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Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5060

January 26, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or
caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without
a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of
the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered
there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such
circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle
without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse
except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for
branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of
transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such
evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to
slaughter has been requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer
unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a
permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human
consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him,
and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age,
brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of
identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which
such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together
with date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the
provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner,
together with date of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or
killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more
than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month
nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition
contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle
for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a

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permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen not
being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable
to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of
large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to
the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and
examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the
municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and
the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase
"at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the words "killed
for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and
keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that
the latter construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make
easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To
this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of
ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to
establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by
certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the contract of sale is
made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in possession, so as to
protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for anyone but
the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But
the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it does on the
official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be
largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the
production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered,
and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a
municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the
slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals
without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of
detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it
will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the
brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion,
since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the
provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the
fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the
bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other identification marks
might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the
legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of
the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of
large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

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It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the
"killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition
is clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption
anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was
expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility
of misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be disposed to modify or
vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control
of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same
conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the
slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for
human consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the
statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and
unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the purpose
and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it
should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is clearly
susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to make effective the
provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was
denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes."
Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured
in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional
and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which
provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the
statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain
without providing for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of
opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the language of that great jurist,
Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved was
the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying away by any person,
including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,)
that the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and
restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of
the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao
owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute;
and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is
an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and authority, and in some degree
interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the regulations in
question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these regulations are
concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we
are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as
is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners
to compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use of the
property, which the legislature had authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury
(supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in
distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police
powers of the State, said:

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We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to
the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can
be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we
allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark
its boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for
human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of
property interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the
State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use,
which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public welfare. And we think that an
examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to
safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the
limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular
provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in
the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police
power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to every
species of property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had
threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy,
eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals.
Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal
almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with
which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. large
areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the
inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to
spend many millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work
animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to produce a
supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands was such
that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people, and in many
provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless
struggle for existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the
immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the
United States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the
provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident
to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of
animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural
community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of
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and the transportation of the products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the
Government to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official
reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of those animals
which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the
Islands where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and
applications of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in
some degree successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the
gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the
operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving those
sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to
five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted
prove entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until
the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the
crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the
enactment of a special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other
personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the legislative authority found that
the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome
provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their
slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the branding
and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food
were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion
that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter
for human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due and proper
exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the
State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the
supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and
records of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the
material welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages
of the disease which swept away the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law
under consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands as a
civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by
disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the
Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of
prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper
exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power
rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by
police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of
carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable
and proper exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded
to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the
destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public
nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a
house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such
as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of
decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of
railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the

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restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children;


the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of
vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and
houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating
liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests
demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary
for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128
U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere
with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so
long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary"
limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by
a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the
community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by
this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the
perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general
principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may
be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights
may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or
safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes
necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property,
and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to
their fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity
demands the interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it
becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the
spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other
great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to
that "necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment of limits within the denser portions
of cities and villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be
erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private
property; but regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result.
Wharf lines may also be established for the general good, even though they prevent the
owners of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes private property. And,
whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal
of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that effect under
penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other persons. Such
regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the legislature have
authority" to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of
circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and

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unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the
public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards which
prove, in the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger
of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery purposes.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States clearly
indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion that
the provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the
terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," a provision which itself is
adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance in the constitution of
most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915
FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellees.
TRENT, J.:
The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his
deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax
mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and
from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the
sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees
the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction
granted soon after the commencement of this action.
This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1) that relating to the
power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (2) that
relating to the validity of those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring
power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the
ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the Government. The sections
of Act No. 2339, which bear directly upon the subject, are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the
use of an injunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy
for any wrong in connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive, thereby
precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is claimed to be constitutional. The two sections,
then, involve the right of a dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional remedy to test the validity of
any tax or to determine any other question connected therewith, and the question whether the
remedy by injunction is exceptional.
Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and
history of the writ of injunction show that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive

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remedy, as distinguished from the common course of the law to redress evils after they have been
consummated. No injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and
when there is no adequate remedy at law. The Government does, by section 139 and 140, take away
the preventive remedy of injunction, if it ever existed, and leaves the taxpayer, in a contest with it,
the same ordinary remedial actions which prevail between citizen and citizen. The Attorney-General,
on behalf of the defendant, contends that there is no provisions of the paramount law which prohibits
such a course. While, on the other hand, counsel for plaintiffs urge that the two sections are
unconstitutional because (a) they attempt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy
for the protection of their property, thereby, in effect, depriving them of their property without due
process of law, and (b) they attempt to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon them
by Acts Nos. 136 and 190, which jurisdiction was ratified and confirmed by the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902.
In the first place, it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the tax in question
because the section, in speaking of a "tax," means only legal taxes; and that an illegal tax (the one
complained of) is not a tax, and, therefore, does not fall within the inhibition of the section, and may
be restrained by injunction. There is no force in this suggestion. The inhibition applies to all internal
revenue taxes imposes, or authorized to be imposed, by Act No. 2339. (Snyder vs. Marks, 109 U.S.,
189.) And, furthermore, the mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is
imposed, is unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of equity to restrain its collection by
injunction. There must be a further showing that there are special circumstances which bring the case
under some well recognized head of equity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity
of suits, or a cloud upon title to real estate will result, and also that there is, as we have indicated, no
adequate remedy at law. This is the settled law in the United States, even in the absence of statutory
enactments such as sections 139 and 140. (Hannewinkle vs. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown, 82 U.S., 547;
Indiana Mfg. Co. vs. Koehne, 188 U.S., 681; Ohio Tax cases, 232 U. S., 576, 587; Pittsburgh C. C. & St.
L. R. Co. vs. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S., 32; Shelton vs. Plat, 139 U.S., 591; State Railroad Tax
Cases, 92 U. S., 575.) Therefore, this branch of the case must be controlled by sections 139 and 140,
unless the same be held unconstitutional, and consequently, null and void.
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature
exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave
responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful
consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and
approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect
with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a
statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a
court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to
be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, the case must be so clear to be
free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable,
because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the
legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary
is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce
a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to
resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. (6 Ruling Case Law, secs. 71, 72, and 73, and cases
cited therein.)
It is also the settled law in the United States that "due process of law" does not always require, in
respect to the Government, the same process that is required between citizens, though it generally
implies and includes regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some well
settled course of judicial proceedings. The case with which we are dealing is in point. A citizen's
property, both real and personal, may be taken, and usually is taken, by the government in payment
of its taxes without any judicial proceedings whatever. In this country, as well as in the United States,
the officer charged with the collection of taxes is authorized to seize and sell the property of
delinquent taxpayers without applying to the courts for assistance, and the constitutionality of the
law authorizing this procedure never has been seriously questioned. (City of Philadelphia vs. [Diehl]
The Collector, 5 Wall., 720; Nicholl vs. U.S., 7 Wall., 122, and cases cited.) This must necessarily be
the course, because it is upon taxation that the Government chiefly relies to obtain the means to

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 9 of 73

carry on its operations, and it is of the utmost importance that the modes adopted to enforce the
collection of the taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible. No
government could exist if every litigious man were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. This
principle of public policy must be constantly borne in mind in determining cases such as the one
under consideration.
With these principles to guide us, we will proceed to inquire whether there is any merit in the two
propositions insisted upon by counsel for the plaintiffs. Section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides: "That
no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the law."
The origin and history of these provisions are well-known. They are found in substance in the
Constitution of the United States and in that of ever state in the Union.
Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, effective since 1867, provides that: "No
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court."
Section 139, with which we have been dealing, reads: "No court shall have authority to grant an
injunction to restrain the collection of any internal-revenue tax."
A comparison of these two sections show that they are essentially the same. Both expressly prohibit
the restraining of taxes by injunction. If the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly and
definitely held that the provisions of section 3224 do not violate the "due process of law" and "equal
protection of the law" clauses in the Constitution, we would be going too far to hold that section 139
violates those same provisions in the Philippine Bill. That the Supreme Court of the United States has
so held, cannot be doubted.
In Cheatham vs. United States (92 U.S., 85,89) which involved the validity of an income tax levied by
an act of Congress prior to the one in issue in the case of Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157
U.S., 429) the court, through Mr. Justice Miller, said: "If there existed in the courts, state or National,
any general power of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship incident
to taxation, the very existence of the government might be placed in the power of a hostile judiciary.
(Dows vs. The City of Chicago, 11 Wall., 108.) While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is
allowed within the departments before the money is finally exacted, the General Government has
wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition
precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the tax is assessed. In the internal
revenue branch it has further prescribed that no such suit shall be brought until the remedy by appeal
has been tried; and, if brought after this, it must be within six months after the decision on the
appeal. We regard this as a condition on which alone the government consents to litigate the
lawfulness of the original tax. It is not a hard condition. Few governments have conceded such a right
on any condition. If the compliance with this condition requires the party aggrieved to pay the money,
he must do it."
Again, in State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U.S., 575, 613), the court said: "That there might be no
misunderstanding of the universality of this principle, it was expressly enacted, in 1867, that "no suit
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court." (Rev, Stat., sec. 3224.) And though this was intended to apply alone to taxes levied by the
United States, it shows the sense of Congress of the evils to be feared if courts of justice could, in any
case, interfere with the process of collecting taxes on which the government depends for its
continued existence. It is a wise policy. It is founded in the simple philosophy derived from the
experience of ages, that the payment of taxes has to be enforced by summary and stringent means
against a reluctant and often adverse sentiment; and to do this successfully, other instrumentalities
and other modes of procedure are necessary, than those which belong to courts of justice."
And again, in Snyder vs. Marks (109 U.S., 189), the court said: "The remedy of a suit to recover back
the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The
remedy so given is exclusive, and no other remedy can be substituted for it. Such has been the
current of decisions in the Circuit Courts of the United States, and we are satisfied it is a correct view
of the law."itc-a1f

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 10 of 73

In the consideration of the plaintiffs' second proposition, we will attempt to show (1) that the
Philippine courts never have had, since the American occupation, the power to restrain by injunction
the collection of any tax imposed by the Insular Government for its own purpose and benefit, and (2)
that assuming that our courts had or have such power, this power has not been diminished or
curtailed by sections 139 and 140.
We will first review briefly the former and present systems of taxation. Upon the American occupation
of the Philippine, there was found a fairly complete system of taxation. This system was continued in
force by the military authorities, with but few changes, until the Civil Government assumed charge of
the subject. The principal sources of revenue under the Spanish regime were derived from customs
receipts, the so-called industrial taxes, the urbana taxes, the stamp tax, the personal cedula tax, and
the sale of the public domain. The industrial and urbana taxes constituted practically an income tax of
some 5 per cent on the net income of persons engaged in industrial and commercial pursuits and on
the income of owners of improved city property. The sale of stamped paper and adhesive stamp tax.
The cedula tax was a graduated tax, ranging from nothing up to P37.50. The revenue derived from
the sale of the public domain was not considered a tax. The American authorities at once abolished
the cedula tax, but later restored it in a modified form, charging for each cedula twenty centavos, an
amount which was supposed to be just sufficient to cover the cost of issuance. The urbana tax was
abolished by Act No. 223, effective September 6, 1901.
The "Municipal Code" (Act No. 82) and the Provincial Government Act (No. 83), both enacted in 1901,
authorize municipal councils and provincial boards to impose an ad valorem tax on real estate. The
Municipal Code did not apply to the city of Manila. This city was given a special charter (Act No. 183),
effective August 30, 1901; Under this charter the Municipal Board of Manila is authorized and
empowered to impose taxes upon real estate and, like municipal councils, to license and regulate
certain occupations. Customs matters were completely reorganized by Act No. 355, effective at the
port of Manila on February 7, 1902, and at other ports in the Philippine Islands the day after the
receipt of a certified copy of the Act. The Internal Revenue Law of 1904 (Act No. 1189), repealed all
existing laws, ordinances, etc., imposing taxes upon the persons, objects, or occupations taxed under
that act, and all industrial taxes and stamp taxes imposed under the Spanish regime were eliminated,
but the industrial tax was continued in force until January 1, 1905. This Internal Revenue Law did not
take away from municipal councils, provincial boards, and the Municipal Board of the city of Manila
the power to impose taxes upon real estate. This Act (No. 1189), with its amendments, was repealed
by Act No. 2339, an act "revising and consolidating the laws relative to internal revenue."
Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that "No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax
assessed under this act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against
him, . . . ."
This inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes imposed by provincial
boards. The inhibition was not inserted in the Manila Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793,
effective October 12, 1907. Act No. 355 expressly makes the payment of the exactions claimed a
condition precedent to a resort to the courts by dissatisfied importers. Section 52 of Act No. 1189
provides "That no courts shall have authority to grant an injunction restraining the collection of any
taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of this Act, but the remedy of the taxpayer who claims that
he is unjustly assessed or taxed shall be by payment under protest of the sum claimed from him by
the Collector of Internal Revenue and by action to recover back the sum claimed to have been
illegally collected."
Sections 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339 contain, as we have indicated, the same prohibition and
remedy. The result is that the courts have been expressly forbidden, in every act creating or imposing
taxes or imposts enacted by the legislative body of the Philippines since the American occupation, to
entertain any suit assailing the validity of any tax or impost thus imposed until the tax shall have
been paid under protest. The only taxes which have not been brought within the express inhibition
were those included in that part of the old Spanish system which completely disappeared on or before
January 1, 1905, and possibly the old customs duties which disappeared in February, 1902.
Section 56 of the Organic Act (No. 136), effective June 16, 1901, provides that "Courts of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction:

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 11 of 73

xxx

xxx

xxx

2. In all civil actions which involve the ... legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. Said courts and their judges, or any of them, shall have power to issue writs of injunction,
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective
provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), effective October 1, 1901, which deals
with the subject of injunctions, are sections 162 to 172, inclusive. Injunctions, as here defined, are of
two kinds; preliminary and final. The former may be granted at any time after the commencement of
the action and before final judgment, and the latter at the termination of the trial as the relief or part
of the relief prayed for (sec. 162). Any judge of the Supreme Court may grant a preliminary injunction
in any action pending in that court or in any Court of First Instance. A preliminary injunction may also
be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance in actions pending in his district in which he has
original jurisdiction (sec. 163). But such injunctions may be granted only when the complaint shows
facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded (sec. 166), and before a final or permanent
injunction can be granted, it must appear upon the trial of the action that the plaintiff is entitled to
have commission or continuance of the acts complained of perpetually restrained (sec. 171). These
provisions authorize the institution in Courts of First Instance of what are known as "injunction suits,"
the sole object of which is to obtain the issuance of a final injunction. They also authorize the granting
of injunctions as aiders in ordinary civil actions. We have defined in Davesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep.,
273), an injunction to be "A "special remedy" adopted in that code (Act 190) from American practice,
and originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which was there issued by the authority and
under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is sought, to
those cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law,"which will not be
granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where
material and irreparable injury will be done,"which cannot be compensated in damages . . .
By paragraph 2 of section 56 of Act No. 136, supra, and the provisions of the various subsequent Acts
heretofore mentioned, the Insular Government has consented to litigate with aggrieved persons the
validity of any original tax or impost imposed by it on condition that this be done in ordinary civil
actions after the taxes or exactions shall have been paid. But it is said that paragraph 2 confers
original jurisdiction upon Courts of First Instance to hear and determine "all civil actions" which
involve the validity of any tax, impost or assessment, and that if the all-inclusive words "all" and
"any" be given their natural and unrestricted meaning, no action wherein that question is involved
can arise over which such courts do not have jurisdiction. (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44.) This
is true. But the term "civil actions" had its well defined meaning at the time the paragraph was
enacted. The same legislative body which enacted paragraph 2 on June 16, 1901, had, just a few
months prior to that time, defined the only kind of action in which the legality of any tax imposed by
it might be assailed. (Sec. 84, Act 82, enacted January 31, 1901, and sec. 17, Act No. 83, enacted
February 6, 1901.) That kind of action being payment of the tax under protest and an ordinary suit to
recover and no other, there can be no doubt that Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over all
such actions. The subsequent legislation on the same subject shows clearly that the Commission, in
enacting paragraph 2, supra, did not intend to change or modify in any way section 84 of Act No. 82
and section 17 of Act No. 83, but, on the contrary, it was intended that "civil actions," mentioned in
said paragraph, should be understood to mean, in so far as testing the legality of taxes were
concerned, only those of the kind and character provided for in the two sections above mentioned. It
is also urged that the power to restrain by injunction the collection of taxes or imposts is conferred
upon Courts of First Instance by paragraph 7 of section 56, supra. This paragraph does empower
those courts to grant injunctions, both preliminary and final, in any civil action pending in their
districts, provided always, that the complaint shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief
demanded. Injunction suits, such as the one at bar, are "civil actions," but of a special or
extraordinary character. It cannot be said that the Commission intended to give a broader or different
meaning to the word "action," used in Chapter 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in connection with
injunctions, than it gave to the same word found in paragraph 2 of section 56 of the Organic Act. The
Insular Government, in exercising the power conferred upon it by the Congress of the United States,

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 12 of 73

has declared that the citizens and residents of this country shall pay certain specified taxes and
imposts. The power to tax necessarily carries with it the power to collect the taxes. This being true,
the weight of authority supports the proposition that the Government may fix the conditions upon
which it will consent to litigate the validity of its original taxes. (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U.S., 69.)
We must, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 and 7 of section 56 of Act No. 136, construed in the
light of the prior and subsequent legislation to which we have referred, and the legislative and judicial
history of the same subject in the United States with which the Commission was familiar, do not
empower Courts of firs Instance to interfere by injunction with the collection of the taxes in question
in this case.1awphil.net
If we are in error as to the scope of paragraph 2 and 7, supra, and the Commission did intend to
confer the power upon the courts to restrain the collection of taxes, it does not necessarily follow that
this power or jurisdiction has been taken away by section 139 of Act No. 2339, for the reason that all
agree that an injunction will not issue in any case if there is an adequate remedy at law. The very
nature of the writ itself prevents its issuance under such circumstances. Legislation forbidding the
issuing of injunctions in such cases is unnecessary. So the only question to be here determined is
whether the remedy provided for in section 140 of Act No. 2339 is adequate. If it is, the writs which
form the basis of this appeal should not have been issued. If this is the correct view, the authority to
issue injunctions will not have been taken away by section 139, but rendered inoperative only by
reason of an adequate remedy having been made available.
The legislative body of the Philippine Islands has declared from the beginning (Act No. 82) that
payment under protest and suit to recover is an adequate remedy to test the legality of any tax or
impost, and that this remedy is exclusive. Can we say that the remedy is not adequate or that it is not
exclusive, or both? The plaintiffs in the case at bar are the first, in so far as we are aware, to question
either the adequacy or exclusiveness of this remedy. We will refer to a few cases in the United States
where statutes similar to sections 139 and 140 have been construed and applied.
In May, 1874, one Bloomstein presented a petition to the circuit court sitting in Nashville, Tennessee,
stating that his real and personal property had been assessed for state taxes in the year 1872 to the
amount of $132.60; that he tendered to the collector this amount in "funds receivable by law for such
purposes;" and that the collector refused to receive the same. He prayed for an alternative writ of
mandamus to compel the collector to receive the bills in payment for such taxes, or to show cause to
the contrary. To this petition the collector, in his answer, set up the defense that the petitioner's suit
was expressly prohibited by the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, passed in
1873. The petition was dismissed and the relief prayed for refused. An appeal to the supreme court of
the State resulted in the affirmance of the judgment of the lower court. The case was then carried to
the Supreme Court of the United States (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U. S., 69), where the judgment was
again affirmed.
The two sections of the Act of [March 21,] 1873, drawn in question in that cases, read as follows:
1. That in all cases in which an officer, charged by law with the collection of revenue due the
State, shall institute any proceeding, or take any steps for the collection of the same, alleged
or claimed to be due by said officer from any citizen, the party against whom the proceeding or
step is taken shall, if he conceives the same to be unjust or illegal, or against any statute or
clause of the Constitution of the State, pay the same under protest; and, upon his making said
payment, the officer or collector shall pay such revenue into the State Treasury, giving notice
at the time of payment to the Comptroller that the same was paid under protest; and the party
paying said revenue may, at any time within thirty days after making said payment, and not
longer thereafter, sue the said officer having collected said sum, for the recovery thereof. And
the same may be tried in any court having the jurisdiction of the amount and parties; and, if it
be determined that the same was wrongfully collected, as not being due from said party to the
State, for any reason going to the merits of the same, then the court trying the case may
certify of record that the same was wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded; and thereupon
the Comptroller shall issue his warrant for the same, which shall be paid in preference to other
claims on the Treasury.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 13 of 73

2. That there shall be no other remedy, in any case of the collection of revenue, or attempt to
collect revenue illegally, or attempt to collect revenue in funds only receivable by said officer
under the law, the same being other or different funds than such as the tax payer may tender,
or claim the right to pay, than that above provided; and no writ for the prevention of the
collection of any revenue claimed, or to hinder or delay the collection of the same, shall in
anywise issue, either injunction, supersedeas, prohibition, or any other writ or process
whatever; but in all cases in which, for any reason, any person shall claim that the tax so
collected was wrongfully or illegally collected, the remedy for said party shall be as above
provided, and in no other manner."
In discussing the adequacy of the remedy provided by the Tennessee Legislature, as above set forth,
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case just cited, said: "This remedy is simple and
effective. A suit at law to recover money unlawfully exacted is as speedy, as easily tried, and less
complicated than a proceeding by mandamus. ... In revenue cases, whether arising upon its (United
States) Internal Revenue Laws or those providing for the collection of duties upon foreign imports, it
(United States) adopts the rule prescribed by the State of Tennessee. It requires the contestant to pay
the amount as fixed by the Government, and gives him power to sue the collector, and in such suit to
test the legality of the tax. There is nothing illegal or even harsh in this. It is a wise and reasonable
precaution for the security of the Government."
Thomas C. Platt commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Tennessee to restrain the collection of a license tax from the company which he represented. The
defense was that sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, supra, prohibited the bringing of that suit. This
case also reached the Supreme Court of the United States. (Shelton vs. Platt, 139 U. 591.) In speaking
of the inhibitory provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, the court said: "This Act has been
sanctioned and applied by the Courts of Tennessee. (Nashville vs. Smith, 86 Tenn., 213; Louisville & N.
R. Co. vs. State, 8 Heisk., 663, 804.) It is, as counsel observe, similar to the Act of Congress forbidding
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes under the Internal Revenue
Laws, in respect to which this court held that the remedy by suit to recover back the tax after
payment, provided for by the Statute, was exclusive. (Snyder vs. Marks, of this character has been
called for by the embarrassments resulting from the improvident employment of the writ of injunction
in arresting the collection of the public revenue; and, even in its absence, the strong arm of the court
of chancery ought not to be interposed in that direction except where resort to that court is grounded
upon the settled principles which govern its jurisdiction."
In Louisville & N.R. Co. vs. State (8 Heisk. [64 Tenn.], 663, 804), cited by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Shelton vs. Platt, supra, the court said: "It was urged that this statute (sections 1 and
2 of the Act of 1873, supra) is unconstitutional and void, as it deprives the citizen of the remedy by
certiorari, guaranteed by the organic law."
By the 10th section of the sixth article of the Constitution, [Tennessee] it is provided that: "The judges
or justices of inferior courts of law and equity shall have power in all civil cases to issue writs of
certiorari, to remove any cause, or the transcript of the record thereof, from any inferior jurisdiction
into such court of law, on sufficient cause, supported by oath or affirmation."
The court held the act valid as not being in conflict with these provisions of the State constitution.
In Eddy vs. The Township of Lee (73 Mich., 123), the complainants sought to enjoin the collection of
certain taxes for the year 1886. The defendants, in support of their demurrer, insisted that the
remedy by injunction had been taken away by section 107 of the Act of 1885, which section reads as
follows: "No injunction shall issue to stay proceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes under
this Act."
It was claimed by the complainants that the above quoted provisions of the Act of 1885 were
unconstitutional and void as being in conflict with article 6, sec. 8, of the Constitution, which provides
that: "The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted
in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law. ... They shall also have power to issue writs of habeas
corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other writs necessary to carry into effect
their orders, judgments, and decrees."

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 14 of 73

Mr. Justice Champlin, speaking for the court, said: "I have no doubt that the Legislature has the
constitutional authority, where it has provided a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law to
recover back taxes illegally assessed and collected, to take away the remedy by injunction to restrain
their collection."
Section 9 of the Philippine Bill reads in part as follows: "That the Supreme Court and the Courts of
First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided
and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands,
subject to the power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure."
It will be seen that this section has not taken away from the Philippine Government the power to
change the practice and method of procedure. If sections 139 and 140, considered together, and this
must always be done, are nothing more than a mode of procedure, then it would seem that the
Legislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting them. Conceding for the moment
that the duly authorized procedure for the determination of the validity of any tax, impost, or
assessment was by injunction suits and that this method was available to aggrieved taxpayers prior
to the passage of Act No. 2339, may the Legislature change this method of procedure? That the
Legislature has the power to do this, there can be no doubt, provided some other adequate remedy is
substituted in lieu thereof. In speaking of the modes of enforcing rights created by contracts, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Tennessee vs. Sneed, supra, said: "The rule seems to be that
in modes of proceedings and of forms to enforce the contract the Legislature has the control, and may
enlarge, limit or alter them, provided that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with
conditions and restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right."
In that case the petitioner urged that the Acts of 1873 were laws impairing the obligation of the
contract contained in the charter of the Bank of Tennessee, which contract was entered into with the
State in 1838. It was claimed that this was done by placing such impediments and obstructions in the
way of its enforcement, thereby so impairing the remedies as practically to render the obligation of
no value. In disposing of this contention, the court said: "If we assume that prior to 1873 the relator
had authority to prosecute his claim against the State by mandamus, and that by the statutes of that
year the further use of that form was prohibited to him, the question remains. whether an effectual
remedy was left to him or provided for him. We think the regulation of the statute gave him an
abundant means of enforcing such right as he possessed. It provided that he might pay his claim to
the collector under protest, giving notice thereof to the Comptroller of the Treasury; that at any time
within thirty days thereafter he might sue the officer making the collection; that the case should be
tried by any court having jurisdiction and, if found in favor of the plaintiff on the merits, the court
should certify that the same was wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded and the Comptroller
should thereupon issue his warrant therefor, which should be paid in preference to other claim on the
Treasury."
But great stress is laid upon the fact that the plaintiffs in the case under consideration are unable to
pay the taxes assessed against them and that if the law is enforced, they will be compelled to
suspend business. This point may be best answered by quoting from the case of Youngblood vs.
Sexton (32 Mich., 406), wherein Judge Cooley, speaking for the court, said: "But if this consideration is
sufficient to justify the transfer of a controversy from a court of law to a court of equity, then every
controversy where money is demanded may be made the subject of equitable cognizance. To enforce
against a dealer a promissory note may in some cases as effectually break up his business as to
collect from him a tax of equal amount. This is not what is known to the law as irreparable injury. The
courts have never recognized the consequences of the mere enforcement of a money demand as
falling within that category."
Certain specified sections of Act No. 2339 were amended by Act No. 2432, enacted December 23,
1914, effective January 1, 1915, by imposing increased and additional taxes. Act No. 2432 was
amended, were ratified by the Congress of the United States on March 4, 1915. The opposition
manifested against the taxes imposed by Acts Nos. 2339 and 2432 is a matter of local history. A great
many business men thought the taxes thus imposed were too high. If the collection of the new taxes
on signs, signboards, and billboards may be restrained, we see no well-founded reason why
injunctions cannot be granted restraining the collection of all or at least a number of the other
increased taxes. The fact that this may be done, shows the wisdom of the Legislature in denying the

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 15 of 73

use of the writ of injunction to restrain the collection of any tax imposed by the Acts. When this was
done, an equitable remedy was made available to all dissatisfied taxpayers.
The question now arises whether, the case being one of which the court below had no jurisdiction,
this court, on appeal, shall proceed to express an opinion upon the validity of provisions of subsection
(b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, imposing the taxes complained of. As a general rule, an opinion on
the merits of a controversy ought to be declined when the court is powerless to give the relief
demanded. But it is claimed that this case is, in many particulars, exceptional. It is true that it has
been argued on the merits, and there is no reason for any suggestion or suspicion that it is not a bona
fide controversy. The legal points involved in the merits have been presented with force, clearness,
and great ability by the learned counsel of both sides. If the law assailed were still in force, we would
feel that an opinion on its validity would be justifiable, but, as the amendment became effective on
January 1, 1915, we think it advisable to proceed no further with this branch of the case.
The next question arises in connection with the supplementary complaint, the object of which is to
enjoin the Collector of Internal Revenue from removing certain billboards, the property of the plaintiffs
located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal. The plaintiffs allege that the billboards here in
question "in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general
welfare of the community, or of any persons." The defendant denies these allegations in his answer
and claims that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls,
he "decided that the billboard complained of was and still is offensive to the sight, and is otherwise a
nuisance." The plaintiffs proved by Mr. Churchill that the "billboards were quite a distance from the
road and that they were strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no
advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community." The
defendant presented no testimony upon this point. In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the
parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are offensive to the sight."
The pertinent provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 read: "If after due
investigation the Collector of Internal Revenue shall decide that any sign, signboard, or billboard
displayed or exposed to public view is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance, he may by
summary order direct the removal of such sign, signboard, or billboard, and if same is not removed
within ten days after he has issued such order he my himself cause its removal, and the sign,
signboard, or billboard shall thereupon be forfeited to the Government, and the owner thereof
charged with the expenses of the removal so effected. When the sign, signboard, or billboard ordered
to be removed as herein provided shall not comply with the provisions of the general regulations of
the Collector of Internal Revenue, no rebate or refund shall be allowed for any portion of a year for
which the tax may have been paid. Otherwise, the Collector of Internal Revenue may in his discretion
make a proportionate refund of the tax for the portion of the year remaining for which the taxes were
paid. An appeal may be had from the order of the Collector of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of
Finance and Justice whose decision thereon shall be final."
The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, says: "The question which the case presents under
this head for determination, resolves itself into this inquiry: Is the suppression of advertising signs
displayed or exposed to public view, which are admittedly offensive to the sight, conducive to the
public interest?"
And cunsel for the plaintiffs states the question thus: "We contend that that portion of section 100 of
Act No. 2339, empowering the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if
objectionable to the sight, is unconstitutional, as constituting a deprivation of property without due
process of law."
From the position taken by counsel for both sides, it is clear that our inquiry is limited to the question
whether the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government; for all property is held subject to that power.
As a consequence of the foregoing, all discussion and authorities cited, which go to the power of the
state to authorize administrative officers to find, as a fact, that legitimate trades, callings, and
businesses are, under certain circumstances, statutory nuisances, and whether the procedure
prescribed for this purpose is due process of law, are foreign to the issue here presented.

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There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to
the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature
which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes
with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the
Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it
should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views for what is proper
in the premises for those of the Legislature. In Munn vs. Illinois (94 U.S., 113), the United States
Supreme Court states the rule thus: "If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such statute,
then we may declare this one void because in excess of the legislative power of this state; but if it
could, we must presume it did. Of the propriety of legislative interference, within the scope of the
legislative power, a legislature is the exclusive judge."
This rule very fully discussed and declared in Powell vs. Pennsylvania (127 U.S., 678) "oleomargarine" case. (See also Crowley vs. Christensen, 137 U.S., 86, 87; Camfield vs. U.S., 167 U.S.,
518.) While the state may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a
large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interest of the
public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests; yet, its
determination in these matters is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
courts. (Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U.S., 133.) Can it be said judicially that signs, signboards, and
billboards, which are admittedly offensive to the sight, are not with the category of things which
interfere with the public safety, welfare, and comfort, and therefore beyond the reach of the police
power of the Philippine Government?
The numerous attempts which have been made to limit by definition the scope of the police power
are only interesting as illustrating its rapid extension within comparatively recent years to points
heretofore deemed entirely within the field of private liberty and property rights. Blackstone's
definition of the police power was as follows: "The due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom,
whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well governed family, are bound to conform
their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neigborhood, and good manners, to be decent,
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." (Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 162.)
Chanceller Kent considered the police power the authority of the state "to regulate unwholesome
trades, slaughter houses, operations offensive to the senses." Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts
defined it as follows: "The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." (Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush., 53.)
In the case of Butchers' Union Slaughter-house, etc. Co. vs. Crescent City Live Stock Landing, etc. Co.
(111 U.S., 746), it was suggested that the public health and public morals are matters of legislative
concern of which the legislature cannot divest itself. (See State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75
Wash., 581, where these definitions are collated.)
In Champer vs. Greencastle (138 Ind., 339), it was said: "The police power of the State, so far, has not
received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state
functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort,
convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the
organic law." (Quoted with approval in Hopkins vs. Richmond [Va., 1915], 86 S.E., 139.)
In Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. ([1911] 232 Pa., 141), it was said: "The police power of the state is
difficult of definition, but it has been held by the courts to be the right to prescribe regulations for the
good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which
does not encroach on a like power vested in congress or state legislatures by the federal constitution,
or does not violate the provisions of the organic law; and it has been expressly held that the
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution was not designed to interfere with the exercise of
that power by the state."
In People vs. Brazee ([Mich., 1914], 149 N.W., 1053), it was said: "It [the police power] has for its
object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 17 of 73

collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have
consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of
this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand
correction."
In 8 Cyc., 863, it is said: "Police power is the name given to that inherent sovereignty which it is the
right and duty of the government or its agents to exercise whenever public policy, in a broad sense,
demands, for the benefit of society at large, regulations to guard its morals, safety, health, order or to
insure in any respect such economic conditions as an advancing civilization of a high complex
character requires." (As quoted with approval in Stettler vs. O'Hara [1914], 69 Ore, 519.)
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has said in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U.S.
[1911], 575: "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
This statement, recent as it is, has been quoted with approval by several courts. (Cunningham vs.
Northwestern Imp. Co. [1911], 44 Mont., 180; State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581;
McDavid vs. Bank of Bay Minette [Ala., 1915], 69 Sou., 452; Hopkins vs. City of Richmond [Va., 1915],
86 S.E., 139; State vs. Philipps [Miss. 1915], 67 Sou., 651.)
It was said in Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 85), per Shaw, C.J., that: "It is much easier to perceive and
realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe
limits to its exercise." In Stone vs. Mississippi (101 U.S., 814), it was said: "Many attempts have been
made in this court and elsewhere to define the police power, but never with entire success. It is
always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within the general scope of the power,
than to give an abstract definition of the power itself, which will be in all respects accurate."
Other courts have held the same vow of efforts to evolve a satisfactory definition of the police power.
Manifestly, definitions which fail to anticipate cases properly within the scope of the police power are
deficient. It is necessary, therefore, to confine our discussion to the principle involved and determine
whether the cases as they come up are within that principle. The basic idea of civil polity in the
United States is that government should interfere with individual effort only to the extent necessary
to preserve a healthy social and economic condition of the country. State interference with the use of
private property may be exercised in three ways. First, through the power of taxation, second,
through the power of eminent domain, and third, through the police power. Buy the first method it is
assumed that the individual receives the equivalent of the tax in the form of protection and benefit he
receives from the government as such. By the second method he receives the market value of the
property taken from him. But under the third method the benefits he derived are only such as may
arise from the maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society and is often referred to as
damnum absque injuria. (Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. 232 Pa., 141; Bemis vs. Guirl Drainage Co., 182
Ind., 36.) There was a time when state interference with the use of private property under the guise
of the police power was practically confined to the suppression of common nuisances. At the present
day, however, industry is organized along lines which make it possible for large combinations of
capital to profit at the expense of the socio-economic progress of the nation by controlling prices and
dictating to industrial workers wages and conditions of labor. Not only this but the universal use of
mechanical contrivances by producers and common carriers has enormously increased the toll of
human life and limb in the production and distribution of consumption goods. To the extent that these
businesses affect not only the public health, safety, and morals, but also the general social and
economic life of the nation, it has been and will continue to be necessary for the state to interfere by
regulation. By so doing, it is true that the enjoyment of private property is interfered with in no small
degree and in ways that would have been considered entirely unnecessary in years gone by. The
regulation of rates charged by common carriers, for instance, or the limitation of hours of work in
industrial establishments have only a very indirect bearing upon the public health, safety, and morals,
but do bear directly upon social and economic conditions. To permit each individual unit of society to
feel that his industry will bring a fair return; to see that his work shall be done under conditions that
will not either immediately or eventually ruin his health; to prevent the artificial inflation of prices of
the things which are necessary for his physical well being are matters which the individual is no
longer capable of attending to himself. It is within the province of the police power to render

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 18 of 73

assistance to the people to the extent that may be necessary to safeguard these rights. Hence, laws
providing for the regulation of wages and hours of labor of coal miners (Rail & River Coal Co. vs.
Taylor, 234 U.S., 224); requiring payment of employees of railroads and other industrial concerns in
legal tender and requiring salaries to be paid semimonthly (Erie R.R. Co. vs. Williams, 233 U.S., 685);
providing a maximum number of hours of labor for women (Miller vs. Wilson, U.S. Sup. Ct. [Feb. 23,
1915], Adv. Opns., p. 342); prohibiting child labor (Sturges & Burn vs. Beauchamp, 231 U.S., 320);
restricting the hours of labor in public laundries (In re Wong Wing, 167 Cal., 109); limiting hours of
labor in industrial establishment generally (State vs. Bunting, 71 Ore., 259); Sunday Closing Laws
(State vs. Nicholls [Ore., 1915], 151 Pac., 473; People vs. C. Klinck Packing Co. [N.Y., 1915], 108 N. E.,
278; Hiller vs. State [Md., 1914], 92 Atl., 842; State vs. Penny, 42 Mont., 118; City of Springfield vs.
Richter, 257 Ill., 578, 580; State vs. Hondros [S.C., 1915], 84 S.E., 781); have all been upheld as a
valid exercise of the police power. Again, workmen's compensation laws have been quite generally
upheld. These statutes discard the common law theory that employers are not liable for industrial
accidents and make them responsible for all accidents resulting from trade risks, it being considered
that such accidents are a legitimate charge against production and that the employer by controlling
the prices of his product may shift the burden to the community. Laws requiring state banks to join in
establishing a depositors' guarantee fund have also been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court in
Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U. S., 104), and Assaria State Bank vs. Dolley (219 U.S., 121).
Offensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible of suppression in
thickly populated districts. Barring livery stables from such locations was approved of in Reinman vs.
Little Rock (U.S. Sup. Ct. [Apr. 5, 1915], U.S. Adv. Opns., p. 511). And a municipal ordinance was
recently upheld (People vs. Ericsson, 263 Ill., 368), which prohibited the location of garages within two
hundred feet of any hospital, church, or school, or in any block used exclusively for residential
purposes, unless the consent of the majority of the property owners be obtained. Such statutes as
these are usually upheld on the theory of safeguarding the public health. But we apprehend that in
point of fact they have little bearing upon the health of the normal person, but a great deal to do with
his physical comfort and convenience and not a little to do with his peace of mind. Without entering
into the realm of psychology, we think it quite demonstrable that sight is as valuable to a human
being as any of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to this sense conduces as much to
his contentment as the care bestowed upon the senses of hearing or smell, and probably as much as
both together. Objects may be offensive to the eye as well as to the nose or ear. Man's esthetic
feelings are constantly being appealed to through his sense of sight. Large investments have been
made in theaters and other forms of amusement, in paintings and spectacular displays, the success
of which depends in great part upon the appeal made through the sense of sight. Moving picture
shows could not possible without the sense of sight. Governments have spent millions on parks and
boulevards and other forms of civic beauty, the first aim of which is to appeal to the sense of sight.
Why, then, should the Government not interpose to protect from annoyance this most valuable of
man's senses as readily as to protect him from offensive noises and smells?
The advertising industry is a legitimate one. It is at the same time a cause and an effect of the great
industrial age through which the world is now passing. Millions are spent each year in this manner to
guide the consumer to the articles which he needs. The sense of sight is the primary essential to
advertising success. Billboard advertising, as it is now conducted, is a comparatively recent form of
advertising. It is conducted out of doors and along the arteries of travel, and compels attention by the
strategic locations of the boards, which obstruct the range of vision at points where travelers are
most likely to direct their eyes. Beautiful landscapes are marred or may not be seen at all by the
traveler because of the gaudy array of posters announcing a particular kind of breakfast food, or
underwear, the coming of a circus, an incomparable soap, nostrums or medicines for the curing of all
the ills to which the flesh is heir, etc. It is quite natural for people to protest against this
indiscriminate and wholesale use of the landscape by advertisers and the intrusion of tradesmen
upon their hours of leisure and relaxation from work. Outdoor life must lose much of its charm and
pleasure if this form of advertising is permitted to continue unhampered until it converts the streets
and highways into veritable canyons through which the world must travel in going to work or in
search of outdoor pleasure.
The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon the use of private property as it does
upon the use of the channels of travel used by the general public. Suppose that the owner of private

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 19 of 73

property, who so vigorously objects to the restriction of this form of advertising, should require the
advertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards so that they would face the interior of the property
instead of the exterior. Billboard advertising would die a natural death if this were done, and its real
dependency not upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the unrestricted use of the
public highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole value of
the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, we conceive that the regulation of
billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation of
the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.
We would not be understood as saying that billboard advertising is not a legitimate business any
more than we would say that a livery stable or an automobile garage is not. Even a billboard is more
sightly than piles of rubbish or an open sewer. But all these businesses are offensive to the senses
under certain conditions.
It has been urged against ministering to the sense of sight that tastes are so diversified that there is
no safe standard of legislation in this direction. We answer in the language of the Supreme Court in
Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U.S., 104), and which has already been adopted by several state
courts (see supra), that "the prevailing morality or strong and preponderating opinion" demands such
legislation. The agitation against the unrestrained development of the billboard business has
produced results in nearly all the countries of Europe. (Ency. Britannica, vol. 1, pp. 237-240.) Many
drastic ordinances and state laws have been passed in the United States seeking to make the
business amenable to regulation. But their regulation in the United states is hampered by what we
conceive an unwarranted restriction upon the scope of the police power by the courts. If the police
power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if
the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which
encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. A source of annoyance and irritation
to the public does not minister to the comfort and convenience of the public. And we are of the
opinion that the prevailing sentiment is manifestly against the erection of billboards which are
offensive to the sight.
We do not consider that we are in conflict with the decision in Eubank vs. Richmond (226 U.S., 137),
where a municipal ordinance establishing a building line to which property owners must conform was
held unconstitutional. As we have pointed out, billboard advertising is not so much a use of private
property as it is a use of the public thoroughfares. It derives its value to the power solely because the
posters are exposed to the public gaze. It may well be that the state may not require private property
owners to conform to a building line, but may prescribe the conditions under which they shall make
use of the adjoining streets and highways. Nor is the law in question to be held invalid as denying
equal protection of the laws. In Keokee Coke Co. vs. Taylor (234 U.S., 224), it was said: "It is more
pressed that the act discriminates unconstitutionally against certain classes. But while there are
differences of opinion as to the degree and kind of discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions that a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil,
and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up
and enumerating other instances to which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court
can see. That is for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear."
But we have not overlooked the fact that we are not in harmony with the highest courts of a number
of the states in the American Union upon this point. Those courts being of the opinion that statutes
which are prompted and inspired by esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the
promotion and gratification of the esthetic sense, and not the promotion or protection of the public
safety, the public peace and good order of society, must be held invalid and contrary to constitutional
provisions holding inviolate the rights of private property. Or, in other words, the police power cannot
interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The courts, taking this view, rest
their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from any relation
to the public health, morals, comfort, or general welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of
the state. But we are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs,
signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general
welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well recognized principle
to further application. (Fruend on Police Power, p. 166.)

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For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed
upon the merits, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR A REHEARING, JANUARY 24, 1916.
TRENT, J.:
Counsel for the plaintiffs call our attention to the case of Ex parte Young (209 U.S., 123); and say that
they are of the opinion that this case "is the absolutely determinative of the question of jurisdiction in
injunctions of this kind." We did not refer to this case in our former opinion because we were satisfied
that the reasoning of the case is not applicable to section 100 (b), 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339. The
principles announced in the Young case are stated as follows: "It may therefore be said that when the
penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the
company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is
the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of laws
which deeply affect its rights.
It is urged that there is no principle upon which to base the claim that a person is entitled to
disobey a statute at least once, for the purpose of testing its validity without subjecting himself
to the penalties for disobedience provided by the statute in case it is valid. This is not an
accurate statement of the case. Ordinarily a law creating offenses in the nature of
misdemeanors or felonies relates to a subject over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is
complete in any event. In these case, however, of the establishment of certain rates without
any hearing, the validity of such rates necessarily depends upon whether they are high enough
to permit at least some return upon the investment (how much it is not now necessary to
state), and an inquiry as to that fact is a proper subject of judicial investigation. If it turns out
that the rates are too low for that purpose, then they are illegal. Now, to impose upon a party
interested the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of such a question (no prior hearing
having ever been given) only upon the condition that, if unsuccessful, he must suffer
imprisonment and pay fines as provided in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches
to the courts, and thus prevent any hearing upon the question whether the rates as provided
by the acts are not too low, and therefore invalid. The distinction is obvious between a case
where the validity of the acts depends upon the existence of a fact which can be determined
only after investigation of a very complicated and technical character, and the ordinary case of
a statute upon a subject requiring no such investigation and over which the jurisdiction of the
legislature is complete in any event.
An examination of the sections of our Internal Revenue Law and of the circumstances under which
and the purposes for which they were enacted, will show that, unlike the statutes under consideration
in the above cited case, their enactment involved no attempt on the part of the Legislature to prevent
dissatisfied taxpayers "from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation;" no effort to
prevent any inquiry as to their validity. While section 139 does prevent the testing of the validity of
subsection (b) of section 100 in injunction suits instituted for the purpose of restraining the collection
of internal revenue taxes, section 140 provides a complete remedy for that purpose. And furthermore,
the validity of subsection (b) does not depend upon "the existence of a fact which can be determined
only after investigation of a very complicated and technical character," but the jurisdiction of the
Legislature over the subject with which the subsection deals "is complete in any event." The
judgment of the court in the Young case rests upon the proposition that the aggrieved parties had no
adequate remedy at law.
Neither did we overlook the case of General Oil Co. vs. Crain (209 U.S., 211), decided the same
day and citing Ex parte Young, supra. In that case the plaintiff was a Tennessee corporation,
with its principal place of business in Memphis, Tennessee. It was engaged in the manufacture
and sale of coal oil, etc. Its wells and plant were located in Pennsylvania and Ohio. Memphis
was not only its place of business, at which place it sold oil to the residents of Tennessee, but
also a distributing point to which oils were shipped from Pennsylvania and Ohio and unloaded
into various tanks for the purpose of being forwarded to the Arkansas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi customers. Notwithstanding the fact that the company separated its oils, which

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 21 of 73

were designated to meet the requirements of the orders from those States, from the oils for
sale in Tennessee, the defendant insisted that he had a right, under the Act of the Tennessee
Legislature, approved April 21, 1899, to inspect all the oils unlocated in Memphis, whether for
sale in that State or not, and charge and collect for such inspection a regular fee of twenty-five
cents per barrel. The company, being advised that the defendant had no such right, instituted
this action in the inferior States court for the purpose of enjoining the defendant, upon the
grounds stated in the bill, from inspecting or attempting to inspect its oils. Upon trial, the
preliminary injunction which had been granted at the commencement of the action, was
continued in force. Upon appeal, the supreme court of the State of Tennessee decided that the
suit was one against the State and reversed the judgment of the Chancellor. In the Supreme
Court of the United States, where the case was reviewed upon a writ of error, the contentions
of the parties were stated by the court as follows: "It is contended by defendant in error that
this court is without jurisdiction because no matter sought to be litigated by plaintiff in error
was determined by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The court simply held, it is paid, that,
under the laws of the State, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for any purpose. And it is
insisted "hat this holding involved no Federal question, but only the powers and jurisdiction of
the courts of the State of Tennessee, in respect to which the Supreme Court of Tennessee is the
final arbiter."
Opposing these contentions, plaintiff in error urges that whether a suit is one against a State
cannot depend upon the declaration of a statute, but depends upon the essential nature ofthe
suit, and that the Supreme Court recognized that the statute "aded nothing to the axiomatic
principle that the State, as a sovereign, is not subject to suit save by its own consent."And it is
hence insisted that the court by dismissing the bill gave effect to the law which was attacked.
It is further insisted that the bill undoubtedly present rights under the Constitution of the
United States and conditions which entitle plaintiff in error to an injunction for the protection of
such rights, and that a statute of the State which operates to deny such rights, or such relief,
`is itself in conflict with the Constitution of the United States."
That statute of Tennessee, which the supreme court of that State construed and held to be prohibitory
of the suit, was an act passed February 28, 1873, which provides: "That no court in the State of
Tennessee has, nor shall hereafter have, any power, jurisdiction, or authority to entertain any suit
against the State, or any officer acting by the authority of the State, with a view to reach the State, its
treasury, funds or property; and all such suits now pending, or hereafter brought, shall be dismissed
as to the State, or such officer, on motion, plea or demurrer of the law officer of the State, or counsel
employed by the State."
The Supreme Court of the United States, after reviewing many cases, said: "Necessarily, to give
adequate protection to constitutional rights a distinction must be made between valid and invalid
state laws, as determining the character of the suit against state officers. And the suit at bar
illustrates the necessity. If a suit against state officer is precluded in the national courts by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it is
contended in the case at bar that it may be, without power of review by this court, it must be evident
that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution; and the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its
operation. ... It being then the right of a party to be protected against a law which violates a
constitutional right, whether by its terms or the manner of its enforcement, it is manifest that a
decision which denies such protection gives effect to the law, and the decision is reviewable by this
court."
The court then proceeded to consider whether the law of 1899 would, if administered against the oils
in question, violate any constitutional right of the plaintiff and after finding and adjudging that the oils
were not in movement through the States, that they had reached the destination of their first
shipment, and were held there, not in necessary delay at means of transportation but for the business
purposes and profit of the company, and resting its judgment upon the taxing power of the State,
affirmed the decree of the supreme court of the State of Tennessee.
From the foregoing it will be seen that the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction because the suit was one against the State, which was prohibited by the Tennessee

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 22 of 73

Legislature. The Supreme Court of the United States took jurisdiction of the controversy for the
reasons above quoted and sustained the Act of 1899 as a revenue law.
The case of Tennessee vs. Sneed (96 U.S., 69), and Shelton vs. Platt (139 U.S., 591), relied upon in
our former opinion, were not cited in General Oil Co. vs. Crain, supra, because the questions
presented and the statutes under consideration were entirely different. The Act approved March 31,
1873, expressly prohibits the courts from restraining the collection of any tax, leaving the dissatisfied
taxpayer to his exclusive remedy payment under protest and suit to recover while the Act
approved February 28, 1873, prohibits suits against the State.
In upholding the statute which authorizes the removal of signboards or billboards upon the sole
ground that they are offensive to the sight, we recognized the fact that we are not in harmony with
various state courts in the American Union. We have just examined the decision of the Supreme Court
of the State of Illinois in the recent case (October [December], 1914) of Thomas Cusack Co. vs. City of
Chicago (267 Ill., 344), wherein the court upheld the validity of a municipal ordinances, which reads
as follows: "707. Frontage consents required. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
to erect or construct any bill-board or sign-board in any block on any public street in which one-half of
the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residence purposes, without first
obtaining the consent, in writing, of the owners or duly authorized agents of said owners owning a
majority of the frontage of the property, on both sides of the street, in the block in which such billboard or sign-board is to be erected, constructed or located. Such written consent shall be filed with
the commissioner of buildings before a permit shall be issued for the erection, construction or location
of such bill-board or sign-board."
The evidence which the Illinois court relied upon was the danger of fires, the fact that billboards
promote the commission of various immoral and filthy acts by disorderly persons, and the inadequate
police protection furnished to residential districts. The last objection has no virtue unless one or the
other of the other objections are valid. If the billboard industry does, in fact, promote such municipal
evils to noticeable extent, it seems a curious inconsistency that a majority of the property owners on
a given block may legalize the business. However, the decision is undoubtedly a considerable
advance over the views taken by other high courts in the United States and distinguishes several
Illinois decisions. It is an advance because it permits the suppression of billboards where they are
undesirable. The ordinance which the court approved will no doubt cause the virtual suppression of
the business in the residential districts. Hence, it is recognized that under certain circumstances
billboards may be suppressed as an unlawful use of private property. Logically, it would seem that the
premise of fact relied upon is not very solid. Objections to the billboard upon police, sanitary, and
moral grounds have been, as pointed out by counsel for Churchill and Tait, duly considered by
numerous high courts in the United States, and, with one exception, have been rejected as without
foundation. The exception is the Supreme Court of Missouri, which advances practically the same line
of reasoning as has the Illinois court in this recent case. (St. Louis Gunning Advt. Co. vs. City of St.
Louis, 137 S. W., 929.) In fact, the Illinois court, in Haller Sign Works vs. Physical Culture Training
School (249 Ill., 436), "distinguished" in the recent case, said: "There is nothing inherently dangerous
to the health or safety of the public in structures that are properly erected for advertising purposes."
If a billboard is so constructed as to offer no room for objections on sanitary or moral grounds, it
would seem that the ordinance above quoted would have to be sustained upon the very grounds
which we have advanced in sustaining our own statute.
It might be well to note that billboard legislation in the United States is attempting to eradicate a
business which has already been firmly established. This business was allowed to expand unchecked
until its very extent called attention to its objectionable features. In the Philippine Islands such
legislation has almost anticipated the business, which is not yet of such proportions that it can be said
to be fairly established. It may be that the courts in the United States have committed themselves to
a course of decisions with respect to billboard advertising, the full consequences of which were not
perceived for the reason that the development of the business has been so recent that the
objectionable features of it did not present themselves clearly to the courts nor to the people. We, in
this country, have the benefit of the experience of the people of the United States and may make our
legislation preventive rather than corrective. There are in this country, moreover, on every hand in
those districts where Spanish civilization has held sway for so many centuries, examples of

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 23 of 73

architecture now belonging to a past age, and which are attractive not only to the residents of the
country but to visitors. If the billboard industry is permitted without constraint or control to hide these
historic sites from the passerby, the country will be less attractive to the tourist and the people will
suffer a district economic loss.
The motion for a rehearing is therefore denied.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12172

August 29, 1958

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendantsappellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal
mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.
It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as
mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in
question providing as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.
SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for
each repair permit issued.
SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the
violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less
than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building
destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at
the expense of the owner of the building or house.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name,
located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On
January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building
would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants
reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the
mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a
typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 24 of 73

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace
court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the
Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35
each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the
public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said
public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in
question.
We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.
A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute
discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard
to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed;
no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards;
standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined
and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d)
392)
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in the
respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the city is to
be granted. Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the
privilege to some and deny it others; to refuse the application of one landowner or lessee and
to grant that of another, when for all material purposes, the two applying for precisely the
same privileges under the same circumstances. The danger of such an ordinance is that it
makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights under
our government do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and
which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The
ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
As was said in City of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112,28 N. E. 312, 314 13 L. R. A. 587, 28
Am. St. Rep. 180: "It seems from the foregoing authorities to be well established that municipal
ordinances placing restrictions upon lawful conduct or the lawful use of property must, in order
to be valid, specify the rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or business; and
must admit of the exercise of the privilege of all citizens alike who will comply with such rules
and conditions; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of
any arbitrary discrimination by the municipal authorities between citizens who will so comply.
(Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE (2d), pp. 394-395).
It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the
proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in
its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant
was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the public plaza"
by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use
their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to
regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.
But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the
State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the
State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance
of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land,

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 25 of 73

regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best
suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants
just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual
taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation,
while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs.
Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).
A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is
confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs.
Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So.
114).
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of
the opinion of zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without
compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our government nor in the
principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of
public benefit that property remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the
private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property under
the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs.
Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827) (Emphasis supplied.)
The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243, par. (c),
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section provides:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall
have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof,
charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less
than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees
collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal council to
require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of
the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As
there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits
within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired
within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not
conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality
of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null
and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with
costs de oficio. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 26 of 73

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,


vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs.
Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence,
began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in
phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in every point of view in
which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power
of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the
personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve
the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established
at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as
follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan
work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place
most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 27 of 73

"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio
of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro
subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and"Resolved further, That
Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications
are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which
says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts
of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan
Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam,
and to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of
Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759
of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan,
selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court
is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the
prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by
said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 28 of 73

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section
2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial
laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later
be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the
phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set
down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians,"
with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in
Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo,
on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November
10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in
order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they
may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry
out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times;
the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year
one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve
God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities,
and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein
they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of
our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to
give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by
different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with
great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their
doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who
would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already
in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not
required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the
greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the
remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner
and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters.
lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein
the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 29 of 73

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they
shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We
hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the
lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx

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LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or
indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And,
because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby
order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who
should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same
reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also
indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and
four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more
than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the
priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid,
on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and
December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS,"
AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the
reducciones and towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who
deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living;
robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios
would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides
maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and
also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to
reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of
grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in
the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the
law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest.
As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias
and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by
this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol.
2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 30 of 73

A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition
of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in
the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an
integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is
the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which
enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under
the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation
of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer
the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the
representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of
the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races
might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to
allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments
imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus
giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government
has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the
territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this
serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as
well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the
unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and
Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so
indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a
practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner
and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate
the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the
common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of
instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part
of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided
into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming
a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered
completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be
published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces
wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules.
These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the
means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the
towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment
of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the

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opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative


organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so
that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect
the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall
not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in
case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the
place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these
cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a
regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and
duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands
and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the
Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against
these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the
rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious
indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned
governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic
Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains
igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity
among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they
wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting
submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law;
freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and
give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption
from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years;
and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials
under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall,
in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools,
and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians;
provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not
have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a
place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding
the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first
of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for
the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of
the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of
such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and
implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be
repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and
everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.

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12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my
authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military
authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the
attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern
part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied
to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or
permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application
of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and
priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining
about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within
their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp.
128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of
these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One
paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for
the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body
and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly.
The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was
to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain
exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was
not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish
a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision
over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed
senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian
tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

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2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of
Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act;
Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397,
the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963,
the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The
major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an
d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States
Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445,
500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of
Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva
Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws,
because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE
MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the
provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing
with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of
office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed
shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and
eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the
townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision
and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual
freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has
advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of
sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a
township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is
hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and
1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act
No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained
the provisions in questions.

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These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are
to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be
found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and
in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase,
there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative
Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos.
2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code
of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving
to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion,
and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration
of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain wellknown authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt,
"Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair
& Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine
Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is
its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other nonChristian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines
Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of
the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section
of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never
seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with
the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec.
2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 35 of 73

religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is
predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce
the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for
so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian
tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third
Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United
States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous
government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906,
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated
by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et
seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged
the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to nonChristian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about
their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs.
Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage
in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the
act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called
non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance
with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the
accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon
to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted
much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his
authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed
a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter
which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive
Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally
non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently
baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of
individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It
was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real
purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious
belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be
brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the
person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes,
therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt
even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of
regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 36 of 73

the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion
above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the
provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe
the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of
June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious
denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as
against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of
the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula
taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that
persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all
other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations
with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including
Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities
or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a
man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula
tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as
to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a nonChristian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew
of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a
Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians,
Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city
are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite
widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also
exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office
in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and
non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved
by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes
due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of
settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published
for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they
do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 37 of 73

All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided
into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a
member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs
the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to
the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If
he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to
persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration
of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him
without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man
is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess
Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack
of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and
"Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the
application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as
those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations
No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on
April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the
regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized
by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he
entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an
infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No.
1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore
set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in
question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person
selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least,
I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold
otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural
meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or
strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian
tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond
the reach of law and order . . .

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The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos
which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the
religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No.
2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of
the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its
lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion
of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows,
then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized
Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et
seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to
be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing
Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political
Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture
and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a
way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of
1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de
Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be
that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been
applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was
given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows
that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending
still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by
the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community
life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to
make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the
Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines
Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes.
Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the

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Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and
how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of
the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the
preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect
this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution
which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position
of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's
opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since
the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a
complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians
who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since,
have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and
established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the
Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of
this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or
the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could
be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a
purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to
define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations,
and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes
are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely
for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they
are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely
due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now
weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere
else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered
was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit
the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico
to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding
their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of
the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the
Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection,
where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally,
we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate

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commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an
unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized
nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired,
and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been
deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the
government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs.
Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee
Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169
U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415;
Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs.
Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever,
therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to
pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full
protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a
hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the
relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The
petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca
tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn
from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general
habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and
without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and
without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and
restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to
the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of
Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the
Indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the
request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required
the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that,
pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to
arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from
which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the
Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court
said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade
and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost
unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether
such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not ,
need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the
exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore,
the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases
where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is
restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.

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2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the
Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of
the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as
the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white
race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they
obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws
thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine
that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person"
within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine
courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the
United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so
located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that
the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and
that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for
the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this
power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has
abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee
violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.
R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section
21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority
as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the
relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.

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Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President
may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian
relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long
established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The
power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such
supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it
would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed,
Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States
Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general
rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province
of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown
clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words
as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians'
and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the
Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is,
consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious
equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and
Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued
meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to
religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold
that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization,
and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals
an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to
the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny
to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions, it has been said
"are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The
protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of
like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)

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Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses
on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the
offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty
exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more
liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one
ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same
right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject
for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted
with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which
recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with
which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of
any human government especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution
to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect
of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with
which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in
all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and
essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the
guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the
right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs.
Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896],
165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order
of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such
assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in
the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper

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scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in
the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court,
since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules
which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a
rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process
a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice,
must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process
of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in
its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a
class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and
necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and
cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United
States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That
slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth
Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force
in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the
punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage,
all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906],
203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.
(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to
be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is
the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that
among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State,
develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S.,
27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of
the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection,
and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and

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welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the
current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative
discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security
for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be
not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs.
Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If
legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure
of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site
selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction
of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school
the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which
are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and
habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less than
one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be
expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement
to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and
evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political
communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this
country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on
account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be
subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants."
This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to
leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions
inhabited by the non-Christian people.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 46 of 73

(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development
and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote
social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the
Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile
regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian
people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they
may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits
are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are
being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into
fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid
them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children,
and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they
are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to
economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of
the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called
non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development
and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian
people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and
liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and
in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating
the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in
the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident.
Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations
on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the
advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a
reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health
and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish
times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed
with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are
to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint
in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people.
Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free,
and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with
many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 47 of 73

surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon
the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature
in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro
must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is
no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are
imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to
develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the
Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy
and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must
prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes)
are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and making illegal
caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its
interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve
and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State
and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will
be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from
one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins
thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they
are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not
practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to
what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures
looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the
remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the
alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure
was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the
education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people
under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day
which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been
accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up
the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests would be
injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead
this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to
redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there
has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 48 of 73

Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works
of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of
savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of
the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they
object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They
are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established
for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization
and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them
slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody
but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a
nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to
another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the
property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to
another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about
which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the
mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them
live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to
naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a
general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he
pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the
Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation.
Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided
for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were
accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people
confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy
of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are
given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the
contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law
intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always
exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a
redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no
particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary
should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a
question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely
an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the
peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very
existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent,
dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen,
this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 49 of 73

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics
and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the
amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes
seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a
great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems
to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to
the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards
the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs.
Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies
furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales
which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general
rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its
influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason
and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians
has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the
Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they
may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro
must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of
the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes,
in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own
good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature,
a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward noninterference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final
decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it
should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general
governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted
sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force
as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 50 of 73

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,
not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the
CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.
Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners.
The City Legal Officer for respondents-appeliees.
GANCAYCO, J.:
At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640
passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are
reproduced below:
ORDINANCE--640
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN
THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS,
GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND
TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD
CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET
xxx xxx xxx
Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that:
SECTION 1It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in
the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or
other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full
payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the
said tickets.
SECTION 2Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction be punished
by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P600.00) or an imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or
both such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court.
If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager, Agent or
Representative of such firm or corporation.
SECTION 3This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.
Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya and Dalisay
Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of
Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 51 of 73

Butuan City docketed as Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the
subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. 1
Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July 14, 1969 by the
court a quo enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing Ordinance No.
640. 3 On July 29, 1969, respondents filed their answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance. 4
On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 On June 4, 1973, the respondent
court rendered its decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor of the respondents and
against the petitioners, as follows:
1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid: Provided, however, that
the fine for a single offense shall not exceed TWO HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the aforequoted
Section 15 (nn) of Rep. Act No. 523;
2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and;
3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners.
4. SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo which was denied
in a resolution of the said court dated November 10, 1973. 9
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra
vires and an invalid exercise of police power.
Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as
provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states:
Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject
to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . . theaters, theatrical
performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and all other performances and places of
amusements ...
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by
invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law, which provides:
(nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act, and to fix
the penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall not exceed a two hundred peso fine or six
months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license
fees for theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of
amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question
which needs to be resolved is this: does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the
fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general
grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?
This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local
government with the operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the
prices of admission to these places. Previous decisions of this Court involved the power to impose

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 52 of 73

license fees upon businesses of this nature as a corollary to the power of the local government to
regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or theaters to increase the price of their
admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have been held to be invalid for these
impositions were considered as not merely license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not
regulation which the cities have no power to exact, 10 unless expressly granted by its charter. 11
Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 12 where the word "regulate" was interpreted to
include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate
places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper
police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
While in a New York case, 13 an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission tickets to
public exhibitions or performances by virtue of the power of cities under the General City Law "to
maintain order, enforce the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health,
comfort and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of said
purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was considered not to be within the scope of any duty
or power implied in the charter. It was held therein that the power of regulation of public exhibitions
and places of amusement within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any authority
to interfere with the price of admission to such places or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other
places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government. 14 Thus, in People v. Chan, 15 an ordinance of the
City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity
was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power. Still in another case, 16 the
validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting admission of two or more persons in
moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid
regulatory police measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are
concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety, and the general welfare.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question
under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to
it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance.
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally
requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 17 The legislature
may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business,
or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the
determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the courts. 18
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for
being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the
right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a
contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.
In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 19 this
Court held:
The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power, Inasmuch as the same
generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of persons, which are
protected and even guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the
obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the
Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights the police power measure must be
reasonable. In other words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police
power to the extent only and only to the extent--that may be fairly required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640?

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 53 of 73

A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the ordinance in question
was passed shows that a certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken into
account the complaints of parents that for them to pay the full price of admission for their children is
too financially burdensome.
The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out its raison
d'etre in all probability the respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are entitled to
share in the joys of their elders, but that considering that, apart from size, children between the ages
of seven and twelve cannot fully grasp the nuance of movies or other public exhibitions, games,
contests or other performances, the admission prices with respect to them ought to be reduced. 19a
We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper
measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of
the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. 20 The
methods or means used to protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare, must have some
relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police power, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the legislative
department. 21
We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest.
The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and means. 22 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help
ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for
the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission
would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to
bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of
earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point
out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since
the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12
years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard
against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth
certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at
all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon
the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from the pernicious
practice of movie operators and other public exhibitions promoters or the like of demanding equal
price for their admission tickets along with the adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and
unconscionable to the interest of the City in the furtherance of the prosperity, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and the general well-being of its inhabitants.
There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are
merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make
a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both
children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally
voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances.
Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and necessary to lessen the
economic burden of parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive nuisance being
maintained by the petitioners. Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children
are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they
pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.
The supposition of the trial court that because of their age children cannot fully grasp the nuances of
such entertainment as adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket price is
justifiable. In fact, by the very claim of respondent that movies and the like are attractive nuisances,
it is difficult to comprehend why the municipal board passed the subject ordinance. How can the
municipal authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 54 of 73

children to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children? Perhaps, there is some
,truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the public good and the
general welfare of society for it encourages children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than
attend to their studies in school or be in their homes.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be
discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if
only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these
movie house and theater operators cannot be compelled to exhibit any particular kind of film except
those films which may be dictated by public demand and those which are restricted by censorship
laws. So instead of children being able to share in the joys of their elders as envisioned by the trial
court, there will be a dearth of wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy.
There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United
States which upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as
against the right of the state to interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case
at bar.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor
of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the
purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that
he behaves properly. 23 Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case
may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property.
The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner
thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has
the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. 24 So
that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the
regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of property.
25
In Collister vs. Hayman, 26 it was held:
The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with a public interest, was
without a franchise to accommodate the public, and they had the right to control it, the same as the
proprietors of any other business, subject to such obligations as were placed upon them by statute.
Unlike a carrier of passengers, for instance, with a franchise from the state, and hence under
obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue the business year in and year out, the
proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can make a lawful
complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can limit the
number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They
can preserve order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a part of
the contract and condition of admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket
that no one shall be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be
admitted, or that a woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like.
The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of admission in any
reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to buy a ticket or make the
contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made, the minds of the parties meet upon
the condition, and the purchaser impliedly promises to perform it.
In Tyson and Bro. United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton, 27 the United States Supreme
Court held:
... And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and quite as certainly, its
activities are not such that their enjoyment can be regarded under any conditions from the point of
view of an emergency.
The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may be more nearly, and with
better reason, assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and markets and in the rental of
houses and apartments for residence purposes; although in importance it fails below such an interest
in the proportion that food and shelter are of more moment than amusement or instruction. As we

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 55 of 73

have shown there is no legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or clothing, or the rental
charges for houses and apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we are
unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule in respect
of amusements and entertainment ...
We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of American courts. In this
jurisdiction, legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods commodities and drugs during
periods of emergency, 28 limiting the net profits of public utility 29 as well as regulating rentals of
residential apartments for a limited period, 30 as a matter of national policy in the interest of public
health and safety, economic security and the general welfare of the people. And these laws cannot be
impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.
However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In no sense
could these businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a
national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean
however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree.
Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas
and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and
public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. 31 People of
all ages flock to movie houses, games and other public exhibitions for recreation and relaxation. The
government realizing their importance has seen it fit to enact censorship laws to regulate the movie
industry. 32 Their aesthetic entertainment and even educational values cannot be underestimated.
Even police measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in order to
safeguard public health and safety.
Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the
same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally
true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must
be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with
the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of
regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. 33 A police measure
for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix
a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as
such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a
right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for
their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. 36
Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
ordinance. This maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always
in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be
set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is
established by proper evidence. 37 The exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a
common right. 38
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could
assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has
been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal
rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise
of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO,
in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON:
BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and
Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is
assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary
and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio,
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public
Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a
constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power
measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered
as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on
December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or
serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles
along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching
motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of
local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E.
Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor
vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device
consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the
base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for
thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads,
the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at
least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The
Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as
herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 57 of 73

motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall
also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4.
All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or
appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended
by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby
amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor
vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a
reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The
Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate
to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the
implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President
Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of
early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on
June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the
immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29,
1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter
of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on
motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No.
1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from
whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained
in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except
motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of
charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be
indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of
the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby
superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by
respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative
Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction
No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For
him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to
the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with
arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided,
onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on
the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a
better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the
assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a
restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C.
Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised
and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory
injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10)
days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a
[temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this
Court. 16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations
and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 58 of 73

owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car,
17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3,
4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions
Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its
Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal
protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive,
arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said
allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and
Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical
recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional
litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of
the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the
charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned
Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative
decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20
and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United
Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which
was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and
dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of
Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To
repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal
protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing.
The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice
Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers
of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force,
Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso
reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth
decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most
essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all
the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of
Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present
with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is
thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that
men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare." 24

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 59 of 73

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be
a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character.
None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in
point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the
same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which
was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as
national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise
prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules
and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual
foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt
from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The
statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are
asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact
may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of
validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary
statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual
foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too
vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of
the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of
petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by
this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void
on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that
not reason enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rearend collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise
result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the
issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive
Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to
conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known
penchant for exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction
was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is
not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1)
blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4)
"well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who
sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or
expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in
the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 60 of 73

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of
the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or
in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early
warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like
petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring
or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity,
motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the
same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and
administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive,
onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said
devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *.
Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be
committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that
unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an
unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the
challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional
defects alleged against it. 32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack
of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say
negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished,
if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language
of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As
expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it
within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long
as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not
supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus
settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the
main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to
such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left
to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence
to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly
litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is
equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint
himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to
make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the
matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is
public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.'
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too
long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 61 of 73

made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity
of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency
with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative
in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed."
34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which
was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then
that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * *
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36
The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not
for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta
sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of
international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even
elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical
why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate
occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern
Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the
point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a
talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that
success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and MelencioHerrera, concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
Aquino J., took no part.
Concepcion J., is on leave.
Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123880. February 23, 1999]
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORPORATION, (Owner of Century Park Sheraton Manila),
petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EDDIE DAMALERIO,
respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks to annul and
set aside the Decision, dated September 18, 1995, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) [1], and the Order [2], dated January 30, 1996, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 62 of 73

in NLRC-NCR-CA No. 005642-93, on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.
On April 2, 1992, Eddie Damalerio (Damalerio), a room attendant of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel,
operated by Maranaw Hotel and Resort Corporation, was seen by hotel guest Jamie Glaser (Glaser)
with left hand inside the latter's suitcase. Confronted with what he was doing, Damalerio explained
that he was trying to tidy up the room. Not satisfied with the explanation of Damalerio, Glaser lodged
a written complaint before William D. Despuig, shift-in-charge of security of the hotel. Glaser also
reported that Damalerio had previously asked from him souvenirs, cassettes, and other giveaways.
The complaint was later brought by Despuig to the attention of Major Eddie Buluran, chief of Security
of the hotel.
On April 3, 1992, Damalerio was given a Disciplinary Action Notice (DAN). The next day, an
administrative hearing was conducted on the matter. Among those present at the hearing were: 1)
Lourdes Ricardo (room attendant), 2) Angelito Torres (floor supervisor), 3) Major Eddie Buluran (chief
of security), 4) Susan Dino (Personnel representative), 5) Alfredo San Gabriel (senior floor supervisor)
and 6) Ben Hur Amador (union representative).
Taking the witness stand on his own behalf, Damalerio denied the accusation against him, theorizing
that when he found the room of Glaser in disarray, and was about to make the bed, he noticed some
belongings, such as socks and T-shirts of the said hotel guest scattered around, so much so that he
thought of placing the same in his luggage. While doing so, Glaser arrived. When asked by the latter
if something was wrong, he (Damalerio) said "I'm just cleaning your room," and Glaser remarked,
"Good work," and then, the two of them chatted about Glaser's concert at the Araneta Coliseum.
On April 13, 1992, Damalerio received a memorandum [3] issued by Alfredo San Gabriel, Sr., Floor
Supervisor, bearing the approval of Nicolas R. Kirit, Executive Housekeeper, stating that he
(Damalerio) was found to have committed qualified theft in violation of House Rule No. 1, Section 3 of
Hotel Rules and Regulations. The same memorandum served as a notice of termination of his
employment.
On May 19,1992, Damalerio filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal against the
petitioner.
On August 20, 1993, after the parties had sent in their position papers, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J.
Diosana decided the case; disposing, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dismissal of complainant to be illegal and
ordering the respondents to reinstate him to his former or equivalent position without loss of seniority
rights and with backwages from April 15, 1992 when he was preventively suspended up to actual
reinstatement and other benefits, including but not limited to his share in the charges and/or tips
which he failed to receive, and all other CBA benefits that have accrued since his dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
From the aforesaid Labor Arbiter's disposition, the petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which modified
the appealed decision by giving petitioner the option of paying Damalerio a separation pay equivalent
to one (1) month pay for every year of service, instead of reinstating him.
On November 22, 1995, petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail.
denied the same on January 30, 1996.

NLRC

Undaunted, petitioner has come to this Court via the present petition; posing the questions:
1.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDUCE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF ITS VERSION OF THE INCIDENT, CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD INELUCTABLY SHOWS THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO;
and
2.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT REVERSING THAT PORTION OF THE DECISION OF THE LABOR

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 63 of 73

ARBITER ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO PAY PRIVATE RESPONDENT HIS SHARE IN THE SERVICE
CHARGE WHICH WAS COLLECTED DURING THE TIME HE WAS NOT WORKING IN THE HOTEL.
The petition is barren of merit.
Petitioner's theory that Damalerio was caught committing qualified theft in flagrante delicto is anemic
of evidentiary support. Records disclose petitioner's failure to substantiate such imputation against
him. During the investigation presided over by the Labor Arbiter, Damalerio narrated a plausible and
satisfactory explanation for his behavior complained of. According to him, he was then cleaning the
hotel room of Glaser, and while in the process of placing inside the luggage the personal belongings
of Glaser scattered near the bed, the latter entered the room. Glaser did not bother to testify as all
his things were intact.
Although it was not completely proper for Damalerio to be touching the things of a hotel guest while
cleaning the hotel rooms, personal belongings of hotel guests being off-limits to roomboys, under the
attendant facts and circumstances, we believe that the dismissal of Damalerio was unwarranted. To
be sure, the investigation held by the hotel security people did not unearth enough evidence of
culpability. It bears repeating that subject hotel guest lost nothing. Albeit petitioner may have
reasons to doubt the honesty and trustworthiness of Damalerio, as a result of what happened, absent
sufficient proof of guilt, he (Damalerio), who is a rank-and-file employee, cannot be legally dismissed.
[4] Unsubstantiated suspicions and baseless conclusions by employers are not legal justification for
dismissing employees. The burden of proving the existence of a valid and authorized cause of
termination is on the employer. [5] Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the employee, in keeping
with the principle of social justice enshrined in the Constitution. [6]
All things studiedly considered and viewed in proper perspective, the dismissal of Damalerio, under
the premises, cannot be countenanced.
As regards the share of Damalerio in the service charges collected during the period of his preventive
suspension, the same form part of his earnings, and his dismissal having been adjudged to be illegal,
he is entitled not only to full backwages but also to other benefits, including a just share in the service
charges, to be computed from the start of his preventive suspension until his reinstatement.
However, mindful of the animosity and strained relations between the parties, emanating from this
litigation, we uphold the ruling a quo that in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay may be given to the
private respondent, at the rate of one (1) month pay for every year of service. Should petitioner opt
in favor of separation pay, the private respondent shall no longer be entitled to share in the service
charges collected during his preventive suspension.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Court affirms the questioned Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission, to be implemented according to law and this disposition. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero (Chairman), Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 64 of 73

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT


BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA,
HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the
shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we
invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power
of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking
basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security
providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A decentralized
Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby
established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to
draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby
created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the
IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall
serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 65 of 73

Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the
standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective
systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in
coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other
concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to
educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security
Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the
respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the
Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and
Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April
8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO.
308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM
WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing
to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver
that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have
yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of
our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 66 of 73

issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and
member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality
of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per
se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot
cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security
System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National
Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that
representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national
identification system. 7 All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O.
No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality.
In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable
stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308
establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress
is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make
laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and
cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another
will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as
the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.
11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution,
either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The
executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. 18 He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that
he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office
or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of control, the President also
has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public
order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable
him to discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate
to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 67 of 73

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in
the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the
argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The
Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and
procedural principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative structure and
procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General
Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III
on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional
Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure.
These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of
departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government
budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal
organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of
1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the allimportant freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of
the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals
with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen
cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without
the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one
can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O.
No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation
and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the
established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by
Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative
legislation must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a
substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although
administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is
not an independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy.
The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,
30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that
the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found
within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 68 of 73

Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the ''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional
right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of
married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional
right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language
of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea
that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age
industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined
in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of
Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 69 of 73

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that
"[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into
the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy
of letters and other private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation
of secrets by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to dwelling.
40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use
of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category
of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the
individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a
relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial
features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice
print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal
identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that
the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and
turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is
stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service.
This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. 50
Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the
capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger
print. 51 Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes
the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of
biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face
using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone,
skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now
science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual.
It is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of
an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific
biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people
who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O.
No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.

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A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the
Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will
not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the
avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government
the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the
dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the computer or in the
documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments,
income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge
formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered
for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal
information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and
other basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not
save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and
categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall
control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are
essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the
computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no
controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the
particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use
of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode
and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may
pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics
and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over
what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They
threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an
individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer
revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored
data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When information of a
privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on
the subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of
privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its
danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a
laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty
if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for
the fire that could consume them.

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We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand.
The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation
is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual circumstances of the case determines the
reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation.
69 The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected
privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes
as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file
depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and
software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a
reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its
provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations
merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually
infettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the
individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public
disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 74 These laws, however, apply to records and
data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other
government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of
A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by
using the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to
streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by
avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He
cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are
rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the
law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his
sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was
enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities
for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an
administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what
practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at
bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional
scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is
at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter
scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic
right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They
must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or
regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution
whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of
doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights
protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United
States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 72 of 73

centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs
pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required
physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a
recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the
patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The
plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary
medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to
public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs
alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in
avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a
grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary
to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patientidentification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon
recommmendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter.
Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate
disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and
retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited
public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we
discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the
use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our
bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private
industry seek. Many information system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate
important social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more
efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and
streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good
administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame
policy and make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the
information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and
search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85
and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that
any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The
reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic disctinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of
the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society
has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and
organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms,
the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society. 87
IV

Consti2_DP-Subs_ 73 of 73

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats
emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th
case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext
that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only
the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to
compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the wellworded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an
unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its recordkeeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the
dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right.
We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

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