(A) Hegel's Manifold Response To Scepticism in The Phenomenology of Spirit

Hegel's Manifold Response to Scepticism in "The Phenomenology of Spirit"
Author(s): Kenneth R. Westphal

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 103 (2003), pp. 149-178
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
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VIII*FHEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE

TO SCEPTICISMIN THE
PHENOMENOLOGYOF SPIRIT
by KennethR. Westphal
For many reasons mainstreamHegel scholarshiphas disregarded
Hegel's interests in epistemology, hence also his response to scepticism.From
the points of view of defendersand critics alike, it seems that 'Hegel' and 'epistemology' have nothing to do with one another.Despite this widespreadconviction, Hegel was a very sophisticated epistemologist whose views merit
contemporary interest. This article highlights several key features and innovations of Hegel's epistemology-including his anti-Cartesianism,fallibilism,
realism (sic) and externalism both about mental content and about justification-by consideringhis systematicresponsesto Pyrrhonian, Humean, Cartesian and Kantian scepticism.
ABSTRACT
ntroduction.
For many reasons mainstreamHegel scholarship
has disregardedHegel's interests in epistemology, hence also

his response to scepticism.From the points of view of defenders
and critics alike, it seems that 'Hegel' and 'epistemology' have
nothing to do with one another. This impressionresultsfrom the
lack of interestof nearlyall Hegel scholarsin epistemology,on the
one hand, and the lack of interest of epistemologists in Hegel's
philosophy, on the other.1This grave mis-impressionaccurately
reflects one point: Hegel's epistemology differs fundamentally
from standardviews in epistemology,whetherempiricist,rationalist, Kantian or analytic (a very broad grouping, to be sure).
However, the distinctness of Hegel's epistemology may result
from his having alreadyrecognizedkey insights-along with key
defects-in these kinds of epistemology.
This claim may seem most implausiblein the case of analytic
epistemology. However, analytic epistemology has followed,
1. A few recent books have addressed Hegel's epistemology. However, they have
generally not been very successful because their authors lack adequate background
in epistemology. See Westphal (1999).
* Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London,
on Monday, 10th February, 2003 at 4.15 p.m.
150
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
more seriously than is often recognized, Russell's 1922 exhortation, 'I would take "Back to the 18th Century!"as my battle
cry, if I had any hopes that others would rally to it.'2 Russell's
return to Hume's first Enquiry rooted analytic epistemology
deeply in the Cartesiantradition that Kant, Hegel and Hume (in
the Treatise)identifiedas the key source of irresolvableepistemological difficulties.In 1966 Strawsondeclaredthat two of Kant's
key insights are 'so great and so novel that, nearly two hundred
years after they were made, they have still not been fully
absorbed into the philosophical consciousness'-a judgment he
still regards as true.3 Failure to appreciateKant's achievements
exacerbatesthe difficultiesin grasping Hegel's epistemology.
Though one essay cannot treat the entiretyof Hegel's epistemology, I hope to convey some of its most importantfeaturesand
insights by summarizing the main points of Hegel's critical
responses to scepticism in the Phenomenologyof Spirit.4These
points fall underfour headings:Pyrrhonian(Section I), empiricist
(Section II), Cartesian (Section III) and Kantian (Section IV)
scepticism.
PyrrhonianScepticism.Pyrrhonianscepticism is not a doctrine,

but rather a collection of sceptical argument-strategies,'tropes',
which supposedlyresultin suspensionof judgment (Epoche),thus
leading to tranquillity(Ataraxia). The Pyrrhonistrescinds both
affirmationand denial. This frees him from pointless, unhealthy
controversy over hopelessly inconclusive claims about alleged
knowledge of reality, whateverthat may be.
In his early essay on scepticism (1801) Hegel gladly appealed
to Pyrrhoniantropes in order to undermine the pretensions of
the 'finite understanding'to metaphysical knowledge.5He held
2. Russell (1994), 9:39. One of his most devoted followers in this regard is Quine
(1969, 72, cf. 74, 76), who maintains 'on the doctrinal side [sc. epistemological justification], I do not see that we are farther along today than where Hume left us. The
Humean predicament is the human predicament.'
3. Strawson (1996), 29. In personal correspondence (May 1999) he affirmed that his
statement remains true.
4. A synopsis of Hegel's epistemology appears in Westphal (2003a).
5. Forster (1989), Part I.
HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM
151
that 'infinite reason' avoids scepticism through 'intellectual

intuition' of the absolute. The utter poverty of this response to
Pyrrhonismwas brought home to Hegel through an anonymous
article by G. E. Schulze titled 'Aphorisms on the Absolute'
(1803).6By summer1804 Schulze'sessay had made clear to Hegel
that his 'absolute idealism' also must scrupulously avoid question-begging (petitio principii).7 Thereafter Hegel treated
Pyrrhonianscepticismnot merelyas a useful source of arguments
against inadequate accounts of knowledge (e.g., naive realism8),
but also as a profound philosophical opponent. Indeed, Hegel
took the threat of Pyrrhonian scepticism more seriously, and
developed a far more incisive response to it, than any other
epistemologist.9Unfortunately, this advance of Hegel's epistemology has proven to be a liability in the recognition of his
achievement:neitherproponentsnor criticshave recognizedHegel's engagement with Pyrrhonian scepticism, much less understood it.
The whole series of 17 Pyrrhonian tropes need not be considered here, nor Sextus Empiricus's decisive criticism of
representational theories of perception. (Hegel rejected such
theories.) We should begin with the classic Five Modes (tropes)
of Agrippa, for they are the classic statement of the sceptical
regressargument.10
1.1. The regress argumentconsists in demanding, for any claim
offered by anyone, a ground of proof for that claim, and likewise
again a ground of proof for whateverground of proof is offered.
This regress supposedly leads to any of five untenable possibilities: a falsehood that groundsnothing, a dogmatic assertionthat
begs the question, an infinite regressthat grounds nothing, a circularity that grounds nothing, or a supposedly self-justifying
claim.11 Pyrrhonists then offer a series of further objections
6. Schulze (1803), brilliantly explicated by Meist (1993).
7. Westphal (2000b), ?5.
8. Dusing (1973), Graeser (1985).
9. Westphal (1989), (1997a).
10. For discussion of this 'Agrippa problem' in connection with contemporary epistemology, see Fogelin (1994).
11. Alston (1988), 26-27.
152
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
against 'self-justification'or 'self-evidence'.These further objections needn't detain us here; we need only focus on the problem
of circularity,because Hegel rejected the essentially deductivist
model of empiricaljustification which drives the regress argument and which has dominated mainstreamepistemology from
Descartes to Hume, and from Russell to William Alston (including, e.g., non-foundationalists such as Dretske).'2 Even more
than Kant, Hegel was anti-Cartesian.Hegel understood as well
as Kant that human empiricalknowledgeis not built on allegedly
basic bits of sensory knowledge, nor can empiricalknowledge be
derived from such bits of knowledge. Like Kant, Hegel rejected
the foundationalist model of empirical knowledge. Neither was
Hegel a coherentistin any standardsense of the term; he recognized that both models are inadequate.
1.2. Sextus Empiricusaverredthat for any positive thesis an equally compelling antithesis can be offered (equipollence),so that
we suspend judgment and achieve Epoche'.3 Hegel criticized
(among others) Sextus Empiricus for being satisfied with mere
refutation, with merely 'abstractnegation', i.e. finding sufficient
fault with a theory to reject it as inadequate, but stopping at
that.'4 In opposition to this Hegel maintains that a truly penetrating refutation consists in a strictly internal critique that
identifiesboth the insights and the defects of a philosophicaltheory, and through that critique derives grounds of proof for a
more adequate theory. This Hegel calls 'determinatenegation'.5
At this general, programmatic level one cannot determine
whether Sextus could respond to such an Hegelian 'determinate
negation' by offering mutually opposed 'determinatenegations'
of two competing theories. Determining who is correct (or at
least closer to the truth) about this issue instead requiresexamining carefully actual internal criticism of various theories of
knowledge. Elsewhere I have argued in detail that Hegel's
internal criticisms of the epistemologies of naive realism,
12. For discussion of Dretske, see Westphal (2003a), Ch. 9.
13. Pyrrhonian scepticism is summarized in Westphal (1989), 11-16.
14. PhdG, GW 9:57.7-14. Hegel's remark also applies, e.g., to Popper's
falsificationism.
15. PhdG, GW9:57.1-12; cf. Westphal (1989), 125-26, 135-36, 163. The term is misused by Brandom (1999), 174.
153
Descartes, Hume, Kant, Carnap, Russell, Alston, Dretske, Putnam's 'internalrealism',and FrederickSchmitt's'social epistemology' provide their 'determinatenegations' and hence provide
considerable grounds of proof for Hegel's own epistemology.16
With all due respect to Wilfrid Sellars, no other epistemologist
has so acutely probed and exploited the views of his opponents.
Pace wide-spreadprejudiceto the contrary, Hegel was an acute
epistemologist. (Pardon my use of the term, but prejudiceit is
because it is based on ill-considered reputation rather than
knowledge of Hegel's views or texts.)
1.3. In Hegel's view, two important Pyrrhonian tropes, circularity and the Dilemma of the Criterion, share a common solution. Justificatorycircularityis a problem, not because a series
of grounds of proof mutually support each other, but because
such a series appears to offer no independentproof to convince
any dissenter. And so it seems when the circle consists solely in
affirmations.However, a circle of groundsof proof appearsquite
differentlyif following it out (or around) consists instead in persistent critical reconsiderationof each ground of proof. If this is
the procedure,there is at least the possibility that any particular
ground of proof or justificatory link within the circle may be
affirmed,denied, revised or replaced. In these ways, the circle of
grounds of proof can be improved, not merely reiterated.How
can such critical reconsiderationoccur? Such reconsiderationof
the chain of grounds of proof must be critical, but to avoid begging the question and to identify one's own errorsthe reconsideration must be self-critical as well. A few epistemologists have
noted in passing the importanceof self-criticism.'7Hegel, alone
among epistemologists, developed an exacting analysis of the
possibility of productive self-criticism."8
If constructiveself-criticism is possible, we are not locked into the forced options epitomized in the Five Modes of Agrippa.
How is a self-critical reconsiderationof one's own views, or
likewise the strictly internal criticism of others' views, possible?
As mentioned above, this question was posed to Hegel sharply
by G. E. Schulze, who drew Hegel's attention back to Sextus
16. Westphal (1989), (1998a), (2000a), (2002b), (2003a), Ch. 9, 10, (2003c).
17. E.g., Price (1932, 192), Sellars (1963, 170).
18. Westphal (1989, 1997a).
154
KENNETHR. WESTPHAL
Empiricus's Dilemma of the Criterion. Sextus formulated the

Dilemma thus:
In order to decide the dispute which has arisenabout the criterion
[of truth],we must possess an acceptedcriterionby which we shall
be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted
criterion,the dispute about the criterionmust firstbe decided.And
when the argumentthus reducesitself to a form of circularreasoning the discovery of the criterionbecomes impracticable,since we
do not allow [those who make knowledge claims] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterionby
a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum.And furthermore, since demonstrationrequiresa demonstratedcriterion,while
the criterionrequiresan approveddemonstration,they are forced
into circularreasoning.19
In his early essay on scepticismHegel merelynoted this dilemma

in passing.20By 1804, thanks to Schulze'sintervention,Hegel saw
how crucial this sceptical challenge to philosophy is. Accordingly, Hegel paraphrasedthe Dilemma right in the middle of the
Introduction to the Phenomenologyof Spirit. Initially, Hegel
notes the general problem of avoiding question-beggingwhen
presentingand defendingany unfamiliarphilosophical-'wissenschaftlich'or 'scientific'-theory. (SurelyHegel's epistemologypart of his philosophical 'science'-is one example of an unfamiliar epistemology!)Merelystating or assertingone's view cannot
justify it, for any position is of course stated by its advocates,
whilst 'one bare assurancecounts as much as another'.2' Hegel's
pointed observation about 'bare' assurancesagain follows Sextus's own dictum,22and poses the general problem of questionbegging. Two pages later Hegel formulates the Dilemma of the
Criterion directly, though he speaks of a 'standard' (MaJ3stab)
19. Sextus Empiricus, PH Bk. 2, Ch. 4 ?20; cf. bk. 1, Ch. 14 ??l 16-17, AL I ??316,
317. Remarkably, Fogelin (1994) focuses on the Five Modes of Agrippa and all but
ignores the Dilemma of the Criterion, which is only mentioned in passing (ibid., 6).
20. Hegel (1802a), GW 4:212.8-10. Forster (1989) follows exclusively Hegel's early
essay on scepticism. Forster (1998, 131) cites the passage in which Hegel refers
expressly, if en passant, to the Dilemma of the Criterion. In neither book does Forster
recognize Hegel's restatement of the Dilemma in the Introduction to the Phenomenology, nor Hegel's profound response to it. Consequently, Forster misrepresents
Hegel's mature response to Pyrrhonian scepticism. See Westphal (1999, 2000c).
21. PhdG Introduction ?4, GW 9:55.18-24, my translation.
22. AD I ?315; cf AD II ?464.
155
rather than a 'criterion.23 The apparent implication of these

problems is that Hegel's 'philosophical science', including his
epistemology, cannot be based on any mere assurance,but also
not on any proof, because the soundness of a proof can only be
determinedby criteriaof soundness, and such criteriaare just as
controversialas the assurancesor even the proofs that are offered
on behalf of a philosophical theory. How can question-begging
be avoided, how can genuine standardsof justificationbe established, whenever philosophical debate concerns fundamentally
differentphilosophical views?24
Hegel's response to this challenge grounds both his analysis
of 'determinatenegation' and his solutions to the problem of
circularity and the Dilemma of the Criterion in an acute and
subtle analysisof the possibilityof constructiveself-criticism.The
basic points are the following.
A careful textual analysis revealsthat Hegel analyses our consciousness of an object into six main aspects.25Hegel distinguishes the object itself from our concept of the object itself.
Likewise, he distinguishesbetween ourselves as actual cognitive
subjects in our actual cognitive engagementsfrom our self-concept as engaged cognitive subjects. More importantly, Hegel
analyses our experienceof an object, and likewise our experience
of ourselvesas cognitive subjects, as resultingfrom our use of
these concepts in attempting to know their 'objects'. This is to
say, our experienceof the object resultsfrom our use of our concept of the object in attempting to know the object itself. Likewise, our self-experienceas knowers results from our use of our
cognitive self-concept in attempting to know ourselves in our
cognitive engagements.
23. PhdG Introduction, ?9; GW9:58.12-22.

24. Note that Chisholm thought there was no non-question-begging response to what
he called the problem of the criterion, that sceptics, methodists, and particularists
(himself included) can and must beg the question against each other. See Westphal
(1989), 217; (1997a), ?0.
25. Westphal (1989), Ch. 7, 8; (1997a).
156
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
Consider this table of the aspects Hegel distinguishes:

A. Our concept of the object.
1. Our cognitive self-concept.
B. Our experienceof the object. 2. Our cognitive self-experience.

C. The object itself.
3. Our cognitive constitution

and engagementthemselves.
In this way, our experienceof the object (B) is structuredboth

through our concept of the object (A) and through the object
itself (C). Likewise our experienceof ourselves as knowers (2) is
structuredboth through our cognitive self-concept (1) and our
actual cognitive constitution and engagement(3). Hegel's analysis implies directly that, on the one hand, we have no conceptfree empirical knowledge, and likewise no concept-free selfknowledge. On the other hand, neitherare we trappedwithin our
conceptual scheme! Put positively, our experience of the object
(B) can only correspondwith the object itself (C) if our concept
of the object (A) also correspondswith the object itself (C). Likewise, our cognitive self-experience (2) corresponds with our
actual cognitive constitution and engagement(3) only if our cognitive self-concept (1) also correspondswith them (3). Put negatively and critically, insofar as our concept of the object (A) or
likewise our cognitive self-concept (1) fail to correspond with
their 'objects'(C, 3), we can detect and correctthis lack of correspondence, though only through sustainedand pointed attempts
to comprehendour 'objects' (C, 3) through use of our concepts
(A, 1) in our experience of those objects (B, 2). Such attempts
can inform us whether and how our concepts (A, 1) can and
must be revised in order to improve their correspondencewith
their 'objects' (C, 3).
Moreover, our concept of the object (A) and our cognitive
self-concept (1) must mutually correspond, in the sense that we
conceive of the object (A) in ways that can be known in accord
with our cognitive self-concept(1), and our cognitive self-concept
(1) is of a cognitive subject who can know such objects as we
conceive them (A). These concepts must not merelybe consistent,
but must support each other. Likewise our experience of the
object (B) and our cognitive self-experience(2) must supporteach
other. Finally, our concept of the object (A) must be such that
it renders our cognitive self-experience(2) intelligible, and our
157
cognitive self-concept (1) must render our experience of the

object (B) intelligible.In sum, the four aspects (A, B, 1, 2) must
mutuallycorrespondand mutuallysupporteach other in the sense
that they groundor justify each other. However,those aspectscan
only do this insofaras our concepts(A) and (1) correspondto their
objects (C) and (3). At the broad level of the criticalexamination
of key concepts of human empiricalknowledge, where different
concepts (or models) of the objects of empirical knowledge
require different concepts (or models) of empirical knowledge,
this complex of correspondencesis a sufficient criterion of the
truth, and hence also the justification, of an epistemology.
Two important points must be noted directly. First, Hegel's
criterion of epistemic justification directly entails a fallibilist
account of philosophicaljustification. On Hegel's view, a philosophical epistemology can only be justified through pointed, not
only prior but also on-going and future attempts to use its main
concepts in connection with their 'objects'to account for human
empiricalknowledge. Hegel's fallibilismalso resultsfrom the circumstance,central to his account of 'determinatenegation', that
an epistemology can only be justified through thorough, strictly
internal critique of alternativetheories of knowledge. However,
alternative theories of knowledge form no closed series. Since
1807 a wide range of new theories of knowledgehave been developed, along with new variants of older theories of knowledge.
All of these must be carefullyconsideredin order to reassess,and
so far as possible preserve,improve, or if need be diminish the
justification of an epistemology, whether Hegel's or any other.
(Plainly, Hegel's epistemology and its attendant meta-epistemology requires of us lots of intensive homework. No doubt this
is one reason philosophershave sought simpler,more straightforward theories of knowledge.)
The second importantpoint is that Hegel's epistemologicalcriterion directlyentails the rejectionof semanticinternalism.Hegel's criterion directly implies that our experience of worldly
objects and events is not restrictedto the explicable content of
our concepts of those objects. Instead, Hegel is clearlycommitted
to the thesis that the semantic content of our concepts is only
partly a function of whateversemanticcontent can be explicated
in terms of descriptionsof the objects those concepts purportedly
refer to. On Hegel's view, the content of our concepts is also in
158
KENNETHR. WESTPHAL
part a function of the objects in connection with which they are

used, and in two ways: the content of a concept is partly specified
by its paradigm instances (Putnam), and also by the particular
object regarding which it is used on any particular occasion
(Evans). This is to say, already in 1807 Hegel rejected the key
thesis of descriptions-theoriesof semanticmeaningand reference.
In this way, Hegel avoids in advance both Kuhn's main arguments for paradigm incommensurabilityand Putnam's main
arguments for 'internal realism'.26Hegel's semantic externalism
is supportedby his transcendentalargumentfor what we would
now call 'mental content externalism' (see below, Sections III,
IV).
In a word, Hegel was the original pragmaticrealist.27The key
idea of pragmatismis put succinctlyby Sellars:
Aboveall, the [foundationalist]picture is misleadingbecause of its
static character.One seems forced to choose between the picture
of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the [coherentist]picture of a great Hegelian serpent of
knowledgewith its tail in its mouth (Wheredoes it begin?).Neither
will do. For empiricalknowledge, like its sophisticatedextension,
science, is rational, not because it has a foundationbut because it
is a self-correctingenterprisewhich can put any claim in jeopardy,
though not all at once.28
The so-called 'Hegelian serpent'was invented by Hegel's expositors and critics, not Hegel. An exacting analysis of Hegel's epistemology reveals no such thing.29In effect, we begin with our
epistemologicalpredilections,whatever they may be, and determine the extent to which they can be developed into an adequate
epistemology that can withstand critical scrutiny-including
critical self-scrutiny. If we are thorough and scrupulous about
this, and if Hegel's accounts of constructive self-criticismand
'determinate negation' are sound, we can develop considered
convergenceby the fact that we epistemologists, all of us, share
the human cognitive constitution and engage through it with a
26. For Hegel's response to Kuhn, see Westphal (1989), 146-47; to Putnam, see
Westphal (2003c).
27. On Hegel's realism see Wartenberg (1993), Westphal (1989), 140-8.
28. Sellars (1963), 170.
29. See Westphal (1989), 56-7.
HEGEL'SMANIFOLDRESPONSETO SCEPTICISM
159
common world-whatever each of these ultimatelyproves to be.

(Regardingour common world, see below Sections III, IV.)
1.4. Characteristicof Pyrrhonianscepticismis its thorough indifference regardingany thesis or claim, whether negative or positive. Characteristicof Sextus Empiricus'swritingsis his thorough
indifferencetowards other philosophical views. However, Hegel
identified one key substantive assumption made by Pyrrhonian
scepticism. Pyrrhonianscepticismreduced all human experience
to the experienceof mere appearancesby appeal to the classical
Greek 'ontological' concept of truth, according to which something is true only if it is utterly stable and unchanging. If truth
requires this, then any human experience counts as something
untrue, as mere appearance,simply because it is transitory and
variable. Precisely this absurd search for invariant existence
(a.k.a. 'truth') in the context of the variabilityof human experiences is one key point in Hegel's internal critique of Pyrrhonian
scepticism.30
The assumptionthat the truth must be stable and unchanging

leads directly to the constant yet always unsatisfied Pyrrhonist
search for truth.31 To the contrary, Hegel maintained that we
must and can only grasp truth within our variable and various
experiencesof the world. This view can only be developed and
justified through Hegel's entire epistemology. However, one step
in this directionHegel takes is alreadyclear:he holds a semantic,
correspondenceanalysis of the nature (not the criteria)of 'truth'.
II
Empiricist Scepticism. The history of empiricism frequently
repeats a striking phenomenon: one begins with the plausible
assumptionthat knowledge of the world must be sensory knowledge, though ultimatelyone winds up espousing either subjective
30. PhdG, GW 9: 120-1/?205; Westphal (2000c).
31. PH I ??226, 236. The other factor supporting this (alleged) constant search after
truth is to avoid the incoherence of denying that knowledge is possible. If we were
demonstrably incapable of knowledge, the search for truth would be easy to rescind.
However, if we were demonstrablyincompetent in this way, we would know something after all. Pyrrhonists distinguished themselves from Academic Sceptics, who did
argue (paradoxically) that we are cognitively incompetent, over precisely this issue.
160
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
idealism or empirical scepticism. The grounds of this phenomenon are complex, and cannot be discussed here. It suffices to
recall this general tendency in order to frame Hegel's critical
rejectionof empiricism.Empiricismwas well representedin Germany around the turn of the Nineteenth Century, most prominently by G. E. Schulze.32Schulze responded to Kant's Critical
philosophy by re-deploying Hume's criticisms of induction and
of our very concept of causality, though he didn't recognize the
problemsbesettingempiricismthat Hume himself recognised(see
below, Section 2.2). In order to assess empiricism critically,
Hegel had to consider the paradigmaticempiricist, Hume, and
that he did.34
2.1. Characteristicof strong empiricist foundationalism is the
thesis that we enjoy concept-free knowledge of sensed particulars. Although this doctrine was not espoused by most of the
Scottish school-though Hume's official 'copy theory' of ideas
and impressions commits him to it-this thesis was commonplace among German empiricists, e.g. Hamann, Jacobi, G. E.
Schulze and W. T. Krug.35Later, of course, it was espoused by
Russell. Such concept-freebasic knowledgeis supposedto justify
any and all derivedknowledge. Such knowledgeis also supposed
to enable us to avoid both the Dilemma of the Criterionas well
as Hegel's highly sophisticatedresponse to it: if we enjoyed concept-freesensory knowledge of particulars,we could just look to
see what are the relevant facts and thereby settle any disputes
about claims to empiricalknowledge. This strategypreservesthe
basic model of epistemological foundationalism(the distinction
between basic and derived knowledge), which attempts to
respond directly to the sceptical (classically, Pyrrhonist)regress
argument.
Against this strong empiricist foundationalism, Hegel argued
that foundationalismcannot answer scepticism because there is
no such concept-free basic knowledge, and because the foundationalist model of our empirical knowledge is seriously misleading. It is misleading because it views the justification of
32.
33.
34.
35.
Kuehn (1987), Beiser (1987), 165-92, 266-84.

Regarding Schulze, see Westphal (1998a), 27-30; (2000a).
Westphal (1998a).
Westphal (2000a), note 18.
161
derived knowledge in essentially deductivist terms (otherwise it

would lack persuasive force against sceptics), and because it
views the justification of any basic bit of knowledge in terms of
its independenceof any other bits of basic knowledge (otherwise
problems of circularity set in). Moreover, Hegel aims to show
that the original realist orientationof empiricismcan be justified,
not by empiricism,but only by Hegel's own, pragmaticallyreconstructed rationalism(see Sections III-V).
Hegel defends this thesis in part in the first three chapters of
the Phenomenology,the so-called 'Consciousness' section, containing the chapters 'Sense-Certainty','Perception', and 'Force
and Understanding'. In all three chapters Hegel argues (like
Kant) that human empirical knowledge of any one worldly circumstance(an object or event) can only be achievedcontrastively,
by distinguishingit from other possible and actual circumstances.
Any one empiricalstate of affairscan be identifiedonly by differentiating (discriminating)its spatio-temporalregion from other
spatio-temporal regions, and only by differentiating both its
intrinsicand its relationalcharacteristicsfrom the characteristics
of other actual and possible empiricalcircumstances.Moreover,
these two forms of identificationare mutually interdependent.36
If this is the case, then we can have no allegedlybasic knowledge
of any one empiricalfact independentof our knowledge of other
empirical facts. Hence the justification of human empirical
knowledge is weakly holistic: our justificatory grounds for any
one empirical claim are interdependent with our justificatory
grounds for other empiricalclaims. This feature of empiricaljustificationis weakly holistic due to Hegel's account of constructive
self-criticism.
Hegel's criticismof allegedly concept-freebits of basic knowledge relates directly to his critique of concept-empiricism,the
thesis that any legitimateconcept either names a simple object of
sensory experience, or is a logical term, or can be exhaustively
defined by these two kinds of terms.37According to this thesis,
36. Hegel's analysis concurs strikingly with some of Evans (1975), esp. pp. 351-52. I
argue that Hegel's critique of 'immediate knowledge' holds of Russell's 'knowledge
by acquaintance' in Westphal (2002b).
37. This 'simple object' need not be understood in phenomenalist terms, though typically it has been so understood in the Twentieth Century, following Hume's use of it
in connection with sensory impressions.
162
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
as Locke and especiallyHume showed, the supposed concepts 'I'

and 'thing' cannot be defined at all, and so are not legitimate,
and the concept of 'cause' can only be defined statistically or
psychologically. Hence concept-empiricismis an crucial basis of
empiricistscepticism.38
Concept-empiricismis also important because it distinguishes
between a priori and a posteriori (or empirical) concepts. Any
concept that can be definedin accord with concept-empiricismis

empiricalor a posteriori.Any concept that cannot be defined in
this way is a priori. As the history of Logical Empiricismand the
fate of attemptsto replacetalk of ordinaryobjects or events with
constructions of sense data both showed, by this criterionmost
of our concepts, includingscientificconcepts, are a priori. Generally unrecognisedthroughthese criticismsof Concept-empiricism
is that there are certain a priori concepts that are also 'pure', in
the sense that we must have and use these pure a priori concepts
in order to have any self-conscious experiencewhatsoever, and
so to have any occasion on which to learn, develop or to use
the many rich concepts, whether ordinaryor scientific,we use in
making any even moderately interesting claims. This Kantian
thesis about 'pure' a priori concepts has been widely rejectedin
Twentieth Century philosophy, though without sufficient
consideration.39Now that Kant's grounds for maintaining the
completeness of his Table of Judgmentshave been made out,40
this issue must be carefully reconsidered.The crucial questions
about pure a priori concepts are two: whether indeed we have
any, and whether we can use them in genuine claims to knowledge. Only if this latter condition is satisfied are pure a priori
concepts legitimate. Traditional rationalists overlooked this key
question. Kant first posed it, and Hegel followed suit.
Hegel argues against concept-empiricismin 'Sense Certainty'
that any empiricalcircumstancecan be known, because it can be
38. Note that Concept Empiricism is a semantic thesis about the meaning or content
of concepts. It is distinct from Verification Empiricism (Hume's Fork) which distinguishes two ways of justifying knowledge of two kinds of propositions, namely a priori
knowledge of analytic propositions or a posteriori knowledge of synthetic
propositions.
39. This way of distinguishing empirical and a priori concepts is too simple. Some of
the necessary refinements are discussed in Westphal (2003a), ??21, 22. Also see Section
2.2 regarding the a priori status of the concept 'cause'.
40. See Wolff (1995, 1998, 2000).
163
identified,only by our using pure a priori concepts of 'I', 'other',

'time', 'times', 'space', 'spaces', and 'individuation'.In 'Perception' Hegel shows that the very concept of 'perceptiblething' is
pure a priori. In 'Force and Understanding'Hegel argues that
our concept of 'perceptiblething' is only intelligiblethrough the
concept of 'cause', which also is pure a priori. ElsewhereI have
argued in detail that Hegel's analyses in 'Sense Certainty' and
'Perception' are sound.41 The arguments Hegel provides show
both that these basic concepts are pure a priori, and that our
cognitive use of them is legitimate, because without them we
could not even putativelyidentify or make claims about singular
objects or events. Because the idea that we have pure a priori
concepts has become so unfamiliar,it deservesbrief discussion.
2.2. Hume's analyses of the concepts 'cause' and 'perceptible
thing' ('the idea of body', Hume called it) deserve close reconsideration.Kant alreadysaw that Hume's analysis of the concept
of 'cause'underminedHume's own account of our causal beliefs.
According to empiricist principles of generalization through
repeatedexperiences,only throughmany repeatedexperiencesof
particular(allegedly) causal relations among particularkinds of
things; e.g. 'Today the sun warmed this stone,' 'Today the sun
warmed that stone,' 'Yesterday the sun warmed some other
stone,' etc., can we formulate and affirm the particularcausal
belief, 'Sunshine warms stones.' However, this is only the first
step. Only by comparing many, many such particular causal
beliefs can we formulate and affirm the particularcausal principle, 'Each kind of event has some one kind of cause.' And only
after comparing many more instances of this principle can we
take the third step to form the general concept of causality,
expressedin the statement, 'Every event has a cause.'
Kant noted (KdrV B240-41) that this Humean analysis is
unsound because so often we experienceonly a supposed cause,
though not its supposed effect; or likewise we experienceonly a
supposed effect without experiencingits supposed cause. Consequently, we could hardly formulate,much less affirm,any beliefs
in particularcausal relations. Hence we could hardly formulate
the particularcausal principle,'Each kind of event has some one
41. Westphal (1998), (2000a). I discuss some key points from 'Force and Understanding' in Westphal (1989), 159-160, (1997e).
164
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
kind of cause.' And if we could hardly formulate that principle,

we could not at all formulate or affirm the general proposition,
'Every event has a cause.' That we do formulate and affirm this
principle, along with various particular causal beliefs, shows
instead that we presuppose the general concept of causality, on
the basis of which alone we can sort out our quite mixed evidence
regardingany particularcausal relations.42(This is why the principles Kant defends are not and cannot be high-level generalizations from experience,pace the criticismsof Kant by Schlickand
Reichenbach, still widely accepted among analytic epistemologists as conclusive.)
Unlike his followers, whetherin Germany circa 1800 or in the
Twentieth Century, Hume noted precisely this problem, though
only in passing in the difficult and unjustly neglected section of
the Treatise (1.4 ?2), 'Of Scepticism with regard to the senses'.
The main aim of this section is to explain our 'idea of body', i.e.,
our concept of a perceptiblephysical object. The problem results
from the fact that this concept is necessaryfor our very belief in
'outer' objects, though it cannot be defined in accord with concept empiricism.Any impressionof sense instantiatesthe concept
of unity; any group of sensory impressionsinstantiates the concept of plurality.However, the concept of the 'identity'of a perceptible object is distinct from both of those concepts, and
cannot be defined on their basis, all the more so when we consider the changes we perceive in things. Hume observed:
'Tisconfestby the mostjudiciousphilosophers,
that our ideasof
bodiesarenothingbutcollectionsform'dby the mindof the ideas
of the severaldistinctsensiblequalities,of whichobjectsarecompos'd,andwhichwefindto havea constantunionwitheachother.
Buthoweverthesequalitiesmayin themselvesbe entirelydistinct,
'tis certainwe commonlyregardthe compound,whichtheyform,
as Onething,andas continuingthe Sameunderveryconsiderable
alterations. The acknowledg'dcompositionis evidentlycontraryto
this suppos'dsimplicity,
and the variationto the identity.43
To resolve these 'contradictions',Hume introduced psychological propensitiesby which we produce a 'medium'between 'unity'
and 'plurality',namely the concept of 'identity'.44
42. See Beck (1978), esp. 121-25.
43. Treatise, L.iv.3:219;bold added.
44. Treatise I.iv.2:201.
165
Hume's analysis is unsound. At most, Hume explicated the

occasioningcauses of our use of the concept of identity. He failed
to define the content of this concept solely on the basis of concept-empiricism.(Could he have done so, he could have omitted
psychological propensities.) In effect, his psychological propensities are propensitiesto use a priori concepts, in particular,the
concept of a perceptiblething, i.e., its identity amidst its many
perceived qualities and amidst is many perceived changes of
qualities.45
In 'Perception' Hegel identified and critically analysed precisely this problem in Hume's empiricistscepticism.Through his
strictly internal critique of Hume's analysis of our concept 'perceptible thing' Hegel establishedthat this concept is pure a priori.
To this extent, concept-empiricismprovides no sound sceptical
objection to our belief in, or to our knowledge of, perceptible
spatio-temporalobjects.46
2.3. In the 'Consciousness'section, Hegel justifies our use of the
pure a priori concepts mentioned above (Section 2.1, end) by
showing that without using those concepts we could have none
of the alleged basic knowledge touted by (inter alia) empiricists.
Without these concepts we could not even believe in 'body', that
is, in perceptiblethings in space and time. Without them, neither
could we have any awareness or knowledge of singular objects
or events, whether commonsense or scientific. Hegel reinforces
these results through his criticisms of Cartesian and Kantian
scepticism(Sections III, IV).
45. Quine (1953, 66, 73-74; 1960, 116; 1969, 71; 1995, 5) recurs to this section of
Hume's Treatise, sketching the error Hume ascribes to us in believing that there are
physical objects. This appears to be Quine's (1953, 44) main reason for referring to
the 'myth' of physical objects. One key problem with Quine's account is that he fails
to recognize that if Hume's official empiricism is true, we would lack the very concepts required to make this mistake. Quine (1969, 75; cf. 1974, 1) remains persuaded
that one 'cardinal tenet of empiricism remain[s] unassailable ... to this day ... all
inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence'. By 'ultimately' Quine surely means 'solely', even though sound arguments for our having
some non-logical, pure a priori concepts, by use of which alone we can learn or
acquire any empirical concepts, were developed at the turn of the Nineteenth century
by Kant and Hegel. Indeed, Hume himself demonstrated that his official copy theory
of impressions and ideas could not at all account for the generality of thought. (This
last point I analyse in some forthcoming work.)
46. Westphal (1998a); summarized in Westphal (1998c).
166
KENNETHR. WESTPHAL
2.4. Before turning to these criticisms, some key points of Hegel's critical response to Hume's problem of induction should be
mentioned. Hegel criticises several key assumptions of Hume's
problem, namely Hume's justificatoryinfallibilism, deductivism
and internalism.Hegel also notes that future events simply are
not objects of knowledge because they do not presently exist.
Hegel regards'inductivereasoning'as an importantform of analogical reasoning that enables us to 'anticipate' future events.
Hegel's term for this is 'Ahnen',which has extremelyweak cognitive connotations (Enz. ?190 and Zusatz). On Hegel's view,
empirical knowledge requires both predication and singular
demonstrativereferenceto the object of knowledge.Ex hypothesi
this latter condition is not fullfilled in the case of future events
or observations.Hence induction cannot be a case of knowledge.
Thinking otherwise is the problem. The thought that, due to the
universal claims at issue in inductive arguments, our predictive
fallibility precludes present knowledge of the alleged universal
characteristics of things; or the thought that on a fallibilist
account of justification the truth condition of knowledge may
not be satisfied-these are both infalliblistthoughts. Any sober
fallibilistaccount of justificationrequiresthat the truth condition
of knowledgeis satisfied,even if sufficient(fallibilist)justification
does not entail that this condition is satisfied.
III
CartesianScepticism.Descarteswas no sceptic.The problem,and
the common name for this kind of scepticism, stem from the
fact that the only philosopherever convinced by Descartes' antisceptical arguments was their author.47Thereafter 'Cartesian
Scepticism'means more or less the combination of dream scepticism and the problem of the evil deceiver, developed in the first
two Meditations. The refutation, or at least the dissolution, of
Cartesianscepticismhas been a centralpreoccupationof epistemology, especially in the Twentieth Century. Unfortunately,most
attempted refutationshave tried to develop a direct response to
Cartesian scepticism, accepting the sceptical argumentsas legitimate and trying to answer them, rather than criticallyto assess
47. Elsewhere (Westphal, 1987-88) I have argued that Descartes' argument suffers
not one, but five distinct vicious circularities.
167
and reject the presuppositions of Cartesian scepticism. In this

context, Kant's anti-Cartesian re-orientation is extremely
revealing,as Hegel recognized.
Already in Hegel's early essays, 'The Differencebetween Fichte's and Schelling'sSystemsof Philosophy' (1801) and 'Faith and
Knowledge' (1802b), Hegel followed out the insights of Kant's
'Refutation of EmpiricalIdealism'in a way furtherdeveloped in
the Phenomenology,especially in 'Self-Consciousness'and also
in 'Observing Reason'. Hegel realized that Kant's 'Refutation'
receivespowerful support from Kant's doctrine of the 'transcendental affinity of the manifold of intuition'.48Please bear with
this jargon long enough for me to explain the key point.
Kant maintainedthat the matter of our sensations is given us
ab extra. Kant furthershowed that we are not able even to think,
and hence are unable to identify ourselves (and so to be selfconscious), just because we have complete and intact cognitive
capacities(i.e. understandingand sensibility).To be able to think
we must be able to produce and to use concepts. We acquireour
pure a priori concepts, the Categories,'originally',insofar as they
are generatedby our 'transcendentalimagination',upon stimulation by our manifold of sensory intuitions, and on the basis of
the twelve basic forms of logical judgment.49(Kant calls this the
'epigenesisof pure reason'.50)On Kant's view, empiricalconcepts
are generated in accord with concept-empiricism,though under
guidance of the Categories, on the basis of repeated patterns of
sensory experience.The main point in Kant's analysis is that we
can make no cognitive judgments at all, and hence can have no
knowledge whatsoever (whether empirical knowledge or selfawareness) without using schematized categories (categories
further specified so as to hold of spatio-temporal objects and
events)-in particular,a schematizedconcept of substance that
serves as the concept of a perceptiblething-nor without using
empirical concepts. However, we can only have Categories,
schematized categories and empirical concepts insofar as we
48. On Hegel's early articles, see Westphal (1996, 2000b); on his PhdG, see Westphal
(1989, 2002).
49. See Wolff (1995, 1998, 2000) for a brilliant explication and defence of Kant's
claim that there are twelve basic forms of human logical judgment.
50. KdrV B167, GS 17:492, 18:8, 12, cf. 7:222-3; Longuenesse (1998), 221 note 17,
243, 252-3.
168
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
that is, our power of judgment-can and do detect both regularities and differenceswithin the contentof our manifold of sensory intuition. Such regularitiesand differences constitutewhat
Kant calls 'the transcendentalaffinity of the manifold of [sensory] intuition'. Any world containing human beings but (somehow) lackinghumanlydetectableregularitiesand varietiesamong
the contents of our manifold sensations is a world in which we
may be flooded with sensations, but these would be to us 'even
less than a dream' (KdrV Al 12), Kant notes. The ratio cognoscendi, the ground of proof, that this affinity is a necessarytranscendentalcondition for possible self-consciousexperiencelies in
the argumentjust sketched, to the effect that we could not be
self-conscious,we could have no self-consciousexperienceat all,
unless such 'affinity' (regularityand variety) obtains among the
contents of our sensations. Conversely,the ratio cognoscendithat
such 'affinity' does obtain (if and when it does) is that we are
self-conscious.
However, Hegel noticed that the ratio essendi, the ground of
existence, for this affinity is quite distinct from its ratio cognoscendi. Because the manifold content of sensation is given us ab
extra, whatever ground or reason for there being 'affinity'
(humanlydetectibleregularityand variety)among the contents of
our sensationsmust also lie outside us; it must lie in those sensory
contents and their source (whateverthat may turn out to be).
Hegel argues (see below, Section 4.3) that the ground of the
regularityand variety among the contents of our sensations lies
in our experiencinga regular, natural spatio-temporalworld. If
that is correct, then Hegel's reconstructionof Kant's doctrine of
the 'transcendentalaffinityof the manifold of (sensory)intuition'
powerfully supports the conclusion to Kant's 'Refutation of
Empirical Idealism'. The conclusion of Hegel's combined and
reconstructedKantian proof is that we can be self-consciousonly
if we are conscious of a detectably regular, though changing
natural world. If this is true, then we are only able to pose, to
consider, even to formulate sceptical hypotheses regarding
empirical knowledge, whether Pyrrhonian, Cartesian or
Humean, if we in fact alreadyhave at least some genuineempirical knowledge, and so are able to reject those sceptical challenges. This is one of Hegel's main justificationsof his semantic
and mental content externalisms.
If sound, this argumentdirectly blocks the common sceptical
argument that first adduces admitted perceptual misjudgments,
169
and then generalizesperceptualmisjudgmentinto thoroughgoing

perceptual delusion by asking, in effect, 'If you erred in those
cases, how can you know now, how can you ever know, whether
you deceive yourself perceptually now, in this instance?'
Attempting to respond to this challenge piecemeal leads inevitably to foundationalism (whether strong or weak), which
attempts to secure one at a time various definite instances of
basic empirical knowledge. This strategy has never succeeded.
Because Kant and, following his lead, Hegel rejected foundationalism, they are never tempted into this hopeless pursuit.
Instead they purport to show, through the argument sketched
above, that we can only be self-conscious if we in fact have at
least some empirical knowledge. This blocks the sceptic's
attemptedgeneralizationfrom occasional to universalperceptual
error. Whichempirical circumstanceswe correctly perceive and
judge is a furtherissue. (How, after all, did honest epistemologists detect their occasional perceptualerrors, cited by sceptics, if
not by subsequentreliable perception?)Whichinstances of purported empirical knowledge are genuine is determinable only
through constructive self- and mutual criticism. If we had no
empirical knowledge whatsoever, sceptical statements would
merely beat the ear-drums of unself-conscious human bodies.
(Recall that Hegel's response to the Dilemma of the Criterion
consists in an account of how constructiveself-criticismis possible; this account extends naturallyto the possibility of constructive mutual criticism.5")
Part of Hegel'sjustificationfor his thesis that the naturalworld
is the source of the 'affinity'among the contents of our sensations
is provided by his internal critique of Kantian scepticism. This
further supports Hegel's semantic and mental content
externalisms.
IV
KantianScepticism.Kant is now generallyregardedas the great
anti-sceptic,though the Critiqueof Pure Reasonimmediatelywon
him a reputationas the most dangerousscepticever.52The sceptical side of the first Critique is suggested by Kant's famous
51. On which, see Westphal (2003a), ??11, 13.9, 20, 24, 27, 28, 30, 35.
52. Beiser (1987), 4-5, 173, cf. 270, 292-93.
170
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
remark, 'Hence I had to delimit knowledge,in order to make

room for faith ...' (KdrVBxxx). That Kant espoused some form
of scepticism is also indicated by his rejection of knowledge of
things in themselves.Recent interpretershave arguedthat Kant's
distinction between appearancesand things in themselvesis not
metaphysical,but ratherepistemological.S3In reply, others have
argued, rightly I believe, that Kant's distinction is indeed metaphysical,and not merelyepistemological.4 Kant's transcendental
idealism brings in tow scepticism regarding 'transcendental'
reality, namely, about anythingthat exists, and whatevercharacteristics it has, regardlessof our human cognitive capacities and
acts. Paradigmatic of Kant's 'changed method of thinking' is
'that we only know of things a priori what we ourselvescontribute to them' (KdrV Bxviii)i55
One such human contribution,accordingto Kant, is causality
itself. Kant contended that only transcendental idealism can
answer Hume's scepticismabout causality.
4.1. Hegel was not at all satisfiedwith Kant's metaphysical,ultimately scepticaldistinctionbetweenappearancesto us and things
in themselves. Considered strategically,Hegel's response in the
Phenomenologyto Kant's transcendentalidealism and its attendant scepticism lies in his attempt to validate human empirical
knowledge, without at all adopting transcendentalidealism. In
particular, if Hegel's justification of our causal judgments in
'Force and Understanding'and in 'ObservingReason' is sound,
then he answers Hume's scepticism about causality without
appealing to transcendentalidealism. If that is the case, then
Hegel showed that Kant erred in supposing that only transcendental idealismcan reply effectivelyto Hume's causal scepticism.
4.2. Consideredcritically, Hegel's 'changedmethod of thinking'
is rooted in his 1802 insight that Kant's transcendentaljustification of our causal judgments is unsound.56At best, Kant
53. E.g., Bird (1962, 18-35). Praus (1974), Allison (1983, 1987), Buchdahl (1992).
54. Rescher (1981), Guyer (1987), 333-69; Amneriks(1992), Westphal (1997d, 1998d,
2001), Adams (1997), Langton (1998).
55. Here and above I highlight some key points of the substance of Kant's philosophical re-orientation. I discuss his changed method in Westphal (2003b).
56. Hlereagain, this is a shift in the substance of the views Hegel espouses, but this
change is so basic that it required changes in method, rooted in his reconsideration
of philosophical justification sketched above, Section I.
171
proved transcendentallyonly the proposition, 'Everyevent has a

cause'. Unfortunately, this principle is insufficientfor justifying
our causal judgments about worldly objects and events. Those
causaljudgmentsrequirea more specificprinciple,namely 'Every
physical event has an externalcause.' This specificprincipledoes
not follow from Kant's transcendentallyjustified general causal
principle. Kant saw this gap in his proof in the Metaphysical
Foundationsof NaturalScience and noted it again in The Critique
of Judgment,where he confirms that the more specific principle
of externalcausality can only be proved 'metaphysically'and not
merely'transcendentally'.57
Kant attemptedto close this gap with
his metaphysicaljustification of this more specific causal principle in the MetaphysicalFoundations.
Ultimately, however, Kant recognized that even this further
argumentis invalid. The groundsfor this are complex and cannot
be discussedhere.58For present purposes it suffices to note first,
that Kant's metaphysical cum sceptical distinction between
human appearances and things in themselves didn't provide a
sound reply to Hume's causal scepticism after all. Second, by
1802 Hegel identifiedexactly this problem with Kant's analysis,
without any knowledge of Kant's private notes to the same
effect.59Hence Hegel, too, had overwhelminggrounds to alter
fundamentallyhis 'method of thinking'.
4.3. Hegel's Phenomenologyprovides not only a strategic (Section 4.1) and a critical (Section 4.2), but also a direct objection
to Kant's transcendentalidealism, and thus to Kant's sceptical
distinctionbetweenhuman appearancesand things in themselves.
Kant argued that the 'transcendentalaffinity of the manifold of
[sensory] intuition' is satisfied because it is a 'transcendentally
ideal' condition of integrated self-conscious experience. Such
conditions are satisfied due to the structureand functioning of
our human cognitive capacities. Hence, Kant argued, only transcendentalidealismcan explain the satisfactionof this condition.
However, Kant's arguments for this conclusion are unsound
because each of his four supportingargumentsconflates the ratio
57. Westphal (I 995a).
58. Westphal (1995b).
59. Westphal (1997b).
172
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
cognoscendi and the ratio essendi of the satisfaction of this

condition. Kant's analysis of the 'transcendentalaffinity of the
manifold of [sensory] intuition' (sketched above, Section III),
provides the ratio cognoscendifor knowing that this condition is
satisfied:We can be self-conscious only if this condition is satisfied; whenever we are self-conscious, this condition is satisfied.
However, that line of reasoning does not explain how or why
this condition is satisfied; it does not provide its ratio essendi.
Hegel knew this by 1801.60 Hegel exploited this insight in the
Phenomenologyin 'Self-Consciousness'to show, first, that genuine transcendentalproofs can be developed without transcendental idealism. In this, Hegel is in line with recent 'analytic
transcendentalarguments'.61More importantly,Hegel exploited
this insight to show, second, that a sound refutation of idealism,
closely following Kant's own 'Refutation of EmpiricalIdealism',
can be built on the 'transcendentalaffinity of the manifold of
[sensory]intuition', though Hegel's refurbishedrefutation holds
not only against what Kant called 'empiricalidealism', but also
against Kant's own transcendentalidealism. The ratio essendiof
the 'transcendentalaffinity of the manifold of [sensory]intuition'
ultimately grounds realism (sans phrase) regardingnatural, perceptible things in space and time.62
On Hegel's view, then, thejustificationof commonsenseknowledge of particulars,e.g., Hegel's knowledgeof the pen with which
he wrote, is complex. Hegel's transcendentalproof of realismand
his transcendentaljustification of our use of such pure a priori
concepts as 'physical object' justify the kind of empiricaljudgment representedby this example. Any particular case of this
kind is justified in part by one's experientialevidence for it, and
in part by a reliabilistaccount of our perceptualsystems. (Hegel
was deeply influenced by Aristotle regarding the proper functioning of our cognitive psychology and physiology, and he
recognisedthe role for this within Kant's account of sensation.63)
60.
61.
62.
63.
Hegel (1801, 1802b), Westphal (1996).

On which, see Stem (2000).
Westphal (1995b), (1997b).
DeVries (1988).
173
The Persistence of Infallibilism. The details of Hegel's transcendental proof of realism cannot be discussed further here.64
However, a word can be said about the bevy of objections likely
to have occurred to the reader, who may have considered such
things as reneweddream scepticism,brains in vats, perhaps 'narrow' construals of mental content or even a 'grand coincidence
on a cosmic scale', among other contemporary philosophical
commonplaces, none of which may be discussed in detail here.
However, there is a common nerve running through these
examples, taken as sceptical counter-examples,as disproofs of
alleged genuinecases of perceptualknowledge.We'reprofessionally trainedto spot many kinds of logical gaps and defects in our
positions and those of others. This is an important and instructive philosophicaltechnique.However, a dangerlurks in its unrestricted use in epistemology: it strongly encourages the implicit
assumptionthat genuinejustificationmust be deductivelysound,
even in the case of empiricaljustification.This assumptionmade
Descartes into the father of Cartesianism,this assumptiondrives
scepticism, and this assumption has been used to undermine
analyses of knowledge ever since. The pervasivenessand apparent persuasivenessof this assumption is indicated by the widespreadconviction among epistemologiststhat 'fallible(empirical)
justification'is an oxymoron and that 'fallibilism'is incoherent.65
It is indicated too by the wide-spreaduse of the lottery paradox
to argue against fallibilismand for 100%conclusivejustification.
It is also indicated by the deeply deductivistorientation of 'analytic transcendentalarguments', which, interesting as they are,
have systematicallyfailed to answer scepticism.66
It would not be too much to say that this infallibilistassumption has played a role in TwentiethCenturyepistemologydirectly
analogous to the role played in Pyrrhonian scepticism by the
64. In Westphal (1998b) I develop the argument independently of Hegel's texts, and
argue inter alia that it provides a much stronger basis than Wright's (1992) 'cognitive
command' and 'cosmological scope' for rescinding a minimalist and adopting a
strong correspondence analysis of truth.
65. See, e.g., Kim & Lehrer (1990). Their key argument against fallibilism is validon one (strongly internalist) interpretation, though this interpretation is one that no
fallibilist need or should accept.
66. See Grundmann (1994), Bell (2000), Westphal (2003b).
174
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
'ontological' concept of truth (above, Section 1.4). Insisting that

justification must be deductively sound directly restrictshuman
knowledge to logic and maths (dependingon one's view of sets).
The history of epistemology from Descartes to the present day
ought to convince us this deductivistassumptioncannot be correct. We need, in short, to 'change our method of thinking', as
Kant put it. Change it to what? To transcendental-pragmatic
accounts of justification, one sophisticatedversion of which has
been sketched in the present essay. Hegel is the grandfatherof
pragmatism, and he showed that pragmatism has far richer
resources than is commonly supposed, even by its advocates.67
Hegel showed, namely, that pragmatismnot only is consistent
with, but when thoroughly thought through, it requiresrealism
about the objects of empirical knowledge. Hegel showed, too,
that pragmatism is consistent with genuine transcendental
proofs, proofs that (among much else) can block empiricalscepticism-provided, of course, that we change our 'method of thinking' sufficientlyto understandand appreciatesuch arguments.
VI
Conclusion.The standardresponses to scepticismhave not been
striking successes. This unfortunate track record strongly indicates that we need to 'change our method of thinking'.Given the
animosity towards the views (mistakenly)associatedwith 'Hegel'
that characterizedthe formation and development of analytic
philosophy, I realize how paradoxical it seems to suggest that
Hegel in fact had already gone where we now need to go. I have
no doubt that many philosophers will reject this suggestion out
of hand-probably long before having reached this concluding
remark. Please do not mistake Hegel's views for those of his
would-be expositors, especially those of the last century when
these battle lines were drawn, who didn't care for epistemology
and most often didn't have the acuity to identify Hegel's views
beneath his apparent rhetoric. If Hegel's philosophy is read in
terms of dichotomies standard in the field (such as, e.g., Agrippa's Five Modes), the result is gibberish. This has been typical
67. Westphal (2003c). The one exception is the too little known pragmatist, Frederick
L. Will (1997).
175
among his readers,whether critical or sympathetic.What is lost

to such readers is the fact that, and the ways in which, Hegel
challengedwhat he identifiedas false dichotomies. Even if everything Hegel wrote were deeply mistaken, we should still have to
study his writings carefully,for they are the most powerful antidote to the worst of philosophicaldiseases:hardeningof the categories. To lay scepticismto rest requiresa 'changedmethod of
thinking'. Genuine such changes are difficult, and cannot be
effected by a few brightideas. Hegel alreadycontributedso much
to a genuinelychanged method of thinking that it behoves us to
consider his views, analyses and methods very carefullyindeed.68
School of Economicand Social Studies
Universityof East Anglia (Norwich)
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(A) Hegel's Manifold Response To Scepticism in The Phenomenology of Spirit

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Hegel's Manifold Response to Scepticism in "The Phenomenology of Spirit"

Author(s): Kenneth R. Westphal

VIII*FHEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE

has disregardedHegel's interests in epistemology, hence also

PyrrhonianScepticism.Pyrrhonianscepticism is not a doctrine,

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

that 'infinite reason' avoids scepticism through 'intellectual

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

Empiricus's Dilemma of the Criterion. Sextus formulated the

In his early essay on scepticismHegel merelynoted this dilemma

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

rather than a 'criterion.23 The apparent implication of these

23. PhdG Introduction, ?9; GW9:58.12-22.

Consider this table of the aspects Hegel distinguishes:

1. Our cognitive self-concept.

B. Our experienceof the object. 2. Our cognitive self-experience.

3. Our cognitive constitution

In this way, our experienceof the object (B) is structuredboth

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

cognitive self-concept (1) must render our experience of the

part a function of the objects in connection with which they are

common world-whatever each of these ultimatelyproves to be.

The assumptionthat the truth must be stable and unchanging

Kuehn (1987), Beiser (1987), 165-92, 266-84.

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

derived knowledge in essentially deductivist terms (otherwise it

as Locke and especiallyHume showed, the supposed concepts 'I'

concept that can be definedin accord with concept-empiricismis

identified,only by our using pure a priori concepts of 'I', 'other',

kind of cause.' And if we could hardly formulate that principle,

Hume's analysis is unsound. At most, Hume explicated the

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

and reject the presuppositions of Cartesian scepticism. In this

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

and then generalizesperceptualmisjudgmentinto thoroughgoing

remark, 'Hence I had to delimit knowledge,in order to make

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

proved transcendentallyonly the proposition, 'Everyevent has a

cognoscendi and the ratio essendi of the satisfaction of this

Hegel (1801, 1802b), Westphal (1996).

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

'ontological' concept of truth (above, Section 1.4). Insisting that

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

among his readers,whether critical or sympathetic.What is lost

Fogelin, Robert, 1994. PyrrhonianReflectionson Knowledgeand Justification.

HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM

Quine, W. V. O., 1975. The Roots of Reference.LaSalle, Ill., Open Court.

Westphal, Kenneth R., 1998b. 'Transcendental Reflections on Pragmatic

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