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Kevin Potts
12/12/14
Seminar in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Relations
Professor Cardwell
Taiwan: Yet another Cog in the Containment Machine
BOOM! A thunderous roar of artillery fire erupted out of the calm, yet tense morning of
September 3, 1954. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of the Chinese communist government
on the mainland had opened fire. For five hours they sustained this barrage. What was their
target? Two small islands less than two miles off the coast of China. These islands were referred
to as Quemoy in the West, but were also known as Kinmen (Jinmen) in its local dialect. These
small islands were situated just a few thousand yards from the well-populated and fortified port
city of Amoy (Xiamen). They were so close to these islands in fact, that they were clearly visible,
and one could almost hold a shouting conversation between the two land masses. The military
might of the Chinese mainland, an area more extensive than the United States, was for the
moment focused on some islands that totaled about sixty square miles. It was a classic David and
Goliath scenario. The future did not look good for the underdog. But we know from the biblical
story that the scrawny yet righteous David, armed only with his sling and some river stones,
stood up to the blood-thirsty colossus, Goliath, and won. Against all odds, David persevered and
ended up killing his opponent. The story isnt a perfect archetype of what happened in this
historical incident, which came to be known as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. From the viewpoint
of the present, we can easily point out one difference between the biblical story and what actually
happened. The Chinese communists and the PLA represent Goliath; however unlike Goliath,
they were not destroyed in battle. Far from it. In the end, they were merely detained from
achieving their goal. However, thats not what is important. What is truly important is that David

stood up to this colossus in the first place and was unvanquished. And who was this David,
armed with a sling and dead set on flinging stones at his enormous opponent? Why none other
than Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist (Kuomintang/KMT) forces on Taiwan.
On that first day in early September, the PLA used its heavy artillery to fire upon the tens
of thousands of KMT troops stationed on the islands. From its fortified position on the islands,
the KMT troops fired back, using their own heavy artillery. The exchange lasted about five hours
and resulted in relatively few casualties, including two American military advisors. However,
this incident was only the beginning. Five hours might not seem like a long time in the grand
scheme of things, but that was only the first day. The bombardment lasted for months, with a
cease fire finally being arranged in May of the following year. While studying history, it is easy
to get used to long historical processes that last for years, decades, or even centuries. Social
movements, political strife, and changing demographics are but a few examples of long historical
processes that cause us to grow numb to studying these long periods of time. So when an
incident such as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis occurs that lasts for about nine months, it seems
like a short little speck on the vast timeline of human history. However, it is important to realize
that for the soldiers that lived through this incident, those nine months must have seemed much
longer. Although bombardment on September 3rd lasted for about five hours, the proceeding
days, weeks, and months were not nearly as intense. Artillery fire was relatively infrequent and
light. Soldiers on both sides played a sort of waiting game that mixed together times of boredom
with times of extreme adrenaline. This might not be so much the case with the PLA forces on the
mainland. Sure, they suffered casualties from sporadic artillery fire from the islands, but their
overall position was much more enviable. PLA soldiers could be transferred in and out of the
front lines if need be. The tens of thousands of KMT soldiers who were piled onto the Quemoy

islands were in it for the long haul. They were essentially trapped on the front lines for as long as
the crisis would last. This waiting game that they played for nine months must have seemed that
much longer when times of boredom were frequent and when there was no end in sight.
So why were there so few casualties amongst the Nationalist forces on Quemoy if there
were so many cramped into a very small area? Although their location so close to the mainland
seemed ill-advised and insecure at best, their position was nonetheless fairly strong. Ever since
the communist take-over of the mainland in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang
government used vast amounts of money and resources, from their newfound base of operations
on Taiwan, to fortify their few remaining footholds on the Chinese mainland. These footholds,
however, were not truly on the Chinese mainland. They consisted of various islands groups just
off the coast, such as Quemoy, Matsu, the Dachen Islands, Yijiangshan, Wuciu, and Hainan.
However, they acted symbolically as anchors that held Chiang Kai-Sheks KMT-ruled Republic
of China moored close to the mainland. These anchors kept their government from floating away
into a state of despondency and out of the international spotlight. After all, maintaining these few
remaining connections was in essence maintaining their legitimacy as a government that
represented the Chinese people. This helps to explain why Chiang Kai-shek committed
approximately eighty thousand soldiers to defend the island groups of Quemoy and Matsu, with
most of them being stationed on Quemoy. However, their vulnerability would be high when
stationed that close to the mainland. Something had to be done in order to protect this massive
army from annihilation. Their answer: tunnels. These rocky islands served as defensive
fortifications in more ways than one. They served as early warning stations for an impending
attack on Taiwan, but their basic geology also served as a protective shield for Nationalist
military operations on the islands. These tunnels were the reason why there were so few

casualties. However, like the soldiers fighting in World War I in the trenches, these tunnels
caused men to go stir-crazy and caused many more to question what they were fighting for.
The soldiers stationed on Quemoy and some of the other offshore islands held by the
Nationalists had a right to be worried. Artillery bombardment was an omnipresent threat that
proved its lethality time and time again. Military men on the islands also worried about an
amphibious invasion such as the one that occurred on the much larger island of Hainan in 1950.
They viewed the invasion as inevitable. American leaders agreed. Some thought that it was
simply insane to fortify a position so close to the Chinese mainland and so inconsequential in
their strategic defense of Taiwan. Harry Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson
advised that the Nationalists withdraw from the islands to consolidate their forces. Still others,
such as the newly elected president Dwight D. Eisenhower and his team of advisors departed
from the Truman-Acheson policy and prepared to help Chiang Kai-Shek defend his remaining
offshore islands.i However, none of these people understood what was going on behind the
bamboo curtain. What was going on in the mind of Mao Zedong?
In truth, Mao Zedong never planned on invading Quemoy. Like Chiang, he saw the
islands as a vital link between Taiwan and the mainland. If he captured these, he would in effect
cutoff Taiwan and exclude it from its rightful place as a part of China. The shelling of Quemoy
was instead seen as a political move by Mao. The shelling was a reaction to the impending
Manila Conference that would result in the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) on September 8, 1954. This international organization was created to block further
communist gains in Southeast Asia. Needless to say, Mao was not happy. Not only was the
shelling of Quemoy political, it was also low risk. Before the capture of Hainan, the Chinese
communists had several botched amphibious invasions of offshore islands held by the

Nationalists. They couldnt afford to keep losing face by losing battles. Interestingly enough, the
nine month shelling of Quemoy seemed to be nothing out of the ordinary for the Mao and other
Chinese communist leaders. They had been sporadically attacking the Nationalist forces ever
since their retreat from the mainland in 1949. Of course, artillery bombardment is still an act of
war, but the Chinese communists never used their newly obtained Russian MIG-15 jets, which
goes to show that they were never serious about conducting an invasion. The number of these
jets amounted to 100-150 in total, and they far exceeded the flight capabilities of the old World
War II planes that made up the Nationalist Air Force. The fact that they were never put into
action helps to prove the point that Mao was not planning on capturing Quemoy at this time. The
contrast in attitudes about this incident between the Chinese communists and the U.S. backed
Chiang regime were stark. In contrast to former U.S. officials who vividly recollected the main
events, high-level Communist officials and advisers active during the 1950s and interviewed for
this essay did not recall the September 3 bombardment or consider the time one of sharp conflict
with America.ii Chiang and Eisenhower saw the incident as a crisis and acted accordingly. Mao
saw it as business as usual. When it comes to the term First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the term crisis
is only applicable to one side. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and the
American media were all convinced of an impending invasion. They were wrong.
Although the Nationalists had built up a formidable defense on Quemoy, their position
against the communists on the mainland was on unsure footing. Chiang Kai-shek knew that he
could not keep this up forever. The communists had a much larger military and were better
equipped, mostly because of the Soviets. Plus, the cost of maintaining the Nationalist military
was astronomical. Eighty-five percent of total ROC government expenditure was on the military
at the time.iii That is almost an unbelievable statistic. There was no way this could be maintained

without runaway inflation and sky-rocketing taxation. The Republic of China on Taiwan could
not survive this alone, so Chiang turned to the United States for help.
The foreign relations of the United States during the 1950s were dominated by the onset
of the Cold War. The Cold War was called cold because it never heated up into actual armed
conflict. In reality, it was more of an era than a war. To be fair though, it did actually involve
quite a bit of actual war, ranging from the Korean peninsula to Afghanistan. After the conclusion
of World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union had emerged as world superpowers
with far-reaching military influence and conflicting ideologies. It was also an era that came to be
dominated by the growing awareness that the greatest threat to human life was ourselves. The
world lived under the dark shadow of potential atomic warfare. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union had an arsenal of atomic weapons that were pointed at one another as each waited
for the other to blink. Although the United States possessed a much larger arsenal of atomic
weapons, Americans were afraid, and rightfully so. As the famous American writer William
Faulkner stated in his Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, our tragedy today is a general and
universal physical fear so long sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no longer
problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up? Unfortunately, this
came to be the central question of human existence during this time.
After World War II, it seemed as though communism would just keep spreading, as large
parts of Eastern Europe and Asia were engulfed. The United States was terrified by this and
responded with the policy of containment, as American diplomat George F. Kennan termed it.
Communism would be allowed to stay where it was as long as it did not spread. This was largely
a view held by the government; however, the American people soon came to share it as well. As
President Harry Truman outlined in his Truman Doctrine, the United States would support

freedom-loving peoples against communist threats all around the globe. It was this doctrine that
created the language with which Americans would view the world and Americas place within it.
It depicted the United States as free and the communists as tyrannical. It also helped to justify
our support of anti-communist regimes, no matter how undemocratic, which was particularly
relevant in the American support of Chiang Kai-shek.
The artillery bombardment of the offshore islands in 1954-55 proved to tighten the bond
between Washington and Taipei while at the same time sinking U.S.-Chinese relations to their
lowest point since the Korean War. However, this event did not happen within a vacuum. Modern
warfare ensured that conflicts would have international reach. The Taiwan Strait Crisis strained
Americas relations with some of its other close allies such as Great Britain and India. The
possibility of war between the United States and China over specks of land off the coast of China
worried many foreign onlookers. The offshore islands had been targets of military action ever
since Chiang and the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan. However, despite this prolonged
state of uneasiness, the shelling of Quemoy still caught the United States by surprise. Neither
Eisenhower nor Dulles were in Washington D.C. when it occurred and were absent from the
National Security Council meeting held on September 9th. Vice President Nixon, who led the
meeting, knew he had quite a bit to talk about. Not only did it seem as though Maos Liberate
Taiwan propaganda campaign was finally underway; there was also attention diverted to the
downing of a U.S. navy patrol plane by two Soviet aircraft over the Sea of Japan on September
4th, the day after the shelling started.iv Days later, with Eisenhower and Dulles back in
Washington D.C., they finally sat down to talk about this new development in international
affairs. The U.S. government believed that the Chinese could militarily overwhelm any of the
offshore islands in a relatively short amount of time. Quemoy was the one exception, and had

proved to be defensible back in 1949 when the Nationalists were victorious in a bloody skirmish.
However, neither the United States nor the ROC could predict when the PLA would make their
move on the Nationalist island outposts. The U.S. government remained blind to what the
Communist leaders hoped to accomplish. It was during this phase of the Cold War that the U.S.
relied on espionage to collect important information and data. However, in hindsight, these
tactics proved to be an abysmal failure and rarely yielded any reliable information. American
spies in China were scarce. Although the CIA was involved, it remained so bad that a senior
CIA official referred to this period as the dark ages for communications intelligence.v
Many saw this recent bombardment as a retaliatory act by the Chinese in order to protest
the Manila Conference that was being held at that time. This conference was held between the
countries of Southeast Asia as they sought to create an organization for collective defense. It
came to be known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO. The organization itself
was an idea largely affected by the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine, and Secretary Dulles was its
biggest supporter. However, others in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), such as Admiral Radford
believed otherwise. He thought that the shelling of Quemoy was merely a diversion, and that the
real attack was to be focused on the Dachen Islands off the coast of Zhejiang Province. He
proposed that the United States renounce its no defense policy toward the offshore islands and
commit itself to defending ten such island groups. His concerns were more political and
psychological than militaristic. The capture of 40,000 or so Nationalist troops on Quemoy alone
was nothing compared to the loss of morale and international prestige it would entail for the
ROC. And not only that, the United States had its own reputation to uphold as guardians of
freedom. General Matthew Ridgeway of the JCS disagreed. He believed that committing military
defense to the offshore islands would commit the United States to future operations on the

mainland that would result in outright war with China. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson
agreed. The JCS was split. Eisenhower was confident that the loss of Quemoy would deal a harsh
blow to Nationalist morale and that the United States could not remain indifferent to that
outcome.vi Interestingly enough, despite his beliefs, he refused to overturn the no defense policy
toward the offshore islands. From September until January 1955, Eisenhower and Dulles stuck to
the policy of no-defense while maintaining purposefully ambiguous so as to deter the Chinese.
If there was to be a war, he did not want it with China, but rather, he preferred to go to the head
of the snake, the Soviet Union.vii He also believed that if military action should take place, it
should be done in a Constitutional matter. He believed that Congress should be involved, not
bypassed. However, no matter how Eisenhower viewed the problem at hand, he knew that the
United States faced, as Dulles put it, a horrible dilemma.
Throughout it all, Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles dominated the administrations
decision making. Because of this, it is important to take a step back and consider who these men
actually were and how their beliefs altered U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-ROC relations. First of
all, it is crucial to understand that they both affected and were affected by the 1950s national
obsession with communism. However, both men gave precedence to Europe and they both saw
the real enemy as the Soviet Union, not the Chinese. Dulles functioned as Eisenhowers partner
and advisor, and shared Eisenhowers disinterest in Asia and dismay at having to pay so much
attention to Chinese affairs.viii This kind of disinterest in Asian affairs reflected the racism of
both of these men and the racism ingrained within the society they were a product of.
Eisenhower saw nonwhites as inferior to whites. He was content to live in a segregated nation
and had no compunctions in telling nigger jokes in the White House.ix In 1948, he even went
as far as to testify to the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that the U.S. military

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should not be desegregated. Dulles was comparable. He also believed in the superiority of the
white race, and was recorded in a conversation with Ambassador Wellington Koo as saying that
the oriental mindwas always more devious than the occidental mind.x Broad-based racism
had a disturbing effect on U.S. foreign policy and helped convince many that outposts of the
ROC had no inherent worth. The United States regarded Taiwan as little more than a pawn on
the global chessboard on which its international quest for power and influence was to be played
out.xi
U.S. China policy fell within Moscows shadow. The United States and the Soviet Union
dominated global affairs. These two countries came to oppose and rival each other, and competed
for ideological and strategic influence around the globe, whether it be in Europe, the Middle
East, or East Asia. The China situation was no different. The Soviets supported the communist
regime under the leadership of Mao Zedong, while the Americans supported the viciously anticommunist Republic of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Neither Chinese leader
was perfect. In fact, far from it. Both were strong-willed to the point of being uncooperative,
both were hot-headed and hot-tempered, both were war mongers, and both were responsible for
horrible atrocities that occurred during their reigns. The United States and the Soviet Union had
to pick sides based on ideologies and had to suffer the consequences of siding with their
respective Chinese ruler. For the United States, Chiang proved to be irksome to say the least.
The United States had had to deal with Chiang Kai-shek long before the First Taiwan
Strait Crisis. The Americans supported his government and his armies throughout World War II
and watched as he squandered away valuable time and resources. Americans came to associate
the Chiang regime with the single theme of corruption. However, this did not deter the American
leaders from supporting his government against the communist menace on the mainland.

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Interestingly enough, Christianity had quite a bit to do with how Washington viewed their
Chinese ally. Thanks to his wife Song Meiling, also known in the West as Madame Chiang Kaishek, the Generalissimo was converted to Christianity during his time in political exile on
Taiwan. Those who supported Chiang in the United States, such as Secretary Dulles, chose to
focus attention on the fact that he was a Christian convert as opposed to dwelling on the
troublesome truth that he was also an undemocratic authoritarian leader. The United States was a
very Christian country throughout the 1950s, despite the supposed separation between church
and state. Because the communists were in theory atheists, Congress in 1954 added the words
under God to the Pledge of Allegiance as a symbol of Americans resistance to communism
and in support of Americas righteous and Christian ways. By displaying Christian morals by
supporting a fellow Christian, Americans were in a sense fighting communist atheism, which like
anything communism-related, was inherently bad. Also, no matter how unlikeable Chiang might
have been, supporting him was a much better option than letting the island of Taiwan fall into the
hands of the communists. After all, it was widely assumed by the Republic of China, the United
States, and other countries firmly within the anti-communist bloc, that the Soviet Union desired
Asia as a means of dominating the world.xii
Ties between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the United States grew even stronger
as a result of the onset of the Korean War. The American public turned increasingly anti-Mao and
anti-Red China as American soldiers fought and died on the Korean Peninsula against Sovietbacked North Korean and Chinese armies. It was this incident that caused American leaders such
as Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, and Dwight D. Eisenhower to rethink the importance of
Formosa in world affairs. As argued by military men such as Douglas MacArthur and Admiral
Arthur W. Radford, Taiwan was a vital link in the island chain that connected the Aleutian

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Islands of Alaska all the way down to the Philippines and Southeast Asia. If Taiwan fell into
Communist hands, the link would be severed, and vital trade and military
communications/transportations would be made hazardous if not impossible. As a result,
American foreign aid began flowing into Taiwan.
American aid came in two forms: economic aid and military aid. The vast majority came
in the form of military aid, and it was this kind of aid that Chiang, with the help of his wife and
de facto ambassador, Song Meiling, was seeking out. Politicians and American military men saw
the shelling of Quemoy as a crisis that had to be dealt with immediately. National Security
Council meetings were held between September 12th and November 2nd where Admiral Radford,
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that American troops be stationed on the
islands as well. Most of the other Joint Chiefs agreed, with the exception of General Matthew
Ridgeway, who was almost a constant critic of Eisenhower and his foreign policy. However, the
other Joint Chiefs agreed with this turn towards increased militarism. Along with stationing
American troops on the islands, some recommended that the U.S. join the Nationalist air force
with the bombing of the mainland. John Foster Dulles stressed that the only way to keep Red
China at bay was with nuclear warfare, or at least the threat of nuclear warfare. This terrifying
notion was almost universally agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Eisenhower proved to be
a master of deterrence, and used the threat of massive retaliation to persuade Mao to behave.
However, threatening to use nuclear warfare was much easier than actually following
through with it. In their Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, the point was made that war with Red
China would lead to war with the Soviet Union. This they did not want. Suddenly, Eisenhower
reversed his views and started to think that the offshore islands were not worth getting involved
with. They certainly werent important enough to start a cataclysmic World War III over. But at

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the same time, Eisenhower worried that Chiang would sense a weakening of the American
position on the offshore islands and simply quit the fight and renounce Formosa. The CIA
supported this fear by reporting that whole entire units of the Nationalist armies stationed on the
islands were all too ready to jump to the Communist side.xiii So, Eisenhower had to find a way to
ease his rigid foreign policy towards Red China without upsetting Chiang. He also had to
appease the growing discontent the vast majority of the American people felt toward the Chinese
communists. People were still angry after the inconclusive conclusion to Korean War. Not only
that, but Senator Joseph McCarthy was ramping up his Red Scare tactics by waging a political
witch hunt for any and all communists or communist sympathizers within the United States.
Those who were guilty of little more than naivet about the CCP (Chinese Communist Party)
and its intentions were persecuted and accused of betraying their countrys interests by
undermining the Nationalists.xiv At this point, to support the Nationalists was to be American.
This led to a strengthening of the so called China Lobby, which was formed by pro-Chiang
politicians within the U.S. and constituted the largest base of support for the Republic of China
on Taiwan. Eisenhower had to be careful about how he would deescalate tensions in the Taiwan
Strait if he was to appease all these groups.
For the Americans, options were limited. However, Dulles was quick to come up with a
plan to not only salvage the situation but also protect American prestige. He recommended to
Eisenhower in early October that they should pursue a United Nations cease-fire resolution for
the Taiwan Strait. Even if, as they expected, the ROC or the Soviets vetoed it as members of the
UN Security Council, the United States would be in a much better position with stronger moral
ground to stand upon. Eisenhower agreed and Dulles at once began appealing to the British to
support the UN resolution. It was agreed between the two powers that New Zealand would

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introduce the cease-fire resolution, due the fact that it held one of the rotating seats on the
council. It also was significant in its geographical position in the Pacific and its close ties to both
the U.S. and the UK. The New Zealanders were eager to work out the details. The U.S., the UK,
and New Zealand held secret discussions in Washington DC all throughout early to mid-October.
Dulles quickly discovered how difficult it was to please both the British and Taipei. For example,
the British wanted America to have open diplomatic talks with the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC). Dulles was stalwartly opposed to any such talks. He knew public opinion in the United
States would not allow for it. Plus, Chiang would most certainly see it as a betrayal and might try
something unexpected, such as a premature invasion of the mainland. The British saw the ceasefire as being large in scope while Dulles only wanted to protect the offshore islands. The purpose
in his mind was to halt all attacks on and from the offshore islands, not to end all hostilities.xv
This was because Chiang saw neutralization of the Taiwan Strait as getting rid of his sacred goal
of recovering the mainland from the communists. It was this goal that kept his government
legitimate. Legitimate in the eyes of his soldiers, his citizens, the international community, and
even himself. No matter how unlikely this goal may have been, it gave him a reason to keep on
fighting.
Dulles knew he was treading a very fine line with grave consequences for any missteps.
Interestingly enough, Dulles from the very start did not actually think that the resolution would
get passed.xvi He still wanted to go through with it however since it would gain international
attention, and as a result, serve as a deterrent to both sides of the Taiwan Strait in the case of
future military clashes. This UN initiative that was being discussed in secret was code-named
Oracle, but it would not remain secret for long. News of these talks was leaked to the
Generalissimo himself a few days before the implementation of the cease-fire resolution. He was

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furious. He hated the idea of the cease-fire, because in his mind, it was one step closer to UN
membership for Red China. It lent credibility to the two China policy that recognized two
different Chinas with two different governments as opposed to what both Chiang and Mao
wanted: a one China policy, with their respective government as the sole true representative of
China.
In order to convince Chiang of their good intentions, the U.S. agreed to negotiate the
mutual defense treaty that Chiang had been craving for so long.xvii Though the Generalissimo was
swayed, the British proved to be hesitant once again. They got cold feet once they learned of the
proposed mutual defense treaty and refused to proceed due to the conflict of interests that they
believed skewed proper judgment on the issue.xviii Dulles kept having to lead both sides to the
negotiating table which proved to test even his adept diplomacy skills. He also had to do quite a
bit of persuading in talks that were off the record, so to speak. For example, Dulles had to
persuade the British that the mutual defense treaty was not as one-sided as it seemed. In fact, it
was more of a restrictive treaty than anything. It held the Nationalists back from conducting raids
on the Chinese mainland, relaxed the China embargo, and showed a clear bias in favor of the
two China policy which the British strongly favored. Had Chiang known the content of these
conversations, he most certainly would have called for an end to both pieces of compromising
legislation.
The proposed mutual defense treaty was not solely beneficial to the Chiangs Free China.
In truth, it was quite alluring to the United States as well. First and foremost, the treaty was seen
as neutralization as opposed to a defensive measure. Although many of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were unhappy that offshore islands were not guaranteed defense, it accomplished what
Eisenhower wanted most: to avoid war with China and as a result, the Soviet Union. Eisenhower

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wanted to do this while maintaining the semblance of a defensive posture in the region. To
preserve a posture of ambiguity on the offshore islands, Dulles stated that it would be possible to
fuzz up the language in the defense treaty so as to keep the Communists in doubt about the U.S.
reaction to an attack.xix A mutual defense treaty would also give Eisenhower the constitutional
authority to deploy U.S. troops to the Far East in order to defend Taiwan. Due to the fact that the
military conflicts in Korea and Indochina were over, the necessity of the presence of the U.S.
Navys 7th Fleet in Chinese waters was no longer easily defendable. With a treaty however, this
would change. As diplomatic discussions continued on the mutual defense treaty, on November
1st, the Peoples Liberation Army bombarded the Dachen Islands. No invasion occurred, but the
rain of shells that fell upon these islands caused Dulles once again to turn to the UN resolution
on the cease-fire. Both he and Eisenhower wanted Oracle underway as quickly as possible, but
the British were still dragging their feet. No compromise could be reached. Later in December,
both sides would agree to postpone the cease-fire idea. Although Oracle might have died
before ever getting the chance to alter international relations, it did set the stage for the creation
of the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China.
In December of 1954, Eisenhower and Dulles reached a diplomatic breakthrough.
Republic of China (ROC) Ambassador Wellington Koo, as part of the China Lobby, along with
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles helped to form a close tie to the United States through an
international treaty that came to be known as the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. This
treaty stipulated that if either the Republic of China or the United States was attacked, the other
would come to that countrys assistance.xx The treaty also allowed for more economic and
military aid to enter Taiwan and an increased sense of trust was procured. Thanks to Wellington
Koo, and much to the delight of Chiang Kai-shek, this treaty elevated the status of the ROC on

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the international stage as the China with which the USA entrusted for preserving peace.xxi
However, this treaty was as helpful as it was frustrating, especially for Chiang Kai-shek. On
paper, the treaty was a dream come true for him and his KMT-ruled government on Taiwan.
However, treaties are just words on paper without people to reinforce them. Unfortunately,
Eisenhower wasnt completely sold on the notion of coming to the defense of Chiang, especially
if it only involved skirmishes over the offshore islands. The treaty was ambiguous enough to
leave Eisenhower with the ability to interpret his own meanings. It allowed for some wiggle
room so that the president wouldnt be forced into an unlikeable situation. The treaty never
actually mentioned the offshore islands. Instead, it specified that the United States would come
to the defense of the ROC should either Taiwan or the Penghu Islands (located in the middle of
the Taiwan Strait) be attacked. The president would only have to protect the offshore islands if he
himself thought it was for the best. Otherwise, it was Chiangs problem. And it was a big
problem. Chiang had roughly forty percent of his entire army stationed on the offshore islands. If
captured, the Republic of China on Taiwan would not only receive a crushing military blow, but
an enormous loss of morale as well. Eisenhower along with his advisors were still reluctant to
fully support Chiang due to previous corruption and incompetence within his regime. In the end,
the U.S. alone would determine the amount of military support it would give to Republic of
China.xxii
With the creation of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, ROC Ambassador
Wellington Koo and John Foster Dulles inadvertently developed an anomaly that came to be
known as the two-china policy. This refers to the policy that there existed two separate Chinas:
the Peoples Republic of China on the mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan. It is
important to remember that this was de facto recognition as opposed to de jure recognition.

18

Maos regime on the mainland was still not recognized as the true China, and was thus not
allowed a seat in the United Nations. The United States had given its support to the Republic of
China in the international arena. After 1950, the Soviet Union countered by challenging Chiangs
regime as being the true representative government of the Chinese people.xxiii The Soviets had a
good point. Chiang only represented the Chinese people located on the island of Taiwan. In
1954, the population of Taiwan was roughly nine million. The total population of the mainland
however was nearly six hundred million. So, the Republic of China had a seat in the United
Nations claiming to represent the Chinese people, when in reality, it represented less than two
percent.
The Chinese communists were outraged and up in arms. Chiang Kai-shek, the
Generalissimo, was thrilled. He was very satisfied with the conclusion of the treaty and the close
bonds of friendship that it promised between the two nations. However, it was not a total victory
for the Nationalists. The Generalissimo recognized that the treaty only covered Taiwan and the
Penghu Islands. It did not include the offshore islands.xxiv That much was clear. However,
Eisenhower didnt want it to seem as though the U.S. was indifferent as to the fate of the islands.
That would be bad foreign policy and bad for the morale of the Nationalists. It was this kind of
double standard that Eisenhower and Dulles tried their best to maintain throughout these years.
They wanted flexibility. They wanted wiggle room to make a decision when or even if a situation
ever arose. However, not everyone agreed. Chiang Kai-shek for example wanted a clear answer
when it came to possible war over Nationalist-held territory. George M. Humphrey, the Secretary
Treasury, expressed that the problem was if we dont know where we are going we will get into
a lot of trouble.xxv He did not want to be placed in the untenable position of getting itself into a

19

position it did not mean to defend. Eisenhower and Dulles however did not wish to be bound by
rigid rules, and that is essentially how U.S.-Taiwan relations existed during this time.
Time was the United States biggest ally. Eisenhower believed that inevitably, the
situation would diffuse itself. He and Dulles agreed that the Soviet Union was only a temporary
bad influence upon Red China. They believed that given time, China would become increasingly
individualistic and separate itself from Soviet influence. Eisenhower and Dulles also held the
racialist conception that the traditional Chinese dislike of foreigners would eventually lead to the
abandonment of close relations with the Soviets.xxvi Their trust in the curative powers of time
helped avoid a cataclysmic clash of world powers that very likely could have resulted in yet
another global war.
The Republic of China on Taiwan served many purposes for the United States. The island
served as a vital link in the Pacific off-shore island chain that held back the tide of communism
on the mainland. For this reason alone, foreign policy makers saw Taiwan as an essential element
to U.S. national security. Not only was its geography important, but also its politics. A
strengthened Nationalist government would serve as a focal point for freedom (capitalism) in
East Asia as opposed to communism. It could also gather support from overseas Chinese and
Chinese on the mainland. Development of a stronger Taiwanese economy was also extremely
lucrative. Capitalist societies such as the United States needed free markets abroad after all in
order to sell its precious industrial goods. The U.S. had historically felt the need to enforce the
freedom of access to raw materials, trade, and investment opportunities for US business and
obtain economic gains for American businessmen. It was also crucial to make sure that economic
development in underdeveloped countries, such as Taiwan, was firmly rooted in capitalism so as

20

to increase their dependence on American markets. There was no lack of reasons for defending
Chiang and the Nationalists on Taiwan. There was only a lack of consensus on how to do so.
On January 6, Eisenhower transmitted the Mutual Defense Treaty to the Senate. Things
were looking up for the Republic of China. They were getting closer to gaining the protection
that they had so long sought after. Mao Zedong and the communists on the mainland were
furious. In a retaliatory move, on January 10th, Chinese communists attacked the Dachen Islands
located off the coast of Zhejiang Province with approximately fifty war planes. Nine hours later,
the bombing had stopped. The ROC Navy was the main target, and it proved to be the largest
attack since the artillery shelling of Quemoy in September of 1954. Generalissimo Chiang was
rightly worried and wanted to know how Eisenhower viewed the incident and what level of
importance he deemed the Dachen Islands. What he truly wanted was to know what kind of
material support he could expect from the U.S. government in the defense of the offshore islands.
He also wanted moral and logistical support.xxvii Chiang feared the strengthening of the
communists air force as a result of Soviet military aid. The air raid on the Dachens was larger
than any Communist air action in the Korean War. This showed that their air force capabilities
were rising rapidly. It was widely assumed by members of the ROC government that their fate
was in the hands of the United States. Ambassador Wellington Koo said that his government
(the ROC) would probably consider the UN incapable of deterring Chinese Communist
aggression against the off-shore islands.xxviii Since the Soviet Union held veto power within the
UN, the ROC saw their options limited.
Beginning with the large raid on the Dachen Islands on January 10th, fears escalated both
at home and abroad. The situation, as interpreted by Eisenhower and Dulles, called for an
increased presence in the Far East and role in the affairs of Taipei. Once again, Chiang made the

21

point that the Dachen Islands were of great significance from a psychological and political
standpoint. Losing these islands would lead to a loss of morale and would thus be a grave blow
to the Nationalist government. At the same time, the island group was two hundred miles away
from Taiwan, and the United States had a hard time seeing the strategic importance of devoting
manpower to ensure their protection. However, if the communists took the Dachens by force, it
would showcase the inability of Chiangs government on Taiwan to defend its territory and
would thus discredit it in the eyes of Chinese people everywhere. They could not afford to lose
face in the international community. Still, Eisenhower knew that he could not commit U.S. forces
to go to war for islands so far away from the territory they claimed to be defending. The U.S.
hadnt totally abandoned hope for the Dachens however. The garrison on the island group had
received training before deployment from the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG), a group active on the island since 1951. Chiang was still not satisfied. Through his
intermediary Ambassador Wellington Koo, he made a series of requests of the U.S. government.
He wanted Eisenhower to make an official statement denouncing the Communist assault on the
Dachens and sympathizing publicly with the Nationalists. He also requested that a high ranking
military official get assigned to Taipei as a sort of permanent consultant. He also requested that
the 7th Fleet be deployed closer to the Dachens so as to exert more of an influence in that region
without actually engaging in battle. Eisenhower and his advisors realized that the Nationalist
position on the Dachens was strong, but its supply line was all too vulnerable. This would prove
to be a very serious problem in the very near future.
For Dulles, this new state of foreign affairs in East Asia only served to bolster the need
for a strong Mutual Defense Treaty with the Nationalists. The Communists proved to be
aggressive and needed to be dealt with accordingly. However, thanks to the treaty, Chiang was

22

still kept on a short leash. He could not use military force against the mainland without American
approval. According to the American Ambassador to the ROC, Karl Lott Rankin, without
improved defenses and logistics, the Dachen islands would eventually fall to the communists
like a ripe apple.xxix They did not have to wait long. The Dachens got most of the political
attention, but the first place the communists decided to strike was an even more remote island,
called Yijiangshan.
On January 18, at 8:00 in the morning, the invasion began. An air raid began the assault,
with Communist war planes strafing the islands. At 9:00, artillery began shelling the island.
Around midday, over seventy naval vessels began making their way to the offshore island,
carrying with them a powerful landing force. High winds disrupted their first attack, but the PLA
was more successful on their second attempt.xxx Their landing was successful, but the
Nationalists proved to have effective defensive fortifications. The invaders were met with fierce
enemy fire, with nearly all of the two hundred or so PLA casualties occurring at the time of the
landing. However, they quickly pushed forward. Having been ousted from their primary
defensive positions, the Nationalist defenders were forced to retreat into their intricate network
of tunnels. These tunnels were extremely narrow and dark, and were not well suited closecombat. Conventional fighting tactics were not useful here. However, the PLA troops were
equipped with flamethrowers. With the Nationalist troops trapped in a very small space, there
was little they could do to escape being engulfed by the flames. The total Nationalist casualties
numbered 567, most of them having been burned to death. The rest of the 1,086 nationalist
defenders on Yijiangshan became prisoners of war.

23

Although the battle was relatively small in scale and the number of casualties but a drop
of water in a bucket compared to some of the other armed conflicts of the Chinese Civil War, it
was still an important gain for the PLA and a demoralizing event for the Nationalists. The United
States position of ambiguity toward the offshore islands proved to encourage Mao, as opposed
to deter him. Since ambiguity proved to be ineffective, the U.S. needed to come up with a bolder
strategy for the Taiwan Strait. On January 19th, Yijiangshan was firmly under the control of the
Peoples Liberation Army. Over 50,000 shells were fired upon that rocky islet, along with at least
500 bombs dropped. It was a terrifying display of the PRCs modern warfare and an unsettling
predictor of things to come. And just as Chiang Kai-shek feared, this did not bode well for the
Dachens.
Yijiangshan proved to be a stepping stone to the more desirable Dachen Islands. It was
this archipelago that was the target of this original invasion. On January 19th, the Communists
immediately turned their attention to the Dachens and used their superior air force to bomb the
islands. There were few casualties, but that was not the goal of the mission. They had targeted
infrastructure and had struck with precision, effectively crippling the islands transportation and
communications. The second attack came on the same day but directed at an entirely different
target. This time, they targeted the reservoir. It caught the Nationalists completely off guard as
the Communists succeeded in destroying their only fresh water supply. Without it, the
Nationalists could not hope to hold out for very long.
As the situation unfolded, Eisenhower regarded the hope for victory as increasingly
bleak. On January 23, he urged Chiang to evacuate the islands in order to save face and to save
lives. According to Dulles, the Dachens were too far from Formosa, too vulnerable, and
insufficiently important from the strategic point of view to justify an American commitment to

24

defend them.xxxi Chiang was adamantly opposed to such a request. In fact, he had explicitly
written a letter telling the commanders on the Dachens to fight to the death.xxxii Fortunately for
the thousands of soldiers on the islands, the Generalissimo was convinced by his own Minster of
Defense a few days later that victory was no longer plausible. After much internal debate, the
Republic of China agreed to an orderly evacuation carried out by the American Navys 7th Fleet.
The decision to withdraw was made on February 5th, and the operation proceeded swiftly. The
evacuation, termed Operation KING KONG, was truly massive in scale. Carried out mostly by
U.S. Marines along with eighteen Nationalist interpreters, the operation got underway. From
February 8-12, 132 American boats and 400 American aircraft were used to transport over
15,000 civilians, 11, 000 military, 125 vehicles, 5300 tons of material, 7600 tons of ammunition,
and 165 artillery pieces back to the island of Taiwan two hundred miles away.xxxiii No casualties
were sustained. Although the Nationalists had lost the battle and were in fact ceding territory, the
evacuation of the Dachens was seen as an unlikely victory. It saved lives and consolidated the
military power of the ROC. For the Communists, the acquisition of the Dachens was important
to protecting their shipping lines along with eliminating a base for potential guerilla strikes. Both
sides could claim victory, and thus, this bloody affair amounted to nothing more than a draw.
The Chinese invasion of the Dachens led to stronger and closer relations between
Washington and Taipei. It also led to a stronger international consensus that the Chinese
communists needed to be contained. In a February 1955 Gallup poll, 66% of Australians
supported going to war to prevent the Chinese communists from invading Taiwan.xxxiv However,
possibly the most important result of the attack on the Dachens was what came to be known as
the Formosa Resolution. It represented a huge surge in the executive power of the president. The
White House and the State Department composed the request and the resolution rapidly passed

25

through Congress on January 29th. Only a total of six people combined voted against the
resolution. In the Senate it passed 85:3, and in the House, it passed 410:3. As can be seen from
these extraordinary statistics, the fear of the spread of communism was strong enough to bridge
the partisan gap in America. An opinion poll conducted in March showed that 73% of a national
sampling supported the resolution.xxxvThe finalized resolution included the securing and
protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the
taking of such measures as he (the president) judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the
defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.xxxvi At its very core, the Formosa Resolution gave
Eisenhower unequivocal authority to take military action as needed throughout the Taiwan
area.xxxvii No longer did Eisenhower have to worry about the constitutionality of his actions in
the Taiwan Strait.
Mao Zedong and the Chinese communists saw this act as a barefaced war cry.xxxviii
However, Eisenhower and Dulles were still as opposed to war as ever. In fact, Dulles was once
again trying to kick start Oracle so as to consolidate an agreement on a UN-mandated ceasefire. The dual purpose was to further the two china policys international standing. Both Mao
and Chiang strongly protested this development, and the British, although giving the go-ahead,
were still uneasy about the ordeal. Countries such as Britain and India persuaded the United
States that the best way to obtain a cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait was to help the Nationalists
evacuate Quemoy and Matsu, just like Dachens. There was broad agreement on this subject.
However, Eisenhower still feared that with the offshore islands out of the equation as buffers,
Taiwan would be that much easier to conquer for the communists. Chiang Kai-shek and the
Nationalists did their best to feed this fear. Despite the hopes of the international community in
general, Chiang would not be shaken free from Quemoy or Matsu. The Generalissimo would not

26

tolerate any further retreat. As Eisenhower had feared, both Chiang and Mao seemed to be
completely indifferent to the mass loss of human life when it came to the legitimacy of their
respective governments.
The diplomatic inflexibility of Chiang during these months greatly angered Eisenhower
and caused him to resent his oriental behavior during the crisis.xxxix Throughout the months of
February and March, as both political and public attitudes toward the offshore islands were
heating up, the actual situation in the Taiwan Strait was cooling off. However, despite the fact
that the area had stabilized for the time being, the Eisenhower administration misjudged the
situation and concluded that the Chinese communists were building up for another large-scale
attack. It led to the Eisenhower-Dulles plan to help the Nationalists evacuate the offshore islands,
blockade the Chinese coast opposite of Taiwan, and even station U.S. marines and atomic
weapons on the island of Taiwan. The attack on the Dachens exacerbated the fears of the
American public. They feared that the domino theory might actually be true and that if offshore
territories of the Republic of China kept falling, so too would the king pin. Nothing would come
of these secretive plans, due to the fact that Chiang vehemently opposed them.
Despite the fact that the United States did not want war with China, that is not to say that
they would not start preparing for it. The mutual defense treaty was officially ratified by the
Senate on February 9th, and from there, preparations got underway. Throughout the month of
March, much talk arose within the administration about the use of nuclear weapons against
China.xl However, despite all this nuclear rhetoric, neither Eisenhower nor Dulles actually
intended to use them in this time or place. Eisenhower was a masterful Commander in Chief
during the Cold War. He knew how to fight the Cold War and how not to fight it. Unlike his
military successes on the great battlefields of Europe in World War II, he knew that the Cold War

27

was different. As opposed to massive armies clashing in glorious battle, he relished propaganda
campaigns, intimidation, nuclear threats, and creating and supporting insurgencies. Operation
Plan Rochester was something else entirely.
All throughout March of 1955, talks were held in Taipei between Vice Admiral Pride of
the 7th Fleet representing the Commander in Chief of the Pacific fleet, and Yu Tawei, the ROC
Minister of Defense.xli The plan provided for the combined operations of U.S. and Chinese forces
in the event of hostilities in the Taiwan area in which both forces are engaged. The proposed
Plan Rochester operation would define the basic responsibilities of both the U.S. and the ROC
under combat in defense of Taiwan, Penghu, and possibly the offshore islands. Members of
Chiangs administration were not pleased to hear that the offshore islands were to be potentially
excluded from this military arrangement. In these talks, each side debated the general military
situation, the capabilities of the enemy, the number of U.S. forces to be deployed, etc. It was
decided that the Nationalists would provide the ground forces while the United States would
cover any necessary air and naval bombardment. Eisenhower was careful to not establish a
combined staff or combined command intermingling Chinese and U.S. officers in a single
headquarters. He worried of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalists and any corruption that could
plague their operations. After all, there were still many Americans in the administration like
Livingston Merchant who didnt trust Chiang, and thought that his regime is rotten and beyond
reclamation.xlii As the talks proceeded, the U.S. representatives felt that they had nothing to rely
on for their rights and privileges. Another conference was held in Taipei in mid-April, but after
that, Plan Rochester disappeared from the record. It seems as though talks broke down, and an
agreement could not be made. Perhaps the Commander in Chief of the Pacific fleet did not give
it the approval it needed to go further. Regardless of how it ended, the important thing to

28

remember is it began. Operation Plan Rochester was successful not in that it solved the myriad
of problems, but it showed willingness on both sides to solve the problem.xliii
Since the end of World War II, the United States had been resistant to politically
recognizing the Chinese communists and refused to enter into any official diplomatic relations
with them. In a letter written by Eisenhower and addressed to Winston Churchill, he explained
how we cling to the theory that the Communist ruling clique there is a conspiracy and is not a
government in the civilized meaning of the word.xliv The Chinese communists had been
similarly resistant, due to its hatred of what it perceived as American imperialism in the region.
However, this all changed in April of 1955, when twenty-nine governments from Asia and Africa
convened in Indonesia at what was called the Bandung Conference. The Peoples Republic of
China was one of them. Discussions would center on peace and the role of the Third World in the
Cold War era. They would also discuss economic development along with the conditions of
decolonization, political self-determination, respect of sovereignty, non-aggression, and noninterference. There was a lot to talk about on the agenda at Bandung, and Chinas Premier Zhou
Enlai was ready to make history.
Before arriving in Bandung, Indonesia, Zhou had to pack his things, go to the airport,
board a plane, and successfully avoid an assassination attempt, all in one day. The plane Zhou
was supposed to take, the Kashmir Princess, was scheduled to leave Hong Kong at 4:35. Prior to
leaving the airport, Nationalist operatives had secretly planted a time bomb on the plane. The
bomb went off at 9:25 pm when the plane was flying high above the South China Sea on its way
to Indonesia. The crew miraculously survived the crash landing into the ocean, but all the other
sixteen passengers drowned. Zhou would have suffered the same fate had he not rescheduled his
flight due to an emergency appendectomy. Some believe that he knew about the assassination

29

attempt and decided to let it happen anyway because of the harsh light it would cast on the
Nationalists. Still others believe that the CIA was behind it. There is never a scarcity of
conspiracy theories that surround calamitous events such as this one. What we do know is that
the assassination attempt failed and Zhou Enlai made it to the conference in Bandung on a later
flight.
The United States viewed the Bandung Conference with caution. These twenty-nine
nations were pledging their solidarity and explicitly wanting to reduce their reliance on Europe
and North America. This was what came to be known as the spirit of Bandung.xlv The
Eisenhower administration perceived it as a distinct leftward shift that promoted revolution
against oppressors and an end to the old broken forms of society. At dinner one night, Zhou
commented that he would be willing to engage in negotiations with the United States over
growing tensions between the two nations. The Indonesian Prime Minster, upon hearing him say
that, mentioned to him that if he had really meant that, then he should make a public statement.
He replied that he would do so. A couple days later, Zhou made it known that he was ready to
engage with the United States in talks over many of the issues that had plagued their relationship
for years. However, he wanted it known that he would not budge on the need for Taiwans
liberation. Taiwan irredentism was strong within China. This was the notion that Taiwan had
once been a part of China, and as a result, it must be reclaimed. Zhou was not willing to
compromise on the liberation of Taiwan because to him, it was not an international affair.
Taiwan is Chinas territory, the people living in Taiwan are Chinese people, and the liberation of
Taiwan by the Chinese people is a question of Chinas domestic affairs.xlvi
Although the First Taiwan Strait Crisis came to a close on May 1st, military action had
long been dormant. However, tensions were still high. No one could be entirely sure of

30

Communist intentions, except that they were always bad.xlvii There was confirmed military
buildup on the mainland, as well as the speedy construction of five airfields in Fujian Province.
There was no crystal ball that Eisenhower could use to foretell communist actions. There was not
much the United States could do for the Nationalist cause aside from providing more hard rock
drills for increased tunneling on Quemoy and underwater mines for perimeter defense. The
situation was bad, and neither Eisenhower nor Dulles wanted it to continue. As always, they were
resistant to holding official diplomatic talks with the communists, but members of the
international community were swayed by Zhou Enlais willingness to compromise. India and
Britain urged Washington to enter negotiations, but Eisenhowers administration was hesitant.
They were not convinced of Zhous sincerity and thus did not want a face-to-face meeting with
him.xlviii However, in order to ease tensions, Eisenhower and Dulles agreed to use intermediaries
to probe the intentions of the Chinese communists. This was despite Chiangs resistance to any
such talks, due to the elevated status it would inevitably give the PRC. European powers that
were prodding the United States to enter into negotiations saw no reason to abstain from doing
so. They saw a big difference between defending the offshore islands and defending Taiwan.
They were sick of the Generalissimo and thought that his role in Asia should be over. He was
unpredictable and dangerous. Besides, European countries saw recognition of the PRC as
inevitable. Dulles leapt to Chiangs defense, stating that he was a man of integrity and sincere
anticommunism.xlix However, he too understood the importance of these talks, so the talks began
unofficially in Geneva, Switzerland within the month.
As opposed to talking about the growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the focus of these
conversations was on the captured United States airmen being imprisoned in China. This was a
significant problem that dominated American attitudes toward the Chinese communists. These

31

eleven American airmen had been shot down over Chinese airspace in Manchuria while they
were dropping propaganda leaflets. They were jailed as spies in violation of the Korean
armistice. It occurred exactly one week before Eisenhowers inauguration, and it was something
he had been dealing with ever since. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold was instructed to
seek their release immediately but had failed in accomplishing this task. For years, American
attitudes toward China simmered dangerously hot. Eisenhower emphasized that the problem of
the prisoners was not a minor one but involved principles which were very fundamental and
which deeply engaged United States sentiment.l
These talks proved to be unfruitful however and the strained relationship with the
Chinese was getting no better. During a meeting of the National Security Council on June 30th,
members discussed the additional Russian jets, submarines, and destroyers that were being
transferred to Communist China. Infrastructure such as railroads was improving transportation
from the interior to the coast. The five airfields under construction were scheduled to be
completed in as little as one month. Everything seemed to be moving fast except the pace of the
talks going on in Geneva. Finally, the decision was made in July that the U.S. and the PRC
would hold ambassadorial talks about the repatriation of the airmen along with any other
pertinent matters, meaning any ideas to reduce tension between the two nations. However,
Eisenhower still wanted it to be made clear that these talks still would not involve official
diplomatic recognition. As for Taiwan, the United States was going to be 100% loyal to its
obligations; that we were not going to sell anyone into communist captivity, and that whether our
friends were great or small we were equally loyal to our commitments and to our principles.li
The ambassadorial talks between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China
began on August 1, 1955. The Chinese communists were represented by Ambassador Wang

32

Binnan and the United States was represented by our Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Alexis
Johnson. The main issue at stake in these talks was the return of civilians on both sides to their
respective countries. This had been the cause of heated debate ever since the end of the Korean
War. There was, however, a second reason, and it was left ambiguous in Secretary Dulles
instructions to Ambassador Johnson. Dulles just told him to feel free to talk about any other
practical matters at issue for both sides. Clearly, Taiwan was one such issue. By September 10th,
both sides had agreed on the first issue and proceeded with the repatriation of its captive citizens.
The next issue was not so easily remedied and would continue on for years. It was the issue over
tensions in the Taiwan Strait that came to dominate these talks.
On July 20th 1955, the National Security Council had decided that U.S. interests in
Taiwan were not in immediate danger. However, the Chinese communists were still not to be
trusted. Even though they hadnt launched any new offensives against Taiwan, the relative peace
was still being misconstrued by the Eisenhower administration as the calm before the storm.
NSC 5503 concluded that U.S. actions in all fields should be taken at every opportunity to
counteract the peace offensive of the Chinese Communists.lii The fear of communism was so
great that it caused members of the National Security Council to actually fear peace. This
communism-phobia led to a reincarnation of Operation Plan Rochester but came in the form of
the United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC). From September of 1954 and all
throughout 1955, U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan culminated in the creation of the USTDC on
November 1, 1955.
Similar to what was discussed during the talks surrounding Plan Rochester, the
USTDC was a sub-unified command composed of personnel from all branches of the U.S. armed
forces, incorporating the 327th Air Division, the 7th Fleet, and the Military Assistance Advisory

33

Group (MAAG). Its headquarters were in Taipei and it reported straight to the Commander in
Chief of the Pacific fleet. It was a planning headquarters that would operate in defense of Taiwan
and Penghu in case of attack. However, its role was not strictly limited to wartime, for it had
planning and peacetime responsibilities as well. Most importantly, it acted both as a buffer
between the two antagonists and as a trip wire in case of aggression.liii The Nationalist
government valued their presence, for it helped in the training of its own soldiers, along with the
sense of safety it emanated. The Chinese saw the USTDC as a blatant act of imperialism. With a
huge naval fleet sailing in waters near their coastline, it is not hard to understand why. As
Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson put it, the United States was now doing something new
in historythat is, it was keeping strong U.S. forces which, however, were not occupation
forces, in foreign countries in times of peace.liv
For Americans, the Republic of China was known as Free China. It was a beacon of
hope in an increasingly dark world.lv In the eyes of politicians and the general public, it was
Americas duty to protect the island from communist take-over. It proved to be a symbiotic
relationship, as if the ROC was a little remora and the United States was a big shark. TaiwanU.S. relations during the 1950s and the 1960s demonstrated a typical subject of a dominant
states military and political interest on a small dependent state.lvi From 1951-1965, the United
States poured $1.4 billion in economic aid and $2.5 billion in military aid to the ROC.lvii It kept
the Taiwanese economy afloat while Chiang spent unbelievable amounts on military
expenditures. However, the USTDC did much more than money ever could. It provided security
and peace. The USTDC lasted for over twenty years, proving to be one of the longest U.S.
military operations in modern history. It served as an effective cog in the containment machine
that held back the tide of communism from sweeping over Taiwan. In fact, it did its job so well

34

that it goes virtually unremembered. Not a whole lot is written about it. It served as an effective
deterrent to the Chinese communists, and because of that, history does not remember it well. As
Senior Master Sergeant Don Wiggins of the USTDC said, history unrecorded is history lost.lviii
From September of 1954 and all throughout 1955, U.S.-Taiwan relations were hardly ever stable.
But as represented by the creation of the USTDC toward the end of 1955, the United States was,
and would continue to remain, supportive of its ally across the Pacific.

i Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap of Harvard UP, 2009. Print. Pg. 472.
ii Chang, Gordon H., and He Di. "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu
in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?" The American Historical Review 98.5 (1993): 1500. Pg. 1501.
iii Yen T.-K. 1990. The Influence of US Aid to ROCs Economic Development, Issues and Studies 29: 85-98.
Pg. 89.
iv Accinelli, Robert. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill: U of
North Carolina, 1996. Pg. 158.
v Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. The China Threat Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s. New York:
Columbia UP, 2012. Print. Pg. 159.
vi Accinelli, Robert. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill: U of
North Carolina, 1996. Pg. 162.
vii Accinelli, Robert. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill: U
of North Carolina, 1996. Pg. 162
viii Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. The China Threat Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s. New York:
Columbia UP, 2012. Print. Pg. 38.
ix Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. The China Threat Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s. New York:
Columbia UP, 2012. Print. Pg. 45.
x Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. The China Threat Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s. New York:
Columbia UP, 2012. Print. Pg. 45.
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