GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L.

CESA,
JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR.,
VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget,
FRANCISCO TANTUITCO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice,
respondents.
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funs Therefor and
for Other Purposes was passed.
Transitory provisions (ART 44) reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an
Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts
shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office."
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the
Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the
occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary.
Petitioners assail its validity saying that said law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security
of judges of the court. He averred that only Supreme Court can remove judges and not the Congress. (Petitioner argues
that the provisions of the said act would violate constitutional safeguards and guarantees of the independence the
judiciary such as:
1. Security of Tenure of its members (section 7, art X)
2. Prerogative of SC to administratively supervise all courts (sec 6)
3. Power of SC to discipline judges of inferior courts and order their dismissal)
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, is unconstitutional, considering it violates the security
of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
HELD: NO. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate
body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. What is really involved in this case is not the removal or separation of
the judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the
abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition
of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition
must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That
remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and
tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of
removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be
free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between
one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.