CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law

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MALLARI v. CA
265 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 110569, December 9, 1996
Homicide / Illegal Possession of Firearms / Lawful Arrests / Proof Beyond
Reasonable Doubt
FACTS: On December 27, 1990, Pat. Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both then
assigned at the Capas Police Station, received reliable information that appellant Diosdado
Mallari, who has a standing warrant of arrest for Homicide in 1989, was seen at Sta. Rita,
Capas, Tarlac. Immediately upon receipt of such information, with personal knowledge of the
existence of a standing warrant of arrest against appellant, they proceeded to Sta. Rita,
Capas, Tarlac. Upon reaching the place, the arresting officers surrounded the house of
appellant and arrested him. Thereupon, the arresting officers searched him and found a
homemade gun (paltik) with one M-16 live ammunition. He was brought to the Capas Police
Station where he was endorsed to the chief investigator while the homemade gun and live
ammunition were endorsed to the property custodian.
At the time of the arrest and seizure of the gun and live ammunition, the officers did not
have with them a search and seize warrant. They did not possess the standing warrant
arrest for the Homicide case as well. However, they contended that they knew that there
was a standing warrant of arrest. And at such, they did not possess the said warrant because
they were in a hurry that if they will wait for the warrant officer, they may not reach the
accused to effect his arrest immediately. When they returned to Capas Police Station,
however, they reached the warrant officer and the warrant was shown to Mallari.
After investigation, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. The trial court and the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions. He, however, insists
that there was no standing warrant for his arrest, thereby making the search and seizure
invalid. He posits that the absence of the requisite warrant is fatal and renders the search
and seizure unlawful. He also claims that even assuming that the handgun and ammunition
had in fact been found in his possession, the prosecution failed to prove that he had no
license therefor and absent this essential element of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms, it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to uphold his conviction.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the search and seizure could be validly effected as it
was done on the occasion of a lawful warrantless arrest, particularly, while in the act of
committing the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the presence of the arresting
officers. Also, the Office of the Solicitor General did not attempt to point out any evidence on
record of petitioners non-possession of a license or permit for there really is no such
evidence. It relied on the theory that as the firearm involved is a homemade gun or paltik
and is illegal per se, it could not have been the subject of license. This, according to the
Solicitor General, dispenses with the necessity of proving that petitioner had no license to
possess the firearm.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the arresting officer needs to have the warrant in his possession at
the time of the arrest
2.) Whether or not there is a need to prove that there is in fact no license to possess the
firearm
HELD:
1.) No. The applicable provision is Section 7, Rule 113 which allows a police officer to
effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. The rule

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allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the
time of the arrest. Thus, appellants arrest being lawful, the search and seizure made
incidental thereto is likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant.
2.) Yes. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden
of proving the elements thereof, (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the
fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess the same. The latter is a negative fact which constitutes
an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the
prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. In the
case at bench, the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from the PNP
that petitioner was not a licensee of the said firearm would have sufficed for the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of
illegal possession. The absence of the foregoing is fatal to the prosecution's case and
renders petitioner's conviction erroneous.
The Court did not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a
homemade gun, it is illegally manufactured and cannot be issued a license or permit, and is
no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. This appears to be at first blush, a very
logical proposition. However the Court did not yield to it because nothing was said about
such, that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or permit and that proof that a firearm is
a paltik dispenses with proof that it is unlicensed. Hence, the accused was acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.
RATIO: Sec. 8. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. - When making an
arrest by virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of
the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest,
except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to
inform him or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The
officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but
after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to
him as soon as practicable.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden
of proving the elements thereof, (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b)
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess the same.
--PEOPLE v. CALING
208 SCRA 821, G.R. No. 94784, May 8, 1992
Homicide / Illegal Possession of Firearms
FACTS: On August 2, 1989, Emerchon Pua, a truck driver, was drinking beer and gin in front
of his house, together with Marcelino Alindayu, and four others. Emerchons brother,
Raymundo Pua, was also there. It was while they were thus occupied that another truck
driver, Angelito Caling, arrived at the place, driving a truck, with Felino Neri. Calings truck
could not pass the road leading to his employers house because two of Emerchons own
trucks, were blocking the way. Caling asked Emerchon to move his trucks, but the latter said,
"Sorry, the truck wont start." Obviously irritated, Caling then roughly backed up his truck
and took another road to his employers residence. Not long afterwards, while at his
employers house, Caling heard one of Emerchons trucks being started. Believing they had
been lied to and unnecessarily inconvenienced, Caling and Felino Neri decided to confront
Emerchon. Neri had with him an M-14 rifle.

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Caling and Neri saw Emerchon in his truck. Caling forthwith went up the stepping or running
board of the vehicle and said to him: "Putang ina mo, pare, umaandar pala, sabi mo hindi
umaandar, para kang hindi logger, pareho tayo lahat loggers." Emerchon replied that the
truck really would not start earlier, and he was unaccountably able to start it then, "only by
chance." At this point, two shots were heard from the rear of the truck, after which Calings
companion, Felino Neri, ran towards Emerchon stating the obvious, that he had a rifle. Caling
allegedly told Neri, "Banatan mo na, pare." Neri then fired at Emerchon, hitting him below
the chest, on the left side of the abdomen. Raymundo took hold of him, and rushed him to
the Isabela Provincial Hospita. Nothing could however be done for Emerchon. He expired
from the bullet wounds inflicted on him, numbering two, according to the physician who
conducted the post-mortem examination.
The Trial Court found Calings guilt of the crime, as co-conspirator, and rendered judgment
convicting Caling "as co-principal of the special complex crime of Illegal Possession of
Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph
of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended.
Caling has then appealed and attributes to the Trial Court the following errors: 1) failing to
perceive that "the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish all the essential elements
of the crime charged"; and 2) "finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of illegal possession of unlicensed firearm used in homicide."
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a special complex crime of Illegal Possession of
Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide
HELD: No. The Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as "the
special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as
provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended," and
declaring Caling guilty thereof. What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material
to the present case, is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully
possess any firearm . . . (or) ammunition . . ." Obviously, possession of any firearm is
unlawful if the necessary permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is
attached the penalty of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. The gravamen
of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession of a firearm without
license. The crime may be denominated simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from its
aggravated form. Now, if, "with the use of an unlicensed firearm," a "homicide or murder is
committed," the crime is aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital
punishment. It is aggravated if the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of a
homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not
absorbed in the crime of possession of the unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter absorbed
in the former. The mere possession of a firearm without legal authority consummates the
crime under PD 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is made heavier by the firearms
use in a killing. The killing, whether homicide or murder, is obviously distinct from the act of
possession, and is separately punished and defined under the Revised Penal Code. The use
of an unlicensed firearm in the perpetration of a homicide or murder gives rise to the crime
of unlawful possession in its aggravated form, not the "special complex crime" of illegal
possession with homicide or murder. A prosecution for unlawful possession under PD 1866
can only result, assuming evidence of guilt to be adequate, in a conviction for unlawful
possession, simple or aggravated, not for homicide or murder.
In a prosecution for this offense, therefore, it is incumbent on the Government to prove, not
only that the accused was in possession of a firearm in this case, an M-14 rifle, but also
that said accused had not first obtained a license or permit therefor from the appropriate
authorities. Notable in the proofs of the prosecution is (1) the absence of any evidence to
establish that Neris possession of the rifle was unlawful; i.e., no license or permit had been

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first obtained therefor; and (2) the absence of the rifle itself. Of course, the actuality of
Felino Neris possession of a rifle, supposedly an M-14, cannot but be conceded, in view of
the evidence. There is, however, nothing in the record by which a conclusion of whether that
rifle is unlicensed or not and therefore unlawfully possessed or not - may be drawn. Given
this indisputable circumstance, it is not possible to find either Neri or Caling guilty of
unlawful possession of the weapon. If the crime of simple unlawful possession of firearm
cannot be ascribed to Caling or Neri, a fortiori, the offense of unlawful possession in its
aggravated form cannot be imputed to them.
RATIO: "SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. If homicide
or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed."
The elements of the offense of what may be denominated "simple illegal
possession" under PD 1866 are two: (a) possession of a firearm or ammunition,
and (b) lack or absence of prior license or permit to possess the same.
--PEOPLE v. MOLINA
292 SCRA 742, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998
Murder with Special Aggravating Circumstance of Using Unlicensed Firearms
FACTS: On August 14, 1989, at Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Ilagan, Province of
Isabela, a shooting incident, reportedly between two political factions, resulted in the death
of a town mayor, a Sangguniang Bayan member and two others; and the wounding of at
least six other persons after a heated conversation at a funeral wake. The accused, had in
their respective possessions the following firearms, to wit: Veriato Molina - an M-14 armalite
rifle; Ruben Molina - a cal. 38 revolver; Gregorio Gajas, Casimiro Castillo and Jesus Ariola - M16 armalite rifles; and John Doe, Richard Doe, Michael Doe, and Mark Doe - M-16 armalite
rifles and a cal. 30 garand rifle, which were loaded with their corresponding ammunitions,
without the necessary license and/or authority to possess and carry the said firearms and
ammunitions outside their residence issued by the corresponding government authorities,
and which they used in the shooting and killing of Mayor Bonifacio Uy, Municipal Councilor
Antonio Manaligod, Jaime Vargas, and Policarpio Estrada, and the serious wounding of
Manuel Mariano, Andres Figarola, Moises de la Cruz, and Wilma Acierto with intent to kill,
treachery, abuse of superiority and with the aid of armed men and of nocturnity.
The trial court further concluded that the crime committed was multiple murder and
frustrated murder qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and use of armed men.
The lower court also found both accused-appellants guilty of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions. Evidence recovered from the crime scene included a Smith and Wesson
revolver (.38 caliber), bearing SN (Serial Number) C617376, and six spent shells which were
found by the NBI to have been fired from the aforementioned revolver. The Firearms and
Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, Quezon City, certified that said revolver had been issued to
Veriato Molina of Amulung, Cagayan; and that Ruben Molina was likewise a licensed holder
of a registered revolver, Orohm Caliber .22, with SN 232904. Neither appellant, however,
had a permit to carry any firearm outside his residence.

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Upon conviction by the trial court, Veriato and his uncle Ruben, filed their Notice of Appeal
on several assignment of errors upon the trial court, two of which are on the Multiple Murder
and Multiple Frustrated Murder Cases and on the Illegal Possession of Firearms Case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases
HELD: In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and (2) the fact that
the accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, did not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess or carry the same outside his residence.
Both elements have been indubitably proven by the prosecution. Witnesses categorically
stated that both appellants held firearms during the incident -- Veriato, an M-14; and Ruben,
a handgun. Recovered from the scene of the crime were a revolver, which was later
confirmed as registered in the name of Appellant Veriato Molina, and spent shells expelled
from it as well as from other high-caliber weapons. Neither of the appellants, though both
registered owners of handguns, was legally authorized to carry such gun outside his
residence, according to a certification issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit.
Neither was Appellant Veriato authorized to possess an M-14 rifle, the weapon he used in
killing Bonifacio Uy. Obviously, the use of an M-14 rifle was unauthorized because this
weapon cannot be licensed in favor of, nor carried by, private individuals. With these pieces
of evidence, appellants should be held liable for violation of Sec. 1 of PD 1866. Under our
ruling in People vs. Quijada, violation of PD 1866 is an offense distinct from murder;
appellants should perforce be culpable for two separate offenses, as ruled by the trial court.
Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and
considers the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder
or homicide, and not as a separate offense. Thus, the unauthorized use of a weapon which
has been duly licensed in the name of its owner/possessor may still aggravate the resultant
crime. In the case at bar, although appellants may have been issued their respective
licenses to possess firearms, their carrying of such weapons outside their residences and
their unauthorized use thereof in the killing of Bonifacio Uy may be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in imposing the proper penalty for murder.
All in all, appellants may be held liable only for murder with the special aggravating
circumstance of using unlicensed firearms. Nevertheless, the death penalty cannot be
imposed upon appellants, since the killing occurred in August 1989, when the imposition of
the capital penalty was still proscribed by the Constitution. Appellants Veriato Molina and
Ruben Molina are found guilty of murder for the death of Bonifacio Uy with the special
aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed firearms.
RATIO: While affirming the conviction of accused-appellants for the murder of the
late Mayor Bonifacio Uy, the Court applies in their favor Republic Act No. 8294,
which amended PD No. 1866. Under the new law, the use of an unlicensed weapon
in the commission of homicide or murder is considered simply as an aggravating
circumstance and no longer a separate offense. Thus, said law effectively
modified the courts ruling in People vs. Quijada, in which it was held that the use
of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes - one, for the
aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and, two, for homicide or murder.
--PEOPLE v. BORROMEO
G.R. No. 61873, October 31, 1984
Parricide

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FACTS: On July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to
Matilde Taborada, mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because
Elias was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told the child to go to Geronimo
Taborada, her son, who was then working in their mango plantation. Upon hearing the report
of the child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana's hut. The
windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats
at the wall where he saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead beside her onemonth old child who was crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on to a
bloody kitchen bolo.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police officers arrived.
The peace officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly that
he would smoke first before he would open the door. When he did, the peace officers found
Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her abdomen. A small kitchen bolo
was at her side. When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble
incoherent words. The trial court then found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding as it did that
appellant and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married in a church
wedding ceremony, when the officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage
contract executed on the occasion or later on; hence, the accused could only be liable for
homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide
HELD: Yes. In his testimony, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceasedvictim was his legitimate wife. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the
accused of the existence of such marriage. Person living together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant
violation of decency and law. And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the
registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof,
all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate
to the registry is not one of said requisites.
RATIO: The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in
law. The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not
concubinage: legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that persons
living together as husband and wife are married to each other.
--PEOPLE v. WAGAS
171 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 61704, March 8, 1989
Parricide
FACTS: On April 30, 1982, the deceased Victoria Wagas, her sister Felisca, and one Paulita,
were sitting outside the house of Berta Banis, talking about the strawberry plantation where
they had picked berries that morning. Suddenly, the accused, Nuepe Wagas, appeared
before them, then slapped Victorias right cheek, and thereupon, Nuepe pulled out a knife
from his pocket. The women scampered away, shouting for help. As Felisca ran, she looked

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back and saw that her sister Victoria had fallen into a canal and that Nuepe stabbed her
twice.
Victorias brother, Lamor, who had been chopping firewood, heard the shouts of the women.
He ran towards where Felisca stood, and he saw Victoria sprawled on her back and bleeding,
while Nuepe was standing about seven to eight meters away from her. Lamor went after
Nuepe but the latter ran away. He returned to pick up Victoria and then rushed her to the
Baguio General Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. After Victoria was
brought to the hospital, Nuepe went to their house. When the policemen arrived, they found
the accused sitting inside the bathroom, with the kitchen knife stained with fresh blood
which he had purportedly used to stab his wife to death and an empty bottle of poison
(Folidol) on his side. The policemen got him.
Nuepe was then convicted of parricide. The accused did not deny the killing of his spouse.
His defense was that the killing had been committed under exceptional circumstances. He
claimed that on that fateful day of April 30, he arrived home after selling strawberries in the
market, to find Victoria and a certain Jacinto Solano in the master bedroom, engaged in what
seemed to him like a sexual act. In a fit of fury, he allegedly rushed to the kitchen and
armed himself with a knife purportedly to protect himself from the man he caught with his
wife and who looked stronger than himself. When he returned to the bedroom, Jacinto had
dressed up and had gone out through the window. Giving chase and still failing to catch
Jacinto, he decided to return home to confront his wife.
He, however, found her not at the family abode, but at the house of Berta Banis. He said he
asked her why she had gone to bed with another man, but she only infuriated him when she
revealed her plan to separate from him. Hearing that, Nuepe slapped his wife. She ran away,
but he followed her to a slope where both of them rolled downhill. Then he noticed that
blood was gushing from Victorias chest. Still clutching his knife, he went home and closeted
himself in the bathroom where he broke down and cried and was later found by the police.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of causing the death of a person under exceptional
circumstances is tenable
HELD: No. Article 247 prescribes the essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a
legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter. The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the
husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery. (It can be vice-versa, the wife
killing the husband.) In the instant case, there was failure of the defense to prove the
alleged discovery of the sexual congress between Victoria and Jacinto Solano. On the
contrary, witnesses for the prosecution testified that Victoria had been with them picking
berries all morning of that fateful day. Nothing in the record of this case did the court find
any basis for doubting this testimonial evidence and not appreciating it as sufficient proof of
the fact of Victorias absence from their house all morning of April 30, 1981. The
improbability of the claimed adulterous rendezvous is thus apparent. In effect, the
uncorroborated testimony of Nuepe that his wife committed the ultimate act of infidelity was
successfully rebutted. His defense, therefore, has no leg to stand on.
RATIO: The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an
unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to
chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so
severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in
flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so

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that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.
--PEOPLE v. ABARCA
153 SCRA 735, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances
FACTS: On July 15, 1984, upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused,
the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away. The accused went to look for a
firearm. He went to the house of C2C Arturo Talbo and got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and
went back to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the
"mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing
mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina
Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing
mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley Koh died instantaneously
as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold Amparado
was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife, Lina Amparado,
was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments. The trial court then found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder.
The accused then contended that the trial court erred in convicting him for the crime
charged instead of entering a judgment of conviction under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Article 247 can be applied in the case
2) Whether or not the accused is liable for the injuries suffered by third persons
HELD:
1) Yes. Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the
accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and
the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal
Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that
he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death
caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have
been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the
accused's rage.
2) No. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple.
Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his
act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. But the case at bar
requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when
he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. The court cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for
frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

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RATIO: There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour,
the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went
out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the
following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills
any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements
are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of
murder, therefore erred.
--PEOPLE v. MILAGROS MABANSAG
G.R. No. L-46293, January 30, 1984
Parricide
FACTS: Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City) - The court a quo rendered judgment
finding Milagros Calma Mabansag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
The evidence for the prosecution has been summarized in the People's brief, in that the
accused had illicit relations with her co-accused Tiburcio Caparaz, to whom she had a
bigamous marriage with. The accused sought the services of violent men, accused
Pagsibigan and Peralta, to kill her husband, Francisco Mabansag, for a price. Tiburcio
Caparaz was later on discharged from the information to become a state witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a co-accused against another accused is probable
rendering the former credible
HELD: Yes. As stated above, the court has testimony of Tiburcio Caparaz. In a sense, his
testimony was tainted with treachery against his co-accused Mabansag with whom he had
illicit relations and with whom he was married against accused Pagsibigan and Peralta who
appeared to be violent men of whom he should be afraid, and against Aguilar, his own
compadre. It is for this reason that the court as shown above had to very examine this
testimony and to a whether it finds support on other corroborating evidence, testimony and
document There is still, however, one point that ought to be considered. Are the
circumsatnces narrated by Tiburcio Caparaz probable? For not only must the evidence come
from an able witness, but the evidence must demonstrate Probabilities and not
improbabilities. The instant case, as established by the testimony of Tiburcio Caparaz
presents this situation: Accused Mabansag is faced with a criminal prosecution by her
husband, Fransisco Mabansag, for adultery or bigamy in view of her illicit relations with
Tiburcio Caparaz and her marriage (bigamous) to him. She is determined to stop Francisco
Mabansag from filing a case against her. No woman would like to face a criminal suit. What
is more natural than to approach her paramour and disclose to him her plan to kill Francisco
Mabansag. She is able to obtain the services of accused Pagsibigan and Peralta. Her choice
is well made, for these men are violent men (who later on are to die violent deaths). The
plan to liquidate Francisco Mabansag is laid down for money consideration. There is nothing
more common than killers for money. The habits and movements of Francisco Mabansag are
studied. Killing is a serious business. For some reason or another, no occasion presents the
right time and place to execute the plan. Circumstances are not always within the control Of
the paid assassins. Then comes March 31, 1959, and all the four conspirators, Tiburcio
Caparaz, accused Mabansag, accused Peralta. accused Pagsibigan and accused Aguilar
successfully kill Fransisco Mabansag. The court finds nothing improbable in this series of
events or circumstances attested to by the testimony of Tiburcio Caparaz.
RATIO: The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that "the matter of assigning
value to declarations at the witness stand is best and most competently

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performed by a trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such
testimony in the light of the defendants demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between
the true and the false. The findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are not to be disturbed for the trial judge is in a better position to
appreciate the same, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their behavior and manner of testifying during the trial, unless there is
a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result
of the case; in the case at bar, there is no such showing.
--PIMENTEL v. MA. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
Parricide
FACTS: On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. On February 7, 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On
February 11 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide,
the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question in a criminal case
for parricide
HELD: No. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of
the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to
the filing of the criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants,
or his spouse. The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime
of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is
not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the
victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition

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in the civil case is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at
the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
RATIO: Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as one that arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
--PEOPLE v. OYANIB
G.R. No. 130634-35, March 12, 2001
Homicide / Parricide
FACTS: In 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita Oyanib decided to live
separately. Manolito retained custody of their two children. Despite their separation,
Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of
the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was
very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One
time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the
hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this.
He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him;
they even threatened to kill him.
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a
letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius
failed in two subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had
work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to
Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf. Upon reaching Titas
rented place, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open
the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual
intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus.
The suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took
advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon
seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the
head, while at the same time shouting "kill him Jake, kill him Jake."
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and
Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken

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Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her
three more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her
paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting,
appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told
Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it. Thereafter, Manolito left the
house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his
friends neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At
around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a
bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that
there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police
authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City. When asked why he was carrying a knife when
he went to his wifes place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the
incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him
so they could live together.
After trial, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Homicide and Parricide to which he interposed an appeal
with the Supreme Court to entitle him to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code
HELD: Yes. Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the
exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He questioned
the trial courts appreciation of the facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored and
overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of the accused, like the
photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph graphically
showed that Jesus pants were wide open, unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was
not wearing any underwear, lending credence to his defense that he caught his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon
accused to prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be
relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the
following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills
any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Accused must prove these elements by clear
and convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The death caused
must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon
his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must
concur with her flagrant adultery." There is no question that the first element is present in
the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he
killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses,
we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, cccused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the
act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at
the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse.
Blinded by jealousy and outrage, Accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the
accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in

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support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib
surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
RATIO: The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the
offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal
Code. The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an
unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to
chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so
severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in
flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so
that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.
--US v. ALANO
32 Phil. 381; 383-384, G.R. No. L- 11021, December 1, 1915
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances
FACTS: Accused Alano, feeling tired, went to bed, while his wife remained at the window
looking out and a little while afterward told her husband that she would go down for a
moment to the Chinese store nearby, which she did.
As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick child was crying, Eufrasio Alano left the
house to look for her in the Chinese store situated on the corner of Calles Dakota and
Tennessee, and, not finding her there, went to look for her in another Chinese store nearby,
with the same result. He therefore started to return home through an alley where he tripped
on a wire lying across the way. He then observed as he stopped that among some grass near
a clump of thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman in a position to hold sexual
intercourse with her, but they both hurriedly arose from the ground, startled by the noise
made by the defendant in stumbling. Alano at once recognized the woman as his wife, for
whom he was looking, and the man as Martin Gonzalez, who immediately started to run. He
was wearing an undershirt and a pair of drawers, which lower garment he held and pulled up
as he ran. Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a fan-knife he had in his
pocket and pursued Martin Gonzalez, although he did not succeed in overtaking him, and,
not knowing where he had filed, returned to the house, where he found his wife Teresa in the
act of climbing the stairs. He then reprimanded her for her disgraceful conduct and
immediately stabbed her several times, although she finally succeeded in entering the
house, pursued by her husband and fell face downwards on the floor near the place where a
sick woman Ricarda Garces was lying. The latter on seeing this occurrence, began to scream
and started to run, as did also Teresa Marcelo who had arisen and gone down the stairs out
of the house; but her infuriated husband again assaulted her and when she reached the
ground she fell on one of the posts beside the stairs. When the defendant saw her fall, he
entered the house, took some clothes and started out in the direction of Fort McKinley.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused killed her wife immediately thereafter the act of
sexual intercourse to entitle him to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code
HELD: Yes. The unfaithful wife was not killed in the very place where she was caught, for the
reason that the wronged husband preferred first to attack the despoiler of his honor and
afterwards the adulterous wife who succeeded in getting away from the place where she
was caught with her paramour. The assault upon the woman must be understood to be a
continuation of the act of the wronged husband's pursuit of her paramour, who had the good
fortune to escape and immediately get away from the place of the crime. Consequently,

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although the deceased did not fall dead in the place where she was caught, but in another
place nearby, logically it must be understood that the case at bar comes within the
provisions of the said article.
The discovery, the escape, the pursuit and the killing must all form part of one continuous
act.
RATIO: For a husband to be justified, it is not necessary that he sees the carnal
act being committed by his wife with his own eyes. It is enough that he surprises
them under such circumstances as to show reasonably that the carnal act is being
committed or has just been committed.
--PEOPLE v. GONZALES
69 Phil. 66, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances
FACTS: At the trial, the appellant testified that, on June 2, 1938, on returning to his house
from the woods, he surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told
her that the man was the very one who used to ask rice and food from them, and counseled
her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised him not to do the act again.
Thereafter - the accused continued testifying - he left the house and went towards the South
to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at above five o'clock in the afternoon, and
not finding his wife there, he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his
house in a place covered with underbush, who was standing and buttoning his drawers,
immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him, he
returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife
without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his
house. The Court of First Instance of Tayabas found him guilty of parricide.
The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife, in the afternoon of the date in
question, under circumstances indicative that she had carnal intercourse with Isabelo, he
was entitled to the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail himself of Article 247
HELD: No. The accused cannot avail himself of the aforesaid article, because the privilege
there granted is conditioned on the requirement that the spouse surprise the husband or the
wife in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; the accused did not
surprise his wife in the very act or carnal intercourse, but after the act, if any such there
was, because from the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his drawers, it
does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had committed the carnal act.
The court cannot entirely accept the defense sought to be established by the accused, first,
because his testimony is improbable. It is not conceivable that the accused had only mildly
counseled his wife not to repeat committing adultery with Isabelo, instead of taking harsher
measures as is natural in such circumstances, if it were true that he had surprised the two
offender in the act of adultery on returning to his house on the date in question. Secondly,
because even assuming that the accused caught his wife rising up and Isabelo cannot
invoke the privilege of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the
supposed offenders in the very act of committing adultery, but thereafter, if the respective
positions of the woman and the man were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they had
committed the carnal act.

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RATIO: Article 247 is not applicable when the accused did not see his spouse in
the act of sexual intercourse with another person.
--PEOPLE v. BITUANAN
56 Phil. 23, G.R. No. 34510, October 31, 1939
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances
FACTS: Moro Bituanan and Mora Sabay were married by Datu Alon according to Moro
customs and usages. According to the same customs and usages, the Datu divorced the
couple. Twenty days afterwards, Bituanan caught Sabay and a Moro by the name of Ali
Sabpa sleeping on the same bed. Thereupon, Bituanan attacked Ali Sabpa and Sabay, killing
the former and wounding the latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 247 can be applied in the case
HELD: No. The marriage of Bituanan and Sabay, performed according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion, was valid. This is so because of the nature of the provisions of the
Philippines, as prescribed by statute, are two only adultery on the part of the wife, or
concubinage on the part of the husband, as determined by a proper court. Granting, without
necessarily having to decide, that Bituanan and Sabay were, accordingly, not legally
divorced, it only need be said that there is no evidence in the record showing that Bituanan
surprised Sabay and Ali Sabpa in the act of adultery when he killed the latter. The privilege
given in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code extends solely to the case of a husband who
surprises his wife in the act of actual adultery, that is, actual carnal knowledge with her
paramour. As an example, the article does not apply to a husband who catches his wife
sleeping with another man on the same bed.
RATIO: The phrase in the act of committing sexual intercourse does not include
merely sleeping on the same bed. Article 247 is not applicable when the accused
did not see his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another person.
--PEOPLE v. CALIJAN
226 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 94592, September 28, 1993
Murder / Homicide
FACTS: Intoxicated with alcohol, Ruben Calijan with Arnolfo Baya, enroute home, passed the
house of Gregorio Belnas, the landlord of Arnolfo. Standing at the front yard, Ruben called
out to Gregorio: "Nong, let us smoke."
After a brief while, Gregorio came down bringing with him a lighted kerosene lamp and some
tobacco leaves for smoking. They all sat down on a bench by a bamboo table near a stove in
the kitchen contiguous to the main house. Arnolfo and Gregorio sat side by side, with Ruben
facing them. They smoked for ten minutes. Then, for no apparent reason, Ruben stood up
saying, "Nong Gorio, you want to be killed?" Completely taken aback, the 55-year old
Gregorio could only mutter: "I have not done any offense against you, Ruben, because we
have not quarreled with each other." Ruben replied, "If I want to kill you, I may kill you now."
Arnolfo tried to pacify Ruben saying, "Dong, do not do that; Dong, let us go home." But
Ruben could not be dissuaded. Arnolfo stepped back and Gregorio ran towards the door. But
Ruben, being much younger, was quicker. He overtook Gregorio, held his left hand and
stabbed him on his left chest with the hunting knife he had. The stab wound proved to be

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fatal. Gregorio died of hemorrhage that same night. Seeing the fallen Gregorio, Arnolfo ran
away.
The ensuing events were witnessed by Edwin Baya, brother of Arnolfo. Edwin recounted that
between 11:00 oclock and 12:00 oclock midnight of 30 June 1989, Ruben went to his
(Edwin) house and asked him, "Dong, come with me because Gregorio is already dead." So,
together they repaired to the house of Gregorio. Pointing to the prostrate victim, Ruben told
Edwin to lift him because they were going to throw the cadaver into the Sicopong River.
Edwin refused but Ruben threatened him with the hunting knife. After disposing of the
corpse, Ruben and Edwin went to the house of Rubens relative, Walter Calijan, and both
slept there. Edwin heard Ruben admitting to the wife of Walter that he (Ruben) killed
Gregorio. Edwin left the following morning and reported the incident to a CAFGU member
who then formed a team to arrest Ruben and turn him over to the police. The trial court then
declared Ruben guilty of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
In his appeal, he prays that he be adjudged guilty but only for homicide because there was
neither treachery nor evident premeditation that attended the killing, contrary to the
conclusion of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder
HELD: No. After a careful assessment of the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in appreciating treachery and evident premeditation as having qualified the
crime to murder. Consequently, the killing of Gregorio Belnas was simple homicide
aggravated by scoffing at the corpse and mitigated on the other hand by intoxication that
was not habitual. It was emphasized that aggravating circumstances, especially those which
qualify criminal responsibility, must be proved indubitably as the crime itself. Mere
presumptions or inferences are never enough.
In the absence of other notorious acts evincing his determination to murder Gregorio, known
premeditation in the instant case cannot be deduced from the mere fact that six (6) hours
before he stabbed Gregorio to death, Ruben took the hunting knife of Gerry. There is nothing
in the records to show that there was enmity between the two and it is not for the Court to
conjecture that there was. Indeed, it is foolhardy for us to draw from this single act a coldblooded intention to take the life of another. We simply characterize the killing as spur-ofthe-moment, induced by that degree of intoxication which then triggered off the bellicosity
in Ruben who, incidentally, is known in the community as an ex-convict and a killer. Indeed,
as disclosed by Arnolfo, before they left Felipes place, Ruben got into a tiff with fellow
"hantak" players because after a particular game, Ruben forcibly gathered all the bets
amounting to P40.00. Quite obviously, Ruben was in a not-so-pleasant mood that night and
was just itching to pick a quarrel with anyone. It just so happened that Gregorio got the full
brunt of it, resulting in his violent death. Neither was there treachery, given the open
confrontation between the aggressor and the victim moments before the actual stabbing.
This placed Gregorio on guard because he actually attempted to escape by running towards
the door; only he was overtaken by Ruben. The court a quo likewise took into account the
"aggravating circumstance of adding ignominy on the victim by throwing his cadaver (into)
the river." Strictly speaking, the act of disposing of a cadaver into the river did not make the
crime more shameful nor add to the victims moral suffering since it was done after death
had occurred and intended more to conceal the effects of the felony. The correct aggravating
circumstance to be appreciated is scoffing at the corpse of the deceased, as provided in Art.
248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code, which is a qualifying circumstance. However, since
this attendant circumstance was not expressly alleged in the Information, but only proved at
the trial, it should be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.
---

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PEOPLE v. BUTLER
120 SCRA 281, G.R. No. L-50276, January 27, 1983
Murder
FACTS: Michael Butler, an American Negro serving as a seaman in the U.S. Navy since
February 3,1975 (he was born on September 4, 1957), committed murder on August 8, 1975
when he killed a hostess, Enriquita Alipo, a Filipina, in her residence in Olongapo City, as
proven by his extrajudicial confession which was corroborated by evidence of the corpus
delicti. The confession was admissible in evidence, although it was taken during custodial
interrogation, when Butler was not assisted by counsel, because he voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently waived in writing his constitutional rights to have counsel and to remain
silent.
Butler's confession shows that the murder was qualified by abuse of superiority. It was not
aggravated by the circumstance of outraging or scoffing at her person or corpse. The trial
court appreciated that aggravating circumstance because of the testimony of Doctor
Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, that Butler had anal intercourse with the victim
after her death. Doctor Roxas based his conclusion on the fact that the victim's anus was
partly open and contained spermatozoa. He said that the anus would have completely
closed had the intercourse occurred while the victim was still alive. The trial court
conjectured that "Butler not satisfied with a normal vaginal intercourse demanded from the
deceased (hospitality girl) an anal intercourse. Upon being refused, the accused infuriated
into a demonic frenzy, took hold of a saint figurine, knocked his victim unconscious,
smothered her to death with a pillow and after she was dead, performed anal coitus with the
dead person."
Butler contends that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and
scoffing at the corpse of the victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the
victim.
HELD: Yes. The Court held that to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that the
accused is physically stronger than the victim or the relative strength of the parties must be
proved. The Court said that the essence of this circumstance is that advantage is taken by
the offender of this physical strength which is relatively superior to that of the offended
party. The fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove its existence.
In the light of the above legal precepts and considering the evidence adduced, this Court
holds that there was an abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It
is not only the notorious advantage of height that the accused had over his hapless victim,
he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft 11 inches tall, but also
fits strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving
her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must
have been very strong and powerful to suffocate her to death and without risk to himself in
any manner or mode whatsoever that she may have taken to defend herself or retaliate
since she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced us to find and rule that
the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.

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The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that
treachery attended the commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of
the killing. The extra-judicial confession of the accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she
was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we started wrestling on
the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was
sitting on the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face." Although the
figurine was found broken beside her head, the medical report, however, do not show any
injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of intracranial hemorrhage.
While the court rejected the presence of treachery, it, however, found and sustained the
finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the
corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he mocked or
outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after
she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the
presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medicolegal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, clearly established the
coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after
killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.
RATIO: A guideline to determine whether or not there is abuse of superior
strength has been laid down. The court ruled that to take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the person attached. This circumstance should always be
considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between aggressor,
assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.
To properly appreciate it, not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical
conditions of the protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or objects
employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to analyze the incidents and
episodes constituting the total development of the event.
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