2012 JURISPRUDENCE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND HAZING

2012 JURISPRUDENCE ON CRIMINAL LAW
I. ON MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

G.R. No. 151258. February 1, 2012.,ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to
266 of the Revised Penal Code, 222 the employment of physical injuries must
be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of
malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of
the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in
case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a
specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive
the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries
per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man
guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of
physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People, the accused
teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs
and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises
from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court's finding of criminal
liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: "Independently of
any civil or administrative responsibility . . . [w]e are persuaded that she did
not do what she had done with criminal intent . . . the means she actually
used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any
malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that "as a
matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of
whipping her pupil." In People v. Carmen, the accused members of the
religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the
guise of a "ritual or treatment" plunged the head of the victim into a barrel
of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and
stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous
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breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing

him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since
malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court's finding of
liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead
ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused's initial acts of
inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi
amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
thereby making it subject to Article 4 (1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we
ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and
external acts of the accused. What persons do is the best index of their
intention. We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon
used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be
determinative of the intent of the perpetrator. The Court shall thus examine
the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquila's fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were
told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last
for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they
were subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run,"
"Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies' Privilege Round." The beatings
were predominantly directed at the neophytes' arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Late in the afternoon,
they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the
rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the
neophytes were subjected to another "traditional" ritual paddling by the
fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes.
The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers
and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and
psychological pain on the initiates. It was their regular duty to stop foul or
excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order
that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every
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physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach
the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lenny's consent. A few days before the
"rites," he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.
His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would
be gone for three days.
The CA found as follows:

It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly
and voluntarily consented to undergo physical
initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the
narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the
initiation rites to become members of the Aquila
Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were
given briefings on what to expect. It is of common
knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they
were made aware that traditional methods such as
mocking,
psychological
tests
and
physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the
initiation would involve beatings and other forms of
hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In
fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that
accused Tecson told him that "after a week, you can
already play basketball." Prosecution witness
Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the
initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a
wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that
he expected bruises on his arms and legs. . . .
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without
consenting neophytes. (Emphasis supplied)
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Even after going through Aquila's grueling traditional rituals during the first
day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of
initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof
showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific
animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of
punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were
done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the
elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the
fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done
pursuant to tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the second night
were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were
officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the
paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle,
no other "weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body
parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles,
including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose
of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the
initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who
wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of "traditional"
initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given
a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is
uniquely different from common crimes. The totality of the circumstances
must therefore be taken into consideration.
Xxxxxxx
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the
core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code,
Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a
special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This
dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing
unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society
considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time.
It is safe to presume that Lenny's parents would not have consented to his
participation in Aquila Fraternity's initiation rites if the practice of hazing
were considered by them as mala in se.
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Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate

Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation's very
recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of . . . hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal." Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum,
the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct
of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has not
been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was
to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an
intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal
laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to
rule against the trial court's finding of malicious intent to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as
required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his
death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that
the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability.
The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means
of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without
malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the
part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or
negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury
or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.
Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly
visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act
is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on
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the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the
act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the
degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the
danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very
careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the
danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there are
countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The
duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon
the circumstances of each particular case.
[G.R. No. 187052.
September 13, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELISSA CHUA a.k.a. Clarita Ng
Chua, accused-appellant.
It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not
hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala
in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud.
II. ON CONSPIRACY
[G.R. No. 171359. July 18, 2012.],BENJAMIN A. UMIPIG, petitioner,
Although a conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which
the offense was perpetrated, it must, like the crime itself, be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval is not enough
without a showing that the participation was intentional and with a view of
furthering a common criminal design or purpose.
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[G.R. Nos. 120744-46.

June 25, 2012.],SALVADOR YAPYUCO y
ENRIQUEZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when
two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of
each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness
of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once
found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless
abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the
time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its execution. The instant case requires no proof of any
previous agreement among petitioners that they were really bent on a
violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that
conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that
matter, had converged and strategically posted themselves at the place
appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been
ignited by the common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and
evade their authority when it suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was
attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it to
stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were
confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by
preventing the jeepney's supposed escape even if it meant killing the driver
thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their
concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from
the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of
the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they
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did achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on

the passenger side of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories.
Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had
discharged their weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries
sustained by Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the
Sandiganbayan's conclusion that since only herein petitioners were shown to
have been in possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the
same, they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of
the subject law enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong.
[G.R. No. 187733. February 8, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. TEOFILO "REY" BUYAGAN, appellant.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a
joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. For conspiracy to
exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of
the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its
execution.
G.R. No. 169084. January 18, 2012.,PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELANIO
DEL
CASTILLO
y
VARGAS,
HERMOGENES DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD AVENGOZA y
DOGOS, FELIX AVENGOZA y DOGOS, RICO DEL CASTILLO y RAMOS,
and JOVEN DEL CASTILLO y ABESOLA, accused-appellants.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is
either express or implied. Thus, the State does not always have to prove the
actual agreement to commit the crime in order to establish conspiracy, for it
is enough to show that the accused acted in concert to achieve a common
purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose,
a concert of action and a community of interest. Where the acts of the
accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.
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Once a conspiracy is established, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable

as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not
have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he have to
know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the
criminal act.
III. ON COMPLEX CRIMES AND COMPOSITE CRIMES
[G.R. No. 184926. April 11, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO, accusedappellant.
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime,
also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes
that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the
product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a
complex or compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a
composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a
complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified
but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the
necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for
the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound
crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a
composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the
commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a
separate information.
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides:
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Article 266-A.
Rape; When and How Committed.
Rape is committed
1)
By a man who have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a)
Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b)
When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious;
c)
By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d)
When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstance mentioned above be present.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Article 266-B.
Penalties. Rape under paragraph
1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
xxx
xxx
xxx
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is

committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite
crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide. In both
composite crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of
rape. As can be noted, each of said composite crimes is punished with a
single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter
with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are
crucial in determining whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex
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or compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the
notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender originally
designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing.
The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or consummated)
is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase on the
occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To understand what
homicide may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the rape, a resort
to the meaning the framers of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful.
Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353,
the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape
to refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the
commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim
of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as
long as the killing is linked to the rape, became evident.
[G.R. No. 184500.
September 11, 2012.], PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WENCESLAO NELMIDA @
"ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @ "PORDOY," accused-appellants.
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code which explicitly states that:
ART. 48.
Penalty for complex crimes. When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in
the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only
one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex
crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known
as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single
bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs
where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes.
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[G.R. No. 183132. February 8, 2012.], RICHARD CHUA, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve
petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of
public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document. It is settled doctrine that
"When a complex crime has been charged in an
information and the evidence fails to support the
charge on one of the component offenses, can
defendant still be separately convicted of the other
offense? The question has long been answered in the
affirmative. In United States v. Lahoylahoy and
Madanlog, the Court has ruled to be legally feasible
the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses
included in a complex crime charged, when properly
established, despite the failure of evidence to hold
the accused of the other charge." (previous citations
omitted)
[G.R. No. 187733. February 8, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. TEOFILO "REY" BUYAGAN, appellant.
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is penalized, under
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, with reclusion perpetua
to death. Since the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed
firearm had been alleged and proven during trial, the lower court correctly
sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty pursuant to Article 63 8
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Nonetheless, we cannot impose the
death penalty in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Pursuant to
this law, we affirm the CA's reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua for each count, with the modification that the appellant shall not be
eligible for parole.
IV. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
[G.R. No. 191913.
March 21, 2012.],SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
The Revised Penal Code provides the requisites for a valid self-defense claim:
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ART. 11.
Justifying circumstances. The
following do not incur any criminal liability:
1.
Anyone who acts in defense of his person
or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. We

explained, "Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to
stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated,
even if the other elements are present." It would "presuppose an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a
person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude but most
importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor. . . . There is aggression in contemplation of the law only when the
one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought
to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative."
To successfully invoke self-defense, another requisite is that the means
employed by the accused must be reasonably commensurate to the nature
and the extent of the attack sought to be averted.
Supporting petitioner's claim of self-defense is the lone gunshot wound
suffered by the victim. The nature and number of wounds inflicted by the
accused are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia. In
People v. Catbagan, We aptly held:
The means employed by the person invoking selfdefense is reasonable if equivalent to the means of
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attack used by the original aggressor. Whether or not

the means of self-defense is reasonable depends
upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the
physical condition, the character, the size and other
circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of
the person who invokes self-defense; and also the
place and the occasion of the assault.
In the instant case, the lone wound inflicted on the victim supports the
argument that petitioner feared for his life and only shot the victim to defend
himself. The lone gunshot was a reasonable means chosen by petitioner in
defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed victim, his drunken
state, disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a
warning shot.
The last requisite for self-defense to be appreciated is lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. As
gleaned from the findings of the trial court, petitioner gave the victim a
lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and drunk
victim. Absent from the shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner
sufficiently provoking the victim prior to the shooting.
All told, We are convinced that petitioner was only defending himself
on the night he shot his fellow police officer. The rule is that factual findings
of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
This rule is binding except where the trial court has overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and
substance. As earlier pointed out, the trial court did not consider certain
facts and circumstances that materially affect the outcome of the instant
case. We must, therefore, acquit petitioner.
[G.R. No. 169084.
January 18, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELANIO DEL CASTILLO y
VARGAS, HERMOGENES DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD
AVENGOZA y DOGOS, FELIX AVENGOZA y DOGOS, RICO DEL
CASTILLO y RAMOS, and JOVEN DEL CASTILLO y ABESOLA, accusedappellants.
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by
clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful
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aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. On the other hand, the requisites of
defense of strangers are, namely: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (c) the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a
primordial element, a condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression
attributed to the victim is established, self-defense and defense of strangers
are unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel. 22 The character of
the element of unlawful aggression has been aptly described in People v.
Nugas, as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the
primordial element of the justifying circumstance of selfdefense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances
is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril
the life or personal safety of the person defending himself;
the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.
Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of
three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there
must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the
attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent;
and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful
aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon,
an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to
cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive
and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot
or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
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By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in

effect admitted their parts in killing the victims. The rule consistently
adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused's defense is selfdefense he thereby admits being the author of the death of the victim, that it
becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court. The rationale for the shifting of the burden of
evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable
unless he satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense. But the burden to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders
of the State, which carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other words,
only the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for self-defense is an
affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient
and satisfactory proof. He must now discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution,
considering that the Prosecution's evidence, even if weak, cannot be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.
V. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
[G.R. No. 169084. January 18, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELANIO
DEL
CASTILLO
y
VARGAS,
HERMOGENES DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD AVENGOZA y
DOGOS, FELIX AVENGOZA y DOGOS, RICO DEL CASTILLO y RAMOS,
and JOVEN DEL CASTILLO y ABESOLA, accused-appellants.
Due to both such penalties being indivisible, the attendance of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances would not affect the penalties except to aid the
trial court in pegging the penalty to reclusion perpetua if the only modifying
circumstance was mitigating, or the mitigating circumstances outnumbered
the aggravating circumstances; or to prescribe the death penalty (prior to its
prohibition under Republic Act No. 9346) 43 should there be at least one
aggravating circumstance and there was no mitigating circumstance, or the
aggravating circumstances outnumbered the mitigating circumstances. This
effect would conform to Article 63, (2), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties. In all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
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In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty

composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2.
When there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
VI.
PERSONS
PARTICIPATION
CRIMINALLY
LIABLE/DEGREE
OF
[G.R. No. 187052.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELISSA CHUA a.k.a. Clarita Ng
Chua, accused-appellant.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and penalized under Sections 6
and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, as follows:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring,
or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken
by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13 (f) of Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That
any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so
engaged. It shall likewise include the following
acts, . . .:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a

syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one
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another. It is deemed committed in large scale if

committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses
are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In
case of juridical persons, the officers having control,
management or direction of their business shall be
liable.
SEC. 7.
Penalties.
(a)
Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than
twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more
than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b)
The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall
be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less
than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements
must concur: (1) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) 20 of the Labor
Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 21 of
the Labor Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042) and (2) the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers. 22 In the case of illegal
recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the offender
commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more
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persons, individually or as a group. 23 All three elements are present in the

case at bar.
VII. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

[G.R. No. 200922. July 18, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. CESAR CONCEPCION y BULANIO, appellant.
Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (The Indeterminate Sentence Law) provides:
[I]n imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of

offenses punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment; to those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition
or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those
who are habitual delinquents; to those who have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to
those who having been granted conditional pardon by
the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those
already sentenced by final judgment at the time of
approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5
hereof.
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Since Concepcion is guilty of the crime of theft of property valued at P3,000,

the penalty shall be the maximum period imposed by the RPC due to the
presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle
in the commission of the crime. The maximum penalty to be imposed upon
Concepcion is prision correccional in its medium period. However, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of Concepcion's
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the RPC for the offense, which is arresto mayor in its maximum period. For
this reason, we impose upon Concepcion the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period, which is 6 months, to prision correccional in its medium
period, which is 4 years and 2 months.
[G.R. No. 171359. July 18, 2012.],BENJAMIN A. UMIPIG, petitioner,
The penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 is "imprisonment
for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, and
perpetual disqualification from public office." Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, if the offense is punishable by a special law, as in the present
case, an indeterminate penalty shall be imposed on the accused, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the law, and
the minimum not less than the minimum prescribed therein.
There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case, the
Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as
maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
[G.R. No. 182059.
July 4, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAMILO D. NICART and MANUEL T. CAPANPAN,
accused-appellants.
Likewise applicable in the determination of the appropriate penalty is the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that "if the offense is punished
by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same."
Accordingly, with respect to the crime of illegal sale of shabu, due to the
absence of any mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed
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the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as these are within the period and range of the fine prescribed
by law. As regards the crime of illegal possession of 0.3 gram of shabu, the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve years (12) and
one (1) day, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, as maximum, and a fine of
P300,000.00, which is within the range of the amount imposable therefor is
likewise in order.
[G.R. No. 188979.

PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO,
appellant.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
attempted rape is two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion
perpetua for consummated rape. Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua
is prision mayor whose range is six (6) years and one (1) day to 12 years.
Without any attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
upon the appellant is prision mayor in its medium period, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
correccional whose range is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years,
in any of its periods. Accordingly, we sentence the appellant to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
[G.R. No. 182522. March 7, 2012.],PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL T. ADALLOM, accused-appellant.
For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that
which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and
the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any mitigating or aggravating
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circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be within the
range of prision mayor in its medium term, which has a duration of eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years; and that the minimum should be
within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration of six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, we sentence accusedappellant to suffer imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
for the attempted murder of Babelito in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105877.
VIII. PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES
Revised Penal Code Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.
The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine Archipelago.
[G.R. No. 139930. June 26, 2012.],REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
MARIA CLARA LOBREGAT, JOSE ELEAZAR, JR., JOSE CONCEPCION,
ROLANDO P. DELA CUESTA, EMMANUEL M. ALMEDA, HERMENEGILDO
C. ZAYCO, NARCISO M. PINEDA, IAKI R. MENDEZONA, DANILO S.
URSUA, TEODORO D. REGALA, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, ELEAZAR B.
REYES, EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA, DOUGLAS LU YM,
SIGFREDO VELOSO and JAIME GANDIAGA, respondents.
Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that
law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years. 16 Since the acts complained
of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period
for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally
enacted.
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be
computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326, 18 which provides:
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Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the

day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when the
prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, if such commission is known; and second, from its
discovery, if not then known, and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to
prescription, the same began to run only from the date it was discovered,
namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge could be filed as
late as 1996.
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the
prescriptive period from the discovery of such loans. The reason for this is
that the government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that those
loans existed when they were made. Both parties to such loans supposedly
conspired to perpetrate fraud against the government. They could only have
been discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people ousted
President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no person would have
dared question the legality or propriety of the loans.
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is
questioned here is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could
be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing
their documentations. What is rather involved here is UCPB's investment in
UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco,
supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does not, however, appear to
have been withheld from the curious or from those who were minded to
know like banks or competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no
allegation that respondent members of the board of directors of UCPB
connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment.
Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board
rooms when UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible
government clearing house for increases in corporate capitalization, to
accommodate UCPB's investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in
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the General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated to

submit annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon request.
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPB's
investment in UNICOM during martial law at the President's or anyone else's
instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever been hurled at the SEC
with reference to corporate transactions of whatever kind during martial law
since even that regime had a stake in keeping intact the integrity of the SEC
as an instrumentality of investments in the Philippines.
And, granted that the faint-hearted might not have the courage to question
the UCPB investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second element
that the action could not have been instituted during the 10-year period
because of martial law does not apply to this case. The last day for filing
the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after
martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions
for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the remaining period
of prescription run its course before bringing the proper action.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the
beginning of organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the
plaintiff can postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving the
defendant, through the passage of time, of access to defense witnesses who
would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents that would have
been discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover, the memories of
witnesses are eroded by time. There is an absolute need in the interest of
fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.
Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to
show probable cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of
UNICOM's capitalization, the stated value of the one million shares without
par value, which belonged to its incorporators, was P5 million. When these
shares were converted to 5 million shares with par value, the total par value
of such shares remained at P5 million. But, the action having prescribed,
there is no point in discussing the existence of probable cause against the
respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
IX. PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

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[G.R. No. 190793. June 19, 2012.],MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO,

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
This Court, in People v. Patriarca, explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to
rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign
grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations.
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that
the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty
is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. . . ."
X. DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

[G.R. No. 180177. April 18, 2012.],ROGELIO S. REYES, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
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The procedural safeguards start with the requirements prescribed by Section

21 of R.A. No. 9165 relating to the custody and disposition of the confiscated,
seized, and surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of the dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments and
paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. The provision relevantly states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. . . .:
(1)
The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
This appeal involves two distinct drug-related
offenses, namely: illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs requires: (a) proof that the transaction or sale
took place, and (b) the presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti, or the dangerous
drugs themselves. On the other hand, the
prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
necessitates the following facts to be proved,
namely: (a) the accused was in possession of
dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was not
authorized by law, and (c) the accused was freely
and consciously aware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs. 36 For both offenses, it is crucial
that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the
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seized dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity

thereof has been well preserved from the time of
seizure or confiscation from the accused until the
time of presentation as evidence in court. Nothing
less than a faithful compliance with this duty is
demanded of all law enforcers arresting drug pushers
and drug possessors and confiscating and seizing the
dangerous drugs and substances from them.
This duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is
discharged only when the arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of
custody is unbroken. This has been the reason for defining chain of custody
under Section 1 (b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of
2002, viz.:
(b)
"Chain of custody" means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from
the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody
of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer or custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the
final disposition; (Emphasis supplied)
In Mallilin v. People, the need to maintain an unbroken chain of custody is
emphasized:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received,
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where it was and what happened to it while in the

witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it
is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody
becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not
distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of
testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution
and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule.
Cogently, Mallilin v. People is reiterated in Catuiran v. People, 38 People v.
Garcia, 39 and People v. Villanueva, among others.
Section 21 (1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia
and/or
laboratory
equipment
so
confiscated,
seized
and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
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(1)
The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
The aforecited provision is elaborated on under
Section 21 (a) of the IRR which provides:
(a)
The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
[Emphasis supplied]
The duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous
drugs and substances is discharged only when the
arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of
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custody is unbroken. 27 Section 1 (b) of Dangerous

Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defines
the chain of custody as:
b.
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from
the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody
[was] of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition[.]
While there is no strict compliance with the
prescribed procedure, we hold that the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items were
properly preserved by the buy-bust team under the
chain of custody rule.
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic
sachet containing shabu during the buy-bust operation. Records show that
only Sistemio was in possession of the shabu from the time it was given to
him by appellant, while they were in the Security Office of the mall where the
accused were initially brought, while they were in transit, and up until they
reached the PDEA Office. While the marking was not immediately made at
the crime scene, it does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of
custody as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
have been preserved. The marking of the seized items at the police station
and in the presence of the accused was sufficient compliance with the rules
on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates
even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team. In this case, Sistemio immediately marked the seized item upon
reaching the PDEA Office. He marked it with his initials "PVS" and the date of
the buy-bust sale.
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The second link is the turnover of the drugs at the PDEA Office, which was
brought and marked by Sistemio himself.
The third link constitutes the delivery of the request and the specimen to the
PNP Crime Laboratory. It was likewise Sistemio who prepared the request and
personally turned over the specimen to the forensic chemist.
The fourth link seeks to establish that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination is the one presented in court. Appellant harps on the nonpresentation of the forensic chemist which could have established the final
link in the chain of custody. The non-presentation as witnesses of other
persons such as the investigator and the forensic chemist is not a crucial
point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the
prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion
as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to
present as witnesses. Furthermore, it was already stipulated during the pretrial that the forensic chemist, Abraham Tecson, had examined the illegal
drugs taken from the accused.
Under these circumstances, the prosecution has established beyond doubt
an unbroken link in the chain of custody. The unbroken link in the chain of
custody also precluded the possibility that a person, not in the chain, ever
gained possession of the seized evidence.
[G.R. No. 194255. June 13, 2012.],THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee, vs. NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a
"FRANZ/FRANS," MAKDUL JAMAD y BUKIN (AL) a.k.a. "MACKY," a
certain "TAS," and a certain "JUN," accused,
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous
case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In
fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without one's consent and to
be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is
horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was
trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons
was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary
damages is likewise justified. (Emphasis supplied)
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XI. FENCING LAW

[G.R. No. 181184. January 25, 2012.],MEL DIMAT, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2)
the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived
from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself
or for another.
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla's Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two
years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00.
Dimat's defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later
sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number
CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those
transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand,
had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimat's defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from
him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to
have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from
Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicle's engine and chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But
Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is
regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. 4 Of
course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have
known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was
derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out
of his acts.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the
latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino
supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt
of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration
and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this
promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino's failure to deliver the documents
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should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any
certificate of registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought
was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old
certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be
true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no
documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise
to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan
Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado
who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.
That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not
stand accused in the case.
SPECIAL LAWS COVERED BY 2013 BAR EXAMINATIONS

HUMAN SECURITY ACT IMPORTANT PROVISIONS (REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9372)
AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM
TERRORISM
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SECTION 1. Short Title. This Act shall henceforth be known as the "Human
Security Act of 2007."
SECTION 3. Terrorism. Any person who commits an act punishable under
any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a.
Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the
Philippine Waters);
b.
Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c.
Article 134-a (Coup d'Etat), including acts committed by private
persons;
d.
Article 248 (Murder);
e.
Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f.
Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
(1)
Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
(2)
Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear
Waste Control Act of 1990);
(3)
Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of
1968);
(4)
Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
(5)
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974); and,
(6)
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws
on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and
shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the
benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
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SECTION 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. Persons who conspire to

commit the crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of
imprisonment. aSCDcH
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3
hereof and decide to commit the same.
SECTION 5. Accomplice. Any person who, not being a principal under
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4
hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer
the penalty of from seventeen (17) years, four months one day to twenty
(20) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 6. Accessory.
Any person who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and
without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under
Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manner: (a) by profiting himself or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing
or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in
order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in
the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to
their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with
the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of
subparagraph (a).
SECTION 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of
Communications. The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire
Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement
official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court
of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form,
kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for
that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or
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spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and

outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or of any
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications
between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their
sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
SECTION 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. The written order
of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen
to, intercept, and record communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte
written application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been
duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53
of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to
establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed,
or is about to be committed; (b) that there is probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which
is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to
the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and, (c) that
there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such
evidence.
SECTION 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. The
written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as
well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the original application
of the applicant, including his application to extend or renew, if any, and the
written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are
hereby declared as classified information: Provided, That the person being
surveilled or whose communications, letters, papers, messages,
conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been
monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities
has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement
authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the
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legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued the
written order. The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals shall specify the following: (a) the identity, such as name and
address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded
and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or
otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the
telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and
recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person
shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable
ground to do so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the police or law
enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official,
including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law
enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized
to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words; (c) the
offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be
prevented; and, (d) the length of time within which the authorization shall be
used or carried out.
SECTION 10.
Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. Any
authorization granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall only be effective for the length of
time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of
receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
by the applicant police or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the
said authorization for another non-extendible period, which shall not exceed
thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or
renewal is in the public interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte
application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original
applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.
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In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled

to file the application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the
original applicant among the members of the team named in the original
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the
application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the
liability of the police or law enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof,
the applicant police or law enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days
after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as
provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate
case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the
surveillance, interception and recording of the termination of the said
surveillance, interception and recording. The penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the
applicant police or law enforcement official who fails to notify the person
subject of the surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording as
specified above.
SECTION 11.
Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications.
All tapes, discs, and recordings made pursuant to the authorization of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, including all excerpts and
summaries thereof as well as all written notes or memoranda made in
connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration
of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any
extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals in
a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be
accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement
official and the members of his team.
In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to
execute the required affidavit, the one next in rank to the applicant among
the members of the team named in the written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the members of the team
that required affidavit.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the
tapes, discs and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes
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or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge,

incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in
whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.
Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys
the items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years
and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 12.
Contents of Joint Affidavit. The joint affidavit of the
police or of the law enforcement official and the individual members of his
team shall state: (a) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have
been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and
the number of written notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection
therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and
recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as the
number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes
and memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in
the deposit; and (d) the date of the original written authorization granted by
the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to
conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as
the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authority granted
by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of
the whole or any part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no
duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of any of such excerpts,
summaries, written notes, and memoranda, have been made, or, if made,
that all such duplicates and copies are included in the sealed envelope or
sealed package, as the case may be, deposited with the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit
or exclude from the joint affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in
this Section.
Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts
prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less
than ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
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SECTION 13.
Disposition of Deposited Material. The sealed envelope
or sealed package and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby
declared classified information, and the sealed envelope or sealed package
shall not be opened and its contents (including the tapes, discs, and
recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof and the notes and
memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed,
read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be
granted only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed
before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a
showing that the Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing
by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application with proper written notice
the person whose conversation, communication, message discussion or
spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance, monitoring,
recording and interception to open, reveal, divulge, and use the contents of
the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his
duty to notify in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined
above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of
imprisonment.
SECTION 14.
Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed
Package. The written application with notice to the party concerned to
open the deposited sealed envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the
purpose or reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package;
(b) for revealing or disclosing its classified contents; (c) for replaying,
divulging, and or reading any of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the
notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); and, (d) for using any of
said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the
excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made
in connection therewith) as evidence.
duty to notify as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one
day to eight years of imprisonment.
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SECTION 15.
Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. Any listened
to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any
information or fact contained therein, including their existence, content,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation
of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and
usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative,
or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SECTION 16.
Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or
Recordings. Any police or law enforcement personnel who, not being
authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks
down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form
any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written
word of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and
shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any
other offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment and the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any police or law
enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court
of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever
manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or
spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism: Provided, That
notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such
authorization shall be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed
package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution of any
police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said
authorization.
SECTION 17.
Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or
Group of Persons. Any organization, association, or group of persons
organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not
organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in
this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to
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give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of

Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of
persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.
SECTION 18.
Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest.
The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary
notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having
been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken
custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any
criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper
judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the
said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested,
detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement
personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance
under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this
Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining
the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before
any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the place where the
arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the
judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law
enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and
presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have
arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation
whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or
psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a
written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought
before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the
person thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within
three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her
residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law
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enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest
the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided, That where the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice
shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the
accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding
paragraph.
SECTION 19.
Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent
Terrorist Attack. In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack,
suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the written
approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights
Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the
Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the
arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after
office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring
the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned
above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The
approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police
or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of
the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three
days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror
attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.
SECTION 20.
Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial
Authority within Three Days. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law
enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and
taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged
or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three
days.
SECTION 21.
Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. The
moment a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and
detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting police or law
enforcement officers or by the police or law enforcement officers to whose
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custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right: (a) to be

informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law
enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal
assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit
of the IBP or the PAO thus contacted to immediately visit the person(s)
detained and provide him or her with legal assistance. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; (b)
informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal
counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to
confer with them at any time without restriction; (d) allowed to communicate
freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his family or
with his nearest relatives and to be visited by them; and, (e) allowed freely to
avail of the service of a physician or physicians of choice.
SECTION 22.
Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. Any
police or law enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other
law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer
the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a
detainee or detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty
shall be imposed on the police officer or hear or leader of the law
enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation
was done.
SECTION 23.
Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its
Contents. The police or other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care
and control the person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has been placed under custodial
arrest and detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official
logbook, which is hereby declared as a public document and opened to and
made available for the inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the
person under custody or any member of his or her family or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree or his or her physician
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at any time of the day or night without any form of restriction. The logbook
shall contain a clear and concise record of: (a) the name, description, and
address of the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his initial
admission for custodial arrest and detention; (c) the name and address of the
physician or physicians who examined him physically and medically; (d) the
state of his health and physical condition at the time of his initial admission
for custodial detention; (e) the date and time of each removal of the
detained person from his cell for interrogation or for any purpose; (f) the date
and time of his return to his cell; (g) the name and address of the physician
or physicians who physically and medically examined him after each
interrogation; (h) a summary of the physical and medical findings on the
detained person after each of such interrogation; (i) the names and
addresses of his family members and nearest relatives, if any and if
available; (j) the names and addresses of persons who visit the detained
person; (k) the date and time of each of such visits; (1) the date and time of
each request of the detained person to communicate and confer with his
legal counsel or counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and date and
time of each departure of his legal counsel or counsels; and, (n) all other
important events bearing on and all relevant details regarding the treatment
of the detained person while under custodial arrest and detention.
The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon demand of the
aforementioned lawyer or lawyers or members of the family or relatives
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the person under
custody or his or her physician issue a certified true copy of the entries of
the logbook relative to the concerned detained person without delay or
restriction or requiring any fees whatsoever including documentary stamp
tax, notarial fees, and the like. This certified true copy may be attested by
the person who has custody of the logbook or who allowed the party
concerned to scrutinize it at the time the demand for the certified true copy
is made.
The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with
the preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty
of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 24.
No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation.
No threat, intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of
physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, on the
detained person, which shall vitiate his free-will, shall be employed in his
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investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of

conspiracy to commit terrorism; otherwise, the evidence obtained from said
detained person resulting from such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or from
such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological
pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable as
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative,
investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SECTION 25.
Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the
Investigation and Interrogation of a Detained Person. Any person or
persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict physical pain
or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which shall vitiate
the free-will of a charged or suspected person under investigation and
interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs
as a consequence of the use of such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a
consequence of the infliction on him of such physical pain or torment, or as a
consequence of the infliction on him of such mental, moral, or psychological
pressure, the penalty shall be twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20)
years of imprisonment.
SECTION 26.
Restriction on Travel. In cases where evidence of guilt is
not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court,
upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the
accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case
is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent
with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said
municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a
violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited
as provided under the Rules of Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or
her usual place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, emails, computers, the internet or other means of communications with
people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court.
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The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of

the accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon
the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused.
SECTION 27.
Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits,
Accounts, and Records. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as
amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of
Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after
satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called
for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) of a
member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association,
or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement
officer and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the
anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank or
financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the gathering of any relevant
information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution
concerned shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the
desired information, when so ordered by and served with the written order of
the Court of Appeals.
SECTION 28.
Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and
Records. The written order of the Court of Appeals authorizing the
examination of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records: (1) of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of any judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons, or (3) of any
member of such organization, association, or group of persons in a bank or
financial institution, and the gathering of any relevant information about the
same from said bank or financial institution, shall only be granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte application to
that effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly
authorized in writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism
Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and
upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and
urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust
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accounts, assets, and records: (1) of the person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of
persons; or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of
persons.
SECTION 29.
Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing
the Examination of Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. The written
order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as
its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the original ex parte
application of the applicant, including his ex parte application to extend or
renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council,
shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided,
That the person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by law
enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the
law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she
intends to do so, the legality of the interference. The written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals designated to handle cases
involving terrorism shall specify: (a) the identify of the said: (1) person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such judicially declared
and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case may
be, whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to
be examined or the information to be gathered; (b) the identity of the bank
or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons
who will conduct the said examination and the gathering of the desired
information; and, (d) the length of time the authorization shall be carried out.
SECTION 30.
Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and
Obtain Information on Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. The
authorization issued or granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals to examine or cause the examination of and to freeze bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records, or to gather information
about the same, shall be effective for the length of time specified in the
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall
not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written
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order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant

police or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the
said authorization for another period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days
renewable to another thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original
period: Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is
satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest: and,
Provided, further, That the application for extension or renewal, which must
be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the
Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled
to file the application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the
original applicant among the members of the ream named in the original
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the
application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the
liability of the police or law enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof,
the applicant police or law enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days
after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as
provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate
case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify in writing the person subject of
the bank examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant
police or law enforcement official who fails to notify in writing the person
subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records. HIDCTA
duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years
and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SECTION 31.
Custody of Bank Data and Information Obtained after
Examination of Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records.
All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working
sheets, reports, and other documents obtained from the examination of the
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a
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person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of

conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of
any such organization, association, or group of persons shall, within fortyeight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48)
hours after the expiration of the extension or renewal granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be deposited with the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed
package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit
of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the persons who
actually conducted the examination of said bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records.
SECTION 32.
Contents of Joint Affidavit. The joint affidavit shall state:
(a) the identifying marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets, and records examined; (b) the identity and address of
the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the number of
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records discovered,
examined, and frozen; (d) the outstanding balances of each of such deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets; (e) all information, data, excerpts,
summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, documents, records
examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; (f) the date of the
original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the
applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the examination of the
said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records, as well
as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authorization
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; and (g) that the
items enumerated were all that were found in the bank or financial institution
examined at the time of the completion of the examination.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of
the information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working
sheets, reports, and documents acquired from the examination of the bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records have been made,
or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are placed in the sealed
envelope or sealed package deposited with the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals.
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It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank
data and information obtained after examination of deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records to copy, to remove, delete, expunge,
incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in
whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.
Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or
destroys the items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than
six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 33.
Disposition of Bank Materials. The sealed envelope or
sealed package and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby
declared classified information and the sealed envelope or sealed package
shall not be opened and its contents shall not be divulged, revealed, read, or
used as evidence unless authorized in a written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted only
upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the
Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the AntiTerrorism Council to file the application, with notice in writing to the party
concerned not later than three days before the scheduled opening, to open,
reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed
package as evidence.
duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years
and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SECTION 34.
Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. The
written application, with notice in writing to the party concerned not later
than three days of the scheduled opening, to open the sealed envelope or
sealed package shall clearly state the purpose and reason: (a) for opening
the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing and disclosing its
classified contents; and, (c) for using the classified information, data,
excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and
documents as evidence.
SECTION 35.
Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. Any
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, work sheets,
reports, or documents acquired from the examination of the bank deposits,
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placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism: (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization,
association, or group of persons, which have been secured in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as
evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SECTION 39.
Seizure and Sequestration. The deposits and their
outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any
bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and
communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of
whatever kind and nature belonging: (1) to any person suspected of or
charged before a competent Regional Trial Court for the crime of terrorism or
the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a member
of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized,
sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or
conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the
people or injurious to the interest of the State.
The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be
reasonably needed by the monthly needs of his family including the services
of his or her counsel and his or her family's medical needs upon approval of
the court. He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or
sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon
permission of the court for any legitimate reason.
Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division
of the Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism
or of the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums
from sequestered or frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records as may be necessary for the regular sustenance of his/her family or
to use any of his/her property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen for
legitimate purposes while his/her case is pending shall suffer the penalty of
ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
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SECTION 40.
Nature of Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits,
Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. The seized, sequestered
and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records
belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be deemed as property held in trust by
the bank or financial institution for such person and the government during
the pendency of the investigation of the person suspected of or during the
pendency of the trial of the person charged with any of the said crimes, as
the case may be and their use or disposition while the case is pending shall
be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases are
pending.
SECTION 41.
Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank
Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Record. If the person
suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism is found, after his investigation, to be innocent by the investigating
body, or is acquitted, after his arraignment or his case is dismissed before his
arraignment by a competent court, the seizure, sequestration and freezing of
his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall
forthwith be deemed lifted by the investigating body or by the competent
court, as the case may be, and his bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records shall be deemed released from such seizure,
sequestration and freezing, and shall be restored to him without any delay
by the bank or financial institution concerned without any further action on
his part. The filing of any appeal on motion for reconsideration shall not state
the release of said funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing.
If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism is convicted by a final judgment of a competent trial court, his
seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records shall be automatically forfeited in favor of the
government.
Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him or her,
the amount of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) a day for the
period in which his properties, assets or funds were seized shall be paid to
him on the concept of liquidated damages. The amount shall be taken from
the appropriations of the police or law enforcement agency that caused the
filing of the enumerated charges against him/her.
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SECTION 44.
Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. Any public
officer who has direct custody of a detained person or under the provisions of
this Act and who by his deliberate act, misconduct, or inexcusable
negligence causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall be
guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and
one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has
already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent
court; and (b) six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if
the detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final
judgment of a competent court.
SECTION 45.
Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. The
provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and
Benefits Act) to the contrary notwithstanding, the immunity of government
witnesses testifying under this Act shall be governed by Sections 17 and 18
of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court: Provided, however, That said witnesses
shall be entitled to benefits granted to witnesses under said Republic Act No.
6981.
SECTION 46.
Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person, police or law enforcement
agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being authorized by the Court
of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified information
under this Act.
SECTION 47.
Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or
Spurious Evidence. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to
twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious evidence
in any investigation or hearing under this Act. STcDIE
SECTION 48.
Continuous Trial. In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis
from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure
speedy trial.
SECTION 49.
Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another
Prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any Special Penal Laws.
When a person has been prosecuted under a provision of this Act, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
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substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily
included in the offense charged under this Act.
SECTION 50.
Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. Upon
acquittal, any person who is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the
payment of damages in the amount of Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained or deprived of
liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of such an accusation. The
amount of damages shall be automatically charged against the
appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought
or sanctioned the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be
released within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the
accused. The award of damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice
to the right of the acquitted accused to file criminal or administrative
charges against those responsible for charging him with the case of
terrorism.
Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release or
refuses to release the amounts awarded to the individual acquitted of the
crime of terrorism as directed in the paragraph immediately preceding shall
suffer the penalty of six months of imprisonment.
If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained persons, the
amount needed to complete the compensation shall be taken from the
current appropriations for intelligence, emergency, social or other funds of
the Office of the President.
In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current budget of the
police or law enforcement agency concerned, the amount shall be
automatically included in the appropriations of the said agency for the
coming year.
SECTION 51.
Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the
Informant. The police or law enforcement officers to whom the name or a
suspect in the crime of terrorism was first revealed shall record the real
name and the specific address of the informant.
The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the informant's
name and address to their superior officer who shall transmit the information
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to the Congressional Oversight Committee or to the proper court within five

days after the suspect was placed under arrest or his properties were
sequestered, seized or frozen.
The name and address of the informant shall be considered confidential and
shall not be unnecessarily revealed until after the proceedings against the
suspect shall have been terminated.
SECTION 52.
Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. The provisions of
Book I of the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable to this Act.
ANTI-PHOTO AND VOYEURISM ACT (RA 9995) OF 2010

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9995
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PHOTO AND VIDEO
VOYEURISM, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
SECTION 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Photo and
Video Voyeurism Act of 2009".
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. The State values the dignity and privacy
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Toward
this end, the State shall penalize acts that would destroy the honor, dignity
and integrity of a person.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the term:
(a)
"Broadcast" means to make public, by any means, a visual image with
the intent that it be viewed by a person or persons.
(b)
"Capture" with respect to an image, means to videotape, photograph,
film, record by any means, or broadcast.
(c)
"Female breast" means any portion of the female breast.
(d)
"Photo or video voyeurism" means the act of taking photo or video
coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any
similar activity or of capturing an image of the private area of a person or
persons without the latter's consent, under circumstances in which such
person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy, or the act of selling,
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copying, reproducing, broadcasting, sharing, showing or exhibiting the photo

or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or similar activity through
VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and similar means or device without the
written consent of the person/s involved, notwithstanding that consent to
record or take photo or video coverage of same was given by such person/s.
(e)
"Private area of a person" means the naked or undergarment clad
genitals, pubic area, buttocks or female breast of an individual.
(f)
"Under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy" means circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe
that he/she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image
or a private area of the person was being captured; or circumstances in
which a reasonable person would believe that a private area of the person
would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether that person is in a
public or private place.
SECTION 4. Prohibited Acts. It is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful
for any person:
(a)
To take photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons
performing sexual act or any similar activity or to capture an image of the
private area of a person/s such as the naked or undergarment clad genitals,
pubic area, buttocks or female breast without the consent of the person/s
involved and under circumstances in which the person/s has/have a
reasonable expectation of privacy;
(b)
To copy or reproduce, or to cause to be copied or reproduced, such
photo or video or recording of sexual act or any similar activity with or
without consideration;
(c)
To sell or distribute, or cause to be sold or distributed, such photo or
video or recording of sexual act, whether it be the original, copy or
reproduction thereof; or
(d)
To publish or broadcast, or cause to be published or broadcast, whether
in print or broadcast media, or show or exhibit the photo or video coverage
or recordings of such sexual act or any similar activity through VCD/DVD,
internet, cellular phones and other similar means or device.
The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding
that consent to record or take photo or video coverage of the same was
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given by such person/s. Any person who violates this provision shall be liable
for photo or video voyeurism as defined herein.
SECTION 5. Penalties. The penalty of imprisonment of not less than three
(3) years but not more than seven (7) years and a fine of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court shall be
imposed upon any person found guilty of violating Section 4 of this Act.
If the violator is a juridical person, its license or franchise shall automatically
be deemed revoked and the persons liable shall be the officers thereof
including the editor and reporter in the case of print media, and the station
manager, editor and broadcaster in the case of a broadcast media.
If the offender is a public officer or employee, or a professional, he/she shall
also be administratively liable.
If the offender is an alien, he/she shall be subject to deportation proceedings
after serving his/her sentence and payment of fines.
SECTION 6. Exemption. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall
render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a
written order of the court, to use the record or any copy thereof as evidence
in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of the crime of photo or video
voyeurism: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted
upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and upon showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that photo or video voyeurism has
been committed or is about to be committed, and that the evidence to be
obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution or
prevention of, such crime.
SECTION 7. Inadmissibility of Evidence. Any record, photo or video, or
copy thereof, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
SECTION 8. Separability Clause. If any provision or part hereof is held
invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions not affected thereby
shall remain valid and subsisting.
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SECTION 9. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree or issuance,

executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
SECTION 10.
Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: February 15, 2010
SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR ON GUIDELINES IN IMPOSING PENALTIES

IN LIBEL
SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 08-08
TO
All Judges
SUBJECT
:
Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel, committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, with
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party.
In the following cases, the Court opted to impose only a fine on the person
convicted of the crime of libel:
In Fernando Sazon v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 1 the
Court modified the penalty imposed upon petitioner, an officer of a
homeowners' association, for the crime of libel from imprisonment and fine
in the amount of P200.00, to fine only of P3,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the reason that he wrote the libelous
article merely to defend his honor against the malicious messages that
earlier circulated around the subdivision, which he thought was the
handiwork of the private complainant.
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In Quirico Mari v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 2 where the
crime involved is slander by deed, the Court modified the penalty imposed
on the petitioner, an ordinary government employee, from imprisonment to
fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, on the
ground that the latter committed the offense in the heat of anger and in
reaction to a perceived provocation.
In Roberto Brillante v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 3 the
Court deleted the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon petitioner, a local
politician, but maintained the penalty of fine of P4,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each of the (5) cases of libel, on the
ground that the intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period
in 1988 must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter; and that
incomplete privileged communication should be appreciated in favor of
petitioner, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to
defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant
to their performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to
matters of public interest involving them. ECSHID
In Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines and Atty. Jose Pieraz, 4
the Court opted to impose upon petitioner, a lawyer, the penalty of fine only
for the crime of libel considering that it was his first offense and he was
motivated purely by his belief that he was merely exercising a civic or moral
duty to his client when he wrote the defamatory letter to private
complainant. 2uplaw08
The foregoing cases indicate an emergent rule of preference for the
imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in libel cases under the
circumstances therein specified.
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing
rule of preference set by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition
of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles:
1.
This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for the crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code;
2.
The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and
taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine
whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
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justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the

seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3.
Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
The Court Administrator shall cause the immediate dissemination of this
Administrative Circular to all courts and judges concerned.
This Administrative Circular, approved by the Supreme Court En Banc in A.M.
No. 08-1-17-SC at its session of 22 January 2008 shall take effect upon its
issuance.
Issued this 25th day of January 2008.
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2012 JURISPRUDENCE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND HAZING

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2012 JURISPRUDENCE ON CRIMINAL LAW

I. ON MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing

The CA found as follows:

Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate

[G.R. Nos. 120744-46.

did achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on

Once a conspiracy is established, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable

Through force, threat, or intimidation;

When the rape is attempted and a homicide is

[G.R. No. 183132. February 8, 2012.], RICHARD CHUA, petitioner, vs.

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. We

attack used by the original aggressor. Whether or not

By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty

[G.R. No. 187052.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a

another. It is deemed committed in large scale if

persons, individually or as a group. 23 All three elements are present in the

VII. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of

Since Concepcion is guilty of the crime of theft of property valued at P3,000,

[G.R. No. 188979.

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the

the General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated to

IX. PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

[G.R. No. 190793. June 19, 2012.],MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO,

X. DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

The procedural safeguards start with the requirements prescribed by Section

seized dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity

where it was and what happened to it while in the

custody is unbroken. 27 Section 1 (b) of Dangerous

[G.R. No. 194255. June 13, 2012.],THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

XI. FENCING LAW

SPECIAL LAWS COVERED BY 2013 BAR EXAMINATIONS

Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);

Article 248 (Murder);

Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);

Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under

Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);

Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);

SECTION 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. Persons who conspire to

spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and

In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled

or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge,

give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of

custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right: (a) to be

investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of

The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of

order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant

person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of

to the Congressional Oversight Committee or to the proper court within five

ANTI-PHOTO AND VOYEURISM ACT (RA 9995) OF 2010

"Female breast" means any portion of the female breast.

copying, reproducing, broadcasting, sharing, showing or exhibiting the photo

SECTION 9. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree or issuance,

SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR ON GUIDELINES IN IMPOSING PENALTIES

justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the

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