Searle:

Naturalismo Biolgico
Marcelino Pequeno, 10-05-2015

1. Introduo

A teoria da mente de Searle bastante intuitiva, em observncia do senso
comum, admite os estados subjetivos da conscincia em primeira pessoa e
admite todos os estados mentais ordinrios como crena, desejo, dor, esperana,
etc. O Qualia (experincias subjetivas) para ele bsico e qualquer teoria que
no o admita, Searle considera insuficiente e defeituosa (Philosophical Zombies)

Searle se ope ao dualismo, mas sua alternativa um grau intermedirio entre o
dualismo e o materialismo, bastante difcil de caracterizar (e aceitar). No
dualista, mas tambm no materialismo redutivista. Muitos crticos o
consideram um property dualist, mas ele renega este rtulo em um paper
(http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final.pdf). Ele certamente um
(materialista?) no redutivista. Uma caracterstica importante da teoria de Searle
admitir que os estados mentais possuem causal power, isto , estados
mentais afetam os estados fsicos do corpo, por exemplo.

2. Naturalismo Biolgico

Searle se afirma um fisicalista (materialista) e um naturalista: Consciousness is
just an ordinary biological feature of the world . . .

[t]he mental state of consciousness is just an ordinary biological, that is, physical feature of
the brain.2 Searle is adamant: Consciousness, to repeat, is a natural biological
phenomenon.3

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1013386105239

Assim, estados mentais existem e no podem ser reduzidos a qualquer outra
coisa. Embora, os estados mentais sejam resultantes dos processos cerebrais
(ativao de neurnios e sinapses).

1 The reality and irreducibility of consciousness. Conscious states, so defined,

are real parts of the real world and cannot be eliminated or reduced to
something else.
A irredutibilidade essencial dos estados mentais um ponto importante para
Searle. Enquanto alguns fenmenos fsicos podem ser explicados em termos de
outros (o por do sol, o arco ris etc), ele argumenta que a distino aparncia-
realidade no se aplica a fenmenos mentais, a aparncia da existncia de
conscincia, a realidade de sua existncia. Outro ponto que para Searle, a
conscincia tem uma ontologia subjetiva de primeira pessoa e qualquer
explicao de base neuronal (fsica) uma ontologia objetiva de terceira pessoa.
Por isto que para Searle qualquer tentativa de explicao fsica no reconhecer

o carter subjetivo, qualitativo da conscincia e reduzir o ser humano a um

zumbi filosfico.
Observe que aqui que Searle e Dennett divergem frontalmente. Dennett quer
explicar os estados mentais em termos de perturbaes neuronais.

Conscincia deve ser explicada em termos do funcionamento do crebro, mas
no pode ser reduzida a ele. H algo especial sobre a conscincia.

Often when we get a complete causal explanation of something we can show that it can be
eliminated as an illusion this happened with sunsets and rainbows, for example or that it
can be reduced to some more basic phenomena; it can be shown to be nothing but micro
phenomena this happened to liquidity and solidity, for example. We cant do either of these
with consciousness.

But we cant do this eliminative reduction with consciousness, because the epistemic basis is
the reality itself: if it consciously seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious. We
can make lots of mistakes about our own consciousness, but where the very existence of
consciousness is in question we cannot make the appearancereality distinction, because the
appearance of the existence of consciousness is the reality of its existence.

We cannot do an ontological reduction of consciousness to more fundamental neurobiological
processes, for a reason that is implicit in what I have already said: consciousness has a
subjective or a first-person ontology; the neurobiological causal basis of consciousness has an
objective or a third-person ontology. You cannot show that a first-person ontology is nothing
but a third-person ontology. I will say more about this point later. The causal reducibility of
consciousness leads to our next point.

2 The neuronal basis of consciousness. All conscious states are caused by

lower level brain processes.
A despeito da fato dos estados mentais serem irredutveis aos estados do crebro,
ainda assim, Searle admite (e a evidncia abundante) que os estados mentais
so causados por estados correlatos no crebro.

E Searle, surpreendentemente, chega a admitir a realizao mltipla da
conscincia, aproximando-se das posies funcionalistas sobre a mente.

The fact that brain processes cause consciousness does not imply that only brains can be
conscious. The brain is a biological machine, and we might build an artificial machine that
was conscious; just as the heart is a machine, and we have built artificial hearts. Because we
do not know exactly how the brain does it we are not yet in a position to know how to do it
artificially.

3 The neuronal realization of consciousness. All conscious states are realized

in the brain as higher-level or system features.
Aqui Searle se mostra um emergentista, os estados mentais se realizam no
crebro, mas no a nvel de neurnios e sinapses individuais, estados mentais
so propriedades de alto nvel (emergentes) do funcionamento do crebro visto
como um sistema.

4 The causal efficacy of consciousness. Conscious states, as real parts of the

real world, function causally.

Searle tudo menos um epifenomenalista, e admite que os estados mentais

podem ser considerados que possuem poderem causais. Isto porque, para ele,
tudo depende do nvel discricional adotado. Ao levantar um brao, tanto posso
dizer que meu pensamento de levantar o brao foi o causador; como posso dizer
que foi a secreo de acetylcholine nos axnios de meus neurnios motores.

Um mesmo sistema admite diferentes nveis de descrio, e isto tanto valido
para um motor de carro quanto para o crebro. Importante observar que no so
duas estruturas causais distintas, mas apenas uma que admite diferentes nveis
de descrio.

Typically, for example, when I make a conscious decision to raise my arm and my arm goes
up, my decision causes my arm to go up. As with all physical systems, the brain admits of different levels of description, all of which are causally real levels of one and the same causal
system. Thus we can describe my arm going up at the level of the conscious intention-inaction to raise my arm, and the corresponding bodily movement, or we can describe it at the
level of neuron firings and synapses and the secretion of acetylcholine at the axon endplates of
my motor neurons, just as we can describe the operation of the car engine at the level of
pistons, cylinders, and spark plugs firing, or we can describe it at the level of the oxidization
of hydrocarbon molecules and the molecular structure of metal alloys. In both the case of the
brain and the case of the car engine, these are not separate causal structures; it is a single
causal structure described at different levels. Once you see that the same system can have
different levels of description which are not competing or distinct, but rather different levels
within a single unified causal system, the fact that the brain has different levels of description
is no more mysterious than that any other physical system has different levels of description.

Concluso

Principais ideias do Searle

O mental existe, qualitativo (qualia); subjetivo (primeira pessoa);
unitrio (uma conscincia de cada vez); e intencional (se dirige a objetos
do mundo).
O mental biolgico assim como a digesto, a fotossntese e mitose
e produzido por processos neuronais no crebro.
O mental so caractersticas (propriedades) de mais alto nvel do fsico
que o nvel mais baixo. Isto torna Searle um emergentista: O mental
emerge do fsico, e se distingue pelo diferente grau de descrio.
Contudo, o mental no se reduz ao fsico, portanto ele um emergentista
forte.
Os estados mentais tm poder causal, tudo uma questo de nvel
discricional. Alto nvel: descrio mental. Baixo nvel: descrio neuronal.
Searle no aceita que a naturalizao da conscincia seja negar-lhe sua
realidade subjetiva de primeira pessoa.

RESUMO:

Propriedades
Dualista de Substncia
Dualista de Propriedade
Materialista
Materialista Redutivo
Materialista No Redutivo
Materialista Eliminativo
Funcionalista
Teoria Computacional da Mente
Supervenista
Emergentista
Linha Filosfica

Status
NO
TALVEZ
SIM
NO
SIM
NO
NO
NO
SIM
SIM

Observaes

H controvrsias





Quarto Chins


Naturalismo Biolgico

Um Exemplo de Searle a Ttulo de Concluso

Right now I am consciously thinking about my desire to drink a cold beer. This
conscious thought is real in the sense that it cannot be shown to be an illusion or
reduced to something else. It is subjective in the sense that it has first-person
ontology, and the conscious thought is qualitative in the sense that it has a
certain qualitative feel to it, and it is definitely intentional in the sense that it is
directed at or about beer drinking. Furthermore, it occurs as part of my total
conscious field at the moment. My current consciously felt desire is entirely
caused by brain processes, it is located in the brain and it will very soon cause me
to go to the refrigerator and pour myself a glass of cold beer.

Objees ao Searle

No seu Artigo, Searle levanta e se defende das seguintes objees.

Objection 1. You cannot have it both ways. You cannot claim that
consciousness is an ordinary biological process and thus have a materialist
account of consciousness, but at the same time claim that it is irreducibly
subjective, which gives you a dualist account of consciousness. You have to be
either a materialist or a dualist you cannot pretend to avoid both or to be
both.
Objection 2. Biological Naturalism cannot avoid the charge of
epiphenomenalism. That is, the physical Universe is causally closed, and if
consciousness is irreducible to the physical or material Universe, then it can
have no causal effects on the physical Universe.
Objection 3. Your account seems to be self-contradictory. Is it reductionist or
not? On your account, consciousness is clearly causally reducible, because it is
entirely caused by neuronal processes, and it has no causal powers beyond

those of neuronal processes. But at the same time, though you grant that it is
causally reducible, you deny that it is ontologically reducible. You deny that
consciousness can be reduced to physical processes and you insist, like oldtime dualists, that it is something over and above the physical or material
processes.
Objection 4. You are still involved in inconsistencies. You say that
consciousness is caused by brain processes. But if consciousness is really
caused by brain processes, then there must really be two different things there:
the brain processes as a cause, and the consciousness as an effect. And that is
dualism.

Concluso das Objees

I said that both dualism and materialism are trying to say something true but,
because of the philosophical tradition, they end up saying something false.
Which part is false and which true? Dualism says truly that consciousness is a
real feature of the real world and is not eliminable or reducible to something
else. But it says falsely that consciousness is not an ordinary part of the
physical world we all live in but inhabits a separate metaphysical realm.
Materialism says truly that the Universe consists entirely of physical particles
in fields of force (or whatever the ultimately true physical theory says are the
basic building blocks of the Universe) but says falsely that consciousness, as an
irreducible, subjective, qualitative mental phenomenon does not exist. One way
to see Biological Naturalism is as an attempt to preserve what is true in each
while discarding what is false. In order to do that, we have to overthrow a set of
powerful philosophical presuppositions.

Crticas ao Searle

Estas so crticas externas ao Naturalismo Biolgico.

Jaegwon Kim, Mental Causation in Searle's "Biological Naturalism. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LV, No. 1, March 1995. Artigo na pasta
Dropbox do curso.

Abstract. The good news is John Searle's announcement,in the very first
sentence of The Rediscovery of the Mind: "The famous mind-body problem...has
a simple solution."' What is this "simple solution" that has eluded all the
"experts" in philosophy of mind and cognitive science for so long? Searle doesn't
waste any time: in his characteristically direct and confident way, he breaks the
news.
Here it is: Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the
brain and are themselves features of the brain.

Edward Feser, Why Searle Is a Property Dualist. Paper presented at the
American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meeting in Pasadena, CA,
March 24-28, 2004. Artigo na pasta Dropbox do curso.

http://www.edwardfeser.com/unpublishedpapers/searle.html

Abstract. John Searle has tried to stake out a middle position between
materialism and property dualism, which he calls biological naturalism. To
many of his critics (e.g. Nagel 1995, p. 96; Chalmers 1996, p. 370, n. 2), biological
naturalism has seemed little more than property dualism in disguise. Searle
insists that his view has been misunderstood, and has attempted in a series of
writings (1984, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1998) to distinguish it from property dualism,
most recently in his article Why I Am Not a Property Dualist (2002). But the
critics are, as I will try to show, correct. Searle is, whether he realizes it or not, a
property dualist.

K Corcoran, The trouble with Searles Biological Naturalism. Erkenntnis, Volume
55, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 307-324. Artigo na pasta Dropbox do curso.
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1013386105239

- A principal crtica ao Searle de incoerncia. O Naturalismo Biolgico se
sustenta em quatro teses que so inconsistentes entre si.
- Searle no consegue escapar do dualismo que tanto critica.
- Searle sustenta ao mesmo tempo o no redutivismo e o fechamento causal
do domnio fsico e isto no possvel (Objection 2).

Collins, Corbin (1997). Searle on consciousness and dualism. International
Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33. Artigo na pasta Dropbox do curso.

Abstract: In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the
relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the
traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are
both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of
the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of
neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties
of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental is 'ontologically
irreducible' to the physical, a view which follows from his understanding of the
status and nature of consciousness. Consciousness is essential to the mind;
subjectivity is essential to consciousness; and no purely objective, physical
description of consciousness could ever capture or explain its essentially
subjective character. None the less, Searle maintains that irreducibility is a
'trivial' result of our 'definitional practices' and is entirely compatible with his
theory. I contend that this latter claim is based on an equivocation: Searle's
conclusion only seems to follow because he alters and trivializes what
philosophers ordinarily mean by 'reduction'. I also maintain that Searle's
position is reductionist in the ordinary, nontrivial sense. For this reason, his
theory fails to accommodate the subjective character of consciousness and fails
to solve the traditional mind-body problem. Finally, I briefly discuss Searle's
claim that he is not an epiphenomenalist, and argue that given the assumptions
of his view there is no interesting causal role for consciousness in the physical
world. (Objection 2).

Georg Northoff and Kristina Musholt , How Can Searle Avoid Property Dualism?
Epistemic-Ontological Inference and Autoepistemic Limitation. Philosophical
Psychology, Volume 19, Issue 5, 2006, pp 589-605. Artigo na pasta Dropbox do
curso.

Abstract. Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain
problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards
either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searles argument and
demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly
located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide
such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of autoepistemic
limitation that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own
brain as a brain from the first-person perspective. The neglect of the
autoepistemic limitation leads to inferences from epistemic properties to
ontological featureswe call this epistemic-ontological inference. Searle
attempts to avoid such epistemic-ontological inference but does not provide a
sufficient argument. Once the autoepistemic limitation is considered, epistemic-
ontological inference can be avoided. As a consequence, one can escape
traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or
materialism.

Referncias

John Searle, Biological Naturalism, Chapter 25, pp 325-334. In: Max Velmans and
Susan Schneider (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell
Publishing, 2007. Livro na pasta Dropbox do curso.

John Searle, Why I am not a property dualist. Journal of Consciousness
Studies 9.12 (2002): 57-64. Artigo na pasta Dropbox do curso.