US Army at Kasserine Passe 1943

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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations
The Graduate School
October 2013
Bloodied but Bruised: How the World War II

American Army at Kasserine Pass Grew Up in
North Africa
Chris Sherwood
The Florida State University
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Recommended Citation
Sherwood, Chris, "Bloodied but Bruised: How the World War II American Army at Kasserine Pass Grew Up in North Africa" (2013).
Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations. Paper 8638.
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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
BLOODIED BUT BRUISED:

HOW THE WORLD WAR II AMERICAN ARMY AT KASSERINE PASS GREW UP IN
NORTH AFRICA
By
CHRISTOPHER ERIC JACOB SHERWOOD, SR
A Thesis submitted to the

Department of History
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Degree Awarded:
Fall Semester, 2013
2013 Christopher E. J. Sherwood, Sr.
Christopher Sherwood defended this thesis on October 29, 2013.

The members of the supervisory committee were:
G. Kurt Piehler
Professor Directing Thesis
James Jones
Committee Member
Jonathan Grant
Committee Member
The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and
certifies that the thesis has been approved in accordance with university requirements.
ii
To my brothers and sisters in arms who never made it home!!
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to first thank my adviser, G. Kurt Piehler, for the intellectual guidance,
encouragement, and moral support that helped to make this thesis possible. I am indebted to him
for his infinite patience and support of my career as an Army officer and a scholar. I also thank
him for his personal interest in my research and leadership within the field of military history.
I thank Dr. Richard Sommers and Dr. Conrad Crane of the US Army Military Institute at
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania for their insightful comments and bibliographic help. In
addition, I thank three archivists, Richard Baker, Shaun Kirkpatrick, and Tom Buffenbarger, also
of MHI, who showed extraordinary patience and diligence throughout my research trip.
I thank my parents, Jeff and Brenda Sherwood, for teaching me to become the person I
am and for their continual support throughout my entire life.
I would like to thank my fellow graduate students, Sean Klimek, Hillary Sebeny, Kyle
Bracken, and Chis Juergens who proofread my thesis and provided thoughtful and insightful
comments. Regardless of any help that I received, I take full responsibility for any errors.
Finally, I could not have done this without the unconditional love and patience provided
by my wife, Allyson. She is the backbone of our family that kept the household running
smoothly even through my deployments, research trips, and long periods of writing. I thank her
from the bottom of my heart for her devotion, sacrifice, and encouragement.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vii
1.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................1
2.
UNPREPARED .....................................................................................................................20
3.
TRAINING ............................................................................................................................80
4.
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................134
APPENDICIES ............................................................................................................................142
A.
CHRONOLOGY .................................................................................................................142
B.
BATTLE ORDER ...............................................................................................................146
C.
THE SONG OF THE FIGHTING 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION.........................................152
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................153
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................................162
LIST OF FIGURES
1
Tunisian Front, Mid-January 1943 ....................................................................................16
Battle of Sidi bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943 .....................................................................21
Delay and Withdrawal, Sbeitla, 16-17 February ...............................................................38
4
Citation of 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment following operations in Sbeitla area.
LTC Gardiner is in the trench coat near the front of the M4 tank. ................................................47
5
Battles at Kasserine 19-22 February 1943 .........................................................................55
6
American tanks of the 1st Armored Division advance to strengthen Allied positions 20
February 1943 ................................................................................................................................64
7
The tactical solution for a protective front given to General Orlando Ward from the
British ..........................................................................................................................................104
8
The War Department Pamphlet coving mine and booby-traps ........................................117
9
The War Department pamphlet displays enemy as devils and emplaces Nazi symbols to
build hatred for the enemy. Examples of the cartoon type drawings to keep the attention of
soldiers. ........................................................................................................................................119
10
A pictorial display showed the training cycle for the Infantry Replacement Training
Center. As the needs of the army changed the training cycle was decreased in 1944 ................123
vi
ABSTRACT
The American Armys first encounter during World War II with the German Army in
North Africa at the Battle of Kasserine Pass resulted in a tactical defeat. Lloyd Fredendall, the II
Corps commander, did not lead from the front and instead preferred to remain at a safe distance
in his man-made command post cut into a mountain over one hundred miles from his forward
positions. After the Wehrmacht launched its attack on 14 February 1943, the American positions
quickly disintegrated and headquarters elements fled to the rear stranding entire infantry units on
mountaintops. As the senior leaders were running for their lives, they ordered field grade
officers to conduct counterattacks against a superior German armor force. These battalion
commanders fought valiantly, but were overmatched and their units became combat ineffective.
Finally, two days into the fight, British General Kenneth Anderson released a substantial
reinforcement element to bolster the lines and slow down the German thrust enough to allow the
American 9th Infantry Division artillery forces to be brought 735 miles to eventually stop Field
Marshall Erwin Rommels offensive. Following the defeat, General Dwight Eisenhower
replaced senior generals who had made glaring tactical mistakes throughout the battle with
capable leaders. The new commanders instilled discipline within the ranks which would play a
critical role in future battles in North Africa.
Eisenhower realized that the men under his command made mistakes throughout the
battle and he was inspired to create changes in combat training. First, lessons had to be collected
from the men at the frontlines. Ike issued training directives based on combined arms lessons
to the units under his command, but he also had a bolder plan to influence the training cycles of
basic training and unit predeployment training in the United States. Armed with combat
experience, Eisenhower flooded the War Department with recommendations to intensify training
vii
to better prepare the units for war. The bureaucracy of the War Department prevented immediate
modifications to existing training cycles, but by late summer 1943 training regiments were
infused with battle lessons. The ability of the American Army to change training based on the
lessons it received from the frontlines of North Africa was decisive to success in the North
African, Mediterranean, and European theater of operations.
viii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The American defenses at Kasserine Pass began to collapse on the foggy morning of 20
February 1943 under a renewed German effort led by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, Afrika
Korps commander. Throughout the morning the artillery observers fled their positions because
they thought, this place is too hot.1 Around 1200, the Germans overran the 19th Engineers
command post. Colonel Alexander Stark, ground commander, was determined to hold out, but
by 1700 German grenades were detonating near his command post and he had to crawl out to
save his life. Rommel captured Kasserine Pass, but the pass would not stay in the hands of the
Germans for long.
The baptism of fire for the United States Army in the European theater in World War II
occurred fourteen months after Pearl Harbor during the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February
1943. This should have been enough time for the army to train the American soldiers for their
first battle against the Germans, but the American GIs were inexperienced. The German
offensives Frhlingswind and Morgenluft to capture the mountain passes at Sidi bou Zid and
Gafsa were the Germans final efforts to reclaim the strategic initiative in North Africa. In spite
of German tactical successes, the offensive wavered in the mountains beyond Kasserine Pass and
the Axis forces failed to break out of their vulnerable position in Tunisia. The Battle of
Kasserine Pass was a disastrous tactical loss for the U.S. Army. As the historian Charles
Whiting has noted, Just how ill-prepared the GI Army were and how inexperienced their
generals were became horrifically apparent at the Kasserine Pass where the Germans gave the
Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, 1st ed, The Liberation Trilogy v. 1 (New
York: Henry Holt & Co, 2002), 372.
new arrivals a really bloody nose.2 The American forces learned valuable lessons and
disseminated them throughout their ranks. Stateside training cycles were changed which allowed
the troops to recover from the tactical defeat and along with British forces evicted the German
forces off the African continent in May 1943.
Literature Review
The Battle of Kasserine Pass emerged as a shocking, massive military loss to Americans
back at home and participating soldiers. Historians wrote about the Battle of Kasserine Pass as a
small portion of the North African campaign where the American Army learned lessons and
leadership changes allowed for future battlefield successes against the Wehrmacht Army.3 This
thesis strives to answer the following questions: What did the U.S. Army learn at Kasserine Pass
and how were these lessons passed throughout the units. It analyzes the decisions that leaders
made throughout the battle. Were they the right decisions? Did that decision cause men to be
unnecessarily killed or captured by the Germans? How did the units filter information down the
chain of command? Did higher headquarters in the rear make tactical decisions or were they
made at the front? This section reviews the literature of notable military historians on the results
of this battle based on three principles of war: the preparedness of the soldiers, learning lessons,
and the role of leadership.
In the official army history, commonly called the green books, George Howe,
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (1957), reveals the primitive nature of land
2
Charles Whiting, Disaster at Kasserine: Ike and the 1st (US) Army in North Africa, 1943 (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire:
L. Cooper, 2003), cover.
3
Rick Atkinson, Orr Kelly, George Howe, and Martin Blumenson all write about the North African campaign and
show that Kasserine Pass was the first major battle of the American Army against the German army, but it was just
the first of many battles between the two armies. Following the defeat at Kasserine Pass, the American and British
Armies engaged the German Army in two months of battle that eventually led to the defeat of German forces in
North African. These historians argue that the American army learned lessons following the defeat, but fail to
specify the lessons beyond changing basic training length from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks. Instead these
historians focus of the leadership changes that swept through the American II Corps where General George Patton
and Omar Bradley took over and lead successful attacks against the Germans.
and air tactical coordination by the U.S. Army. For instance, during the early months of the
North African campaign American artillery commanders suggested and implemented a
centralized control of gunfire for forward observers, direct, and indirect firing. Howe shows how
the lack of resources in communication and labor also constrained the development of adequate
military techniques. The air-ground coordination improved slightly after Kasserine. Greater
strides were made regarding artillery and infantry coordination when the Americans recaptured
Gafsa in March 1943.4
Martin Blumensons article Kasserine Pass in Americas First Battles, 1776-1965
(1986), believes the army lost at Kasserine Pass due to the United States rampant neglect in
updating and becoming proficient on their weaponry after World War I. As a result, the soldiers
received a punishment from the Germans because of inadequate training in modern tactics and
equipment at the start of World War II.5 Blumenson expands his argument in Heroes Never Die:
Warriors and Warfare in World War II (2002), to include that the soldiers were not trained on
the new equipment and tactics after the U.S. entered into World War II.6
During the invasion of North Africa, the American troops had clearly displayed huge
limitations in training, experience, combat tactics, maneuver, and skills in utilizing their fighting
equipment. Orr Kellys, Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch
to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia (2002), implies that the U.S. troops dispatched to North
Africa against Rommels troops underwent a selection process based on availabilitynot skill,
adequacy of artillery, or leadership quality. Accordingly, the most important task during the
4
George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The
Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army,
1957), 410412, 574.
5
Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943., in Americas First Battles, 1776-1965, ed.
Charles E Heller and William A Stofft, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986),
226227.
6
Martin Blumenson, Heroes Never Die: Warriors and Warfare in World War II, 1st Cooper Square Press ed (New
York: [Lanham, Md.]: Cooper Square Press; Distributed by National Book Network, 2001), 226.
Battle at Kasserine Pass was squarely upon the Regular Army units of the 1st Armored Division,
the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, and the National Guards 34th Infantry Division.7 In late
December 1942, the Allied forces had postponed their offensive operations in Tunisia citing a
number of tactically unsound concerns. These included unpreparedness due to poor logistics,
undesirable climatic conditions, poor air and land integration, and long uncovered distances
between battlefronts. With the army strung out all over northern Tunisia, Eisenhower marched
farther south, where he hoped to launch an additional Allied offensive. He utilized the expansive
area between Kasserine and Tebessa to offer the U.S. Army an area of responsibility where they
could gain initial combat experience.
No scholar has explored in depth the lessons learned from Kasserine. In fact, there is
little scholarship focused on articulating the lessons that were learned, how they were
communicated at the frontlines, and changes that were made to training cycles based on feedback
from combat experience. The only exception was Michael Doubler in his work Closing with the
Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (1994), his case study based on the
European Theater of Operations (1944-1945). He affirms that the soldiers ability to learn from
the war and utilize improved warfare techniques contributed to their success throughout World
War II.8
Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (2002), suggests
that the soldiers that were sent to North Africa were green troops and were not adequately trained
in their equipment before being sent overseas. Atkinson aims at portraying a U.S. Army that
evolved from the amateurs who fought the Battle of Kasserine Pass to notable veterans after the
Orr Kelly, Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in
Tunisia (New York: J. Wiley, 2002), 7.
8
Michael D Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945, Modern War
Studies (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 2.
campaign ended in 1943. Indeed, he states that, no soldiers in Africa had changed more
grown morethan [Dwight D.] Eisenhower.9 However, Atkinson failed to specify the lessons
that the soldiers learned at Kasserine and over the course of the campaign in conducting modern
combat. Instead, the author claims that these hard-fought lessons and a change in the corps
leadership allowed for the army to grow up in North Africa and defeat the Germans only two
months after the Battle of Kasserine Pass.10
According to Eisenhowers biographer, Stephen Ambrose, Ikes real problems were
welding these well-equipped Americans into a genuine army, winning the final victory in North
Africa as quickly and as decisively as possible, and in the process holding together the Allied
team, which now included the French.11 Ambrose also portrays Eisenhower as a commander
who had a unique gift for reconciling differences among leaders of a multinational army.
Additionally, he turned aside the British as they tried to relegate American troops to a secondary
role after the GIs performance following Kasserine. Ward Rutherford agrees in, Kasserine:
Baptism of Fire (1970), by pointing out that one of the harsh lessons the general came to learn:
how to restructure his relationships with civilian and military leaders within the Allied
organization. Operation Torch and the Battle of Kasserine Pass stand out as a training front for
Ikes military skills.12
A unit during war, like the II Corps, would have a meager or satisfactory performance
based on the role of its leadership throughout the battle. Steven Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943:
Rommels Last Victory (2006), affirms the most outstanding critique about Eisenhowers skills
lies in his inadequacy to tackle the mismanagement concerns in the II Corps during the Tunisian
Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 533.

Ibid., 1318.
11
Stephen E Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 217.
12
Ward Rutherford, Kasserine: Baptism of Fire (Ballantine Books, 1970), 7.
10
campaign. Despite noticing the weaknesses in Major General Lloyd Fredendall, the II Corps
commander, Eisenhower further questioned his own leadership skills by refusing to sack him.
Indeed, he seemed initially averse in the dismissal of Fredendall. However, the General would
later grow into becoming more skillful in such decision-making situations during future military
campaigns.13
Jrg Muth, Command Culture Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German
Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (2011), is highly critical of
the leadership of Fredendall as the principal reason for the defeat at Kasserine. But Muth also
believes that Fredendall became the scapegoat to cover up the massive problems in the Allied
command structure and unclear strategic direction.14 Blumenson agrees with Muth that
Fredendall was one of the most incompetent generals to take charge of a corps during World War
II. In the view of both historians, Fredendall not only failed to effectively communicate with
subordinates over the course of the battle, but also failed to provide a positive example of
personal leadership. Even worse, they criticize these two basic elements of his questionable
leadership were central to his tendency to govern and his unorthodox relationship with General
Orlando Ward.15
This thesis builds on these previous works to revisit the role of leadership and conduct an
analysis of these leaders. Moreover, it uncovers the complex and dysfunctional German
command structure where major decisions had to be made in Rome. Additionally, it expands on
the unpreparedness of the American soldiers by providing new insights into how the U.S. Army
changed stateside training regimens to provide a steady stream of well-trained men, ready for
13
Steven Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommels Last Victory (Osprey Publishing, 2005), 6667, 90.
Jrg Muth, Command Culture Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940,
and the Consequences for World War II, 1st ed (Denton, Tex: University of North Texas Press, 2011), l. 5746.
15
Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1967), 31.
14
combat when they arrived. Finding based on extensive research in previously unexploited
primary source materials reveals that Eisenhowers involvement as Supreme Commander of the
Allied Forces in Europe in collecting lessons played a major role in shaping changes to the
training cycles which created an environment for sustained battlefield success.
Ike is generally
regarded as a political general with the ability to hold a coalition of Allied forces together
throughout the war, but he must also be looked upon as the man who encouraged making
significant changes within the War Department. Although the American forces suffered their
first tactical defeat, U.S. Army leaders gathered to debate why they were so decisively
overwhelmed, discussed the lessons that they learned, and what they needed to change in order
to defeat the German army in North Africa and beyond. For these reasons, the Battle of
Kasserine Pass served as a distant victory because radical changes swept throughout the entire
American Army.
The Strategic Background
Before looking at what occurred at Kasserine Pass, an understanding of what brought
these forces together there needs to be addressed. North Africa was a marginal theater of
operations for both the United States and Germany, but their allies coaxed both into military
operations. In Germanys case, Italy attempted to expand its African colonies in 1940, but the
British swiftly rebuffed that endeavor. The humiliating Italian fiasco in Africa prompted Adolf
Hitler to dispatch Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox, in February 1941 with a
small armor force. The Deutsches Afrika Korps victories against the overstretched British
Eighth Army resulted in additional reinforcements for Rommel, but never enough for a pivotal
advantage. Meanwhile, Hitlers military attention shifted eastwards towards Russia.
The British saw North Africa as vital to maintaining their imperial commitments in
Africa and the Middle East. Control of the Suez Canal was deemed vital in order to provide the
lifeline to India. This was accomplished by maintaining a small army and a large navy, but the
trade off was that Britain could not challenge Germany in North Africa while keeping the bulk of
the army in Britain to guard against a possible Axis invasion. Once the risk of a German
invasion of the United Kingdom abated in late 1940, Britain bolstered its commitment in Egypt
with the purpose of driving the Axis forces off the continent. The desert warfare throughout
most of 1941 and 1942 in North Africa remained at an impasse, with the battle lines shifting
back and forth whenever either country enjoyed temporary advantages in supplies, forces, and
new equipment. In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, so the prospects for
continuous supplies and support for the Afrika Korps diminished. The Russian theater of
operations became the Wehrmachts main effort and the balance of forces in North Africa shifted
to Britains favor by the summer of 1942.16
Following Hitlers declaration of war on the United States in December 1941, British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill tried to convince Franklin D. Roosevelt of the benefits of a
Mediterranean strategy. Mark Stolers Allies and Adversaries the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II (2003) describes the intense debate Roosevelt
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had in 1942 over the direction of American strategic efforts in
1943 whether to maintain a Germany first or shift to the Pacific. The JCS wanted a Pacific-first
strategy against Japan which Roosevelt overruled to emphasize the need of defeating Hitler
before shifting emphasis to the Pacific. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C.
Marshall, objected to an invasion of North Africa and instead strongly favored dedicating
resources for an invasion France as early as possible, preferably in 1943. The British were
16
unwilling to launch such an invasion and the U.S. lacked the resources to insist for a major land
campaign in France in 1943. In place of an immediate cross channel invasion of France, the
British progressively influenced Roosevelt to participate in Mediterranean operations after a
series of conferences as a means to keep pressure on the Wehrmacht.17 Additionally, Joseph
Stalin also advocated combat action by the Americans to open up a second front because his Red
Army had borne the brunt of German attacks for more than a year and could use some relief.
Roosevelt finally acceded to British pressure and ordered plans drawn up for a North Africa
invasion.18
Operation Torch
Operation Torch was the codename for the Anglo-American invasion plans for North
Africa. The aim of Operation Torch was to squeeze the Axis forces out of North Africa from the
western side as the British drove the Germans from the east. Throughout the summer of 1942,
Rommel attacked the British Eighth Army, led by General Bernard Montgomery, in Egypt and
was only sixty miles from the Nile River when Montgomery stopped Rommels advance at El
Alamein in August 1942. Armed with 300 new Sherman tanks recently received from the United
States, Montgomery counterattacked Rommel on 23 October 1942 at the second battle of El
Alamein, and secured a victory that started a 1,500 mile retreat by German and Italian forces
through Libya. The Allied landing, Operation Torch, was executed on 8 November 1942 at three
locations against the Vichy French in North Africa by a primarily American force. Although
there was some resistance in a few locations, by and large the landing took place without serious
opposition.19
17
Mark A Stoler, Allies and Adversaries the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World
War II (Chapel Hill, N.C.; London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 8486.
18
Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 1213.
19
Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943., 241243; Blumenson, Heroes Never Die, 426.
Hitlers reaction to the Allied landing was predictable: the Wehrmacht occupied the
remainder of France. Philippe Ptain remained as Chief of State Vichy France, but this left the
situation in the French colonies such as Tunisia and Algeria in doubt. With Rommel retreating
from Egypt, Hitler dispatched a second German contingent under General Hans-Jrgen von
Arnims, 5th Panzer Army, to occupy the Tunisian bridgehead. A contest developed to see who
would seize Tunisia firstKenneth Andersons British 1st Army, marching from Algeria, or the
5th Panzer Army, arriving in Tunisia by aircraft and ships from Italy. The Germans won the race,
and by the middle of December, a stalemate had developed along the Tunisian frontier, with the
Allies still too weak to launch well-organized offensives and the German forces too poorly
supplied to drive the Allies back into Algeria. Additionally, bad winter weather bogged forces
down and the Allies presumed a major offensive would wait until the spring. Meanwhile,
Rommel disregarded instructions that he stage a defense in Libya and he moved most of the
German units and some of the better Italian units into Tunisia by February 1943, safeguarded
behind the French-built Mareth Line.20
Opposing Plans
German plans. With Rommels forces on the verge of joining the 5th Panzer Army in
Tunisia, the Germans knew that they could not stay on the defensive. On 9 February 1943,
General Albert Kesselring, German commander of the Mediterranean theater, and General
Vittorio Ambrosio, the Italian Chief of Staff, flew to Tunisia to discuss upcoming plans.
Rommel saw the weakness in the Allied defensive positions and wanted to attempt one last
operation before he returned to the Fatherland to receive medical treatment. The Allied defenses
in Tunisia were still weak and inexperienced American forces held the southern flank. Rommel
dismissed the inexperienced U.S. Army as Britains Italians and believed that a concentrated
20
Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 1112.
10
attack would easily pierce the American lines.21 If the plan succeeded, the supply depot in
Tebessa could be taken and Andersons 1st Army would also be threatened.22
Von Arnim argued that Rommels ambitious plans lacked the necessary resources and
that his more limited offensive, Operation Kuckucksei, would pressure both the Americans and
the British lines. After discussing the issue with Kesselring, Ambrosio proposed a compromise
on 11 February. Instead of a unified attack directed by Rommel, Ambrosio wanted von Arnim
and Rommel to conduct two complementary attacks separately. Von Arnim would drive through
the Fad Pass with Operation Frhlingswind, surging towards Sidi bou Zid and driving the allies
off the Eastern Dorsal mountain range. Rommel was given two additional days to reset his
forces before he launch the second spoiling attack, dubbed Operation Morgenluft, that would
take Gafsa, sixty miles to the south. The Afrika Korps was too weak from their retreat to
conduct an attack without reinforcements, so von Arnim would launch his attack and then
transfer the 21st Panzer Division back to Rommel for his operations. Ambrosio and Kesselring
left open the issue of a further advance into the Western Dorsal until the first phase of the attacks
had been undertaken. The precise date of Frhlingswind was left to von Arnim, as the cold,
rainy winter weather in early February had been turning the battlefield to mud, inhibiting a
Panzer advance.23
On the Axis side, Rommel has been portrayed as a strong-willed figure who was
respected by most of his soldiers. However, Bruce Watson as points out in Exit Rommel: The
Tunisian Campaign, 1942-1943 (1999), his leadership skills raised concern at the Battle of
21
Helmuth Greiner, Diary Notes Fron 12 August 1942 to 17 March 1943, n.d., 16 February 1943, The George
Howe Collection, Box 7, NARA II, College Park, MD.
22
Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 1st American ed. (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), 393; Albert
Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989), 149151.
23
Christopher F Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia (London: Spearman, 1975), 174; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 322;
Charles Whiting, Kasserine: First Blood (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 159. Rommel and Von Armin had first
met each other eighteen years earlier and did not care for each other and their relationship had not improved over
time.
11
Kasserine Pass due to his indecisiveness in selecting a battlefront following the break through at
Kasserine. Furthermore, Rommel was quick to resign to fatigue and his incapability of working
with von Armin prompted the German-Italian forces to loose their aggressive posture and retreat.
Watson stands out as the only historian who believed the Battle of Kasserine Pass was a German
loss because their offensive was stopped repeatedly on 21 and 22 February 1943 by the Allied
forces.24
Allied plans. After losing the race for Tunisia, General Dwight Eisenhower wanted to
regain the initiative. He created an initial plan for the employment of the II Corps dubbed
Operation Satin. The 1st Armored Division would conduct mobile raids towards Sfax and Gabs
in order to disrupt Rommels supply lines, the Germans primary concern. Anderson was
skeptical of such a risky venture and convinced Eisenhower to cancel the operation.25
From Andersons perspective, the II Corps and the central Tunisian fronts were
secondary concerns. His main focus was the British sector and defeating von Arnims 5th Panzer
Army in northern Tunisia. Intelligence assessments supported the idea that the offensive would
take place in the British sector. The top-secret ULTRA intelligence gathering system intercepted
a radio message from the Luftwaffe commander on 31 January which showed von Arnims plans
for Operation Kuckucksei in detail. Eisenhowers G-2 intelligence officer, British Brigadier
General E.E. Mockler-Ferryman, concluded that the main German threat would come through
the Fondouk Pass and threaten the flank of the British positions.26
On 4 February, Mockler-Ferryman received another ULTRA message about Rommels
more ambitious attack plans. The G-2 concluded the previous intercept was an approved plan
where Rommels plan was only a proposal of possible action. Mockler-Ferryman again
24
Bruce Watson, Exit Rommel: The Tunisian Campaign, 1942-1943 (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999), 7093.
Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 270272, 282283.
26
25
12
misconstrued later decrypted ULTRA messages and these bolstered Andersons belief that the
pending German attack would come against his lines. Eisenhowers British intelligence officer
was fully dependent on the ULTRA intercepts and dismissed the tactical intelligence he was
receiving.27
The Americans on the other hand were out collecting intelligence through more
traditional methods of ground and aerial reconnaissance. The II Corps G-2 estimate stated on 25
January 1943, Rommel can be expected to act offensively in southern Tunisia as soon as rested
and rearmed and prior to arrival of the 8th Army before MARETH line in threatening strength
and state of supply. Note his superiority in Infantry over II Corps.28 By 4 February, Colonel
Benjamin Monk Dickson, the II Corps G-2, reported that the combat power was building up
behind a screen of Italian forces in the II Corps sector near Gafsa and a strike could occur in
conjunction with an offensive through Fad Pass. Each day, Fredendalls intelligence officer
flew over the German position in an observation plane accompanied by four fighters. Dickson
saw that the supply dumps were growing and large armored units were moving towards the
American position.
Finally, Fredendall called Anderson to say that he was convinced that Rommel would
launch the attack through his area within a day or two with an estimated four armored divisions.
Fredendall forcefully requested that his CCB be released to him to meet the very obvious threat.
Anderson replied, Fredendall, arent you getting jittery? Fredendall said, Shit and hung up
the phone, knowing he would not get his men.29 On 13 February ULTRA revealed the attack
would occur the following day and that the 21st Panzer Division was deploying to its forward
position. Again, the intelligence officer decided this information meant the Fondouk attack.
27
Ibid., 3536.
Benjamin Dickson, G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe, n.d., 39, The Benjamin A. Dickson Collection, USMA.
29
A.E. Schanze Papers, n.d., 24, The A. E. Schanze Papers, MHI.
28
13
Mockler-Ferryman forwarded this information to Anderson who alerted his units of the threat,
particularly around Fondouk. Furthermore, Anderson thought the Germans might stage feign
attacks so the French and the II Corps were also alerted.30
Leaders and disposition of the II Corps. General Dwight Eisenhower oversaw the allied
strategic situation leading up to the battle from his command post in Algeria. His primary focus
was on the invasion of Sicily, so he left the tactical situation up to his subordinate commanders.
British General Harold Alexander was selected to lead a new command, the 18th British Army, at
the Casablanca conference to oversee the Tunisian theater with an assumption of command date
of 20 February. In the northern sector, Anderson was temporarily given command of the
Tunisian front. The French, led by General Alphonse Juin, were stationed directly south of the
British. Juin was not under the command of Anderson and instead reported directly to
Eisenhower. The American II Corps, commanded by General Lloyd Fredendall covered the
southern flank, where the Germans offensive occurred.31 Under his command was General
30

General Lloyd Fredendall is one of the few people who had the distinction to fail out of West Point two times. He
first entered West Point on 11 June 1901, but failed out of mathematics course. The following year, Fredendall
again secured entrance to the academy and once again failed out due to poor mathematics skills. For the third year
in a row Senator Francis Warren of Wyoming recommended entrance but this time West Point denied admission.
Fredendall decided to attend Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he improved his mathematics skills. In
those days, commissions in the Army could be obtained through passing competitive examinations which Fredendall
passed in 1906 to earn his commission. The Casablanca conference was held from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan
the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. In attendance were U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and representing the Free French forces, General Charles de
Gaulle, and General Henri Giraud. Premier Joseph Stalin had declined to attend, due to the ongoing conflict in
Stalingrad. The conference agenda addressed the specifics of tactical procedure, allocation of resources and the
broader issues of diplomatic policy. The debate and negotiations produced what was known as the Casablanca
Declaration, and what is, perhaps, its most historically provocative statement of purpose, unconditional
surrender. The doctrine of unconditional surrender came to represent the unified voice of implacable Allied
willthe determination that the Axis powers would be fought to their ultimate defeat and annihilation. Roosevelt,
under the advisement of General George Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Ernest King, Chief of
Naval Operations, lobbied for a cross channel invasion of Europe. Churchill felt the time was not opportune, and
favored an Allied assault on Sicily. Throughout the conference Roosevelts attention was prominently focused on
the Pacific war front and faulted the British for what he felt was not a full commitment against the Japanese
entrenchment. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, a compromise between the two leaders, Roosevelt acceding to
the Churchill approach for Europe. Churchill, in turn, pledged more troops and resources in the Pacific and Burma to
31
14
Orlando Ward of 1st Armored Division, who had four combatant commands (CC), designated by
letters.32
Fredendall was a leader focused on the security of his command post and ordered his
corps level engineers to build a fortified area that was designed to withstand Axis aerial attacks.
The command post was over one hundred miles from the front and drilled into the side of a
mountain. Additionally, the headquarters was located fifteen to twenty feet back into the hole.
Command posts needed to be mobile in tank warfare and near the frontlines; Fredendalls had
neither of these qualities. He also did not leave his command post often and when he created his
defensive plans for the Eastern Dorsal mountain range it was done with map reconnaissance.
Moreover, the II Corps commander personally placed units down to the battalion level.33
Additionally, Fredendall micromanaged his subordinates and even emplaced units to
establish specific defensive positions around Fad Pass in his 11 February orders. Ward arrived
at Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John Waters, 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, position with a
letter in hand. Ward told the field commander, Waters, Ive got a letter from Fredendall and
here is where he wants the antitank guns; here is where he wants the tank destroyers; here is
where he wants your tanks, and here is where he wants your infantry. Ward said, Never have I
reinforce positions. America would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing
crafts.
32
George F Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old Ironsides, Divisional Series 11
(Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1979), 108. The four commands under the 1st Armored Division were CCA, CCB,
CCC, and CCD which had elements of infantry attached. The 1st Armored Division had been split up and its CCB,
led by General Paul Robinett, had been detached to help bolster the French position further north. The 1st Armored
Division was a triangular division with CCA and CCB being the tank regiments and CCC organized around the
Armored Infantry Regiment which allowed the division to either attack with three prongs or two prongs if the
infantry were in direct support of the tanks. The CCD was the divisional artillery that provided artillery support to
the other combat commands inline with the division commanders priorities.
33
Lloyd Fredendall, Defense of Faid Position, February 11, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI;
Omar Nelson Bradley and Herman Finkelstein Collection (Library of Congress), A Soldiers Story, 1st ed. (New
York: Holt, 1951), 154; John Waters, Senior Officer Oral History Program, n.d., 187188, The John Waters
Collection, Box 2, MHI.
15
seen anything like this before. Here I am, division commander of the 1st Armored Division, and
all I have left to command is the medical battalion. Everything is taken away from me, put
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Figure 1 Tunisian Front, Mid-January 1943 [Courtesy of the U.S. Army Center for Military
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16
around here, there and everywhere. Combat command here, combat command there, etc.34
Ward had essentially been stripped of his command and was just a messenger for Fredendall who
was in effect commanding the 1st Armored Division for Ward.35 The proper Army technique
taught at the Command and General Staff college at Fort Leavenworth was to issue orders to
defend a specific sector and allow the subordinates flexibility on how to accomplish the given
mission. This exemplifies of one of the flaws of his leadership because Fredendall was
micromanaging his subordinate units and from the distance of his sheltered command post.
When recommendations were sent up the chain of command to move positions based on lower
leaders ground assessment, they were all denied and told to maintain their positions.
Good army leaders need to visit the men at the front in order to have a better
understanding of the tactical situation, and also to talk with the men of their units about how they
were getting along. Eisenhower left his headquarters late on 12 February 1943, and arrived at
the II Corps headquarters in Tebessa around 1200 on 13 February for an inspection of the
frontlines. The commander was shocked to discover the fortified command post that the
engineers had spent three weeks working to build. Eisenhower asked an engineer working on the
structure if they had first assisted in building the frontline defenses. The young staff officer
replied, Oh, the divisions have their own engineers for that!36 This appalled the commander
and remained the only time throughout the war where he saw a divisional or higher command so
concerned about their own safety that they built an underground shelter.
Anderson also visited Tebessa to consult with Fredendall and Eisenhower, but he first
met with Dickson, the II Corps G-2, who argued that the tactical intelligence pointed to a
German attack coming from Gafsa and possibly Fad, not Fondouk. Overly confident due to the
34
John Waters, SOOHP, 590. John Waters was the son-in-law to General George S. Patton.
Lloyd Fredendall, Defense of Faid Position.
36
Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1948), 141.
35
17
ULTRA intercepts, Anderson dismissed the accounts that the Germans would not attack the
esteemed British and announced, Well, young man, at least I cant shake you. Turning to
Fredendall, he added, You have an alarmist and a pessimist for a G-2.37 During the briefing
with Ike, Anderson stated that he believed that the attack would come in his sector at the
Fondouk pass. This allied command assumption about the location of the attack was nearly fatal.
Anderson abruptly left later in the day when his staff reported that a German attack in their
sector was imminent due to additional ULTRA intercepts.38
A visit by the commander of North Africa to the front lines was ceremonial and
subordinate commanders were called back from their men to brief Eisenhower. Waters had been
called back to CCA command post on the evening of 13 February to brief Colonel Peter Hains,
1st Armored Regiment commander, and Brigadier General Raymond McQuillin, CCA
commander, on the current situation at his position. Earlier in the day, Hains and Waters
reconnoitered a back trail leading to Fad Pass and tried to observe the German side of the
mountain. However, German aircraft appeared and chased them off the mountain before getting
eyes on the enemy position which further raised suspicions about German activity. The G-2
personnel said, Dont worry, theres not going to be any attack tomorrow morning through Fad
Pass. The attacks going to come at Fondouk and Pichon. Waters said, okay and turned to
ask, General McQuillin, suppose I wake up in the morning and I find that an attack is under way
from Fad and its an Armored Division of the Germans. McQuillin responded, Oh, Waters,
dont suggest that. With the lack of guidance Waters said, Okay, General thats it and left the
command post before Eisenhower showed up to return to his position at the frontlines.39
37
Benjamin Dickson, G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe, 40.

Lucian King Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 1st ed. (New York: Dutton, 1954), 154; Bradley and
Herman Finkelstein Collection (Library of Congress), A Soldiers Story, 25.
39
John Waters, SOOHP, 191192.
38
18
After dusk following the briefing, LTC Russell F. (Red) Akers, II Corps G-3 staff officer,
escorted Eisenhower, not Fredendall himself, to the 1st Armored command post to discuss the
disposition of their troops and the situation of their reserves. Around midnight, Eisenhower
traveled to CCA command post and met with McQuillin, who briefed that his reconnaissance
elements had occasionally met with Germans, but had noticed no change in German disposition
or patrols. Eisenhower left the front lines around 0300 on 14 February to return to the II Corps
headquarters where he planned to talk to Fredendall about the disposition of his troops, as it was
not customary to tell subordinates several levels down, but instead use the chain of command.40
It is interesting to note that Eisenhower chose to visit that day, as the Germans on the other side
of the mountain were preparing to attack in just a matter of hours.
Eisenhower found a number of disturbing details on the visit that can be attributed to a
lack of discipline and complacency of the frontline soldiers. At one point, a commander told Ike
that minefields had not yet been emplaced on his front with the excuse that infantrymen had been
on the scene for only two days. This commander explained with a sense of arrogance that he had
already drawn up a mine emplacement plan on the map and would start on the morning of 14
February. Meanwhile, the Americans had learned that the Germans were able to prepare strong
defensive lines, with minefields, within two hours of arrival at a location.41 Obviously, this
lesson had not made its way down to the frontline commanders yet and Eisenhower directed that
he fixed it immediately. By the time Eisenhowers group arrived back at the II Corps
headquarters that morning, the German assault had already begun.
40
41
Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 155.

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 141142.
19
CHAPTER TWO
UNPREPARED
In battle, you can do three thingsgo forward, stop, or fall back. If you fall back,
you are lost; if you stop, you are shot up. You must go forward. If you go
forward, you can envelop or go straight ahead. If you go dead ahead, you will
usually suffer many casualties, probably get turned back and lose the fight, so you
go around and envelop under the cover of firefire often and accuratelyfire and
maneuver.
George S. Patton, Jr42
Valentine Day Attack of Sidi bou Zid
Instead of directly commanding the operation, General Jrgen von Arnim selected his
chief of staff, General Heinz Ziegler, to oversee Operation Frhlingswind. Ziegler conducted a
reconnaissance during the early morning hours of 14 February 1943 to observe Fad Pass and
noticed no activity on the American side. It appeared to Ziegler that the Americans did not have
knowledge of the German attack and that their plans had indeed been kept secret. The Germans
had scouted the routine of the G Company, 1st Armored Regiment, commanded by Major
Norman Parsons, for a week and observed at the same time everyday these men guarding the
pass dismounted their tanks to eat breakfast. This was the designated assault time. On Sunday
14 February the Germans started preparing at 0400 and assaulted through the pass around 0630
with a force of one hundred MKIV Panzer tanks, and MKVI Tiger tanks with infantry and 88mm
42
LTC J. S. Switzer and LTC R. W. Curtis, Observers Report, August 22, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records
of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI.
20
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Figure 2 Battle of Sidi bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943 [Courtesy of U.S. Army Center for
Military History]
21
antitank guns in tow, supported by an artillery bombardment under the cover of a dust storm
directly into LTC John Waters position.43
When Waters returned from his overnight meeting with Brigadier General Raymond
McQuillin, CCA commander, he ordered Parsons to send a tank patrol out immediately to help
cover Fad Pass and create a listening post. Parsons reported that his men were in position with
an established outpost when they were actually three or four miles short of the pass. The
American observation post guarding the pass was quickly overrun, so the men of G Company did
not radio or shoot the pre-arranged rocket signal that would have resulted in a preplanned
artillery barrage of the pass.44
When General Friedrich von Broich led the 10th Panzer Division tank assault through the
Fad Pass, the Germans also maintained aerial supremacy throughout the day. The German air
came on station at 0715 onwards, with a combination of Stukas (dive-bombers) and Jabos
(fighter-bombers) to add to the discomfiture of the new boys.45 The Allies were only able to
scramble four different lines of aircraft missions to try to interdict the German fighters at Fad,
but were outnumbered and did not inflict much damage. The majority of the American aerial
fleet was already tasked to conduct normal bombing missions over the Mediterranean Sea where
they ran into a large fleet of Axis air transport and were able to shoot down five planes trying to
resupply Tunisia.46
43
10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, February 1943, 14 February , Kasserine Pass Reading
Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; Helmut Hudel and Paul Robinett, The Tank Battle at Sidi
Bou Zid, n.d., B22, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 339; Blumenson,
Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943., 248252.
44
John Waters, Senior Officer Oral History Program, n.d., 192193, The John Waters Collection, Box 2, MHI;
1957), 411.
45
Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia, 203; Heinz Werner Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert (London: Harrap, 1951),
197. The Luftwaffe had 371 available planes for the offensive.
46
10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, 14 February; Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia, 204.
22
Waters listening post failed to report the attack, but the sound of the artillery barrage
alerted Colonel Peter Hains, commander 1st Armored Regiment, of activity and he requested
information since he could not see because a sandstorm decreased visibility. Hains called
Waters and asked, whats going on over in your part of the world? We hear a lot of shooting in
that direction. Waters responded, Ive received no reports yet of anything going on. I havent
heard any fire and I have no reports of anything. Waters was interested in finding out what
Hains heard, and climbed the hill to see what he could discover. Once Waters reached an
observation point he reported, I can hear some shooting far out there. There is a strong wind
blowing, sand is blowing right towards me, a sand and dust storm. I cant see anything.47
Waters then tried to raise Major Parsons for an updated situational report; however, the major
was not with the tank. Well, where the hell is he? screamed Waters. The tanker on the radio
replied, I dont know. Hes not out here.48 Waters sent his messenger to Parsons tent and
found the commander still asleep in his bed and woke him as the German tanks poured through
Fad Pass. Parsons got in his tank and went out towards his company only to find they had
already moved. Parsons tank was shot soon afterwards and he failed to provide any intelligence
about the attacking force.49
Meanwhile, Waters scaled the hill again to gain a better vantage point and thirty or forty
tanks emerged out of the dust to the front and another sixty tanks to the rear. Waters quickly
grasped the gravity of the situation and ordered his fifteen light M3 Stuart, Honey tanks, forward
47

Ibid., 205.
49
CCA G3 Operational Reports, February 14, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments
Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI.
48
23
to block and delay, but their 37mm gun did not penetrate the German armor and proved no match
compared to the German 75mm and 88mm guns.50
Once past the initial resistance the Germans split into pre-arranged formations to circle
the hill of Djebel (DJ) Lessouda.51 As the 10th Panzer Division rounded DJ Lessouda Hill, they
took a tactical pause to try and coordinate the encirclement of Sidi bou Zid with the 21st Panzer
Division; however, the 21st Panzer Division was delayed so Broich was ordered to press forward.
In the lead tank, Major Helmut Hudel became nervous and feared he was entering a trap.
Additionally, he was nervous because he knew the Sherman 75mm gun could penetrate the
Panzer III and IV models at 1,500 meters where his 50mm gun shells would bounce off the
Shermans. Soon after the assault was renewed, Oberfeldwebel Graf Augustin destroyed a
retreating Sherman with his Tiger tank (Panzer VI) at the range of 2,700 meters during the
assault toward Sidi bou Zid.52 The German attack proceeded better than planned, nevertheless
they still had not secured their daily objective but did have the Americans scrambling.
At this point, Waters lost radio contact with his entire element except the artillery and
higher headquarters. CCA called again and said they heard vehicles rumbling toward
Lessouda. Another call reported enemy tanks. Pete Hains called again and said, There must be
something going on. There is an awful lot of firing out there in front of you now. Its
50
Whiting, Kasserine, 174.

The railroads leading into Tunisia were inadequate because they were narrow-gauged and in some parts of the
country the tunnels were only big enough to allow the light tank to go thorough and not the medium. The medium
tanks had to be driven overland. While other railroad lines were wide-gauge. This created logistical challenges that
prevented the Allies from having the proper force in place to prevent the Germans from defeating them at Kasserine
Pass. The MK4 panzer tanks had a 75mm main gun while the MK6 Tiger tanks had a 88mm main gun.
51
Djebel means mountain in Arabic and is abbreviated through US documents as DJ. Allied commanders used
Djebel since all of their maps used the tem or its abbreviation.
52
10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, 14 February; Helmut Hudel and Paul Robinett, The
Tank Battle at Sidi Bou Zid; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 340; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored
Division, Old Ironsides, 148; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 189; Volkmar Khn, Rommel in the Desert: Victories &
Defeat of the Afrika-Korps, 1941-1943, Schiffer Military History (West Chester, Pa: Schiffer Pub, 1991), 193.
Hudel was in a Panzer III, medium tank. This tank was stopped being produced in 1943 since it became obsolete
with the lack of fire power provided by the 50mm gun and the lack of armor.
24
increasing. Waters climbed the hill for the third time and could hear the firing, but the dust
again blocked his view. Waters ordered the artillery to open fire. The artillerymen asked, Well
where are they [German tanks]? Well, theyre under our minimum range. We cant hit them.
Theyve gotten in under us. Waters told the artillery to move back and said, If you cant fire,
move back to where you can.53 Somehow the artillerymen were able to get around the sixty
German tanks and continued fighting, but Waters and the remainder of the infantrymen still on
the hill were not so lucky.
Despite the dire situation, Waters unrelentingly kept Hains informed throughout the day;
however, he understood that he was in a grim situation with the infantry surrounded in the
mountains by 0950.54 Waters told Hains, The war was over for us. Well sit here and do the
best we can to report to you whats going on and try to keep in communication and be a source
of information. All the armored support was gone and the infantry was stranded. Hains replied,
Well, good luck to you, John.55 Waters was not the only unit in this dismal condition.
Colonel Thomas Drake, 168th Infantry Regiment commander, had his men split between
two mountains around Sidi bou Zid. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Robert Moore, 2nd Battalion,
168th Infantry Regiment was on the same hilltop as Waters while Drake and 3rd Battalion, led by
LTC John Van Vliet, were ten miles south on DJ Ksaira which were not mutually supporting
positions. As the German tanks flanked around DJ Lessouda, motorized infantry units,
approximately a battalion, moved to the base with towed 88mm guns around 0900. These
infantrymen started infiltrating throughout the base of the mountain but dug defensive positions
when they came within small arms range of Moore. Although surrounded, the men of 2nd
Battalion maintained high levels of morale because they controlled the coveted elevated
53
John Waters, SOOHP, 600, 204, 213.

CCA G3 Operational Reports, 14 February.
55
54
25
ground.56 Waters was surrounded by Germans and wanted to link up with the infantry who were
holding the ground at the top of the hill. He sent his half-track driver to inform Moore of
Waters position and that he would join Moore at night. The driver came back and said, Sir, I
couldnt get up there and I got shot.57 The infantry were scared and shooting at any moving
targets.
At 1130, the German infantry attacked G Company on the right flank of Lessouda. An
intense small arms firefight ensued that stopped the assault cold. Additional enemy artillery and
infantry were brought up and another assault occurred at 1400 across a bigger front. This time
the Germans managed to overrun half of F Company and captured one platoon and a heavy
machine gun section before being driven back with heavy losses. In the meantime, Moore had
lost radio contact with the regiment but the last order from Drake was to hold the line at all costs.
Around 1600, a German officer approached the lines with an offer to accept the surrender which
Moore quickly dismissed. The German artillery barrage continued into the night before it
diminished. Concurrently, Drake and Van Vliet spent the day under heavy enemy artillery fire
but did not receive any infantry attacks.58
Meanwhile, civilian Arabs neared Waters position and were looking at his half-track.
Waters told Hains, Ive got to get breakoff communications. Im going to dismantle the radio
and Ill hide the parts so that if I can get back to it, Im going to come back to you. I will then go
into the next little ditch and hide out there until dark. Then Im going to join Brown. Around
56
History of the 168th Infantry for Period Novemebr 12, 1942 to March 15, 1943, n.d., 168, RG 407, Box 9576,
NARA II, College Park, MD.; Captain Jack Lake, The Operations of the 168th Infantry, 2d Battalion (34th
Division) Fad Pass, 12-21 February 1943, n.d., 1618, Donovan Research Library,
http://www.benning.army.mil/library/content/Virtual/Donovanpapers/wwii/index.htm.
57
58
Captain Jack Lake, The Operations of the 168th Infantry, 2d Battalion (34th Division) Fad Pass, 12-21 February
1943, 1718; 2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History, February 3, 1943, 1416, 21, Kasserine Pass Reading
Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-IPart_1.pdf.
26
1600, Waters heard someone walking up the wadi (dry river bed) towards him and thought it was
Captain Jim Fraser, his assistant S-3. Waters stood up to discover that three or four Arabs were
leading a patrol of Germans directly towards him. They were fifteen feet away from Waters and
shot a burst from their guns without aiming from the hip and missed. Instead of killing Waters,
he was taken prisoner for the remainder of the war.59
As the fighting progressed throughout the morning, Eisenhower arrived at the II Corps
headquarters and was briefed on the attack at Fad Pass but the information was so vague that the
theater commander had no idea that this was the Germans main effort. Furthermore, McQuillin
was preparing a counterattack and there was no other action reported on the front so Eisenhower
thought it was a local assault that CCA could handle. Eisenhower then took a nap for a few
hours before he left to return to his command post in Constantine starting at 1130. Along the
way Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott, deputy commander in charge of
advanced command post for Ike, stopped to visit the famous Roman ruins at Timgad. When
Eisenhower arrived at the advanced command post by midafternoon he was appalled to learn at
the devastation of the days failures.60
McQuillin did not have a clear operational picture of what occurred from his command
post, but was determined to react. He thought a quick counterattack would drive the Germans
back so he ordered LTC Louis Hightower, 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, to clear up the
situation at 0730.61 Hightower moved his battalion, consisting of two tank companies and part
59
John Waters, SOOHP, 212. Waters thought the infantry commander was named Brown but it was actually
Robert Moore.
60
Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 155; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 142143. The stop to visit
the ruins shows how slowly information traveled to higher headquarters. Five hours after the Germans assaulted
through the gap, II Corps did not have the situational awareness to understand that the attack was a large scale
German offensive and not a small or minor local attack. If II Corps had the proper situational awareness,
Eisenhower would have directed the fight, ordered Anderson to send reinforcements, put his staff to work, and not
stop to take in the historic sights on his return trip.
61
27
of A Company, 701st Tank Destroyer Company east to resecure Fad Pass. He parked his tank,
named Texas, on top of a small hill to observe the enemy movement around the pass. From this
observation point, he noted one hundred German vehicles approached from the east. Hightower
reported around 0930 to McQuillin that the Germans decisively outmatched his force and that he
could only fight a delaying action. As the day progressed it became apparent to CCA that a
second panzer unit, the 21st Panzer Division, came through the Maizila Pass twenty miles to the
south with the intent to envelope the Americans at Sidi bou Zid.
Throughout the morning, Hightower and his men fought in a zigzag pattern while moving
back towards Sidi bou Zid. Unknown to Hightower, this town served as the primary objective of
the assaulting Germans and his tanks received the brunt of their attack. The relentless onslaught
of German panzers and anti-tank guns slowly bled Hightowers battalion, but the skillful
maneuvers executed by the battalion allowed McQuillin and the rest of his command to escape
Sidi bou Zid before the Germans encircled the town. Hightower held his ground against the 10th
Panzer Divisions advance from the east, but he was overwhelmed when the 21st Panzer
Divisions lead elements attacked from the south.62
While Hightower created time, McQuillin made a withdrawal of his CCA headquarters to
avoid the encirclement, but had left two battalions of 168th Infantry Regiment behind Axis lines.
When CCA retreated from Sidi bou Zid they reestablished their command post at a road
intersection that became known as Kerns Crossroads. Meanwhile, Colonel Thomas Drake
had requested permission to withdraw his position at 1130. CCA sent a situation report to
division that said, Enemy tanks closing in and threatening both flanks and cut off Drake. Any
orders? First division stated to Wait. Then the orders came down for Drake to continue on
62
CCA G3 Operational Reports; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old Ironsides, 143
165; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 340342; Howe, Northwest Africa, 411415; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 149
153; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 188191.
28
your mission. Drake knew he was in a dire situation, but no German infantry threatened his
position yet so he could hold out. Again at 1408 Drake requested to retrograde off the
mountaintops. Division replied, Too early to give Drake permission to withdraw. The last
orders to the 168th Infantry Regiment was to continue to hold your position.63 The higher
command did not have a well-defined understanding of the tactical situation, but from Drakes
vantage point he had a clear operational picture that showed the Germans had not just defeated
the Americans, but done so with ease. One of Drakes flaws as a leader was that he placed too
much faith in requesting and waiting for orders and not in taking battlefield initiative to serve the
welfare of the men under his command.
Meanwhile, Sergeant Clarence Coley, radio operator of Texas, could not contact any of
the remaining tanks of 3rd Battalion, so Hightower recognized the desperate situation and
maneuvered his lone tank into position to engage ten advancing enemy tanks from the south.
Hightower ordered his driver to stop and popped up out of the tank commanders hatch to spot
his gunners shots with his binoculars. The tank crew worked feverishly to destroy the panzers
as they advanced towards their position. Soaked in sweat the loader shoved round after round of
75mm ammunition into the breach of the gun every three to four seconds. Hightower and his
gunner, Corporal Austin Bayer, worked together to adjust their shots. The tank commander
shouted you shot over the turret bring it down! You got him, next tank to the left!64
As the ammunition racks dwindled, Sergeant Coley scrambled to dig additional rounds
out of the hull while German rounds struck the skin of the Sherman. The Germans grew closer
and anticipation heightened among the crew, cramped in their steel box filled with the acrid
63
CCA G3 Operational Reports; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 334346; Watson, Exit Rommel, 77; W. G. F
Jackson, The North African Campaign, 1940-43 (London: Batsford, 1975), 339.
64
I am speculating on Hightowers exact words, but I base this on personal combat experience and the detailed
account of the fight by Hightower.
29
smell of spent shell casings, fuel, and sweat. The loader yelled over the rumble of the engine
that a round had gotten stuck in the gun. Defenseless, Hightower ordered the tank to move to a
wadi for protection, but before the vehicle moved, a German shell smashed and penetrated
Texas turret. The round punctured the gas tank, leaked fuel all over the crewmen and
ammunition, and ricocheted through the tank barely missing everyone. As the projectile lay
there spinning and sputtering fire Hightower yelled, Now is the time to git.65 As Texas erupted
into a fireball the crew sprinted away.66 The Germans secured their objective of Sidi bou Zid
and halted their advance for the day while the Americans had suffered heavily with Hightowers
battalion now being combat ineffective with forty-eight of fifty-two Sherman tanks destroyed.
The German units could have attacked the undefended road west of Sidi bou Zid. Field
Marshall Erwin Rommel staged in the south preparing for his thrust, operation Morgenluft,
towards Gafsa where he advocated to von Arnim to follow up on his tactical success. At this
success, I urged the Fifth Army, which was in charge of the operation, to push straight on during
the night, keep the enemy on the run and take Sbeitla. Rommel further noted in his diary,
Tactical successes must be ruthlessly exploited. A routed enemy who, on the day of his flight,
can be rounded up without much effort, may reappear on the morrow restored to his full fighting
power. 67 Conversely, von Arnim decided not to heed this advice and instead waited for the
65
Single U.S. Tank Fights 10 Germans: Machine Named Texas Stages Alamo of Its Own to Save 300 Lives in
Tunisia, New York Times, February 21, 1943.
66
CCA G3 Operational Reports; African Campaign--1st Armored Regiment, July 10, 1943, Microfilm, New
records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI; Single
U.S. Tank Fights 10 Germans: Machine Named Texas Stages Alamo of Its Own to Save 300 Lives in Tunisia. The
following titles also have summaries of this action. Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old
Ironsides,; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn; George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West,
United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957); Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co,
1967); Kelly, Meeting the Fox.
67
Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 398.
30
allied counterattack in the morning. Thus, the 21st Panzer Division did not follow up the
retreating Americans until the night of 16 February.
American Counterattack 15 February
During the evening of 14 February, the allied command did not have a clear picture of
what happened throughout the day. There were serious intelligence failures because CCA had
failed to identify the 10th Panzer Division as the unit that advanced through Fad Pass. In fact,
the 10th Panzer Division was not positively identified until 1226, 15 February.68 Thus, General
Kenneth Anderson assumed that this was a feint attack and believed that the 10th Panzer Division
would still make the main push in his northern sector which prevented Anderson from ordering
reinforcements to the American southern sector. Fredendall pleaded with Anderson to release
CCB for a planned counterattack the next day. At first Anderson did not want to release any of
CCB. Finally, Anderson relented to Fredendalls appeal and allowed one medium tank battalion
to join the mornings counteroffensive. Anderson was more interested in preventing the
Germans from piercing a soft underbelly gap, as II Corps retreated, into the British sector of the
Maktar valley than in helping the Americans. So he authorized elements from the 34th Infantry
Division to withdraw from Fondouk and Pichon and established a new defensive position at
Sbiba.69 Thus, the Americans were left to fend for themselves on the morning of 15 February.
The loss of the effectiveness of CCA at DJ Lessouda necessitated the immediate
withdrawal of 2nd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, LTC James Alger, from CCB to report to
Colonel Robert Stack, CCC commander, and conduct a counterattack. On Sunday evening at
2010 Anderson sent Fredendall a message, As regards action in Sidi bou Zid: concentrate
68
The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion G3 Logs 12 to 26, February 1943, Microfilm, New records:
Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI.
69
31
tomorrow on clearing up situation there and destroying [the] enemy.70 By the time the orders
got down to 1st Armored Division, Ward wrote in his diary that [I] did not like it much, but he
did not protest the order or firmly request larger reinforcements.71 Instead, LTC Alger, a twentynine year old West Point graduate from Massachusetts, was tapped to lead the assault to retake
the town of Sidi bou Zid, destroy the German armor, and rescue the stranded infantrymen with a
force that was weaker than the counteroffensive the previous day. The only available assets to
Alger were an artillery battalion (minus one battery) and 1st Infantry Battalion, 6th Infantry
Regiment.72 Ward wrote in his diary, Alger [was] more or less on [his] own [with] many AT
[anti-tank] guns against him.73
Alger listened to advice from his old boss and readied his men before launching the
assault against the entrenched Germans. Before Brigadier General Paul Robinett, CCB
commander, released Alger, he cautioned him against precipitate action or rat racing as it was
called in the Division; but I [Robinett] doubt that he really understood the power of the enemys
guns.74 From approximately 0600 until 1300, Alger prepared his unit for the forward
movement and included a two-hour rehearsal. The planned counteroffensive covered thirteen
miles of flat open desert terrain with wadis. No prior reconnaissance was conducted. At 1300,
LTC James Alger led the attack, according to then-current Army doctrine, with his tanks
advancing in a line across the field with mounted infantry and artillery in support. The Germans
had set a trap and expected a larger force so they delayed their response until they knew this
small force was the entire counterattack heading their direction. The American maps on hand
70
First Army to II Corps, February 14, 1943, RG 331, AFHQ microfilm, AFHQ G-3 Forward, R-100-D, 319.1,
NARA II, College Park, MD.
71
Orlando Ward, Diary, February 15, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 10, MHI.
72
Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 350. LTC Algers task force reported to Robert Stack, CCC commander, for this
operation.
73
Ward, Diary.
74
Paul Robinett, Armor Command (McGregor & Werner, 1958), 157.
32
did not show these obstacles, and Alger was forced to transform his formation into a single
column at the initial obstacle. The Germans started harassing the Americans with aerial
bombardments and after twenty minutes the assault configuration was reestablished and Alger
slowed the rate of travel as they approached the second wadi. Additionally, Alger was waiting
for a promised air attackthat did not comeon Sidi bou Zid which would have provided
updated intelligence on the enemy disposition.75
At this point, the Germans fired airburst artillery rounds above the most likely crossing
points of the wadi to disrupt the advance, thus causing the tanks to button up.76 Usually, the
tank commander kept his upper torso exposed to maintain maximum situational awareness;
however, overhead-exploding rounds forced the tanks into greater protection mode. Despite the
limited visibility, Algers D Company located and destroyed six hidden German guns positioned
to cause havoc at the crossing site. The tanks clambered out of the second wadi and made for the
third and final wadi before the town.
Alger decided to leave one reserve tank company at the second wadi and traversed the
final wadi before Sidi bou Zid while heavy German artillery continued to rain down. By 1530,
Alger snatched the village after personally destroying two German tanks, the destruction of
numerous gun positions, and continued towards the stranded infantrymen to the east. The
battalion command had accomplished one of his objectives but the success was short-lived.
Subordinate commanders reported to Alger between 1545 and 1555 that enemy tanks were
approaching the town from both the north and the south. With the American flanks exposed, the
75
10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, 15 February; 21st Panzer Division War Diary,
February 1943, 15 February, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; LTC
James D. Alger Papers, January 10, 1991, The James Alger Collection, USMA; Historical Record of CCC, 1st
Armored Division 23 January to 19 February 1943, February 1943, 15 February, Microfilm, New records: Records
of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI.
76
The term button-up refers to a tank crew closing all of its hatches. This posture affords maximum protection for
the crew but greatly reduces visibility to the narrow viewing slits. Tank commanders do not like to take this posture
unless survival dictates.
33
German tanks launched a surprise assault. The Americans struggled to maneuver and the
Germans killed and destroyed the Americans within their designated kill zone area. At 1651
Colonel Stack asked Alger for an updated situational report and what help he needed. Alger
replied, Still pretty busy.77 An enemy round soon severed the radio antenna and this was the
last report Alger sent to Stack. By 1808, Colonel Stack ordered a retreat and only the infantry
and artillery were able to make it back to the American lines.78 Alger preformed well with his
lack of reconnaissance and intelligence on the German forces. Furthermore, Andersons
insistence on reclaiming Sidi bou Zid without releasing Brigadier General Paul Robinetts CCB
to 1st Armored Division led to an unnecessary, second horrific American defeat in as many days.
The counterattack had failed before dusk, but Fredendall did not call Truscott to report on
the operation until the following morning 0800, 16 February. The II Corps commander reported,
The picture this morning does not look too goodInformation is still confusing but G-3 has
them [1st Armored Division] on the phone getting the latest information. I will have a full report
and will call you back in a few minutes. A little later, Fredendall called again to pass on the
news about the devastating loss of Algers battalion.79 Even at the early stages in this battle, the
II Corps commander was not an engaging or involved leader. He did not leave his command
post to personally follow up on the counteroffensive or even call 1st Armored Division to request
an update before he went to bed for the evening on 15 February. Worse he called higher
headquarters first thing in the morning even before he asked his operations staff what occurred
during the battle. From the beginning, the II Corps had an ineffective commanding general.
77
Historical Record of CCC, 1st Armored Division 23 January to 19 February 1943, 15 February.
LTC James D. Alger Papers, 912; Historical Record of CCC, 1st Armored Division 23 January to 19
February 1943, 15 February; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 350351; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22
February 1943., 248252; Whiting, Kasserine, 187191; Jackson, The North African Campaign, 1940-43, 340
341; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 204.
79
78
34
Around 1700 on 15 February, while Alger was in the middle of a dogfight for his life,
Eisenhower authorized Andersons request to move back to defensive positions on the Western
Dorsal. In order to cover the withdrawal the Allies needed to hold Sbeitla at all costs.80 At 1900
on 15 February, General Robinett received orders from II Corps to move at once to Sbeitla and
revert to 1st Armored Divisions authority. General Fredendall said, Move the big elephants to
Sbeitla, move fast, and come shooting!81 Robinett created two columns to move his troops
sixty-two miles starting at 2130, and the command closed in at Sbeitla at 0830, 16 February.
However, not all forces were pulled back immediately as the withdrawal of the CCA at Kerns
Crossing would have to wait while the Americans tried a bold plan with their stranded
infantrymen.
At dusk on the night of 15 February, Robert Moore and his trapped infantrymen on
Djebel Lessouda received an aerial dropped message that stated, Tank destroyers and infantry
will occupy positions T-6363 [Kerns Crossing] at 2200 hours tonight to cover your withdrawal.
You are to withdraw to position to road west of Blid Chegas where guides will meet you. Bring
everything you can. Signed General Orlando Ward.82 After reading the message, LTC Moore
called for a conference of his company commanders where he decided to initiate the withdrawal
at 2230 hours. He went over the route, order of march, and to only return fire if the column was
fired upon first. Preparations were started immediately and the mens demeanor brightened,
even though they faced a fifteen-mile march through the lines of two divisions of German armor
and infantry. All heavy weapons and radios were disassembled and made unserviceable. All
written records and maps were burned to prevent them from falling into enemy hands.
80

Robinett, Armor Command, 164.
82
2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History, 17. The order is in all capital letters in the original document. The
location T-6363 was known as Kerns Crossings.
81
35
At the prescribed time, Moores men formed two columns and marched off the mountain
with the battalion commander leading the way. Before leaving, Moore took the German
prisoners they had captured on 14 February and told them if they made one false move or noise
of any kind to attract attention, that they would be bayonetted on the spot.83 After only 800
yards at the base of the mountain, the column encountered a battery of four towed 88mm guns
digging artillery pits. So close was the column to the guns that any one individual in the
column could have reached out and touched the guns.84 One crewmember popped his head out
of his foxhole and shouted something in German to the column. Moore and his men ignored this
man and kept marching. Without thinking twice, the German crewmember went back to work
on his foxhole. As Moore continued to march, they encountered a second German line around
0345 near the prescribed rally point. Moore thought this was the Americans and moved towards
the voices he heard. As he got closer he realized they were speaking German and had challenged
Moore twice. When Moore did not respond to the inquiry the Germans answered with machine
gun fire. Moore yelled, Scatter and to run like hell!85 The column quickly moved back toward
DJ Lessouda and dispersed according to plan before starting to infiltrate in smaller units. The
plan had worked and at 0500, 16 February Moore had finally reached American lines. His men
slowly straggled in throughout the day and of the 904 men he started with on 14 February, a total
of 432 made it safely back to American lines on 16 February. The remainder of his unit was
either killed or picked up by the Germans over the next two days as prisoners of war.86
83

1943, 20.
85
2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History, 18.
86
1943, 19212; 2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History, 1719; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 207210; Atkinson,
An Army at Dawn, 353354.
84
36
The big operational picture as seen by General Truscott after two long days consisted of
over one hundred American tanks destroyed, two artillery battalions overrun, and two battalions
of infantry lost and stranded behind enemy lines. Eisenhower was fully briefed on this situation
and decided that he could best serve the fight from his headquarters in Algiers. Upon arrival at
the local airfield the airplane was not ready and Eisenhower decided to return by car. Before
leaving he handed Truscott two hand written notes with his thoughts about the battlefront.
Eisenhower still did not know this was the major offensive but he did understand that any attack
against Andersons lines could not be very significant. Hence, Anderson needed to support II
Corps with direct forces, infantry, tanks, and support elements as soon as possible. Additionally,
II Corps must organize their lines with a strong defensive posture including mines and
reconnaissance must be conducted prior to digging in.87 All this damage had been done before
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox, even brought his forces into the fight.
Battle of Sbeitla and Rommel Enters Engagement
Operation Morgenluft was scheduled to begin 16 February but Rommel sent a
reconnaissance element early to Gafsa. The Allies had indications that the Afrika Korps was
advancing in the south toward Gafsa and Anderson insisted to Fredendall to evacuate that
garrison on 14 February. Gafsa was hastily packed up and soon Highway 15, heading northwest,
overflowed with army trucks, overloaded refugee carts, and livestock. A rear guard of engineers
and rangers stayed in Gafsa overnight to blow up the bridges and the power station.88
Andersons decision to shorten the southern flank saved the men at Gafsa from Rommels
upcoming offensive.
87

Ibid., 156; Watson, Exit Rommel, 77; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 347348; Jackson, The North African
Campaign, 1940-43, 340.
88
37
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Figure 3 Delay and Withdrawal, Sbeitla, 16-17 February [Courtesy of the US Army Center of
Military History]
38
Oberleutnant Heinz Schmidt led a company of scouts, 2nd Battalion, Special Group 288,
in a reconnaissance on Gafsa on 15 February and discovered that it had already been evacuated
with the exception of the rear guard of American rangers and Derbyshire Yeomanry. Once the
city belonged to the Germans, they quickly started to search for supplies and were pleased to find
a truck full of cigarettes. The men were happy to have the lavish American rations in their hands
after their long retreat from Egypt. The Germans, under Rommel, would capture operational
vehicles and they would use them to fill their shortages. After one hour of taking the city,
Schmidt and his men were ordered to pursue the rearguard to Feriana but were stopped by
American artillery and allied dive-bombers.89 Meanwhile, the Desert Fox thought the
American command appeared to be getting jittery and they were showing the lack of decision
typical of men commanding for the first time in a difficult situation.90
Rommel arrived in Gafsa on the morning of 16 February, even though von Arnim did not
send the 21st Panzer Division to the Desert Fox as planned for operation Morgenluft. Von
Arnim figured he could keep the panzer division for his own use since Rommel had already
achieved his objective without them. Hitlers veteran commander was an aggressive battlefield
leader and he decided to continue moving west to take the abandoned airfields at Feriana and
Thelepte, because his eyes were focused on the bigger objective of the American supply depot at
Tebessa. He sent this plan up the chain of command for approval and had to wait two days
before receiving authorization from Comando Supremo. At the same time, von Arnim sent his
own plans for approval to wheel north to attack the British. The lack of a unified command on
the ground in Tunisia hurt the Germans here. It is interesting to consider the Axis leadership
challenges since they had already been at war for over three years yet still had serious issues of
89
90
Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, 198199, 202.

39
command over military operations. Thus proving that conducting war was an inexact science or
more of an art than a science. The Germans had met their initial objectives but were left with the
inevitable question of their next steps. The Allies had lacked security on their radio
transmissions during their retreat so the Germans understood if they pushed their offensive they
would only encounter rear guard elements of a retreat. Instead, von Arnim elected to do mop-up
operations and reconnaissance. Nevertheless, before the day was over, Comando Supremo
ordered von Arnim to strike Sbeitla during the afternoon of 16 February.91
While the Germans waited on orders, the Americans tried to regroup. The II Corps had
already suffered the loss of ninety-eight medium tanks, fifty-seven half tracks, and twenty-nine
heavy artillery guns. These heavy losses ruled out the possibility of any additional
counterattacks.92 Ward finally had the chance to fight as a division now that CCB returned. His
initial plan was for CCA to cover the northern sector of the Fad-Sbeitla road with the remnants
of CCC supporting while CCB covered the southern sector about three miles east of Sbeitla. In
order to established these new lines CCB displaced forward at 1430 but heavy traffic delayed
them establishing their positions until 1830. Meanwhile, CCA still held Kerns Crossroad and
tasked Captain Herman McWatters, G Company, 13th Armored Regiment, to cover CCAs
withdrawal to Sbeitla. McWatters had worked out a leapfrog plan with LTC Ben Crosby, 3rd
Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, who took up a position on the high ground to the rear of G
Company. Throughout the afternoon the Germans pressed McWatters who had to start falling
backwards. Crosby observed this advance and waited until the German flanks were exposed
91
Fifth Panzer Army War Diary, 10-17 February 1943, n.d., 16 February, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part
1, U.S. Army center for military history; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 357359; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st
Armored Division, Old Ironsides, 169.
92
Allied Force Headquarters: Commander-in-Chiefs Dispatch, North African Campaign 1942-1943, n.d., 35,
Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 3,
MHI.
40
before he attacked with H Company. The Germans were caught by surprise and forced to
withdrawal temporarily.93 McWatters showed poise on the battlefield and allowed the CCA to
retrograde in an organized fashion and establish a defensive line around Sbeitla. However, the
Germans did not wait long to strike again. At dusk illumination artillery rounds were fired into
the air above the American position to allow the battle to continue throughout the hours of
darkness.94
When the 21st Panzer Division renewed their assault at dusk, the scene on the allied side
quickly turned chaotic. Retreats were never orderly, but panic and fear quickly set in with the
soldiers of CCA and CCC. McWatters maintained his position until the last possible minute
when he reported a large armored column heading westward. Crosby finally ordered the
company to fall back to the battalions lines to help reinforce for the pending attack. Here the
lack of night training for the Americans was displayed as Crosby tried to resupply his battalion
and infuse McWatters company behind his lines at the same time. Confusion quickly ensued
with multiple moving vehicles and some of Crobys tanks joined other elements of CCA heading
towards the rear. Colonel Stack was trying to restore order through Ward as CCA was quickly
disappearing through his lines. Then at 2030 engineers at Sbeitla blew up the ammunition dump
without any type of warning causing a terrific explosion. The sky was lighted up by a display
of pyrotechnics beyond the Fourth-of-July dreams of any boy. The ammunition, gasoline, and
other supplies for an offensive operation went up in smoke.95 The little organization left among
the Americans on the northern flank was now gone as men fled as fast as possible for the rear.96
93
Robinett, Armor Command, 164165; CCA G3 Operational Reports, 16 February 1943.

When an illumination round is fired a brilliant white flare lights up the sky to stimulate daytime conditions to
allow the battle to continue. This flare is attached to a parachute which allows for a slow descent and maximizes
artificial light and minimizes number of rounds to be fired.
95
96
CCA G3 Operational Reports; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 360366.
94
41
Additionally, the explosion practically invited the enemy to enter Sbeitla and the 21st Panzer
Division continued to press its attack.
Ward would not give up so easily and he determined to fight it out at Sbeitla even though
the situation along the frontlines continued to crumble. The soldiers were scared and not used to
night fighting. After three days of retreating and being defeated by the Germans, many men lost
their confidence and discipline. Although the scene on the Allies side was pure chaos, the
Germans had intercepted a message indicating that the Americans were abandoning Sbeitla, so
they were surprised to find a tough defense and called off the attack.97 At 2230 16 February
Truscott telephoned the Corps G-3 to seek additional information on the offensive and was told
that it had only been a scouting mission to conduct reconnaissance but had since returned east
and the front was quiet. The Germans renewed their assault on CCAs lines at 2245 and
immediately the American command post and artillery displaced to the rear. The men were
scared but continued to fight until it was reported at 0000 that elements were retreating to the
rear without orders. Staff officers had to put their vehicles across the roads and check each
vehicle to allow them through or send them to assembly areas by units and later sent back to the
front.98 At 0100 on 17 February, Fredendall called Truscott, frantically reporting that an
estimated eighty-nine German tanks assaulted their lines by moonlight and he considered the
situation extremely grave, and [was] uncertain of [1st Armored Divisions] ability to hold.99
Right after finishing the phone call, Truscott was handed a message that reported the Germans
were fighting all around Wards command post. The situation looked very grave at this point in
the battle and the outcome was far from certain but Ward continued to fight. The Americans
97
Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old Ironsides, 172173; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 220.
CCA G3 Operational Reports.
99
98
42
were on the verge of suffering another horrific defeat and of losing the last of their armored
capability.
The Americans had finally received a break and Fredendall called Truscott at 0130 to
report good news. Andersons chief of staff, Brigadier General C.V. ON. McNabb, ordered
Sbeitla held at all costsfor a minimum of at least twelve hours before a withdrawal was
authorized.100 On the morning of 17 February after Anderson awoke, Fredendall got into an
argument about how long to hold Sbeitla. Anderson did not agree with his chief of staff and told
Fredendall to hold all day at Sbeitla. The II Corps commander disputed this firmly, as he could
not afford to let 1st Armored Division get into another dog fight and possibly lose them as a
fighting force. Anderson finally relented and authorized Fredendall to hold until 1100.101 The II
Corps commander finally showed that he had some fight in him by standing up to his superior,
although it would not last. Meanwhile, at the lower level, the ingenuity of the staff officer of
CCA had placed enough manpower back at the front to stop the German advance in their sector
with artillery and tank fire by 0200. With the offensive fizzling out, word came down from
Ward around 0314 that ordered Sbeitla be held at all costs until 1100 on 17 February.102 The
battered men of CCA could finally breathe a sign of relief but were expecting a renewed attack at
daylight.
Marooned 168th Infantry Regiment
While the 1st Armored Division was engaged in a tank fight around Sbeitla, Colonel
Drake was still stranded on Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid near Sidi bou Zid. This position was
worse than Robert Moores with the Allied lines twice the distance. Drake commanded over
100
Ibid., 161.
Ibid., 162.
102
CCB Operations Report, 15 to 18 February 1943, March 1, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War
Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI; Robinett, Armor Command, 166;
101
43
1,900 men and the American lines were now over thirty miles. The last message Drake reported
at 0953 16 February stated no change to the situation, besieged, good strength, good morale.103
In fact, the situation was much worse, as supplies were running low especially food and water.
Fredendall telephoned Truscott and said, As for Drake over to the east, I have sent him word
that he will have to cut his way out. You cant give him much help. The air [resupply] mission
we laid on today could not be flown due to poor weather and a low ceiling throughout the
afternoon.104
Around 1500 on 16 February, CCA sent a radio message to the 168th Infantry Regiment
that said, Fight your way outtime and place yoursair cover will be providedinstructions
will be dropped by plane this afternoon!105 Three American fighter planes came overhead
around 1700 and dropped a message four and a half miles from the command point which was
not retrieved until 2000. Drake summoned his commanders, came up with an exfiltration plan,
and ordered his men to destroy any equipment they could not carry out. Drakes code word,
Bust the balloon, to start the exfiltration was issued at 2130.106
The units made their final preparations but the withdrawal off the mountaintop took
longer than expected to start, as there were many causalities. It was decided to leave one enlisted
medic with the wounded at the regiments ad hoc aid station. In fact, the last soldiers left the
hilltops around 0000 on 17 February. As the men marched, off they lacked discipline and left
weapons and ammunition when they were too heavy to continue to carry. Additionally, they
were talking as they were marching throughout the night. One soldier tossed a hand grenade into
103
The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion G3 Logs 12 to 26.

105
Report of Activities of the 168th Infantry in the Si Bou Zid-Fad Area 14-17 February 1943, February 27,
1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A,
Reel 2, MHI; 2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History, 30.
106
2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History, 23.
104
44
a German scout car which set it on fire until it burned up. Luckily there was a lot of commotion
in the area and the movement was not discovered overnight even as they passed a tank park and
infantry bivouac area.
Before the final fate of Drake and his men became known, Truscott was on the phone
with Fredendall who said, We are going to have to write Drake off . . . There is no way out. He
is completely surrounded. He had two days ammunition and two days rations. He had been
out for twenty-four hours. There is no prolonging the agony. We have got to write him off.107
Although the men of the 168th Infantry Regiment had managed to successfully get off the
mountains overnight, Fredendalls assessment proved true as daylight brought trouble for the
regiment.
At dawn, Drake had marched between twenty-two and twenty-six miles but his men were
scattered into various size groups over a five-mile stretch. German vehicles from the 21st Panzer
Division soon appeared with infantry and later tanks to encircle Drake and the men he directly
led. Always a fighter, Drake deployed his men into a formation and set one truck on fire. Not
long afterwards a German officer approached Drake under a white flag and called out, Colonel,
you surrender. Drake replied, You go to hell. The infantrymen were surrounded and
outgunned so they finally had to surrender to the Germans. A staff car picked up Drake to take
him away where a German general commended Drake: I want to compliment your command
for the splendid fight they put up. It was a hopeless thing from the start, but they fought like real
soldiers.108 Over 1,400 Americans from the 168th Infantry Regiment were captured on the
morning of 17 February. The regiments executive officer, LTC Gerald Line, managed to evade
the Germans and reported to the II Corps on the morning of 19 February as the only officer from
107

Commander, 168th Infantry, Report, 7-17 February 1943, n.d., 20, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1,
U.S. Army center for military history.
108
45
the regimental headquarters.109 A few other men trickled in on 19 and 20 February, but the 168th
Infantry Regiment was not longer a combat-effective force and would have to be rebuilt and
retrained before going into combat again.
Sbeitla Morning of 17 February
The Germans planned to renew their assault early in the morning on 17 February, but
General Ziegler had to delay his attack against Sbeitla when Drakes force suddenly appeared
behind their lines. Additionally, von Arnim directed the 10th Panzer Division to break contact
and head northeast to strike the Fondouk and Pichon passes recently vacated by CCB.110 This
wild goose chase wasted precious oil resources, exhausted the men on the forced march, lessened
the pressure off the sparsely held American lines, but most importantly gave the Allies additional
time to reinforce positions. The 10th Panzer Division met no troops, just artillery fire and mine
fields which effectively took them out of the fight for the next thirty-six hours. Once again, von
Arnim commanded his units by proxy and again missed an opportunity to annihilate the only
American armor in sector.
Ward and Robinett braced for the impending advance at dawn that did not come.
McQuillin, in typical fashion, started executing a withdrawal from his position at 1130 towards
Sbiba even though his lines were not being engaged.111 There was now a gap in the American
lines with the road leading into Sbeitla unguarded and unprotected. However, when the Germans
109
Commander, 168th Infantry, Report, 7-17 February 1943; 2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History;
Report of Activities of the 168th Infantry in the Si Bou Zid-Fad Area 14-17 February 1943; 21st Panzer
Division War Diary, 17 February; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 352357; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 30
January-22 February 1943., 252; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 211214.
110
Fifth Panzer Army War Diary, 10-17 February 1943, 17 February 1943; 10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 1422 February 1943, 17 February 1943.
Meanwhile the German command was is an extremely vulnerable situation because Kesselring was meeting with
Hitler in East Prussia and could not be reached to override von Arnims decisions. Rommel was sitting ideal in
Gafsa waiting with reconnaissance elements striking at airfields that were southwest of Kasserine Pass.
111
The first elements of CCA arrived at Sbiba at 1730. Orders from General Anderson awaited McQuillin to occupy
a defensive position east of Sbiba until relieved by 34th Infantry Division.
46
Figure 4 Citation of 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment following operations in Sbeitla area.
LTC Gardiner is in the trench coat near the front of the M4 tank. [Courtesy of the Military
History Institute]
resumed their push they did not advance along the same lines as the previous night into CCAs
abandoned sector but instead headed directly towards Robinetts well-prepared defensive
position. At 1145 a tank destroyer reported that forty tanks supported by mounted infantry were
attacking them. Robinett ordered him to fight a delaying action, falling back to the right of LTC
Henry Gardiners 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment. The fighting intensified and the enemy
slashed through the tank destroyers; nevertheless, Gardiner covered their withdrawal and
prevented a serious loss of life and equipment. It was a fine exhibition of leadership,
comradeship, and initiative by this mid-grade officer on the battlefield.
Robinett continued to fight throughout the afternoon and did not plan on being a speed
bump to the German assault as McQuillin had been at Sidi bou Zid. At 1315, Gardiner was
frontally assaulted by a superior number of tanks but stood his ground from hull defilade
positions.112 Gardiner told his men to hold their fire until they were within the kill zone.
112
A hull defilade position is a defensive position where a tank is behind some type of object that decreases the
visibility of the tank to the turret. However the crew can still view the battlefield without over exposing their tank to
the enemy before an engagement starts. When the tank commander wants to fire he has the driver pull forward to
allow the gunner to shoot unhampered at his target.
47
Gardiner finally opened fire when he said, Boys, let them have it!113 The heavy, accurate fire
immediately knocked out or disabled fifteen panzer tanks. The Germans were temporarily
studded by the volume of fire but soon continued their attack.114
Robinett was holding the line, but some of his men were not as confident. LTC George
Wrockloff, artillery commander, came to the rear upset and saying that his lines had been broken
and the battalion was overrun. Robinett did not believe the report and took him to an observation
point to clear things up. On the way up, Robinett reminded him of General William Tecumseh
Shermans advice, When things are going badly at the rear, go to the frontthey are always
better up there!115 From the observation post it was obvious that the battle was well in hand and
the Germans had not broken the lines. Wrockloff quickly recognized that his command post was
too far in the rear and his artillerymen were displacing in an orderly fashion. This provides an
example that learning did take place at all levels of command and the first step to fixing a
problem is recognition of a shortcoming. Ward ordered Robinett to prepare to retrograde to
Kasserine Pass while covering the withdrawal of the other units. CCB held Sbeitla until 1500
which allowed all remaining forces to move back with very few losses. After the battle,
Hightower confided to General Omar Bradley that, At SBEITLA it was the tanks that bothered
us more than the anti-tank guns. There were just too many . . . The Mark VI [Tiger tank] is the
113

21st Panzer Division War Diary, 17 February.
115
Robinett, Armor Command, 169; William T Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman / (New York,,
1875), 407, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/yale.39002009162026. The quote Robinett gave Wrockloff during the battle
was not exactly correct but he conveyed Shermans meaning. This quote is reflective of Robinetts writing.
Shermans memories state, I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but I feared that some calamity had
happened at the frontthe apparent confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and maimed,
parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue;
all these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the contrast was completeperfect order, men and
horses full of confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon
might be firing, the musketry clattering, and the enemys shot hitting close, there reigned a general feeling of
strength and security that bore a marked contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear; therefore,
for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the front than the rear line of battle.
114
48
main threat. A 75 against the front will not hurt.116 The CCB had fought with great skill and
courage against a superior force to cover the withdrawal of the American forces. In his journal
Rommel noted that the Americans had skirmished skillfully and bitterly at Sbeitla.117
Meanwhile, the Americans and Fredendall were doing everything in their power to bring
whatever available forces to the front to try stopping the German advance. At 1045 Truscott
asked the II Corps commander what resources he needed in order to win the fight. All
Fredendall could think of at that time was a replacement battalion for the 18th Field Artillery that
had lost its guns at Sidi bou Zid. Then Fredendall replied that he would take a survey [of] the
situation and take inventory and would let [Truscott] know.118 This demonstrates that the
battlefield commander was clueless as to the current situation of his command. They had been
fighting and losing for three days and were in desperate need of additional armor, infantry,
engineer, and artillery assets. Finally after getting some advice from his staff, Fredendall
reported to Truscott at 1330, I am holding a lot of mountain passes against armor with three and
one-half battalions of infantry. If they [Germans] get together [at] any place [with] a couple of
infantry battalions, they might smoke me out . . . I havent got a damn bit of reserve. I need a
combat team of infantry worse than hell.119 Truscott told the II Corps commander that the
artillery from 9th Infantry was moving to the front but it would take them a couple days to arrive.
Truscott recommended that Fredendall appeal to Anderson again for infantry help or additional
reinforcements. So with the Germans on the outskirts of Kasserine Pass, it would be up to
Fredendall and Anderson to piece together the defense with whatever units they had available.
116
Omar Bradley, Observers Report, March 1, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center &
School to Command & General Staff College, Box 144, NARA II, College Park, MD.
117
118
119
Ibid., 164.
49
Kasserine Pass 19 February

The morning of 18 February was generally a quiet day except for some minor
reconnaissance skirmishes.120 The Allies identified Kasserine Pass as the strategic gateway to
the whole front.121 During a phone conversation with Truscott, Fredendall said, We are a little
bit thin but if they [Germans] will just reconnoiter for awhile, well be all set. The longer they
let us alone, the better well be set.122 He got his wish as once again delays in the German
decision-making process gave the Allies extra time to prepare defenses around Kasserine. But
would Fredendall use the much-needed time to emplace a stout defense?
The 1st Armored Division had taken the brunt of the German offensive up to this point so
the II Corps commander, in a puzzling move, gave them the mission to block the route to
Tebessa, the Bahiret Foussana Valley, and not to hold the key terrain of the Kasserine Pass.
Instead, the defense of Kasserine Pass was left to whatever units Fredendall could scrap together.
At this point in the battle, 1st Armored Division had already lost 117 tanks and over 133 other
vehicles but still maintained enough combat power to continue fighting.123 The division had not
been defeated; instead they had been simply misused by Fredendall who did not understand time
and space of mobile warfare and the importance of logistics.
On 18 February, Ward, in a questionable command decision, sent the CCA from Sbiba
through Thala to the Tebessa area which took the majority of the day to complete. Meanwhile,
the CCB covered the road headed north to Thala from their withdrawal after Sbeitla and had to
countermarch over land back towards Kasserine Pass to this newly assigned area, only to be
ordered on 20 February to move again back towards their original position to establish a
120
21st Panzer Division War Diary, 18 February 1943.

Philip Furneaux Jordan, Jordans Tunis Dairy (London: Collins, 1943), 200.
122
123
Ibid.
121
50
defensive line. The CCC was ordered to detach 3rd Battalion, 6th Infantry to the British 26th
Armored Brigade holding Thala and the remainder of the command was dissolved to become
part of CCA.124 These two units passed each other to get into their assigned position instead of
being given the sector closest to them and maximizing time to conduct a reconnaissance and
establish a defensive position.
The relationship between General Fredendall and Ward had become totally dysfunctional
and the two barely talked or displayed confidence in the other. This was the main reason that the
1st Armored Division was given a support role instead of the main effort. Fredendall called
Truscott to demand that Ward be relieved of command and asked if this matter could be brought
up to Eisenhower. Truscott believed both generals had made mistakes throughout the battle but
agreed something had to be done. Eisenhower decided to bring Major General Ernest Harmon,
commander of the 2nd Armored Division, from Morocco to further evaluate the situation between
the generals but it would take a few days before he could arrive at the frontlines.125 The battle
would not pause while the Americans tried to sort out the command relationships, and a battle at
Kasserine Pass was eminent.
Instead of the battle-hardened 1st Armored Division, the green 1,200 men strong 19th
Combat Engineer Regiment, commanded by Colonel Arthur Moore, was given the mission to
defend Kasserine Pass. The regiment was not fully trained before arriving in North Africa and
had not yet seen combat. In fact, they had spent the last six weeks mostly doing road
construction. Fredendall also reinforced Kasserine Pass with 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry
124
CCA G3 Operational Reports, 18 February; Robinett, Armor Command, 172; Historical Record of CCC, 1st
Armored Division 23 January to 19 February 1943; CCB Operations Report, 20-25 February 1943, March 1,
Reel 2, MHI; CCB Operations Report, 15 to 18 February 1943.
125
Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 169; General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History
Program, interview by LTC R. T. Reed, February 5, 1973, 56, The Hamilton Howze Collection, Box 1, MHI.
51
Regiment from 1st Infantry Division. With a shortage of manpower at Kasserine Pass,
Fredendall had requested all the mines in North Africa. About 20,000 mines were flown in and
delivered by fifty-two planes.126 Unfortunately, the infantrymen of the 1st Infantry Division did
not know how to emplace the mines and untasked engineer support was limited. Around 2000 on
18 February, the II Corps commander called Colonel Alexander Stark, commander of the 26th
Infantry Regiment, to take command of Kasserine Pass and get there that night. Alex, I want
you to go to Kasserine right away and pull a Stonewall Jackson. Take up over there. Stark
hesitated. You mean tonight, General? Yes, Alex right away.127 It would take Stark twelve
hours to reach the pass throughout the night and Fredendall had wasted the opportunity he had
been given by creating a collection of various forces, without a single commander, who arrived
throughout the day and night instead of giving the defense to 1st Armored Division and
supplementing them with these additional available forces.
The tactical situation to the northeast of Kasserine at Sbiba was much more organized
since CCA had vacated the area. The 34th Infantry Division, led by Major General Charles
Ryder, started moving into the area throughout the evening of 17 February spent the entire next
day strengthening their positions.128 Luck struck the Americans as the upcoming thrust would
strike hardest at Ryders lines and not Starks.
Meanwhile, the battle weary Americans at the frontline surely wondered why the
Germans did not continue their offensive. Soldiers must have speculated if they had whipped the
Axis enough around Sbeitla to made them have to lick their wounds. Or maybe their defensive
position in the mountain pass was so strong that the Germans did not want to face another
126
Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 232.

128
34th Infantry Division, Report of Operations, Sbiba-Sbeitla Gap, 16-22, February 1943, Kasserine Pass
Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history.
127
52
slaughter. In fact it was none of these, but instead a power struggle with a very dysfunctional
Axis chain of command.
Rommel had men of the Afrika Korps at the foothills of Kasserine as the Americans were
trying to establish a defense after their withdrawal from Sbeitla that was the extent of his
command at this point. Rommel could no longer sit around watching and waiting as von Arnim
continued to mismanage the battle. Time was of the essence because of the low supply levels
and the threat of facing the enemy on two fronts, Montgomery to the south and Fredendall to the
west; Rommel had to take greater risk than he usually would. At 1420 he sent an operational
proposal to Albert Kesselring and the Italian High Command, Comando Supremo, for an
immediate thrust towards the American supply depot of Tebessa, the II Corps headquarters, and
requested that the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions be put under his operational control.129 Von
Arnim later expressed his concerns to Kesselring and Comando Supremo with Rommels plan
because he planned to use those two divisions within the next few days in a renewed assault
against the British underbelly at Fondouk and Pichon passes. The Desert Fox continued to
press his bold plan as a possibility to force the withdrawal of the British lines without a direct
confrontation if he could cut their supply lines. Kesselring agreed with Rommels plan and took
it to the Comando Supremo that evening for a final decision. Finally at 0130 on 19 February the
plan was approved; however, the Comando Supremo changed the objective from Tebessa to Le
129
The Comando Supremo was just another name for the Italian High Command. The political situation inside Italy
was becoming unstable so Adolf Hitler gave operation control of the North African campaign to Benito Mussolini
with a hope that military victories would improve the Italian situation. Hence, all decisions for large-scale military
operations were made in Rome. Kesselring was stationed in Rome acting as an ad hoc liaison, in addition to his job
as commander in chief of the southern theatre, to help expedite military decisions. Thus, there was no overall
military commander on the ground in Tunisia.
53
Kef. Although the general did not agree with the orders, he knew speed was the most important
aspect of this operation. So he deployed his troops instead of arguing.130
At 0330 Rommel issued orders for operation Sturmflut to begin at 0800 which told the
Afrika Korps to attack Kasserine Pass, the 21st Panzer Division to strike Sbiba, and recalled the
10th Panzer Division to meet the Desert Fox at Sbeitla to receive follow-on orders to exploit
whichever pass had the weakest resistance.131 The Germans had an issue with the timely
dissemination of orders. The divisions did not have much time to prepare for their respective
offensives and did not even know until several hours later that they would fall under Rommels
leadership.
The night of 18 February passed quietly for the men of the 21st Panzer Division until an
urgent radio message came in at 0445 from 5th Panzer Army stating, Get ready to march
immediately. Probable time of departure 0800 h. under Rommel in directions of 5372 [Sbiba].
Order for starting follows. At 0634 the division received the following order, The 21st Pz. Div.
comes under the orders of Rommel effective at once. The division will leaveat 0800 h. 19
Feb.132 Bad, muddy roads held up the 21st Panzer Division and they encountered heavily
defended minefields covered by artillery support. The bad weather prevented the Allied
airplanes from supporting, which would have been devastating in the confines of the valleys.
This was an advantage for the Germans that they were not able to exploit.
130
Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 400402; Fifth Panzer Army War Diary, 18 to 23, February 1943, Kasserine
Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history.
Tebessa was located in a generally western direction from Kasserine where Le Kef was more northwest and a
British supply depot. This new objective shortened the internal allied lines and allowed for allied reserves to be
emplaced quicker.
131
Erwin Rommel, Fernspruch, February 19, 1943, Microfilm, T313 reel 475, MHI.
Rick Atkinson incorrectly stated that Rommel issued his orders at 0450 based on when the Afrika Korps received
their orders and not when they were first issued. Atkinson also did not say the name of the operation. Martin
Blumenson, Kelly Orr, and Charles Whiting did not state either what the operation was called or the time that
Rommel issued his orders.
132
21st Panzer Division War Diary, 19 February.
54
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Figure 5 Battles at Kasserine 19-22 February 1943 [Courtesy of U.S. Army Center for Military
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55
Once the 21st Panzer Division reached Sbiba they were met by a strongly reinforced
position of British and American forces. The initial attack by the Germans was repulsed and
then the British responded with a small counteroffensive resulting in a draw. When Rommel
arrived, he advised concentrating the tanks in a forward movement because there was no infantry
support in the hills and the Luftwaffe was grounded due to low clouds. Throughout the day, the
American artillery fire was accurate and devastating. At 1710, LTC Dirk Stenkhoff reported to
21st Panzer Division our tank attack is at a stand sill as a result of barbed wire obstacles, mines
and antitank guns, and also because of enemy artillery.133 The division commander decided to
call off the assault for the day and refit the tanks for another thrust the next morning.134 At the
end of the day on 19 February, Sbiba gap remained firmly in allied hands but the situation at
Kasserine Pass was much more volatile.
When Colonel Stark arrived at Kasserine on the morning of 19 February, he only found a
hastily established defensive position. The 19th Engineers occupied the low ground on the south
side of the pass while 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment maintained the northern flank with
one platoon on the high ground and the rest in the valley. LTC Verdi Barnes 33rd Field Artillery
Battalion was in support. Even with an entire day to prepare defensive positions, Stark
discovered they had barely been started and enemy probing attacks were already beginning. The
commander quickly shifted an additional platoon from 1st Battalion to bolster the high ground
and ordered 19th Engineers to take the high ground if that was still possible.135 Although the
Americans were ill prepared, the initial reconnaissance attack by the Afrika Korps at Kasserine
133
Ibid.
Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 401403; Watson, Exit Rommel, 8586.
135
A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa, n.d., Kasserine
Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; 26th Infantry Unit History, 18-24 February
1943, n.d., Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history. While Stark was
fighting for his life to hold Kasserine Pass, Fredendall issued an order for four specific soldiers to be pulled from the
line and report directly to II Corps headquarters without delay for the purpose of taking an examination on 1 March
134
56
Pass was repelled. After observing the fight, Rommel wrote in his diary, The trouble was that
they had gone the wrong way about it. After fighting so long in the desert, the officers had
suddenly found themselves confronted with terrain not unlike the European Alps.136 The hills
and mountains on both sides were about 5,000 feet and were occupied by American infantrymen
and artillery observers. The mechanized German troops (armor and infantry) were not prepared
to fight in the mountains because the mobility of their equipment significantly decreased and
they also lacked recent training in mountain warfare tactics.137
During a renewed assault on Kasserine at 1100, Oberleutnant Heinz Schmidt attacked the
right flank. He had to dismount his vehicles due to wadis and climbed the mountain using rocks
as cover from artillery fire. When Schmidt reached the crest they came upon an American
machine gun nest only 30 yards away. Schmidt sent a troop leader to flank and lay down
suppressing fire and this machine gun nest withdrew. The Germans now had men controlling the
high ground. One of Schmidts men noticed that a bridge cut the road through the pass and he
decided to try and take it.138
As dusk approached, Schmidt succeeded in capturing this bridge behind allied lines.
When the first allied truck approached, the commander sent his men onto the bridge to stop it,
but the American truck opened fire and drove away. Schmidt learned his lesson and opened fire
on the next approaching vehicle. After two more vehicles were shot up, his men set up a
roadblock and captured more Americans. Regimental headquarters radioed Schmidt for his
current location which he told them. Headquarters could not believe the reported coordinates
1943 for admission to West Point. The commanding generals priorities clearly were not on fighting and winning
the battle at hand. See Special Order 26, February 19, 1943, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant Generals Officer,
WWII Operations Reports, 1940-48, II Corps, Box 2616, NARA II, College Park, MD.
136
137
Donald S Detwiler, Charles Burton Burdick, and Jrgen Rohwer, eds., World War II German Military Studies,
vol. 9, 24 vols., Garland Series: World War II German Military Studies (New York: Garland Pub, 1979).
138
Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, 203205.
57
because they were behind allied lines and asked for him to confirm his location again.
Regimental headquarters did not understand that Schmidt had cut the road behind the allied
defense at Kasserine.
Soon afterwards, a column of five tanks approached and Schmidt was upset that he had
left his anti-tank guns behind with their vehicles. The lead tank commander pulled up, stopped
his tanks, and asked, Why this barricade? Previously, Schmidt passed an order to his men not
to engage the tanks, but he forgot to ensure that his order was passed to the far side of the wadi.
The machine gun crew on the flank opened fire on the tanks. The tanks shot wildly into the
mountains and pushed through the barrier and continued down the road. Without any anti-tank
weapons Schmidt had nothing that could defeat the tanks. The next hour was tense as Schmidt
was expecting a counterattack that never came. When the same tanks re-crossed the bridge
without stopping, Schmidt ordered a withdrawal. They left the wounded men under the care of
one officer and marched back over the mountain throughout the night. Upon arrival at the
regimental headquarters, Schmidt handed the prisoners over and his men went to sleep.139 After
a full day of fighting, the Germans controlled and seized the most important terrain feature, point
1191, a ridge on top of the DJ Semmama but still had not broken the American lines.
As difficult a time as the Americans were having defensively against the Germans, fresh
replacements continued to arrive from American and British armies despite several days of rain
that made travel slow. Two British tank regiments arrived to reinforce CCB and the 1st Infantry
Division, commander Major General Terry Terrible Terry Allen, moved to strengthen the II
Corps lines. Allen met Fredendall along a road twenty-four miles northeast of Tebessa to outline
the latest developments. Fredendall was cheerful and optimistic and directed that the 1st
139
Ibid., 205211.
58
Infantry Division must be prepared to counterattack where needed. Allens area of responsibility
was the southern most position along the Bahiret Foussana Valley, west of Kasserine Pass.140
Additionally, Brigadier General Charles Dunphie, 26th Armored Brigade (British) was
placed under II Corps control around Thala. After learning the situation, Dunphie visited Stark
at his command post at 1630 which by now was under direct small arms fire. Although Stark
claimed to have the situation under control, when Dunphie returned to Thala he reported the
situation to General Anderson and was granted permission to restore order. Dunphie quickly
assembled one infantry and one armored battalion, called Gores Force, to head for Kasserine,
which delayed the Germans from pushing through the gap until the evening on 20 February.
Although all tanks were lost, this was exactly what the Allies needed to continue moving their
forces into positions behind Kasserine.141 Dunphies initiative and Gores Force tactical success
in the delaying operation on 20 February contributed to the overall outcome of the battle.
Heavy fog hung on the valley floors on the morning of 20 February thus decreasing
visibility, but Rommel insisted the attack must press forward. The forces at Sbiba were
identified as British, who the Germans gave a combat value considerably higher than that of the
American troops thus the Desert Fox shifted his main effort to Kasserine.142 At 0635 on 20
February the II Corps G-2 reported that the situation [vicinity Kasserine Pass] was well in
hand but his prediction was way off.143 At 0700 on 20 February, the Desert Fox left Sbeitla to
oversee the operations at Kasserine Pass. The general became upset that von Arnim had released
140
A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa.
Here the Germans introduced a new weapon system, the Nebelwerer, literally translated means fog thrower, that
became known by allied forces as screaming meemies or moaning minnies. The Nebelwerer was a six-barrel
mortar that would shoot six 75-pound high explosive rounds at the same time.
141
II Corps, Report of Operations 1 January-15 March 1943, May 2, 1943, 910, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume
1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; 26th Infantry Unit History, 18-24 February 1943; Blumenson,
Kasserine Pass, 249.
142
Fifth Panzer Army War Diary, 18 to 23, 121.
143
The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion G3 Logs 12 to 26.
59
only half of General von Broichs forces and the 10th Panzer Division was moving slowly. When
the Desert Fox inquired why there was a delay in the attack and the status of the motorcycle
battalion, Broich stated that he did not designate the motorcycle battalion for the assault, but
instead to exploit after the breakthrough. Valuable time was being wasted. Rommel was
extremely angry and ordered the commanders to take themselves closer to the front where they
could get a proper view of the situation.144 The German commander ordered the motorcycle
battalion to the front and designated them as the assault force. From 1200 onwards, tough handto-hand combat ensued, and progress was slow. By 1700, the pass belonged to the Germans.
After taking the pass, Rommel stated, The Americans were fantastically well equipped and we
[Germans] had a lot to learn from them organizationally. One particularly striking feature was
the standardization of their vehicles and spare parts.145 This was a lesson that the Americans
had learned from the British.
Meanwhile on the southern front, General Bernard Montgomery sent a screening force to
the Mareth line. A larger attack would occur later, but Rommel knew that his window for the
decisive victory was closing quickly.146
The allied tactical situation continued to improve but command structures remained
complex. After the efficacy of Gores Force, Fredendall paid a visit to Dunphie on the afternoon
of 20 February and placed him in overall control of the tactical situation of British and American
forces in the greater Thala area. This included CCB but not 1st Infantry Division. Once again,
General Ward had his command cut out from under him and would not play any role in the
remainder of the battle. While on the road, Robinett met Fredendall who gave an oral order:
The British will cover Thala. Head your column off at Haidra and move southeastassume
144

Ibid.
146
Ibid., 414; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 250.
145
60
command of all troops south of Oued [river] El Hatab in the Foussana Plain, stop the enemy
advance in that sector, drive him out of the valley, and restore our position in Kasserine Pass.147
After Robinett indicated that he understood the new mission, Fredendall said in a bantering tone
of voice, Its no use Robbie. Theyve broken through; you cant stop them now. The brigadier
replied, Dammit, general well go down and try.148 The corps commander responded, if you
stop the Germans this time, Robbie, I will make you a field marshal!149 Once again the II
Corps commander was not coordinating his subordinate unit commanders but instead telling
them they were in charge and wishing them good luck.
Meanwhile, Anderson ordered Brigadier General Cameron Nicholson, 6th Armored
Division (British), to overtake battlefield command to prevent any rank issues with Robinett and
Dunphie.150 A conference was set up at Thala post office at 0200 on 21 February to discuss and
coordinate the defensive plans between Robinett, Dunphie, and Nicholas although Allen was not
invited. Several days of rain made rivers unfordable and communications impractical except by
traveling the roads around mountains. Thus, due to travel time, Robinett had to leave before
Nicholas arrived at 0245, beforehand Nicholas chief of staff decided upon the plan of action that
Dunphie and Robinett discussed. The plan called for Robinett to restore the situation towards
Tebessa while Dunphie was to defend in depth, by fighting and falling back to another defensive
line to once again fight, until 1800 where the 2nd Battalion, 5th British Leicester would replace
147

Martin Philipsborn, Jr. and Milton Lehman, The Untold Story of Kasserine Pass, Saturday Evening Post,
February 14, 1948, 106.
149
Robinett, Armor Command, 176; Martin Philipsborn, Jr. and Milton Lehman, The Untold Story of Kasserine
Pass, 106.
150
BG Robinett and BG Dunphie both commanded a similar size element. Military protocol would be for the man
who got promoted to the rank of Brigadier General first to take overall command of the operation. However,
military men of the same rank do not always follow this rule thus making command and control extremely difficult.
BG Nicholas was also the same rank; however, he commanded a division size element and would have date of
rank on the other generals. Because Nicholas commanded a division he could more easily assert this authority over
Robinett and thus prevent any type of command infighting. Anderson did not have much faith in the abilities of
Fredendall so he wanted his own man to have command of the situation. MG Allen was also in the area but not
given overall command.
148
61
him south of Thala.151 In addition to these changes, a new overall commander took charge of the
tactical situation.
At the Casablanca Conference on 14 January 1943, it was agreed upon that once the
British Eighth Army, commanded by Bernard Montgomery, entered Tunisia from the east,
Harold Alexander would assume responsibility of the entire Tunisia battlefield as Ikes deputy in
command of the Eighteenth Army Group. Alexander was scheduled to take command on 20
February but due to the chaotic situation he cabled Eisenhower on 19 February stating he would
assume command immediately.152 One of the first orders that Alexander issued was that there
will be no withdrawal from the positions now held by First Army. No man will leave his post
unless it is to counterattack.153 It was doubtful that this order had any effect on what would
occur over the next few days on the battlefield because the previous withdrawals were caused by
poor terrain being held and overwhelming German forces. Now the restrictive terrain favored a
defensive position and the German forces had to assault multiple passes.
Rommel had finally broken through the American lines, but then broke one of the
cardinal rules of warfare by dividing his attacking force instead of using a concentrated,
overwhelming force against the staggering Allies. The weather on 21 February had became
worse during the night with rain softening the dirt roads, creating limited access up the
mountainsides. Hitlers veteran commander had decided to divide his forces again after taking
Kasserine Pass, with some forces in a feign operation west towards Tebessa and his main attack
north toward Thala. Rommel believed that, by deploying troops at several danger spots I hoped
151
II Corps, Report of Operations 1 January-15 March 1943.

Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander Alexander of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs, 1940-1945 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1962), 41; Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, February 22, 1943, MHI; Atkinson, An Army
at Dawn, 375377. The 18th Army Group had never existed before and Alexander got the idea to call it the 18th
because it would comprise the 1st British Army, commanded by Anderson, and the 8th British Army, commanded by
Montgomery.
153
CCA G3 Operational Reports.
152
62
to split the enemy forces far more than our own.154 Additionally, the Desert Fox thought the
Allies would stay on the defensive so he ordered the 21st Panzer Division to continue attacking at
Sbiba in order to prevent those forces from reinforcing at Thala.155
Just as the Americans needed reinforcements throughout the battle, so did the Germans.
Unlike the Allies, however Rommels chain of command was not very successful at providing
replacements. Before the Thala offensive, the Desert Fox requested von Arnim send nineteen
Tiger tanks from the 10th Panzer Division. Arnim falsely claimed the Tigers were all under
repair so he could not send them to Rommel and Kesselring once again failed to interject in this
dispute between the commanders.156 The rifts in the German command structure continued to
cause the Desert Fox to take unmitigated risks during the offensive.
After spending the morning inspecting destroyed American tanks in Kasserine, Hitlers
veteran commander visited Broich, near Thala, to speed up the attack. At this point in the battle,
Rommel understood he was in a race against the allied reinforcements and every delay allowed
the Allies to bolster their defensive lines. The commander also wanted to make his own
assessment of the battlefield situation and found the lead scouts in a cactus grove pinned down
by artillery fire. Rommel moved back to a hilltop to establish a better observation point and soon
ordered Broich to continue pressing forward.157
Opposing the 10th Panzer Divisions assault towards Thala were Dunphies tank forces
that were supported by artillery fire. Dunphie beautifully fought the planned defense in depth.
This strategy slowed the German advance until the British withdrew to the final defensive line.
The Germans had captured an operational British Valentine tank earlier in the campaign and as
154

Watson, Exit Rommel, 94; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 378379.
156
Detwiler, Burdick, and Rohwer, World War II German Military Studies; Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 406.
157
155
63
Figure 6 American tanks of the 1st Armored Division advance to strengthen Allied positions 20
February 1943 [Courtesy of the Military History Institute]
dusk approached, this captured tank drove through the British lines followed by German tanks
and infantry. The fighting was intense but burning gas cans illuminated the ground enough for
tanks to identify friends and foes and engage. Additionally, the allied infantry used sticky bombs
on the German tanks. Close quarters combat ensued until exhaustion set in, and both sides
pulled back about 1,000 yards.158 Unknown to the Germans at the time, but if the Axis forces
could break through at Thala, they would have an unopposed approach to Le Kef.
158
II Corps, Report of Operations 1 January-15 March 1943, 1011; Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine
and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4, July 31, 1943, 50, U.S. Army center for military history,
64
On the thrust west toward Tebessa, the Afrika Korps ran into Robinetts CCB and Allens
1st Infantry Division. The roads toward Tebessa were flanked by forest so the tanks had to stay
on the road. At daylight the Germans aggressively attacked the 1st Infantry Division and after
considerable close hard fighting the Germans attempted to withdrawal to the north only to run
into the CCB. Robinett had learned an important lesson, that he should put his tanks in a
concealed position and allow the enemy to come into the kill zone before firing. He employed
these tactics and they worked exquisitely. The Americans were able to mass their artillery with
heavy and concentrated firepower and allied air support was extremely effective. The restricted
terrain caused the German tanks into a single file formation which allowed the American and
British bombers to strafe their targets with ease even though the ceiling was low. However, the
Allies did not exclusively dominate the air situation and the Luftwaffe harassed the forces on the
ground too. The CCB shot down two enemy aircraft on the afternoon of 21 February, causing
German planes to take evasive maneuvers and lessening the effectiveness of their divebombers.159 The American will to stand and fight stopped the German advance towards Tebessa
over 21-22 February.
The Germans conducted a night march on 21 February to try to outflank Robinett, but
ended up further south than expected and again ran into Allen. Confusion quickly erupted
because the lead German infantry elements wore previously captured American and French
uniforms to allow for easier infiltration. A battery from 33rd Field Artillery Battalion was
overrun and German tanks followed up the infantrys success. The fight was far from over but
http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf; Howard Marshall, Over to Tunis, the

Complete Story of the North African Compaign (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1943), 72; Watson, Exit Rommel,
94; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 259.
159
A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa; Watson, Exit
Rommel, 97; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 379; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old
Ironsides, 192.
65
the 1st Infantry Division issued warning orders for withdrawal. Allen would not give up so easily
and first ordered local counterattacks where the coordination between the infantry and artillery
was exceptional. Furthermore, it was not until the 16th Infantry Regiment launched a large-scale
counterattack at 1530 that the Germans broke and ran. Over 400 prisoners were captured and
CCB followed this success with another counteroffensive.160 For the first time, the tactical
situation seemed to be going well for the Americans, but unless they could stop Rommels main
effort around Thala, the strategic situation would remain shaky.
Meanwhile in the Thala area, LTC William Westmorelands 34th Field Artillery Battalion
was the lead reinforcement element of 9th Infantry Divisions artillery to arrive and bolster the
thinly held lines. The artillerymen had endured a four-day 735 mile forced march through snowy
and icy mountain passes and stopped only long enough to maintain vehicles which allowed them
to arrive at the battlefront just in time to play a decisive role in the outcome of the battle. When
Westmoreland arrived, he found General Nicholas in a basement of a building looking at a small
map. He asked, What have you got in the way of troops? Nicholas replied that he had three
platoons of British infantry, a battery of 25-pounders and five tanks and that was all.161
Westmoreland got to work emplacing his artillery into positions while General S. LeRoy Irwin,
9th Infantry Division Artillery commander, directed the other units into sectors of fire. By 0500
on 22 February all the artillerymen were in position and they waited for daybreak to conduct gun
registration.
160
1st Infantry Division, Summary of Activities, January-March 1943, March 8, 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading
Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; CCB Operations Report, 20-25 February 1943; 16th
Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, Operations Report 19-26, February 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2,
U.S. Army center for military history; Robinett, Armor Command, 185186; Deutsches Afrika Korps, War Diary
19-24 February 1943, n.d., 21 to 22 February, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for
military history.
161
General William Westmoreland, Senior Officer Oral History Program, interview by Colonel Raymond
Funderburk and Colonel Duane Cameron, 1978, 88, The William Westmoreland Collection, Box 69, MHI.
66
The remnants of 10th Panzer Division advanced at 0700 and interrupted the artillery
registration so instead the gunners fired at German targets of opportunity all morning with heavy,
devastating artillery fire. In a major gamble, General Nicholas sent a small detachment of tanks
to counterattack under the heavy barrage from the 9th Infantry Division. The Germans thought
this was in preparation of a large-scale counteroffensive thus delaying their push. After a couple
of hours the Germans realized the Allies were not going to counterattack and resumed their
assault without much success. The veteran German leaders would have most likely identified
three battalions of artillery at Thala and they understood that translated into support for an entire
infantry division. Additionally, the skies finally cleared enough for the allied air support to take
part in strafing and bombing runs for an entire day during the operation.162 The combined effort
of the American and British artillery stopped Rommels attack at Thala with almost no infantry
present. It was now up to the Germans to decide what their next move would be for their
overstretched forces.
Rommel made his final front-line inspection on Sunday morning at Thala where he
decided the Allies were too strong and the offensive needed to stop. Kesselring had a long
meeting with the Desert Fox at his Kasserine field headquarters at 1300, where he found
Rommel in a very dispirited mood.163 The generals heart was no longer in the operation and
the lack of support with resources from the inefficient chain of command inspired little
confidence in the field marshal. The Desert Fox saw the offensive as a defeat and Kesselring
knew the thrust through Thala could not have been continued (if a break through occurred)
162
10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, 22 February; 9th Infantry Division Artillery,
Narrative of Events, Thala Engagement 21-24 February 1943, March 4, 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1
part 1, U.S. Army center for military history; General William Westmoreland, Senior Officer Oral History Program,
8991; Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia, 176; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 246247; Blumenson, Heroes Never Die, 432;
Watson, Exit Rommel, 94.
163
Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, 151.
67
without additional fuel and without captured allied trucks. Kesselring then traveled to talk with
von Arnim who had no grasp of the strategic significance of the German commanders offensive
and instead talked about a planned attack in his sector. Finally Kesselring agreed to Rommels
plan to withdrawal after arriving at his own headquarters back in Rome.164
Rommel had ordered a retreat on the night of 22-23 February to return to the original
German positions on the Eastern Dorsal. His men blew up the bridges and planted more than
43,000 mines. Around 2100 on 22 February a report was intercepted at Thala for the 10th Panzer
Division to pull back through Kasserine. This was the first indication the Allies had of general
retreat by the Germans.165 This report was discounted at the time and the Allies were still
rushing replacements towards the frontlines.
General Ernest Harmon received an urgent telegram to move from Morocco and report
immediately to General Eisenhowers headquarters in Algiers for limited field duty.166 Upon
arrival, Eisenhower explained the command relationship challenges between Fredendall and
Ward and charged Harmon to either take command of the II Corps from Fredendall or the 1st
Armored Division from Ward, whichever Harmon deemed necessary. In astonishment Harmon
blurted out, Well, make up your mind, Ike, I cant do both. Eisenhower replied, Thats right
but right now I dont know what is to be done down there. Im going to send you as deputy
corps commander. Your first job is to do the best you can to help Fredendall restore the
situation. Then you will report direct to me whether you should relieve Ward or Fredendall.167
Harmon then set out for Tebessa and arrived around 0200 on 23 February but was unable to find
164
Detwiler, Burdick, and Rohwer, World War II German Military Studies, 9:D125 10; Kesselring, The Memoirs of
Field-Marshal Kesselring, 151152; Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 407.
165
Janusz Piekakiewicz, Rommel and the Secret War in North Africa, 1941-1943: Secret Intelligence in the North
African Campaign, Schiffer Military History (West Chester, Pa: Schiffer Pub, 1992), 221; Atkinson, An Army at
Dawn, 389.
166
Ernest Nason Harmon, Combat Commander; Autobiography of a Soldier (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall,
1970), 111.
167
Ibid., 112.
68
the headquarters because it had moved. After a II Corps staff officer drew a map, Harmon
finally arrived at II Corps headquarters around 0300.
We have been waiting for you to arrive, said Fredendall. Shall we move the
command post? No, sir, Harmon replied, right here will do fine. That settles it, said
Fredendall.168 Harmon was handed an envelope stating, Here it is. The party is yours.169 The
telephone rang and Fredendall was talking to Wards operations officer, LTC Hamilton Howze,
when an argument broke out over tanks. Harmon said, If I am in command, Ill handle this.170
Harmon told Howze to get the tanks to Thala by dawn because if the Germans managed to take
Thala then his tanks would not be able to catch Rommel. Howze protested again before
promising to carry out the order.
Harmon then left the command post to visit the battlefield commanders with his first stop
to see Robinett. CCB still had forty-eight operational tanks and Robinett seemed to have the unit
in good order and felt that he could hold against any renewed attack. Harmon agreed and
ordered Robinett to hold on 23 February and counteroffensive the following day before he
moved on to Thala to meet Brigadier General Nicholas. The Germans were still shelling the city
when Harmon arrived to get an update on the situation. Nicholas stated, We gave them a
bloody nose yesterday and we are damned ready to give another one this morning.171 Harmon
repeated his orders to hold today and counterattack on 24 February, when General Irwin rushed
into the office cursing that Anderson had ordered him to pull his artillery back to Le Kef
immediately. In his memoirs Harmon firmly stated, the hell with that. I would take
responsibility with the First Army and the 9th Division Artillery would stay thereWe were
168
Ibid., 114.
170
Harmon, Combat Commander; Autobiography of a Soldier, 115.
171
Ibid., 117.
169
69
going to stay and stop the Germans if it was the last thing we did and we knew we could do
it.172 The Germans conducted their normal morning artillery barrage, but on 23 February it was
disturbing light because only a small detachment was left to cover the general withdrawal.
Furthermore, the Americans did not know this and Harmon reconnoitered the artillery positions
until the tanks arrived from 1st Armored Division at 1000 led by LTC Hightower.
The men that Hightower led were not the same outfit that charged into battle at Fad Pass.
Instead, most of his men were a collection of available bodies that had never fired a tank gun
before and had not yet bore-sighted the tanks. Harmon was not going to waste any time and told
Hightower to put the tanks up on the hillside. Then Harmon got on top of the tank said, You
can bore-sight to beat hell. Theres nothing in front of you but Germans to shoot at.173 Now
that the line was set Harmon took off to plan the counterattack of Kasserine with Ward. Once it
became apparent that the Germans had withdrawn, Harmon gave up command and returned back
to Eisenhowers jubilant command post to brief the commander on his assessment of the
generals. Harmon did not do anything magical during his trip as the II Corps deputy but instead
played the role of an active corps commander coordinating the defensive positions and visiting
the frontlines. Harmon had really just done Fredendalls job.174
Eisenhower personally met with the II Corps commander during the evening of 23
February to tell him that the Germans were no longer capable of any offensive actions and it
would be perfectly safe to launch counteroffensives to regain contact with the withdrawing
forces. Fredendall disagreed and stated that the German still had, one more shot in his locker
and would spend the next twenty-four hours strengthening his lines instead of counterattacking.
Eisenhower was so confident in his evaluation that he said that he would assume full
172

174
General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 8.
173
70
responsibility for any disadvantage that might result from vigorous action on his part.175
Fredendall declined to order an offensive and Eisenhower did not demand one so contact was
lost.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass was over, but the decisive blow to the Allies had eluded the
Wehrmacht. In fact, the entire operation terminated in a stalemate with heavy losses in
personnel and equipment, both to the Germans and to the Allies. Rommel saw several reasons
why his objectives were not meet: the failure to exploit initial success, Commando Supremo
ordering to attack the Allies flank instead of their supply lines, the tough defense at Thala and
Kasserine passes, the delayed and partial arrival of 10th Panzer Division from von Arnim, and the
clumsy leadership of some of the German commanders. The Desert Fox then praised the
Americans in his journal, Although it was true that the American troops could not yet be
compared with the veteran troops of the [British] Eighth Army, yet they made up for their lack of
experience by their far better and more plentiful equipment and their tactically more flexible
commandThe tactical conduct of the enemys defense had been first class.176 Meanwhile, the
Americans regrouped and continued to rush replacements to the frontlines to fill shortages
caused by battle causalities. The II Corps had barely survived the German offensive, based on
the lackluster performance of their leadership and questionable command decisions. Eisenhower
was still a timid battlefield commander, but that would soon transform when he directed
sweeping leadership changes. Hanging onto ineffective leaders for extended time periods was a
mistake he did not repeat throughout the remainder of the war.
175
176
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 145.

71
Leadership Changes
From the American perspective, the Battle of Kasserine Pass exposed the need for better
command and control of combat units. Eisenhower knew that not all of the senior leaders under
his command had performed up to standard throughout the battle, and he planned to replace the
ineffective leaders. First to go was his intelligence officer, Brigadier General MocklerFerryman, whom Eisenhower believed depended too heavily on the top-secret ULTRA
intelligence radio intercepts. Sweeping changes within the 1st Armored Division were up next
when Robert Stack, CCC, was relieved on 2 March and followed by Raymond McQuillin, CCA,
soon afterwards. General Alexander wanted to replace Anderson but Montgomery would not
allow a replacement to come from his organization, so Anderson stayed in command throughout
the rest of the campaign.177 General Anderson met Monk Dickson one evening after the battle
and said, Well, young man, you were right. After Dickson left the room, Anderson told
Fredendall that the whole defeat was his fault and that he could not sleep at night because our
dead and wounded preyed on his conscience.178 Andersons leadership style included
micromanaging Fredendall. We can conclude that Anderson was as much at fault for the fiasco
as the II Corps commander. But the elephant still hung in the room as to what to do about Ward
and Fredendall.
Throughout the battle the American commander rarely left his command post and
commonly bypassed Ward with orders. Major Red Akers, assistant G-3, II Corps, was given an
order by Fredendall and told, I want to send this order by Ward, to the troops on Lessouda and
have them dispose their units in this manner.179 This was a complete violation of military
protocol. The command college at Fort Leavenworth taught leaders to issue orders to your chain
177
General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 17; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 399.
Benjamin Dickson, G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe, 47.
179
178
72
of command not bypassing them and issuing orders directly to lower units. Eisenhower was not
fully convinced yet of Fredendalls ineffectiveness and heeded the advice of General Truscott
and Harmon before making his final decision.
After Harmons limited field time with the II Corps was completed, he spoke frankly to
Ike about his assessment of Generals Fredendall and Ward. The 1st Armored Division
commander had preformed well but Fredendall had treated Ward wrong by not allowing him to
command the division and sending orders directly to subordinate units. Eisenhower asked,
Well what do you think of Fredendall? Harmon replied, Hes no damned good. You ought to
get rid of him.180 Eisenhower offered command of the II Corps to Harmon. This was the
opportunity of a lifetime, but Harmon believed it would be ethically wrong to recommend firing
a commander and then take over that job. Instead, he recommended bringing General George
Patton from Morocco to take command.
Truscott also talked to Eisenhower about Fredendall. His opinion was that the men of the
II Corps had lost faith in their commander, and would not fight well under his command
anymore. Truscott also believed that Fredendall disliked and distrusted the British. Truscott also
recommended to Eisenhower that George Patton take over the II Corps.181 Eisenhower decided
to go with Truscotts recommendation and replaced Fredendall with General Patton on 7
March.182
Patton, as the new commander of the II Corps, wisely elected to make his presence felt as
dramatically as he could throughout the command and his ideas were entirely acceptable because
the corps needed a new and vibrant personality to lead them. He instituted fines for anyone
180

182
Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 400. Eisenhower shared the responsibility of the loss because he did not want to
place the entire burden of loss on the shoulders of Fredendall. Ike recommended to Marshall that Fredendall receive
an Army command in the states where he was promoted to Lieutenant General.
181
73
caught outside without a helmet. Additionally, he rushed to the various units frontlines to make
the soldiers know there was a new commander and also so he could gain a better tactical
understanding of the area.183
General Ward survived the first rounds of cuts but would not last long. Ward wrote to his
wife Edith, Fredendall is trying to knife me.184 After the change of command at the II Corps,
Patton gave Ward a fair chance to command the 1st Armored Division yet by 1 April Patton
decided to replace Ward with Harmon.185 Harmon brought his own management crew with him
and Howze was fired as the division G-3 and took the demotion of becoming the 13th Armored
Regiment S-3. Lawrence (Bob) Dewy replaced Howze. Also Maurice Rose took over as
division chief of staff.186 Harmon was shaking up the management team within the division
similar to many corporate executive officers when they take over.
The Americans tasted their first major engagement and suffered about 5,500 casualties,
but had only inflicted about 2,000 causalities on the Germans. Additionally, over 151 medium
and 84 light American tanks were destroyed nevertheless replacements were already available.187
Philip Jordon, a British staff officer working for Eisenhower, said, It would be easy to
exaggerate the importance of the enemys drive . . . But the truth is that they have been worth
while. Men can learn to be soldiers only in battle; and defeat is a sharper lesson than victory.188
The Battle of Kasserine Pass had gone a long way in teaching green American troops that it
183
General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 910; Robinett, Armor Command, 198199.
Orlando Ward, Orlando Ward to Edith Ward, March 3, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 11, MHI.
185
186
General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 11. The staff officers at a division or above
organization have a G before their office number which stands for General Staff 3, for example. A staff officer at
the combat command level and below would have a S before their officer number which stands for Staff 3, for
example.
187
Evelyn Monahan, And If I Perish: Frontline U.S. Army Nurses in World War II, 1st ed (New York: Knopf, 2003),
82; Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, March 1, 1943, 6, MHI; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 148; II
Corps, G-1 Periodic Reports January 1943 to March 1945, n.d., 1422 February 1943, RG 338, Records of U.S.
Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (World War II and Thereafter), Box 1, NARA II, College
Park, MD. II Corps personal reports from 14 to 23 Feb had 192 killed, 2624 wounded, and 2459 missing.
188
Jordan, Jordans Tunis Dairy, 196.
184
74
would take better equipment and better-disciplined soldiers if they were going to defeat the
veteran combat troops of the Wehrmacht. With these hard-fought lessons in hand and with the
ability to communicate these lessons to organizations throughout the army, America would not
stay down for long after the tactical defeat. The German is skillful, ruthless and a master of
deception. He can be beaten . . . The myth of the invincibility of the German Army and its
equipment has been exploded.189 Eisenhower said, Our troops are rapidly becoming battlewise
and their future operations are certain to bring discouragement to the ranks of our enemies.
Front line units now have the urgent task of replacement, rehabilitation, and trainingLet us
make sure that the new men coming up quickly absorb the lessons that the front line units have
learned.190 Rejuvenated with new leadership and the knowledge of how to tactically defeat the
German tanks, the Americans would not only rebound from their defeat at Kasserine, they would
help to clear North Africa of all German forces by May 1943.
While the senior American leadership needed sweeping changes the field grade officers
preformed well throughout the battle. Two excellent examples were Hightower and Gardiner.
Robinett wrote in an after action report about the battle of Fad Pass: only for the determined
action of the Battalion Command, Lieutenant Colonel Louis V. Hightower, there is no question
but that the entire Combat Command [A] would have either been killed or captured.191
Hightower faced horrendous odds of success in his counterattack by a battalion against an entire
panzer division, but he managed to instill confidence in his men and lead them into battle.
Although the Germans won that clash, the American had a hard charging determined officer on
their hands that was not afraid to fight. At the end of the battle, Hightower had been refitted with
189
War Department, Lessons From The Tunisian Campaign (Government Printing Office, 1943), 37.
Message of Commendation, March 4, 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for
military history.
191
Helmut Hudel and Paul Robinett, The Tank Battle at Sidi Bou Zid, B25.
190
75
a unit comprised of cooks and other non-tankers yet he was able to rally and motivate them to
arrive at Thala after an almost impossible night march.
While Hightower led his men in an offensive operation, Gardiner oversaw a key
defensive operation around Sbeitla that prevented the Germans from capturing the town by
several hours. Gardiner understood that mobile warfare only works if the entire team worked
together which was why he covered the withdrawal of the tank destroyers. Conducting this task
in a spontaneous fashion takes a battalion commander who communicated extremely effectively
to get all his tanks lined up and also to prevent fratricide. Gardiner again preformed well as the
Germans renewed their assault against his position by not only providing heavy fire, but also
being able to move his positions backwards to establish another line without his men going into
full retreat mode. With successful field grade officers like Hightower and Gardiner the
American Army had good men at the frontlines leading their men into battle bravely and
gallantly. Leaders like these two provided a solid base that allowed new senior leaders to take
over commands and have success because the field grade officers could execute their orders.
American and German Leadership Challenges
Eisenhower, as any good army commander should, accepted responsibility for the in
place command structure at the front which allowed the Germans to exploit and push the
American back over eighty miles. When Ike reflected on the battle, he saw that the II Corps was
overextended and that the southern lines should have been shortened to allow the Americans to
concentrate their forces instead of covering every pass. Additionally, Ike realized that the French
troops should have been under Andersons command and not reporting directly to Eisenhowers
headquarters.192 While the command structure in place was totally Eisenhowers fault, even if
192
Allied Force Headquarters: Commander-in-Chiefs Dispatch, North African Campaign 1942-1943, 50;
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 146; Harry C Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower; the Personal Diary of
76
the French had been under Andersons command the outcome of the battle would have been the
same. Anderson did not take into account any of the reports from the Americans after the thrust
through Fad Pass and the French did not have a significant role in the entire battle. Meanwhile,
Alexanders arrival at the frontlines and the establishment of 18th Army Group fixed the complex
command structure for the remainder of the North African campaign. Although it did not have
any real impact on the result of the battle because the reinforcements that stopped Rommel had
already been ordered to the front before he took command.
On the German side, the command structure was just as complex as the Allies. The
political situation inside Italy was becoming unstable so Adolf Hitler gave operational control of
the North African campaign to Benito Mussolini with the a hope that military victories would
improve Mussolinis political control in Italy. Hence, all decisions for large-scale military
operations were made in Rome. Kesselring was stationed in Rome acting as an ad hoc liaison, in
addition to his job as commander in chief of the southern theatre, to help expedite military
decisions. Thus, there was no overall military commander on the ground in Tunisia. Rommel
and von Arnim constantly disagreed on courses of action and the long lines of communication
delayed decisions and allowed the Allies to reinforce positions. After the initial success at Fad
Pass, von Arnim refused to heed Rommels advice to follow up his tactical success and instead
chose to wait for a counterattack. The road to Sbeitla was lightly defended and if von Arnim had
continued his assault, that city would have fallen into German hands much easier and earlier.
Overall, von Arnims inability to aggressively follow-up success, coupled with his lack of
battlefield presence, was one of the root causes for why the Axis did not achieve their stated
objectives.
Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1946), 265.
77
Rommel, on the other hand, did not press for command until he was sitting at the gates of
Kasserine Pass. Kesselring had waited for the Desert Fox to take control of the situation
instead of asserting his authority and appointing Rommel as the overall commander. Kesselring
claimed that the orders from the Comando Supremo gave Hitlers veteran commander the
flexibility to assault Tebessa before taking Le Kef through the Thala corridor. However,
Kesselring failed to directly tell this to Rommel and once again showed he was a deeply flawed
leader. Once the Desert Fox had command, he aggressively attacked, but the change of terrain
and the lack of having control of the entire 10th Panzer Division doomed his plans from the
beginning. After securing Kasserine, Rommel broke from doctrine and divided his force into
three prongs of attack. He gambled on this strategy and lost. Instead, he overstretched his lines
of communication, supply, and support and found his men facing superior allied forces who had
shorter internal lines to move British reinforcements to the fight. The Desert Fox had been
given every disadvantage, including von Arnim not sending nineteen Tiger tanks with the 10th
Panzer Division, and still managed to secure tactical victories. He blamed the overall failing to
meet the objectives on the strategic level on von Arnim, Kesselring, and Mussolini. After the
German withdrawal Kesselring put into effect a new command structure by placing Rommel as
overall commander of the entire African theater.193
In a report on the North African campaign, Eisenhower said, The turn of the tide at
Kasserine proved actually to be the turn of the tide in all of Tunisia.194 As Ike reflected back
upon the campaign, he understood that the battle became so important in the grand scheme
because the American army learned how to fight throughout the eight day battle. More notably,
Eisenhower started an initiative to collect lessons learned from the men at the battlefronts and
193
Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, 151152; Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 407408.
Brief of General Eisenhowers Report on the North African Campaign, April 15, 1944, Microfilm, New
records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 3, MHI.
194
78
disseminated those lessons throughout his ranks. Finally, to go one step further, Ike wanted
changes made in the stateside training regiments of the combat arms soldiers. This remained
why the Battle of Kasserine Pass was an eight-day tactical defeat on the battlefield, but in the
long run it proved to be a strategic victory for the new commanders that oversaw the defeat of
the Germans in North Africa in May 1943.
79
CHAPTER THREE
TRAINING
He who knows not, and knows not that he knows not, is a fool. Pity him.
He who knows not, and knows that he knows not, is ignorant. Show him.
He who knows, and knows that he knows, is wise. Follow him.
Unknown
Overview
The U.S. Army encounters with the German Army during February 1943 in North Africa
afforded Americans a chance to gain practical experience in the combat arts and learned similar
lessons firsthand that their Soviet and British Allies had already gained. On a strategic level, the
overall doctrine of combined arms overcame a shaky beginning and improved from contact with
the Wehrmacht. Although, the full potential of American combined arms would not be fully
realized until the summer of 1944, a good basis was created in North Africa.195 The ability to
communicate these lessons throughout the army and change stateside training cycles helped
improve the army and allowed them future tactical successes in the European theater of
operations.
American soldiers throughout the ranks learned valuable lessons after the defeat at
Kasserine Pass; however, if they did not share these lessons then it was equivalent to nothing
being learned. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General, European Theater of
Operations, was interested in improving his troops and changing army training to produce welltrained replacements. The bureaucracy of the War Department prevented an immediate change
in the training cycle at basic training centers as the lessons were vetted before recommended
195
Michael D Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945, Modern War
Studies (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 7.
80
changes were instated. The war was not going to stop and wait for the Americans to catch up
with the Germans so immediate measures had to be created within each leaders area of
responsibility to improve his organization. The first task was to collect the lessons from the
soldiers and leaders at the front lines through appointed observers who reported back to the War
Department or Eisenhower. While those lessons were being filtered up to the War Department,
commanders changed their standard operating procedures within their formations in order to win
the next fight. Frontline soldiers and replacements received additional training on battle-focused
tasks. Informal channels were established through long-standing, private, semi-official
professional journals to disseminate information to leaders and fellow officers. The War
Department issued official publications in the form of training circulars to bridge the knowledge
gap and distributed lessons to stateside and frontline units. Meanwhile, before training regiments
changed their curriculum, lessons needed to be validated through the War Departments
bureaucratic process before implementing a change. Finally, the army formally changed
stateside training throughout 1943 generally in line with the desires of combat commanders.
Eisenhower was a central figure in accumulating battle lessons and also disseminating
them throughout his command and the U.S. Army. Eisenhower believed, all that we can know
and learn from those who have had this ultimate of all training will contribute to the great task of
preparing men and units for battle.196 Although Ike was a major driving force, his command
was not the only organization that actively tried to improve training. Lieutenant General Jacob
Devers, Chief of the Armored Force, ordered his assistant commanding general, Brigadier
General T. J. Camp, to the frontlines of Tunisia to talk to the new combat veterans of 1st
Armored Division. Once Camp arrived in North Africa, Eisenhower fully endorsed him which
196
G-3 Training Section AFHQ, Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia (Government Printing Office,
1943), i.
81
allowed unrestricted access to the men. General Camp compiled and published a pamphlet
called, Tankers in Tunisia, to the armored recruits going through training so these men could
hear the lessons learned or best practices from the frontlines.
Although this was a good start, Eisenhower was not done gathering lessons. He sent
officers to the front in March 1943 to collect best practices and published training guidance in a
booklet called, Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia. Furthermore, after the North
African campaign ended, he ordered all subordinate units to submit their experiences and
lessons. Eisenhower published Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign to his command and helped
convince the War Department to disseminate across the entire U.S. Army.
Finally, the War Department took all the lessons from the frontlines and after vetting
infused them into training cycles. This remained an extremely complex process because the
training centers only have a specific time period to train their recruits on all the tasks. In order to
add a course on the subject then other parts of the curriculum had to be removed from the
training calendar. For example, in August 1943 the Armored School deleted destruction of
equipment and reduced tank principles classes in order to add theory technique and tactics of
screening smoke, tank company (light and medium) maneuvers, employment of reconnaissance
and tank platoons during the tactics course.197 The War Department was the approving authority
for changes to all training cycles so the armored and infantry school had to go back and forth
over weeks or months with the operations division of the War Department depending on how
much the two sides disagreed before changes were finalized. Eventually, the War Department
decided to extend the basic training cycle from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks, which
allowed lessons to be applied more freely in the schoolhouses. The final and slowest step in the
197
Changes in Training Program, September 13, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center &
School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD.
82
process was to create and disseminate training circulars infused with lessons to combat
commands worldwide.
Lessons Learned
Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commanding general of the Armed Ground Forces,
had the foresight to know that the army had fallen into disarray between the world wars and that
training was sacrificed to rush units into the invasion of North Africa. However, McNair was in
a position to correct training deficiencies and sent over forty officers to North Africa to observe
and report back on their observations of combat operations with items they believed needed to be
stressed or taught on prior to deployments. The officers ranked from major to major general and
generally spent about thirty days with specific-type of units. Observers covered all major
combat units, infantry, armor, field artillery, and tank destroyer while others looked at staff-level
operations and logistics. Reports were submitted to the Armed Force Board at the Army War
College and copies of the memos were distributed to commanders from army to corps level and
to all training centers.198 Additionally, General Eisenhower occasionally ordered some of his
men to submit reports to the observer board. Major General Omar Bradley was sent to the front
after the Kasserine campaign ended to collect lessons. Furthermore, before General Fredendall
was relieved of command from the II Corps he had to submit a report on lessons his unit learned.
Eisenhower and McNair had brilliant foresight to employ this unique method during World War
II to collect lessons by including observers from the very beginning of operations in the
European theater of operation.
Tankers in Tunisia. Other organizations wanted to improve the characteristics of their
training in order to produce high quality replacements. Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, Chief
198
n.d., The Observer Board Collection, MHI.

General Bradley was on General Eisenhowers staff at that time. General Bradley would become General Patotns
deputy commander and later the commanding general of II Corps in North Africa.
83
of the Armored Force, ordered Brigadier General T. J. Camp to travel to Tunisia to get firsthand information. Get the story at the front. Go to the enlisted man. See what he knows. The
General further ordered Camp to find out if our replacements are in condition and are trained
right for battle. Check them all the way from General Headquarters to the units and from the
gang plank to the battlefield.199 Once General Camp was in North Africa, General Eisenhower
appointed Camp as his personal representative and visited all American armored units whom had
been in combat. Camp asked soldiers and leaders what they had learned in combat that they
would like the new tankers to know before arriving at the front lines.200 Upon Camps return to
Fort Knox, he compiled the pamphlet Tankers in Tunisia and distributed a copy to each man that
came through the Armored replacement training center.
The focus of Tankers in Tunisia was not the big picture operational history of the war,
but instead little tricks men discovered that saved lives at the frontlines. The overarching
theme was the need for exact discipline while the rest of the book was divided into the
following sections: leadership, reconnaissance, tank tactics, tank gunnery, and individual
protection.201 The general officers believed that discipline went further than just obeying direct
orders, it also meant having integrity to do what was right when nobody was looking and men
undertaking the basics they had been taught without orders. The non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) were responsible to supervise soldiers to ensure orders were executed. However, an
NCO could not physically and directly supervise every task that each of his four or five soldiers
had to do throughout the day. So soldiers needed discipline to conduct maintenance on their
tracked vehicle every time the tank stopped. In the pamphlet, Eisenhower said, Discipline is
199
Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4, July 31, 1943, I, U.S.
Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf. General C.
L. Scott replaced General Devers as the Chief of the Armored Force before Tankers in Tunisia was published.
200
Ibid., 11.
201
Ibid., 1.
84
vital. A possible fifty percent improvement in value of men results from making them tough and
well disciplined. See that orders are carried out exactly Great nervous energy is required of
commanders. They must meet requirements and exact discipline and obedience.202 General
Charles Sawbridge went a little further about armored replacements when he wrote in the
booklet, Replacements generally lack fundamental discipline. They have not learned initiative
or to act for themselves. They wait for a non-commissioned officer.203
The frontline NCOs agreed with the generals that discipline was a necessity in combat
operations. Staff Sergeant Seaborn Duckett said, At Kasserine Pass I know we lost some men
by going to sleep. You got to be awake all the time. We lost men by wanting to go to sleep.
They seem to get the idea that they should have rest more than anything else. They dont get
scared until it is too late. The Germans were astute and discovered Americans who had
inadequate concealment. Duckett continued, Up at Kasserine Pass a man didnt carry out orders
that he should have, orders to move to the top of the mountain, and some of those that went to
sleep didnt come out. It is necessary to obey orders.204
Leadership. Toxic leaders can turn the best units into bad units and vice versa for good
leaders. As we have seen, General George Patton quickly transformed the II Corps by instilling
discipline after he replaced General Lloyd Fredendall. Additionally, unlike his predecessor
Patton led from the front and the men of II Corps knew their commander had a grasp on the
situation at the battlefront. Battlefield success boasted confidence in leaders but sometimes it
was the behind the scenes actions that gave men confidence in their leaders. Following the
defeat at Kasserine Patton ordered that guards over watch the cemetery to prevent the Arabs
202
Ibid.
Ibid.
204
Ibid., 17.
203
85
from digging up and pillaging the bodies.205 Small initiatives can have a great impact on the
morale of a unit and their willingness to fight.
A higher headquarters remained only as good as a combination of its lower elements.
Good leadership had to start at the bottom with the junior officers and NCOs. Major General
Ernest Harmon, Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division, claimed, The division will
succeed only as well as the platoon succeeds.206 A well-trained platoon does not have to wait
for their platoon leader or company commander to issue orders before they reacted to enemy
contact. Sergeant Lawrence Butler, I Company, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division,
understood that he had to operate as part of a platoon but he used initiative when the opportunity
presented itself. Bulter said, One must act on his own a great deal of the time. You cant wait
to be told when to fire or where to fire. When you see something which you think worth firing
upon, take the chance. The function of the officer is to keep the men together and tell them what
is going on. The soldier has to use his individual judgment.207
Another important aspect of leadership was effective communication and leading by
example instead of simply issuing orders and waiting in the rear for reports. LTC Elton Ringsak,
6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored Division, noted, Frankness with your subordinate leaders is
the biggest thing in leadership. The officer should be truthful. If he doesnt know, he should
admit to the noncommissioned officers that he doesnt know all the answers and that they must
205
Franklin J. Schaffner, Patton, DVD, Biography, Drama, History, War, 1970, sec. 7, 10, 11.
Report on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training Purposes, 1st Armored Division, June 13, 1943,
2, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel
1, MHI.
General Harmon was the commanding general of 2nd Armored Division during Kasserine Pass battle. He was sent
by General Eisenhower to help General Fredendall restore order at the end of Kasserine Pass battle. General
Harmon replaced General Ward as the 1st Armored Division Commander in April 1943.
207
Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4, July 31, 1943, 40, U.S.
Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf.
206
86
work it out together.208 Platoon leaders learned that fighting required them to lead from the
front. Lieutenant H. F. Hillenmeyer, H Company, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division,
recalled that he learned the importance of physically leading his men into battle and not just
issuing orders. When you get out in front, theyll follow you easily.209 Exceptional leadership
at the bottom allowed for the II Corps to transform into a combat unit that would win many
future battles in North Africa.
Reconnaissance. Tank warfare depended on the same basic principles as General Terry
Allens philosophy; however, due to the mobility of tracked vehicles, reconnaissance was the
most important aspect to prevent enemy tanks from flanking positions. A reconnaissance of the
field, if you are lucky enough to be able to make it, is the most important thing I can think of,
LTC Luis Hightower, commander 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division,
remembered from the battle of Sidi bou Zid. In tank fighting nothing is more important than
expert reconnaissance of your routes of advance and withdrawal. During the counterattack at
Fad Pass, Hightower thought they had a clear route, only to find a dry wash blocking the way
which forced the tanks to funnel through choke points where they could cross.210
One of the failures at Fad Pass was the lack of effective reconnaissance prior to the
German assault. In order for the reconnaissance men to successfully complete their mission,
they had to accurately report information to higher headquarters in a timely manner. Sergeant
John Mahoney, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored Division, wanted every
manin the battalion [to] be able to operate the radio.211 However, one deficiency of Sergeant
208
209
Ibid., 25.
210
Ibid., 19.
211
Ibid., 10.
87
Mahoneys men was they all could not read a compass or a map.212 If Mahoneys men could
have reported enemy activity they would have likely submitted bad intelligence because the
location would have been wrong. Colonel Mitchel Talbotts, commanding officer, 2nd Battalion,
1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, reconnaissance men trapped on Lessouda
Mountain observed German tanks slowly moving for hours on 15 February without creating a
dust trail which allowed the Germans to be in position to assault the flanks of the American
counterattack.213 By this point in the battle, communications with the trapped men was very
sporadic and Colonel Talbott could not pass this vital information along to 1st Armored Division.
This failure to pass along critical intelligence resulted in LTC Algers counteroffensive being
launched without knowing the enemys disposition and it led to an unnecessary defeat.
Tank tactics. Tactics are based on doctrine but are always evolvingsimilar to a game
of baseball where the pitcher and hitter continue to change approaches throughout the game to
keep each other off balance. While discussing tank tactics with Camp, Hightower stated,
Generally they [the Germans] try to suck you into an antitank gun trap. Their light tanks will
bait you in by playing around just outside effective range. When you start after them, they turn
tail and draw you in within range of their 88-mm guns.214 The artillery fire distracted tankers
attention and soon concealed antitank guns on the flanks were attacking. One common
technique was to designate a tank to look out for the 88mm anti-tank guns. Hightower than
added, Take it very slowly. Germans do it that way all the time. Do not shift gears once you
start, particularly in the dust, because the backfire will give you away In this country, too,
212
Ibid., 43.
Ibid., 37.
214
Ibid., 20.
213
88
weve learned to move slowly so as not to reveal our position. You cant boil up to battle at high
speed without broadcasting your coming in a big cloud of dust.215
Once the Americans learned German tactics, they practiced ways to defeat the enemy
next time they met in battle. Lieutenant Harry Holtzman, D Company, 1st Armored Regiment,
1st Armored Division, recommended teaching tactics over a terrain board. Following Rommels
withdrawal he made a terrain model of the Sid bou Zid battle and reviewed the actions of both
sides. He gave platoon leaders objectives and let entire crews come up with possible
solutions.216 By reviewing the battle actions, Holtzmans company was better prepared to face
the enemy in future battles. After talking about locating and maneuvering against the Germans,
General Camps booklet turned to the importance of effective shooting to destroy and disable
enemy tanks.
Tank gunnery. When a tank gunner pulls the trigger, the round will go where the tube is
aimed; however, if the sight and the tube were not aligned prior to the engagement the gunner
would always miss. While LTC Hightower discussed tank gunnery with Camp, he said, Bore
sight to beat hell but dont let the boys try to do it at 1,000 yards so the Axis of sight and tube
coincide, because when you are shooting at 6,000 yards there is no telling where it will hit. Keep
your sights parallel. Bore sight on a distant object the more distant the more effective.217
High-ranking officers bring great insight; however, the enlisted men and NCOs do most
of the fighting and understand the German tendencies better. Sergeant James Bowser, H
215
Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 37.
A terrain model is something that a person creates based on a map or physical reconnaissance of an area. There is
no specific standard on how to create on except to use anything possible to make the most useful model. Mountains,
cities, wadis, avenues of approach, etc. are all placed into a sand table representation of the land. Friendly and
enemy positions and vehicles are added at the end. One method is to move the vehicles around the sand table in
order to see what happened and expose weaknesses. This is an excellent training tool that supports dialogue to
discuss tactics, sustainment and improvements for future engagements.
217
Ibid., 24. Bore sighting is similar to zeroing a rifle but on a tank it aligns the gun sights, that the gunner is
looking through, to the target the tube pointed towards.
216
89
Company, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, added, theres just one thing you must
remember when youre fighting Germans. When you shoot at them they stop and try to kid you
into thinking you knocked them out. Then when you turn your back on them, they open up
again. Sir [General Camp], we shoot until they stop and then keep shooting until they burn.218
Hightower learned from his men that if you shoot a highly explosive tank round low it will
ricochet and kill the crew in the turret or disable the German tank.219 Meanwhile, Sergeant
Bower discovered to always check his ammunition. Once I had to climb out of a tank during an
action to ram a bent shell case out of my gun and then hurry back in before the machine guns got
me.220 Sergeant Warren Lasley, G Company, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division,
believed in having every soldier in the tank actively search for enemy targets. Sometimes the
driver or assistant driver would find tanks that the gunner could not see.221 Sergeant Frank
Sabin, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored Division, added that the driver should
be ready no matter what happens. Should know all gunsI had a hard time when I was first in
the front lines. I was gun shy, scared.222 Tank platoons needed to be able to shoot, move, and
communicate to effectively engage and destroy the enemy on the battlefield. However, all those
skills would be insignificant unless the men knew how to properly identify friendly and enemy
vehicles and also actions to protect themselves while they were stopped or outside the tanks.
Individual protection. The white star painted on tanks as an identification system was
not effective in the desert because it commonly got covered with dirt. When Hightowers radio
went out, he heard [his] own tanks turning their guns on [him]and really sweated out that
approach. At dusk its always hard to tell which vehicles are really friendly, and were always
218
Ibid., 27.
Ibid., 23.
220
Ibid., 27.
221
Ibid., 39.
222
Ibid., 10.
219
90
afraid to shoot until theyre right on top of us. The Germans shot rockets and different colored
smoke to mark their positions when Stukas were overheard to prevent the airplanes from
bombing their own frontlines.223
German airpower and artillery demoralized men because it was difficult to see the
enemys incoming rounds and they would land near positions at all hours which made foxholes
worth their weight in gold. Sergeant Frank Sabin, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st
Armored Division, said, Dig good foxholes. We learned in Sbeitla Valley that foxholes offered
smaller area and less chance of getting hit by bombs and shrapnel.224 Sergeant William Etritge,
I Company, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored Division, had three main points that he thought
were important: first always keep you weapon clean and the bolt sand free so they fire. Stay
under cover. Stay quiet, especially at night otherwise mortars and machine gun fire will come
your way.225 Staff Sergeant Fred Erdwins, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored
Division, recalled that he had never seen a man killed in a slit trench, but I did see three men
killed who did not start digging as the others. Entrenching tools are very valuable and almost as
necessary as a mans arms.226 Sergeant George Cleland, D Company, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st
Armored Division, wanted replacements better trained in digging foxholes. Additionally, a
concealed position was extremely important but if a soldier was careless and left tin cans around
his position uncovered the sun will reflect and give away the position.227
The Germans had aerial superiority through the majority of the Kasserine Pass battle
which allowed the Americans to refine their anti-aircraft techniques. When asked about enemy
aircraft, Hightower responded, The .50 caliber machine guns, however, will keep them high.
223
Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 41.
225
Ibid., 14.
226
Ibid., 47.
227
Ibid., 42.
224
91
German pilots seem to despise the stuff.228 Although Hightowers men struck down several
enemy airplanes, they consistently had trouble with leading the target because they aimed at the
target instead of where the target was expected to go, thus missing. Hightower told his men
youve got to shoot planes as you would ducks.229
First aid training. Hightower and other combat leaders quickly realized how important
effective first aid was to combat soldiers. Medical personnel were not always going to be
available at the front lines and the first aid that a soldier could give while waiting on additional
care could be the difference between life and death. Hightower said, Weve also learned that
its important for everyone to know what to do with wounds, especially shock Ive also seen
our men save almost 500 causalities by prompt treatment of their wounds with sulpha drugs and
proper treatment of shock. Most of the sulpha drugs were administered by the men
themselves.230 Lieutenant Holtzman further suggested to General Camp, Try to arouse interest
in learning first aid. The most valuable asset when a tank is hit is to know the use of sulpha
powder and pills and the treatment of burns, puncture and laceration wounds.231 Treating an
injured man reduced overall causalities but the wounded still needed to be collected from the
battlefield before receiving treatment.
General Camp had the opportunity to sit down with an unnamed, seasoned British
General who gave some interesting suggestions that helped save lives. The Sherman tank had an
escape hatch in the bottom to allow the driver to get out in case of an emergency, but the British
discovered another use for the hatch. Causalities could be collected without exposing men to
228
Ibid., 20.
Ibid.
230
Ibid., 20.
231
Ibid., 37.
229
92
enemy gunfire by driving over causalities, opening the escape hatch where the assistant driver
could pull him into the tank to prevent men from being unprotected.232
Eisenhowers actions. As the North African campaign came to an end, General
Eisenhower realized the value of combat experience and battle lessons to current training is of
utmost importance.233 He desired to help mold the training of all army units in the United
States by infusing appropriate lessons and experience from the North African campaign.
Eisenhower knew that time would diminish the lessons and experience so he ordered them
compiled while they were still fresh and vivid in the minds of the participants.
One of the first steps that Eisenhower took was to send an extensive group of inspectors
across the front lines of II Corps from 18 to 30 March 1943 to collect frank statements during
informal conferences with inspecting officers. The role of these inspectors was similar to
McNairs inspectors except they reported back to Eisenhower instead of the War Department.
Ike wanted to know what was going on at the frontlines but more importantly how he could help
fix the issues at the front through training. The men of II Corps had recently received the
ultimate phase of military trainingactual combat experience. Eisenhower designed and
distributed a pamphlet on 15 May 1943 called Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia
that he hoped would be used by individuals and units who were preparing for their own overseas
deployments. The pamphlet would be a success if just one person read and learned from it.
The pamphlet was designed to break down lessons that were common to all branches and
also specific combat arms branches. Every soldier needed to know how to properly dig a
foxhole, camouflage, concealment, and cover. As we saw at Kasserine Pass, mine warfare
needed to be known by all troops, not just the engineers. The infantry wanted their replacements
232
Ibid., 57.
Reports on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training, May 14, 1943, Microfilm, New records:
233
93
well versed in scouting, patrolling, and night operations. Furthermore, they desired to have their
men mentally hardened to the sights and sounds of war so they would not hesitate at the first
sound of artillery fire coming towards their position. Axis and Allied armored vehicle and
aircraft recognition needed to be improved to prevent fraternization and enemy vehicles slipping
through the lines at dusk. In addition to the above tasks, the armored men also wanted their
soldiers to focus on gunnery skills and the use of smoke to screen their movements. Finally,
combined arms training needed to be conducted to ensure that the artillery, armor, and
infantrymen could operate in unison instead of as individual units.234
As the fighting in Tunisia ended, Eisenhower ordered his subordinate units on 14 May
1943 to create reports on combat experience and battle lessons for training purposes which was
key to the learning process. The substance of the reports was designed to either validate or
provide recommendations to the War Department for all branches of the army.235 Each branch
was responsible for analyzing the soundness or weakness of present tactical doctrine, techniques,
and organization based on lessons and experience. The combat arms wrote about offensive,
defensive, retrograde movements, special operations, and cooperation by support and
observation aviation.236 Other miscellaneous lessons that could be applied to all branches
included mine warfare and booby traps, night operations, camouflage, concealment, cover,
communications, defense against air attacks, defense against tanks, and reconnaissance.
Weapons and equipment were criticized with frank and constructive opinions based on
experience as to deficiencies in quality, sustainability, capabilities, and quantity. Also, similar
234
G-3 Training Section AFHQ, Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia (Government Printing Office,
1943), iiv.
235
The army divides its officers into branches of service while enlisted personnel have a military occupation
specialty. For example an engineer officer could be responsible for construction and repair of roads, fortifications
and mine operations. Where an enlisted mans job would only be mine operations. The branches in the final reports
consisted of the following: infantry, artillery, armored forces, tank destroyer units, cavalry, anti-aircraft artillery,
engineers, signal corps, quartermaster corps, medical corps, and ordnance department units.
236
Combat arms units are limited to artillery, cavalry, armored, infantry, engineer, and anti-aircraft units.
94
assessments about weapon systems that worked effectively were welcomed. These reports were
sent up the chain of command to Eisenhowers level and also sent unabridged to the War
Department. This method showed war planners that many different organizations believed
changes to the training cycles were necessary.237
The lessons that Eisenhower ordered had more than one intention. First, he attempted to
make major changes in the training of soldiers before they left for combat theaters. Additionally,
he wanted to ensure that the men directly under his control knew the lessons and trained on them
until they became second nature. Once the information was collected, Eisenhowers staff had to
shift through it and complete a training memorandum based on the major themes to distribute to
the men under his command. Additionally, the major combat arms training schools of the
Armed Ground Forces were sent a copy.238
The War Department fully understood the importance of communicating lessons
throughout their commands. Once the operations division within the War Department reviewed
the training memorandum, they immediately realized the impact that the document could have on
training men for combat. It was sent to the Government Printing Office to create a pocket-sized
book that soldiers could easily carry around. The dissemination was restricted to people in the
service of the United States and undoubted loyalty and discretion who were cooperating in
Government work.239 In order to ensure further distribution, General George C. Marshall, Chief
of Staff of the U.S. Army, authorized a version of the training memo to be published by the
newspaper Army and Navy Register over a two-week period.240 The newspaper was only for
237
Reports on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training,.

Training Memorandum 44, August 4, 1943, RG 407, WWII Operations Reports, 1940-1948, II Corps, 202-0.4202-0.12, Box 2609, NARA II, College Park, MD.; Training Memorandum 44, August 4, 1943, Microfilm, New
records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI.
239
War Department, Lessons From The Tunisian Campaign (Government Printing Office, 1943).
240
Army and Navy Register, 11 December 1943.; Army and Navy Register, 18 December 1943.
238
95
sale to people associated with the U.S. military, so Marshall believed the minor risk of the
information getting out beyond the military community was worthwhile in order to ensure wider
dissemination of the lessons.
Frontline
Replacement training. Although the Americans had lost tactically at Kasserine, one of
their strengths had been their ability to replace causalities and equipment from the United States.
For example, the 3rd Battalion, 168th Infantry Regiment had to be totally replaced since the entire
unit was captured at Fad Pass. Throughout the battle, whole units were shifted to help plug the
gaps, and after the German withdrawal, replacements were brought in from 2nd Armored
Division.241 The ability of the Americans to rapidly replace men and equipment proved to be a
decisive action in the final defeat of the Germans in Africa.
However, just because the Americans could get a new individual replacement up to the
frontlines did not mean that he was fully qualified in combat skills. This caused three out of four
(or seventy-five percent) of the causalities to be the new replacements. Thus it was important to
ensure that replacements were well trained before deploying them on the frontlines.242 When
replacements showed up at the frontlines, they were generally put under the command of a
combat NCO. The NCO and other combat veterans were responsible for teaching these new
soldiers as quickly as possible so that they might survive their first contact with the Germans.
The Americans witnessed German tactics in action at Fad Pass, which included shooting the
tracks off of vehicles to immobilize them in place so that they would become sitting ducks.243
241
Company K-50 Years Ago, Gene C. Mallette Papers, Coll. #00.0116, The Institute on World War II and the
Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL.
242
Ibid.
243
World War II-A Soldier Remembers, Henry Loewenthal, Jr. Papers, Coll. #00.0122, The Institute on World
War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL.
96
At the frontlines, the NCOs also taught the new men about the German 88 millimeter
artillery pieces that engendered fear to all who encountered them. The flat trajectory allowed
soldiers to hear the round whistle just before it exploded. The replacements quickly learned to
hit the ground and find cover when they heard whistling because the round would soon explode.
If the NCO himself was a replacement then he had to learn these lessons extremely fast because
he had to turn around and teach his men about them.
The American troops learned fast, since rapid learning was necessary for survival. Those
that did not take the time to figure out new equipment right away did not survive long. For
example, Colonel Thomas Drakes 168th Infantry Regiment received six truckloads of bazookas
on the night of 12 February but the initial training was not scheduled until the morning of 14
February. These weapons could have been used by the infantrymen in the defense of Fad Pass
but instead the lack of training made them no better than a paperweight against the German
tanks.244 So it became very important that troops learned to use equipment that anyone in the
unit carried. In war causalities occurred and some else needed to be able to pick up and use
equipment against the enemy.
Replacements showed up and had to be integrated with the old timers. Experienced
soldiers developed a sixth sense (or survival techniques) as the war progressed. They learned
when to move or not move and where to go or not go.245 Sergeant Leland Sutherland, 6th
Armored Infantry, tried to teach his men how to stay down when under enemy fire; however,
244
Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, 1st ed, The Liberation Trilogy v. 1 (New
York: Henry Holt & Co, 2002), 323.
245
Company K-50 Years Ago, Gene C. Mallette Papers, Coll. #00.0116, The Institute on World War II and the
Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. In Tunisia the first replacements came from units
that were currently stationed in North Africa around Casablanca like 2nd Armored Division. Once new replacements
arrived they were backfilled into the now skeleton units. The reorganization helped infuse these basically brand new
units with combat experienced leaders to train the men.
97
Sutherland harped and preached but the new soldiers did not listen to him and three were killed
in one night.246
The 9th Infantry Division reorganized during the Tunisian campaign as an experiment to
see if there was a better technique for infusing replacements. The army decided to move officers
between unitswho had not yet seen actionto provide a mixture of combat experience
alongside officers and NCOs fresh from the replacement training centers. James Leopold
learned from his North African experience that once a commander goes down in battle, killed or
wounded, the executive officer must step in immediately and take command. Delay in taking
command led to disaster.247 This important message was passed along in Eisenhowers report on
combat experience in May 1943, in Tankers in Tunisia in July 1943, and The Army and Navy
Register in December 1943.248
The War Department sent Lieutenant William E. Everett to North Africa as a replacement
officer to evaluate the effectiveness of equipment. Before going to the front, he attended a weeklong local replacement-training called Lion Mountain in North Africa. Then he moved into
the desert to a British-run training site for additional training in mine warfare and unexploded
bombs. The British training was better than what Lieutenant Everett had received in the States
and covered basic battle drills which consisted of fire and maneuver tactics, movement
246
247
James G. Leopold, interviewed by Jack Sigler, transcript 16 July 2003, Coll. #WWII-1555, Reichelt Program for
Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and
the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL.
248
Reports on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training, May 14, 1943, Microfilm, New records:
Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI; Tankers in
Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4, July 31, 1943, U.S. Army center for
military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf; Tunisian Campaign
Lessons, Army and Navy Register, December 11, 1943, MHI.
98
formations, establishing defensive positions, etc. The very concentrated training lasted two to
three weeks.249
1st Infantry Division training program. Major General Terry Terrible Terry Allen,
Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, was concerned with the quality of replacements that
he received following Kasserine. He decided that instead of placing these men directly into
frontline units to be used as cannon fodder to charge machine gun nest and die by the hundreds,
Allen would create an internal replacement training battalion for 1st Infantry Division even
though the division was still engaged in frontline operations. The replacements received
supplementary training in rifle marksmanship, at least one supporting weapon system (machine
gun, mortar, anti-tank gun), physical conditioning, day and night scouting and patrolling, and
small unit tactics. This was a significant drain on the division manpower, but Allen believed it to
be worthwhile in preparing his men for combat.250
Allens training program was not an uncommon occurrence in North Africa. 1st Armored
Division decided to follow suit and ordered LTC Elton Ringsak, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st
Armored Division, to also run a training center for replacements with the supply trains before
sending the men up to the front.251 Additionally, a training center was also established in Algiers
for new signal replacement soldiers.252 These training centers provided to be worth the resources
in manpower because the units were having greater success in combat.
249
William E. Everett, interviewed by David Gregory, transcript 30 May 2000, Coll. #WWII-983, Reichelt Program
for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II
and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
250
Letter to General Marshall from General Terry Allen, June 7, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the
War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI.
251
252
Robert Schoen, interviewed by Jack Sigler, transcript 5 August 2002, Coll. #WWII-1434, Reichelt Program for
Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and
the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL.
99
On the evening of 21 February 1943, the German night march in the vicinity of the key
terrain of the Bou Chebka Pass was a disaster because the unit had gotten lost and was unable to
outflank the 1st Infantry Divisions position. Allen took note and understood that in order to
successfully defeat the Germans, his units would have to become proficient at night operations.
Allen created a standard operating procedure directive called Night Attacks to provide training
guidance to his men. The commanding general compiled this document from extracts of War
Department manuals and documents. The keys to effective night assaults required disciplined
troops with proficiency in map reading, night orientation, night patrolling, and who were trained
to execute cross-country movements at night without noise or confusion. In order to be
successful, Allen emphasized employing the following basic essential skills for maximize
capacity: detailed reconnaissance, careful preparations, and skill in maintaining direction and
control, combined with secrecy and vigor of execution.253 By using these latest lessons, Allen
successfully trained the men within his sphere of influence in current tactics, techniques, and
procedures that allowed them to defeat the Germans in battle.
While Allen saw night operations as the key element to his divisions success, he also
understood that his men had to become proficient at day and night operations. Allen knew that
reconnaissance and intelligence drove operations so he collected these lessons. Now that the 1st
Infantry Division had complied lessons, it was time to inform his men. Allen issued a combat
training directive to ensure that his guidance was clearly disseminated throughout the division.
Furthermore, he sent a copy of the directive to the War Department for informational use with
the hope that some of the lessons would be incorporated into stateside training cycles. Allen
253
Night Attacks, ND, The Terry Allen Collection, Box 5, the U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania. The documents that General Allen used included field service regulation 100-5, rifle platoons and
rifle companies 7-10, heavy weapons company 7-15, infantry battalion 7-20, rifle regiment 7-40, combat lessons,
number 1, and lessons from the Tunisian campaign.
100
called his philosophy FIND EM, FIX EM, and FIGHT EM.254 The enemy had to be found
through reconnaissance and intelligence. Once contact was gained, it had to be maintained,
otherwise the foe would move and have to be found again. Artillery reconnaissance was
important and only effective in conjunction with the use of infantry and armor.
Allen stressed that infantry units needed to be mutually supported by artillery in order to
fix the enemy in place. Properly coordinated artillery fire supported by infantry machine gun
pits would pin the enemy in their position, thus allowing the infantry to maneuver against them.
Close teamwork between the artillery and infantry units was essential for combat effectiveness.
Mutual confidence and a full understanding of capabilities and limitations had to exist between
the units in order to be successful. Now the units were ready to fire and maneuver on the enemy.
Throughout the Kasserine campaign starting at Fad Pass, the II Corps did not withhold a
reserve force. Allen stressed that commanders always must keep a reserve force to meet later
developments as the battle progressed. He said, The strength of the initial reserve was
influenced by the enemy situation, the terrain, and the distance to the objective.255 Allen
emphasized to the War Department in closing, aggressive, extensive reconnaissance, effective
security, prompt supporting fires, and skillful use of fire and maneuver are all essential in the
attack. All commanders and all units must be imbued with an aggressive, offensive spirit.256
Realistic and repetitive training made actions on contact second nature to the men. In
keeping with General Allens philosophy, Sergeant Vincent McKinney recalled that his unit, 16th
Infantry, trained in patrolling, firing at the range, roving patrols like military police in Oran while
254
Brief of 1st Division Combat Directive, September 29, 1943, 1, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945,
353 27 August 1943 to 25 September 1943, Box 2666, NARA II, College Park, MD.
255
Ibid., 6.
256
Ibid., 8. Underlined in the original document. Fire and maneuver tactics refers to a common tactics understood
by soldiers of combat arms units. This term means to use suppressive fire against an enemy position while another
friendly unit maneuvers to the left or right to outflank the enemy force.
101
they waited to be sent to the front in February 1943.257 Allens leadership and his focus on
training transformed his unit into a force who would continually defeat the Germans throughout
the rest of the African campaign.
Unit level changes. After being surrounded during the opening battle at Fad Pass and
suffering many causalities and captured the 168th Infantry Regiment became combat ineffective.
When the Germans retreated back through Kasserine Pass, LTC Gerald Line, executive officer,
wasted no time in retraining his men in infantry tasks for six solid days starting on 26 February
1943. The men needed the supplementary preparation for the upcoming Allied offensive to
regain contact with the Germans. The immediate attention was on squad level offensive tasks
that included fire and maneuver, anti-tank 37mm operations and range estimation, displacement
of crew served machine guns, combat patrols, and 81mm mortar actions. LTC Line wanted his
men to have realistic training so he ordered the exercise include practical work in movement
covered by fire of adjacent squads.258
Next, the 168th trained on defensive operations and reinforced range estimation. The
instruction was realistic because half of each platoon played the opposing force in the field to
give the men moving targets to observe. Additionally, reporting and radio operations were
emphasized. Meanwhile, six NCOs from each company received train the trainer instructions
on mine operations, while vehicle drivers attended a mechanic course, and mortar men practiced
gunner tests until they became proficient.
By training a small batch of NCOs from each unit, the regiment was able to quickly train
all their men. Another method would have been to send engineers to each company to educate
257
Vincent McKinney, interviewed by Robin Sellers, transcript 21 December 1998, Coll. #WWII-579, Reichelt
Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World
258
Training Memorandum, 168th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division, N.D., RG 407, WW2 Operations
Reports, 1940-1948, 34th Infantry Division, Box 8283, NARA II, College Park, MD.
102
the soldiers thus allowing the instruction to be done by technical experts. However, the selected
method caused a lower level of instruction because the NCOs could not remember everything
they were taught by the engineers. It did serve to reinforce mine operations because NCOs were
forced to know enough to effectively teach subordinates.
After the men of the 168th conducted additional individual training, they were ready to
practice larger movement operations. The last phase was collective or unit training that
cumulated with full platoon-level patrolling operations. The final training objectives went back
to reinforce individual level tasks of map reading, forced marches, marksmanship, and machine
gun drills.259 Just days after suffering a humiliating defeat, 168th Infantry Regiment was
retrained and ready to get back into the fight with the Germans; however, they were not the only
unit that actively sought out ways to improve.
Orlando Ward, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, also wanted to improve his
division. After the battle Ward wrote a memorandum to his command stating that the lessons
learned at Kasserine must be passed along. Lessons learned through our costly mistakes in this
campaign must not be forgotten. They should contribute immeasurable to the wisdom and skill
necessary for success in future operationsThe importance of having all ranks know the basic
plan of the tactical maneuver and its objectives can not be over-emphasized.260 Knowing the
basic plans helped cause the men not to panic when they faced the Germans under fire.
Unlike the infantry unitswho now had many units who encountered the Germans in
battle1st Armored Division was the only American tank unit with any real combat experience.
In a brilliant move, Ward turned to the British for help since they had been fighting tanks in the
desert since 1940. British Brigadier George Roberts had a wealth of battle experience and had
259
Ibid.
Ward, Orlando, Memorandum to the Men of 1st Armored Division, February 27, 1943, The Orlando Ward
Collection, Box 2, MHI. Underlined in original document.
260
103
produced a pamphlet called Battle Drills.261 Ward understood that his frontline commanders had
little spare time, so he read through the book and condensed it into extracts to produce the most
obvious lessons for his leaders and any outside unit that was interested.
Control was the most significant principle for an armored force in combat, which Ward
did not have during Kasserine due to Fredendalls micromanaging leadership style. In order to
Figure 7 The tactical solution for a protective front given to General Orlando Ward from the
British [Courtesy the U.S. Army Military Institute]
261
Roberts was a British General and considered to be an expert on tank warfare. He was an instructor at the Tank
Driving and Maintenance School from 1933 to 1937. He was again posted to Egypt for 1938 and 1939 before
battling the Germans throughout the North African campaign. He was given a division command of 11th Armoured
Division in 1944. Every American Armored Division except 1st Armored Division received tank desert warfare
training prior to overseas service. However, 1st Armored Division was the only armored unit to partake in desert
warfare during World War II.
104
achieve and maintain control, it remained necessary to have these two essentials: good
communications and sound battle drills.262 Wireless communication required good radio
discipline, short concise messages, and effective listening by officers and radio operators. A
battle drill was designed to become a natural reaction to a specific combat situation conducted by
tank commanders without being ordered by superiors. The drills must be simple and fluid and
are designed to rapidly maneuver tanks. They should be known by every tank commander to
ensure that he understands what exactly his vehicle was to do and where it was to go. Every
officer and NCO must know the battle drills, and the goal remained for every man within a tank
unit to also know them. To achieve this level of proficiency, practice was necessary. Ward
selected three drills he wanted his men to be competent in: close formations to be used in
darkness, sandstorms, or moving over difficult terrain; open formations for when contact with
the enemy remained probable; and a protection front while in a defensive or guarding position.263
All the training in the world would be trivial if weaknesses of German equipment were
not discovered and exploited. The Americans captured German Tiger tanks at Kasserine and
conducted tests to find the vulnerabilities of the tanks. Weak spots were found around the tracks
and in the armor where the turret meets the hull. The intelligence (G-2) channels passed this
information in February 1943 to the lowest level through so that the gunners could exploit and
inflict greater damage.264 The ability of the intelligence community to quickly find flaws
German armor created an environment for tank guners to thrive against the Wehrmacht.
262
A battle drill is a maneuver, based on doctrine, that is to be conducted when a units encounters a specific
situation.
263
Memorandum to all units and separate organization commanders from 1st Armored Division, 6 March 1943,
The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, the U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
264
G2 Notes on German Equipment, N.D., The Martin M. Philpsborn Collection, Box 2, MHI.
The G2 is the intelligence officer staff officer in an organization that is commanded by a general officer. In a unit
commanded by a colonel or lieutenant colonel their intelligence officer would be called a S2.
It is unknown who conducted this testing on the German tanks but the ordnance branch probably conducted it. The
captured tank was destroyed in the testing so future testing would come when additional tanks were captured.
105
However, the capability to disseminate this very important to the operator level proved to be a
decisive aspect of the success for the Americans throughout the rest of the African campaign.
Informal
Professional journals. The Army supported the use of longstanding, professional,
branch-specific journals as additional method to help keep officers informed during the war
through the Field Artillery Journal, Cavalry Journal, and Infantry Journal. The combat arms
published select articles, including unclassified lessons, several months after they were
concluded. Although these journals served the purpose of disseminating past operations and
lessons they also served as American propaganda for the troops. The field artillery journal
circulated operational information, beginning in August 1943. Major Evert Strong discussed the
importance of reconnaissance that allowed the field artillery units to be properly emplaced
overnight on 21-22 February 1943 at Thala. The British lines were extremely weak, and without
American reinforcements, the 21st Panzer Division would have likely broken the line. In fact, the
tanks and infantry played very minor roles during the final German push at Thala and the
artillery finally stopped Field Marshall Erwin Rommels, commander Afrika Korps, offensive.
Major Strong showed other artillery officers that the German army could be defeated and that
accurate and concentrated artillery fire played the decisive role in stopping the Germans.265 An
article like Major Strongs boosted artillerymens morale and provided confidence in U.S. Army
doctrine and equipment.
Colonel Hamilton Howze published an article in October to demonstrate combined arms
tactics based on experience. He demonstrated how tanks and artillery had to work together at
Mateur in order to have a successful battle. Howze stated, tanks can not penetrate an organized
265
Evert Strong, Thala Engagement: February 21-24, Field Artillery (August 1943): 573.
106
enemy position without prohibitive losses, except with overwhelming artillery support.266 The
artillery branch must be commended for their outstanding articles and their ability to print
current trends without disrupting operational security.
The Cavalry also published its first article in August 1943 followed by a three part series
on the operational history of the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Armored Division. This
reconnaissance unit had more battlefield experience during the North African campaign than any
other unit. The 81st made mistakes, but they became instantly aware of the errors and actively
took steps to correct them. Charles Hoys overarching message to his fellow officers was
training had to be continuous. They believed the most effective training occurred when tactical
walks were conducted under combat conditions. In fact, they compared campaigns to football
seasons and battles to an individual football game. The football team trains between games,
keeping in condition, correcting mistakes, and perfecting new plays.267 The army needed to
have the same philosophy if it wanted to have continued success on the battlefield.
Two weak aspects of the 81st were the areas of information and communications. The job
of a scout is to provide timely and accurate information to the commander. Hoy stated,
Remember, no matter how much information is collected if it is not transmitted back to higher
headquarters it has little or no value.268 Too often the scouts did not know their proper location,
which resulted in false reporting. Additionally, scouts guessed instead of reporting something as
unidentified. It took lots of training to be able to quickly and accurately identify vehicles,
weapons, personnel, and aircraft, both allied and enemy.
266
Hamilton H Howze, Artillery Tank Support, The Field Artillery Journal 33 (October 1943): 779780.
Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in Tunisia, October 19, 1943, 1, The Martin M. Philpsborn Collection, Box
4, MHI.
268
Ibid.
267
107
Next, the scouts had to be able to perfectly and concisely report the information to higher
headquarters without tying up the radio network. For example, an observation post reported that
a German 88mm gun had been abandoned. Upon examination, it was found that the gun was
prepared for destruction with a pull-type igniter. If this observation post had reported enemy
88mm captured this would not have been complete information. Instead the report should have
stated that the gun was abandoned, prepared for destruction, but not yet destroyed. This would
have told higher headquarters that the Germans morale or discipline was low because they had
not followed orders to destroy the gun before abandoning it. If a reconnaissance unit could
provide accurate information and timely reporting, they would have successfully completed their
mission.269
The slowest branch to disseminate lessons through journals was the infantry. It was not
until June 1944 that lessons from the North African campaign appeared in the Infantry Journal.
As we will see, predeployment training had already been changed. Major Robert Cullis
continued to stress the need for map reading and obtaining the dominating piece of key terrain.
Cullis emphasized that if these skills were neglected, units would suffer losses as heavy as had
occurred in Tunisia.270 Once the infantry realized the benefit outweighed the risk of operational
lessons being published in journals, they quickly corrected their deficiencies. In September,
Major James Carvey published an article on the Battle of Fad Pass. Carvey showed how
intelligence failures led to the German surprise attack and how the units were improperly placed
269
Charles Hoy, The Last Days in Tunisia, Cavalry Journal 53 (February 1944): 812; Charles Hoy, Mechanics
of Battlefield Reconnaissance, Cavalry Journal 53 (June 1944): 2429; Charles Hoy, Reconnaissance Lessons
from Tunisia, Cavalry Journal 52 (December 1943): 1621.
270
Robert E. Cullis, We Learn in Combat, Infantry Journal LIV, no. 6 (June 1944): 3135.
It is unknown why the Infantry Journal delayed in publishing lessons.
108
to mutually support each other. Infantry units could not be left unsupported on mountains
because they would become easily enveloped and quickly find themselves behind enemy lines.271
Conferences. The professional journals were used to widely disseminating lessons but
they were not able to quickly distribute information because of the processes that go into
publishing a journal. Another method used to speed up the information flow was having guests
from the battlefront come to training environments and give talks in a conference setting. One of
the benefits was the ability for trainees to ask questions directly to the speaker so that they would
be more prepared when they went overseas.
After the conclusion of the fighting in North Africa, General William Palmer, G-2,
Armored Ground Forces, hosted a conference at Fort Knox, Kentucky on 16 June 1943 and had
Brigadier General Robert Maraist and Colonel Peter Hains as guest speakers. General Maraist
had been an artillery commander in 1st Armored Division since January 1942, and Colonel Hains
had commanded 1st Armored Regiment. The officers in attendance were from the Armored
School and Replacement Training Center at Fort Knox and were interested in hearing lessons
from North Africa and asking questions. General Maraist talked about getting defeated, but the
experience gained showed that artillery pieces could be double purposed used as indirect fire and
also anti-tank weapons. Including replacement equipment, about 125 percent of his guns were
lost throughout the North African campaign. A tactical lesson that Maraist learned about the
Germans was that their plans consisted of limited objectives and if commanders could see past
the fog of war there were chances to strike at the enemys flank.272 For example, during the
battle as the Germans drove towards Kasserine and Sbeitla, their supply lines were exposed to a
271
272
James Carvey, Fad Pass, Infantry Journal (September 1944): 812.

Conference on North African Operations, June 16, 1943, 12, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI.
109
flank attack from the north. The inexperienced Allied command was too focused on getting
reinforcements into position to stop the drive instead of assaulting the unprotected flank.
Maraist stressed successful battles had preplanned coordinated firepower and used
combined arms tactics of employment of artillery, tanks, and infantry mutually supporting each
other.273 Headquarters believed that tasking artillery, anti-tank guns, and tank destroyers out
individually to support an element was a flaw in the tactical application by leaders rather than the
overall doctrine. This tactic did not work and left elements exposed. Instead, an entire platoon
of three or four guns needed to be kept together in order to properly support their assigned
element.274 Maraist concluded that the training practices for field artillery were suitable but
repetitions of gun drills needed to be increased so crews became proficient before they went
overseas.275
Colonel Hains knew that the American positions were overextended before the Germans
attacked through Fad Pass, but he was unable to influence a reorganization of the lines. Once
the Germans assaulted, 1st Armored Regiment learned many lessons. Tank commander
causalities were horrific which caused many junior officers to suddenly find themselves in
command of a company.276 With these new, inexperienced leaders in charge, proper reporting
and the chaos of battle caused higher headquarters to be ill informed about the tactical situation.
Furthermore, reinforcements sent were delayed providing relief against the Germans. Maraist
stressed that higher commanders must personally go to the front to collect information instead of
waiting for information to come back to the command post.277
273
Ibid., 4.
Ibid.
275
Ibid., 6.
276
Ibid., 8.
277
Ibid., 3.
274
110
Some skills and best practices that were taught before overseas service proved to be
worthless in the combat zone, especially the combat load carried in a tank. During stateside train
up, the 1st Armored Regiment spent significant time practicing loading equipment into tanks that
included extra clothes and non-essential combat supplies. Once the bullets started flying the men
did not use any of the non-essentials and the next day stripped the tanks to load extra fuel and
ammunition. This conference cannot be directly connected to any formal changes to the training
cycles, although by communicating these lessons to the officers in training, Hains provided
important information to the leaders that would not be found in any army documents but would
save lives in future battles.
The officers asked about techniques to deal with mines and Hains stated that they put
sandbags on the floors of vehicles. These saved soldiers lives but not the vehicles. Another
officer asked about tank battles. The best advice was to watch the German tanks in operation
and then modify the approach. The Germans moved slowly, without dust trails which to an
untrained eye the tanks would appear standing still. At Kerns crossing Hains had eight tanks
left out of two battalions. They established a defensive position and awaited the assault at
daybreak. The Germans were only five miles away but did not attack until three in the
afternoon. All day, it appeared that the tanks remained in their original position and then
suddenly they appeared on the northern and southern flanks. The Germans had developed this
forward movement all day.278 With the question and answer session, Maraist and Hains were
able to pass along hard fought lessons to the young officers currently going through training.
These lessons allowed them to be better prepared to face the Germans when they met.
Throughout the summer of 1943, the army continued to hold conferences as a method for
infusing tactical lessons into organizations that had not yet seen action at the frontlines. General
278
Ibid., 11.
111
Brehon Somervell, Army Service Forces, hosted a conference in Chicago for all the commanding
generals of service commands in July 1943. The major theme was the importance of leadership.
Films were shown and later delivered to the posts where each service was based to allow every
officer within the command to watch. Leadership needed to find creative ways to direct the men
in order to achieve desired results. One tool used was the creation of informational films that
showed their operations, posters, pamphlets, and radio presence to enlisted soldiers to boast
morale of the unit.279
Ingenuity of soldiers. One of the strengths of the U.S. Army was that individual soldiers
could come up with a solution to a problem and with the help of the chain of command it could
be implemented on a large scale. Sergeants H. F. Kameen and Elwood Tkoes, 88th Glider
Infantry, discovered that the projectile for the M-69 60mm mortar round could not be extracted
after it was fired. These men thought outside the box and drilled a hole through the fin assembly
and punched out the expended cartridge to create solution. Not only did this save time but
allowed the fin to be reused, thus saving time and money.280
Furthermore, the 47th Armored Medical Battalion (AMB) quickly found out that they
could not provide adequate field medical care to soldiers with their issued equipment and
invented a surgical trucka complete operating room mounted on a two and one-half ton truck.
These mobile operating rooms could be set up and broken down in fifteen minutes. In fact, they
were so successful in the Tunisian campaign that they soon were adapted as standard equipment
in every armored division. The 47th AMB also invented a rolling drug store on a truck
platform that carried a complete stock of medical supplies and a dental truck with the capability
279
Indoctrination and Orientation of Army Service Forces Troops, July 22, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File
1040-1945, 353, 19 June 1943 to 5 August 1943, Box 2668, NARA II, College Park, MD.
280
Letter from SGT H. F. Kameen and Elwood Tkoes, June 27, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 10401945, 353, 19 June 1943 to 5 August 1943, Box 2668, NARA II, College Park, MD.
112
of bringing dental care into the fieldthe first time this occurred outside an established
hospital.281
Formal changes
New equipment. As new equipment became available in Africa it was fielded, including
new tank destroyersthe M10s. These were a vast improvement over the half-tracks with
37mm guns attached to the rear of a half-track vehicle. The M10 mounted a navy three-inch gun
that could pierce 250mm of armor plate at 1,000 yards and was mounted around an armor plate
to protect the gunner. The M10 could move twenty-five to thirty miles per hour, which was fast
during World War II. However, the high profile of the M10 made it an easy target.282 While in
Casablanca, Private Raymond Carters unit, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, fielded new M10
tank destroyers. They had never seen the M10s before and had only trained on half-tracks.
Carter trained on the new equipment and was shipped inside the vehicle to Tunisia by railcars.
During the movement the men become more familiar with the equipment.283
Many soldiers desired better tank sights so the Tank Destroyer Board, a stateside unit that
was responsible for overseeing tank destroyer equipment improvements, tested three and four
power sights. After careful comparison testing, the three-power sight was selected as the
standard. Current light and medium tanks in production were being outfitted with the three
power direct telescopic sight. However, the Ordnance Branch was not satisfied, so they
developed a six power periscopic telescopic sight to be developed and tested later in 1943.
281
1st Armored History 05-1AR, 1945, 62, MHI.

World War II-A Soldier Remembers, Henry Loewenthal, Jr. Papers, Coll. #00.0122, The Institute on World
283
Raymond Carter, interviewed by Steve Brewer, transcript 10-15 October 2002, Coll. #WWII-1457, Reichelt
282
113
Gunners were extremely satisfied with the new three-power sight. Tankers were full of envy as
they waited for an updated sight.284
The army was in need of a more effective tank diesel engine over the current unleaded
gasoline. Thus, the 40-tank test was inaugurated in March 1943 to test various models of
engines and to determine the best model. The test included the engine and power train and how
it operated with different types of track, communication equipment, ammunition racks, turrets,
and other equipment. Based on the results, the test concluded that the production of the Ford
Tank Engine, Model GAA-V-6, be expedited to the utmost.285 Although the combat troops
wanted the less flammable diesel model tanks and the research test selected a gasoline engine
without seriously considering a diesel replacement.286 Other items tested included ammunition,
communications equipment, gas masks, flame-throwers, fire-aid kits, goggles, tanks, half-tracks,
and other armored vehicles.
284
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, April 24,
1943, 2, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A,
Reel 1, MHI; G-3 Training Section AFHQ, Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia (Government Printing
Office, 1943), 55, 60; Major Allerton Cushman, Observer Report, May 3, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records
of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI; Report on Combat
Experience and Battle Lessons for Training Purposes, 1st Armored Division, June 13, 1943, 13, Microfilm, New
records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI; Combat
Experience and Battle Lessons, 1st Tank Destroyer Group, June 12, 1943, 10, Microfilm, New records: Records of
the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI.
The sights that the Tank Destroyer Board tested varied in the magnification each sight provided over the naked eye.
The three and four power sights sat in a location on the tank that was equal to the gunner level. This sight cause the
tank turrets to become more exposed in order for the gunner to actively scan for enemy targets. Meanwhile, the
periscopic sight, similar to what is used on a submarine, allows the tank to stay in a defilade position, or concealed,
while searching the battlefield for enemy activity.
285
Testing and Equipment: The Armored Force Medical Research Laboratory, N.D., The Orlando Ward
Collection, Box 2, MHI.
Unleaded gasoline is more combustible than diesel. Many tanks caught fire throughout the Kasserine Pass battle
due to the gasoline catching fire. Some men claimed that it was actually the ammunition that caught fire first. This
could have occurred on several occasions but the fuel would quickly catch on fire afterwards causing the tank to
burn. Hence the army needed a tank that would be less susceptible to blaze after being hit by enemy rounds. Diesel
is more difficult to ignite and became the solution.
286
Nicholas Molnar, General George S. Patton and the War-Winning Sherman Tank Myth, in The United States
and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front, ed. G. Kurt Piehler and
Sidney Pash, 1st ed, World War II, the Global, Human, and Ethical Dimension (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2010), 137.
114
When the Germans started using anti-tank mines as they retreated after Kasserine, the
Armed Force Board was directed to test adequate means for clearing minefields. The equipment
provided for testing proved a complete failure for the plan to drag weights suspended from a
boom in front of a tank. The T3 (scorpion) used by the British in the African campaign with
considerable success, was declared by the board to be the most effective device for exploding
mines. The T3 used the technique of flailing the ground with many chains suspended on a
rotary device out in front of a medium tank. As a result of tests at Fort Knox, thirty medium M4
tanks were modified with the scorpion and sent abroad for use by Americans at the frontlines in
May.287 Additionally, over half a million non-metallic anti-tank mines with chemical fuses were
being procured and expedited to the front.288
The traditional mission of tanks was to close with the enemy and destroy him by direct
fire, but combat experience revealed a secondary use of tanks shooting indirect fire. Meanwhile,
the tank destroyer mission was not to close on the enemy but instead to destroy enemy tanks
from concealed positions by direct-fire guns. However, tankers realized that if they were not
directly involved in the conflict the tank or tank destroyer could be used to provide indirect fire.
This, of course, required additional training of the tank and tank destroyer crews in the new
gunnery technique.289 In order for the tankers to provide accurate, indirect fire the tanks required
a gunnery quadrant to allow the gunner to properly aim the gun on target. These quadrants were
in high demand once it was discovered the tanks could provide this additional firepower to the
287
Testing and Equipment: The Armored Force Board, N.D., The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI;
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, April 24,
Reel 1, MHI.
288
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 1.
289
Employment of Tanks and Tank Destroyers as Field Artillery, March 11, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal
File 1040-1945, Box 2664, NARA II, College Park, MD.
115
battlefield.290 The War Department rushed the equipment to the front with 232 gunners
quadrants arriving and installed on tanks in theater in April 1943. Four hundred more were
ready for shipment and rushed to the combat zone.291
Training documents. As a bureaucratic organization, the War Department had to find
ways to issue clear training guidance to units worldwide in a quick and efficient manner.
Soldiers lives on the frontlines depended on training during lulls in the fighting and well-trained
replacements. Training circulars became the short-term solution that were printed and
distributed by the War Department to bridge the gap until training centers could rework their
training schedules. The circulars were infused with lessons from the battlefront on different
training solutions. Sometimes these pamphlets were written instructions and other times they
were graphic aids. One of the first to be issued after the defeat at Kasserine was a graphic aid
focused on rifle marksmanship and scouting. Frightened soldiers had fired without aiming
during the battle and going back to the basics of marksmanship allowed the soldiers to become
more proficient with their personal weapons. The aids were large enough to instruct a companysized element but the intent was to emphasis groups the size of a platoon or smaller in order to
receive better instruction.292
While units used NCOs trained by engineers to teach mine clearing and emplacement at
the front, the War Department looked to create a more standardized training platform. The
solution became a pocket-sized pictorial training aid that covered from the basics of why it was
important to learn about mines and booby traps to more technical information and specifications.
290
Training Circular--Fundamentals of Gunnery for High Velocity Artillery Type Weapons, December 14, 1943,
RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353, 13 Novemeber 1943 to 31 December 1943, Box 2663, NARA II,
College Park, MD.
291
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 2.
292
Training Circular 75, 28 May 1943; RG 407, Army AG decimal file 1940-1945, Box 2669, NARA II, College
Park, MD.
116
Figure 8 The War Department Pamphlet coving mines and booby traps. [Courtesy National
Archives]
117
In order to keep the soldiers interested while viewing the pamphlet, there included cartoon-type
funny pictures conveyed essential information. Additionally, the message within the book was
simplified to a middle school education-level so that every soldier would understand how mines
and booby traps could affect them. What sets them off? You Do! Heres HOWYou PULL
Things. You LIFT things. You CUT things. You MOVE things.293 After the basics were
covered extremely detailed pictures of mines were displayed with exact size specifications. This
allowed the soldiers to see exactly how an uncovered mine looked and where exactly the triggers
for each mine along with the necessary poundage to set them off.294 The last part dealt with how
to discover and defuse mines. If a soldier was inside an unmarked minefield, he needed to prod
the ground with his bayonet and pull out any mines with ropes from a safe distance and inside a
foxhole. The War Departments ability to keep a soldiers attention and entertain them while
teaching about mines and booby traps was a brilliant design to pass the message to the troops.
It was important for soldiers to be well versed on mine recognition, emplacement, and
removal; however, they also needed to be trained on barbed wire obstacles. Sometimes the
Germans would place barbed wire before, inside, or after mine fields, and the soldiers needed to
293
Mines and Booby Traps, War Department Pamphlet No 21-23, N.D., 1116, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File
1040-1945, Box 2664, NARA II, College Park, MD.
All the original words in the work were capitalized. The words capitalized in this paper were of a larger font to
emphasize to the reader. This is why only the stressed words are capitalized in this paper.
294
Generally speaking, the Germans employed three kinds of minesthe anti-tank mine, the anti-personnel mine,
and the booby trap. The anti-tank mines, or Teller mines, were placed on roads, gaps in barbed wire, in towns and
open spaces which might be utilized by armored vehicles. Often the Teller mines were laid just off the roads and in
roadside ditches. The Germans often laid their mines in pairs, one above the other or upside down, in order to
increase their effectiveness and make their removal more difficult. The anti-personnel mine were employed in great
numbers and were very effective. These mines were blown out of the ground and would explode approximately
three feet in the air. They were often placed on trails, tracks through foliage, and around urban areas. Another
German technique was to place them in ditches of well travel roads where they were very effective at inflicting
casualties when troops were seeking shelter from air attacks during convoys. The Germans would double stack antipersonnel mines less often than anti-tank mines. German booby traps used both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.
They were connected to windows, doors, chairs, toilets, and any object that might arouse the curiosity of a solider.
Once the object was disturbed the mine would explode. See Major General Walton Walker, Report of Visit to
North African Theater of Operations, June 12, 1943, 6, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments
Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI.
118
know how to tackle these obstacles. Hence, the War Department published a thirty-nine page
graphic training aid that showed the type of obstacles the Germans generally created and the
Figure 9 The War Department pamphlet displays enemy as devils and emplaces Nazi symbols to
build hatred for the enemy. Examples of the cartoon type drawings to keep the attention of
soldiers. [Courtesy National Archives]
recommend method of breaching. Additionally, the training aid showed how to properly
emplace a fortified barbed-wire obstacle around defensive positions.295 As we saw, the men at
Fad Pass did not create an active minefields or barbed-wire obstacles around their positions,
which allowed the German offensive unabated access to their poorly defended positions.
The War Department knew that changes to publications and their timely dissemination
held the keys to victory. Major General Ray E. Porter, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War
Department General Staff, was charged with overseeing this task. As the lessons started flowing
295
Graphic Training Aid 5-9, Barbed-Wire Obstacles, November 23, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File
1040-1945, 353, 13 Novemeber 1943 to 31 December 1943, Box 2663, NARA II, College Park, MD.
119
in from the African and Pacific campaigns, changes were directed to field manuals, training
circulars, and other publications from the operations (G-3) division.296 The army estimated that
23,000 employees worked full time to post changes to manuals. At first the average time it took
to revise and print the new manual was seventy days, though some took about ninety days.297
However, as more information came in from the front, General Porter had a difficult time
keeping up that rate of production and called a conference on 22 October 1943 to discuss
recommendations to speed up the process. Acting under the authority of Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson, Porter took drastic steps to curtail printing and other forms of reproduction
throughout the army. The Government Printing Office, field plants, and other plants had reached
astronomical proportions due to ridiculous requirements like printing and distributing pamphletsize manuals on how to drive a nail, how to saw a board in two, etc. Porter ordered a fifty
percent reduction in printing which would be accomplished by stopping one hundred percent of
extraneous and non-essential material.298 Although changes and printing still took a substantial
time to produce, General Porters ability to influence the printing by allowing only printing
material that was essential to the war effort proved critical to disseminating lessons and training
changes to soldiers.
While there remained a large focus on fixing the Allied camouflage issues, the engineer
section of the Allied Force Headquarters worked on a camouflage bulletin to help soldiers
identify German camouflaged positions. There was no evidence that the Germans used any
special camouflage techniques that the Allies did not know or that they possessed any superior or
special camouflage equipment. Instead, the Germans were simply more disciplined at covering
296
The G-3 section of a staff encompassed all operations, training, organization allotments, and schooling.
R. A. Menedith, Training Literature, October 12, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, Box
2664, NARA II, College Park, MD.
298
Ray E. Porter, Training Literature, October 24, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, Box 2664,
297
120
up their posts and vehicles. The engineers described the German camouflage systems and
showed pictures to help soldiers with identification.299
To address the training shortfalls in vehicle and aircraft recognition, the War Department
published a bimonthly journal called U.S. Army-Navy Journal of Recognition. This publication
was devoted to help soldiers, airmen, and sailors recognize enemy armored vehicles, ships, and
aircraft was first issued in September 1943. By classifying the journal as restricted, this allowed
wide dissemination to the soldiers almost immediately. The journal showed how quickly Allied
intelligence gained information about new Axis weapons. Additionally, new Allied equipment
was included to help prevent soldiers from conducting fraternization through familiarization.300
By selecting to publish this information in a journal format, the War Department was able to
disseminate the information more quickly than waiting to include it in field manuals or other
training aids.
At first combat commanders were confused on how to properly use tank destroyer units
and quickly learned to mass their fires for the most effective results. The tank destroyer was
improperly used at Fad Pass but effectively at Sbiba. The War Department agreed to clarify the
proper application of tank destroyer units and issued a training circular rather quickly in June
1943. In a defensive position the tank destroyer would be placed in a location to protect a hostile
breakthrough and the flanks. A properly emplaced tank destroyer team would force an enemy
tank into their kill zone and either be destroyed or force a withdrawal.301
299
Lessons of the Tunisian Campaign Camouflage Bulletin #4, August 16, 1943, Microfilm, New records:
300
Army Navy Recognition, September 1943, viiviii, MHI; Training Circular 131, December 14, 1943, RG
407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353 27 August 1943 to 25 September 1943, Box 2666, NARA II, College
Park, MD.
301
Training Circular 88, Employment of Tank Destroyer Units, June 24, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File
1040-1945, 353, 19 June 1943 to 5 August 1943, Box 2668, NARA II, College Park, MD.
121
Changes to training schools. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commanding

general of the Armed Ground Forces, was charged with training and preparing the U.S. Army for
overseas service. As the lessons and requests for changes to training schools came back from the
frontlines, it was General McNairs job to oversee the changes to the training of all branches.
One of McNairs goals was to standardize common core training for branch immaterial tasks.
These replacement-training centers (RTC) of the Army Ground Forces had the primary
mission of training basic and specialist replacements of all areas within the maximum training
period allowable. RTC changed the training cycle from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks.
There were nine infantry centers, three field artillery, two antiaircraft, and one each for cavalry,
armored, and tank destroyer. Replacement depots had a three-fold mission of processing
personnel from RTCs and units to staging areas, checking to ensure each individual had
completed the prescribed training; correcting any essential training deficiencies prior to shipping;
and maintaining physical and training standards. Fort Meade, Maryland was the depot for all
European bound replacements. The schools were another important agency for training purposes
with the dual mission of furnishing specialized training of officers and enlisted men and training
officer candidates. School capacities were studied continually to ensure the needs of the army
were meet and not excessive.302
Acting on orders from Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Major General Ray Porter,
assistant chief of staff, G-3 ordered for the basic training period to be extended from thirteen
weeks to seventeen weeks starting 1 October. Additionally, the replacement training centers and
unit training programs were also prolonged to seventeen weeks to include four weeks of small
302
Army Ground Forces, Replacement Training Centers, Depots and Schools, ND, RG 337, Hq Army Ground
Forces, Army Field Forces HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section Training Group Schools Division, Classified Decimal
File 1942-1948, Box 142, NARA II, College Park, MD.
122
Figure 10. A pictorial display showed the training cycle for the Infantry Replacement Training
Center. As the needs of the army changed the training cycle was decreased in 1944. [Courtesy
National Archives]
unit training and field exercises.303 The Armored Replacement Training Center had no
difficulties expanding their training schedules to seventeen weeks seeing how they already
conducted two weeks of field training in their current thirteen-week schedule.304
303
Inquiry Re Length of Basic Training, October 12, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces
HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section Training Group Schools Division, Classified Decimal File 1942-1948, Box 142,
NARA II, College Park, MD.; Inquiry Re Length of Basic Training, September 29, 1943, RG 407, Army AG
Decimal File 1040-1945, 353 27 August 1943 to 25 September 1943, Box 2666, NARA II, College Park, MD.; G3
Logs, Activities, Schools & Replacement Training Branch, Miscellaneous Division, August 14, 1943, RG 337, Hq
Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section Training Group Schools Division,
Classified Decimal File 1942-1948, 319.1 to 322, Box 141, NARA II, College Park, MD.; Replacements for 1st
123
In addition to extending the training cycles, the War Department published guidance to
establish minimum training requirements before a unit was classified as ready for overseas
service. All individuals had to complete basic training and follow on technical training.
Furthermore, all soldiers had to be exposed to close overhead artillery fire on a mental
conditioning course. The unit had to be filled to at least seventy-five percent of authorized
personnel and equipment before its training cycle could begin. Units had to complete seventeen
weeks of training together if their basic and technical training occurred at the unit level. If the
basic and technical training occurred elsewhere then the unit only had to train for eleven weeks
together before being certified as fully trained.305
Combat veterans were employed in 1943 by the War Department to bolster training
schools as cadre.306 This allowed for the instructors to teach the trainees the small things that
would keep them alive without having to devote additional time on the training schedules. For
example, during field time a cadre member could teach and show the trainees how leaving a tin
can outside their foxhole could reflect in the sunlight and be observed by enemy lines. These
small but vital lessons that combat veterans brought to the schoolhouse paid dividends when the
recruits arrived at their units.
Armor. General Charles L. Scott led the Armored Force Replacement Training Center
(AFRTC) at Fort Knox, which had a shortage of tanks to train the men on before the war.
Additionally, personnel shortages persisted until February 1943, when officers assigned were
Infantry Division, July 17, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division
1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI.
304
Visit to Armored Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky, July 30, 1943, 3, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352,
Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD.
305
Army Service Forces Circular Number 60, September 27, 1943, 67, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 10401945, 353 27 August 1943 to 25 September 1943, Box 2666, NARA II, College Park, MD.
306
Training of Enlisted Men at Replacement Training Centers Other Than Trainees or Overhead, December 24,
1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353, 13 Novemeber 1943 to 31 December 1943, Box 2663,
124
required to have an armor background in order to be assigned as a trainer. The Armor Branch
wanted to continue improving their training from example, when General Camp traveled to
Tunisia to get lessons from the frontlines.307 Beginning in March 1943, all specialists were given
a minimum of six weeks basic training followed by two weeks of driver training and vehicular
familiarization before attending one week of battle training. Battle training focused on exposing
soldiers to the sights and sounds of warfare in an attempt to season the soldiers prior to being on
the frontlines. Whistle bombs, smoke, tear gas, barbed wire, demolitions, and overhead firing of
machine guns all played a part in teaching coordination under fire. The battle training was
divided into six phases: combat driving, tank crew training, tank crew firing, close combat firing,
booby traps and grenades, and reconnaissance.
On 10 March 1943, Scott recommended that the school training be extended to fifteen
weeks in order to allow for additional battle training. His executive officer Colonel Harvie R.
Matthews personally went to Washington and secured approval in May 1943. The two weeks
were spent on demolitions, obstacles and mines; decontamination and camouflage; tactical
supply distribution; battle field vehicle recovery; dismounted reconnaissance and terrain
appreciation; battle driving, dry fire runs and movement; live fire exercises; sub-caliber firing;
self-preservation; infiltration and close combat drills; crew drills; tank vs. tank problems; how to
use K rations; bivouac, night security, and night movements. Lieutenants were required to
attend an additional month of battle training after graduating in order to enable them to become
more seasoned so that they would not mentally break as easily under fire at the frontlines.
Among the highlights of the training at the center was the institution of a Nazi platoon to
307
The Armored Force was overall responsible for all training of tankers, reconnaissance, and specialty jobs
associated with the armored branch. The training mission was divided between the AFRTC and the Armored Force
School. The mission of the AFRTC was to provide filler and loss replacements trained in the fundamentals of their
respective arms, ready to take their place in units as privates. While the Armored Force School was responsible for
training individual who would go to a unit that was stateside and preparing for overseas service.
125
stimulate alertness among the trainees. They wore German uniforms and were made up of
officers that were fluent in German which added to the realism of the training.308
Even with the focus on battle training, there remained a dire need for additional tankgunnery practice. So the Armored Command increased its ammunition allowances for
replacement training. Medium tank crews with 75mm guns and also light tank personnel with
37mm guns would shoot twenty additional rounds. Furthermore, the crews would shoot
familiarization firing on the opposite weapon system to allow them to have a basic knowledge of
both weapon systems.309
One idea that Major General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Chief of the Armored Force, wanted to
adopt was the use of 20th Armored Division as the training element because he believed that it
would give an added value to the graduates of the AFRTC. Using a full division to play the
opposing force would add more realistic elements to practice tactics, reports, observation, and
camouflaged techniques. General McNair did not believe that a tactical unit should be used to
train soldiers as that was the job of the replacement training centers and the men assigned to
those units. Thus, McNair denied Gillems request and ordered that 20th Armored Division be
made combat ready as soon as possible for shipment overseas.310 Gillem was further stymied
when McNair informed him that a recommendation to increase the time of training was sent to
the War Department for approval. In the mean time, Gillem said, with the possibility of
changes of one kind or another, it seems best that your particular methods remain unchanged.311
308
Training A.F.R.T.C., N.D., The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI.

Ibid.
310
Letter from LTG Lesley McNair to MG Alvan Gillem, June 21, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352,
311
Letter from LTG Lesley McNair to MG Alvan Gillem, July 5, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352,
Although McNair did not want to use the 20th Armored Division as a training element his orders were to keep using
the 20th until future orders are received from the War Department. The 20th Armored Division retained the training
mission until they were sent overseas in October 1944.
309
126
The AFRTC trained 732 soldiers per battalion cycle, but effective 27 June 1943 the
trainees per cycle was bumped up to 786. There were a total of nine battalions training
simultaneously at different points in their training cycle to allow for effective use of the land.312
The increases of personnel created a dilemma at Fort Knox, Kentucky of insufficient office and
billeting space. Previously, the Armored School was training seventy percent tankers and thirty
percent reconnaissance scouts. With the expansion of the training mission focused on tankers,
the numbers changed to eighty percent tankers and twenty percent reconnaissance scouts.313
Still, with the increase in training output the AFRTC and Armored Force School could not meet
the requirement for overseas shipment of personnel. In fact the shortage was 1,039 per month or
12,468 per year.314
With the Armored Forces RTC operating at maximum authorized capacity and the
substantial shortage of replacement requirements, it was time to look for various solutions.
During a command visit from Colonel Ronald Shaw, G-3 staff officer, the Armed Ground
Forces, asked, where should replacements, specialists and officers of the assault troops, the
reconnaissance troops and the support troops be trained? The Armored School recommended
that assault gun personnel should be trained at Fort Knox due to the similarity of their platform
to tanks. They believed the reconnaissance troops should be trained at Fort Riley and the tank
personnel trained at Fort Knox.315 Colonel Donald Tibbets, G-3 staff officer, Armored Force
School, recommended moving the reconnaissance traininga subsection of armorto Fort
Riley, Kansas. He also endorsed moving the tactical units off Fort Knox to free up the necessary
312
Production Rate, Armored Replacement Training Center, June 29, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces,
352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD.
313
Visit to Armored Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky, July 30, 1943, 1, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352,
314
Production Rate, Armored Replacement Training Center.
315
Visit to Armored Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 2.
127
office space, training area, and housing to prevent cuts to the number of personnel being trained.
The reconnaissance center was moved but the tactical units stayed at Knox to conduct their
training.316
The men at the front lines wanted additional first aid training, and the Army Ground
Forces (AGF) agreed by telling the armored command that the time allotted for First Aid,
Personal and Sex Hygiene, Camp and Field Sanitation was insufficient. General McNair said
that additional time could be allotted during the two-week field exercise to properly cover this
subject.317
The AGFs goal was to make replacement training on core subjects uniform at every
center across the United States. There was too much variation between the training given at the
AFRTC and training given to tactical units, which resulted in replacements not fitting into
tactical units without additional training. While comparing the armored training schedule to
others, Colonel Shaw identified the time allotted to Special Battle Courses as excessive. Other
replacement centers had ten hours devoted to this subject with a breakdown of two hours in an
infiltration course, two hours in close combat course, and six hours devoted to combat in cities.
General McNair told the armored school to conform their schedule.318
During a command visit, Colonel C. C. Higgins, G3 staff officer, the Armed Ground
Forces, noticed that the armored center had changed how weapons firing was implemented based
on feedback from the battlefront. The marksmanship included a dry run of weapons mounted
onto vehicles prior to allowing the soldiers to shoot live ammunition. Upon completion of the
316
Telephone conversation, Col Shaw, HQ AGF and Col Tibbets, Armd, Fort Knox, July 3, 1943, RG 337, Hq
Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II,
College Park, MD.
317
Headquarters Army Ground Force to Commanding General Armored Command, August 3, 1943, RG 337, Hq
Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II,
College Park, MD.
318
Ibid.
128
dry and live fire exercises the trainers conducted a critique to the gunners in order to enhance the
instruction.319 In order to maximize training opportunities, trainees fired the .30 caliber machine
gun against moving tanks. This accomplished a dual purpose of making training realistic and
creating an occasion to mentally condition the tankers to know the sights and sounds of being
fired upon by someone.320 General McNair thought the risk associated with shooting live bullets
at crews in training was worthwhile to create a realistic training situation. He accepted the
possibility that soldiers inside tanks could become possible causalities during training exercises.
General Scott believed that there was a complete difference between training of radio
operators and radio repairmen. A specialty course on radio operations was already being taught,
but this was limited to changing batteries, radio etiquette, inputting and changing radio
frequencies. The radio operators did not know how to troubleshoot or fix a radio once it broke.
Thus, the unserviceable radio would have to be sent well behind the frontlines to the
maintenance personnel to fix. The headquarters requested authorization and got approval to start
a radio electrician course so radios could be fixed at the front without hampering operations
more than necessary.321
The quota for trained specialists from the replacement armored school was increased
from 380 to 500 per month in September.322 After graduating from tanker school, men were
selected and sent to specialty schools based on their individual skills. The Armored School
continually had around fifty percent excess personnel in all radio operator and mechanics classes.
319
Visit to Fort Knox, September 17, 1943, 1, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School
to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD.
320
Ibid., 2.
321
Radio Electricians Course, June 24, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Ground General School to
Med School, Box 149, NARA II, College Park, MD.
322
Ibid., 6.
129
However, they ran a deficit in clerical positions, radio electricians, and gun mechanics all of
which required more highly skilled men.323
The men at the frontlines wanted better trained officers so the Armored school created an
eight week company officers course running every two weeks and a six weeks battalion
commander course starting every four weeks. These courses were designed to help fill officers
knowledge gaps before they were deployed. However, the courses were not filled to capacity
because men were not recalled from overseas duty to attend these courses. These courses were
not established overseas because the teachers resided at Fort Knox, the course was too long to
run overseas, and transportation to Europe was difficult. The company grade had a shortage of
about fifty officers per class and the battalion commander course had a shortage of eighty per
class. The Armored school wasted precious manpower to resource these classes without meeting
the quota. The courses taught valuable information to officers but in order to meet all training
requirements, the capacity dropped the average class size and the frequency was reduced to
every four weeks for company grade and every six weeks for battalion commanders.324
The excess facilities and manpower from the officers course allowed the Armored
School to create a new twelve week enlisted tactics course with a capacity of fifty students
starting every week. The basic tactical principles taught to the enlisted men were the elements of
an armored battalion, operations of individual combat vehicles, section and platoon tactics,
duties of an NCO, field engineering to include demolition, anti-tank defense, field expedients,
323
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 8.
Originally the authorization for company grade officers was 125 and reduced to 75. The battalion commander
course also originally held an authorization of 125 and was reduced to 45. A company grade officer is either a
captain or a lieutenant. Battalion commanders generally hold the rank of lieutenant colonel but majors were often
thrust into the position due to causalities at the frontlines.
324
130
map reading, gunnery, tank crew drills, and communications.325 This new course helped create a
better-trained force with the reallocation of assets already located at the Armored school.
The War Department scrutinized the Armored Officer Candidate School training
schedules and questioned why thirty hours were devoted to administrative time. General Patrick
Lentz said that the material taught during the administrative time was largely theoretical and was
learned by doing, not listening to lectures.326 The Armored School fought the War Department
to maintain the administrative hours. They believed these hours were necessary because many
candidates had zero knowledge of the subject coming into school. The Armored School bent but
repurposed one hour to censorship training in hopes of keeping their training intact.327 After
deliberation, General Lentz decided to reduce the amount of company administrative time from
thirty hours to sixteen hours, which was more in line with infantry and field artillery training.328
Infantry. General Terry Allen recommended that each infantryman be trained on at least
one supporting weapon system. Army regulations had already authorized ammunition for
instruction but it had not been used by July 1943. General McNair ordered that courses of
instruction be added for these weapons systems. Additionally, ammunition allowances were
increased to provide additional weapons proficiency and familiarization prior to deployment. A
weapon that any infantryman would commonly carry, like the .30 caliber rifle, would be shot in a
familiarization, qualification, and combat environments. Other infrequently used weapons like
325
Ibid., 89.
Increase in Length of Officer Candidate School Courses, May 28, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces,
352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD.
In 1943 every individual branch had its own Officer Candidate School (OCS). Men could volunteer for OCS but
that practice was terminated in the summer of 1943. Additionally, the cadre for basic training and replacement
training centers could nominate individuals to attend OCS upon completion of the specific school.
327
Headquarters Armored Force School to Chief of the Armored Force, July 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground
Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park,
MD.
328
Telephone conversation, LTC Jeter, Schools and Replacement branch, G-3, and Colonel Shallene Replacement
and School Command, July 14, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to
Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD.
The administrative hours needed to include instructions on mess management and supply operations.
326
131
tear gas would be taught only in an instructional mode. The army learned from Colonel Thomas
Drake at Fad Pass. His men received anti-tank bazookas, but did not know how to operate them
and soon training centers started shooting rocket launchers. Furthermore, mines and various
engineer explosives were added to the allowance tables for trainees to practice.329
The Infantry branch struggled with their armored brothers to provide trained radio
technicians that could fix radios at the frontlines. General McNair approved a radio electricians
course to be taught at the Infantry School. However, McNair did not want the infantry to
reinvent the wheel and denied the length of nine weeks. Instead, McNair stated that the Field
Artillery School and the Tank Destroyer School already had a similar course of four and eight
weeks respectively. The Infantry School needed to reach out and get the training schedules from
those other organizations to provide uniformity of training throughout the Army Ground Force.
Furthermore, the Infantry School had to figure out how to train more recruits with fewer
resources because no additional overhead or cadre soldiers were authorized to teach the new
class.330
The Infantry School was much more efficient than the Armored School in making
changes to their program of instructions with the War Department. In order to accommodate a
major change to bolster cannon instruction, map maneuvers, and attack of a fortified position, the
Infantry School reduced physical training by twenty-two hours and forced the trainees to
329
Ammunition Allotments Inclosure 2, N.D., RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces HQS,
General Staff, G-3 Section Training Group Schools Division, Classified Decimal File 1942-1948, Box 142, NARA
II, College Park, MD.; Replacements for 1st Infantry Division, July 17, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of
the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. AR 775-10 authorized
ammunition for instruction with the automatic rifle, carbine, rifle, anti-tank rocket and 60mm mortar or 81mm
mortar.
330
Radio Electricians Course, June 24, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Ground General School to
Med School, Box 149, NARA II, College Park, MD.
132
workout on their own during their limited free time.331 Again, when the Infantry School sent up
requests for changes, the War Department saw the compromises as reasonable. Mounted zone
reconnaissance was deleted and two hours in anti-tank gunnery, courses in aircraft identification,
and military censorship were added.332 Training an infantryman was much less technical than
teaching a man to operate a tank and thus allowed the Infantry School greater flexibility in its
training schedules.
331
Program of Instruction for Officers Advanced Course, The Infantry School, July 21, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army
Ground Forces, 352, Ground General School to Med School, Box 149, NARA II, College Park, MD.
332
Program of Instruction for Officers Advanced Course, The Infantry School, September 7, 1943, RG 337, Hq
Army Ground Forces, 352, Ground General School to Med School, Box 149, NARA II, College Park, MD.
133
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
Although the Allies expected an attack on 14 February 1943, British General Kenneth
Anderson did not anticipate General Hans-Jrgen von Arnim unleashing his units through Fad
Pass towards Sid bou Zid. The Axis venture resembled the later offensive known as Operation
Wacht am Rhein (Battle of the Bulge) in that it attained operational surprise and was the last
effort of a desperate enemy to isolate the Allied armies from their supply base.333 Like the 1944
offensive, the Kasserine offensive failed because there was not enough German combat power or
clear management to accomplish its stated goals.334
Meanwhile, Allied intelligence had come to depend on the ULTRA intercepts, especially
after their clear value during the El Alamein battles, but the messages seldom revealed the whole
picture. Eisenhowers intelligence officer, British General Eric Mockler-Ferryman,
misinterpreted the raw data to support the theory that the German attack would come at the
Pichon and Fondouk passes. On the other hand, frontline units and staffs including the II Corps
G-2 believed that a German offensive would come through Fad.335 Neither Anderson nor
Eisenhower appreciated that Mockler-Ferrymans assessment was wrong and that tactical
intelligence contradicted his interpretation of the incomplete ULTRA assessments. This
assumption prompted Major General Lloyd Fredendall, the II Corps commander, to take action,
but fault lay in how he emplaced units and his lack of frontline leadership.
333
The Battle of the Bulge (14 December 1944-25 January 1945 was a major German offensive launched through
the densely forested Ardennes region of Belgium on the Western European front. The battle achieved tactical
surprise and the American forces were overwhelmed and retreated. Controlling the city of Bastogne was key
because all the roads ran through the city. American paratroopers were sent forward as reinforcements and
prevented the Germans from seizing Bastogne.
334
Ralph Francis Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 200.
335
1957), 401.
134
Scared for his life, Fredendall spent a significant portion of his time worrying about the
security of his command post from a German airstrike. Thus, he ordered his corps engineers to
build a fortified headquarters inside the side of a mountain one hundred miles from the
frontlines. The corps commander barely left this structure to visit the soldiers under his
command and gain a better perspective of the land that he was defending. Instead, Fredendall
hung a map of the battlefield on the wall of his command post and made troop disposition
decisions based on his map reconnaissance instead of listening to input from his subordinate
commanders. With the lack of a personal assessment, Fredendall did not understand that the
Germans held a strong defensive position around Fad Pass and the Americans held an
indefensible position on two mountaintops with open terrain to the rear. A more experienced
combat leader than Fredendall would have seen the Western Dorsal, not the Eastern Dorsal, as a
defensible position where a well established observation post system could effectively cover the
open terrain to prevent a surprise German attack.
At the beginning of the offensive, the Americans reported to General Anderson quite
accurately the strength and disposition of the German offensive through Fad Pass. However,
Anderson brushed-off these reports as exaggerations of green and untried troops because he
firmly believed, based on G-2 intelligence that the offensive would only come against the British
Army. The result of this intelligence and leadership misconception allowed the penetration to
gain tremendous steam before Anderson understood the situation and could send reinforcements.
Inexperience ran throughout the chain of command starting with Eisenhower. During
Ikes visit to the frontlines just prior to battle, he should have made on the spot corrections for
glaring deficiencies. When Eisenhower arrived at the II Corps headquarters on 14 February, he
planned to talk to Fredendall about his observations on the disposition of forces. Instead, the
135
commander was briefed that the Germans had attacked through the Fad Pass and the CCA was
planning a counteroffensive. As the battle progressed, Ike knew about the serious deterioration
of the command relationship between Fredendall and Orlando Ward, but he debated with himself
and sought advice about what leadership changes to make. As Eisenhower toiled with replacing
one of the generals, the Germans continued to push their offensive. Finally after the battle was
over, Ike decided to replace Fredendall with George Patton. The lesson that the Allied
commander learned and implemented throughout the remainder of the war was that he could not
hesitate to replace ineffective generals.
Fredendalls leadership style included micromanaging his subordinate commanders while
staying in his command post. Instead of giving the 1st Armored Division a mission and a sector
to defend, Fredendall ordered the exact placement of battalion size elements to cover a specific
area. This was completely against army doctrine. Throughout the battle, Fredendall seldom left
his fortified headquarters and never visited the frontlines. The II Corps commander did meet
with some of his generals on the side of the road a few times, but after issuing vague orders to
stop the assault Fredendall returned to his headquarters.
Another example of an ineffective leader was Brigadier General Raymond McQuillin
who was responsible for the defense around Sidi bou Zid during the opening stages of the battle.
LTC John Waters asked McQuillin the night before the attack what was expected if a German
division attacked in the morning. Instead of offering an answer, McQuillin dismissed the
question and told Waters not to bring that issue up anymore. Then at Sbeitla, McQuillin ordered
a withdrawal without coordinating with his adjacent units which left a large section of the front
exposed and unprotected. However, the German attack that day went against the prepared lines
136
and not McQuillins vacant position. These episodes reveals the thoughtlessness of another
senior leader that soldiers depended upon to make sound decisions.
While the senior leaders ranks were filled with ineffective leaders, field grade officers,
like LTC Luis Hightower and LTC James Alger fought valiantly during the Axis offensive.
These two officers were given missions that were nearly impossible to successfully complete and
suffered heavy losses of men and equipment, but they also displayed to the Germans that the
Americans planned to fight and not hastily retreat at first contact. LTC Henry Gardiner also
performed exceptionally as he covered the withdrawal around Sbeitla which allowed the
Americans to retreat and reestablish positions in a orderly fashion. The field grade officers
formed the fighting nucleus that allowed Patton to quickly transform the II Corps after taking
command.
On the offensive side of the battle, the Germans had a command structure that was just as
flawed as the Allies even though they had already been at war for over three years. Rommel
drew up the original plans, but he had to send the request back to Rome for final approval. The
Comando Supremo changed the plan and ordered two mutually supportive thrusts without
naming an overall on the scene commander. This divided chain of command resulted in a failure
to follow up initial success with the Americans retreating hastily. Rommel was finally given
command of the entire operation five days after the assault started and requested Tiger tanks.
Von Arnim did not want to release this asset and lied to Rommel that every requested tank was
under repair. Although Rommel led the main effort, he still had no command authority over von
Arnim and appealed to Rome for help to no avail. The lack of a unified Axis command
throughout the Battle of Kasserine Pass caused the Germans to miss an opportunity to truly
137
massacre the American Army. The Allies were given enough time to regroup, send
reinforcements, and eventually stop the Axis offensive.
The American Army showed great resolve in North Africa after being defeated by the
Germans at Kasserine Pass. After suffering this crushing rout, Eisenhower spearheaded learning
from this tactical defeat in order to overcome the Germans in both North Africa and the
European theater of operations. Without Eisenhowers vision and leadership, the army would
not have been able to communicate lessons learned throughout their ranks. In fact, after the
fighting ended in Africa, Eisenhower ordered his men to continue training in order to keep their
skills sharp for upcoming battles. Private Raymond Carter, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion,
conducted his training in Algiers where he chased camels with tanks.336 Meanwhile, in Oran,
Leonard Travaline, 166th Field Artillery Battalion, and Robert West, 91st Reconnaissance
Squadron, could only train for half a day due to the heat.337 Eisenhowers focus on learning
lessons started early into the war in North Africa and continued on throughout operations in
Sicily, Italy, and France.
The first step in learning was collecting the hard fought lessons from the men involved in
the battle. Captain Arthur Moore, 1st Armored Division, said, Rommel was my best teacher of
tactics.338 When the Allies invaded North Africa, the War Department sent observers along
with the units to provide recommendations for improvement in training for follow-on units
before their overseas service. This method proved so successful to the War Department that
336
Raymond Carter, interviewed by Steve Brewer, transcript 10-15 October 2002, Coll. #WWII-1457, Reichelt
337
Diary. No date, Leonard Travaline Papers, Coll. #00.0522, The Institute on World War II and the Human
Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. Robert L. West, interviewed by Robin Sellers, transcript 20
August 1998, Coll. #WWII-493, Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A
copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, FL.
338
Captain Arthur R. Moore, WW2 10; 205, N.D., 2, World War II Veterans Survey, 1st Armored Division, Box
1, MHI.
138
observers stayed throughout the North African campaign. Furthermore, Eisenhower sent
General Omar Bradley to the front to collect battle lessons from the men of the 1st Armored
Division following the defeat at Kasserine Pass. The lessons that these men compiled were
submitted directly to the War Department. The Army Ground Forces, as the training extension
of the War Department, forwarded these observer reports to the commanding generals at every
active army group, corps, and training center. The reports were furnished for information only,
but the War Department understood that these reports could informally change training while
changes to training doctrine were vetted and staffed for official publication at a later date.
Men still fighting at the frontlines implemented changes within their organization to put
these lessons into practice. General Terry Allen, 1st Infantry Division, created pamphlets for his
men so that they knew and understood his training philosophy. Others like General Orlando
Ward, 1st Armored Division, asked his British Allies for lessons they had learned in their two
years of desert warfare. Ward then sent these lessons to his men where they were put into
application.
Throughout the North African campaign, Eisenhower continued to collect lessons. He
sent inspectors to visit all the units of the II Corps and created a pamphlet to disseminate the
training notes. At the end of the campaign, he asked all his subordinate units for battle
experience and created a training document that the War Department valued and decided to
publish Army-wide.
The War Department promoted the use of professional journals so that branches could
communicate branch specific material to officers throughout their ranks without the desired
success. All the combat arms used these journals to disseminate lessons, but the information was
not always published within a timely manner. Although the speed varied by branch, major
139
operations were already underway before the lessons were published. There was risk involved if
these magazines fell into enemy hands but General George Marshall decided the possibility was
worthwhile in order to effectively pass information along to subordinate commanders. While the
use of professional journals was a good idea it was not used effectively during World War II. In
fact, the Infantry Journal first printed lessons from Kasserine Pass while the GIs were busy
storming the beaches of Normandy.
Eisenhower has not received the recognition due for his creative initiatives to collect and
publish lessons learned. General Marshall also played an important role in overseeing the
changes within the War Department which supported the greater cause of improving the army.
Marshall approved sending officers to be observers to collect lessons and recommend changes,
but without Eisenhowers support these officers would not have had unfettered access to various
units or leaders to complete their mission. The most important impact from collecting and
disseminating lessons were the formal changes enacted by the War Department. The training
cycles of basic, replacement, and entire units was extended from thirteen to seventeen weeks.
This additional time allowed for more field experience, where recruits were taught to refine their
skills as soldiers. In addition, new classes were added to training schedules to allow for more
weapons training, mine operations, camouflage indoctrination, and various other offensive and
defensive operations. Without Eisenhowers actions the U.S. Army would not have had
continued success against the Germans throughout the rest of World War II.
After World War II ended, the U.S. Army demobilized and reduced its end strength from
ninety divisions to sixteen active divisions.339 During the Korean and Vietnam wars, the military
once again ramped back up and rebuilt fighting forces before hastily putting them into battle. As
339
John Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series
(Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1998), 207, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/MF/index.htm#contents.
140
those wars concluded the force structure of the army was once again reduced and lessons learned
in those conflicts were lost. By the mid-1980s, the senior army leadership realized there was no
formal system within the army to collect and disseminate lessons from their training centers.
Operation Urgent Fury (invasion of Grenada 1983) brought this flaw to the forefront. The Army
Chief of Staff, General John Wickham approved creating a unit charged with capturing lessons
learned, familiarizing units with current training trends, and disseminating lessons. The Center
for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) was stood up on 1 August 1985 at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. Combat training centers were established at Fort Irwin, California, Fort Polk, Louisiana,
and Hohenfels, Germany to expedite infusing lessons into unit training exercises.340 The CALL
received the first combat lessons from Operation Just Cause (invasion of Panama, 1989) which
helped enhance preparedness for Desert Storm in 1991. The first extended warfare the army
conducted since Vietnam was in Afghanistan and Iraq and the CALL has played a major role in
keeping soldiers informed about current tactics, techniques, and enemy procedures. These
included evaluating damage to vehicles from insurgent attacks that led to supplementary armor
added for further protection. Additionally, the ability of the army to learn lessons has allowed
soldiers to quickly adapt to changes in enemy tactics. The capability to learn lessons in combat,
disseminate current information in a timely fashion, and change training regiments proved to be
a critical element to sustain battlefield success during extended warfare.
340
Center for Army Lessons Learned Mission, n.d., http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/mission.asp, accessed

October 6, 2013; 333: The Center for Lessons Learned (The American Life, May 25, 2007),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/333/transcript; History of the Armys Lessons Learned
System, n.d., 6 October 2013, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_97-13_history.htm;
Greg Slabodkin, Army Lessons Learned, FCW: The Business of Federal Technology (July 17, 2006),
http://fcw.com/Articles/2006/07/17/Army-lessons-learned.aspx?Page=1.
141
APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGY
08 November 1942:
Allies invaded North Africa.
09 November 1942:
German troops occupied Tunis and Bizerte.
24 December 1942:
Eisenhower announced loss of race for Tunisia and Allies took

defensive posture.
30 January 1943:
Germans took Fad Pass.
11 February 1943:
Transfer of responsibility from Fad Pass was given to 1st Armored

Division (- CCB).
14 February 1943:
Battle of Kasserine Pass started with German attack through Fad Pass on
Sidi bou Zid.
Gafsa was evacuated during night.
15 February 1943:
American counterattack at Sidi bou Zid repealed.

Lessouda Force escaped during the night.
16 February 1943:
Allies decided to withdrawal to Western Dorsal.

Battle of Sbeitla started.
168th Infantry Regiment attempted escape during night.
17 February 1943:
Battle of Sbeitla; Germans take town.

The II Corps completed withdrawal to Western Dorsal.
Feriana and key airfield at Thelepte were evacuated.
19th Engineers prepared defense of Kasserine Pass.
18 February 1943:
Both sides reorganized.

Germans probed east entrance of Kasserine Pass.
142
French XIX Corps adjusted line west to encompass Sbiba.

19 February 1943:
Rommel took complete command and authorized to attack towards Le

Kef.
Artillery stopped German advance at Sbiba.
Germans launched attack on Kasserine Pass.
20 February 1943:
21st Panzer Division attack on Sbiba defeated and eastern prong of

German offensive stopped primarily by artillery.
Attack on Kasserine Pass was resumed; 10th Panzer Division was
committed.
Germans secured Kasserine Pass before dusk.
Combat Command B moved to Djebel El Hamra on Tebessa road.
Gore Force committed to delay on Thala Road.
21 February 1943:
Artillery stopped Afrika Korps attack along Tebessa road.

26th Armored Brigade pushed back with heavy losses at Thala.
With Thala up for grabs, 9th Infantry Division Artillery arrived after 800mile march.
22 February 1943:
Germans reached high-water mark of offensive.

Major Afrika Korps attack broken up primarily by devastating artillery fire
on Tebessa road; Germans retreated.
The 9th Infantry Division Artillery opened up on German tanks
concentrating for an attack.
Rommel concluded Allies were too strong and called off offensive.
23 February 1943:
Germans broke contact; secretly withdrawing during the night.
143
Allies started reconnaissance forward.

24 February 1943:
Americans and British advanced very hesitantly amidst heavily mined

approaches to Kasserine.
25 February 1943:
Kasserine Pass recaptured without a fight.

Germans escaped without losses in very successful withdrawal.
26 February 1943:
The 168th Infantry Regiment started a six day retraining cycle following
their poor performance in combat.
1 March 1943:
General Omar Bradley visited the 1st Armored Division to collect lessons.
2 March 1943:
Robert Stack relieved of command from CCC.
7 March 1943:
Lloyd Fredendall relieved of command from the II Corps and replaced by

George Patton.
18-30 March 1943:
Eisenhower sent officers to the frontline to collect lessons from units with
combat experience which became Training Notes from Recent Fighting in
Tunisia.
1 April 1943:
Orlando Ward relieved of command from the 1st Armored Division and
replaced by Ernest Harmon.
13 May 1943:
The North African campaign ended with the unconditional surrender of

the last Axis units.
14 May 1943:
Eisenhower directed units to compile and submit reports on combat

experience and battle lessons for training purposes.
15 May 1943:
Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia was printed and

distributed.
144
9 June 1943:
The War Department issued training circular on the application of tank

destroyer units.
13 June 1943:
Reports on combat experience and battle lessons for training purposes due
to Allied Force Headquarters and the War Department.
16 June 1943:
Conference hosted by Armored Ground Force command at Fort Knox.
22 July 1943:
Conference hosted by Army Service Force in Chicago.
31 July 1943:
Tankers in Tunisia was printed and distributed to soldiers going through

Armored school at Fort Knox.
August 1943:
Field Artillery Journal and Cavalry Journal printed first articles on

lessons from Kasserine Pass battles.
4 August 1943:
Lessons from Tunisian Campaign printed and distributed by Allied Force

Headquarters as Training Memo #44.
September 1943:
The U.S. Army-Navy Journal of Recognition was first issued.
1 October 1943:
Basic training cycle was changed from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks.
15 October 1943:
Lessons from Tunisian Campaign was printed by the Government Printing

Office and disseminated by the War Department.
13 December 1943:
Part 1 of Lessons from Tunisian Campaign was printed in Army and Navy
Register.
18 December 1943:
Part 2 of Lessons from Tunisian Campaign was printed in Army and Navy
Register.
June 1944:
Infantry Journal printed first article with lessons from Kasserine Pass.
145
APPENDIX B
BATTLE ORDER
Battle of Sidi bou Zid 14-15 February 1943
U.S.:
II CorpsMajor General Lloyd Fredendall
1st Armored DivisionMajor General Orlando Ward
81st Reconnaissance Battalion
Combat Command ABrigadier General Raymond E. McQuillin
1st Armored Regiment (-2nd and 3rd Battalion)Colonel Peter Hains
168th Infantry Regiment (-1st Battalion)Colonel Thomas Drake
Battery B, 68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm, SP)
91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm, SP)
2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery Battalion (155mm, towed)
Platoon, 701st Tank Destroyer
Platoon, C Company, 109th Engineers
C Company 109th Medical Battalion
39th Cannon Company
Enemy:
Fifth Panzer ArmyGeneral Hans-Jrgen von Arnim, Commanding; General Heinz
Zeigler, Officer in Tactical Command, Frhlingswind
10th Panzer DivisionGeneral Fritz von Broich
21st Panzer DivisionGeneral Hans Georg Hildebrandt
Counterattack of Sidi bou Zid 15 February 1943
Combat Command CColonel Robert I. Stack
2nd Battalion, 1st Armored RegimentLTC James Alger
6th Armored Infantry (-1st and 2nd Battalion)
G Company, 13th Armored Regiment
701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (-A and C Companies)
68th Field Artillery Battalion (-A Battery)
146
1st Platoon, D Company, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion

1st Platoon, 443rd Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion (SP)
Detachment, B Company, 13th Armored Regiment
A Company, 47th Armored Medical Battalion
Battle of Sbeitla 16-17 February 1943
U.S.
Combat Command ABrigadier General Raymond E. McQuillin
1st Armored Regiment (-1st Battalion)
1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry
3rd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment
701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (-)
91st Field Artillery Battalion
Battery, 68th Field Artillery Battalion
C Company, 16th Engineer Battalion
5 guns, 106th Coast Artillery
Battery, 213th Coast Artillery (90mm guns)
Combat Command BBrigadier General Paul M. Robinett
13th Armored Regiment (-1st and 3rd Battalion)
2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry
27th Field Artillery Battalion
601st Tanks Destroyer Battalion (-C Company)
A Company, 16th Armored Engineers
Platoon, B Battery, 443rd Coast Artillery (AA) (SP)
Combat Command CColonel Robert I. Stack
3rd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry
1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (-)
68th Field Artillery Battalion (-)
16th Engineers Battalion (-)
Elements 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion
Company, 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion
147
Kasserine Pass Forces 18-20 February 1943

1st Armored DivisionMajor General Orlando Ward (vicinity El Ma el Abiod)
Task Force Stack (Starkforce)Colonel Alexander N. Stark, Jr. (18-20 February)
26th Infantry Regiment (-2d and 3d Battalions)
19th Engineer Regiment (Colonel Arthur T. W. Moore)
33d Field Artillery Battalion
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion
894th Tank Destroyer Battalion (20 February)
Battery, French 6th African Artillery (75mm)
3d Battalion, 39th Infantry (19 February)
3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry (20 February)
Gore ForceLieutenant Colonel A. C. Gore (20 February)
C Company, 10th Rifle Brigade
C Squadron, 2d Lothians
F Battery, Royal Horse Artillery
Troop, 93d Anti-tank Regiment, Royal Artillery
Enemy Forces:
Panzer Army GroupField Marshall Erwin Rommel
Kampfgruppe Deutches Afrika KorpsMajor General Karl Buelowius
German:
33d Reconnaissance Battalion
Panzer Grenadier Regiment Afrika
8th Panzer Regiment
Group Stotten (1st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment)
Italian: Centauro Armoured Division
131 Tank Battalion
5th Bersaglieri
7th Bersaglierri (20 February)
Sbiba Gap (19-22 February)
Friendly:
6th British Armoured DivisionMajor General C.F. Keightley
148
1st Guards Brigade (78th British Division)

16th/5th Lancers (6th Armoured Division)
2d Hampshires
Elements, 72d Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery
Elements, 93d Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery
34th Infantry DivisionMajor General Charles W. Ryder
18th Infantry Regiment (1st Infantry Division)
133d Infantry Regiment
135th Infantry Regiment
151st Field Artillery Battalion
Enemy:
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel
21st Panzer DivisionGeneral Hans Georg Hildebrandt
5th Panzer Regiment
104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
580th Reconnaissance Battalion
609th Flak Battalion
Thala Road 20-22 February
British:
Nick ForceBrigadier General Cameron G. G. Nicholson (21-25 February)
26th Armoured BrigadeBrigadier Charles Dunphie (minus 16/5 Lancers) (20-23
February)
2d Lothians
17/21st Lancers
10th Royal Buffs
2d Battalion, 5th Leicestershire Regiment (46th Division) (20 February)
450th Battery, 71st Field Regiment, Royal Artillery
90th/100th Battery, 23d Army Field Regiment, Royal Artillery
F Battery, Royal Horse Artillery
229th Battery, 58th Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery (-troop)
Detachment (one gun), 93d Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery
149
Canon Company, 39th (US) Infantry (6-37mm guns)

2 sections, 86th Chemical Warfare Company, Royal Engineers (4.2-inch, mortars)
Gore ForceLieutenant Colonel A. C. Gore) 19-20 February
C Company, 10th Battalion, Royal Buffs
C Squadron, 2d Lothians (7 Valentines, 4 Crusaders)
F Battery, 12th Royal Horse Artillery
One Troop, S Battery, 93d Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery
Stark Force (remnants) after 20 February
th
9 Infantry Division ArtilleryBrigadier General S. LeRoy Irwin (22 February)

34th Field Artillery BattalionLieutenant Colonel William Westmoreland (155mm)
60th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
84th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
47th Canon Company (75mm)
60th Canon Company (75mm)
Enemy:
10th Panzer DivisionGeneral Fritz von Broich
Battalion, 7th Panzer Regiment
86th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
10th Motorcycle Battalion
Foussana Valley-Bou Chebka (21-24 February)
II CorpsMajor General Lloyd Fredendall; Major General Ernest Harmon (23-24 February)
CCBBrigadier General Paul Robinett
2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment
I and G Companies, 13th Armored Regiment
Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion
894th Tank Destroyer Battalion
27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
7th Field Artillery Battalion
150
33d Field Artillery Battalion

2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry
2d Battalion, 16th Infantry
Company D, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion
Maintenance and Supply Companies, 13th Armored Regiment
Detachment, 16th Medical Battalion
Detachment, 49th Medical Battalion
Composite (straggler) unit, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry
Elements, 443d Coast Artillery (AA) (SP)
Elements, 105th Coast Artillery Battalion (AA)
1st Infantry DivisionMajor General Terry Allen (-18th and 26th Infantry)
2d Battalion, 16th Infantry
Enemy:
Kampfgruppe Deutches Afrika KorpsMajor General Karl Buelowius
33d Reconnaissance Battalion
580th Reconnaissance Battalion (21st Panzer Division) (21 February)
1st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment
Panzer Grenadier Regiment Africa
Centauro Armoured Division (-)
151
APPENDIX C
THE SONG OF THE FIGHTING 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
Kasserine Pass
The Dutchmen broke through
KASSERINE
And occupied the brush
When we took over they took off
And left it in a rush
From what we saw of C C B
This fact we do observe
Its us they leave to beat the krauts
While they go in reserve
The gals in blue from the Forty-Eighth
And the Ninth Evac
Were ordered up to hold the line
While Second Corps fell back
While we had a company left
As a matter of course
Second Corps would split us up
And form another force
A certain man has gone at last
For which we tank the Lord
A few more weeks of the sonofabitch
And we would have faced a board
Our Provost Marshals left us
To go to Second Corps
Hell probably get a medal
And never see the war
152
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Failings. M.A. Thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 2003. http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA424990.
Hazen, David. Role of the Field Artillery in the Battle of Kasserine Pass. M.A. Thesis, U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College, 1973.
161
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Christopher Eric Jacob Sherwood, Sr. was born in Davenport Iowa. He earned a
Bachelors Degree in History from Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas in 2004.
Upon receiving his degree Chris was commissioned into the United States Army. In 2012 he
entered Florida State Universitys history program to pursue a Masters Degree in War and
Society. Upon graduation he will return to active service in the Army.
162

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The Florida State University

The Graduate School

Bloodied but Bruised: How the World War II

Follow this and additional works at: http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/etd

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

BLOODIED BUT BRUISED:

A Thesis submitted to the

2013 Christopher E. J. Sherwood, Sr.

Christopher Sherwood defended this thesis on October 29, 2013.

To my brothers and sisters in arms who never made it home!!

BATTLE ORDER ...............................................................................................................146

THE SONG OF THE FIGHTING 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION.........................................152

Tunisian Front, Mid-January 1943 ....................................................................................16

Battle of Sidi bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943 .....................................................................21

Delay and Withdrawal, Sbeitla, 16-17 February ...............................................................38

Battles at Kasserine 19-22 February 1943 .........................................................................55

The War Department Pamphlet coving mine and booby-traps ........................................117

Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 533.

Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 78.

Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 1112.

Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 3537.

Benjamin Dickson, G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe, 40.

Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 155.

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John Waters, SOOHP, 596.

Whiting, Kasserine, 174.

John Waters, SOOHP, 600, 204, 213.

Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 217.

Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 208.

Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 158.

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Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, 198199, 202.

Robinett, Armor Command, 164165; CCA G3 Operational Reports, 16 February 1943.

The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion G3 Logs 12 to 26.

Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 162163.

Robinett, Armor Command, 168.

Kasserine Pass 19 February

21st Panzer Division War Diary, 18 February 1943.

Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 232.

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Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 404.

Robinett, Armor Command, 176.

II Corps, Report of Operations 1 January-15 March 1943.

Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 405.

http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf; Howard Marshall, Over to Tunis, the

Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 171.

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 145.

Harmon, Combat Commander; Autobiography of a Soldier, 120.

n.d., The Observer Board Collection, MHI.

Reports on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training,.

James Carvey, Fad Pass, Infantry Journal (September 1944): 812.

1st Armored History 05-1AR, 1945, 62, MHI.

Changes to training schools. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commanding

Training A.F.R.T.C., N.D., The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI.

Center for Army Lessons Learned Mission, n.d., http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/mission.asp, accessed

Allies invaded North Africa.

German troops occupied Tunis and Bizerte.

Eisenhower announced loss of race for Tunisia and Allies took

Germans took Fad Pass.

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