1) Nikko Hotel v Reyes

FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto
Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko
Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes,
Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a
basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to
his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to
leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the
party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart
ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed
by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida
Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr.
Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over
the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the
celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who
part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed
each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request
only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what
happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the
necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave
the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is

experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held
liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
2) Quisumbing v Meralco
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94
Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants inspectors
headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all
single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask
permission and was granted by the plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection, it was found that
the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the
information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in
their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered,
defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour,
inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that
unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply
will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due
process, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social and business reputation and
therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing
differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary
damages including attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals
including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public.
SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any
action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. Under the law, the Manila
Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of
alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and
attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was
present.
Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was
premised only upon Lornas testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put the
injure position where it was before it was injured.

3) Gasheem Shookat Baksh v CA

FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the
petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later
courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilous house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his
apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint
because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in
the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant
but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is
already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed
to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he
asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and
his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual
expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
HELD:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court
held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioners deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal
knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.
4) Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp v NLRC
Facts:
On October 30, 1984 Wage Order No. 6 mandated an increased in the cost-of-living allowance of
non-agricultural workers in the private sector for P3.00. The order was complied by the
petitioner Corporation by multiplying the same by 22 days, equivalent to the number of working
days in the company.

Respondent union alleges that instead of multiplying the COLA by 22 it should be multiplied by
30 representing the number of days in a month, as what the corporation's normal practice prior
to the said Wage Order. Thus the union filed a complaint against the Corporation for for illegal
deduction, underpayment, unpaid allowances, and violation of Wage Order No. 6.
Issue:
Whether or not COLA under Wage Order No. 6 should be multiplied by 22 or 30 representing
the number of working days in a month.
Held:
Labor Arbiter Adelaido F. Martinez sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding
that since the individual petitioners acted in their corporate capacity they should not have been
impleaded; and that the monthly COLA should be computed on the basis of twenty two (22)
days, since the evidence showed that there are only 22 paid days in a month for monthly-paid
employees in the company. His reasoning, inter alia, was as follows:
To compel the respondent company to use 30 days in a month to compute the allowance and
retain 22 days for vacation and sick leave, overtime pay and other benefits is inconsistent and
palpably unjust. If 30 days is used as divisor, then it must be used for the computation of all
benefits, not just the allowance. But this is not fair to complainants, not to mention that it will
contravene the provision of the parties' CBA.
Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 uniformly read as follows:
Section 5. Allowance for Unworked Days.
All covered employees shall be entitled to their daily living allowance during the days that they
are paid their basic wage, even if unworked. (Emphasis supplied)
... it is evident that the intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages.
Hence, we have the principle of 'No Pay, No ECOLA.
5) University of the East v Jader
FACTS:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1st semester, he
failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete
grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos
Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of
required fees. He took the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.

The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation,
his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from work from
April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he
dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UEs negligence.
ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all
the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?
HELD:
SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latters actual
damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status
and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed
that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what CA held
because its also respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been
responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic
achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesnt only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and
submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet.
6) Pe v Pe
FACTS:
Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in
Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio
introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of
Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita
sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary.
Eventually they fell in love with each other.
Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately
and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas family on the ground of moral, good custom
and public policy due to their illicit affair.
HELD:

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the
trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The
wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.
7) Tenchavez v Escano
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of
the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be
their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written
by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.
Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left
for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on
approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for
the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran,
an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition
on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation
of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can
afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American
husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of

Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos
sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled
to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by
one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
8) St. Louis Realty Corp v CA
FACTS:
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay
Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times
where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.
St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This was
republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramils
house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house
to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding
an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that
it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted
Dr. Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St
Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology or
explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April
15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.
ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.
HELD:
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication.
Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just
contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000
as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the
judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under
articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful
house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
9) Spouses Yu v PCIB
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation
over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine
Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a
loan.
As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent
filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City
properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998
scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest bidder.
The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After
two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte
petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of
certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was
denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing
that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte
petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the
issuance of a Writ of Possession.
ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and
a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for
annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a
special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and
take their own direction independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It

generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure
of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
10) Donato v Luna
FACTS:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with
the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan.
Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz
consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no previous
knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage
license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for
which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home
upon learning that Donato already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended
in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic
relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
HELD:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means
of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
We make no pronouncement as to costs.
11) Quimuging v Icao

FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan
City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at
P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court
in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled
that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted
by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in
Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn
violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.
12) Geluz v CA
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner
and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before
she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents,
she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953
since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February
21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was

in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have
any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person
does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court
and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently
because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or
criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil
action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It
shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the
circumstances was clearly exaggerated.