by D. S.

Rajan

( June 2, 2015, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The

State Council Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) issued the
governments first white paper on Chinas Military Strategy on 26 May 2015.
The 25-page document of about 9,000 Chinese characters, is the ninth one to be
issued by China since 1998; unlike the last edition brought out in 2013 which among
others revealed for the first time the military strength of the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) as 1.483 million personnel divided into 18 different corps, the current one does
not give any such fact or figure, and instead focuses exclusively on what should be
Chinas military strategy; this has happened for the first time.
2. Secondly, the 2013 document had said that China will build a strong national
defense and powerful armed forces which are commensurate with its international
standing; such a remark caused doubts, if not fears, among China analysts on what
global role, a politically powerful and militarily modernized China can play in future- as
a responsible stake holder or as a power practicing hegemony. As against this, there
is no such terminology used in the latest document which emphasizes only on
building a strong army under new situation and carries an assurance that the PLAs
role would be for maintaining world peace. Such omission may signify Chinas

intention at this juncture to remove any misgivings abroad which could have resulted
from the 2013 characterization of the PLAs growth.
3. The 2015 Defence White Paper has a Preface, followed by six chapters under the
heads National Security Situation, Missions and Strategic Tasks of Chinas Armed
Forces, Strategic Guideline of Active Defense, Building and Development of Chinas
Armed Forces, Preparation for Military Struggle and Military and Security Cooperation.
As done in previous years, it identifies major strategic tasks for the armed forces of
the PRC; most prominent among them is the one asking the military to resolutely
safeguard the countrys sovereignty, security and development interests. The use of
the term development interests is notable as it firmly establishes the role to be played
by the military in the countrys development process. Confirming the militarydevelopment nexus, is the declaration in the paper that Chinas military strategy
should be subordinated to and serve the two national development objectives of the Xi
Jinping era- two centenaries and national rejuvenation.
4. The White Paper focuses on the military strategy acting as guide to the building
of a strong military in the new situation. A question arises what is the new
situation? The term appeared for the first time in the papers 2013 edition captioned
The Diversified Employment of Chinas Armed Forces; it discussed New Situation,
New Challenges, and New Missions. To understand the term, what the 2011, 2013
and 2015 papers have said on strategic opportunities of China, appear important. The
2011 document had said that China is still in the period of important strategic
opportunities for its development. The 2013 edition, declared among other things that
China has seized and made the most of this important period of strategic
opportunities for its development. The current document displays similar sentiment. It
observes that China will remain in an important period of strategic opportunities for its
development and expresses confidence that in this period much can be achieved. It
notes that Chinas comprehensive national strength, core competitiveness and riskresistance capacity are increasing and that the PRC enjoys growing international
standing and influence. What clearly emerges therefore is that in both 2013 and 2015
editions of the defence white papers, unlike what was seen in 2011, there is an
increase in the level of confidence with regard to Chinas ability to make use of
strategic opportunities. The new situation can therefore be described as one
generated by such confidence.
The bold and innovative formulations of the countrys national security and foreign
policies, now being made by a confident Xi Jinping leadership with aim to increase
Chinas influence over the world, reflect such confidence. These formulations indeed
mark a departure from Beijings past approach in international relations based on
hiding ones capacities and biding ones time (veteran leader Deng Xiaopings famous
24-character maxim of tao guang yang hui). It may be correct to say that the
leaderships confidence came through Chinas ability to achieve a sustained growth
and the growth in the countrys comprehensive national strength has grown. This
being so, at the same time, the Xi administration seems aware that in the new
situation, the international environment may still not be entirely favorable to Chinas

protection of its expanding interests; in response, it is therefore laying stress to

developing a strong military and taking some vigorous diplomatic efforts, for e.g
that aimed at promoting new type of great power relations and one belt-one road
initiative (A New Situation: Chinas Evolving Assessment of its Security Environment,
China Brief, James Town Foundation, Volume: 14 Issue: 15, July 31, 2014).
5. Taking into account that threat perceptions contained in Chinas defence white
papers have always given a clue to the likely directions of Chinas security and foreign
policies at different times, what has been said in the chapter on National security
situation in the 2015 paper, appear meaningful. The paper mentions that in the
foreseeable future, a world war is unlikely, and the international situation is expected to
remain generally peaceful. However, China faces multiple and complex security
threats. It lists new threats coming from hegemonism, power politics and neointerventionism; these are Chinese jargons meaning intervention of the US and allies
in other countries. It also finds the growing terrorist activities worrisome and views
issues, such as ethnic, religious, border and territorial disputes, as complex and
volatile. Small-scale wars, conflicts and crises are recurrent in some regions.
Therefore, the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars.
6. Country wise, the 2015 document names the US and Japan as sources of security
challenges to China. It tends to question the rationale behind US rebalancing
strategy and its military alliances in this region and Japans overhauling of its military
and security policies. For the first time in Chinas defence white papers, some of
Chinas offshore neighbors, have come under charges of taking provocative actions
and reinforcing their military presence on Chinas reefs and islands that they have
illegally occupied. It looks obvious that this regard, China has countries like Vietnam
and the Philippines in its mind. Also, the document, with the US as a clear target,
charges some external countries as being busy meddling in South China Sea affairs
and attacks a tiny few for maintaining constant close-in air and sea surveillance and
reconnaissance against China.
7. The document also points to other sources of challenge to Chinas national security
like smoldering land territory disputes (an indirect reference to border with India?); the
uncertain situation in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and regional terrorism,
separatism and extremism. On Taiwan issue, it acknowledges that in recent years,
cross- Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development,
but says that the root cause of instability has not yet been removed, with the Taiwan
independence separatist forces and their activities still being the biggest threat. It then
finds separatist forces for East Turkistan independence and Tibet independence as
security challenges, besides accusing anti-China forces of attempting to instigate a
color revolution in China. It also highlights the challenges to the security of Chinas
overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of
communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad. Another
notable challenge identified in the document concerns the new stage in Revolutionary
changes in military technologies and the form of war.
8. The chapter on Strategic Guideline of Active Defense, explains the three ways

which Chinas armed forces should function adherence to the unity of strategic
defense and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the principles of defense,
self-defense and post-emptive strike; and adherence to the stance that We will not
attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked. It also
mentions that the Active Defence guideline began in 1993 with winning local wars in
conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology, as the basic point in
making Preparation for Military Struggle (PMS). In 2004, the guideline was further
substantiated, and the basic point for PMS was modified to winning local wars under
conditions of informationization. The document adds that the basic point for PMS will
now be placed on winning informationized local wars and carrying out maritime PMS.
9. In the chapter on building and development of Chinas armed forces, it has been
mentioned that the PLA army (PLAA) will elevate its capabilities for precise, multidimensional, trans-theater, multi-functional and sustainable operations. Also, in line
with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection,
the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from offshore waters defense to the
combination of offshore waters defense with open seas protection. It has also been
said that Chinas previous approach of giving precedence to land forces over naval
power would be abandoned, and it would give higher priority to preparation for
maritime conflicts. The current white paper discusses more about Chinas overseas
interests than any other documents published previously. It says that it is necessary
for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its
national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and
maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic sea lines of
communication and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime
cooperation.
10. Mention is also made in the chapter about the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
development. In line with the strategic requirement of building air-space capabilities
and conducting offensive and defensive operations, the PLAAF will endeavor to shift
its focus from territorial air defense to both defense and offense, and build an airspace defense force structure that can meet the requirements of informationized
operations. On the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), it has been said that the
Force will strive to transform itself in the direction of informationization. The paper
adds that China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security
threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its
national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security. As
cyberspace weighs more in military security, China will expedite the development of a
cyber force. On Chinas nuclear force, the paper says that the PRC has always
pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and will optimize its nuclear force
structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration,
rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or
threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.
11. It is beyond doubt that Chinas military strategy will lead to an increase in tensions
in South China Sea; this assessment comes from the envisaged gradual shift of

Chinas naval focus from offshore waters defense to the combination of offshore
waters defense with open seas protection as well as the stress on building a
modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and
development interests and preparing for Maritime Military Struggle (Maritime PMS) .
12. Worth noting is that the issue of the white paper has coincided with rising tensions
due to Chinas land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea intended to bolster
its territorial claims in the disputed area. Such efforts include Chinas construction work
at four sites including building of a runway on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Island
chain. China is defending the work as taking place within its own territory and
intended to help with maritime search and rescue, navigation and research. The US,
on its part, is concerned with the military dimension of reclamation work that could
undermine its naval and economic power in the Pacific. A recent report of US
Department of Defence has said that at the four reclamation sites, China has moved
from dredging operations to infrastructure development that could include harbors,
communications and surveillance systems, logistics support and at least one airfield.
China has also outlined plans to build two lighthouses for navigation safety, each in
Huayang Reef (Cuarteron Reef) and Chigua Reef (Johnson south Reef) in the Spratly
islands (called Nansha by the Chinese) in South China Sea. There are speculations
that China may declare an Air Defence Identification Zone in South China Sea, similar
to what it did in East China Sea. In such circumstances, relations between the PRC
and key regional nations like Vietnam and the Philippines are likely to suffer if the
Chinese military strategy is put into operation. Chinas ties with the US would also
definitely be affected despite the formers preference now on building a new model of
military relationships among them. The only silver lining seems to be the reported
efforts from China and Japan to sign a bilateral a Memorandum of Understanding
leading to setting up of a maritime and aerial crisis liaison mechanism. If this happens,
the situation in East China Sea may become quieter than before.
13. Neighboring countries like Japan, ASEAN nations and India, which have unsolved
territorial disputes with China, have reasons to worry about Beijings intentions behind
the envisaged shift of focus in the operations of the PLA Army, Naval, Air Force and
Second Artillery; the shift respectively concerns multi-dimensional fighting, open
sea protection, defence and offence and informationization. These nations may
feel the necessity to match the Chinese strategy now formulated and may accordingly
feel the need to review their military plans. Also, the world at large may think that it
has to suitably respond to the projected pro-active role for the Chinese military in the
fields of cyber security and outer space. What is therefore possible is a chain reaction
to Chinas directions under its latest military strategy which may not be conducive to
world and regional peace.
14. India should become aware of negative implications for its Act East policy arising
from the likely rise in tensions in South China Sea (SCS) as a result of the PLA Navys
open seas protection role. India has economic interests in South China Sea region
and SCS tensions may affect them. How India should respond? It has only a limited
capacity to directly influence events in SCS; moreover, Beijing is wary of any pro-

active role by India in the SCS. New Delhi may therefore have to rely on its diplomatic
options to bring down tensions in the SCS.
15. It would be very much essential for India to note and act on Chinas plans to
involve its Navy in open seas protection. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is certain to
emerge as one of the key areas for Chinas securing of its overseas interests; the
IOR already figures prominently in the Chinas Maritime Silk Road (MSR)initiative ;
this is forcing it to actively woo nations in Indias neighborhood through extending
economic and military aid. Examples are Chinas infrastructure projects in Myanmar,
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and the proposal for China-Pakistan Economic corridor,
passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. As China copes up with demands with
respect to energy security and regional integration under the MSR initiative, its
attention is going to be increasingly towards securing of the Indian Ocean sea lanes. It
may thus view operation of its naval vessels including submarines in that region
legitimate and desirable. The debate on the subject of having overseas naval bases
has not died down in China, in spite of official denials. Potentials for an India-China
competition in the IOR look therefore high.
16. Additional points of concern for India could be the white papers references to
smoldering land border disputes and placing of Preparations for Military Struggle
(PMS) on winning informationized local wars. As long as the boundary problem with
China remains unsolved, New Delhi will continue to experience strategic pressure
from Beijing, irrespective of improvement in bilateral economic relations. On the
Chinese concept of local wars, a widely prevalent view is that such wars can happen
in Chinas periphery. India has to be prepared for Chinas waging local wars in the
Sino-Indian border.
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies,
Chennai, India. Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
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