Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JUSTICIABILITY
1. Spotting the issue:
Triggers.
Aesthetic injury (imminentdefinite, inevitable)(Lujan)
Speculative injury
Citizen suit provision
Quasi sovereign interest is created: Sovereign entity (Mass v. EPA)
Guaranty Clause Claim = NJPQ (Luther v. Bordan)
Impeachment of Judge (Nixon)
Congress Line Item Veto (Raines v. Byrd)
Associational standing. (If one member can sue, the organization or if the organization
is harmed as a whole)
(An organization may only sue on behalf of its members if the prudential limitation that
militates against 3rd parties has been waived by Congress (Lujan))
Rationale of standing:
Limited jurisdiction/Separation of powers: courts power to adjudicate w/out political
accountability must be checked
Competency/vigorous advocacy: a party w/ a real stake will zealously litigate and create
digestible information
Resources/Limiting quantity of litigation: concern that subpar quality and quantity
litigation would overwhelm courts
Parties vs. Public: courts should only hear cases from real parties; public should use
political process; just b/c there is a constitutional violation does not mean that the Court
will hear the case
2. Framework
Framework: Case or Controversy Requirements (Justiciability Doctrines)
Rule. If one of the justiciability doctrines is violated, the court will not hear the case.
1. Advisory Opinion (Pr. / Con.) opinion that does not involve an actual case
regarding the constitutionality of a pending legislation or questions referred to the
judiciary by other branches of the government
2. Constitutional Requirements:
a. Actual, concrete dispute, adversarial Actual CASE between adverse litigants
b. Substantial likelihood that the courts decision for P will actually effect him
Courts decision will be FINAL
3. Standing (Article III and Prudential strands)
4. **Constitutional Requirements**
a. Injury in fact. P must show that he has suffered a particularized injury that
is concrete, real, and imminent
i. Counts. Bodily, professional interests, financial, vote dilution, loss
opportunity/race, aesthetic offense (Lujan), associational standing,
procedural right to protect a concrete interest (EPA)
ii. Doesnt Count. Mere Procedural Injury (Lujan lack of consultation with
other departments which is procedure), Not particular or imminent
(Lujan needed a ticket)
iii. Exceptions. Associations see below
a. Causation.
i. Counts. Fairly traceable to s conduct, contributing factor, or fairly
attributable. (EPA)
CON LAW ISSUES OUTLINE 1
ii. Doesnt Count. Intervening 3rd parties (Allen tax exempt racist schools)
b. Redressability. must show that a favorable decision by the court
will redress s injury. needs standing for ALL remedies sought:
compensation, injunction, or declaratory relief
i. Counts. Partial redressability is good enough! (Mass)
ii. Doesnt Count. Ultimate person responsible not a party to suit,
speculative redress (Lujan)
2. **Prudential Requirements**
a. Prohibition on 3rd Party Standing - Exception:
i. Associational Standing: organization injured or sue for all member
(economic) 1) each can sue on their own behalf, 2) interest is related
to associations purpose 3) members dont need to be present (NAACP);
b. Prohibition on Generalized grievances if injury is merely as a citizen, he is
prohibited from bringing suit to force government to enforce laws (taxpayer
Lujan; loss of political power Raines) - citizen suit provision?
c. Prohibition on Suits outside the laws zone of interests.
i. Zone of injury congress expected this kind of injury would be
addressed under the statute or constitutional provision
ii. Zone of interest the party is within the zone of interest protected byt
eh statute or constitutional provision
3. Mootness
a. there must be an actual controversy that exists at all stages of review,
including appeal, not just at the time the complaint was filed.
b. Cases are moot if something happens after the litigation has begun that
deprives the Article III court of an actual controversy
c. Controversy must not arise too late (settlement, P dies, settlement, law
repealed) exception: events capable of repetition but evading review, ie. Roe
d. court must dismiss case if becomes moot
4. Ripeness
e. a dispute is too remote or speculative to warrant judicial action if it is
insufficiently developed and brought too soon.
f. A person cannot seek a pre-enforcement or anticipatory review of a statute in
federal court leads to an advisory opinion because no real or imminent
injury yet
i. Parties can go to federal court and askf or a declaratory judgment (ie.
Against a statute they find unconstitutional) because we want people to
be able to challenge statutes
g. Controversy must not arise too early, (e.g. threat prosecution, preenforcement review) exception: declaratory judgment
5. No Political Questions (Pr. / Con.) Analysis: [Baker v. Carr standards for
determining whether NJPQ]
p[pIf all other standing requirements have been met, the court may still decide not
to hear a case because it is a Non Justicible Political Question
h. Does the constitution commit the issue to other branches? question turns on
the interpretive power of the court, which is broad (Marbury, Cooper) (textual
restriction)
i. Is there a judicially discoverable and manageable standard for resolving this
issue? (Is there a standard by which the court as a court could decide the
issue? If the court needs specialty in the issue, it may refrain from
deciding. Judiciary may not have tools to decide) (prudential)
j.
Cause. Intervening 3rd party cuts the causal chain (be wary of statutes there the
government is influencing 3rd parties who are in turn injuring or causing injury to the
P where redressability against the government would be irrelevant (Allen)
Redressability. Wouldnt be able to address the problem anyways. Intervening 3rd
party. India / China.
PQ. See framework
EPA Distinguished since state (as sovereign) might have relaxed requirements.
Political Question Doctrine. Under the Political Question Doctrine, the Supreme court
has held that courts should not rule on certain issues, despite fulfilling standing,
mootness, and ripeness, since these claims subject is still inappropriate for judicial review
(Baker, US v. Nixon). These issues should be left to the other political branches, since
they are in a better position to answer them. The PQ doctrine is governed by a 3-part test
established in Baker v Carr that contains both constitutional and prudential concerns. The
constitutional branch turns on whether there has already been a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to another political branch. The prudential branch
contains five parts. First, there needs to be a judicially discoverable and manageable
standard for resolving the issue in question. Next, the court must assess if, by deciding,
they would be laying out a nonjusticible policy that requires non-justicible discretion.
Third, taking on the issue cannot disrespect or overstep the boundaries of another branch.
Fourth, the court must defer to political decision that have already been made. Lastly, the
court should ensure that the government is speaking with one voice, and avoiding
speaking when a question seems like it belongs to another branch to avoid confusion.
Historically, the court has also stepped in to remedy a representation reinforcement
problem when the political process itself wont be able to fix the problem (Baker v. Carr).
II. FEDERALISM
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) scope of Congresss enumerated power: vast
expansion of federal power; relaxed standard for necessary and proper
FACTS: Many states object to charter of 2nd US Bank pursuant to Congressional
statute; MD tries to tax bank. Congress has the power!
HOLDING #1: Court says YES, uses 4 modes of argumentation:
o Historical Experience Justification
Political Safeguards of Federalism = states are represented in Congress;
thus Courts should stay out
Power was already consented to at very early period of American history
(framers thought it was constitutional); recognized by successive
legislatures and acted upon by the judiciary
Its existence creates a presumption of constitutionality (despite absence
of any previous SCOTUS review)
o Rejection of Compact Federalism
MD argues that the Constitution was created by compact of states, who
chose to give some powers to the fed govt states are ultimate
sovereign power, and can tax if they so desire; the fed govt cannot act
in a way that disturbs the states
Marshall argues core sovereignty is retained by the people, not the
states federal government acts on behalf of all the people, who
ultimate source of authority
4
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Considerations (Morrison):
(i) Is Congress regulating economic activity?
(ii) Jurisdictional element?
(iii) Congressional Findings? Findings are helpful, but not dispositive - Lopez.
(iv) Attenuation, too many steps? (Similar to Lopez education argument to
commerce).
RATIONAL BASIS the court wont defer to congress when the single state
intrastate activity is not economic or commercial, when it is, the court will defer
to congress: as long as congress reasonably believed that regulating the
noneconomic intrastate activity could have a substantial effect on commerce.
The court does not completely defer to congress it depends on the nature of
the activity economic/ commercial:
i. If its not economic activity it will be presumed not to be commerce and the
court wont defer (Lopez)
ii. If it is economic the court will give deference to congress as long as theres a
rational basis (Wickard)
Aggregation for Non-Economic Activities. Congress can regulate noneconomic if doing so is reasonably adapted to a larger regulation of economic
activity, otherwise congress can aggregate when economic.
If cong regulates at high enough level of generality and comprehensiveness
(production, distribution, consumption, such as in controlled substances) it may
regulate non-economic activity that taken in the aggregate congress could
reasonably believe substantially affects interstate commerce.
This is internal analysis, and then go to external constraints (10th Amendment).
3. Language
Background:
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3: The Commerce Clause is one of Congresss enumerated
powers. Under McCulloch v. Maryland Congress can use reasonable measures to wield
their enumerated powers.
From the New Deal until 1995 the Court was extremely deferential to congresss exercise
of its Commerce Power. In 1995, however, the court moved towards a less deferential
method of evaluating whether the legislatin in question sufficiently related to a matter of
interstate commerce. Lopez and Morrison revived internal constraints on the Commerce
Power in light of congresss article 1 section 8 authority, and additionally pursued external
constraints as seen in X and Y cases. Regardless, the court has shown that it will continue
to defer to congressional laws that concern interstate commerce.
Rule:
Congress may regulate within three general categories, such as the use of channels of
interstate commerce, such as highways, waterways, and airspace; instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, such as the people or things moving through interstate commerce,
including cars, boats, airplanes, and shipments of goods; and intrastate activities that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. (Lopez affirmed in Morrison),
TO satisfy the third category, one can use the four step test outlined in Morrison. Here
_______.
First, one must assess whether the intrastate activity is economic in nature. (If Y,
deference, but not dispositive: must meet rest. If no, presumptively unconstitutional, only
upheld if there is a real factual basis between intrastate non-econ activity and interstate
activity)
Next, one must assess whether there is a jurisdictional element in the statute
that ties the activity to interstate commerce. (if Y, actually provides link between
statute and regulation want to establish that federal cause of action is in pursuance of
Congresss power to regulate interstate commerce. If no, doesnt work).
Then, one must assess whether there are sufficient legislative findings. These
findings, although not required nor dispositive, are persuasive. (Lopez) Here, the court
found ___. Certainly, these findings would help persuade a court that the statute falls
under the commerce clause.
Finally, we must assess if the activity is too attenuated. (if Y, There are too many
steps needed to bridge the gap between regulating a local activity to an impact on
interstate commerce. If congress were to regulate this activity, similarly non-economic
and traditionally state activities, such as __, could be regulated. Courts definition of
economic activity is breathtaking and threatens to sweep all of productive human activity
into federal regulatory reach. (OConnor in Raich). If no, say how there is a rational
basis / significant connection non-economic things may be aggregated if the activity is
necessary to regulate under a broader regulatory scheme, or Leaving a home grown or
local non-economic segment of the market unregulated would affect congress ability to
regulate the national commerce market generally (Raich))In Lopez, the court held that the
argument against the presence of guns in school zones because of its negative impact on
education was too attenuated to interstate commerce and, if it were to be held as a
substantial impact, anything could be considered to substantially impact commerce and
therefore anything could be regulated.
Ultimately, the court will defer to congress decision about an activity substantially
affected interstate commerce if the activity is economic, so long as there is a rational
basis under Wickard.
Even if one would say this is not economic and therefore would be inappropriate to apply
the substantial affects test it may still be regulated by applying the test in Raich, which
allows the regulation of activities which are part of an overall economic class in broad
regulation.
** If federal law is valid (use Raich, Wickard, Darby
Category Pigeon Hole. Argue for a category; aggregate activity through congressional
findings. Stages of production no longer an issue.
Aggregation. Leaving a home grown or local non-economic segment of the market
unregulated would affect congress ability to regulate the national commerce market
generally (Raich, Wickard)
Broad Regulation of Commerce (Ominous) v. Narrow As Applied challenge.
Non-economic things may be aggregated if it is reasonably adapted to a larger
economic activity, under Raich Rational basis; significant connection. Raich.
Intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce is valid (Darby and
WIckard)
Historical Cases. Can bring in history for broad scope of Commerce Power. (Darby)
Congressional Findings demonstrate substantial effect on interstate commerce,
which helps.
Indirect. Look at affects on commerce not the actual harm itself, rejects direct test
and moves toward substantial affects test (NLRB)
Rational Basis (civil rights cases) As long as rational basis and the means were
reasonable and appropriate. (Even if little far fetched and wrong) (Breyer Dissent
in Morrison more deferential).
CON LAW ISSUES OUTLINE 9
the supremacy clause to invalidate a state law that goes against the federal directive, not
commandeering the state to regulate.
Rule. The 10th amendment is violated when congress utilizes its commerce
clause power to impose an affirmative duty upon a state. (New York take title
provision). Congress cannot impose regulations on states that force them to regulate
their people according to how congress feels is right. However, when congress is merely
prohibiting a harmful activity, or regulating the state as if it were a private individual or
business owner, there is no 10th amendment violation, and the 10th amendment does not
function as an external restraint. (Reno shall not sell drivers information).
Analysis. In New York, a congressional statute that required states to take title to
nuclear waste was interpreted as commandeering. The court held that the provision was
coercive, in that it forced states to take on private parties nuclear waste, an area that
traditionally is reserved for the states. This legislation would coerce state action and
would blur political accountability for the action, leaving citizens unable to figure out what
party to hold accountable for the new procedure for nuclear waste.
Fed Law is Invalid- Plaintiff
10th amendment IS a distinct external limit
Commandeering / Affirmative Hard Choice. Fed Law Forces States to Make
Subsidy to State Citizens. It is unconstitutional for Congress to compel state
legislatures to adopt laws or state agencies to adopt regulations. (New York) Hard
choice.
Court must step in: this blurs lines of political accountability. State voters
adversely affected wont know whom to blame. (New York)
Policy Reasons: state and local governments can tailor policies to fit the specific
needs of their citizens; states are laboratories of experimentation that can yield new
practices later on; more accessible and closer to citizens. Decrease likelihood of federal
tyranny. This statute is an affront to core state sovereignty.
Discretionary. The act forces discretionary actions, reduces states to mere
handmaidens (accountable for a decision they didnt make). So no political
accountability problem here.
[States = labs of experimentation]
Fed Law is Valid congress
10th amendment is only a truism and reminder!
Mere Prohibition. Against harmful activity.
Policy: Can deal with negative externalities that flow across state boundaries; provide
certain public goods; can provide well against catastrophes; can spread wealth across
states; can prevent destructive competition and races to the bottom among states;
protect against tyranny of local officials. Preventing national coordination problem.
Political Safeguard of Federalism. Federalism is already safeguarded by the
political process. 10th Amendment is but a mere truism. Court should not intervene
where no failure of the political process (Darby)
Theory: consent when the fed law was passed by governors of state so cant
complain now (Dissent in NY).
Ministerial. Mere ministerial Act not discretionary.
Rationale: prevent race to the bottom
ASK:
Does it look like a tax? does the IRS take it?
Does it produce revenue for the government?
Is it overly excessive payment as to compel compliance?
Does it have a scienter requirement? Like is it structured like a penalty (like
Power to tax: plenary power; not subject to other enumerated powers; but subject
to 10th Amend. and the Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. 1 8 cl. 18)
o Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.: does not allow Congress to use its taxing
power to regulate & to expand its Commerce Clause Power
o National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: allows
Congress to use its taxing power to regulate
3. Language SPENDING
Background.
Congress can utilize its Spending Power from article 1 8 cl. 1 to induce, but not coerce,
states cooperation indirectly in places where it cannot directly regulate directly under the
commerce clause. Congress may utilize funding conditions to encourage states to follow a
regulation of national coordination under its pending power, but if the choice becomes
compulsory or overly coercive, the regulation may violate the 10 th amendment and no
longer fall under congress spending power. (dole)
Rule. In general, Congress may condition grants to state governments when the
conditions themselves meet four requirements: they must promote general welfare; be
germane, or there must be a reasonable relationship between the conditions of the grant
and the federal interest in the program; the regulation must be enacted unambiguously,
allowing the States to exercise their choice knowingly; and there is no independent
constitutional bar, as Congress cannot induce the States to violate another provision of
the Constitution
Assuming the regulation contains a reasonable condition for the states, it would not
infringe on coercion and would simply fall under inducement. This standard is rarely met
and therefore unlikely to be considered coercion here.
After Sebilius, there are three additional factors to consider: whether there is a significant
change to an already existing program; whether the states have relied on settled
expectations of a program; and the overall amount the states would lose if they were to
not abide by the condition presented.
4. Language TAXING
Congress can also utilize its Taxing power from article 1 section 8 clause 18 to use its
taxing power to regulate, but not coerce, state activity. Congress is not allowed to utilize
its taxing power to get around restraints imposed by the commerce clause. It may use its
taxing power to raise revenue, but not as an end-run in stretching the boundaries of the
commerce clause. Further, Congress cannot use its taxing powers to coerce states into
following a tax: if it acts as a penalty, it does not fit under Congress taxing powers.
To analyze whether a provision is a tax or a penalty, need to see if it meets the following
elements. First, must see if the IRS collects it in the way they would a tax. Second, assess
if it produces revenue for the government. Next, see if it is an overly excessive payment
as to compel compliance? Last, confirm it does not have a scienter requirement.
Federal law is valid
Framework Elements. Argue all 4 framework elements are present.
Germaneness. Reasonable Relationship. Findings. The federal interest in the
program is (insert facts herehighway safety from drunk driving) is reasonably
related because there is evidence in the record (findings) that (harm the statute seeks
to preventunderage individuals who cant drink in one state will cross state lines to
get booze in another state)
Not Coercive. Just an Incentive (New York). Solution to National
Coordination (Steward Machine). This is not a coercive action because were
trying to solve a national coordination problem (Steward Machine state social security
pools). This is merely a condition on spending. Facts / Analogy. Not having (old
age) benefits in one state will cause the needy to move out of state seeking benefits
and ruining the tax base of the original state. Want to avoid a national race to the
bottom.
Deferential Standard. The way the court has applied the four-part test in Dole, it is
so deferential that it is hard to imagine when a condition would be coercive.
No external limits. The court has never invigorated the 10th amendment in the context
of the spending power as it has in the context of the commerce power where there has
been a recent revival of federalism-based limits. Rather the court has repeatedly
endorsed broad congressional discretion regarding the scope of the spending power.
Federal law is invalid
Attack all four elements. Distinguish Doles highway funding program.
Coercion. High percentage. No this is a high degree of coercion and reaches the
outer limits articulated by Justice Rehnquist in South Dakota v. Dole. When the choice
becomes clearly compulsory (high percentage) it borders on commandeering and
might violate the 10th Amendment. No real standard.
Indirect loophole. Cant use their spending power to indirectly exceed their direct
power. OConnor dissent
Steward Machine Distinguished. Same ppl got taxed and benefited and not
earmarked for certain group; states approved the tax; and states can repel whenever they
want.
Conclusion
Therefore, this federal statute (which contains a condition on federal spending just like the
one in New York) is likely to be valid under the congressional Spending Power, and the
court is unlikely to raise an external constitutional bar in this area (South Dakota v. Dole).
More likely to find external limits on commerce clause than spending power as we see in
NY v US. Never had a 10th amendment violation for spending power.
VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS
a. Executive Powers Youngstown Framework
1. Triggers
CON LAW ISSUES OUTLINE 15
Triggers.
Domestic v. Foreign
Executive action where congress has been silent (when its domestic)
Theater of war
Emergency circumstance
Scope of the Executive Power
Congressional Acquiescence
Refusal to amend (Taft-Hartley)
Formal (Black) v. Functional (Frankfurter; Jackson)
2. Framework
Framework.
Jackson: Youngstown Steel Seizure
There are three zones of presidential authority under which a president may
act:
- Zone (1): Executive Power is at its maximum when the president is relying upon
his Article II powers and a Congressional Authorization (based on Article I). Such
actions that are constitutional or congressional are presumptively constitutional.
-
Zone (3): The Executive Power is at its lowest ebb when the President takes
actions in conflict with the Congressional authority (express or implied will). In this
circumstance, the President must have express authority under Article II;
otherwise his action is presumptively unconstitutional, and he is proceeding in the
teeth of congress. The court must find the Congressional statute unconstitutional in
order for the President to move forward. Presumptively unconstitutional
Here, the Presidents seizure of the steel mills fits into the 3rd Zone
because Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field but
has covered it by 3 statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure. By not
adopting the amendment, which would have allowed the president to do this
in the Taft-Hartley act, Congress has spoken.
3. Language
Background. Article II enumerates the presidents specific powers. However, the scope
of the presidents power has been up for debate. Questions about the presidents inherent
powers not expressly enumerated in Article II have drawn concern regarding separation of
powers.
-
branch. However, the different branches actions overlap in the federal government, and
more than one branch is necessary to complete nearly any government action, as
explored by Justice Jacksons functional view in Youngstown.
2. Framework
(1)Has the President Acted? If so, Treaty or Executive Agreement?
(2)If Treaty, subject to Presentment and Bicameralism. (Needs Senate Approval), If
Executive Agreement; presumptively constitutional.
(3) Has Congress Acted? What have they said? Affirmative grant of power (Zone 1)?
Prohibition on Presidential Action (Zone 3)? Long acquiescence (Zone 2; possibly Zone 3)?
3. Language
Background. Treaties v. Executive. The judiciary will not bail out congress where
theyve been silent.
The courts have read congressional silence as indicative of Jacksons zone 2, not zone 3.
When the president makes executive agreements with foreign nations, no specific
authorization is needed. In Dames & Moore Justice Rehnquist read the surrounding
statutes and congressional silence as indicative of congressional acquiescence, placing
the presidents acitons in zone 2.
If the court adopts such an approach in the current matter it could find the executive
action to be a valid exercise of his article II powers (Dames & Moore).
A narrow reading of D&M suggests that only executive agreements prevail over a
conflicting state law, and are only permissible when authorized my federal statutes. This
reading leaves open the possibility that some future executive agreement might be
invalidated as usurping the Senates treaty approving power. However, the SC has never
held an executive agreement as unconstitutional by usurping Senates treaty approving
function.
Treaty: An agreement between the US and foreign country that is negotiated by the
President and is effective when ratified by a 2/3rd majority in the Senate.
Executive Agreement: An agreement between the US and a foreign country that is
effective when signed by the President and the head of the other government.
Note: D&M does not provide support for the assertion that the President has ability to sign
an executive agreement that would violate the Bill of Rights.
Rule. Executive Agreements Functional. In the area of executive agreements the
court will read the congressional record in toto and infer accordingly.
Executive Jackson, Functional
A presidential executive agreement is presumptively constitutional.
Zone 1. (If there is a statute at play) We are in Zone 1: Congress gave executive
authorization to
Historical Precedent. (If there is congressional silence) This conduct has been
engaged in by other presidents in the past for many years; therefore read
congressional silence as acquiescence in this practice Zone 2. Quote Frankfurter
from Youngstown, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned may be treated as a gloss on
Executive Power vested in the President by Section 1 of Article II.
Rule. The President may detain a US citizen as an enemy combatant so long as they are
captured in the theatre of war. (Milligan).
However, the detainee is entitled to particular assurances of due process, including a right
to hear the charges against him, a right to an attorney, and a right to challenge said
charges (hamdi). There, the court held that the burden would shift to the defendant to
prove his innocence in such scenarios (Hamdi). Additionally, unlawful military combats
are constitutionally entitled to military tribunals (Curian).
The legality of military tribunals raises policy questions about separation of powers and
the application of the constitution. Those defending the executive power argue that there
is a need for broad power to deal with terrorist threat. While others argue that check and
balances are necessary and that basic rights should not be compromised.
Executive
Zone 1. The statutes language is broad and encompasses this action. Reading the
statute broadly furthers its clear purpose to (Prevent a terrorist from returning to the
theater of war).
Acquiescence. Historical Acquiescence. Long-term congressional silence in this area
is a gloss on executive power (Youngstown)
Zone 2. Text/Structure. Article II gives the executive the power to act as the
Commander in Chief and to take care. This action is a how action, and fall within
the scope of the executives article II powers. Even without explicit authorization from
congress, this action is authorized.
Separation of Powers. The executive defines the scope of its war power. For the
court to intervene trenches on the executives constitutionally granted war powers.
Plaintiff
Formal (Black). The formal distinction between the executives and congresss power
prohibit the executive from taking unilateral action without statutory authorization
from congress.
No Emergency text in the Constitution suspends its terms
Functional (Zone 3). Even from a more functional perspective, congresss clearest
statement concerning this presidential action expressly forbids it, putting this action in
Zone 3. The executive acts in the teeth of congress (Frankfurter Youngstown)
Functional (Zone 2). The language in the statute does not reach this presidential
action, so Congress is silent and the executive proceeds on his article II powers alone
Due Process = Balance. Governmental interest v. individuals interest (Matthews v.
Eldridge)
Unitary Executive. Jacksons concern regarding the tyranny of a unitary executive in
Youngstown couldnt be more present than in this case.
Separation of Powers. Since executive has trenched on congresss allocation of war
powers the judiciary must step in to protect rights of the individual
Conclusion
As in Hamdi the ct is likely to construe statutes language broadly to encompass the
executives actions.
Eisentrager German civilians captured in the pacific as enemy aliens did not have
Due Process Rights
Rasul Q of jurisdiction, Sup Court holds there is jurisdiction in GB because its under
functional control of the U.S. (Congress stripped jurisdiction under DTA but it didnt
work in Hamdan, and MCA which failed in Boumediene)
Padilla (In Chicago) AUMF doesnt provide enough congressional authorization for
detention under the Non-Detention Act
Hamdi (U.S. Citizen, but captured in Afghanistan), AUMF provides congressional
authorization and necessary authorization under the Non-Detention Act to detain U.S.
Citizen apprehended in foreign country as an enemy combatant valid exercise of
executive authority because its Zone 1 Congress has acted: presumptively
constitutional, (court doesnt address whether inherent power under Art II because
Congress has spoken). However, the court has a role to protect individual liberties and
weighs (under Mathews v. Eldridge), the public and private interest there has to be
notice of the factual basis for classification as an enemy combatant, fair opportunity to
rebut it, right to an attorney, however hearsay evidence is allowed and the burden of
proof is shifted.
Hamdan (alien, captured in Afghanistan, detained in GB, charged with conspiracy),
UCMJ gives the pres the authority to try in a military commission when authorized
either by statute or by laws of war the military commission is authorized, the issue is
whether it is authorized here Court interprets DTA and AUMF not to authorize and
conspiracy is not a law of war (only 4 votes) so this is ZONE 3 a military commission
against the UCMJ and the president needs to rely on Article II alone, procedures violate
UCMJ therefore military commission cant be used and the detainee has to be tried in a
regular court. [Habeas filed before DTA so not CSRT]
Boumediene (detained in GB, enemy combatant as determined by CSRT and Court
of App for DC Circuit according to MCA). MCA attempts to strip jurisdiction given in GB
under Rasul, ZONE 1 Article I and II working together MCA backs the president and
trying to strip jurisdiction issue of individual liberty court has to have oversight. 3
Factor TEST determines the Reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) citizenship/status of
the detainee, (2) place of apprehension, (3) practical obstacles in resolving habeas
review should apply and theres no suspension of the writ: The suspension clause
applies to the detainees and has to be formally suspended, theres no formal
suspension in the DTA or MCA AND (2) the CSRT is not an adequate substitute for
habeas (b/c cant consider exculpatory evidence). Even though this is ZONE 1 Art I +
Art II theres an external constraint: violation of the Suspension Clause another
provision that prevents action its not an Article II violation of power.
CON LAW ISSUES OUTLINE 21
Line Item Veto [Raines v. Byrd Congressmen didnt have standing because the injury
wasnt concrete/particularized], [s here had standing to bring the claim] the President
can veto certain provisions after the bill has been signed into law CLINTON v. NY:
Majority held it was unconstitutional under a formal approach: the president is legislating
and engaging in law making in a way that is inconsistent with bicameralism: its after the
bill has become a law and allows veto of certain provisions, not of the whole. The
presentment clause is the presidents entire role: Constitutional silence is a prohibition
here. The president is legislating formal: legislative is separate from executive.
Dissent: functional approach: the president is executing the law, not legislating,
presentment was already met. The power co-mingle, cancelling a provision is not
amending law.
In favor of Congressional Statute
Analogize Enumerated Power. Congress has the power to deal with (issue
immigration) as an enumerated power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.
Time Framing (BROAD): The requirements of bicameralism and presentment were
already met within the original legislation, allowing for the one-house veto (when the
power was originally delegated).
Hobsons choice Functionalism Necessary. Lawmaking cant happen in todays
world without the administrative state (and congressional delegation to it).so
congress either must give all or nothing to admin under a formalist approach (See J.
White, Dissenting, advocating a functional approach in this area)
Admin Rise. The rise of the administrative state requires an analysis under the
flexible approach, so that congress can legislate efficiently. See policy rationales
(above).
The formalistic approach ignores the current realities
Commingling. Outside of a small core of enumerated functions of each branch, there
will be more commingling because were in a more complicated world.
Problem waiting to happen. The rise of the administrative state is a separation of
powers problem waiting to happen, therefore, the courts need to step in to police the
boundaries.
Judicial Role should be more passive.
Plaintiff:
Exec steps out of Article II. Legislative action under the one house veto is
unconstitutional because it allows congress to act in a legislative role without meeting
the article 1 requirements of bicameralism and presentment
Time Framing (NARROW): Congress cannot agree to violate the constitution without
amending it.
Judicial Role: should be actively policing the separation of powers, an interventionist
umpire.
Conclusion:
Conclusion. Since Chadha was decided in 2005, congress enacted over 200 statues that
would have failed if challenged under Chadha. Although this phenomenon may just
indicate a lack of potential plaintiffs who wish to bring cases like Chadha to court, it could
also imply congress disregard for the courts interpretation of the constitution, and that
the court is cannot enforce its decision horizontally. The latter explanation indicates that
CON LAW ISSUES OUTLINE 23
perhaps a narrow reading of Marbury provides a more accurate reflection of role of the
judiciary. In other words, although the judiciary is a competent source of constitutional
interpretation, it may not be the sole interpreter for all intents and purposes.
e. Qualified Executive Immunity - Criminal
1. quick summary:
Executive Privilege after Nixon: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY court applies a balancing test
(confidentiality and needs of the criminal case, INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWER [in contrast
to Youngstown-Black], The court is the ultimate arbiter of executive privilege
[Marbury].
2. Triggers
Conversations between executive and advisors.
Military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets; powerful claim of executive
privilege (US v. Nixon)
Criminal discovery or proceeding against the president
President has information needed.
3. Framework
(1)Role of The Courts to Interpret. Its the courts role to determine the scope of
executive privilege. The court balances the presidents generalized interest in keeping
communications confidential against the necessities of justice in a criminal proceeding.
(2)Purpose. Confidential Communication.
(3)Functional Approach. Inherent but Qualified Executive Privilege. There is a
qualified executive privilege in the context of a criminal investigation, part of the
presidents inherent powers. Its presumptive (Functional Jackson Approach from
Youngstown)
(4)Military Hint.
Critiques.
(1) There existed adequate political safeguards for handling this issue, making the
courts intervention aggressive and unnecessary.
(2) Case should have been dismissed as a non-justiciable political question.
o Under Baker v. Carr go through elements
Textual Strand: Does the constitution assign the issue to the un-reviewable
discretion of a different branch? Determined by the interpretive power of the
court. Here, the legislature believes there is a violation; the court is involved and
the executive is taking a position.
Justiciable Discoverable & Manageable Standard in the Constitution:
lack of justiciable standards for resolving the issue i.e. standards for which the
court, as a court, can decide the question. In other words, there are no justiciable
and discoverable standards in the Constitution. Large policy questions should
be for the legislature. fails baker test
Prudential Strand: Does this produce enforcement issues? Too controversial?
Government speaking with more than one voice on a sensitive issue? Are there other
political safeguards sufficient to deal with the issue?
3. Language
Background.
The executive privilege refers to the presidents ability to keep secret conversations from
advisors. Presidents have claimed this privilege in the past as an inherent executive
power, and the Supreme Court has previously confirmed this privilege. However, this
confirmation was qualified and thus has limits, and not an absolute immunity. (US v.
Nixon) If a president wishes to utilize this power, he or she must prove a need to protect
diplomatic, sensitive, or military-related national security secrets. Further, the president is
not immune from the judicial processes, nor is he above the law. Further, there is a strong
push towards performing criminal procedure in the most complete way possible, requiring
all possible evidence. In balancing these interests, the court held in US v. Nixon that the
presidents qualified privilege does not keep him from needing to submit evidence for
criminal trials.
Rule.
When it comes to criminal prosecutions, the executive has a presumptive qualified
executive privilege. In determining the scope of this privilege, the court balances the
general need for the executive to communicate confidentially with its agents, staff and
various counter-parties, and the evidentiary importance of the communication in question
to the criminal proceeding. If a court issues a subpoena in the course of a criminal
proceeding, the President must comply if the information sought is not privileged.
United States:
Separation of Powers: absolute privilege would interfere with the ability of the
judiciary to perform its constitutional function. Separation of Powers was never
intended to be airtight. The needs of judicial process may outweigh the presumption of
presidential privilege.
Balance. We employ a balancing test. We weigh the importance of the general
privilege of confidentiality of presidential communications in performance of his
responsibilities, against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of
criminal justice.
Narrow. Scope of executive inherent powers concerning privileges and immunity. Does
not apply to criminal prosecution.
President:
*Its the role of the court to decide the scope of the executive privilege, there is an
executive privilege part of the presidents inherent powers, its presumptive there is a
need of privacy, but its not absolute, its qualified, and balanced by the courts
f. Executive Immunity Criminal
1. Triggers
Firing someone for whistle blowing (Nixon v. Fitzgerald)
Pre-Office sexual activity (Clinton v. Jones)
In-between activity (president at a conference v. president jogging)
2. Framework
The standard of impeachment is a non-justiciable political question.
o Impeachment Treason, Bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
o What are high crimes and misdemeanors? 2 views:
(1) Narrow: criminal acts, some sub-set of criminal law.
Adv: Creates a bright line rule the impeachment remedy is a
political remedy that requires a very high standard to avoid giving
the house and senate too much power
Dis: It would be difficult to remove the president for anything less
than a crime. Argue for lower standard.
(2) Broad: If President engages in any act that de-legitimizes him whether
criminal violation or not; i.e. political crimes, abuses of office, violation of public
trust impeachable offense essentially whatever the House of Representatives
considers it to be. Widely accepted view.
Adv: accepts what the impeachment process is purely a political
remedy for a political process (court not involved). Should be in
the prudential judgment of Congress they take the credit or
blame.
Dis: not sure what the standard means
Critiques of Courts Approach in Fitzgerald
Immunity created here is broad and sweeping; seems to diverge from other immunities
that have been created for other political players (that have to do with the actions of
htose people) qualified immunities. This immunity seems to go with the office
of President not with what he is actually doing. If take this to its logical extreme;
very dangerous proposition because the president could force others to engage in illegal
behavior.
3. Language
Background.
The court wants to avoid frequent lawsuits against the president in order so he or she
may perform presidential duties without distraction. Because of this, sitting and former
Presidents hold a broad Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability for Official Acts while in
office.
Rule. A President or former president cannot be brought to court for money damages
over an action constituting official conduct. He or she holds an absolute permanent
immunity against civil damages for his official actions. (Nixon v. Fitzgerald). However, the
president does not hold absolute immunity to suits for money damages for unoficial
actions performed before he or she assumed the presidency. The court has left open the
question of what in-office acts are official.
Critique.
Because President is not above the law, he or she should to answer to civil suits just like
every other citizen.
Plaintiff:
Distortion. Nixon was only about how the threat of suit might distort the presidents
decision making process while hes in office. Therefore, unofficial pre-presidential
business is not covered by the holding in Nixon.
Function / Not Office. Separation of Powers (Fitzgerald). We should not put the
president above the law. The scope of immunity should be determined by function, not
office. This immunity seems to go with the office of President not with what he is
doing.
Separation of Powers (Clinton): court is not engaging in Article II powers;
furthermore there is no significant burden here on the President to comply with the
civil litigation. If he brought the issue to court in Clinton v. Jones, litigating the civil
issue is not much different. Broad Marbury analysis court reviews.
In Clinton, the court is less worried about such suits interfering with his job because they
do not relate to his day to day duties and decision-making.
President:
Distraction. This suit will distract the president from carrying out presidential duties.
All suits against the president while in office (even if it was about something I did
before becoming president) will distract him or her from my job.
Separation of Powers (Fitzgerald): The President would be a litigation magnet.
Other Political Checks. impeachment; president wants to be re-elected; press and
media will be vigilant; president cares how history will regard him.
Separation of Powers Issue (in Clinton): Narrow Marbury reading: not the courts
place to tell the president to do something here?
4. Conclusion
Clinton v. Jones does not answer the question of whether misconduct that occurs during
Presidents time in office which is functionally unrelated to his Article II duties (injures
someone while riding bike) will get the Fitzgerald absolute immunity; though certainly a
rebuttable presumption that what a President does is limited to his Article II
powers.
***(Fitzgerald + Clinton) President cannot be sued for civil damages for
actions arising out of presidential conduct ABSOLUTE permanent immunity.
But NO absolute immunity for unofficial conduct (conduct before in office).
*BROAD immunity, ABSOLUTE not qualified, extends when the President is out
of office
*There is no immunity for civil actions based on the presidents conduct prior to
becoming president NO immunity from civil suits for unofficial acts (acts
before taking office)
*Court has not decided unofficial while in office
* High crimes and misdemeanors to impeach whatever the house considers to be a high
crime/misdemeanor.
CON LAW ISSUES OUTLINE 27
Injunction. The court allows individuals to sue government officers for injunctive relief to
make sure they abide by the constitution. One can sue a state official to enforce an action
in a state