Quine on Meaning and Existence, I.

The Death of Meaning

Author(s): Gilbert Harman
Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Sep., 1967), pp. 124-151
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QUINE ON MEANING

AND

EXISTENCE,

GILBERTHARMAN

I. The Death

of Meaning

philosophical
writings
are for the most part contained
\^Fuine's
a Logical
Point
in two collections
of essays, From
of View1 and
an
The
in
and
Paradox,2
book, Word
Ways
of
recently
important
The present
and Object.3
to views ex
survey will be restricted
in
three
these
work
in logic is
volumes,
Quine's
although
pressed
with his work
in philosophy.4
continuous
The present Part One
describes

and defends

ing Part

Two

does

especially ontology
a way to be explained

views about meaning.

The follow
Quine's
on other
the same for his views
subjects,
and epistemology.
The two parts are related in
in Part Two.

remarks.

of Quine's
philosophical
views
about
philosophical
If
almost
that
other
is
Quine
meaning.
linguistic
right,
everything
have said and say about meaning
is wrong.
Therefore
philosophers
to begin a discussion
it is appropriate
of Quine's philosophy
with an
an account
account of his theory of meaning,
in particular with
Some

position

that makes
the various

general
lies his

attack

on

At the heart
standard

clear exactly what views

strands of his attack.

Quine

attacks

and that specifies

*
people.

In writing
I have
benefited
from
this paper
with
discussions
many
to Richard
I am particularly
and Thomas
grateful
Rorty
Nagel.
1
Mass.
Harvard
1953.
Second
edition,
Press,
Cambridge,
University

1961. Harper torchbook edition

2
3

New

York:

Random

House,
and New

(New York: Harper and Row,

1963).

1966.

York:
and Wylie,
M.I.T.
Press
1960.
Mathematical
1934).
Mass.,
Logic
(Cambridge,
revised
Mass.,
1940;
1947;
edition,
York,
1951).
(New
Cambridge,
revised
New
Cam
1941;
edition,
1965;
(Boston,
York,
Logic
Elementary
4

Cambridge,
A System

Mass,

of Logistic

bridge, Mass., 1966.) 0 Sentido da Nova L?gica (Sao Paulo, 1944). Methods
of Logic (New York, 1950, revised edition 1959). Selected Logic Papers
(New York, 1966).

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

125

The first is associated

Quine objects to two clusters of views.
the analytic-synthetic
the second with postulation
distinction;
or meanings,
of intensional
in order to
objects,
propositions
account
for translation,
the objects
of psychological
attitudes,
etc.
The
of
not
to
second
views
is
be
group
ambiguity,
thought of
as committed
to the existence
of certain queer entities.
Its mini
mum claim is that the sentences of a
a
mean
have
definite
language
with

scheme of translation
from that lan
ing apart from any proposed
such
two
that
if
of translating
the
guage,
quite different ways
are proposed,
one of these can be correct.
at most
The
language
second cluster may be offered in support of the first in the following
sense:
account
states,

it may be said that any theory of meaning

to
adequate
for translation,
of
objects
ambiguity,
psychological
distinction.
etc., must permit an analytic-synthetic

Before

detailed
these
Quine's
argument
against
some
remarks.
thinks
that
views,
Quine
general
mean
have
been
almost
about
linguistic philosophers
totally wrong
will do any of the things
ing. He denies that appeal to meaning
these philosophers
have wanted
it to do for them. To a philosopher
at ease within
one or both of these clusters of views, Quine's
posi
tion is nearly tantamount
to disbelieving
in meaning.
For example,
when
there is an analytic-synthetic
he
Quine denies
distinction,
does not claim merely
that there is no sharp distinction.
He means
to say that nothing
is analytically
true.
For him the analytic
not
distinction
resemble
does
the
synthetic
red-orange
distinction,
a vague one.
which
is a distinction
It resembles
rather
although
the witch-nonwitch
which
fails to distinguish
distinction,
anything
since there are no witches.
He claims this because he holds that
describing
I must make

the ascription
of analyticity,
like the ascription
com
of witchcraft,
one to an incorrect
claim.
Some
explanatory
philosophers
believe that an analytic-synthetic
can be drawn without
distinction
claim ; but Quine would
appeal to a controversial
explanatory
argue
that this is no more
than
same
someone's
the
for
the
likely
doing
witch-nonwitch
distinction.
He would
that
the
distinction
deny
is already present
in ordinary
talk about meaning,
synonymy,
etc., and would
definition,
talk about
argue that philosophical
shows there is such a
than
analyticity no more
thing as analyticity
the former prevalence
of talk about witches
shows there were once

mits

126

GILBERTHARMAN
can be taught
the distinction
cases
of analytic and
of paradigm
through presentation
truths, just as he would
deny one can teach the witch

He would

witches.
ostensively
synthetic
nonwitch
there
worthy

also deny

distinction

to
is any way
of the name.

he
Furthermore,
or
expresses
meanings

that

in this way.
Thus Quine would
an analytic-synthetic
introduce
that a sentence
denies
a proposition,
in the

has
sense

deny that
distinction

a meaning
in which

or

lin
that an

have held such views.

He claims
philosophers
account of belief, desire,
treat psychological
etc., must
adequate
states as attitudes toward sentences
rather than as attitudes
toward
an
He
also
that
account
trans
of
argues
propositions.
adequate
to preservation
lation does not require reference
of meaning
(if
guistic

is taken

meaning

general
proposed
account requiring
can be
existence

to be fixed by the language

of some
independently
scheme of translation)
indeed
he
claims
that an
;
a
of
with such independent
preservation
meaning
shown

to be

an
he provides
substantial
issues,
without
in this sense.
and also of ambiguity,
appeal to meanings
he claims to show that there are no such "intentional
Therefore
as meanings
or propositions.
he argues that
Moreover,
objects"
accounts
of
translation,
attitudes,
adequate
psychological
ambig
distinction.
uity, etc., do not involve one in the analytic-synthetic
account

of the distinction

false.

between

Moreover

verbal

and

the postulation
of intensional
is not against
Quine
objects
because he has a "taste for desert landscapes."
It is not that he
or meanings,
are a queer
thinks intensional
objects, propositions
one
be a queer
kind of entity (as
believe that electrons must
might
as
is not that intensional
His complaint
of entity).
objects,
no
in
that
offend
his
sensibilities
the
way
abstract,
something
they
in
doubt offend the sensibilities
He believes
of Nelson Goodman.

kind

sets are abstract entities.

sets, although
Quine's
argument
against
the second cluster of views is that the various views in that cluster
are theories
to explain.
that don't explain what
So
they purport
to
similar
his attitude
toward
his
attitude
intensional
is
objects
or the ether (or witches).
toward phlogiston
Quine
obviously
that these

attacks
true
views

views

(and therefore
represent

that many
philosophers
not at all theoretical),
bad empirical
theories.

take

to

be

and he argues
He does not

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

attempt
false.

to show

theories

of witchcraft,

that

these views

believes

127

are a priori false or necessarily

is true or false a priori or neces
use those terms.)
In particular

(Quine
nothing
sarily, as philosophers
typically
or of intensional
Quine does not argue that a defender of analyticity
can
led
be
into
He
contends
instead that
objects
inconsistency.
such defenders
claims which
put forward substantial
explanatory
there is no reason to accept;
and he claims
that there is conse
as much
reason to reject those claims as there is to reject
quently
or the ether.
phlogiston,
says that there is no way

sense of
to make
Sometimes
Quine
the analytic-synthetic
is mean
distinction,
i.e., that the distinction
and this may seem to conflict with
the claim I ascribe to
ingless;
or
that
is
that
all
truth
him,
nothing
analytic,
falsity is synthetic.
But the conflict
is merely
if
that.
to say
Quine wants
apparent,
sense of the analytic-synthetic
that one cannot make
in
distinction
If someone
any way such that there turn out to be analytic truths.
that there are analytic
appears to believe
truths, but also agrees
with Quine's
that
the
lacks
argument
meaning
required explanatory
or postulates
or
intensional
power,
objects of belief, meanings,
no
that
but
also
there
is
agrees
power to
propositions,
explanatory
such postulation,
then an empiricist
like Quine will say this person
has made his view meaningless,
just as under certain circumstances
we might
someone
who
to believe
in
say this of
today continued
or
the
that
God.
witches,
ether,
(for
matter)
Quine's
phlogiston,
is that the analytic-synthetic
intensional objects
message
distinction,
of psychological
ing as conceived
this, is no better
and God is dead.
To

in short mean
all this, any of
or God;
phlogiston,

and propositions,
states, meanings,
certain
linguistic philosophers,
by
off than witches,

the ether,

summarize:

that there is no
Quine does not claim merely
distinction.
His
of
denial
the
distinction
is
sharp analytic-synthetic
based on his view that there are no analytic truths.
His main objec
or intensional
tion to meanings,
is not that
propositions,
objects
are
a
or
that they are abstract entities.
queer kind of entity
they
Finally,

he does

sistency

but

not

argues

to convict his opponents

attempt
rather that they hold bad empirical

the analytic-synthetic
Against
a "full blooded
theory of analytic

distinction.
truth"

takes

What

of

incon

theories.
I shall

the analytic

call

truths

GILBERTHARMAN

128

or that are know

solely by virtue of meaning
virtue
of
virtue
of
the phrase
solely by
meaning.5
"by
By
a
of
truth
commits
its defen
full
blooded
virtue,"
analytic
theory
The main problem
ders to an explanatory
claim about meaning.
to be those

that hold

able

for

the

could

theory

is to make

clear what

sort

of

explanation

this

be.

seems to be this:
the full blooded
idea behind
theory
reason
a
a
is
of
the
sentence
expresses
meaning
always part
why
a
to
sentence
made
since
the
could
be
falsehood
truth,
express
by
to the words
that make
different meaning
up the sen
assigning
tence.
Some sentences
express a truth by virtue of their meaning
The

the world
is. Thus the sentence,
"Copper conducts
a
means
truth
it
what
because
it does and
expresses
electricity,"
were
is. If its meaning
because of the way the world
suitably dif
were
or
nature
in
laws
world
if
the
the
of
ferent,
suitably different,
to the full
not express a truth.
the sentence would
According
are
sentences
other
that
of
there
blooded
truth,
theory
analytic
and independently
express truths solely by virtue of their meaning
is. The sentences
and
of the way the world
"Copper is a metal"

plus

the way

"Copper is copper"
of their meanings.

would
That

be said to express truths

they express truths would

solely by virtue
be said to have

the way the world

to do with
is, apart from the fact that
nothing
these sentences have the meaning
have.
they
this lies in understanding
how the truth of
The problem with
a sentence can be independent
is and depend
of the way the world
on the meaning
of the sentence.
What
is to prevent us
entirely
that copper is a metal
from saying that it is a fact about the world
is a metal"
and that, if this were not so, the sentence
"Copper
And what
is to prevent us from saying
would not express a truth?
is copper"
in part
that the truth expressed
by "Copper
depends
a
on
is, namely that everything
general feature of the way the world
?6
is self-identical

Recent

statements

Kant's
Bennett,
Foundations
Philosophical
Jonathan

1966),
(New

of

the

full

blooded

theory

of analytic

267;
260,
pp.
see esp. p.
Haven,
1958),
6
and Logical
Quine,
"Carnap

423,

the

Truth,"

definition
in The

truth

include

p. 6; Rudolf
Carnap,
Gardner
(New York,

1966),
(Cambridge,
ed. by Martin
of Physics,
Semantics
and Arthur
Pap,
Analytic

and
of

Ways

Necessary

Truth

"broadly
analytic."
p. 106.
of Paradox,

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

129

as knowability
of meaning.
should it not count as
by virtue of knowledge
Why
to
the
know
about
world
that copper is ametal
knowing
something
or that copper is copper ? It is not sufficient
to reply that if some
A similar

arises

problem

if analyticity

is taken

one sincerely denies

he must
fail to understand
these sentences,
in
what he is saying or must be using at least some of his words
can be
a new sense.
This does not by itself show how something
true or knowable

solely by virtue

of meaning.
one
prevents

some sort
Perhaps
from denying
these

of psychological
compulsion
are claims that everyone finds
Or perhaps
claims.
they
were
so
to be denied we would
if
them
that
of
true,
any

obviously
have the

best

for thinking
the speaker either misunder
evidence
possible
in new senses.7 The problem
stands what he says or uses his words
a
to
is
defender
show how in certain cases such
for
of analyticity
a
or obviousness
is
sign of truth or knowability
by
compulsion
virtue of meaning.
One
argument
convention

to do this invokes

The
the notion of convention.
a
some
matter
of
that it is, in
sense,
begins by noting
that a given word means what
Our conven
it does.

attempt

tions might have been different and we can change them now
to. We might
"wood" as we
decide to use the word

want
use

the word

and

"copper"

vice

versa.

Such

in our

change

if we
now
con

like "Copper
affect the truth and falsity of sentences
and
"Wood
conducts
conducts
(From
electricity"
electricity."
now on I shall speak of a sentence as true or false.
If this offends,
sentences which
it may be taken as an elliptical way of describing
A conventionalist
truths or falsehoods.)
further
argues
express
ventions

would

for the use of an expression,

that meaning
depends on conventions
the relevant conventions
instance
that in the present
specify
sentences are to be counted true and which
which
false. The claim
and

that assign
adopted certain rules or conventions
like "Copper is ametal,"
truth or falsity to sentences
"Wood is not
a metal,"
of logic and perhaps mathe
the truths and falsehoods
etc.
determine
the meaning
conventions
of the
These
matics,
is that we

words

have

"copper,"

"not,"

"every,"

7
Ibid.,

pp.

"metal,"
etc.

105-106.

As

"wood,"
a result,

and of logical words

certain

principles

like "if,"

("Copper

is

130

GILBERTHARMAN

or the truths of logic) are true by virtue of meaning,

i.e.,
sense
t^v
we
t
in
virtue
of
the
to
have
convention,
by
given meaning
the words used to state these principles
by conventionally
counting
If we were to change our conven
these and other principles
true.

metal"

of truth and falsity, we would

assignments
the meaning
of at least some of those words.8

tional

thereby

change

faces a major
technical
points out that conventionalism
to
account
it
is
for
if
all
truth
and
difficulty
logical
supposed
falsity.
An infinite number
of sentences
of logic require
conventional
Quine

of truth or falsity.
the conventionalist
assignments
Presumably
we
holds that
make certain general conventions
that together assign
truth or falsity to this infinite
set.
But the statement
of these
use
must
conventions
words
like
general
"if," "whenever,"
logical
"every," etc., and by hypothesis
the conventions.
To understand

are given
meaning
by
and apply the conventions
that
one would
already have to under
these words

to logical words
give meaning
stand some logical words.
Conventionalism
proves circular or leads to an infinite regress.9
But

there

in logic

thus

either

is amore

basic problem with conventionalism.

Even
or
truth
of
determine
assignments
meaning,
falsity
it does not follow that a sentence assigned
truth is true by virtue
It does not even follow that the sentence
of convention.
is true.
if conventional

For

the relevant

the notion

notion

of convention
cannot be distinguished
from
one
can
of postulation.
If
assign truth and falsity to

conven
sentences
in logic, set theory, or mathematics
by general
that determine
the meaning
of one's words,
tions, i.e., postulates
the same is true in geometry,
The meanings
physics, or chemistry.
are
of "molecule,"
etc.
determined
"electron,"
"quantum,"
by the
same
in the
of one's physics
of "is
way as the meaning
postulates
a member
of" is determined
the
of
set
one's
postulates
by
theory.
8

ments
A.

and

Quinton,

Society
pp.

42

statement

classic

Mathematics,
A. J. Ayer

of

and

Knowledge
York,
1959).

conventionalism
of

More
recently:
Review
Rules,"
Philosophical
"The A Priori
and the Analytic,"

(New

(1963);

Michael

in H.

appears

Hahn,

in

Nature,"

Logical
Positivism,
Max Black,
"Necessary
LXVII
(1958),
pp.

Proceedings

of

Scriven, Primary Philosophy

"Logic,
ed. by
State

313-41;
the Aristotelian

(New York,

1966),

if.
9

and

"Carnap
detail
greater
pp. 96-8.

in

Logical
"Truth
by

Truth,"
Convention,"

p.

108.
Ways

The

argument

of Paradox,

pp.

is given
81-98,

in
esp.

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

But not

every physical
theory is true,
the theory of the ether is not

true,

is

convention"

"truth

true,

one's

theory is not
Since
"truth by

Newton's
etc.
conventions,

i.e.,

postu

does not guarantee

truth and therefore
For similar reasons
conventionalism

truth by convention
account
for truth.

lates,"
cannot

to

according

e.g.,

131

of truth by virtue of knowledge

fail to account for knowledge
to
is true according
that something
since knowledge
of meaning,
not
one's
is
follows
from
one's conventions,
i.e., that it
postulates,
sufficient for knowledge
that it is true.10

must

of the full blooded

The ultimate
defense
theory of analytic
true
truth rests on the claim that some truths are either necessarily
or knowable
a priori, where
truth and
the notions
of necessary
is
a priori knowledge
are given
The argument
special meaning.
true
or a priori truth must be analytic truth,
that all necessary
by
or knowable
of
virtue
of
virtue of meaning
meaning.
knowledge
by
a necessary
truth if, given
expresses
and a
itmust be true no matter what;
of the sentence,
can
of its meaning
sentence expresses an a priori truth if knowledge
a
sentence
of
such
The meaning
of its truth.
suffice for knowledge

For

it is said that a sentence

the meaning

is enough
for know
of meaning
its truth; knowledge
guarantees
a
or
the
of
the
and
either
truth;
(or
both) can
necessary
priori
ledge
a metal,"
is
The sentences
be identified with the analytic.
"Copper
of logic and mathe
various principles
is copper,"
and "Copper
truths and are said to be
etc., are said to express necessary
matics,
knowable

a priori;

so they are also said to be analytic truths.

and a prioricity
the relevant notions of necessity
a
In
inquiry certain premisses may
particular

Unfortunately
are not very clear.
be taken for granted and not questioned.
We could say such prem
a priori,
of the inquiry,
isses are known
i.e., at the beginning
in the course of the inquiry, come
while
other things, discovered
to be known
that we
But this would not mean
only a posteriori.
a
of
the premisses
of the inquiry in any sense
have
priori knowledge
usable

by the philosophical
isses need not be known

meaning.

10
p.

114.

They may well

"Truth

by

Convention,"

of analyticity.
For these prem
virtue
of
of their
knowledge
solely by
be known as the result of prior empirical
defender

pp.

93-95;

"Carnap

and

Logical

Truth,"

GILBERTHARMAN

132
inquiry.
They may not be known
known.
The defender of analyticity
a
He needs
priori knowledge.
ly

at all, but only assumed

to be
more
than
needs
such relative
a priori knowledge,
absolutely
whatever
that would
be.
certain truths may be neces
Similarly,
are
in
that
laws
of
nature, e.g., as discovered
sary
they
by science.11
cannot
But such natural
since a
guarantee
necessity
analyticity,
contrast

between

the former

laws of nature
the

latter

and necessary
truths is intended,
of nature do not
Laws
analytic.

synthetic,
of words used to express those
solely by virtue of the meaning
The point is, if you like, that laws of nature are not abso
laws.
that would
be) ; they need not
(again: whatever
lutely necessary
in which
There are conceivable
worlds
have been true.
they do
a priori knowledge
not hold.
The notions
of relatively
and of
are
nature
virtue
of
laws
of
clear
truths necessary
by
(relatively)
a
The notions
of absolutely
and of
notions.
priori knowledge
are
truths absolutely necessary
(no matter what the laws of nature)
hold

obscure.

of a view has
character
One test of the a priori or necessary
to hold, or
to conceive
it is possible
of its failing
been whether
to imagine circumstances
in which we would
it is possible
whether
seem that any simple basic assertion
that can
It would
give it up.
a priori,
not to hold cannot be necessary,
knowable
be conceived
a
or analytic
its meaning,
If, given
sense).
(in the full blooded
does not guar
fail to hold, its meaning
sentence could conceivably
of its meaning
suffice for
its truth, nor can knowledge
antee
of
of truth.
Now, Quine claims that we can conceive
knowledge
we
can
to
that
view
statement
hold
and
for
any
any
imagine
failing
in which we would
that
circumstances
give it up.12 He concludes
no
or
truths are
no truths are a priori
that
and therefore
necessary
analytic
We

in the full blooded

sense.

that a person who denies our basic logical

granted
what he says
that he misunderstands
indicates
thereby
principles
we would
his
from
what
or means
different
words
something
by
we
someone
cannot
not
that
conceive
of
does
mean.
This
imply
nor
does it imply that we
up our basic logical principles
giving

11
12

have

Cf.

"Necessary
"Two Dogmas

Truth,"
Ways
of Empiricism,"

pp.
of Paradox,
a Logical
From

48-56.
Point

of View,

p.

43.

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

133

cannot

to hold.
of these principles
At best it
conceive
failing
cannot be false, that one cannot give
implies that these principles
one can refuse to
them up by simply denying
them.
However,
our
and
instead
that cannot be
accept
principles
adopt principles
into ours;
and we can conceive
of his principles
translated
being
correct.
the law of the excluded middle
(for all P: P or
Perhaps

A person who
fails to hold, even though
it is not false.
a
mean
this law may
different by
accepts
logic without
something
"not" from what we mean;
but his language may contain no prin
to such a person,
According
ciple we can identify with our law.
not-P)

our

law of the excluded

our

rejects

middle

fails

to have

a truth

value:

he

13
notion

of

"not."

even the principle

of noncontradiction
(for all P:
Similarly,
can be conceived
to fail to hold.
both P and not-P)
We may
of its falsity,
not be able to conceive
i.e., we may not be able to
a counterexample;
but we can conceive
of its failing to
envision
not

a truth value.

We can easily imagine someone giving up the

to accept any equivalent
For one
and
refusing
principle
principle.
to
it
is
sometimes
said
that
that
fails
any logic
accept the
thing,
shifts the meaning
of the word
law of the excluded middle
"not."
the
will
If so, this shift
affect
of the principle
of non
meaning
a
in
contradiction.
in which
Furthermore,
logic like Strawson's14

have

a sentence of a truth value, the

of reference
deprives
prin
a refer
not hold, since if P contains
does
of
noncontradiction
ciple
Nor
ring term that does not refer, so will not both P and not-P.
a
the
contain
that
both
sentence
must
its
and
every logic
principle
failure

cannot both be true, for again one's logic may have nothing
as such a principle.
A similar point can be made
that qualifies
truth.
One may
about any putatively
necessary
give up even
to have any expression
"Copper is copper" by refusing
correspond
or by refusing
to
to
countenance
the "is" of identity.15
ing
"copper"
It is a familiar point in ethics that to reject certain principles

denial

sometimes

13
14
15
Pears

Cf.
P.

requires

us to reject certain

and
"Carnap
F.
Strawson,

Truth,"
Logical
Introduction

Ludwig
Wittgenstein,
and McGu'iness
(London,

Tractatus
1961),

terminology,

p. 102.
to Logical

Theory

Logico-Philosophicus,
5.53-5.534.
paragraphs

e.g.,

the prin

(London,

1952).
trans,
by

GILBERTHARMAN

134

to words
Per
like "nigger" or "queer."
that give meaning
same
to
true
the
is
the
the
of
that
give meaning
principles
haps
"witch."
"the
and
words
"God,"
ether,"
Again,
"phlogiston,"
no sense to deny the disjunction
of nonlogical
it makes
perhaps
of some set theory, since these postulates
give meaning
postulates
to "is a member
of." But one may reject the theory without
deny
as
has
Nelson
done.
Goodman
ing it,
ciples

the full blooded

described
Quine's
arguments
against
not
shown how
has
been
that
He
it
of
argues
analyticity.
theory
account
or
can
of
account
for
truth,
meaning
knowledge
meaning
is
this
shown
he
that
denies
In particular
of truth.
for knowledge
a
or
or to necessary
priori
postulation
by appeal to conventional
can
even
The
to
be
what
conceived.
reference
backed
truth,
by
a
are also effective
weaker
same arguments
against
theory that
or
truths as those that are either explicitly
the analytic
identifies
is
"A
male
The
truths
of
male,"
sentence,
sibling
logic.
implicitly
is
an explicit
"A brother
The sentence,
logical truth.
represents
an
to represent
a male"
is supposed
logical truth in this
implicit
to an
to be equivalent
sense, since it is supposed
(on "analysis")
is equivalence
the equivalence
by virtue
explicit logical truth, where
to
count as analytic truths according
Both sentences
of meaning.
I have

the weaker

theory.
but
The notion of an explicit
logical truth is not in dispute;
of
virtue
the claim that two sentences can be equivalent
meaning
by
It may seem that there is no problem
requires further discussion.
if
are meaningful,
each has a meaning:
"If two sentences
here.
are equivalent
same meaning
the sentences
by virtue
they have the
assumes
that there are such
But such an argument
of meaning."
or may not "have" a
as meanings,
that a sentence may
things
one
has
sentence
the
that
may be the same as
meaning
meaning,
can account
same
the
of
and that the possession
another,
meaning
of mean
Notice that the postulation
in truth value.
for equivalence
by virtue of mean
ings can be related to the notion of equivalence
on which
is taken to explain
depending
ing in two different ways,
if e.g.,
to
is
used
the other . Meaning
explain meanings
equivalence
the
of
with
class
a
sentence
of
we
the
given
meaning
identify
of
virtue
to
it
sentences
Alternatively,
meaning.
by
equivalent
if
account for meaning
would
of
equivalence
meanings
postulation

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

135

we could show how two sentences

by virtue of such postulation
can be equivalent
in truth value because they have the same mean
We cannot simply identify
ing. But we cannot have it both ways.
sentences
with
of
classes
if the only account
meanings
equivalent
we give of the relevant type of equivalence
is to say that sentences
are

have

that

equivalent

the

same

meaning.16

there is a difficulty here that cannot

first,
be avoided by appeal to ordinary
talk about meaning,
synonymy,
etc.
I shall then argue that taking meaning
definition,
equivalence
as basic leads immediately
to the sort of problem
that faces the full
I shall

that

argue,

argu
Finally I shall present Quine's
that postulates
of
intensional
meaning
against any theory
etc.
objects, meanings,
propositions,
to remember
From the beginning
it is important
the following
are
When
that
truths
those truths
say
point.
philosophers
analytic
blooded

theory of analyticity.

ments

are synonymous
or mean
with
the same as truths of logic,
use
ex
and
the same" as technical
"mean
they
"synonymous"
use
not
do
these
in
their
pressions.
expressions
ordinary
They
sense.
in order
One has only to examine a dictionary
of synonyms
to appreciate
A
is
this point with respect to "synonym."
synonym
another
that can in certain contexts
the first
replace
expression
serve
our
as well,
at
and
in
least
purposes
expression
speaking
that

better.
another, we

often

And
indicate

also the background

tence

means

with

ymous

the

ordinarily when we say that one thing means

that the second follows from the first, given
we share. We
information
say that one sen

same

as,

comes

to

in truth
equivalent
ation.
Philosophical

the

same

sentences

if the two

another

thing

as,

are relatively

or

is

synon

obviously
inform

value,
shared-background
given
differs
talk about sameness of meaning

from

to hold by
this ordinary
take synonymy
talk, since philosophers
alone and not by virtue of shared information.
virtue of meaning
who would
The same point tells against
those philosophers
dis
tinguish meaning

equivalence

16
cit.,
op.
Pap,
The
stronger
theory.
and P.
by H. P. Grice
LXV
Review,
of subtraction,"

(1956),
Word

from synthetic

equivalence

by appeal

this
seems
but
to accept
also
the
explains
theory
mentioned
in this paragraph
one
resembles
argument
F. Strawson,
"In Defense
of a Dogma,"
Philosophical
It embodies
what
calls
"the fallacy
pp. 141-58.
Quine
and

Object,

p.

206.

136

GILBERTHARMAN

a type of
assume
to dictionary
These philosophers
definitions.
that does not
distinction
between
dictionaries
and encyclopedias
a few random
to anyone who has examined
exist.
This is obvious
in any large dictionary,
and it will be supported
by the
of definition
So the important
is
below.17
question
or not philosophers
can give sense to their technical notion
whether
or meaning
of synonymy
equivalence.
are equivalent
The claim that two sentences
by virtue of mean
entries

discussion

is an explanatory
can be more
meaning

and this raises the problem

how
claim;
than
useful in explaining
is in
it
equivalence
an
truth.
To
the
may
give up
change
equivalence
explaining
a
is
but
of
that
result
of
one's
words;
up any
meaning
giving
one takes to be obvious
or accepts as a basic part of
equivalence
some view or theory.
That rejection would
lead to change
in
can
be equivalence
fails to show how there
meaning
by virtue of
ing

or necessity would
seem to give
virtue
of
than of
meaning
by

; and appeal to convention

meaning
no better an account of equivalence
truth by virtue of meaning.

the weaker
believe
Some philosophers
theory of analyticity
can be set forth without
it is not easy to
claim;
any explanatory
see how.
I shall discuss
the possibility
of such nonexplanatory
truth for a moment
and then return
to the
theories
of analytic
weaker

theories.

explanatory

Quine
technical

and

others

terms,

a small

circle

(e.g.,

explained.18
have
distinction

have

"synonymous,"

"analytic,"

in terms

definable

otherwise

White)

Philosophers
not always

pointed
"necessary,"

of each
who

other
accept

thetic
appreciated
raises, since they have not always appreciated
acter of the terms used to state the distinction.

17

out

but

that,
etc.,

as

form

not

usually
the analytic-syn
the difficulty
this

the technical
Thus

char

it is irrel

and
"Definitions,
Scriven,
Theories,"
Explanations,
in
ed.
the Philosophy
II,
of Science,
by H.
Feigl,
104-5.
M. Scriven,
and G. Maxwell
Minnesota,
1958),
pp.
(Minneapolis,
18
"The Analytic
the Syn
"Two Dogmas,"
and
Morton
White,
Quine,
and
in John Dewey:
thetic:
An Untenable
Dualism,"
of Science
Philosopher

Minnesota

Cf.

Michael

Studies

ed. by
Freedom,
and
the Philosophy

1952).

Sidney

Hook

of Language,

in Semantics
1950);
(New York,
reprinted
ed. by Leonard
Illinois,
(Urbana,
Linsky

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

evant

137

if followed

that definitions,

back, eventually
always become
terms
will
contain
Ordinarily
antecedently
but this is not the case with
terms used by
technical
understood;
who
distinction.
Per
accept the analytic-synthetic
philosophers
a
the
been
has
obscured
fallacious
of
identification
haps
point
by
circular.19

these

the circle

are

There

their more

terms with

technical

on

restrictions

this technical

distinction.

what

One

ordinary
can

cannot

counterparts.
as

count

claim

tinction

an

explanation

of

that a particular
dis
if there is no relation

is the analytic-synthetic
distinction
between
the
distinction
and what philosophers
have
ship
specified
to say about analytic
wanted
and synthetic
truth.
It would
be
a
to
true
sentence
more
call
and
if
it
is
if
pointless
"analytic"
only
ten words

an account of
not provide
and this would
long;
on
the analytic-synthetic
distinction.
Quine's
argument
depends
on such a distinction
the fact that the major
constraint
is that
A notion of "analytic truth" or "meaning
it must be explanatory.
than

that had no

equivalence"

use would
fail to resemble
explanatory
in
have
the past meant
philosophers
by those

anything

sufficiently
expressions.

Several philosophers
deny this.20 They argue that philosophers
new cases as either analytic or synthetic
tend to agree in classifying
on the use of the
and they claim that "where there is agreement
an
with
to
involved
there must
open class,
respect
expressions
be some kind of distinction
present."21
necessarily
They identify
this distinction
with
the analytic-synthetic
it
distinction,
taking
to be a further question whether
claims about this
philosophical
only
technical

generally
generally

19
20
thetic,"
Hilary

explanatory

can

power,

be

supported.

these philosophers
place on an account of the
distinction
is that on any adequate
account
truths
called "analytic" should turn out to be analytic and truths
called "synthetic"
should turn out to be synthetic.
For

restriction

Grice

and

Grice

Strawson,

and

of

op.

Strawson,
of the

Proceedings
"The
Putnam,

Philosophy
Minnesota,
21

its

about

e.g.,

disinction,

The

Science,
op.

Jonathan
Society,

and the Synthetic,"

Analytic
and
III, ed. by H. Feigl

1962).
Putnam,

cit.

op. cit.;
Aristotelian

cit.,

p.

360.

Bennett,
"Analytic-syn
LIX
163-88.
(1959),
pp.
Minnesota
Studies
in the
G.

Maxwell

(Minneapolis,

GILBERTHARMAN

138
these
one

the ascription

philosophers
to

an

explanatory

other

out

case

paradigm

there

that

"show"

would

fail

that witches

does

not

commit

case argument
to a paradigm
for the
than
and it is no more
convincing

In effect, this amounts

existence
of analytic
truths;
any

of analyticity

claim.

argument.

are or were

to have

An

witches,

analogous

argument

it turns
although
There
is a
powers.
and truths that seem

supernatural
that seem analytic
and that distinction
(to those who accept the distinction),
synthetic
use
on
and "syn
the
of
"underlies"
agreement
"analytic"
general
But to call this distinction
thetic" with respect to an open class.
between

distinction

truths

the analytic-synthetic
with
witch distinction
who

people

witches)
One

do not

the witch-non
is like identifying
the distinction
between people who seem and
seem to be witches
in
believe
(to those who
distinction

.22

talk
to reflect on why philosophers
introduce
see
of
taken
to
have
that
ascription
they
generally
analyticity
to
the
power.
possess explanatory
Historically,
analytic
analyticity
or
an epistemological
reflected
has always
distinction
synthetic
we
or
"How
do
know
is
true?"
this
distinction,
"Why
metaphysical
In the twentieth
is this true?"
century one has only to mention
has

only

about

the introduction
of talk about analytic
or
to see the purported
epistemological
was supposed
to
of such talk. Phenomenalism

those views associated with

equivalence
ity or meaning

metaphysical
point
of the external world.
account
for our knowledge
some
to
for the relation
account
was supposed
by
and body;
supposed

between

mind

and it (or talk about "logically

adequate criteria") was
of other minds.
by others to account for our knowledge

22
Quine
he

Behaviorism

of
on

course

agrees
the mechanism

are apparently
and
truths,
analytic
in Word
and
"intuitions"
analyticity
to identify
of analyticity
the notion
refuses
are blameless
in their
"The
intuitions
there

that

speculates
But he
66-67.
Object,
pp. 56-57,
with
that of apparent
analyticity.
be a mistake
it would
but
way,

of

to look to them
for a sweeping
epistemo
as by-products
of language
and
between
truths
dichotomy
analytic
on the world"
as reports
Cf.
and Object,
truths
(Word
p. 67).
synthetic
not
this would
in syntactical
"Even
truth were
if logical
terms,
specifiable
and Logical
it was
in language"
show
Truth,"
p. 119).
("Carnap
grounded
See also W.
V. Quine,
of Katz,"
Journal
"On a Suggestion
of Philosophy,
2 (February
LXIV,
2, 1967),
pp. 52-4.
logical

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

Ethical
know

was

naturalism
the truth

Consider

139

by some to account for how we can

Etc.
principles.
how the usage of philosophers
who dis

intended

of ethical

furthermore

truths is affected by changes

in their
tinguish analytic and synthetic
or imagined.
As
beliefs about the limits of what can be conceived
come
see
can
more
to
be
that
than
had
imagined
they
thought,
they
of analyticity.
certain
At first, most
ascriptions
they retract
philosophers

would
"All

animals,"

take the following

are

bachelors

"All cats are

to be analytic:
is

"Red

unmarried,"

etc.

color,"

to them, some
After having certain imaginary
situations described
no
not
will
of
these
take
these to be
(but
all)
longer
philosophers
After
what
like
if
it
would
be
those
analytic.
imagining
things
we call "cats" should turn out to be radio controlled
some
robots,
"
to "All cats are animals."
refuse to ascribe analyticity
philosophers
After imagining what
it would be like if a flaw in the divorce courts
had made

almost

no

ascribe

all recent

some

divorces

invalid,
to "All bachelors

philosophers
are unmarried."24
analyticity
it would be like to discover
After imagining what
that things look
red partly as the result of an extremely high pitched sound emitted
by red objects such that, if we were to go deaf, the objects would
no longer ascribe analyticity
look grey, some philosophers
to "Red
longer

is a color."

some philosophers
Given these and other examples,
all
of
give up
ascription
analyticity.
Consideration
of such examples
tends to destroy one's ability
to identify
as analytic,
sentences
just as careful study of certain
women
can destroy
as witches.
to identify people
one's
ability
one
cannot vindicate
Therefore
the weak
truth
theory of analytic
or
to
talk
about
by simple appeal
philosophical
meaning,
ordinary
and analyticity.
definition,
synonymy,
the
claim involved
justify
explanatory
a
moment
I shall discuss
In
meaning."
intensional

postulates

23
(October
34
Journal
goes

on

objects

(meanings

Cf. Putnam,
25,
Cf.

"It Ain't Necessarily

1962),
p. 660.
E. Moravcsic,
J. M.
"The

LXII,
of Philosophy,
to defend
the necessity

16

Instead one must

explicitly
in "equivalent
by virtue of
a defense of this claim that

(August
of "Blue

So,"

and/or

Journal

Analytic
26, 1965),
is a color."

propositions).

of Philosophy,
and
pp.

LIX,

the Nonempirical,"
421-423.
Moravcsic

22

140

GILBERTHARMAN
I can think

The only other defense

conventional
definition.

of exploits

the notion

of explicit

to be more
is supposed
Such definition
than mere explication,
more
than
the
of
and
sufficient conditions,
i.e.,
necessary
provision
to provide what
since explicit conventional
definition
is supposed
are sometimes
called "logically" necessary
and sufficient conditions.
The claim is that when we introduce a new expression
by explicitly
an old expression,
it to be equivalent with
the
are thereby made equivalent
of
virtue
meaning.
by

defining
pressions
But

of

now,

our

course,

old

returns.

worry

two

ex

Conventional

is a kind of postulation,
of an equivalence.
the postulation
of
virtue
conventional
definition
is equivalence
Equivalence
by
to
of
one's
lies in
certain
The
according
postulates.
difficulty
definition

can
definitions
by virtue of conventional
as
with
the
the
full
equivalence,
just
corresponding
difficulty
to
blooded
one's pos
theory lies in seeing how truth according
seeing
ensure

how

tulates

can

equivalence

truth.

guarantee

holds the key to analyticity

People who believe that definition
in the formalization
of some body
may be misled
by what happens
or theory.
Often this is done by specifying
certain
of information
use
that
then
those
terms,
terms,
giving postulates
only
primitive
It may appear that the
other terms by "definition."
introducing
desired analytic truths of the interpreted
theory are those equivalent
to
But
A
such
definition
truths.
this is an illusion.
logical
by
can
in
of
doctrine
be
formalized
various
for
various
ways
body
as
one Avay will
take certain predicates
and
purposes:
primitive
a different
another way will make
distinction
others as defined,
sets of sen
and defined predicates.
between
Different
primitive
as definitionally
to logical
count
truths
equivalent
one
on
to
has
formalize.
how
decided
Such definitional
depending
on formalization,
to a logical truth will vary depending
equivalence
of one's terms will not.
the meaning
Therefore
this sort
although
a logical truth is not the same as
to
of definitional
equivalence
in meaning
with a logical truth.
equivalence
tences

will

Postulation
meaning

to describe

of

one's

often
terms

an old one,
truth.

itself guarantee

a way

provides
when

even

one

of partially

introduces

though
In particular,

a new

specifying
theory

such postulation
the postulation

the

or wants

does not by
of an equi

QUINE ON MEANING
valence

in a definition
terms

person's

AND

EXISTENCE,

can help

even

141

the meaning
of a certain
cannot
guarantee
postulation
the same
introduce
people may

to specify
such

though
two
Furthermore,
equivalence.
such
in
different
that "synthetic"
ways
theory
are true by definition
to the one presentation

statements

according

plus logic according

terms in the two presenta
reason differ in meaning.

to the other, although

the corresponding
tions of the theory will not for that
Therefore
definition
does not hold the key to analyticity.25
This concludes
of Quine's
initial arguments
my discussion
sum
the
distinction.
To
up these argu
against
analytic-synthetic
one
the
of
commits
to. an explanatory
ments,
ascription
analyticity
can be true or knowable
claim, the claim that something
by virtue
or at least that two sentences
can be equivalent
of meaning
by
But so far we have seen no way in which mean
virtue of meaning.
ing might
provide
theories
of meaning
e.g.,

objects,

meanings

such
that
or

We

explanation.
postulate
propositions.

the

must

now

existence

of

we

have

When

is wrong
with
and have understood
such theories
native, we will be able to appreciate more fully what
distinction.
the analytic-synthetic

consider
intensional
seen

Quine's
is wrong

what

alter
with

intensional
is often used to express
objects.
Against
Language
a speaker's
some
this
attitudes.
To
psychological
philosophers
fact is incompatible with Quine's
rejection of the notion of meaning
are equivalent
say two sentences
equivalence.
They would
by
of meaning
if they express the same psychological
attitude,
same
the
if
belief.
e.g.,
they express
sen
If the same belief can be expressed
by several different
a
as
cannot
be
belief
construed
the
then
tences,
acceptance of
simply
a sentence.
some philosophers
Therefore
hold that psychological

virtue

states represent
attitudes
toward propositions,
that belief is
e.g.,
the acceptance
of a proposition.
Quine objects to this analysis and
of propositional
claims
that the postulation
attitudes
underlying
to offer an explanation
without
one's sentential
attitudes purports
really doing so. He agrees that there are such things as accepting
a sentence
a sentence
a
(as true), desiring
(to be true), thinking
25

Cf.

"Two

Dogmas,"

p.

35;

"Carnap

and

Logical

Truth,"

pp.

110-113.

142

GILBERTHARMAN

sentence

attitudes underly
(true), etc. but denies that propositional
sentential
In particular
attitudes.
he denies
that a person
a
a
or meaning
sentence
because
he
accepts
accepts
proposition
that
sentence.26
expressed by

these

that people
have noticed
often
Philosophers
identify beliefs
expressed by different sentences.
They infer that belief must be the
of something more basic than a sentence.
acceptance
They have
are ordinarily
two different
also noticed
that when
sentences
said
are also said to
to express the same belief, these sentences
same meaning.
So they have identified
the underlying
or meaning.
the acceptance
of a proposition
The fallacy in the argument
lies in a switch between
use of "means the same."
nary and philosophical
People

have

the
as

belief

the ordi

ordinar
are
if
ily say
they
relatively
in truth value by virtue of generally
obviously
equivalent
accepted
For example,
in 1966 the sentence
principles.
"Lyndon Johnson
has travelled to Vietnam" would be taken to mean
the same (in the
as
sense
sentence
of
the
"means
"The Presi
the
same")
ordinary
that

two

of the United

dent

mean

sentences

States

has

same

the

a
to Vietnam,"
although
are
to say these sentences

travelled

does not want

philosopher
of
virtue
the theory of propo
Therefore,
meaning.
equivalent
by
talk about
sitional attitudes not only fails to account for ordinary
as
an
account
but
talk
of
about
etc.,
beliefs,
desires,
ordinary
even implies things
sameness
of meaning
that are false, since it
linguistic

that the two cited sentences

predict
mean
the same.
be said to
Quine's
theory
To account for ordinary views he need not

would

basic

different

the

such

attitude.

are

often

ordinarily
such problem.
that any more

assume
He

can observe

that

in ordinary
on
that depends

"identified"

is a shifting
postulation

thing
of something

behind

sentence.

offers

Translation

26

pp.

identification

and does not presuppose

of meanings,

"The

attitudes

sentential
but

speech;
context

a sentential

underlies

attitude

not

would
has no

Word

Problem
47-48.

since

and

another

translation

Object,
of Meaning

reason

for postulating
by some

is supposed

from
"Flight
in Linguistics,"

Intension,"
From

propositions
philosophers

220-221.
pp.
esp.
a Logical
Point
of

to

Cf.
View,

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

consist

a sentence

in finding
or

meaning

the

expresses

in one

same

143
that

language

as

proposition

"has"

given

the same

sentence

in

the other.
Quine argues that this is not a correct account of trans
no sense to speak of the translation
because
it makes
of a
lation,
one
a
sentence
sentence
of
into
of
another
single
language
language
apart from other translations
that translation must
always

one would

That

make.

is, Quine says

of a
against the background
proceed
from the one language
to the other.
scheme of translation
general
or
in
translation
from
of
to
French
talking
English
Ordinarily,
a
some
scheme
is
such
Without
German,
etc.,
accepted.
generally
of translation
scheme
the notion
(i.e., the
general
presupposed
notion

of "radical"

of the indeterminacy
For

translation)
of radical
are

there

example,

is indeterminate;
translation.27
various

ways

to

hence

translate

his

thesis

number

von Neumann
one may identify
Following
theory into set theory.
Fol
the set of all smaller numbers.
each (natural) number with
one
set
of
Zermelo
with
the
unit
each
number
may identify
lowing
its predecessor.
Either series of identifications
translation
permits
of number
and apart from some such
of all sentences
theory;
is the
it makes no sense to ask what
of translation,
statement
of an isolated
of number
theory or
what
is the correct way to identify number with
sets.28 Without
to a general
reference
scheme of translation,
the notion
of the
of an isolated sentence of number
translation
is
indetermi
theory
general
correct

scheme

translation

nate.

claims
that this kind of indeterminacy
holds
for
Quine
in
radical translation
general.
all reasonable
conditions
have been placed on possible
When
from number
general schemes of translation
theory into set theory,
several

still satisfy all the conditions.

Both schemes men
Both are relatively
truth.
simple.
Nothing
them except
the purposes
of the moment.

schemes

tioned
can

above preserve
decide between

27
28

and

Word
Paul

chapters
"What

two

and

six.

Could
Not
Be,"
Philosophical
Structure
Goodman,
of Appear
"Constructional
Definition."
one,
(New York,
1966),
chapter
was
out
aware
see his
that Frege
of this
fact;
points
in Philosophy
of Number,"
in America,
ed. by Max Black
Concept
New York,
1965).

LXXIV
Review,
2nd ed.
ance,
Charles
Parsons
"Frege's
(Ithaca,

Object,

Benacerraf,

(1965),

pp.

47-73.

Numbers

Nelson

144

GILBERTHARMAN

Either
do

scheme

not

provide

for which
These

one

exactly

in number

value

for example

(Consider

into

translated

before

theory
a true

sentence

the

differ

by

even

sentence

sentence

Neumann's

value.

false
"The

receives

into

they

sentences

in truth

true nor

translation
von

are

There

This

member."

Yet

translations.

that
translations
they provide
are counted
sentences
neither

latter
has

translations.

equivalent

translation.
two

a set of acceptable

provides

before
number

no

truth

set theory.
scheme

of

It is
trans

it comes out false on Zermelo's

claims
lation;
scheme.)
Quine
cases of radical
to all interesting
that these points can be generalized
In general
translation.
there will be several possible
schemes of
on such a scheme,
conditions
we cannot
Therefore
translations.
yet provide nonequivalent
speak
a
from
of translation
scheme
of
radical trans
translation;
apart
lation is always
the postulation
and consequently
indeterminate;
or propositions
of meanings
is not vindicated
by the possibilities
of translation
from one language
into another.
translation

that satisfy

to see this more

In order
connection

all reasonable

between

of language must ultimately

and this requires
behavior,
states,

e.g.,

desires

lation

only

of

clearly we must examine the intimate

A general
and psychology.
theory
to
and other
attempt
explain linguistic
the postulation
of certain psychological

translation

and

sentential

beliefs.
attitudes,

Some
e.g.,

explanation
one
can

requires
explain

postu
why

a particular
sentence by assuming
he is freely
sentence
the
he
has
uttered.
and
accepts
thoughts

has uttered

person

his

expressing
can agree that the evidence warrants
and his opponents
Quine
over the
of
attitudes.
sentential
such
postulation
They disagree
of
the radical translation
the sen
value of knowing
explanatory
one
tence toward which
the speaker has an attitude.
The more
must

knowr

psychological

a translation
in order to provide
good
more
the
explanations,
justified he is in postulating
that underlie
attitudes.
attitudes
sentential

about

such

propositional
The behavioral

evidence
relevant
to a particular
hypothesis
as
be
construed
the behavioral
evidence
translation
may
about the psychological
relevant to a particular hypothesis
explana
The issue then is whether
this evidence
tion of that behavior.
about

attitudes.
of propositional
Quine argues that
postulation
scheme of translation
in
do not need to know a very complete

warrants
we

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

145

a
i.e., that beyond
required
explanations,
serve equally well.
schemes of translation
behavior we may need to assume nonradical
we may need to assume
that there is some

order

to provide
the
certain point,
various
In order

to explain
i.e.,
translatability,
possible way to translate from his language to ours; but, according
to Quine, we do not need to assume that the speaker's sentence has
a particular

some

from

apart

i.e.,

meaning,

scheme

general

a particular

in this context
of

where

translation,

translation,
several

non

schemes are equally possible.

equivalent
or not Quine is right depends
sort of
Whether
largely on what
must
be satisfied by schemes of translation.
conditions
Indeter
is clearly inevitable unless there are fairly strong restraints.
minacy
assume that beliefs, desires,
etc.,
example, we must
are similar
to be translated
to
the language
speaking
beliefs and desires and that these beliefs and desires arise
etc.
If we did
ways
through observation,
deprivation,
For

of people
our own
in similar
not make

an assumption,
there would
be strong indeterminacy.
In a
one
scheme
of
translation
certain
case,
represent
might
particular
to be about cats.
sentences
On this scheme
of the language
the
such

relevant

beliefs
scheme

native

and desires

would
these

represent

might

be

similar

sentences

to ours.
as

being

An
about

alter
dogs,

on this scheme the relevant beliefs and desires come out quite
from ours such that these people are taken to believe that
like what we call a "cat" is really a dog, such
something
looking
to be caught,
there are mice
that they want dogs when
such that
meow
someone
than
etc.
rather
that
believe
If
bark,
dogs
they
we
cited
the
and
beliefs
would
desires,
expressed
speaking English
we
mean
A good
say that he meant
by "dog" what
by "cat."

where

different

of

scheme

translation

ascribes

translated
arise
arise.

etc.,

desires,
beliefs,
in ways similar to the ways
29

29
sentential

Notice

that

attitudes,
that
possibility

if one
one

believes
should

to the people whose

is
language
that are similar to our own and
our beliefs, desires, etc.,
in which

that

attitudes
underlie
one's
propositional
out
bothered
of ruling
by the problem
such
Cf. with
the philo
beliefs.
strange

be

have
the
people
of the inverted
spectrum:
problem
sophical
mean
that I might
is the problem
by "green"
of discovering
is no way
there
although
pp. 78-79.

for
what
this.

certain

there
philosophers
etc.,
you mean
by "red,"
See Word
and
Object,

GILBERTHARMAN

146

are partially determined

translations
by
we
we
want
to
be
the psychological
e.g.,
may
give,
explanations
are denials of others since we
able to discover
that certain sentences
a person
this in order to explain why
says
may have to postulate
some things
but not others.
that a
We may
have to assume
More

generally,

some

construction
represents
particular
how a person comes to accept P,
struction and also accepts Q. The
tion may enable us to explain how

if Q so that we can explain

that he accepts
that con
given
same translation
of the construc
P,

a person comes to desire true Q,

true
construction
and also desires true P.30
the
given
arises.
Even at this level some indeterminacy
Instead of trans
we
as
as
use not both
well
the
construction
P, if Q
might
just
lating
or
or
P
Some comfort may be taken from the
not-Q.
Q and not-P
that he desires

are always equivalent

in truth value.
translation
of
talk
fairly simple
indeterminacy
Similarly,
translations
about rabbits seems to be indeterminacy
among
equiv
sentence may receive as possible
A particular
alent in truth value.
fact

that

these

translations

in the

sentences

translations

like

"Here

is a rabbit,"

is an

"Here

instance

etc. These are

"Here is an undetached
of rabbithood,"
rabbitpart,"
one
is true if and only if, the others are true.31 But
in that
equivalent
is indeterminate
of truth functional
connectives
where
translation
of translation
truth functional
among
indeterminacy
equivalents,
sentences
of this talk about rabbits is indeterminate
among
equiva
This leads one to
lent by virtue of more
principles.
complicated
translation will be indeterminate
among sen
expect that, in general,
area trans
the
of
the
basic principles
tences equivalent by virtue of
that
would
expect
is indeterminate
among
theory, etc.

One

lated.
chemistry
chemical

the

translation

sentences

of

equivalent

sentences
by virtue

of
of

the view that trans

is incompatible
with
indeterminacy
same
and
sentences
the
that
express
equate
proposition
attitudes underlie
to refute the view that propositional
is enough
There will
but even more can be said.
one's sentential
attitudes;
. . . Two
translations.
be indeterminacy
among "utterly disparate
even be patently
in truth value,
such translations might
contrary
Such

lation must

30
31

Ibid.,

pp.

57-61.

Ibid.,

pp.

40-46,

68-72.

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

is no

there

provided

stimulation

147

that would

assent

encourage

to

either."32

the people
lan
(whose
Suppose on one scheme of translation
are assigned beliefs about numbers
is being translated)
and
Then
suppose we have reduced our number
theory to set theory.

guage

there will

from their number

be alternative
schemes of translation
our
some
set
where
of
these
into
alternatives
pro
theory,
theory
duce nonequivalent
translations
of single sentences;
and there is no
reason

to prefer one of these schemes to the other.

This example
a
case
of
the
clear
radical trans
of
strong
provides
indeterminacy
in the passage
cited above.
The sen
lation that Quine describes
to "The number
two has exactly one member"
tence corresponding
is a sentence
such that the speakers of the given
language
assign
it no truth value

assent to either
would
encourage
(no stimulation
truth values by the
; and it is assigned
contrary

it or its denial)
von

Neumann

and

Zermelo

translations.33

the possibility
of translation
to
from one language
Therefore,
the postulation
does not support
of intentional
another
objects,
or propositions.
ante
Translation
does not require
meanings,
sentences
relations
between
of
different
existing meaning
cedently
scheme of translation
from
apart from some presupposed
languages
A person's
of a sentence
the one language to the other.
acceptance
in another language does not represent an underlying
propositional
scheme of translation,
attitude such that, apart from a presupposed
our acceptance
the same attitude could be said to underlie
of a
sentence in our language.
view.
Further
that the
Quine believes
description
of Quine's
one
in
to
sentences
consists
has
attitudes
basic psychological
reality
32

73-74.

33 Ibid., pp.
Actually Quine envisions a slightly different possibility
cited,
either
In

since

translation

a better

would

he

example
sentence

two
S

that

no
to

than

stimulation
the

different
into

sentence
translations

argument.

and

would
translated
of

in the passage

encourage
as in this

assent

to

example.
one
into
another
theory
where
the new
theory

?7 respectively,
asserts
T if and only
but does not decide
which
of T and U
if not-U
an even
cited makes
the passage
In context
claim
than
stronger
to him;
but this extra
to the purposes
is irrelevant
attribute
strength

present

take

suggests
rather

is true.
that
of

I
the

GILBERTHARMAN

148
in one's
and

language
along with
these attitudes
between

their

these attitudes
among
causes
and effects
(e.g.,
must
agree that there are

His opponents
and speech).
and
causes,
connections,

observation
such

connections
and

attitudes,

effects;

but they
intensional

also

ob
meanings,
propositions,
seen that Quine argues that this postulation
is
with
of
is
the
it
radical
because
wrong
incompatible
indeterminacy
I shall now
translation.
In order to make his case more plausible,
postulate
jects, etc.

underlying
We have

say a few things

His account

about Quine's
of translation

theory

of meaning.

the basis of an account of

provides
a
the words
person
disagreement.
Ordinarily
interprets
in the same way
spoken by other speakers of the "same language"
trans
that he interprets his own words,
i.e., he takes the obvious

verbal

lation

He can do
to apply, call it the "identity
schemo."
the identity scheme ascribes to others roughly the same
the same methods
of belief formation
he has and roughly

scheme

this because
beliefs

for desires
(and similarly
there is no obvious
because
because of an epistemological

and

other

attitudes),
psychological
that does as well,
and also
that favors assumptions
conservatism
one has been making
there are reasons
all along.34
Occasionally
a relatively
this conservatism.
Sometimes
obvious
for overriding
of the identity translation will translate beliefs,
modification
etc.,
that appear to diverge from one's own beliefs, etc., into beliefs, etc.,
If so, one will accept the modified
transla
similar to one's own.
alternative

in belief to be
apparent
disagreement
no
there is
distinc
In general
real (underlying)
"merely verbal."
a difference
in view and a difference
in meaning.
But
tion between

tion

scheme

and

take

the

to override
is systematic
to a degree sufficient
if the disagreement
our conservative
to the identity scheme,
then we call
commitment
we call it a difference
in
otherwise
in meaning;
it a difference
belief.
in
this is to begin to see the mistake
involved
To understand
of
this
distinction
distinction.
the analytic-synthetic
Proponents
without
claim that one cannot give up basic analytic
principles
a real
This
one's
the
of
words.
presupposes
meaning
changing
to
one's
view
between
and
distinction
changing
only appearing

I shall

say more

about

this

conservatism

in Part

Two

of

this

paper.

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

149

the meaning
of words used to state
change one's view by changing
it. The trouble with
this is that any change
from one view to
it will tend to make
another tends to involve a change in meaning;
the identity translation
less good,
since one defect in a scheme of
too
translation may be that it ascribes to others beliefs diverging
can say that any change
in view repre
from ours. We
radically
in meaning,
sents some change
since a sufficient number
of small
we
as a
to
sort
will
lead
the
of
in
view
describe
change
changes
in meaning.
small successive
(To see this imagine
change
so
one
cats
in
one's
beliefs
and
about
that
dogs
changes
eventually
one
comes
cats
to believe
about
what
believes
about dogs and
clear

vice

versa.)

Given

a small

(or the
change in view the change in meaning
to change
in meaning)
is slight.
Should we
say that
tendency
our terms no longer mean
to mean?
This
what
they used
same
the question whether
resembles
is
still
the
if
color
something
can
its color has changed
of
Sameness
represent
meaning
slightly.
a strict

relation
equivalence
the latter.
represents

or a similarity

relation.

Ordinarily

it

The theory that there is an analytic-synthetic

distinction
may
well be the result of confusing
in meaning
exact
with
similarity
sameness
one gives up certain
in meaning.
When
the
principles
of one's words may remain sufficiently
similar to permit
meaning
us to say they still mean
the same thing;
and this may fail to be
if one gives up certain
support the analytic-synthetic

true

other

But that does not

principles.
distinction.
has changed
Meaning
somewhat
in either case,
the
translation
between
i.e.,
identity
as
a
as it is
not
is
with
different
theories
translation
persons
good
two people who
both hold the same theory.
Whether
a
on
there
is
in
whether
say
change
meaning
actually
depends
we can find a
that
translation
etc.
better
beliefs,
preserves
simple
than the identity translation.
between

we

see where proponents

of the analytic-synthetic
distinction
go wrong,
suppose a theory changes twice and let A, B, and C
successive
states of the theory.
The change between A
represent
and B and also that between B and C can both be
so
slight enough
that we say our theoretical
terms have not changed meaning
in the
move
from A to ? or again in the move
from B to C. That is, in
To

may

GILBERTHARMAN

150

between A and B or between B and C, the identity trans

translating
It does not follow that in the
is best.
lation, although not perfect,
terms have not changed
overall move
from A to C our theoretical
in
since
A and C some translation
between
meaning,
translating
same
be better
than the identity
translation.
Thus when
may
sameness of meaning
is similar meaning,
is not transitive
same
is
for
color
when
this
similar
But pro
color).
(similarly
the
of
distinction
need
ponents
analytic-synthetic
transitivity.
They
want to say that because there has been no change
in meaning,
the
move
from A to B has not changed
the analytic
statements
of
meaning

of the theory and similarly for the move

from
"meaning postulates"
B to C. Therefore
there ought to be no such change
in the move
to be no change
to C;
from i
there ought
in
and this means
in the move

from A to C. The mistake

lies in confusing
A
holds
of
between
and B and also
which
meaning,
similarity
between B and C but not between A and C, with exact sameness of
none of these (although
which
holds between
if it did
meaning,
hold between A and B and also between B and C it would
also hold
are also responsible
between A and C).
No doubt other confusions
meaning

for

the

analytic-synthetic

distinction;

but

this probably

plays

role.

major

to be
Quine takes ambiguity
Finally a word about ambiguity.
a special case of the effect of context on acceptance
and rejection
a sentence
of sentences.
is ambiguous
if its
speaking,
Roughly
Here one may feel that some
changes with context.35
out
the difference
been
of
in
left
Quine's
thing
theory:
an
one
on
can
sentence.
A sentence
ambiguous
interpretation
place
on
come
true
such
be
out
all
still
may
yet
ambigu
interpretations
truth

value
has

ous.

for these differences

without
Can Quine account
assuming
or
with
associates
ambiguous
varying meanings
propositions
asso
to him a person
Of course he can.
sentences?
According
with
sentences.36
Para
ciates varying
ambiguous
paraphrases

one

in the speaker's
not sentences
language,
phrases will be sentences
or sentence substitutes
in some universal
of
language
propositional
attitudes.
The varying
what
the speaker
represent
paraphrases
35

Word
86
Ibid.,

and
pp.

p. 129.
Object,
129, 191-195.

151

QUINE ON MEANING AND EXISTENCE,I

sentence given a particular

to the ambiguous
is not that of "meaning
here
of equivalence
an
taken to
of
but rather the notion
equivalence
equivalence,"
of
the relevant group
from what
follow fairly obviously
people
or
the
hearer)
accepts.
speaker
(possibly only
I have tried to explain Quine's
In this part of my discussion
and the postu
the
that
distinction,
analytic-synthetic
arguments
cannot
and
lation of intentional
propositions,
objects, meanings
talk
about
or
to
be justified by appeal either
ordinary
philosophical
or
know
can
truth
or by the view that meaning
explain
meaning,
for
that also accounts
of translation
account
a
or
correct
ledge,
by
to this argument
and ambiguity.
verbal disagreement
According
are no better off than other bad scientific
such theories of meaning
To
and of the ether.
such as the theories of phlogiston
theories
of
the
in
a
of
to accept such
Quine's
continue
light
meaning
theory
the theory
some reply,
is to make
without
offering
arguments,
This
it into a religious
It is to render
theory.
meaningless.
dis
to
will prove difficult
that such theories of meaning
suggests
lies in
achievement
greatest
Quine's
argument.
lodge by mere
to
be
that
shown
dislodged.
they ought
having
takes to be equivalent
The notion
context.

(To be continued)
Princeton

University.