Title

:
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY MICHAEL
DEFENSOR
Citation
:
G.R. No. 163980
August 3, 2006
Ponente
:
TINGA, J.:
Facts

:
A number of presidential issuances prior to the
passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized the creation and
development of what is now known as the National
Government Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a
parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City,
covering a little over 440 hectares as a national
government site to be known as the NGC.
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of
the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the
coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing
instead the disposition of the excluded portion by
direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population
density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No.
137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826,
former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No.
248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical
development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become
beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing
program.
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a
homeowners association from the West Side of the
NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F.
Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The
instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents
from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the
"National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land
Utilization Act of 2003."
Issue

:
Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of
R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should
be declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious
and whimsical.
Held:
Administrative
agencies
possess
quasilegislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or
rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed

pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when

the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasilegislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the
quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly
on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
power, the judicial course to assail its validity must
follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice
of court forum.

Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc.

vs Court of Appeals
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros
Matuguina to operate logging businesses under
her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises.
MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7
stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the
majority stockholder later on. Milagros later
petitioned to have MLE be transferred to
MIWPI. Pending approval of MLEs petition,
Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a
complaint against MLE before the District
Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has
encroached upon the area allotted for
DAVENCORs timber concession. The
Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as
charged and had recommended the Director to
declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed
the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources.
During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her
shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto
Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant
to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co
requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI
to comply with the ruling to pay the value in
pesos of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The
Minister then issued a writ of execution against
MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition
before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of
MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister
from pursuing the execution of the writ.
DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the
ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a
party to the original case (as it was MLE that
was sued a separate entity). That the
issuance of the order of execution by the
Minister has been made not only without or in
excess of his authority but that the same was
issued patently without any factual or legal
basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs
constitutional rights under the due process
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPIs right to due
process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally
accepted is the principle that no man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by
judgment rendered by the court. In the same
manner an execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did
not have his day in court. There is no basis for
the issuance of the Order of Execution against
the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving
MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and
oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the
issuance of a writ of execution against it. In
fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all
furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter
requesting for the Execution of the Ministers
decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made
liable upon the order of execution by the
respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions
that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same,
apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs

letter requesting for the Order, and without

hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the
issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was
not included or mentioned in the proceedings
as having any participation in the
encroachment in DAVENCORs timber
concession. This action of the Minister
disregards the most basic tenets of due
process and elementary fairness. The liberal
atmosphere which pervades the procedure in
administrative proceedings does not empower
the presiding officer to make conclusions of
fact before hearing all the parties concerned.
(1996 Oct 24)

Tan v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986
NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current
buzz regarding the "Sugbuak." The issue in this
case, however, is a bit on the technical side.
- when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially
altered, there are necessarily more than one
unit affected -- the parent LGU and the new
LGU that was created as a result of the
alteration
FACTS:
This case was prompted by the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a
New Province in the Island of Negros to be
known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz
and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
Benedicto.
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law,
the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for
January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a
case for Prohibition and contending that the
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code
because:
(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros
Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del
Norte, were not included in the plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new
provinc of Negros del Norte would only be
about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than
the minimum area prescribed by the governing
statute
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time
so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental
pleading on January 4, 1986, after the
plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the
previous day, January 3.
ISSUE:
W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with
the constitutional requisites under Article XI,
Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that -"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
HELD:
In interpreting the above provision, the

Supreme Court held that whenever a province

is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite
in the unit or units affected" must first be
obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of
Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing
boundaries of Negros Occidental.
"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that
two political units would be affected. The first
would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity
would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte."
The Supreme Court further held that the case
of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the
Honorable Executive Secretary to the
President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984
(128 SCRA 6), which the respondents used to
support their case, should not be taken as a
doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, it
held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente
Abad Santos in the aforementioned case is the
forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting
that:
"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or
units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided
such as in the case at bar or of the people of
two or more municipalities if there be a merger.
I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional
provision."
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO.
3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte was passed for
approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite
shall be conducted in the areas affected within
a period of one hundred and twenty days from
the approval of this Act." However, when the
bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an
unexplained change from "areas affecte" to
"the proposed new province, which are the
areas affected." The Supreme Court held that it
was a self-serving phrase to state that the new
province constitutes the area affected.
"Such additional statement serves no useful
purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous,
and far from truth. The remaining portion of the
parent province is as much an area affected.
The substantial alteration of the boundaries of
the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer,
eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners."
Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced
that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has

no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is
hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the new province of Negros del
Norte, as well as the appointment of the
officials thereof are also declared null and
void.SO ORDERED."

UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE G.R.No. 176831 January

15, 2010 Nachura, J.:
Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for
mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao
Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to
compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his
father so that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already
requested his mother to settle and liquidate the
patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their
respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that
she was in custody of the original holographic will and
that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the
case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondents evidence, petitioner demurred,
contending that her son failed to prove that she had in
her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at
first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it
granted the same on petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Respondents motion for
reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,
the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent
sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially
denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved
for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the
motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and
ordered the production of the will and the payment of
attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was
able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother
had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied
with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court denied this
motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought
the matter before this Court, contending in the main
that the petition for mandamus is not the proper
remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the
appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy
of the respondent.
Held: The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the
writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified,
which duty results from the official station of the party
to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.
This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be
resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who
seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the
public right involved is mandated by the Constitution.
As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if
the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty

to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the

applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
exists, although objection raising a mere technical
question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the
case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in
the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that
the court, officer, board, or person against whom the
action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such
court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the
relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle
that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce
purely private contract rights, and will not lie against
an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a
public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating
to the public and to the government; hence, it is called
a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the
public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the
issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law other than the remedy of mandamus being
invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only
in cases where the usual modes of procedure and
forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.
Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is
equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally
controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of
the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of
the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily
ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe
production of the original holographic willis in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the
remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of
the will and that he seeks the production of the original
for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however,
does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the
same is in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the production of the
subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks

a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants

the demurrer.