Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2 Respectively, Research Assistant, UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UPCIDS) and Professor, University of the Philippines Los Baos.
1. INTRODUCTION
Unexpected events with adverse results such as drought, typhoons, disease infestation, or
earthquake can cause risks in farming activities. The Philippines is very much vulnerable to
these production risks. The Philippines ranks 8 th among the top 10 countries that are most
exposed to natural hazards or multiple hazards (Regalado, 2010). Almost annually, heavy crop
damages have been reported as caused by typhoons, droughts, and other natural calamities.
However, risks and uncertainties could be managed so that the impact could be minimized. Risk
management is concerned with reducing the possibility of unfavourable outcomes, or at least
softening their effects. One way of reducing risk is through agricultural insurance. When
disasters happen, farmers and/or poor farming households will have less access to risk
management options needed to cope with the consequences of such events. It has been
repeatedly mentioned that crop insurance through indemnity payments serves as a cushion when
uncertainties occur. Estacio and Mordeno (2001) wrote that crop insurance is a risk management
mechanism designed to even out agricultural risks and blunt the consequence of natural
disasters to make losses, especially to the more marginalized farmers, more bearable. Several
studies have however alleged that the extent by which income loss is reduced through indemnity
is limited because of the small indemnity payment received (Alarkon, 1997; Bacani, 2005;
Famorcan, 2006).
Insurance is generally defined as: the form of risk management primarily used to hedge against
the risk of a contingent, uncertain loss (Dickson, 1960). Insurance is likewise defined as the
reasonable shift of the risk of a loss, from one unit to another, in substitute for payment.
Agricultural insurance is not only limited to crops, but also covers livestock, forestry, and even
aquaculture.
Given that they produce the countrys staple which is very much vulnerable to agricultural risks,
rice farmers would benefit from insurance as a strategy to deal with such risks. To address this
problem, the Philippine government has come up with a range of risk management programs for
farmers. One of these measures is the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporations (PCIC) Crop
farmers who avail of a loan from banks have a higher probability of participating in the
Rice Insurance Program than non-bank borrowers because it is a bank requirement for
accessing loans from a bank (e.g., Land Bank). Rice farmers who lack or have limited
knowledge about the Rice Insurance Program are less likely to participate in this crop
insurance program of the PCIC than those who have more knowledge about the features
of the program. Rice farmers who have experienced damages due to flood, drought,
earthquake, and pest and disease incidence are more likely to participate in the Rice
Insurance Program of PCIC.
4.
Household
and Farm
5.
Characteristics:
6.
- 7.Household income
8.(farm and non9.farm)
- 10.
Tenure status
- Farm size
- Location/distance of
the farm from the
lakeshore
Awareness of the
PCIC Rice
Insurance Program
Other Factors
- Credit access to
financial
institutions
- Damage
experienced
Figure 2 shows the effects of the PCIC Rice Insurance Program on the reduction of rice farmerparticipants income losses through indemnity payments. Climatic factors such as floods,
typhoons and droughts cause severe crop damages and result in yield and income losses of the
farmers.
Other factors like pest and disease incidence, fire, and earthquake also contribute to crop
damages which would result in income losses. With the participation of the farmers in the PCICs
Rice Insurance Program, these losses are expected to be reduced through indemnity payments.
The extent of income loss reduction, however, may vary among the rice farmers due to variation
in the amount of indemnity payments received by the farmer-participants. The amount of
indemnity payments are expected to be influenced by the percentage of yield loss, total
production cost incurred at the time of damage, stage of the crop at the time of loss. PCIC
categorized the percentage of yield loss as the total loss (90 percent and above), partial loss (10
percent and below 90 percent), and no loss (10 percent or less). It is, therefore, expected that the
amount of indemnity received by the rice farmer-participants would increase with the increase in
the percentage of yield loss.
Climatic Factors:
Floods
Typhoons
Drought
Crop Damage/
Income Loss
PCIC Rice
Insurance Program
Figure 2. Conceptual framework showing the factors affecting the amount of indemnity
payments and the effects of the PCIC Rice Insurance Program on income loss
reduction of rice farmers in selected municipalities in Laguna
The amount of production inputs that can be covered by the program is from PhP 39,000
to PhP 52,000 per hectare depending on the rice variety. It is also expected that farmers who
incurred higher total production cost at the time of loss would receive a higher amount of
indemnity payment compared to those who incurred lower total production cost. Under the Rice
Insurance Program, the stages of cultivation covered are planting (direct seeding or
transplanting) to harvesting (flowering or reproductive stage). It is, therefore, expected that the
amount of indemnity payment would be higher if the time of loss is during the flowering or
reproductive stage compared to early stages of the rice crop. The Rice Insurance Program covers
ceilings for inbred and hybrid varieties. A maximum of 20 percent to cover a portion of the value
of the expected yield can be received at the option of the farmer entailing additional cost. It is
expected that the amount of indemnity received will be higher for rice farmers using hybrid rice
variety because of its higher expected yield
and production cost as compared to the rice farmers who planted inbred rice variety. It is also
expected that large farms would receive higher indemnity payments per farm than those with
smaller farms since they pay more insurance premiums.
Since the percentage of yield loss is a determinant of the amount of indemnity payment,
the factors that affect the percentage of yield loss will be assessed in this study. The percentage
of yield loss may vary depending on the farms location relative to the lakeshore, source of
risk/damage, variety, and farm size. It is expected that rice farmers whose farms are near the
lakeshore will have higher percentage of yield losses than those whose farms are far from the
lakeshore. It is further expected that rice farmers whose wet season crops were damaged by
typhoons and floods incurred higher percentage of yield loss than those whose crops were
damaged due to pests and diseases. Rice farmers who planted hybrid rice varieties are also
expected to have higher percentage of yield loss than those who used inbred varieties. Although
the hybrid rice variety has a higher yield than inbred varieties, it is more susceptible to pests and
diseases and is vulnerable to floods (IRRI, 2005). Rice farmers who have large farms are
expected to have higher percentage of yield loss than those with smaller farms.
Hypotheses of the Study
1
Household income, tenure status of the farmer, farm size, location/distance of the farm from
the lakeshore, loan borrower in a bank, and extent of awareness of the rice crop insurance
program significantly influence the rice farmers decision to participate in the PCIC Rice
Insurance Program.
The percentage of yield loss is significantly affected by the location/distance of the farm
from the lakeshore, source of risk/damage, rice variety, and farm income.
3. The percentage of yield loss, total production cost incurred at the time of damage, stage of
the crop at the time of loss, rice variety, stage of cultivation at the time of loss, and farm size
are the significant determinants of the amount of indemnity payments.
4. The rice farmers mean loss in farm income is significantly reduced as a result of their
participation in the PCIC Rice Insurance Program.
5. The mean loss in farm income after receiving indemnity payments is significantly higher for
farmer-participants with large farms compared to those with small farms.
4. METHODOLOGY
Types of Data and Methods of Data Collection
Both primary and secondary data were used in this study. Primary data were collected through
personal interviews with 40 rice farmers participating and 40 non-participating farmers in the
PCIC Rice Insurance Program in selected towns of Laguna around the coast of Laguna de Bay
using pre-tested interview schedule. The data collected only covered the most recent calamity
period that hit the province of Laguna, which was identified during the 2012 wet season cropping
period. At that time, the typhoon Habagat destroyed the rice crop of most of the farmers along
the lakeshore.
Secondary data including the names of rice farmer-participants who received indemnity
payments, the percentage of estimated yield loss by source of damage/risk, and the amount of
indemnity payments that they received were obtained. Sources of secondary data included the
National Irrigation Administration Region IV Employees Multipurpose Cooperative (NEMCO)
Office in Pila, Laguna and the New Batong Malake Multi-purpose Cooperative (NBMMPC)
office in Los Baos, Laguna.
Sampling Procedure
Rice growing, lakeshore municipalities in Laguna composed of Bay, Calauan, Pila, Sta. Cruz and
Victoria which are very prone to flooding caused by typhoons were purposively selected as the
study areas. These municipalities have also the highest number of rice farmers who received
indemnity payments.
Selection of the Sample Farmer-Respondents
From the list provided by NEMCO and NBMMPC, a total of 40 farmer-respondents were
randomly chosen. All the 40 rice farmer-participant respondents filed indemnity claims at the
PCIC Office in Region 4. The same number of farmers whose rice farms are situated near the
participants calamity-affected rice farms were purposively chosen in each municipality to serve
as the respondents under the non-participant category.
Analytical Procedure
Logit Analysis
Econometric methods that can be used in studying farmers participation in a crop
insurance program are binary models such as logit and probit analyses. Logit and probit models
are certain types of regression models in which the dependent or response variable is
dichotomous in nature, taking a 1 or 0 value (Vashist, 2011).The logit technique allows the
examination of the effects of a number of variables on the underlying probability of a
dichotomous dependent variable. The logit model uses a cumulative logistic probability function
while the probit model emerges from the normal distribution function. The chief difference
between logit and probit models is that the logistic curve has slightly flatter tails while the
normal or probit function approaches the axes more quickly than the logistic curve. The sigmoid
or S-shaped curve of the cumulative logistic function very much resembles the cumulative
distribution function of a random variable (Gujarati, 1988). Qualitatively, logit and probit models
give similar results, but the estimates of the two parameters are not directly comparable. The
logit model is generally used in preference to the probit model for the following reasons (Green,
1990; Vasisht, 2011; and Fernando, 2012): (1) logit analysis produces statistically sound results.
By allowing the transformation of a dichotomous dependent variable to a continuous variable
ranging from to infinity, the problem of out of range estimates is avoided; (2) logit analysis
provides results which can be easily interpreted and the method is simple to analyze; and (3) it
gives parameters which are asymptotically consistent, efficient and normal so that the analogue
of the regression t-test can be applied.
Considering the advantages of logit analysis over probit analysis, logit analysis was
employed to determine the factors that significantly influence the decision of the rice farmers to
participate in PCIC Rice Insurance Program. The logit regression model was estimated using
STATA 10 software program.
The general form of logit regression model is specified as:
P f ( X )
e ( X )
1
( X )
( X )
1 e
1 e
pi
1 pi
Ln
Zi =
6.awareness + ui
where:
pi
0
educ
hincome
fsize
distancedumm
y
Loandummy
the lake
= dummy for loan availment from a bank, where a farmer who availed
of a loan was assigned a value of 1 and zero otherwise
knowledge
i (i = 1 to 6)
e
ui
/Se( )
H0: = 0 (the independent variable has no effect on the decision to participate in the Rice
Insurance Program
H1: 0 (the independent variable has an effect on the decision to participate in the Rice
Insurance Program
where:
that more or less one of their children is below 18 years of age and that least one of them is
employed.
Table 1. Average age, household size, household income, educational attainment of the
household head, number of children below 18 years old, and number of
employed children, 40 sample farmer-participants and 40 sample nonparticipants in the Rice Insurance Program, selected lakeshore municipalities
in Laguna, wet season, 2012
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS
FARMERPARTICIPANTS
NON- PARTICIPANTS
52.65
53.55
190741
198100
10.18
7.38***
Note: The results of the t-test of means did not show significant differences in the mean age, household size,
household income, number of children below 18 years of age, and the number of employed children
between the farmer-participants and the non- participants at 10% probability level, except for education
which is significantly different between the two farmer groups at 1% probability level
PARTICIPANTS
Number Percent
NON
PARTICIPANTS
Number
Percent
31
9
40
77.5
22.5
100.0
29
11
40
72.5
27.5
100.0
34
4
1
1
85.0
10.0
2.5
2.5
39
97.5
2.5
100.0
40
100.0
1
40
10
30
40
25.0
75.0
100.0
6
34
40
15.0
85.0
100.0
21
19
40
52.5
47.5
100.0
17
23
40
42.5
57.5
100.0
Tenure Status
Owner-operator
Lessee
Owner-tenant
Total
9
30
1
40
22.5
75.0
2.5
100.0
5
34
1
40
12.5
85.0
2.5
100.0
Table 2 also shows that a relatively higher percentage of the farmer-participants (25%)
are engaged in off-farm jobs than the non-participant respondents (15%). Both farmer groups
reported that they worked as hired labor in other farms during peak labor demands (e.g., planting
and harvesting) to augment their household incomes. In addition, both farmer categories claimed
that they have made themselves available even in non- farm work particularly during the lean
labor demand for their respective farms. A higher percentage (52.5%) of the farmer-participants
compared to non-participant respondents (42.5%) mentioned that they likewise engage in nonfarm jobs.
Majority of the farmer-participants are leaseholders (75 percent). Only 22.5 percent were
owner-operators. A lone respondent (2.5%) is both an owner as well as a tenant. Most (85%) of
the non-participants are also leaseholders. About 12.5 percent tilled their own farms and only one
non-participant is both an owner and tenant of the farms that he tills.
Farm Characteristics
Results of the t-test of means showed that the mean farm size and the mean number of
parcels were not significantly different between the sample farmer-participants and the nonparticipants at 10 percent probability level. The average farm size of a participant-respondent is
2.68 hectares while that of the non-participant is 2.43 hectares (Table 3). The farmer-participants
also reported to have an average number of parcels of 14 compared with 12 for the nonparticipants.
Most (82.5%) of the sample farmer-participants reported that their rice farms are situated
less than five kilometers away from the lakeshore. Conversely, majority of the non-participants
(52.5%) mentioned that their rice farms are located more than five kilometers away from the
lakeshore. Most of the farms of both farmer groups (85% of the farmer-participants and 92.5% of
the non-participants) are situated in low lying/flat areas.
The major source of irrigation water of the sample farmer-participants is communal
irrigation system (45%), followed by the National Irrigation System (35%). Only 25 percent of
the farmer-participants rely on pumps and spring water for irrigation. In contrast, majority (70%)
of the non-participants use pumps or spring water to irrigate their farms. Only 17.50 percent and
15 percent of the non-participants source their irrigation water from the communal irrigation
system and the National Irrigation System, respectively.
Table 3.Farm characteristics of 40 sample farmer-participants and 40 non-participants
in the Rice Insurance Program, in selected lakeshore municipalities in
Laguna, wet season, 2012
FARMERFARM CHARACTERISTICS
Average farm size (ha)a
Average number of parcelsb
PARTICIPANT
2.68
14.43
Numbe
r
Percent
NON- PARTICIPANT
2.43
12.00
Number
Percent
Geographical Location
Less than 1 km from the lakeshore
1-5 km from the lakeshore
More than 5 km from the lakeshore
16
17
7
40.0
42.5
17.5
11
8
21
27.5
20.0
52.5
Farm Topography
Flat/Low lying
Elevated
34
6
85.0
15.0
37
3
92.5
7.5
Water Sourcec
National Irrigation System
Communal Irrigation System
Pump/Spring
14
18
10
35.0
45.0
25.0
6
7
28
15.0
17.5
70.0
Results of the t-test of means showed that there is no significant difference in the mean farm size between the
two farmer groups (t-value is 0.429) at 10% probability level
b
Results of the t-test of means showed that there is no significant difference in the mean number of parcels
between the two farmer groups (t-value is 0.705) at 10% probability level
c
The total percentage exceeds 100% since two participant and one non-participant reported two sources of
irrigation water
Results of Logit Analysis Showing the Factors the Significant Factors that
VARIABLE
CCOEFFICIENT
Constant
Independent Variables:
Knowledge Score
Education
Household Income
Tenure Dummy
Area Planted
Distance from the lake
Bank availment
X2
Pseudo R2
t-VALUE
6.30***
3.06
10.75***
0.24ns
-6.74E-07ns
1.72*
0.16ns
-2.34*
0.39ns
80.43***
0.72
3.98
1.41
-0.38
1.59
0.59
-1.76
1.22
MARGINAL
EFFECTS
2.66**
0.06ns
-1.67E-07
0.40*
0.04ns
-0.52**
-0.09ns
t-VALUE OF
MARGINAL
EFFECT
4.03
1.50
0.00
1.82
0.57
-2.17
-0.31
***, **, and * - mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% probability level, respectively
ns not significant at 10% probability level
than a lessee. In other words, the more secure the tenure status, the higher is the probability that
the farmer will participate in the insurance program.
Meanwhile, the coefficient of dummy for the distance of the farm from the lake is
negative and significant at 10 percent probability level. The negative coefficient indicates that
the farther the distance of the farm from the lakeshore, the lower the probability that a farmer
will participate in the Rice Insurance Program.
Household income, educational attainment of the farmer, area planted, and credit access from
a bank were found to have no significant influence on the farmers decision to participate in the
Rice Insurance Program at 10 percent probability level. The possible reason why credit access
from a bank has insignificant effect on farmers participation in the Rice Insurance Program is
that both the participant and the non-participant-respondents might have availed of loans from
banking institutions.
The regression line is quite robust with a 2 highly significant and Pseudo R2 equal to
0.72. The Pseudo R2 implies that the variation in the independent variables collectively explain
72 percent of the variation in the probability of farmers participation in the Rice Insurance
Program.
Marginal effects refer to the changes in probability given a unit change in the independent
variable and are a more useful basis for interpreting the results of the logit model. The estimated
marginal effects as shown in Table 4 suggest that the impact of the independent variables such as
knowledge about the program, tenure, and distance of the farm from the lakeshore on the
farmers decision to participate in the PCIC Rice Insurance Program is statistically significant. In
particular, knowledge about the program as measured by the knowledge score appeared to have a
higher impact on the probability of participating in the PCIC Program. For example, a 1 percent
increase in the knowledge score will increase the probability of participation in the PCIC Rice
Insurance Program by approximately 3 percent, holding other factors constant. An owneroperator has 0.4 percent more probability to be a participant in the PCIC Rice Insurance Program
than the tenant/lessee while an increase in farm distance by more than five kilometers from the
lakeshore lowers the probability of participation by 0.52 percent.
Reasons for Participating/Non-participating in the Rice Insurance Program
The sample farmer-participants cited that the major reason for their participation in
the program is that getting rice insurance is part of the lending requirement of the LBP
when they borrowed from the bank (Table 5).
Table 5. Reasons for participating in the Rice Insurance Program, 40 sample
farmer-participants, selected lakeshore municipalities in Laguna, wet
season, 2012.
REASONS FOR PARTICIPATING
Part of the requirement for applying for an agricultural loan
To reduce risk in farming
Recruited by the technician of the cooperative
Convinced by friends
a
NUMBER PERCENTa
34
85.0
26
65.0
2
5.0
1
2.5
Majority (95%) of the farmer non-participant respondents for the 2012 wet season crop
have not previously participated in the program, the major reason for non-participation in
the program was their being unaware of the existence of the rice crop insurance program
of the PCIC as cited by 57.9 percent of the farmer respondents who have not previously
participated in the program (Table 6). The other major reason for non-participation, as
reported by 39.5 percent of farmer non-participant respondents, was their being busy to
attend to the documentation requirements of the program. It was also found in this study,
that technical assistance of the technicians of NEMCO and NBMMC has been ably
provided.
PERCENTa
57.9
39.5
15.8
13.2
5.3
NUMBER
22
15
6
5
2
Results of Regression Analysis to Assess the Factors Affecting Percentage Yield Loss
Results of the multiple regression analysis to determine the factors affecting percent yield loss
showed that the flood risk variable had a positive and significant coefficient. The coefficient
implies that 25 percent of the yield loss in the sample farms is due to the occurrence of floods
(Table 7). The pest risks coefficient is negative and not significantly different from zero in both
equations. The same is true with farm location, rice variety, and farm size which are not
statistically significant at 10 percent probability level.
Table 7. Results of multiple regression analysis showing factors affecting yield loss on a per
farm and per hectare basis of 40 participant respondents in selected lakeshore
municipalities in Laguna, wet season, 2012
PER FARM
ITEM
Constant
PER HECTARE
Coefficient
t-Value
Coefficient
t-Value
48.42***
3.07
48.42***
3.07
-3.36ns
-0.35
-s3.90ns
0.41
Coefficients of Independent
Variables:
Farm Location
Flood Risk
25.55*
1.80
25.80*
1.84
Pest Risk
-4.12ns
-0.31
-4.61ns
-0.36
Rice Variety
10.39ns
0.72
11.07ns
0.79
Farm Size
-0.59ns
-0.39
F-Statistic
1.85
2.33**
R2
0.21
0.21
Only the F-statistic of theper hectare equation is significant at 5 percent level. This
implies that the independent variables collectively affect the percent yield loss for the per hectare
analysis. The R2 in both forms of equation is 0.21, which indicates that only about 21 percent of
the variation in percent yield loss is explained by the independent variables included in the
equation (Table 7). Only the hypothesis that flood risk affects percent yield loss was proven.
Comparison of Mean Amount Indemnity Received by Percent Yield
Loss, Variety Planted, Production Cost, and Farm Size
Table 8 compares the average amount of indemnity received by the farmer-participants
by percent yield loss, variety planted, production cost, stage of production when calamity
occurred, and farm size.
Results indicate that the average amounts of indemnities received by the farmer-participants
increased as the percent yield loss increases. The average amount on indemnity for rice farms
that incur yield losses ranging from 0-25 percent was estimated at PhP 6,000 while rice farms
that recorded losses that ranged from 26-50 percent were given average indemnities amounting
to PhP 10,848. The most affected farms (76-100 percent yield loss) were indemnified with an
average of PhP17,895. These findings suggest that the severity of damage to rice crops increases
as manifested in percentage losses were fairly treated in terms of higher average amounts of
indemnities. The average amount of indemnity is also positively influenced by the total cost of
production incurred by the farmers. For a farmer that recorded a total production less than
PhP25,000, an average indemnity of PhP9,527 has been received. For production costs that
belong to the ranges PhP25,000-49,999 and PhP50,000 and above, average indemnities of PhP
10,818 and PhP 14,932 were respectively provided by the PCIC. Similarly, this study found out
that average amount of indemnity increases when the time of disaster occurred during the later
stage of crop production.
NUMBE
R
2
13
7
16
AVERAGE AMOUNT OF
INDEMNITY (PhP)
6,000
7,065
10,848
17,895
15.07***
Hybrid
Local
t-Value
Range of Production
Cost
Less than Php 25000
Php 25000-49999
Php 50000 and above
F-Value
Stage of Crop
Production
Vegetative to Tillering
Flowering
Harvesting
F- Value
Farm Size Range:
1.5 ha and below
Above 1.5 ha
t -Value
35
5
11,838
12,360
46.20***
11
15
14
9,527
10,818
14,932
51.95***
12
27
1
10,013
12,406
21,000
18.79***
19
21
11,318
12,432
21.28***
When natural calamities happened during vegetative, flowering and harvesting stages of
crop production, average indemnity amounts of PhP10,003, PhP12,406 and PhP21,000 were
received by the farmer-participants, respectively. Results also show that the average amounts of
indemnities similarly increase with farm size but on a smaller proportion. Moreover, affected
farms that utilized local rice varieties received an average amount of which is slightly higher
than rice farms planted to hybrid varieties of rice. Results of the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
in Table 8 suggest that the variations among groups for percent yield loss, production cost, and
the stage of the crop categories were highly significant at one percent probability based on the Fstatistics. However, ANOVA does not indicate which pairs of groups are significantly different
from each other. The t-test of means was therefore conducted to assess which pairs of groups for
the afore-mentioned categories are significantly different. Further analysis showed that all the
pairs of groups compared for the afore-mentioned categories are significantly different at one
percent probability level.
Table 9. Results of multiple regression analysis showing the factors affecting the amount
of indemnity payment on per farm and per hectare basis, 40 sample farmerparticipants, selected lakeshore municipalities in Laguna, wet season, 2012
PER FARM
ITEM
Constant
PER HECTARE
Coefficie
nt
t-Value
Coefficient
t-Value
-411.53
-0.12
-3156.36
-0.75
3.38
145.33***
3.42
137.91***
Production Cost
0.088***
2.67
0.19
1.46
Stage of Cultivation of
Rice Crop
1539.01
0.55
2316.72
0.79
Variety Dummy
-1370.79
-0.37
-1573.30
-0.40
817.51
*
1.69
Farm Size
F-Statistic
R2
4.80***
0.41
4.20***
0.32
The stage of cultivation of the rice crop represented by the before flowering stage and
during and after the flowering stage did not yield significant results. The coefficient is positive,
but not significant at 10 percent probability level. Variety also does not have a significant
influence on the amount of indemnity payment.
At the farm level equation, farm size had a positive and statistically significant
coefficient. The result implies that as farm size increases by one hectare, the amount of
indemnity payment increases by PhP817.
The estimated F-statistics shows the overall significance of the estimated equation. As
shown in Table 9, the F-statistics for both farm and per hectare equations are significant, thus
implying that the variables taken together, affect the dependent variable (amount of indemnity).
R2 at the farm equation is 0.41, while R2 in the per hectare equation is 0.32. For the per farm
equation, the R2 value indicates that 41 percent of the variation in the amount of indemnity is
explained all the independent variables included in the estimated regression model.
Comparison of the Costs and Returns between the 2010 and 2012
Wet Season Rice Crops
Results of the cost and returns analysis for a normal year represented by 2010 wet season
and for a calamity year represented by the 2012 wet season are summarized in Table 10. The
average per farm gross margin or profit in the last normal year 2010 was PhP 66,672.23.
Adjusting this to 2012 prices using the CPI as deflator, the 2010 wet season deflated gross
margin (expressed in 2012 prices) is estimated to be PhP 72,347.63. On the other hand, the
average loss per farm during the wet season 2012 was PhP 12,776.10. Farmers reported the cause
of loss to Habagat.
On a per hectare basis, the average gross margin was PhP 29,345.17 in 2010 and PhP
31,843.15 as expressed in 2012 prices. The loss per hectare during the wet season of 2012 was
PhP 5,623.28. In effect, the total income loss per farm and per hectare as a result of the calamity
in 2012 relative to the 2010 normal year was PhP 59,571.53 and PhP 26,219.87, respectively.
This can also be construed as the cost of damage during the wet season 2012 due to the calamity.
Meanwhile, Table 11 shows the costs and returns comparison between farms which are
near the lake (0-5 km from the lakeshore) and those far from the lake (>5 km from the lakeshore)
on a per hectare basis. The average per hectare gross margin of a farm near the lake during the
wet season 2010 was PhP 30,790.72, which is equivalent to PhP 33,411.75 in 2012 prices. Those
that are far from the lake had an average gross margin of PhP 28,348.87 in wet season 2010.
Adjusted to 2012 prices, this is estimated at PhP 30,762.03. The average loss in wet season 2012
experienced by the participants with farms near the lake was estimated to be PhP 9,483.68 as a
result of the Habagat while participants whose farms are far from the lake has a lower estimated
loss of PhP 2,962.62. These results show the higher vulnerability of the farms near the lake than
those farther from the lake to the vagaries of the extreme weather events.
The comparison of per hectare costs and returns during the normal year and the calamity
year between the farmer-participants by tenure status is summarized in Table 12. The average per
hectare gross margin in 2010 of the owner-participants was PhP 28,994.82 which is equivalent to
PhP31,462.97 in 2012 prices. The tenant farmer- participants had a 2010 wet season net income
average of PhP30,038.75, equivalent to PhP 32,595.77 in 2012 prices. During the wet season
2012, the average loss of PhP 10,307.37 was experienced by the owner-participants; while a
meager gross margin of PhP 3,649.67 was received by the tenant-participants. The positive gross
margin of the tenants was attributed to the lower production cost they incurred compared to the
owners, which may be a function of the low levels of input use of the tenants.
Tables 13 and 14 illustrate the comparison between the costs and returns between farmerparticipants who operate small farms (0.5-1.9 ha) and those who have larger farms (>2 ha), on
per hectare and per farm basis, respectively. The average gross margin per hectare of the farmerparticipants who have small farms in a normal year (2010) was PhP 31,309.72, which is
equivalent to PhP 33,974.93 in 2012 prices (Table 25). During the calamity year of 2012, the
average loss per hectare incurred by the participants who have small farms was estimated at PhP
6,771.21. Those who have large farms had an average gross margin per hectare in 2010 of
PhP28,448.53, equivalent to PhP 30,870.18 in 2012 prices. An average net loss, however, for the
participants who have large farms was estimated to be PhP 5,099.35 per hectare in 2012 wet
season.
On the other hand, the average gross margin per farm of small farms during the normal
year (2010) was PhP 38,769.61, and equivalent to PhP 42,069.83 in 2012 prices (Table 14). For
the large farms, these figures were PhP 104,422.82 in 2010 actual prices and PhP 113,311.71 in
2012 prices. During the calamity year (2012), the estimated average loss per farm was PhP
8,384.52 for small farms. For large farms, the estimated loss of the participants was estimated to
be PhP 18,717.65, on the average.
Table 10. Average gross income, production cost, amount of indemnity received, and profit/loss per farm and per hectare of
40 sample farmer-participants in the Rice Insurance Program, selected lakeshore municipalities in Laguna, wet season,
2010 and 2012
PER FARM
ITEM
Gross Income
(PhP)
Production Cost
(PhP)
Profit/Loss
Before
Receiving
Indemnity (PhP)
Amount of
Indemnity
Received (PhP)
Profit/Loss
After Receiving
Indemnity (PhP)
PER HECTARE
Normal
2012 Actual
Year in
with
2012 Prices
Calamity
Normal Year
(2010)
Normal Year in
2012 Prices
2012 Actual
with Calamity
122,945.00
133,410.57
44,782.25
54,113.12
58,719.44
19,710.50
56,272.78
61,062.94
57,558.35
24,767.95
26,876.29
25,333.78
66,672.23
72,347.63
-12,776.10
26,345.17
31,843.15
-5,623.28
11,952.85
5,260.94
66,672.23
72,347.63
29,345.17
31,843.15
-362.35
-823.25
Note: Gross margin analysis was used in estimating profit/loss in rice production. Production costs only include variable costs.
Table 11. Average gross income, production cost, amount of indemnity received, and profit/loss per hectare by farm location of
40 sample farmer-participants, in the Rice Insurance Program, selected lakeshore municipalities in Laguna, wet
season, 2010 and 2012
ITEM
0-5 KILOMETERS
Normal
Normal Year in
2012 Actual
Year (2010)
2012 Prices
with Calamity
Normal
Year (2010)
>5 KILOMETERS
Normal Year in
2012 Actual
2012 Prices
with Calamity
Gross Income(PhP)
54,813.92
59,479.89
15,121.36
53,630.11
58,195.32
22,873.42
Production Cost(PhP)
24,023.19
26,068.14
24,605.04
25,281.25
27,433.29
25,836.04
30,790.72
33,411.75
-9,483.68
28,348.87
30,762.03
-2,962.62
6,776.94
4,216.08
30,790.72
33,411.75
-2,706.75
28,348.87
30,762.03
1,253.46
Profit/Loss Before
Receiving Indemnity
(PhP)
Amount of Indemnity
Received (PhP)
Profit/Loss After
Receiving Indemnity
(PhP)
Note: Gross margin analysis was used in estimating profit/loss in rice production. Production costs only include variable costs.
Table 12. Average gross income, production cost, amount of indemnity received, and profit/loss per hectare by tenure status of
40 sample farmer-participants in the Rice Insurance Program, selected lakeshore municipalities in Laguna, wet
season, 2010 and 2012
OWNER
TENANT
Normal
Year (2010)
Normal Year in
2012 Prices
2012 Actual
with Calamity
Normal
Year (2010)
Normal Year in
2012 Prices
2012 Actual
with Calamity
56,737.33
61,567.04
18,038.92
48,918.03
53,082.13
23,019.67
27,742.51
30,104.07
28,346.29
18,879.28
20,486.36
19,370.00
Profit/Loss Before
Receiving Indemnity
(PhP)
28,994.82
31,462.97
-10,307.37
30,038.75
32,595.77
3,649.67
Amount of Indemnity
Received (PhP)
5,746.34
4,300.00
profit/Loss After
Receiving Indemnity
(PhP)
28,994.82
31,462.97
-4,561.03
30,038.75
32,595.77
7,949.67
ITEM
Note: Gross margin analysis was used in estimating profit/loss in rice production. Production costs only include variable costs.
Table 13. Average gross income, production cost, amount of indemnity received, and profit/loss per hectare by farm size,
40 sample farmer-participants in the Rice Insurance Program, selected lakeshore municipalities in Laguna, wet
season, 2010 and 2012
0.5-1.9 HECTARES
>2 HECTARES
Normal
Year (2010)
Normal Year
in 2012
Prices
56,488.76
61,297.31
18,795.2
9
53,028.85
57,542.
25,179.04
27,322.38
25,566.5
0
24,580.32
26,672.69
25,227.5
6
Profit/Loss Before
Receiving Indemnity (PhP)
31,309.72
33,974.93
-6,771.2
1
28,448.53
30,870.18
-5,099.35
8,147.8
2
3,943.3
3
31,309.72
33,974.93
1,376.6
2
28,448.53
30,870.18
-1,156.03
ITEM
Amount of Indemnity
Received (PhP)
Profit/Loss After
Receiving Indemnity (PhP)
2012 Actual
with
Calamity
Normal
Year (2010)
Normal Year
in 2012
Prices
2012 Actual
with
Calamity
20,128.2
1
Note: Gross margin analysis was used in estimating profit/loss in rice production. Production costs only include variable costs.
Table 14. Average gross income, production cost, amount of indemnity received, and profit/loss per farm by farm size, 40
sample farmer-participants in the Rice Insurance Program, selected lakeshore municipalities in Laguna, wet season,
2010 and 2012
0.5-1.9 HECTARES
>2 HECTARES
Normal
Year
(2010)
Normal Year in
2012 Prices
2012 Actual
with Calamity
Normal
Year
(2010)
Normal Year in
2012 Prices
2012 Actual
with Calamity
69,947.83
75,902.06
23,273.48
194,647.06
211,216.19
73,882.35
31,178.22
33,832.23
31,658.00
90,224.24
97,904.48
92,600.00
38,769.61
42,069.83
-8,384.52
104,422.82
113,311.71
-18,717.65
10,089.13
14,474.34
38,769.61
42,069.83
1,704.61
104,422.82
113,311.71
-4,243.30
ITEM
Amount of Indemnity
Received (PhP)
Profit/Loss After
Receiving Indemnity
(PhP)
Note: Gross margin analysis was used in estimating profit/loss in rice production. Production costs only include variable costs.
Table 15. Results of the t-test of means to determine the significance of the reduction in
income losses as a result of the farmer-participants participation in the PCIC
Rice Insurance Program, 40 sample farmer-participants, selected lakeshore
municipalities in Laguna, wet season, 2012
ITEM
AVERAGE
AMOUNT OF
INCOME LOSS
REDUCEDa (PhP)
11,952.85
t- VALUE
5,260.94
-6.10
6,776.94
-5.42
4,216.08
-6.39
5,746.34
-7.36
4,300.00
-3.96
8,147.82
-4.85
3,943.33
-5.05
10,089.13
-6.04
14,474.34
-5.79
-8.22
This is the difference between the average amount of loss before receiving the indemnity payment and the average
amount of loss after receiving the indemnity payment. The resulting difference is the amount of indemnity payment.
indemnity received by a farmer-participant was found to increase with the increase in percentage
yield loss. The amount of indemnity was also positively influenced by the total cost of
production and farm size.
Results of the study showed that the sample farmers participation in the Rice Insurance
Program of the PCIC has eased their financial burden as a direct result of the indemnities they
received. The reduction in mean income losses as a result of the sample farmers participation in
the PCIC Rice Insurance Program was highly significant at one percent probability level. On
average, the percentage reduction in income losses was 94 percent per farm.
Based on the results of the study, the following recommendations are suggested:
1. The PCIC management should undertake a more intensive awareness campaigns among
participating farmers/farmer groups and other stakeholders to include lending
institutions and NGOs. The awareness campaign should focus on the details of the
mechanics of the program such as the loss cap provisions by type of pest attack and stage of
crop production. Lack of awareness among the farmer-participants has been the root cause of
the problems, such as delays in processing of documents and failed expectations of the
farmers. Non-participation in the program was also attributed to lack of knowledge or
awareness of the program;
2.
A more accurate estimation procedure in assessing crop yield loss must be developed by
the PCIC. This recommendation is an offshoot of the major problem on the standing crop
basis that was mentioned by the farmers as a major basis in assessing both the prevalence and
severity of the damage on the rice farms caused by natural calamities. Perhaps a more
technically-based approach may be adopted by the team of adjusters and can possibly be
facilitated by updating their capabilities through attendance in actual damage-estimation
training. A training module of this type maybe requested from the Department of Agriculture
or from academic institutions such as the College of Agriculture (CA) of UPLB;
3. The risk classification of the insured farms should be updated. Given the changing biophysical environment as a result of the climate change phenomenon, it is time for the PCIC to
update the risk classification of rice farms. Since premium payments vary by risk
classification, a single risk classification category for Laguna (e.g., high risk) should be
revised depending on the particular location of the participating farmers farm.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Mr Virgilio Lawas of the New Batong
Malake Multipurpose Cooperative (NBMMC) and Mr Robert Acuno of the National Irrigation
Administration Region IV Employees Multipurpose Cooperative (NEMCO) for providing us the
secondary information in the study. We are also thankful to Mr Pablo Rocela of the PCIC
Region IV Office for sharing his insights in the conduct of the study. Lastly, we wish to express
our sincere appreciation to all the rice farmer respondents who shared their precious time to
provide us the field data needed in the conduct of this study.
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