 law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the
862 judges' orders are void, of no legal force or effect. When
863 judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or
864 they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge
865 without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the
866 law, and are engaged in treason The Court in Yates v.
867 Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757
868 (N.D. Ill. 1962)
869
870 *****The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "Since such
871 jurisdictional defect deprives not only the initial court
872 but also the appellate court of its power over the case or
 40

873 controversy, to permit the appellate court to ignore it ...

874 [would be an] unlawful action by the appellate court
875 itself." Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991);
876 Miller, supra.
877
878 ¶31 INTENTIONAL OR NOT, IT SHOULD BE VIVIDLY

879 CLEAR ARIZONA JUDGES ROUTINELY OPERATE OUT OF

880 BOUNDS, OR AS IF THERE ARE NO BOUNDRYS AT ALL.

881 THEIR ACTIONS AND THE RECORD SHOW CONTEMPT FOR

882 THE LAW AND PROOVE THAT SUBJECT MATTER

883 JURISDICTION WAS LOST IN THE VERY FIRST RULING

884 AND MINUTES OF THAT SHAM KANGAROO TRIAL, I WAS

885 SUBJECTED TO.

886 ¶32 FOR THESE JURISTS THERE IS NO COVER, NO

887 LEGAL REFUGE, MY DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED

888 AND CONSEQUENTLY THEIR VOID DECISION HOLDS NO

889 POWER, IT IS AND ALWAYS WAS INVALID, ALL THAT

890 REMAINS IS FOR YOUR HONORS TO DO, IS ACKNOWLEGE

891 THIS NULLTY AND FOR THE STATE TO PREPARE ITSELF

892 FOR A HANDS DOWN CIVIL RIGHTS PUMMELING.

 41

893 ******Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1574:

894 Void judgment. One which has no legal force or effect,
895 invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose
896 rights are affected at any time and at any place directly
897 or collaterally. Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co.,
898 Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092. One which from its
899 inception is and forever continues to be absolutely null,
900 without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind parties or
901 support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever,
902 and incapable of confirmation, ratification, or
903 enforcement in any manner or to any degree. Judgment
904 is a "void judgment" if court that rendered judgment
905 lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the
906 parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due
907 process. Klugh v. U.S., D.C.S.C., 610 F.Supp. 892, 901.
908
909 ******"A void judgment is one rendered by a court
910 which....acted in a manner inconsistent with due process,
911 In re. Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279, (Kan.App. 1999).In
912 re. Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E.2d 741 (Ill. App.Dist.
913 1993). In re. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14 Matter of
914 Marriage of Hampshire, 869 P.2d 58 ( Kan. 1997). In re.
915 Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1992) (citation
916 omitted).” Antoine, et al. v. Atlas Turner, et al. (6th Cir.,
917 1995). In re. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 5- Triad Energy
 42

918 Corp. v. McNeil, 110 FRD 382 (S.D.N.Y.) 1986

919
920 *****Void judgment under federal law is one in which
921 rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
922 dispute or jurisdiction over parties or acted in manner
923 inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted
924 unconstitutionally in entering judgment, U.S.C.A. Const.
925 Amend. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 N.E.2d 1383
926 (Ill App. 5 Dist. 1983).

927
928 ******Judgments entered where court lacked either
929 subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were
930 otherwise entered in violation of due process of law,
931 must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt,
932 S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278
933
934 ******When rule providing for relief from void
935 judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary
936 matter, but is mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30
937 F.3d 1307, ( Colo. 1994).
938 ******"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of
939 jurisdiction." Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.
940
941 ****"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice",
942 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14(1954),
 43

943 ******Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.

944 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the court,
945 in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
946 than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
947 part of the costs, except that in any action brought
948 against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
949 such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be
950 held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees,

951 unless such action was clearly in excess of

952 such officer's jurisdiction.
953

954 Pro se

955 ******The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude

956 when construing their pleadings and papers. When
957 interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common
958 sense to determine what relief the party desires. S.E.C, v.
959 Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also,
960 United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999)
961 (Court has special obligation to construe pro se litigants'
962 pleadings liberally); Poling v. K.Hovnanian Enterprises,
963 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).
964
965 ******Pro se litigants' court submissions are to be
966 construed liberally and held to less stringent standards
 44

967 than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably

968 read the submissions, it should do so despite failure to
969 cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories,
970 poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's
971 unfamiliarity with rule requirements. Boag v.
972 MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551
973 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285,
974 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
975 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines
976 v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652
977 (1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188,
978 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39,
979 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be held
980 to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys);
981 Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999).
982
983 ******Moreover, "the court is under a duty to
984 examine the complaint to determine if the
985 allegations provide for relief on any possible
986 theory." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis. 526
987 R2dl33h 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v.
988 Wilson. 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)
989
990 ******Defendant has the right to submit pro se briefs
 45

991 on appeal, even though they may be in artfully drawn but

992 the court can reasonably read and understand them. See,
993 Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts
994 will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants
995 against consequences of technical errors if injustice
996 would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243
997 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
998

999 SEC 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

1000
1001 ¶33 JUDGE MILLERS BLATANT DISREGARD OF MY SEC

1002 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CLAIMS

1003 WERE INTELLECTUALLY DISINGENUOUS. INDEED, FOR

1004 HIM TO IGNORE SUCH AN ASSERTION, BASED SOLELY ON

1005 THE FACT THAT, I PROVIDED NO EARLIER SPECIFIC CASE

1006 LAW, IS AN EXERCISE IN TREASON. HE IS ENDEAVORING

1007 TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTIONS BY SUGGESTING THAT

1008 ONLY RIGHTS PREVIOUSLY ASSERTED OR ESTABLISHED

1009 BY COURTS CAN BE UPHELD. WHEN THE VERY NATURE OF

1010 THESE RIGHTS ASSURANCES (9 AND 33), IS THAT THEY

1011 ARE, INFACT AS YET UNDELINEATED, OTHERWISE; THE

 46

1012 DRAFTERS WOULD HAVE INTENTIONALLY LAID OUT

1013 EXACTLY WHAT THE ENTAILED RIGHT PROTECTIONS

1014 CONSISTED OF.

1015
1016 ¶34 IT IS INCONTESTABLE THAT CITIZENS POSSES

1017 YET UNASCRIBED RIGHTS, WHICH OUR COURTS THUS FAR,

1018 HAVE NOT EVOLVED ENOUGH TO IDENTIFY AND

1019 CATEGORIZE AS PROTECTED. THESE ETHEREAL RIGHTS

1020 CAN AN WILL NOT COME TO LIGHT, UNTIL INDIVIDUALS

1021 THEMSELVES, PERSONALLY ADVANCE ENOUGH TO

1022 RECOGNIZE AND VOICE THEM. THIS MIGHT OCCUR AT ANY

1023 GIVEN TIME (PERHAPS CENTURIES DOWN THE LINE)

1024 NEVERTHELESS; EVENTUALLY, THE JUDICIARY WILL BE

1025 RELIED UPON TO RECOGNIZE AN UPHOLDABLE THESE

1026 FORMERLY UNDIVULGED RIGHTS (OR GET OUT OF THE

1027 WAY FOR IT WOULD BE GODS WILL THEY WOULD BE

1028 HINDERING). THESE LAWS EXIST SEPARATE AND APART

1029 FROM ESTABLISHED AND ACKNOWLEDGED LAW, UNTIL

1030 TRIGGERED IN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF MEN AT THE

 47

1031 BEHEST OF OUR CREATOR, WHEN WE HAVE BECOME

1032 HONORABLE ENOUGH TO BARE THEM (I.E., WHY ELSE ADD

1033 AMENDMENTS AGAIN AND AGAIN OVER TIME).

1034
1035 ¶35 WHEN I DECLARED (IN MY BRIEF) MY GOD GIVEN

1036 RIGHT...NOT TO ALLOW THOSE PROFESSING TO GOVERN

1037 TO CHEAT THE PUBLIC AT LARGE BY ENGAGING IN FRAUD,

1038 AND RACKETEERING, THAT WAS A VASTLY MORE

1039 LEGITIMATE ASSERTION, THEN THE GOOD JUDGES

1040 SUGGESTION THAT WITHOUT SIGHTING SPECIFIC

1041 PREVIOUS PRECEDENCE, I HADN'T POSTULATED A VALID

1042 REDRESSABLE ISSUE. FOLLOWING HIS LOGIC, THAT

1043 WOULD MEAN IN THE VERY FIRST 9TH OR 33RD TYPE

1044 VIOLATION CASES EVER BROUGHT (AND ALL THOSE TO

1045 FOLLOW), THAT THE PLAINTIFFS CAUSE WOULD LACKED

1046 ACTIONABLE MERIT, BECAUSE THEIR WAS NO

1047 PREEXISTING CASE LAW TO SUPPORT HIS VIEW...THIS IS

1048 A CLEARLY FLAWED AND ABSURD ON ITS FACE, AN MORE

1049 LIKELY A CULPABLE LEGAL RATIONAL, WHICH NEEDS TO

 48

1050 BE SWIFTLY STRUCK DOWN FOR THE TREASONIOUS

1051 OBSTRUCTIONIST BENCHISLATION NONSENSE THAT IT IS.

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066
 49

1067 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1068 AND SERVICE

1069
1070 PURSUANT TO ARCAP 14(B),
1071 I, STEPHEN KANDIK, CERTIFY THAT THE ATTACHED
1072 BREIF (ACCORDING TO MICROSOFT WORD) CONTAINS
1073 7,722 WORDS. AND THAT TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITIES
1074 COMPORTS TO ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS LAID OUT
1075 FOR E-FILLING.
1076

1077 1/28/2010 STEPHEN KANDIK

1078 210 S. SHERWOOD VILLAGE DR.
1079 TUCSON AZ 85710
1080 (520) 245-0527
1081
1082 2 COPIES OF THE FORGOING BRIEF
1083 WERE MAILED ON 1/28/2010 TO:
1084
1085 WILLIAM F. MILLS
1086 SUPERVISING PROSECUTOR
1087 P.O. BOX 27210
1088 TUCSON, AZ 85710-7210
1089
1090 RE: 2 CA-CV 2009-0180/ CT-20090056
1091