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Modern Greece
Author(s): Campbell, John Kennedy Sherrard, Philip
Published By: New York: Praeger, 1968. 426 p.: ill.
Document Type: Monograph
Accessed From: http://ehrafWorldCultures.yale.edu
Accessed On: 2015-3-24 @ 0:15
Page: 138

Subjects
(OCMs)
An abbreviated account of political events in the years which immediately followed the defeat
in Asia
Minor cannot do
Aftermath of combat (727)
justice to the consequences of this catastrophe for every aspect of Greek existence. Of these the settlement of 1,300,000
refugees who had come to Greece before and during the occupation of Anatolia, or as a result of the compulsory
exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey after the war, was a moral and practical problem whose solution was
clearly beyond the unaided resources of the Greek state, bankrupt after ten years of intermittent war and political crisis
and now called upon to accept a destitute population equal to about onequarter of its own.
(OCMs)
The very gravity however of the situation both in humanitarian terms and its possible Subjects
political consequences
brought
Aftermath of combat (727)
assistance from the international community, initially through relief offered by voluntaryExternal
organizations,
the
relationsparticularly
(648)
Private
welfare
agencies
(747)
American Red Cross, and later in November 1923 through the establishment by the Greek government, with the support
of the League of Nations, of the Refugee Settlement Commission. The importance of this step [Page 139] was to remove
the practical administration of refugee settlement from its dependence on the defective machinery of Greek government.
The Commission was an independent corporation with full legal personality under Greek law. It had four members. Two
were appointed by the Greek government, one by the Council of the League. The fourth member, and chairman, was a
national of the United States representing the relief organizations. The Greek government initially undertook to transfer
to the Commission 1,200,000 acres of cultivable land for the establishment of refugee families. Funds for the
Commission's work were partly provided by loans raised on the international money market: 10 million in 1924 and a
further 6,500,000 in 1927. That these financial operations were possible, despite the instability of Greek political life
during these years, was due to the initiative of the League in sponsoring an independent organization with international
affiliations in which foreign lenders had confidence and refugees and Greek officials could work with energy and
purpose.

Page: 139

(OCMs)
Although no accurate figures existed for the previous occupations of refugees theSubjects
Commission
discovered that
Aftermath of combat (727)
considerable numbers were not farmers. Particularly in Anatolia many Greeks had beenPrivate
artisans,
tradersagencies
and labourers.
welfare
(747)
Internal
migration
(166)
Professional men, doctors, lawyers, and teachers also were numerous. Nevertheless it was inevitable that the Commission
External migration (167)
should place the emphasis of its programme on farming. Not only did a farm give meansTillage
of subsistence
(241) for a family but
Real
property
(423)some of the
the abandoned estates of Muslims, particularly in Macedonia and western Thrace, provided land and
necessary housing. The balance of the land required, about half the total area, was found from state lands and the
expropriation of private estates, which under the pressure of the settlement crisis was administered with such radical zeal
that by 1930 arable farms or estates of even a modest size had ceased to exist. In 1928 90 per cent of the country's
953,000 farms were of 12.5 acres or less. And by 1930 when the Commission was dissolved 145,758 families had been
settled on the land.
(OCMs)
Although the economic and social costs of the refugee problem were very considerable itSubjects
is important
to recognize that
Aftermath of combat (727)
the settlement of Asia Minor Greeks in the countryside had a number of beneficial consequences.
and
Private welfare Intensively,
agencies (747)
Internal
migration
(166)
extensively, agricultural resources were more productively used. In the decade after the Asia Minor catastrophe the area
External migration (167)
under cultivation in Greece increased by 55 per cent. Due to the stimulus of the Commission's
Tillage (241) work in refugee

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Agricultural
science (242)
settlements crop rotation was adopted in many others. Tractors and steel ploughs were introduced
to cultivate
the pasture
Special crops (249)
lands of northern Greece. Refugees developed the [Page 140] cultivation of tobacco. Two-thirds
of the production
of this
Real property
(423)
valuable export crop in 1926 could be attributed to their enterprise. And a decade after 1922 the value of agricultural
production in the country had doubled. Against these advances we must weigh the effects of the fragmentation of
farmland into smallholdings consisting generally of separated plots. We
return to this problem in Chapter 10.

Page: 140

Subjects (OCMs)
The settlement of the urban refugees was a more complex problem. Mainly they were congregated
on the outskirts of
Aftermath of combat (727)
Athens, Piraeus, and Salonika where the opportunities for employment were greatest. But
their situation
was difficult.
Housing
(362)
Labor
supply
and
employment
Large-scale industry did not exist and even for the more humble forms of personal service they had to compete for work
(464)
with native Greeks. In cities overcrowded before they arrived their housing conditions were deplorable. Although by
1930 the Commission had built 27,000 houses in 125 urban refugee settlements there were still 30,000 families living in
barracks or shanties. When the Second World war broke out the problem
still remained.
Subjects
(OCMs)Their numbers
Nevertheless, as in agriculture, the arrival of the refugees added some impetus to industrial
development.
Aftermath of combat (727)
widened the very limited domestic market. Even a family living at subsistence level Production
had to make
essential
andcertain
supply (433)
Saving
and
investment
purchases. Moreover, the refugees who were officially exchanged after the war were able to bring with them(454)
money,
Occupational specialization
jewellery, and moveable goods which in value, it is believed, amounted to 56 million (463)
gold pounds. With part of this
Textile
industriesnew
(288) Greece,
wealth refugees opened workshops and small factories, in some cases introducing skills and
manufactures
Domesticated
animalsto(231)
Woven
and 1923
other interworked
for instance silkworm breeding and carpet-making. It was chiefly due to refugees that
between
and 1930 the
fabrics (286)
capacity of the textile industry was doubled. And it is a remarkable fact that even Individual
today 20 per
cent of(472)
Greece's
enterprise
entrepreneurs were born in Asia Minor.

Page: 141

(OCMs) and labour

Economic growth in such an environment protected by a tariff wall created too manySubjects
small, inefficient,
Production and supply (433)
intensive enterprises using a minimum of capital equipment. This is a problem to which we
shall return
Chapter
Ownership
andincontrol
of 11. In
capital
(471)
the short run it was a partial solution to the employment problem and between 1921 and 1929 the value of industrial
Labor supply and employment
production, admittedly starting from a very low base, was multiplied seven times. From a(464)
situation after the First World
Aftermath of combat (727)
war where industry contributed only marginally to the economy, in 1940 it produced 18 Public
per cent
of the (652)
national income
finance
and employed 15 per cent of the working population. Although without the refugees industry and agriculture would not
have remained stagnant after the war, the stimulus of the settlement problem and the energy and numbers of the refugees
greatly accelerated the rhythm of Greek economic life. This must be remembered when we consider the cost of
supporting and settling refugees, which consumed half the country's ordinary budget for many years and the external
loans which have been mentioned. The total cost was claimed by Venizelos to be 83 million, an estimate probably close
to the truth.
Subjects
(OCMs)
Politically the refugees had in their great majority supported republicanism. Not only
did they
believe that King
Form and rules of government
Constantine and the Populists were responsible for their exile, but monarchy, and (642)
the party which supported it,
Political
parties (665)they were
represented for them the established structure of privileged society from which as destitute newcomers
Elections (666)
excluded. Since their voting strength was geographically dispersed they could not formAftermath
a separateofpolitical
force, but
combat (727)
External
relations
(648)
their 300,000 voters altered the balance between the Venizelist and anti-Venizelist parties in favour of the former. In the
election of 1928 they had no hesitation in supporting Venizelos whom they revered as their irredentist champion.
Nevertheless it was during Venizelos' period of office from 1928 to 1932 that many refugees became seriously

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discontented and although this was not immediately reflected in any dramatic change of political allegiance it was a
warning which Venizelos did not fully appreciate. In 1930 the Refugee Settlement Commission was dissolved. With the
majority of the refugees permanently if not contentedly established it was left to the government to complete the work. It
was perhaps natural, after the more visible and acute aspects of the problem had been solved, that the sense of urgency
would be lost. At the same time the commercial and financial effects of the world trade depression became serious in
Greece. Refugees were among the first to suffer through unemployment and a further depression of wage rates, for
instance in the tobacco industry at Salonika and Kavalla. These were additional misfortunes to add to the primitive [Page
142] housing conditions which many urban refugees still had to face. It was therefore unfortunate that Venizelos, secure
behind his formidable majority, should have signed in 1930 the Ankara Convention. Under the original terms of the
agreement on the exchange of populations it had been arranged that the properties of both minorities would be valued and
liquidated for the compensation of their former owners. Almost no headway had been made in this intractable task. In
search of a realistic relationship between the two countries Venizelos agreed under the Ankara Convention to consider
the property of the two minorities as being equivalent in value. The Turks insisted on a small additional monetary
payment in settlement. To satisfy Turkish pride and establish friendly relations this seemed to Venizelos a reasonable
price to pay. To the refugees, whose property was certainly more valuable than that of the Muslim minority which had
left Greece, the Convention was both a national humiliation and an
abandonment of their rights.

Page: 142

Subjects (OCMs)
Such disappointments were a factor in the steady recruitment of refugees into the Greek Communist
Party (K.K.E.). This
Aftermath of combat (727)
had grown out of the Socialist Party, which in 1918 had been formed from small groups
of socialist
and
Political
partiesintellectuals
(665)
Marxists who had little support in the country outside their own esoteric circles. By 1920 it had changed its name to the
Communist Party of Greece and was already using in its literature the familiar terminology. Not surprisingly the party
made particular efforts to win adherents among the discontented urban refugees. They had some success, particularly
among tobacco workers in Macedonia where wages were low and workers were easily organized. In 1926 when elections
were held under a proportional system of representation the country was surprised to find ten communist deputies in
parliament, eight of whom were from Macedonia. After the disillusionment of the Ankara Convention in 1930 leftist
tendencies among refugees became more pronounced. They were assisted, naturally, by rising prices and the general
economic distress which became worse after Britain left the gold standard in September 1931. The majority of refugees,
it must be said, remained faithful to the bourgeois parties. But for the less fortunate or more radical among them the
propaganda of communism had an appeal. Since their own world had been erased some refugees were prepared without
compunction to overturn the inadequate society of the Greek state to which they had no traditional attachment. As a
subject category of Christian Greeks in Turkey they had been despised. In Greece, too, they soon discovered that their
presence was resented and their social status inferior. In the circumstances it was not difficult for some [Page 143] to
stand their Orthodox belief on its head and embrace communism.

Page: 143

(OCMs) policy of an
Yet even among discontented urban refugees the number of Greeks who could acceptSubjects
the anti-Hellenic
Political parties (665)
autonomous Macedonian republic, which the Comintern under the influence of the Bulgarian
Partymovements
insistently demanded,
Political
(668)
External
relations
were a small and uneasy minority. This policy which after the exchanges of population had no ethnic basis(648)
did much to
Composition of population
discredit the party in the eyes of many who might otherwise have supported it. For this
reason the consolidation of
(162)
Macedonia and western Thrace through intense settlement by refugee farmers was a consequence of the agreement on the
exchange of populations which was to prove critically important. In 1912 Greece had been a nationally homogeneous
state with the exception of 6,000 Muslims living on their properties in Thessaly. With the annexations in northern Greece
after the Balkan wars minorities suddenly represented 13 per cent of the total population, including in 1913 370,000

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Turks and 104,000 Bulgars. The effect of the agreement with Turkey, and of an earlier arrangement under the Treaty of
Neuilly with Bulgaria which provided for a voluntary exchange of minorities, was that in Greek Macedonia the Greek
element which in 1912 was merely 42 per cent of the population had by 1926 mounted to 88.8 per cent; in western
Thrace at the time of the Paris Peace Conference the proportion was as low as 17 per cent but by 1924 had become a
respectable majority of 62.1 per cent. By the mid-twenties the possibility of the Communists successfully inciting a
popular movement for an autonomous Macedonia had passed. Nor could the governments of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria
advance any serious territorial claims on the basis of the small Slav minority of 80,000 which still remained in Greece.
Due mainly to refugee settlement the security of Greek Macedonia, at least in a cultural sense, was assured. And the only
1

effect of the continued insistence of the Greek Communists that Macedonia should form an autonomous state was to
divide and weaken their party during a period when many conditions
favoured its advance.
(OCMs)
The symptoms of malaise in Greek society between the two World wars, of which theSubjects
appearance
and growth of the
Sociocultural trends (178)
Communist Party was merely one, must not be attributed only to the physical disruptionCultural
of war,goals
refugees,
(185)and a world
Political
movements
(668)which
slump. In the new state of modern Greece the notion of the Great Idea had offered a supra-local loyalty
transcended the opposed parochial interests of village communities, and the deracinated individualism of those who in
increasing numbers moved to the cities. In that [Page 144] particular respect the ideals of this national conception partly
replaced, partly were confused with, those of the Orthodox Church which had united Christians under Ottoman rule.
When after the military defeat in Asia Minor the ideal was destroyed Hellenism seemed to have been emptied of its
meaning and purpose. As George Theotokas, one of Greece's most significant novelists and thinkers, has written: The
moral influence of defeat has been and continues to be profound in our country. The first post-war decade has
everywhere been a period of resurgence and great efforts. For us it has been a period of despair. Our elders lost in the
harbour of Smyrna not only their power but also their ideals and self-conviction. In 1922 they ceased to have confidence
1

in Greece. The disaster choked every breath of idealism No one expects anything of value from Greece. It is partly
in the light of this reaction that we must attempt to understand the confused chronicle of prejudice and self-interest in
Greek political life between the wars.
1 In 1935, in the interests of the anti-fascist struggle, this principle was exchanged for the recognition of the equality of all minorities.
1 George Theotokas, Free Spirit, Athens, 1929, pp. 1034.
Footnotes:

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