This article was downloaded by: [University of Liverpool]

On: 08 October 2014, At: 00:00

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Israel Affairs
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fisa20

A Positive Aspect to the Tragedy of

Lebanon: The Convergence of US,
Syrian and Israeli Interests at the
Outset of Lebanon's Civil War
Michael Kerr
Published online: 18 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Michael Kerr (2009) A Positive Aspect to the Tragedy of Lebanon: The
Convergence of US, Syrian and Israeli Interests at the Outset of Lebanon's Civil War, Israel Affairs,
15:4, 355-371, DOI: 10.1080/13537120903198621
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537120903198621

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A Positive Aspect to the Tragedy of

Lebanon: The Convergence of US,
Syrian and Israeli Interests at the
Outset of Lebanons Civil War
MICHAEL KERR

The centrifugal forces are too strong, the passions too intense, the
opportunities and incidents too numerous, and the meddlers both
internal and foreign too readily at hand to be contained by anything but
unrelenting political process.1

Jimmy Carters narrow victory over Gerald Ford in the US presidential

elections, on 2 November 1976, had brought US Secretary of State
Henry Kissingers masterful command over American foreign policy to
an untimely and inconclusive end. It also marked a cooling off of US
Syrian relations following Kissingers attempts to draw President Hafez
al-Asad of Syria into a comprehensive Middle East peace process. Before
clearing his desk at the end of 1976, Kissinger had promised Asad that
he would personally inform the new administration of Syrias centrality
to any future US-led efforts to achieve a just and comprehensive
settlement to the ArabIsraeli conflict. More than that, on the eve of his
departure, Kissinger wrote a long and thoughtful message to Asad,
reiterating his belief that there should be no boundaries to the
cooperation between the US and Syria as they sought renewed progress
in the peace process.2 From Asads perspective, the reconciliation that
had occurred between the US and Syria following the outbreak of civil
war in Lebanon, in 1975, had been both fortuitous and expedient. This
allowed him to advance considerably Syrias irredentist claim to Lebanon
by establishing a military foothold in the country without provoking
another war with Israel.
By brokering the Sinai II interim agreement between Egypt and Israel
in 1975, Kissinger had excluded Syria and the Palestine Liberation

Dr Michael Kerr is lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies in the Middle East and Mediterranean
Studies Programme and director of the Centre for the Study of Divided Societies at Kings College
London.
Israel Affairs, Vol.15, No.4, October 2009, pp.355 371
ISSN 1353-7121 print/ISSN 1743-9086 online
DOI: 10.1080/13537120903198621 q 2009 Taylor & Francis

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

356

ISRAEL AFFAIRS

Organization (PLO) from the Middle East peace process. Through his
famous shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger had begun a step-by-step approach to
finding a settlement to the Arab Israeli conflict, which reduced the Soviet
Unions influence and consolidated US Egyptian relations. He was also
seeking to strengthen US relations with Israel and the wider Arab world,
avoid another Arab oil embargo and isolate the PLO.3 Sinai II had caused a
major split between the regions dominant Arab leaders, Asad and
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Concluding that Syria had nothing to
gain from this Israeli Egyptian rapprochement, Asad responded by
establishing a hostile anti-Israeli Arab front, drawing Jordan, Lebanon and
the Palestinians under his leadership.
On the surface, civil war in Lebanon had the potential to spark another
major confrontation between Israel and Syria. Furthermore, it threatened US
interests in the Middle East, as Kissingers priority was to move Egypt and
Israel beyond the Sinai II non-belligerency accords.4 His desire to curtail
the PLO in Lebanon, however, saw him embark on a new initiative. He
attempted to bring Syria into the Middle East peace process and, like Egypt
before it, into the US Governments sphere of influence. The Lebanese crisis,
Kissinger told US President Gerald Ford, could open a unique peace
window through which their efforts in the Middle East might yield rewards.5
This tactical shift occurred due to a convergence of Israeli, Syrian and
US interests in Lebanon. When the PLO and its revolutionary allies in
Lebanon attempted to assert their control over the disintegrating state,
Kissinger facilitated a limited Syrian military intervention, as a means of
imposing a political settlement on its warring factions and reducing the
power-base of PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Furthermore, the possibility of
weakening Syrian Soviet ties by bringing Asad in from the cold made this
policy doubly attractive to the US. But by the summer of 1976, Kissingers
mediation had failed to reduce the violence in Lebanon, 12,000 Syrian
troops were occupying the country and the Soviet Union had risked a clash
with the US in defence of its embattled PLO ally. This article examines how
Kissinger came to view a Syrian solution to the war for Lebanon as a price
worth paying for limiting Soviet influence in the Middle East and drawing
Asad into an Arab-Israeli peace process, which tied Egypt to the US at a
time when both Israel and Syria were acting in concert to break the PLOs
power base in Lebanon.
A UNIQUE PEACE WINDOW FOR KISSINGER

On 13 April 1975, armed conflict erupted between Maronite Christian and

Palestinian militias in Lebanon.6 These clashes marked the beginning of a
fifteen year long civil war, which destroyed the country and drew in regional
actorsprincipally Egypt, Israel, Iran, Iraq and Syria, alongside the worlds
two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. Since independence,

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A POSITIVE ASPECT TO THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

357

Lebanon had been governed under a power-sharing arrangement between

its Christian and Muslim communities, known as the 1943 National Pact.7
When it collapsed in 1975, Lebanese National Movement (LNM) leader,
Kamal Jumblatt, pressed for the deconfessionalization of Lebanons political
system. Under its power-sharing arrangements, the offices of president,
prime minister and parliamentary speaker were reserved for the Maronite,
Sunni and Shia communities respectively, which institutionally denied
Jumblattwho was a Druze tribal leaderthe access to high office he
desired. Under Arafats leadership, the PLO had made Lebanon a base from
which to attack Israel and maintain a degree of independence from Asad
following the groups expulsion from Jordan in 197071. When Arafat
joined forces with Jumblatt, in his opportunistic attempt to radically
transform the state, the strength of their alliance made some form of Syrian
military intervention inevitable.
By the end of 1975 Lebanon was effectively partitioned, the PLO
LNM alliance controlled the country south and east of Beirut and the
Christians maintained their mountainous hinterland north of the divided
capital. Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias vastly outnumbered the frail
multi-confessional Lebanese army. The Lebanese Front, a coalition of
Maronite militias incorporating Pierre Gemayels Phalange and Camille
Chamouns National Liberal Party, successfully held their positions in the
Christian heartlands. Asad pursued a policy of maintaining a balance of
forces between the warring factions in Lebanon and in January, 1976, he
actually intervened to save Jumblatt and the Palestinians from military
defeat. Under the watchful eye of the Israelis, Syrian-led forces had entered
Lebanon in the form of two brigades of the Palestinian Liberation Army
(PLA),8 the Palestinian branch of the Syrian army, which joined up with
2,000 members of Saiqa, the Palestinian Baathist faction, which Asad used
to counter Arafats anti-Syrian Fatah movement.
By this point, Kissinger was convinced that a favourable outcome to the
crisis could only be achieved if Syria imposed a political solution on
Lebanons warring factions and the Palestinians:
The civil war in Lebanon added a new dimension to Arab Israeli
diplomacy. Its potential for transforming itself into a general Middle East
war made progress toward an overall settlement more urgent. But it also
produced an odd reversal of fronts. Sadat was indispensable for our
overall strategy but, in Lebanon, Egyptian support for the PLO
strengthened the radicals. Asad was the most difficult interlocutor for the
general negotiations but, in Lebanon, his distrust of a radical outcome
coincided with our interests.9

Kissinger hoped that by bringing Asad into the negotiating process he

could broker a comprehensive Middle East settlement in the course of
1977. The civil war offered a potential next step in which the US might

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

358

ISRAEL AFFAIRS

initiate negotiations between Israel and Syria, as both states, albeit for very
different reasons, sought to reduce the PLOs autonomy in Lebanon.
Failing that, Kissinger believed that as long as Asad was at loggerheads
with the Soviet Union and preoccupied in Lebanon, the intensity with
which he would be able to oppose further agreements between Egypt and
Israel would be sharply reduced.10 With this probable moderate
outcome, he told Ford, the US was in a good position for peace in the
Middle East. Moreover, if they could keep all the radicals from uniting, or
all the Arabs, Kissinger believed there could be a positive aspect to the
tragedy of Lebanon.11
Relations between the US and Syria had warmed since the US voted, on
30 November 1975, in favour of the unanimously adopted UN Security
Council Resolution 381. Calling for the discussion of the Middle East
problemincluding the Palestinian problemit thereby established a
linkage between these processes, greatly pleasing Asad, who viewed the
resolution as recognition that the Palestinian issue would be central to any
future US-led peace initiative in the region. He also viewed it as a move
away from the bilateral Israeli Egyptian process, which was detrimental
to Syrian interests. Warming to Kissingers overtures, Asad told him that
while Syria was eager to maintain good relations with the US in its search
for peace, to preserve and develop those relations depends much more on
the US than it does on Syria.12
Israel was perturbed by the newfound cordiality in US Syrian relations
and condemning the resolution, its ambassador to the UN, Chaim Hertzog,
described it as the result of Syrian blackmail and Soviet dictates.13 On 28
January 1976, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin warned Ford that if
Syrian army units followed Palestinian irregulars into Lebanon, then the
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), would occupy the country twenty miles north
of the border to the Litani River.14 Kissinger, intent on preventing Israel
from responding to Asads tentative movement in Lebanon, told Rabin that
if his government denied Syria a role in resolving the Lebanese crisis, it
would effectively be providing cover for the PLO. Allowing Arafat to
consolidate his position in Lebanon, he argued, was more detrimental to
Israeli interests than allowing Syria to both restrict his room for manoeuvre
and re-establish a moderate Christian Muslim government in Beirut. The
interests of the Israelis, the Syrians and the US Government overlapped in
this respectthey all wished to avoid the emergence of a radical pro-Soviet
state in the Middle East and the extension of the PLOs freedom of
action there.
It is here that Syrian interests in Lebanon were momentarily aligned
with those of the US and Israel. However, Asads long-term strategy
remained fundamentally opposed to Kissingers vision for a settlement in
the Middle East. Asad viewed Lebanon as an integral part of Syria, which
should never have become an independent state. In geo-strategic terms,

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A POSITIVE ASPECT TO THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

359

Lebanon was pivotal to Asads strategy of confronting Israel with a hostile

pan-Arab coalition under his leadership.15 Syrias foreign minister, Abdel
Halim Khaddam, offered a characteristically blunt delineation of Syrias
attitude towards its disintegrating neighbour. Lebanon used to be part of
Syria, he said, and rather than tolerate an extension of the PLOs authority
on its border, Syria would take it back at the first serious attempts at
partition.16 Asad was more diplomatic. If Lebanese President Suleiman
Frangieh was willing to ask for Syrian forces, he said, these would be at
his disposal and would act under his orders as president of an independent
state.17
Having been isolated by Kissingers step-by-step Egyptian Israeli
detente, the crisis presented Asad with a golden opportunity to further
Syrias irredentist claim to Lebanon. And despite domestic, regional and
international opposition to such a move, military intervention offered Asad
the possibility of reigning in the PLO and strengthening Syrias position in
the Arab Israeli conflict, following what he viewed as Sadats betrayal
of the pan-Arab cause. Kissinger emphasized to Asad that the US
Government was serious in its determination to bring about negotiations
between Syria and Israel.18 He had considered opening preliminary talks
with Syria in Geneva, but the Israelis indicated that they would boycott a
conference if the PLO was invited.19 Asad wanted the United Nations
Security Council to become the forum for advancing Kissingers peace
process to its next phase. Only at the UN, he said, could the PLO be fully
involved as a party to the negotiations, without US invitation and alongside
the Soviet Union, in a setting where Zionist pressures would pose less of a
distraction. By elevating the debate to the UN, Syrias position in the Arab
world would be strengthened at the expense of Egypt and it would enable
Asad to refocus the process on Syrian objectivesexercising complete
control over the PLO, regaining the Golan Heights from Israel and
establishing his pre-eminence in the Arab world.
The Israeli Government, however, was unconvinced of the benevolent
nature of the Syrian regimes offer to come to Frangiehs aid and viewed
Kissingers eagerness to bring Asad to the negotiating table as an
unwelcome development. Jerusalem signalled that if Syrian troops
intervened in Lebanon, it would treat this action as an invasion and
Rabin warned that Israel would not stand aside if Asad pursued such a
policy.20 The Israelis were advancing their interests in Lebanon by arming
the Christian militias and whilst the US supported this policy, Rabin, who
had clashed repeatedly with Kissinger in the context of the Sinai process,
remained suspicious of Kissingers intentions. He believed Asad would
resume his support for the PLOs campaign of violence against Israel as
soon as the balance of power in Lebanon was altered and their interests no
longer coincided.

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

360

ISRAEL AFFAIRS

Israel was not the only regional opponent of Asads plan to extend his
influence in Lebanon. Hostile to his Arab leadership, the Egyptian, Iraqi
and Libyan regimes were all attempting to limit Asads influence by
supporting the PLO LNM alliance. Asad had previously backed the
radicals, but then switched sides to maintain a balance of forces by helping
the Christians to avoid a complete collapse. As the crisis worsened, this
position placed him increasingly at odds with his Soviet allies and provided
Kissinger with a further opportunity to strengthen US Syrian relations. He
believed that if Asad could successfully split the PLO from Jumblatt, then a
balance of forces might be found in Lebanon that would allow him to
advance a comprehensive Middle East peace process and compound the
isolation of the Soviet Union, something which had been his original
preference for the region. To Kissinger this was almost a caricature of
classic balance-of-power diplomacy, with the US in the driving seat as
none of the parties could actively achieve their objectives without its
support:
Israel wanted us to restrain Syria; Syria was seeking our support in
preventing an Israeli move into Lebanon. Egypt knew that we were the
key to rapid progress when the peace process resumed. The Soviet Union
was paralyzed by its perplexities. We emerged as the indispensable
balance wheel of diplomacy in Lebanon because all the players had a
stake in good relations with us.21

This led Kissinger to gain tacit Israeli approval for a limited Syrian military
intervention. And fearing that they were being squeezed out, the Soviet
Unions response was to increase its support for Jumblatt and the PLO. But
the outcome of this was not a clash between Israel and Syria, whose
interests remained in alignment throughout the summer of 1976, but rather
a standoff between the US and the Soviets as the Israeli-backed Christian
militias linked up with Syrian forces against the PLO in Lebanon, seriously
threatening Moscows position in the region.
KISSINGER SUPPORTS A SYRIAN SOLUTION

On 22 January 1976, a political solutionknown as the Constitutional

Documentwas agreed between Syria, the Lebanese and the Palestinians,
with a ceasefire announced the following day.22 Under amendments to the
National Pact, the role of Lebanons president would be weakened, the
prime ministers influence would be extended and the distribution of seats
in parliament would be reallocated on a fifty fifty Christian Muslim
basis.23 Implicit in this deal was a Syrian commitment to contain the PLO,
end Jumblatts gambit to overthrow the government and prevent the
Maronites from making political concessions that significantly eroded
the Christian position in Lebanon and the Middle East. Lacking any

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A POSITIVE ASPECT TO THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

361

mechanism that would enable Jumblatt to fulfil his political ambitions, he

rejected the agreement. The reforms remained unimplemented, the
Lebanese army disintegrated, and it became increasingly apparent that
further Syrian military intervention would be necessary to prevent the
PLO LNM alliance from defeating the Christians. Syria was not quick to
act. Asad failed to support a new presidential candidate and prevent the
formation of a Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) from the Muslim fragments of
the old Lebanese army.
By mid-March 1976, the conflict in Lebanon had escalated
dramatically, the LAA joining forces with the PLOLNM alliance,
which was preparing for a major offensive against Christian strongholds.24
Jumblatt appeared more determined then ever to end the political preeminence of the Maronite community in Lebanon. The PLO, however, was
divided over the wisdom of pursuing this course. Jumblatts ultimate
objective was to overthrow what remained of the old Lebanese state, but
Arafat was aware that Asad would not tolerate a total Christian defeat.
However, the Fatah leader could not easily abandon his most effective
Lebanese ally; therefore Jumblatts intransigence looked set to provide the
pretext for a major Syrian military intervention. This act would define the
remainder of Lebanons civil war and strengthen Asad far more than
Kissinger had originally envisaged. Asad was equally resolute in his
determination to ensure that any regulation of Lebanons conflict would
primarily serve Syrian interests. In Jumblatts intransigence, he saw an
historic opportunity to win over the Maronites for Syria, by letting them
understand that their salvation no longer lay with France or the West, but
with the Arabs, by which of course, he meant Syria.25
Kissinger believed that if a limited Syrian intervention could be achieved
without provoking a disproportionate Israeli reaction, Asad might be
forced to crush the PLO, as King Hussein of Jordan had done in response to
Fatahs attempt to overthrow his state in 1970 71.26 Asad did not,
however, keep the US informed as to how he intended to approach the
escalating crisis in Lebanon. This prompted a warning from Kissinger, that
to deploy regular Syrian troops into Lebanon would carry the most serious
risks of war with Israel.27 The Syrian presidents response was blunt. The
Lebanese crisis was a purely internal Arab problem, he said, and one that
Israel would only respond to by occupying part of Lebanon if it was
inspired by, and had the green light from, the US to do so.28
On 23 March, Khaddam informed the US that Asad was ready to
deploy troops to Lebanon as the Christian position became more and more
precarious. PLO LNM forces were besieging Christian districts in Beirut
and villages in the mountains. Lebanon, Khaddam said, was on the verge of
becoming a new Angola. And so desperate was the situation that Frangieh
had called three times that day, personally requesting intervention by
Syria.29 Kissinger reacted instantly, cautioning that the dangers inherent in

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

362

ISRAEL AFFAIRS

such action were extremely real. In his independent judgement, and

although he was strongly urging restraint on the Israelis, Kissinger told
Asad that, as a minimum, they would occupy substantial parts of
southern Lebanon and perhaps elsewhere should he overstep the mark.30
But Asad had no intention of agreeing to a political compromise in
Lebanon that would allow Jumblatt to emerge victorious or limit his own
ambitions there.
As a means of preventing a major Syrian military intervention, Kissinger
began to consider the formation of an inter-Arab police force for Lebanon.
But King Hussein of Jordan, who was busy promoting Asads Lebanon
policy in Washington, argued that such a force might actually escalate the
crisis, as most of the other Arab regimes were actively supporting one
Lebanese faction or another against Syria. Illustrating this point, Arafat
had been attempting, unsuccessfully, to bring about Iraqi military
intervention to prevent a Syrian offensive against the PLO, and rumours
abounded that a group of Alawite officers in the Syrian army, which
included Asads brother Rifat, were plotting a palace coup against him.31
The Syrian president paid lip service to Kissingers warnings, confirming
that his troops would only be deployed in Beirut, the mountain areas where
Christian villages were under attack and in the Bekka Vally. He restated
that the principal objective behind Syrias intervention was to preserve and
guarantee Lebanons independence. His forces would withdraw once
security was restored throughout the country and the Lebanese had elected
a new president. Kissinger again warned Asad that the Israelis would likely
use his intervention as an excuse to eliminate [the] PLO presence in
southern Lebanon if he did not stick to the letter of these commitments.
Nevertheless, Kissinger remained robust in his support for Asad,
confirming that the US had made it clear to the Israelis in the most
forceful terms that any unilateral move into southern Lebanon would
encounter massive US opposition. He advised Asad that an unannounced
intervention would lessen the chances of an Israeli reprisal and mixing
Syrian forces with local or Palestinian forces would, in turn, further lessen
the danger of war between the two states. He warned, however, that should
Syrian forces advance south of the Beirut Damascus axis, and should the
total number of Syrian military personnel in Lebanon (including those
already there) exceed the size of a brigade (or approximately 3,000 men),
or employ heavy weaponry, then this could make it impossible for [the] US
to restrain the Israelis.32
On 27 March, Jumblatt met with Asad in Damascus in an encounter
which, by all accounts, sealed the Druze leaders political and personal
fate.33 In the Syrian presidents eyes, the visit represented an opportunity
for Jumblatt to make a sober reassessment of what the LNM could
conceivably achieve in Lebanon and, essentially, accept his will. Driven by
the once in a lifetime opportunity that Lebanons civil war represented,

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A POSITIVE ASPECT TO THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

363

Jumblatt petulantly rejected Asads verdict that the conflict would be

settled on Syrian terms. Upon his return to Beirut, Jumblatt complained
bitterly to US charge daffaires, George Lambrakis, of Syrian vassalization in Lebanon and Asads determination to select its next president.
Lambrakis emphasized that time was running short if the country was to
avoid partition. But Jumblatt intimated that this prospect did not trouble
him, as partition, he said, would be a consequence of Lebanons past.34
Unwilling to embrace Asads way of thinking, Jumblatts position in fact
hardened following his trip to Damascus. He believed that the Syrian
leader would shy away from overt military intervention, given the domestic
and regional difficulties such action would provoke. Undoubtedly, siding
with the Christians against the PLO in Lebanon placed Asad in a very
uncomfortable position. His regime was explicitly on the same side as
the Israeli Government, which was busy arming the Maronites against
Arafat and Jumblatt, as their interest in weakening the PLO coincided
with Asads.
With such a united front facing him Arafat had also been to Damascus
for a hearing with Asad, but unlike his Druze ally he took a more realistic
view of the Lebanese crisis. The outcome of their meeting was a split in the
LNM PLO alliance. Arafat agreed that he would no longer fully support
Jumblatt if he continued to reject a ceasefire on the basis of the
Constitutional Document. Kissinger was hopeful that if Frangieh
immediately resigned and if Arafat and Lebanons moderate Muslim
leaders were successful in convincing Jumblatt to back down, Syrian
intervention might be avoided.
BROWN OF PALESTINE

Seeking to prevent a massive Syrian military intervention, on 30 March

Kissinger dispatched US Special Envoy L. Dean Brown to Lebanon. Brown,
who had previously been appointed US ambassador to Jordan in
September 1970, was briefed to make all efforts to avoid a complete
Syrian takeover and to ensure that Jumblatt understood Kissingers
message that he would be defeated should he continue to reject a ceasefire.
Asad viewed Browns intervention as a most unwelcome development, as
Kissinger had instructed him to broker an agreement that would split the
PLO from Jumblatt and limit Syrias ambitions. Asads preferred
intermediary, King Hussein, notified Ford of his growing concerns. The
French Government had informed Asad that Kissinger was now openly
opposed to his involvement in Lebanon. Muddying the waters further,
Jumblatt had boasted to Asad that the Americans were actually
encouraging him to press ahead and resist a ceasefire in Lebanon.
This was completely untrue and Kissinger was furious. He had opened
contacts with Jumblatt and, controversially, the PLO, with the explicit

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

364

ISRAEL AFFAIRS

purpose of getting the message across to Arafat that the PLO would be
destroyed if there is no ceasefire. He sent Asad a message through King
Hussein, telling him to ignore Jumblatts psychological warfare and to
rest assured that the US was totally behind an immediate ceasefire . . . and
behind him also in his position with Jumblatt.35 Taking no chances, he
instructed US Ambassador to Syria Richard Murphy to inform him that
Jumblatts machinations were a malicious, cynical lie . . . designed to sow
seeds of discord between the US and Syria.36
At the beginning of April, Arafats reconciliation with Asad bore fruit.
A renewed ceasefire was announced and the Syrian president pulled back
from the brink of fully occupying Lebanon. The Christians now sought
clarification from Damascus as to how the PLO could be brought to abide
by the 1969 Cairo Agreement.37 Furthermore, Frangieh reneged on his
earlier commitment to sign a constitutional amendment which would
allow for the election of a new president. Only days into his new role,
Brown told Kissinger that it was now Christian intransigence that
threatened to derail the Syrian political solution, which in his view was still
a possibility. But if Frangieh was not pushed from office and a president
installed who was acceptable to all parties, an escalation of the civil war
was inevitable and a large-scale Syrian military intervention would follow.
The PLO ceasefire had changed the balance of forces. The Christian
militias, buoyed by both Browns arrival and generous Israeli arms
shipments, felt they could hold out against the LNM provided that the
Palestinians refrained from joining the fray. So confident had they become
that Chamoun echoed Winston Churchills famous Second World War
plea, telling Brown give us the tools and we will do the job.38 Brown
continued his appeals to Jumblatt for moderation, whilst Ford raised Soviet
concerns by deploying the US Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Nevertheless, Jumblatt rejected these overtures and continued to hold out
for radical political reform. But Brown was hopeful that he could be
convinced, as the Druze veto was not just Jumblatts trump card, it was his
only card. He informed Kissinger that today he relies on the Palestinian
support, but tomorrow he could be pro-Syrian.39 Lebanese Prime
Minister Rashid Karame disagreed. In his view, Jumblatt no longer
envisioned a no victor no vanquished solution to the Lebanese crisis.
It was a question of military victory or nothing.40
The Christian leaders told Brown that if the election of a presidential
candidate was imposed by either Syria or the Palestinians, then the
revolution will change sides and partition will follow. Chamoun warned
him that Asads real intention was to build a state in Lebanon that was 200
per cent hostile to Israel.41 This was a view shared by Arafat. His officials
told the US envoy that he represented the only way out of the crisis,
causing him, in a moment of reflection, to imagine that he stood on the
brink of becoming Brown of Palestine.42 But if both sides were to row

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A POSITIVE ASPECT TO THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

365

back considerably and accept agreement, the longer term question was one
of security. Who would police the reconstruction of Lebanonthe Syrians,
the Palestinians, the UN, an inter-Arab force or a mixture of all four?
Brown informed Kissinger of his belief that if it had to be Syria, then the
situation would have deteriorated so badly that they would probably
require three to four brigades plus support troops.
Nevertheless, Browns diplomacy began to pose a threat to Asads
strategy through the construction of a plan to put in place a joint security
force for Lebanon, comprising Christians, Palestinians, Saiqa forces and
units of a reconstructed Lebanese army. This, and Kissingers willingness to
open contacts with the PLO, placed Asad in a difficult position. The Syrian
president could hardly oppose USPLO dialogue, but he was most anxious
to prevent the internationalization or Arabization of the Lebanon problem.
Such a development would enhance the US role, strengthen his Arab rivals
in Lebanon, and extend Arafats independence from Damascus. Asad
responded by stepping up Syrian military activity in Lebanon, surrounding
the fuel refineries in Tripoli and Sidon and moving to block arms shipments
to the leftist forces.
US diplomacy bore fruit on 10 April, when the Lebanese Parliament
approved an amendment to article 73 of its constitution, which permitted
for the election of a new president with the expectation that Frangieh would
make an early departure from office. Without informing Washington,
where it was viewed as at least halfway to outright military intervention,
Asad immediately sent troops and a large number of tanks across the
Lebanese border.43 Brown was not going to deter Asad from his primary
objective of intervening in Lebanon. The Syrian president declared that the
intransigence of Jumblatt and his allies, who he deemed the principal
culprits in the Lebanon crisis, had made military intervention unavoidable.
As three Syrian brigades entered the Bekka Valley, causing panic
amongst the LNM and their Palestinian allies, Kissinger sent a message to
Asad indicating that his intervention had gotten just about to the brink of
where the US could be expected to restrict an Israeli response.44 The US, he
said, was walking through a mine field in its efforts to prevent a clash
that could escalate into a wider Middle East war.45 Kissinger was then
immediately forced onto the defensive, as press reports suggested that he
had formulated a red line of engagement with the Israeli Government.
Comments made publicly by Rabin, that there was a red line in Lebanon
that Syria could not cross without risking Israeli military intervention,
appeared to correspond with the wording of Kissingers private warnings
to Asad. Seeking to reassure the Syrian president, he stressed that The
Washington Posts headline: Kissinger, Rabin, caution Syria on Lebanon,
was simply misleading and irresponsible.46
The ceasefire then collapsed, shelling and gun battles recommenced
in Beirut and the Christian militias made advances in the mountains.

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

366

ISRAEL AFFAIRS

Brown suspected that the Christian offensive was the result of external
support and Chamouns desire to internationalize the crisis by making it
worse. The objective of Kissingers balancing act, through Browns
mediation, had been to bolster the Christians to the extent that they were
strong enough to negotiate an agreement without capitulating. But it
merely prompted the Christians to escalate the violence in the hope of
provoking a major confrontation between Asad and the PLO. Brown
warned Kissinger that the Maronites were drawing all the wrong
conclusions from their newfound position of strength. He lamented, that
in Lebanon, one years history has shown that a winner hates to quit and a
loser begins to palm his cards.47
Sensing the impending danger, Arafat cunningly tried to detach himself
from the losing side, preserve his position and act as a mediator between
the Lebanese and the Syrians. On 15 April, he set off for Damascus and
presented the US Envoys security proposals to Asad as his own, prompting
Brown to complain that, I feel as if Ive been mugged.48 Arafat was
attempting to carve out a role as honest broker between Jumblatt and
Asad, and find agreement in which the Syrians would hold their forces in
their current positions and reduce pressure on LNM. Arafat was extremely
apprehensive that the LNM would ultimately drag the PLO back into
hostilities with the Lebanese Forces and of the Syrian reprisals that would
surely follow. He hoped to coordinate Syrian/Palestinian positions on the
election of a new president, establish a commission to set up Browns joint
security force and renegotiate the Constitutional Document. Asad,
however, was now ready to assert himself in Lebanon.
THE DAMASCENE VIEW

Although under increasing pressure from the Soviets and deeply suspicious
of Browns diplomacy in Lebanon, Asad held his nerve. Kissingers attempt
to support Syrian intervention, on the one hand, and limit it through
Browns diplomacy, on the other, had resulted in a cooling in US Syrian
relations as the crisis reached boiling point. Calling for the reconvening of a
Geneva conference on the Middle East peace process, with full Palestinian
representation, the Soviets were poised to defend their investment in the
PLO.49 Nevertheless, Asad moved to prevent Jumblatt and the Christians
from successfully establishing separate governmental institutions in
different parts of Lebanon and reinforcing the de facto partition of the
country. Having been rearmed by the Israelis, the Lebanese forces again
escalated the conflict in efforts to provoke Syria to intervene against the
PLO. Asad responded by deploying PLA troops onto the streets of Beirut,
but the violence that raged across the capital now served only to
demonstrate clearly that his forces, at their present strength, were
incapable of quelling the civil unrest.

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A POSITIVE ASPECT TO THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

367

The political and military support the Christian militias enjoyed from
both the Israeli and Syrian governments had considerably tempered their
propensity to compromise. Having lost the sense of urgency and impending
doom that had gripped their community in late March and early April,
the Christians looked to the US for some deus ex machina to ensure they
triumphed from the continuing crisis. Brown feared that the Christian
leaders had interpreted US support as an ironclad guarantee for their future
or, at least, a position that Fords administration could not easily
disentangle itself from. Brown felt that US policy was coming unstuck in
the Lebanese imbroglio. He warned Kissinger that Syrian short-term
intentions and long-term objectives remained unclear. Put in the Egyptian
contribution, which was, he said, at least temporarily, anti-Syria, a pinch
of Libya and Iraq, and you get a stew that is quite indigestible.50
On 8 May, Elias Sarkis was elected as Frangiehs successor and, having
ignored Arafats eleventh hour endeavours to broker a compromise,
Asad prepared for a military showdown with Jumblatt and the PLO.
Kissinger immediately sought to restrain Asad, telling him that the US
would be in a strong position to make the all-out effort for a settlement
the following year.
The US Government, he said, was committed to, and understood fully,
Asads determination to bring the Palestinians into the negotiating
process.51 At the same time, Brown was desperately trying to bring
Jumblatt into the political process before the crisis reached the point of no
return. He believed that it was still possible to extricate the Lebanese
situation from the ongoing feud between Asad and Sadat, by preventing the
Lebanese factions from playing one off against the other. But Asad now
openly rejected the notion that his freedom of action in Lebanon would be
limited by external powers. As Christian Palestinian clashes succeeded in
forcing Arafat back into Jumblatts arms, Asad accused the US of
concocting a plot to prolong the civil war.52 Having failed to reduce
the crisis by diplomacy, Kissinger withdrew Brown, on 11 May, and the
Christians launched a major offensive against the LNM, adding to the
pressure on Jumblatts coalition.
On 1 June, the Soviet prime minister, Aleksej Kosygin, travelled to
Damascus intent on avoiding a clash between his two main allies in the
regionthe PLO and Syria. As he arrived, Asad deployed more troops
deeper into Lebanon. They were successful in alleviating pressure on
Christian villages in the Bekka Valley, but suffered heavy losses in Beirut as
Arafats Fatah and Jumblatts LNM retaliated, decimating pro-Syrian
Saiqa and PLA units there.53 Anticipating a massive Syrian intervention,
Kissinger set in train plans to evacuate all US citizens.54 And by 7 June,
Syrias 12,000 troops in Lebanon had taken up positions outside Sidon in
the south and Sofar on the Beirut Damascus highway.55 However, they
made heavy work of securing the southern Lebanese port and resorted to

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

368

ISRAEL AFFAIRS

shelling the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps on the outskirts of
the capital in frustrated attempts to subdue the PLO.
Dissident forces from all sides coalesced to ensure no quarter would be
given to those calling for mediation. The new US Ambassador, Francis
Meloy, mused that the Saudis, who were signalling their willingness to
mediate, should present Lebanons president designate with an inauguration gift of an armour plated car. But soon after, on 16 June, Meloy was
kidnapped and subsequently executed by Palestinian gunmen as his own
car attempted to navigate Beiruts green linethe demarcation zone
dividing the capitals Christian and Muslim territory. Bruised and deflated,
Kissinger intimated that the US would not be driven off its course by
violence but, in the same breath, ruled out the possibility of US military
intervention.56
At the end of June, Lebanons political process suffered another setback
when Chamouns Tiger Militia launched a major offensive against the
Palestinian camps in East Beirut. This relieved the Syrian forces there,
which welcomed the Christian advance. Consequently, the tables turned
dramatically in July, as the PLO and the LNM were caught up in a deadly
crossfire between the Lebanese forces and the Syrian army. This prompted
the Soviet Union to defend its position in the Middle East and, anticipating
a major crisis, Kissinger told Ford that he had an uneasy feeling that they
were going for broke.57 As Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon put it, if
the PLO is destroyed, the Soviets will have lost a great vehicle in the
region.58 Arafat then unexpectedly broke with Asad during an Arab League
conference, illustrating the Soviet Unions determination to maintain his
independence from Syria. The PLO leader announced that he would not go
to Damascus until the Syrians withdrew from Lebanon. King Hussein
warned Kissinger that this was not a Soviet request but a demand.59 To
withdraw unilaterally would have left most of Lebanon under Arafats
control and represented a humiliating defeat that would have seriously
threatened Asads leadership. The Soviets responded to Asads refusal to
ease the pressure on the PLO by freezing the supply of spare parts,
economic and military aid to Syria. This Cold War standoff posed a
significant threat to US interests in the region and Kissingers Middle East
strategy. He spelt out the inherent danger of a USSoviet clash in the
Middle East, telling Ford, You may be facing your first real first-class
crisis since taking office. He advised the US president to hold his nerve,
concluding that, we must keep the Syrians there and we may have to play
tough to do so.60
As a signal of his administrations determination to prevent a Syrian
withdrawal, Ford moved the US fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean to
within twenty-four hours notice of deployment.61 King Husseins warnings
proved correct. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev delivered a blunt letter to
Asad, before taking the highly unusual step of making public his criticisms

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A POSITIVE ASPECT TO THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

369

of the Syrian leaders handling of the Lebanon crisis. He cautioned Asad

against taking any further steps that would make fissures appear in their
relationship.62 Asad showed no hint of wavering under Brezhnevs decision
to increase the supply of Soviet arms to the PLO/LMN alliance. And the
two sides actually clashed in an incident at the northern port of Tripoli, as
the Soviet carrier Kiev attacked a Lebanese gunboat when it approached
to investigate reports of a vessel unloading arms.63
The Syrian strategy towards the PLO in Lebanon was neither
spectacular nor conclusive, and had it been, Asads image in the Arab
world would have been further tarnished. In the event, he underestimated
Arafats strength and the resolve of both Moscow and his Arab rivals to
replenish rebel supply lines. Having cut his losses in Beirut, Kissinger was
content to see the PLO worn down and Asad embroiled in the Lebanese
quagmire. But Asad did not shy away from the confrontation, having
waited patiently for his moment to occupy Lebanon.
On 27 July, a ceasefire agreement was reached, following a second
rebuke from Brezhnev to Asad and intensive negotiations between the PLO
and the Syrians. The Soviet leader indicated that he would continue to
support the Palestinians and block arms supplies to Syria unless it
withdrew its forces. Syria, he said, must withdraw to the Bekka Valley, an
Arab League Force should be deployed to maintain the ceasefire and the
PLO/LNM alliance should retain control over the areas they occupied. But
as the Soviets were at odds with their two main allies in the region, Asad
knew that there was a limit to how far Moscow was prepared to go to
prevent his ascendancy in Lebanon.
The US reaffirmed its continued support for Syrias role in Lebanon,
providing Asad with intelligence on direct and indirect Soviet arms
shipments, in a move Kissinger himself described as a diplomatic
revolution.64 He told Asad to be mindful of getting bogged down, but
having made a military commitment to Lebanon, agreed that there could
be no question of a withdrawal, as this would only represent a victory for
the PLO. Asad responded cryptically. He told Kissinger that there is no
reward for losing in moderation and no substitute in some situations for a
military victory. This view had led the Syrian leader to conclude that there
were no landmarks ahead in the search for a purely political solution to
Lebanons civil war.65 Asad had achieved his objectives, his view that there
would be no solution to the Lebanon crisis that did not first and foremost
suit Syrian interests, had prevailed.
For Lebanon, however, having failed to provide a window for peace in
Kissingers grand design, there were no boundaries to the civil war that
continued to ravage its divided society or to the Syrian solution which
ultimately brought it to a conclusion under Asads control, again with US
support, at the end of the Cold War. Reflecting on his detente with Asad,
which the convergence of US, Syrian and Israeli interests in Lebanon had

370

ISRAEL AFFAIRS

made possible, Kissinger recalled a story that the Tanzanian president,

Julius Nyerere, had once told regarding the intervention of great powers.
At one Nonaligned meeting or another, Nyerere had justified his mistrust
of the great powers to pro-Western Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister of
Singapore, by saying: When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. Lee
had replied: When elephants make love, the grass gets trampled too.66

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

NOTES
The author would like to thank the staff at the Gerald R. Ford Library for their assistance in
conducting research for this article and Professor Rory Miller for reading successive drafts.
1. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 26, Brown to Kissinger, 21 April 1976, Gerald
R. Ford Library.
2. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 14 January 1977, Gerald
R. Ford Library.
3. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, New York, 1999, pp. 101958.
4. Kissinger, Renewal, pp. 347421.
5. NSA Memos. Box 19, Memo of Conversation between Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld and
Scowcroft, The Oval Office, 13 April 1976, Gerald R. Ford Library.
6. On Lebanons civil war see Marius Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War, New York, 1980; Theodor
Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: The Decline of a State and the Rise of a Nation,
London, 1993; Farid el-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 196776, London,
2000; Naomi Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 197576 Civil War, Oxford,
1986; Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society, London, 1996.
7. Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and
Lebanon, Dublin, 2006, pp. 112 140.
8. The Times, 21 January 1976.
9. Kissinger, Renewal, p. 1027.
10. Ibid., p. 1050.
11. NSA Memos. Box 19, Memo of Conversation between Ford and Kissinger, The Cabinet
Room, 18 June 1976.
12. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to Kissinger, 25 November 1975,
Gerald R. Ford Library.
13. Ibid., 1 December 1975.
14. Kissinger, Renewal, p. 1026.
15. See Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, California, 1996, pp. 267289.
16. The Times, 22 January 1976.
17. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to Kissinger, 2 November 1975.
18. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 20 September 1975.
19. The Times, 5 January 1976.
20. The Times, 26 January 1976.
21. Kissinger, Renewal, p. 1043.
22. The Times, 23 January 1976.
23. Under the National Pact, positions in its ninety-nine seat parliament were originally distributed
on a ratio of 6:5 between Christians and Muslim. See Kerr, Imposing, pp. 146147.
24. Hanf, Coexistence, pp. 214 215.
25. Ibid., pp. 216217.
26. NSA Memos. Box 18, Memo of Conversation between Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld and
Scowcroft, The Oval Office, 24 March 1976.
27. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 15 March 1976.
28. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to Kissinger, 18 March 1976.
29. Ibid., 24 March 1976.
30. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 24 March 1976.

Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 00:00 08 October 2014

A POSITIVE ASPECT TO THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

371

31. JordanState Department Telegrams, Box 23, Pickering to Kissinger, 24 March 1976, Gerald
R. Ford Library.
32. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Pelletreau, 27 March 1976.
33. He was assassinated in Lebanon the following year, most probably by Syrian agents. Interview
with Walid Jumblatt, Beirut, 9 April 2002.
34. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 25, Lambrakis to Kissinger, 29 March 1976,
Gerald R. Ford Library.
35. NSA Memos, Box 18, Memo of Conversation between Ford, Kissinger, King Hussein and
Prime Minister Zaid Rifai of Jordan, The Oval Office, 31 March 1976, Gerald R. Ford
Library.
36. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 31 March 1976.
37. The Cairo Agreement, signed on 3 November 1969, granted the PLO freedom of action
against Israel from within Lebanon and limited the possibility of the government exercising a
purely Lebanese foreign policy. The Melkart Protocols, signed on 18 May 1973, were a
further attempt to define and regulate the PLOs presence in Lebanon.
38. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 25, Brown to Kissinger, 1 April 1976.
39. Ibid., 2 April 1976.
40. Ibid., 9 April 1976.
41. Ibid., 5 April 1976.
42. Ibid., 7 April 1976.
43. Ibid., 13 April 1976.
44. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 13 April 1976.
45. New York Times, 15 April 1976.
46. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 16 April 1976.
47. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 25, Brown to Kissinger, 13 April 1976.
48. Ibid., 15 April 1976.
49. New York Times, 29 April 1976.
50. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 26, Brown to Kissinger, 7 May 1976.
51. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 8 May 1976.
52. New York Times, 9 May 1976.
53. Hanf, Coexistence, p. 220.
54. LebanonState Department Telegrams, Box 25, Kissinger to Meloy, 4 June 1976.
55. Hanf, Coexistence, p. 220.
56. New York Times, 18 June 1976.
57. NSA Memos. Box 20, Memo of Conversation between Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft, The
Oval Office, 19 July 1976.
58. NSA Memos. Box 21, Memo of Conversation between Ford, Kissinger and Israeli Foreign
Minister Yigal Allon, The Oval Office, 11 October 1976.
59. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 31, Kissinger to Murphy, 21 July 1976.
60. NSA Memos, Box 20, Memo of Conversation between Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft, The
Oval Office, 19 July 1976.
61. Ibid.
62. Le Monde, 20 July 1976.
63. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to Kissinger, 23 July 1976.
64. Kissinger, Renewal, p. 1049.
65. SyriaState Department Telegrams, Box 32, Murphy to Kissinger, 7 August 1976.
66. Kissinger, Renewal, p. 1057.