Professional Documents
Culture Documents
STATE OF MARYLAND
2015
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CAESAR GOODSON,
EDWARD NERO,
GARRETT MILLER,
BRIAN RICE,
ALICIA WHITE, &
WILLIAM PORTER
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STATE'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 4-263(m).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF. AND REOUEST FOR EXPEDITED
IIEARING
Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the
State's
Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and
Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and pursuant to Rule a-263(m)
moves this Honorable Court to issue a protective order restricting the Parties' dissemination
of publicizing
of
discovery materials
jeopardize the ability to conduct a fair and impartial trial of these matters. The State requests this
Honorable Court to designate discovery materials supplied to the defense as confidential. The
scope of the requested restrictions is set forth in the attached proposed
the basic factual grounds and the legal authority for this Motion and proposed order below and
requests that the Court hold an expedited hearing for the State to present partiolJarized facts in
support of the Motion.
Introduction
"Criminal justice must be carried out in the courtro om." Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v.
Gansler,377 lldd. 656, 674 (2003). When publicity surrounds a criminal trial, the United States
Supreme Court has "always held that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair
trial-
the most fundamental of all freedoms-must be maintained at all costs." Estes v. Texas,381
U.S. 532, 540 (1965). To that end, "the right to a fair trial . . . must take precedence over the
right to make comments about pending litigation by lawyers who are associated with that
litigation
if
such comments are apt to seriously threaten the integrity of the judicial process."
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,522F.2d242 (7th Cir. 1975). "As officers of the court,
court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate to the
detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair administration of justice." Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart,427 U.5.539, 601 n.27 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). That duty obliges not
only the government but also the defendant to respect our judicial system, for "the concept of
fair trial extends to both the prosecution and the defense." In re Kinlein, 15 Md. App. 625, 631
n. a Q972); accord Quinones v. Stqte,2l5 Md. App.
noted, the State like the defense is entitled to a fair
system is that the conclusions to be reached
argument in open court . . .
l,
trial.").
"when an attomey makes a publicized, out-of-court statement about fthe case] . . . , the public
may view [his or her] speech as authoritative and reliable . . . [because] [a]ttomeys involved in a
676. As such, while "litigants do not surrender their First Amendmenr rights at the courthouse
door," nor does "a litigant [have] an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been
obtained through pretrial discovery." Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,467 U.S. 20,31-32 (1984).
A fair trial
must be guarded, and "premature disclosure and weighing of the evidence may
jury."
361 n. 1s (1966).
With these precepts in the background, the State's request for a protective
order
restricting the public dissemination of discovery comes amid a foreground of enormous publicity
surrounding the trial
of the Defendants.
described and debated the facts of this case. The Defendants' attorneys themselves have been
responsible for much of that publicity. They have repeatedly and publicly attacked the merits
of
the case and the character and motivation of the prosecution. They have commented on the
evidence that
or not such evidence is relevant or would ever be admissible at trial. In short, they have
attempted to drive the narrative in this case, and the Court can easily deduce that their unfettered
ability to release select discovery to the press without the State being ethically able to respond in
rebuttal will only further enable the manipulation of the public's perception of this case.
While the State at the requested hearing will provide the Court with detailed evidence and
exhibits to support these claims, examples of the amount of publicity and defense counsel's
conduct abound. Following Mr. Gray's death, the mass protests, riots, and state of emergency in
Baltimore City prompted international press attention. The Baltimore Sun newspaper and CNN
both maintain an entire portion of their websites dedicated to coverage of this case.
search for the name "Freddie Gray" yields 60,500,000 results as of this Motion's
writing. When
the Defendants were charged in these cases, defense counsel immediately filed motions
attempting to undermine public faith in the prosecutor and the charges. In their "Joint Motion to
Dismiss
for
like
like
"will
necessarily be inadmissible at
trial."
In
their "Joint Motion for Recusal," they publicly decried that, "[a]t best, the charges levied against
something far more nefarious." The Motion continued that "the charges are baseless and that
there are material false statements and omissions in the Statement of Charges." The defense
attorneys even claimed that familial and political pressures made the prosecution "susceptible to
be influenced in choosing to
Continuing their media blitz, on May 13, 2015, Sgt. White's counsel spoke at a press
conference hosted
Vanguard and other police officers to break the glass ceiling for females." Defendant White's
counsel attacked the prosecution and its case while praising the character of the Defendant:
"[a]ccuracy was sacrificed for speed . .
concluding, "[s]he's your sister, she's your cousin, she's your friend, she's your neighbor."
When on June 2,2015, the State filed a request to extend the time to respond to defense
motions and made reference to the intent to seek this protective order to restrict dissemination
of
the autopsy in this case, the defense publicly mischaracteized the request. Defendant White's
counsel told the Sun, "there is something in that autopsy report that they are trying to hide" and
that "to ask for a protective order is beyond disingenuous." Defendant's counsel proves the
State's point. There is nothing in the autopsy report that the State seeks to
hide.
Indeed,
if
the
Defendants were to consent and the court would so order, the State would have no objection to
posting the entire autopsy report on the intemet, along with all of the discovery in the case.
Defendants, however, want to have it both ways. They want the freedom to publicize selected
aspects
of the discovery, while requiring the State to follow the law that prevents comments in
order to ensure a fair trial for Defendants. The Defendants continue to generate publicity to
prejudice the jury pool and support their argument for removal, yet demand the State remain
silent.
Recently, on June 9,2015, the defense attorneys filed a Supplement to their Joint Motion
for Recusal in which they attach as an exhibit emails they obtained. The emails, dated between
March 17-20,2015, consisted of a correspondence between a prosecution employee and
police
major and a second exchange between that major and other police officers regarding crimeprevention strategies in the area where Mr. Gray was arrested on April T2,2015. The defense
attorneys then wrote that this email exchange somehow meant that certain of the Defendants
were acting "at the direction of the State's Attorney'' the day they are alleged to have arrested
press
roared. The Baltimore Sun ran the story under the headline, "Baltimore
prosecutor asked police to target area where Freddie Gray was arrested." The public reacted
strongly also. Reader comments to the story on the Sun's website expressed, for example, "the
truth is slowly coming out" and "every day is just looking better for the Baltimore police and
their defense." On the other hand, one reader wrote, "the defense attorneys want to adversely
affect the public perception of Mosby's competence." The State agrees this is a more than fair
inference about the defense strategy in this case.
With the State's deadline to provide discovery to the Defendants fast approaching on
June 26, 2015, the degree of media attention has not abated. Considering the defense attomeys'
history of public statements and selective release of evidence, the circumstances compel the State
to seek a protective order to preserve the integrity of the adversarial trial system. The Court must
not allow the discovery in this case to further fuel a defense public-relations firestorm. The
evidence must be made public, but its release to the public must be made in a court of law, not in
defense efforts to court public favor.
be
accomplished in any manner mutually agreeable to the parties," but "discovery materials shall
not be filed with the court." Rule 4-263(k). Nothing in the rule expressly prohibits a party from
disseminating discovery materials to the public by means other than filing them with the court,
but the Rule does provide a mechanism for placing restrictions on such dissemination upon
request. Rule 4-263(m), entitled "protective orders," provides that "[o]n motion of a party . .
the court, for good cause shown, may order that specified disclosures be denied or restricted in
any manner that justice requires."
Coleman v. State,82 Md. App. 247 (1990), the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial judge's
issuance of a protective order that permitted the State to withhold from the defense the names
of
two civilian witnesses until two weeks before trial and that prohibited defense counsel from
revealing those names to the defendants prior to
trial.
constitutional right to discovery of the names of prosecuting witnesses," stating rather that the
"source of any right to discovery of such information is found in Rule 4-263," which "permits
the court in its discretion to order that any of the discovery . . . be restricted." Id. at 251. The
appellants
in Coleman had
to
an
incriminating conversation between the appellants, and the other witness had actually seen the
murder. Id. at 249-250. The State based its request for a protective order with detailed
testimony from a detective that the appellants were members of a drug organization with
history of violence and that the witnesses were justifiably "in extreme fear" for their safety. Id.
The Court found that the detective's testimony "was sufficient to establish the existence of
substantial risk of harm to the two witnesses in question" and that the trial "court struck a fair
balance between the State's concern for the safety of its witnesses and the rights of appellants to
in what is now
Rule 4-263(9), which "permits the court to withhold discovery of information which 'would
entail a substantial risk of harm to any person outweighing the interest in disclosure."' Id. at25l
(quoting what was then Rule 4-263(i)). The Court did not comment on other situations that
might justify a protective order, and when the appellants asked for further review of this
decision, the Court of Appeals merely affirmed the use of the protective order on the same
of
Similarly, in Lancaster v. State,410 Md. 352 (2009), the Court of Appeals reviewed
of other
uses
circuit court's witness-safety protective order that restricted the State's disclosure of witness
information to defense counsel and, in turn, counsel's dissemination of that information to the
defendant. Unlike in Coleman, the Court determined that the trial court erred because the State
failed to make an adequate record to justifu the restrictions, presenting no "evidence of specific
of the
defendant's reputation
for violence,
no
indication who would carry out any such violence since defendants were incarcerated, and no
showing of the materiality of the witnesses' testimony. Id. at379-80. Again, the Court did not
discuss other justifications for a protective order and considered only the restricted dissemination
The State's review of reported Maryland opinions has found no cases that squarely
address the use
of
a protective order
avoid unfair pretrial publicity. Other jurisdictions, however, have established well-litigated
standards on the issue based on their criminal and
standards largely
it
These
u.s. 20 (re84).
In Seattle Times, the Court considered "whether parties to a civil litigation have a First
Amendmenr right to disseminate,
in
22. The
advance
case stemmed
Rhinehart, the leader of the Aquarian Foundation religious group, sued the Seattle Times and a
local newspaper after they published a series of allegedly defamatory and invasive articles about
the group. During the discovery process, the trial court ordered Rhinehart to disclose the
identities of the group's donors and members, which the newspapers stated they intended to use
for future articles about the group. On Rhinehart's motion, the court granted Rhinehart
protective order that prevented the papers from disseminating the information disclosed. The
order was authorized by a Washington rule that permitted "for good cause shown . . . any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, ernbarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense . . . ." Id. at26.
Reviewing the newspapers' appeal from this order, the Court began its analysis by
recognizing that "information obtained through civil discovery authoized by modern rules
civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected
of
speech identified by
the decisions of this Court," noting that there may be a "public interest in knowing" the
information learned from discovery. Id. at 31. While the Court acknowledged that restrictions
on litigant dissemination of discovery impaired the litigant's First Amendment nght of free
expression, the question turned on whether the "good cause" protective rule "furthers an
removed). Answering this question, the Court noted that discovery processes "are a matter of
legislative grace" such that "continued court control over the discovered information does not
raise the same specter
of
in other
situations." 1d. Moreover, "[m]uch of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery
may be unrelated,
or only
tangentially related,
to the underlying
is not "a
cause
of action," and
information." Id. at 33. Additionally, "[l]iberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of
assisting in the preparation and trial" of the case and carries "significant potential for abuse,"
if publicly
The Court determined that the "good cause" protective rule "furthers a substantial
govefirmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" since "the government clearly
has a substantial interest in preventing this sort
furthermore, "whether or not the Rule itself authorizes a particular protective order, we have no
question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent equitable powers of courts
of
law over their own process to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices." Id. (intemal citations
and brackets removed). The Court also found that Washington's protective order provision and
"good cause" standard "requires, in itself, no heightened First Amendmenl scrutiny" given the
'hnique character of the discovery process [which] requires that the trial court have substantial
latitude to fashion protective orders." Id. at
36.
protective order is entered on a showing of good cause . . . , is limited to the context of pretrial
civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other
sources,
the
In the years since this decision, "courts have extended [the Seattle Times) reasoning to
pretrial criminal discovery," holding that "'[d]iscovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a
private process because the litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is
to assist trial preparation."' U.S. v. Carriles,654 F. Supp. 2d 557,573 (W.D. Tex. 2009)
10
l44l
11
high-profile racketeering case)); accord e.g., State v. Cobbins,2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 78
(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4,2015) (applyng Seattle Times in a murder trial to an intervenor's
request
to view discovery materials in the court file that were never formally admitted as
evidence). The federal courts have also considered "good cause" protective orders in the specific
context of preventing excessive pretrial publicity. ln Anderson v. Cryovac, lnc.,805 F.2d
Cir. 1986), the case involving the famous toxic tort suit that served
as the basis
I (1't
and 1998 frlm A Civil Action, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered
the Boston Globe Newspaper Company's intervenor challenge to the trial court's protective
orders issued under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The orders prohibited
the parties from disseminating information obtained through discovery to the press.
Reviewing these orders, the Court applied the Seattle Times analysis to Rule 26(c), which
permits a court to enter a protective order "for good cause shown." Cryovac,805 F.2d at 5. The
Court first explained that "[a] finding of good cause must be based on a particular factual
demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements." Id. at
7. Examining
the record,
"[t]he district court was concerned that the extensive publicity generated.by the allegations made
against the defendants, particularly the accounts appearing in the daily newspapers, would inhibit
"[s]pecific instances of such publicity were discussed in the hearings on the motion, and the
court took judicial notice of 'quite heavy stufP appearing in the newspapers."
Id.
The Court
found on this record that "there was good cause for the district court to issue the protective
order."
Id-
The district court's actions, the Court continued, "were fully consistent" with the
reasoning of In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (1't Cir. 1981), in which the Court upheld a
t1.
protective order "prohibiting disclosure of deposition contents to the press or public, finding that
'the massive amount of publicity' and 'the emotionally-charged nature of the trial' were
reasonably likely to cause 'material harm to the defendants' right to a fair
F.2d at
8.
trial." Cryovac,805
While the Court ultimately found that the district court's order erred by later
permitting selective dissemination to some media outlets but not to others, id. at9, the Court's
holding demonstrates that the risk of prejudicial pretrial publicity can constitute good cause for
restricting parties' right to disseminate discovery materials to the public. These federal cases,
moreover, can guide the use of Maryland's protective order provisions as the State here requests.
Our sister States have likewise recognizedthat there is no right -- constitutional, common
law, or First Amendment based -- to public access of criminal discovery materials. See Tacoma
News, Inc. v. Cayce,256 P.3d 1179,
access to a pretrial deposition
ll91
(Wa.
20ll)
v.
Burk, 504 So. 2d 378, 383 (Fla. 1987) cert. denied 484 U.S. 954 (1987) (holding no First
Amendment ngtfi
of
access
depositions in
criminal prosecutions); In re Worrell Enterprises, Inc.4l9 S.E.2d 271 (Ya. App. 1992) (holding
there is no constitutional right of access to the discovery documents such as defendant's medical,
by the
Commonwealth); Rosado
v.
Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,292 Cowr.l, 36 (Conn. 2009) cert. denied 558 U.S.
991 (2009) (observing that discovery proceedings never were open to the public at common law,
citing Seattle Times; and fuither that the principles supporting liberal discovery are distinct from
those supporting public access to court documents, citing Cryovac).
L2
Conclusion
Maryland's appellate courts have yet to issue a reported opinion about a protective order
issued under Rule 4-263(m) that restricts the parties' right to disseminate discovery materials to
the
State does not ask for any restrictions on the information that
and
counsel, nor does the State seek any restrictions on defense counsel's right
to review
the
discovery material with the Defendants. The restrictions the State seeks neither impair the
Defendants' ability to prepare their defense nor expose them to surprise. The State seeks only to
preserve the integrity of the trial of these matters. Excessive pretrial publicity risks interfering
with the fairness of the potential jury pool and, thereby, the trial itself to the same degree
as the
risk that witness intimidation presented in Coleman to the parties' ability to present their case to
the
its holding in the face of pretrial publicity. The State does not seek a restriction on dissemination
of discovery material any longer than necessary to achieve a final judicial result in these
cases.
The State also does not seek to limit in any way the press's right to attend the trial or any pretrial
hearings of these matters. The State seeks only to have justice carried out in the courtroom, not
the newsroom. Given certain Defendants' attomeys' actions to date and the intense press interest
in these cases, the State believes that good cause amply exists to justify the Court's granting the
reasonable restrictions herein requested that
will prevent
matters. Rather than present evidence by way of written exhibits attached to this Motion, the
13
Honorable Court.
Wherefore, the State moves this Honorable Court to schedule an expedited hearing to
consider evidence in support of this Motion and, following that hearing, to grant this Motion and
issue the attached proposed order.
Respectfully submitted,
Marilyn J. Mosby
/)
I
o"p{/ffi"
/|
tttorney
I ?*1. ast Baltimore S treet
The SunTrust Bank Building
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(443) 984-60 I 2 (telephone)
(443) 984-6256 (facsimile)
i bleds oe@ stattornelt. org
't )
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74
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _
day of June,2015, a copy of the State's Motion for
Protective Order Pursuant to Rule 4-263(m), Memorandum in Support Thereof, and Request for
Expedited Hearing was mailed and e-mailed to:
Matthew Fraling, III, Esq.
Counsel for Caesar Goodson
Respectfully submitted,
Marilyn J. Mosby
State's Attorney
120 East Baltimore Street
15
STATE OF MARYLAND
THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY
TN
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v.
CAESAR GOODSON,
EDWARD NERO,
GARRETT MILLER,
BRIAN RICE,
ALICIA WHITE, &
WILLIAM PORTER
CASE No.
CASE No.
CASE No.
CASE No.
CASE No.
CASE No.
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115141032
115141033
115141034
115141035
115141036
115141031
**{<
ORDER
Having considered the State's Motion for Protective Order and having found good
cause,
day
of
20t5,
ORDERED, that the State's Motion for Protective Order is hereby GRANTED in its
entirety; and it is fuither
in the above-captioned
cases as discovery
pursuant to Rule 4-263 shall be subject to this Order concerning confidential information, as set
forth below:
labeled
..CONFIDENTIAL.''
(b) Information or documents designated as confidential under this Order shall not be
used or disclosed by the parties, counsel for the parties, or any persons identified in
subparagraph (c) below for any purposes whatsoever other than in accordance with this
Order and for the purpose of preparing for and conducting the litigation in which the
information or documents were disclosed (including appeals).
(c) The parties and counsel for the parties shall not disclose or permit the disclosure of
any documents or information, designated as confidential under this Order to any other
person or entity not authorized by the Court, except that disclosures may be made in the
following circumstances
(i) Disclosure may be made to the parties, counsel for the parties,
of
counsel
and employees
the
preparation and trial of the above-captioned matters. Any such employee to whom
counsel for the parties makes a disclosure shall be provided with a copy of, and
become subject to, the provisions of this Order requiring that the documents and
(ii) Disclosure may be made only to employees of counsel required in good faith
to provide assistance in the preparation and trial of the litigation in which
the
persons,
if
matters. Prior
such
of this Order requiring that the documents and information be held in confidence.
.!a'
(v) Any person or entity to whom or to which disclosure is made pursuant to this
Order shall keep all documents designated as confidential which are received
under this Order secure within their exclusive possession and shall take
reasonable efforts to place such documents in a secure area.
(d) Unless subsequently otherwise ordered, this Order shall remain in effect until the
termination of all proceedings of the above-captioned matters in the circuit court.
(e) The Court may exercise its discretion to punish violators of this Court's Order for
contempt of court.
Judge