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1. VILLANUEVA V VELASCO
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for
public use or for private interest and becomes a continuing
property right unless its removal is provided for in a title of
conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before
the execution of the conveyance; Essential requisites for an
easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3)
the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

The existence of the easement has been established by the


lower courts and the same has become conclusive to the SC.
The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide
easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement
mixer and motor vehicle (no mention of what kind.)
Accordingly, the petitioner has to demolish the house to
make way for the easement.
2. COSTABELLA CORP. V CA
Essential requisites: same as previous digest but without
number 5 (this is a case 9 years earlier than the case in the
previous digest); the convenience of the dominant estate is
not the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way but
rather, it should satisfy all four requisites (emphasis on 1st
requisite- it should be merely for convenience but it must be
due to the fact that the dominant estate does not have an
adequate outlet to a public highway.

FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in


QC from Pacific Banking Corporation which it acquired from
the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. When he bought it,
there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It
occupies one meter of two meter wide easement of right of
way the Gabriel spouses granted to Espinolas, predecessorsin-interest of the private respondents, in a contract of
easement of right of way. Amongst others, the contract
provides that the easements purpose is to have an outlet to
Tandang Sora which is the nearest public road and the least
burdensome (Espinolass property being the dominant estate
and Gabriel spousess as the servient estate.) It was also
provided in the contract that the easement shall be binding
to the successors, assigns without prejudice in cases of sale
of subject property that will warrant the circumstances.

FACTS: Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started


constructing their beach hotel. Before such construction, the
private respondent, in going to and from their respective
properties and the provincial road, passed through a
passageway which traversed the petitioners property. As a
result of the construction, this passageway, including the
alternative route, was obstructed. Private respondent filed
for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the
private respondents also alleged that the petitioner had
constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latters property
without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the
residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam
on the beach. The private respondent also claim that the
have acquired the right of way through prescription. They
prayed for the re-opening of the ancient road right of way
(what they called the supposed easement in this case) and
the destruction of the dike. Petitioner answered by saying
that their predecessor in interests act of allowing them to
pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the
use of the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the
private respondents.

The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of


demolition on the house obstructing the easement against the
Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a third party claim with
prayer to quash the writ saying that he was not made a party
to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should not
prosper since the easement which is meant to protect was
not annotated in the petitioners title.
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the
easement exists even though it was not annotated in the
torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong. And that
Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a
voluntary easement but as a legal easement.

ISSUE: 1) W/N easement of right and way can be acquired


through prescription? 2) W/N the private respondents had
acquired an easement of right of way in the form of a
passageway, on the petitioners property?
RULING: 1) NO. Easement of right of way is discontinuous
thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE: W/N the easement on the property binds petitioner?


RULING: YES. A legal easement is mandated by law, and
continues to exists unless its removal is provided for in a
title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed
before the execution of the conveyance conformably with
Art 647 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.

2) NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way


when he has proven the: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3)
the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. The private respondent
failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower
court confirmed that there is another outlet for the private
respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the
private respondents). Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact
that the convenience of the dominant estate was never a
gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must
be a real necessity and not mere convenience for the
dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private

Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are:


(1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right
of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.
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respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify


the petitioners. The SC also clarified that least prejudicial
prevails over shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt
necessarily the best choice.)

with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest. The burden of
proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner
of the dominant estate.

Just in case sir asks: Manresas opinion regarding the subject


matter was used.

For this present case, the first element is clearly absent. As


found by the RTC and CA, an outlet already exist, which is a
path walk located at the left side of petitioners' property and
which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500)
meters long. The private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena
Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas
Avenue. This outlet was determined by the lower courts to be
sufficient for the needs of the dominants estate, hence
petitioners Cristobal have no cause to complain that they
have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.

3. CRISTOBAL V CA
Petitioners cannon insist upon an easement out of mere
convenience. It must be proven that without an easement,
access to the dominant property is impossible
FACTS
Petitioner Cristobal owned a house and lot along Visayas Ave.
For mere convenience, he used an access path called Road
Lot 2 to reach the nearest public highway.

The SC also found that petitioners provided no evidence to


prove that the easement they seek to impose is to be least
prejudicial to the Pacione estate. Check it out: Lot 1 is only
164 square meters. Create an easement on that and the lot
may will be rendered unusable!

Alas, it turns out that Road Lot 2 actually belonged to


Respondent Ledesma. The latter owned the adjacent
subdivision and when Visayas Ave became a national road in
1979, he went to court to title Road Lot 2. The court readily
acceded and converted Road Lot 2 into Lots 1 and 2 which he
ultimately sold off.

4. FLORO v. LLENADO
A legal easement cannot arise merely for the
convenience of the dominant estate. The owner must
prove that the easement is absolutely necessary and least
restrictive on the servient estate.

The latest buyer, spouses Pacione visited the property and


found it occupied by some squatter Geronimo. The spouses
also discovered that Petitioner Ledesma continued to utilize
the lot as an access road to the public highway.

FACTS:
Mr Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in
Bulacan. The subdivision has its own access roads from the
MacArthur Highway through road lot 4.

The intrusion did not sit well with Pacione. Pacione begun
talks with Cristobal but negotiations stalled miserably. To
protect his rights, Pacione began fencing his lot. Cristobal
objected, stating he had no other means of entry and exit to
the national road.

Another fellow, Llenado, owned


the Llenado Homes
Subdivision. He obtained the same from Mr. de Castro, when
it was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision,

The RTC adjudicated and through the Sheriff, found that two
other outlets existed to allow Cristobal access to his lot even
without the creation of Easment on the Pacione property.
This negated the claims of Cristobal so the RTC denied the
motion for an easement.

Llenado Homes was bounded on the south by the Palanas


Creek, 5 which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision.
To the west sat the ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo.
The controversy brewed since Llenado Homes did not have
any passage to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed
access road passing the abandoned riceland of Marcial Ipapo
has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the
former Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was approved
by the HLURB.

The case reached the CA which likewise affirmed the RTC and
vexed Cristobal. The case reached the SC
ISSUE: w/n the requisites for legal easement were present to
support Cristobals request for the creation of a road through
Paciones property.

Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not
exist yet, the Llenados sought, and were granted, oral
permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro
Park . At this point, remember that the agreement was
merely provisional as the parties were still drafting a
contract.

HELD: NO.
The requisites are not present. Easment cannot be insisted
upon.
To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established. These include:

Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question


from the passage of heavy machinery. He then barricaded
Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe
stones. He essentially implied Llenados to keep out off
property.

(1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other


immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation
was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
(4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent

Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC


denied the request. On appeal by LLenado, the CA granted,
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and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the barricades. Mr. Floro
went to the SC

frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and


thus effectively isolated from said road the other lots, i.e., of
Cornelia Dila, and of the children of Anacleta Dila.

ISSUE:
W/n the requirements for legal easement existed to allow
Llenado to claim the same against Mr. Floro.

Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who


subsequently sold them to Ramos.

HELD: NO.
As in the earlier case, the court held that
to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established. These include:
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3)
that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.

Ramos asked for a right of way through Franciscos land but


negotiations failed. Francisco's proposal for an exchange of
land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from
Ramos, as was supposedly the custom in the locality, was
unacceptable to Ramos.
Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m
wide passageway through Dilas lot. Yet in August, 1973, he
inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot,
thereby closing the very right of way granted to him across
Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished was to have a right
of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this
to be more convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep
quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to
get what he wanted.]

For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been
met.

Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by


replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road
with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case
against him asserting his right to a legal easement.

The original subdivision development plan presented by


Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms.
Ipapo to create a right of way through the abandoned Ipapo
ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado
apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such
road. It was easier for him to create an easement via the
Floro property.

ISSUE: w/n Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of


way through the land belonging to Francisco
HELD: NO
The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as
respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from
a public highway and then claim an easement of way through
an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the
claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the
isolation of his property had not been met indeed the
respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition
and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will
not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B
was dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the
contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by
even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere
inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way
does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an
alternative location.

The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal
easement merely out of convenience. Convenience motivated
Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road development and
pursue an access road through the Floro estate. He was
stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary detriment
of his neighbor. The court refused to countenance his
behavior.
5. FRANCISCO V. IAC
An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act
isolate his property from a public highway and then claim
an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Isolation
must not be due to his own acts.
FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta
Estate owned by several co-owners.

6. QUIMEN V. CA
LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE
When the easement may be established on any of several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where
the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should
be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way
which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it
will not be the shortest.

On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and


Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which an undivided 1/3
portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and
another undivided 1/3 portion to the children of a deceased
sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also an
undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and
would be retained by Cornelia Dila. A partition was then
executed.

FACTS
Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister,
inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They agreed to
subdivide the property equally among themselves. The shares

The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of


the subdivision, Epifania Dilas lot came to include the entire
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of Anastacia and 3 other siblings were next to the municipal


road. Anastacias was at the extreme left of the road while
the lots on the right were sold by her brothers to Catalina
Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacias were sold by
her (as her brothers adminstratix) brother to Yolanda.

She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is


not the shortest access to the public road because of the
detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most
damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from
the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering
that an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70)
years, she expects a substantial earning from it.

Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first


because it d no access to the public road. Anastacia prevailed
upon her by assuring her that she would give her a right of
way on her adjoining property (which was in front) for p200
per square meter.

ISSUE:
1)
2)

Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as


her passageway to the public highway a portion of anastacias
property. But when yolanda finally offered to pay for the use
of the pathway anastacia refused to accept the payment. In
fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing
through her property.

w/n there was a valid grant of an easement


w/n the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the
least onerous/least prejudicial to the parties

HELD: YES to both


1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by
covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to
pass over anothers property when his tenement is
surrounded by realties belonging to others without an
adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the
dominant estate can demand a right of way through the
servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for
the beneficial use of his property.

After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the


Quimens (a brother), located directly behind the property of
her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore
between their house, extending about 19m from the lot of
Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and
Anastacias perimeter fence.

The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of


way are:
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper
indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant
estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.

In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying


for a right of way through Anastacias property. The
proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacias
property facing the public highway, starting from the back of
the sari-sari store and extending inward by 1m to her
property and turning left for about 5m to avoid the store in
order to reach the municipal road. The way was unobstructed
except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action, explaining that the right of way through the brothers
property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting
through Anastacias property would no longer make the path
straight. They held that it was more practical to extend the
existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion
of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route
to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties
concerned than passing through Anastacias property.

These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly


shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed
in by the estates of other persons including that of
petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square
meter for her right of way as agreed between her and
petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to
the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular
inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the
trial court itself declared that [t]he said properties of
Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda
Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public
highway and there appears an imperative need for an
easement of right of way to the public highway.

CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of


way on Anastacias property. The court, however, did not
award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in bad
faith when she resisted the claim.
Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be
considered as a servient estate despite the fact that it does
not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She
denies ever promising Yolonda a right of way (bitch!).

2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that the


easement of right of way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the


second lot, the easement of right of way she provided was
ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership
of the dominant and the servient estates in one person so
that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide
private respondent with a right of way as there are other
surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must


prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although
this is a matter of judicial appreciation. When the
easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is
shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen.
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances
do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause
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the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the


shortest.

and shortest access to and from the provincial road; that


plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing through
the properties of defendants in going to and from their lot;
that defendants' mother even promised plaintiffs'
predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of
right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access
from their property to the road; and that alternative
defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for a right of way and
referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, refused to
grant them an easement. Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an
easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be
established in their favor. They also prayed for damages,
attorney's fees and costs of suit.

TCs findings:

Yolandas property was situated at the back of her


fathers property and held that there existed an
available space of about 19m long which could
conveniently serve as a right of way between the
boundary line and the house of Yolanda s father

The vacant space ended at the left back of the store


which was made of strong materials

Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to


the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1)
meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her
right of way to the public highway.

RTC and CA both found for Fajardo and granted the easement
of right of way. On appeal, the Sta. Maria's allege that
Fajardo failed to prove that it was not their own actions
which caused their lot to be enclosed or cut-off from the
road.

CAs finding:

The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m


wide and 5m long at the extreme right of Anastacias
property will cause the least prejudice and/or
damage as compared to the suggested passage
through the property of Yolanda s father which
would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of
strong materials.

ISSUE: W/N the plaintiffs failed to prove the third requisite or


that the isolation was not caused by the plaintiffs
themselves?
HELD: The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by
themselves cause the isolation.

Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are


devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly
erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As between a
right of way that would demolish a store of strong
materials to provide egress to a public highway, and
another right of way which although longer will only
require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second
alternative should be preferred.

As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus:


"Neither have the private respondents been able to show that
the isolation of their property was not due to their personal
or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts." In the instant
case, the Court of Appeals have found the existence of the
requisites. The petitioners, however, insist that private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have, through their own
acts of constructing concrete fences at the back and on the
right side of the property, isolated their property from the
public highway. The contention does not impress because
even without the fences private respondents' property
remains landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to
different owners.

7. STA. MARIA V. CA|FAJARDO, 285 SCRA 351


Requirements of compulsory servitude of right of way: 1)
surrounded by immovables and no adequate outlet to a
public highway; 2) payment of indemnity; 3) isolation is
not due to the owner of the dominant estate; 4) least
prejudicial (and shortest if possible)

Again, for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude


of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:

FACTS:
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the
registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124, in Bulacan.

1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables


and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649,
par. 1);

Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a


fishpond, on the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 126,
owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6a and a portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively by Spouses
Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on
the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family,
on the northwest.

2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);


3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).

On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against


defendants Sta. Maria for the establishment of an easement
of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is
surrounded by properties belonging to other persons,
including those of the defendants; that since plaintiffs have
no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a
right of way passing through either of the alternative
defendants' properties which are directly abutting the
provincial road would be plaintiffs' only convenient, direct

8. RAMOS V. GATCHALIAN, 154 SCRA 703


Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to
justify a grant of right of way. Real necessity must be shown.
FACTS:
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Ramos is the owner of a house and lot in Paraaque.

9. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION V. CA


When a land, originally public land is awarded to a
provate individual, a legal easement may be constituted
and thus no just compensation is required. It would be
otherwise if the land were originally private property, in
which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking
of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right
of way.

Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is


alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was
granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to
service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivision, by the
respondent Asprecs.
Ramos alleged that, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet
high concrete wall right infront of his premises, blocking his
entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest, most
convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road. or
highway, Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue,
Paraaque; that this house and lot is only about 100 meters
from Sucat, Road passing thru Gatchalian Avenue. Ramos also
alleged that due to Gatchalian's construction,he was
constrained to use as his "temporary" way the adjoining lots
belonging to different persons. Said way is allegedly "bumpy
and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of
flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon."
Moreover, according to Ramos, the road right of way which
the private respondents referred to as the petitioner's
alternative way to Sucat Road is not an existing road but has
remained a proposed road as indicated in the subdivision plan
of the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.

FACTS:
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the
province of Cagayan was issued in the name of Vicente
Manglapus, and registered under OCT No. P-24814. The land
was granted subject to the following proviso expressly stated
in the title:
"... it shall not be subject to any encumbrance
whatsoever in favor of any corporation, association or
partnership except with the consent of the grantee and
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and solely for educational, religious or
charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject
finally to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially
those mentioned in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and
114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended..."

RTC and CA both denied Ramos' complaint.


Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from
Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale.

ISSUE: W/N a right of way must be granted based on


allegation of inconvenience?

Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung,


Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of
Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings thereon.
Manglapus filed a complaint for damages against NIA.

HELD:
No. The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We
find no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact
that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an
adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the
Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case,
there is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez
Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its
subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said
lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the
petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does
not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. We
agree with the appellate court's observation that the
petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded from
the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement
and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way
because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot
and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents
Asprec. To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through
Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by
the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because
Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in
going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to
completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently
maintained through the years regarding an easement of a
right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate
is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of
this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial, necessity for it."

ISSUE:
W/N the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the
taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a
right of way.
RULING: No.
The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. It
states that title to the land shall be:
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land
Registration Act and the Public Land Act, as well as
those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and
subject, further to such conditions contained in the
original title as may be subsisting."
Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a
reservation and condition that the land is subject to "to all
conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized
and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections
109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended." This reservation, unlike the other
provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time
period and thus is a subsisting condition.
Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands
granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot
exceeding twenty meters in width for public
highways, railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts,
telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works..."
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We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11)
meters in width. This is well within the limit provided by
law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain.

Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. The owner or


developer of a subdivision without access to any existing
public road or street must secure a right of way to a
public road or street and such right of way must be
developed and maintained according to the requirement
of the government authorities concerned.
a. Because the above provision applies to the
owner or developer of a subdivision (which
petitioners are not) without access to a public
highway.
b. And the petitioners' allegation that the
footpaths which were converted to subdivision
roads have acquired the status of public streets,
is not well taken. The municipal ordinances
which declared subdivision roads open to
public use "when deemed necessary by the
proper authorities"
simply allow persons
other than the residents of the Nonoc Homes
Subdivision, to use the roads therein when
they are inside the subdivision but those
ordinances do not give outsiders a right to
open the subdivision walls so they can enter
the subdivision from the back. The closure of
the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 is a valid
exercise of proprietary rights. It is of judicial
notice that most, if not all, subdivisions are
enclosed and fenced with only one or few points
that are used as ingress to and egress from the
subdivisions.

Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are


established either by law or by the will of the owners. The
former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements."
In the present case, we find and declare that a legal
easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government.
The land was originally public land, and awarded to
respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be
otherwise if the land were originally private property, in
which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of
a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of
way.
10. ABELLANA, SR. V. CA
Subdivision roads open to public use "when deemed
necessary by the proper authorities" simply allow persons
other than the residents of the subdivision, to use the
roads therein when they are inside the subdivision but do
not give outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so
they can enter the subdivision from the back.
FACTS:
The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the
northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, sued to
establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road
which, according to the petitioners, used to be a mere
footpath which they and their ancestors had been using since
time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired,
through prescription, an easement of right of way therein.
The construction of a wall by the respondents around the
subdivision deprived the petitioners of the use of the
subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents access
to the public highway. They asked that the high concrete
walls enclosing the subdivision and cutting of their access to
the subdivision road be removed and that the road be opened
to them.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing
footpath in the place before it was developed into a
subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc
Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a public road
for there is a more direct route from the petitioners' land to
the public highway.

11. ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS


An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a
private property has no access to a public road and the needs
of such property determines the width of the easement which
requires payment of indemnity which consists of the value of
the land and the amount of the damages caused.
FACTS
Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate
which is bounded on the north by the servient estates of
Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a
dried river and the Taal Lake. The servient estate is bounded
on the north by the National Highway.
Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would
just cross the servient estate at no particular point. In 1960,
Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but
provided a roadpath 25 meters long and about 1 meter in
width. At this time, Encarnacion started his plant nursery
business on his land. When his business flourished, it became
more difficult to transfer the plants and garden soil through
the use of a pushcart so Encarnacion bought an owner-type
jeep for transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not
pass through the roadpath so he approached Sagun and
Masigno asking them if they would sell to him 1 meters of
their property to add to the existing roadpath but the 2
refused the offer.

ISSUE:
1. W/N an easement has arisen by prescription
2. W/N the pathway has become a public street
RULING:
1) No. Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of
way is continuous and apparent and may be acquired by
prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous.
The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a
continuous easement because its use is at intervals and
depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a
man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land. Hence,
a right of way is not acquirable by prescription.

Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek


the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an
additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for there is another outlet, which is through the
dried river bed. This was affirmed by the CA thus the case at
bar.

2) No. Petitioners cannot invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which


provides:
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without adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after
payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due
to the propietors own acts and (4) the right of way claimed
is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so
far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

ISSUE: W/N Encarnacion is entitled to an widening of an


already existing easement of right-of-way
RULING: YES
Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally,
a right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely
no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is
one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly
insufficient. In the case at bar, although there is a dried river
bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no
egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the
level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up.
And during rainy season, it is impassable due to the floods.
When a private property has no access to a public road, it has
the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a
matter of law. With the non-availability of the dried river bed
as an alternative route, the servient estates should
accommodate the needs of the dominant estate. Art. 651
provides that the width of the easement of right of way
shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate To grant the additional easement of right
of way of 1 meters, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and
Masigno the value of the land occupied plus amount of the
damages caused until his offer to buy the land is considered.

Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st


requisite, his land is bounded on all sides by immovables, the
lands of Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the river. The
2nd requisite is settled by a remand to the lower court for the
determination of the proper indemnity. As regards the 3rd
requisite, it was found that Panganiban bought the land from
the Baltazars therefore its isolation was not due to his own
acts. And with regard to the 4th requisite, the passage
claimed is the shortest distance from his lot to Braulio Street.
Panganiban was established all 4 requisites therefore is
entitled to the easement.

12. VDA. DE BALTAZAR V. COURT OF APPEALS


For someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4
requisites must be present: (1) the estate must be surrounded
by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a
public highway (2) after payment of the proper indemnity (3)
the isolation is not due to the propietors own acts and (4) the
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.
FACTS:
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No. 1027. It is bounded
on the north by Sta. Ana River, on the south by the land of
vda. de Baltazar and on the west by lot 1028 and on the east
by Lot 1025. Directly in front of 1026, 1028, and 1025 is the
Braulio St.
Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for the
establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of
right of way for him to have access to the provincial road.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for it found 2 other
passageways. The CA reversed the decision for it found that
there was a strip of land used by Panganiban and his
grandfather as a right of way for 30 years until it was closed
and that the 2 other passageways were only temporary and
was granted to Panganiban when the right of way was closed.
Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: W/N Panganiban is entitled to an easement of right of
way
RULING: YES
It has been held that for someone to be entitled of an
easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present. (1)
the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is
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